THE WILSON QUARTERLY
WINTER 1979
A NATIONAL REVIEW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION

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EUROCOMMUNISM: The Italian Case
Edited by Austin Ranney and Giovanni Sartori

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By Myron Weiner

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Edited by Howard R. Penniman

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We cannot, for the life of us, understand why so many liberals in this country are so hostile to private business, when in our opinion they should be working with business to achieve what should be their basic objectives.

Liberals have been among the prime movers in the enactment of much of this country's social legislation—Aid to Dependent Children, Social Security, housing for the poor and the elderly, school lunches, and other programs. All of these programs have to be financed by revenues derived mainly from taxes on individual and corporate income.

The greater these incomes—which is to say, the more prosperous American business is—the greater the tax revenues. When incomes drop, as in a recession, so do tax revenues. Social programs then have to be reduced accordingly or supported by deficit financing, which over any extended period means inflation. For the poor and for people living on fixed incomes, inflation is the cruelest tyranny of all.

It therefore would seem to us that in all logic liberals should be as pro-business as they are pro-social progress. And we believe many more of them would be if they were not so fashionable intellectually to be part of the "trendy left." Too many of them respond unthinkingly to social and academic pressures rather than engaging in clear, independent analysis.

Part of the problem appears to be snobbery, pure and simple. To many of what might be called the professional liberals, business—indeed, our whole industrial society—is impossibly vulgar. To some it is esthetically offensive. And because business can prosper only by serving the masses of people, some consider it unbearably plebeian.

Yet one of the continuing threads in the mainstream of liberal thought has long been dedication to the democratic process and to the right of the masses of people to make their voice heard—and heard effectively. If people stop buying a company's goods or services on any large scale—or just make a credible threat to stop—that company's management tends to listen, and listen attentively. But if you think government is anywhere near as responsive, just recall your last encounter with your City Hall, or your maddening correspondence with a government agency.

Government can become so pervasive that it becomes virtually impossible for the citizenry to turn it around and change its course; indeed, ours may already have become so. But it's doubtful that business could ever get so big or so unresponsive, because it is subject to reaction in the marketplace and to public opinion generally, and to legislation that can curb an entire industry overnight.

What should be a tip-off to any thinking liberal is that an anti-business posture, complete with the cliches that too often substitute for thinking, is mandatory in many liberal circles and is not to be subjected to rigorous intellectual examination. It is a knee-jerk reaction, arising largely from conditions that ceased to exist many years ago and to some that never existed at all.

Lionel Trilling wrote: "It has for some time seemed to me that a criticism which has at heart the interest of liberalism might find its most useful work not in confirming liberalism in its sense of self-righteousness but rather in putting under some degree of pressure the liberal ideas and assumptions of the times." (The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976.)

We find puzzling the extent to which liberals often seem impelled to weaken the economic structure on which not just social progress, but indeed our national livelihood depends. To them we suggest the following, oversimplified but nevertheless pointing up the heart of the matter:

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□ LATEST NEWSLETTER AND OTHER INFORMATION.
Editor's Comment

Last October, the Wilson Center’s Fellows, alumni, staff, and trustees celebrated the 10th anniversary of the congressional legislation that chartered the Center as a “living memorial” to the 28th President. Congress sought to create a place for both academics and nonacademics to do advanced research, a place, too, for scholars to engage in serious discussion with people from the “world of affairs”—Washington politicians, business executives, diplomats, labor leaders, journalists.

The Center got its first resident Fellows in October 1970, and since then more than 250 men and women, from 128 American universities, 40 foreign countries, and a wide variety of professions have come here, each for a year or so. As President Carter noted in his anniversary message to the Center, it has become “a nucleus of intellectual curiosity and collaboration on issues of critical importance to our national well-being.”

The development of the Wilson Center has coincided with the growing importance of Washington as a workplace for serious scholars. This unpublicized change extends well beyond the galaxy of “think tanks” tied to the immediate concerns of the various federal bureaucracies. It stems in part from the postwar diffusion of research efforts throughout America. Important scholarship is no longer confined to academics in a few big-name universities, yet the sheer magnitude of the “knowledge explosion” has made it difficult for even the richest university libraries to acquire all the specialized publications, books, and documents that researchers require. Hence, with the Library of Congress, the National Archives, and scores of other vast public and private collections, the capital now constitutes the nation’s biggest single storehouse of information.

As a result, it is estimated, some 20,000 scholars and specialists now visit Washington each year to mine the gold that is there. Many of the visitors join the Fellows in the Wilson Center’s weekly meetings and seminars, enriching life here and alerting the editors of the Quarterly to new ideas and information developing elsewhere in the nation. This issue of The Wilson Quarterly, like all the others, reflects in part our attempt to exploit that happy coincidence.

Peter Braestrup
The Revolt of
the Republicrats

The victory of the Jarvis-Gann state constitutional amendment limiting property taxes in California represents something more complex than a triumph of voter selfishness and/or old-line conservatism.

The so-called taxpayers' revolt is not new, write Lipset, Stanford sociologist and political scientist, and Raab, head of the Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco. Polls show that the number of Americans who want their taxes cut has been rising steadily since the early 1960s. In 1969, 54 percent of Americans told the Harris survey they had "reached the breaking point" with respect to the amount of taxes they paid; by 1978, the figure was up to 66 percent.

Inflation and the rapid escalation of property taxes, when combined with California's $5.7 billion tax-generated surplus, created a mood that was ripe for Proposition 13—which rolled back property taxes to 1 percent of market value as of 1975, prohibited local taxes from rising more than 2 percent a year, and put other restraints on tax increases.

Lipset and Raab argue that the Proposition 13 vote on June 6, 1978, was neither an expression of "mean-spiritedness" nor the harbinger of a conservative or racist backlash. Many voters with an apparent interest in defeating the measure nevertheless voted for it, including 44 percent of families of public employees, 47 percent of people who rent their homes, and 42 percent of blacks. While 82 percent of self-designated "conservatives" voted for the measure, so did 63 percent of self-described "moderates" and 45 percent of "liberals."

Surveys show that a growing number of Americans are labeling themselves "conservative" and that this self-designation is closely associated with a distaste for ever larger, cumbersome, inept, and wasteful government. At the same time, a majority of Americans (while
opposing "welfare") continue to believe that government should do more for the poor and the elderly. They are "ideological conservatives" and "operational liberals," Lipset and Raab contend. These "neoliberals" continue to swell the ranks of Democratic voters but reject both the demands of liberal Democratic leaders for a bigger, more interventionist government, and the laissez-faire, small-government philosophy proposed by conservative Republicans.

**The High Price of Fairness**

Political parties, long a central feature of America's form of government, are exercising a waning influence over both the selection of Presidents and their behavior once in office, thanks in part to recent party reforms instituted in the name of "direct democracy" and greater "fairness" to the electorate. Ceaser, a University of Virginia political scientist, argues that it is time to reconsider the wisdom of these reforms.

The founders of the republic opposed national parties and sought to establish a nonpartisan system of presidential selection. Later, while a U.S. Senator from New York, Martin Van Buren (1782–1862) encouraged vigorous two-party competition. He believed it could provide candidates with broad national followings, prevent intrigues associated with elections decided by the House of Representatives, help control presidential ambition, and give the electorate a voice in determining national policy. In 1913, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressives introduced the modern notion of a "plebiscitory" presidential selection process in which candidates built their own constituencies within the electorate and were chosen by national party primaries before the party conventions.

There is no evidence that the contemporary plebiscitory state primary selection process assures legitimacy, produces candidates of "greater competence or superior virtue," or restrains the harmful effects of campaigning, says Ceaser. If anything, it seems to encourage executive "imperialism" by removing the once-powerful restraint exercised by political parties.

The specter of "ungovernability" has come to haunt Western politicians and intellectuals in the 1970s.

Today's predicament in the United States, Britain, Italy, and other Western countries is ultimately the by-product of severe strains in advanced capitalist societies, says Burnham, an M.I.T. political scientist. These strains stem from the depression of the 1930s, the convulsions of World War II, and the growth of expensive, new, and complex welfare state systems financed by the affluence that came with rapid, post-1945 economic growth.

Disappointment with governmental performance has now produced a spontaneous revolt by ordinary people against unresponsive power. In the United States, citizens are rejecting the authority of the central government at the very time the country needs a "new American ideology" to reconcile competing interest groups and find rational, comprehensive solutions to major problems like energy.

The American political system has confounded its critics in the past by its capacity to adapt, says Burnham. It could do so again, perhaps through development of mass support for an aggressive foreign policy initiative in response to a serious threat to Israel or Western Europe.

There are three possible lines of evolution, he concludes: the creation of a new political formula to regain popular consensus; a subversion of the political system to concentrate power in the executive branch (e.g., President Nixon's projected "administrative presidency"); or a continuation of the present unhealthy fragmentation.

The Federal Aviation Administration has been charged by Congress with the responsibility to promote the safety of air travel "by prescribing and revising ... such minimum standards ... as may be required in the interest of safety." Safety standards are to be promulgated as soon as possible after the need for them has been established, say Hill and Borenstein, associate director and staff attorney, respectively, at the Institute for Public Interest Representation in Washington, D.C. Yet, in at least two key areas, the FAA has been slow to act.

Since 1970, when federal investigators began measuring the hydrogen cyanide level in blood from victims of fiery air crashes, nearly 275 deaths have been directly or indirectly blamed on deadly gases or
smoke released by burning interior cabin materials, such as decorative draperies and polyvinyl fluoride ceiling panels.

The danger related to the burning of interior cabin materials, say Hill and Borenstein, has been recognized as a safety hazard by airplane manufacturers and airlines at least since 1966; yet no rules setting safe toxic gas and smoke emission levels for these materials have been developed, much less adopted.

The failure of seats and the tiedown mechanism by which they are attached to the aircraft has also been cited in more than a half-dozen reports of commercial air crashes. When seats tear loose, passengers are trapped in their chairs, others are injured when hit by unattached seats, and exit ways are frequently blocked by seat wreckage. Yet with one minor exception, current seat strength requirements have not been changed since 1952, before the advent of jet aircraft brought marked increases in landing speeds and other impact factors.

New technology has produced aircraft better able to withstand impacts and enabled manufacturers to use safer interior designs and new materials. Yet the FAA has still not responded to petitions filed in October 1977 by organizations representing consumers, flight attendants, flight engineers, and airline pilots asking that the existing regulations be amended. As a consumer protection agency, Hill and Borenstein conclude, the FAA leaves something to be desired.

The Bottom Line:
Audit or Analysis

The role of the U.S. General Accounting Office has changed substantially since its creation as a watchdog agency for Congress in 1921. For 30 years, the GAO concentrated on straightforward voucher audits—checking the books of federal agencies and departments. Then, in the late 1940s, it shifted its emphasis to "comprehensive" auditing that covered managerial efficiency as well as the legality of expenditures. During the past decade, says Rourke, a political scientist at the University of Connecticut, the GAO has moved into more controversial territory—examining not just how a program works, but whether it achieves its intended purpose. This larger role has aroused alarm, both within the GAO and in Congress.

The GAO's evolution, says Rourke, has been pushed by its current director, Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats, as well as by members of Congress concerned with the spiraling costs of government. The first congressional directive to enter the program evaluation field came in 1967 when Sen. Winston Prouty (R-Vt.) ordered the GAO to find out whether the new Office of Economic Opportunity was achieving its assigned goals in the "war on poverty."

Traditionalists in the GAO worry that the organization will lose its...
credibility by becoming involved in speculative areas not subject to strict cost-benefit analysis and that emphasis on the "timeliness" of its studies will result in excessive haste and errors. Congressional critics, including House Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon (D-Tex.) fear that involvement in program evaluation will drag the GAO into political battles and impair its independence and judgement.

Since 1970, Congress has refused to grant the GAO new authority (e.g., subpoena power and access to the courts) and has created other institutions (Congressional Budget Office, Office of Technology Assessment) to provide independent information. Since many GAO proposals for legislative or administrative action are never followed up, Rourke concludes that "Congress would be wiser to act more vigorously on these recommendations than to assign the organization more tasks."

**Speed Kills, but Time is Money**

In response to the October 1973 Arab oil embargo and higher oil prices, Congress established a 55-mile-per-hour nationwide speed limit on January 2, 1974. The law resulted in a dramatic decrease in average highway driving speeds and brought many protests, especially from independent truckers, who felt the economic impact of spending more time on the highway.

Reduced highway speeds entail certain penalties, say Clotfelter and Hahn, economists at the University of Maryland. They estimate the cost of added driving time, and of compliance and enforcement, at somewhere between $2.89 and $3.96 billion annually (based on 1974 figures). The value of the benefits in terms of gasoline saved (between 3.39 and 3.50 billion gallons in 1974) and reduced traffic fatalities, injuries, and property damage amount to between $4.4 and $5.2 billion. (Fatalities fell from 50,087 in 1973 to 46,049 in 1974, a decrease of 16.4 percent.)

Thus, by their "rough" calculations, the authors contend, the benefits clearly outweigh the economic costs. However, setting a national speed limit of 55 m.p.h. is not necessarily the best way to achieve fuel conservation and highway safety, and alternative policies might also "eliminate the present inequity of penalizing, in terms of time costs, drivers of efficient compacts and gas guzzlers alike."

Several alternative—or complementary—proposals have been made by the Carter administration and rejected by Congress. These include raising the tax on gasoline and taxing automobiles on the basis of their rated fuel consumption. Mandatory seat belt laws (as in Australia, France, and Canada) or mandatory air bags in new cars could help reduce highway fatalities. Such moves, the authors conclude, would entail economic burdens, but these might be well below the present costs imposed by the new speed limit.
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

A New Formula for U.S. Security


Having shifted from a Cold War strategy of "containment" to a search for "detente" with the Soviets, America faces the future uncertain about its proper international role. Moreover, "double talk" in U.S. foreign policy, says Cline, director of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, has left our traditional allies disillusioned with Washington and perplexed about what the United States is prepared to fight for.

The security of the United States and the protection of its national interests depend on the reconstruction of an effective global alliance system beyond the scope of NATO, Cline contends. This is the only way to prevent a gradual erosion of the balance of power between the Communist nations on the Eurasian land mass and the geographically scattered, comparatively open societies that represent a natural trans-oceanic trading and security system.

The "Oceans Alliance" that Cline proposes would include a core group of 10 nations: United States, Canada, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Israel, Japan, Republic of China/Taiwan, and Australia. To secure overwhelming power for the pursuit of common international goals, he would add 13 other important nations: Mexico, Spain, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and New Zealand. Collectively, these 23

The author proposes a trans-oceanic trading and security alliance joining a core group of 10 nations (dark red) and 13 other important countries (lighter red).

countries contain nearly half the world's population, nearly 70 percent of the world's land surface, and most of the world's technology.

Within such an alliance, Cline argues, the United States should not try to maintain the status quo in world affairs but seek to "create an environment safe for the international exchange of economic goods and services, as well as political pluralism, orderly social change, and the nonviolent resolution of conflicts."

A Cheaper Deterrent

Since 1945, the United States has invested more than $2 trillion in its military establishment and, despite Soviet gains, stands today as the world's foremost military power. While pressures are mounting for the deployment of more costly weapons, Morrison, an M.I.T. physicist, and Walker, a research Fellow in Harvard's Program for Science and International Affairs, argue that the United States can guarantee its security with a defense budget 40 percent, or some $50 billion, below the current $126 billion.

Present U.S. military strength greatly exceeds the requirements for deterrence. Moreover, the current mix of bombers and land-based and submarine-based strategic missiles makes no sense, the authors contend. Our 1,054 land-based ICBMs are becoming obsolete because of their vulnerability to more accurate Soviet warheads. A similar fate awaits the bombers, which must fly many hours before reaching points from which they can launch their cruise missiles.

In conventional warfare, the advent of highly accurate, but relatively inexpensive, "precision-guided munitions" or "smart weapons" now promises a dramatic advantage to the defense and raises doubts about the usefulness of ever more complex and expensive ships, tanks, and planes.

Morrison and Walker would eliminate all long-range strategic bombers from the U.S. arsenal, reduce to 100 the number of land-based ICBMs, cut the number of missile-launching submarines from 41 to 31, reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 13 to 3, and the total number of Navy surface ships from 162 to 125.

With accelerated development of "smart weapons," the number of Army heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions could be reduced from 10 to 8½, the number of light divisions from 7½ to 3, and the number of Marine divisions from 3 to 1. Total military manpower could be cut a third, from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.

This force structure, the authors say, would adequately deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies; reduce the likelihood of disastrous U.S. interventions abroad; promote diplomatic progress in arms control and disarmament; make U.S. policy more understandable and less threatening to the outside world; and release new economic resources in the United States to counter inflation.
The U.S. Congress is now intimately involved in foreign policy and likely to remain so, whether it likes it or not, says Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State for congressional relations. "Presidents and Congresses of the future will find themselves thrust together in a tar-baby embrace on the central international issues of their times, each unable to abdicate its responsibilities to the other, each compelled to justify itself to an impatient public, and each constrained to seek the other's support."

This symbiotic relationship can be a good thing, says Bennet. Public debate is likely to produce more workable policy with greater popular support, and thus provide greater stability in American foreign affairs. But can an anarchic, overburdened Congress make a coherent contribution? Yes, says Bennet, if some obvious requirements are met. Congress needs reliable, objective information and must be involved by the executive branch in the decision-making process as early as possible. The Congress should get itself out of the management of foreign policy (e.g., imposing a patchwork of restrictions on various forms of foreign aid) and spend more time reaching a consensus on U.S. global objectives.

Congressional participation in foreign affairs puts real limitations on the kinds of things the United States tries to do in the world, says Bennet. It makes intervention by U.S. troops abroad less likely, inhibits extralegal and covert activities, and curbs bold White House initiatives. The country's adjustment to the realities of global interdependence, including the demands of the Third World, must be geared to public understanding and support—and for this, says Bennet, "We need Congress to refine, to legitimate and to help sell effective international policies."

The famous defeat of General Edward Braddock and his army by the French, Canadians, and Indians in 1755 is often cited as proof that the British redcoats rigidly adhered to European military tactics on the American frontier and therefore were no match for foes who were experts at concealment and surprise.

Nonsense, says Russell, a University of Michigan historian. The British officers who led the Anglo-American armies in the French and Indian War (1754-63) had considerable prior experience with guerrilla
warfare in Europe and Scotland and put this to good use in the American colonies.

When General Braddock led his 2,200-man army into the Ohio Valley in mid-1755 in an attempt to dislodge the French from Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh), he had little trouble with hostile Indians and Canadian woodsmen. His camps were heavily guarded and, while on the march, one-third of his force was deployed in flanking parties. Moreover, Braddock had recruited Indians as scouts, but to cut payroll costs, he let go all but eight of them. Led by Captain Daniel de Beaujeu, the French repeatedly tried to ambush Braddock's forces during June but found the advancing British troops too alert. Then, on July 9, 1755, the British vanguard, a compact column of regulars with a few scouts out in front, encountered a force of Frenchmen, Canadians, and Indians head on. The latter reacted faster, quickly deploying along both flanks of the British column and seizing a strategic height.

The British vanguard withdrew under fire and collided with Braddock's main force and its baggage train, causing panic and confusion. The French forces fired into the mass of redcoats from concealed positions and a British counterattack failed. After several hours, the British retreated in disorder across the Monongahela River.

In general, says Russell, Braddock employed tactics that were well conceived and well executed. Unfortunately, one fatal lapse gave the British Army its "reputation for ineptitude under frontier conditions."

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**Exploiting East-West Trade**

"Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy" by Samuel P. Huntington, "The Limits of Pressure" by Franklyn Holzman and Richard Portes, and "What Gap? Which Gap?" by John W. Kiser, in Foreign Policy (Fall 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Between 1965 and 1973, the Soviet Union imported from the West some $18 billion worth of machinery and equipment, of which 30 to 40 percent could be considered advanced technology.

Given the Soviet dependence on imported technology, says Huntington, professor of government at Harvard, the United States should develop an economic policy of "linkage" to secure political concessions. This policy would have four essential ingredients. First, management of East-West economic relations should be given to the White House's National Security Council to avoid the conflicts that arise from the present dispersal of such authority among government agencies (e.g., State, Commerce, Agriculture). Second, all sales of goods for which the Soviets have a critical need that can only be satisfied by the United States (e.g., sophisticated computers) should require an export license regardless of their military significance. Third, U.S. government credits to help finance U.S. exports to Russia should be granted with greater flexibility, subject to general congressional limits. Finally, U.S. economic policy should be better coordinated with our allies.
However, economists Holzman, of Tufts University, and Portes, of the University of London, contend that Soviet dependence on Western technology is grossly exaggerated and that consequently no "linkage" policy can be successful. Imported technology represents only a small fraction of total Soviet investment, they say, and its acquisition, at best, can only be delayed by U.S. tactics.

Kiser, a research consultant in Soviet affairs, attacks the basic premise of Huntington's linkage proposal—the presumed U.S. technological superiority over the Russians. (U.S. engineering firms, he says, have been buying Soviet pipe welding technology superior to anything in the West.) Russia's technological "unevenness," he says, needs to be better understood if the "technology gap" is to be more than a self-deceiving U.S. political slogan.

The Politics of Sport


Sports are becoming increasingly politicized in the international arena as athletic contests become another form of highly publicized diplomacy. "As much as purists bemoan the fact, it is ever more evident that sports and politics cannot be separated," says Strenk, a historian at the University of Southern California and a former U.S. Olympic swimmer.

Sports have become a tool of diplomatic recognition or nonrecognition. For example, the United States and the People's Republic of China used "ping-pong" diplomacy in 1971 to help break years of diplomatic silence. And, in the 1960s, East Germany invested great sums of money and became so good in so many sports that it became difficult to ignore them or avoid competing with them.

The image of sports as a means of furthering international understanding and peace has been promoted by the International Olympic Committee, but ideological and political tensions can still create conflict. In 1962, when India protested Indonesia's refusal to admit Israel and Taiwan to the Fourth Asian Games, Indonesia broke off trade relations with India, and rioters destroyed the Indian embassy in Djakarta.

Sports can be used to register "protests," as with the "black power" gestures of black American athletes at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, and threats by various countries to boycott international sporting events that included South African teams. International sports have also been used as a propaganda vehicle to advertise a particular political system (e.g., the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin) and to gain international prestige and publicity (e.g., Japan's lavish investment of $1.5 billion in facilities for the 1964 Olympics.)

The United States is now at a crossroads. Others invest ever greater funds in national sports programs. But the United States adheres to a "voluntary, privately subsidized, inefficient" system, which means that "many American no longer have a sporting chance in international competition" and U.S. prestige suffers as a result.

The new "post Keynesian" economics assumes that modern Western society is in a process of continuous, organic, and beneficent change. The most significant recent change has been the radical decline in the influence of supply and demand as a regulatory force over wages and prices—something that came about through the maturing of industrial society and through demands by people for greater security and control over their personal income.

The citizenry's effort to escape the harsh, arbitrary authority of the marketplace, writes Galbraith, a retired Harvard professor of economics, involves recourse to organizations (including large corporations and unions), state action (e.g., farm price supports, minimum wages, government regulation), and personal qualification (e.g., capitalizing on demand for highly educated, specialized human talent).

Classical economic theory holds that the market economy will tend toward a state of full employment and that savings will always be invested. British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), who strongly influenced New Deal economists, challenged this assumption, arguing in his *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1935) that vigorous government intervention was required to end economic stagnation and high unemployment.
The Keynesian revolution of 40 years ago, says Galbraith, "accepted the need to manage aggregate demand" through governmental monetary and fiscal policy. But this sort of broad, macroeconomic policy depends on the effectiveness of traditional market forces. In recent inflationary times, when the market loses its authority, government restraints on demand reduce output and employment but do not halt the upward movement of prices and incomes. The result is "the combination of inflation and unemployment which is the most characteristic and unpleasant feature of the modern industrial scene."

Adherents of neoclassical, or "conservative," economic theory have three choices, Galbraith concludes. They can deny that anything has happened to the market. They can accept that the market factor has diminished in importance but seek to revive it by urging such things as less government regulation, the abandonment of farm subsidies, or the lowering of the minimum wage. Or, they can accept the decline of the market and concentrate on how to make economic performance serve as many interests as possible. That, says Galbraith, is "what post Keynesian economics is about."

"Who, Me?: Jail As An Occupational Hazard" by S. Prakash Sethi, in The Wharton Magazine (Summer 1978), P.O. Box 581, Martinsville Center, Martinsville, N.J. 08836.

Corporate executives in the United States and Western Europe face a new hazard: going to jail for violations of law or negligence committed by employees far down the chain of command. The new areas of liability, says Sethi, director of the Center for Research in Business and Social Policy at the University of Texas, Dallas, often involve health, safety, and environmental violations about which the top-level executive has no personal knowledge.

Some examples: The president of a supermarket chain was convicted in 1973 of violating federal law and fined $250 after inspectors found evidence of rat infestation at a Baltimore warehouse; and the manager of an H. J. Heinz Co. plant in California received a six-month suspended sentence and probation after being cited by state food and drug authorities for unsanitary working conditions. The new presumption, says Sethi, is that a vigilant executive will make certain that subordinates stay within the law.

Rather than mandate severe prison sentences, Sethi recommends a broad spectrum of punishments for corporate misdeeds, ranging from fines and imprisonment for antitrust and securities fraud to a range of lesser penalties for inadvertent negligence. Lesser penalties might include requiring both the corporation and the responsible executive to make a public apology, barring a convicted executive from holding a management position in any publicly held company, and imposing special reporting requirements on corporations whose operations have been found in criminal violation of certain laws.
American organized labor is in trouble. The number of union dues-payers is declining (one in four workers now belongs to a union, compared with one in three at the end of World War II). Labor’s hopes of reversing this trend through a 1978 Labor Reform Act were shattered by successful corporation lobbying in the Senate.

Signs of union distress are everywhere, writes Raskin, former New York Times labor reporter. Management is becoming more aggressive. Employers are learning new ways to bust unions. They are going to the bargaining table with demands that unions give back some of the prerogatives surrendered to labor over the years. “The classic tug of war over money has taken second place in negotiations to a defensive battle by unions against a take-away of contract-guaranteed limits on management’s freedom to manage,” Raskin contends.

Automation, notably in newspaper publishing, has shifted bargaining power from labor to management. On top of this have come intensified import competition, chronic stagnation, a shift of industry and jobs from the unionized Northeast to open-shop plants in the Sun Belt, and the change from a production economy to one in which seven out of ten jobs are in service industries.

Having joined with management in recent years in various joint efforts aimed at solving everything from the energy crisis to New York City’s fiscal woes, Big Labor now finds itself politically weak and unable to mount an effective strategy of resistance against corporate attempts to weaken union power.

The July 1978 birth to Mrs. Lesley Brown in Oldham, England, of the first “test tube baby” was a major medical achievement. But the euphoria surrounding this well-publicized event may be premature, argue Hellegers and McCormick, of Georgetown University’s Kennedy Institute of Ethics, for it raises profound moral and ethical issues that affect such basic human concerns as parenthood, sexuality, and personal identity.

Some of the ethical considerations surrounding in vitro fertilization were raised earlier by theologians in discussing artificial insemination. In 1949, Pope Pius XII flatly rejected the “licitness” of artificial insemi-
nation by the husband (A.I.H.) on the grounds that it converted marriage and the home into a biological laboratory. Subsequently, however, many scholars and religious leaders have distinguished between the unitive and the procreative aspects of marriage (which Pius XII deemed inseparable), maintaining that A.I.H. can be seen as completion rather than replacement of sexual intercourse. The Bishop of Cork, for example, has no objection to the test tube method “if there is no other possible way for [childless couples] to have babies.”

More specific problems related to in vitro fertilization persist, however, according to Hellegers and McCormick. Among them are: the question of zygote loss (gynecologist Dr. Patrick Steptoe estimates that he failed to achieve embryo transfer with 200 fertilized ova before succeeding with Mrs. Brown; “Are these really mini-abortions?” the authors ask); the risk of fetal damage and deformity borne by the child; a growing cultural tolerance of even more radical developments such as “third party” donor insemination and the carriage of the fetus by a surrogate womb; and the diversion of medical effort from more important programs such as basic health care.

In vitro fertilization offers desperate, sterile couples a new hope, but the authors caution that “there just might be benefits we can never enjoy because we cannot get them without being unethical.”

Ending Disrespect for Learning

Widely publicized reports of declining test performance (notably on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT) by American students since the 1960s have convinced many people that U.S. schools are now turning out illiterates and have prompted new support for a “back-to-basics” movement.

But today’s students are not doing worse than their predecessors on tests of basic skills, writes Jencks, a Harvard sociologist. The National Assessment of Educational Progress, for example, has reported that 17-year-olds actually scored higher on tests of “basic literacy” in 1974 than in 1971.

Since the observed decline in test performance shows up only after students have completed the fourth or fifth grade, Jencks writes, it indicates a decline in the more complex skills and knowledge that tests like the SAT are designed to measure—i.e., ability to infer and analyze, breadth of reading, and knowledge of literature, history, politics, and science.

Rejecting most of the explanations popular among social scientists (e.g., broken homes, working mothers) and the public (which blames TV and parental permissiveness), Jencks attributes this slump to a “crisis of legitimacy” during the tumultuous 1960s. Bored with traditional academic subjects and losing respect for learning, teen-age stu-
6. The Figure below represents a network of one-way traffic lanes. If the traffic divides equally at intersections where there are alternative directions, and in one hour 512 cars enter the traffic pattern at point B, how many cars will leave via Y?

(A) 128 (B) 192 (C) 256 (D) 320 (E) 384

Above is a sample question from the Scholastic Aptitude Test. The correct answer is "(E) 384."

Students began to defy authority more openly than in the past. Educators, seeking to accommodate student whims and to keep schools running smoothly, suffered a "failure of nerve." They, too, began to doubt the legitimacy of traditional academic standards. Teachers and principals became less willing to punish truants and disrupters; some young liberal and radical teachers embraced a "spongy cultural relativism" that treated all ideas as equally defensible. To students, this soon meant that no ideas were worth bothering about.

Since basic skills are not the real problem says Jencks, the "minimum competency" movement will have little impact on the decline in SAT scores. "We must find ways of motivating students to go beyond the basics," he writes. Defending intellectual standards means taking a firm line with students; a school administrator's first priority is to "maintain a climate in which learning is accepted as both necessary and respectable."

"The Tuition Dilemma: A New Way to Pay the Bills" by John R. Silber, in The Atlantic Monthly (July 1978), Box 1857, Greenwich, Conn. 06835.
could draw an advance from a federal fund to pay his tuition, plus up to $1,000 for room and board or other expenses, for a total advance of $5,000 in any one academic year and $15,000 over three years.

Following graduation, the student would repay his advance (the full amount, plus a 50 percent surcharge) at the rate of 2 percent of his gross annual income per year. According to Silber's calculations, a person of average earning power could probably pay off his obligation ($22,500, if he borrowed the $15,000 maximum and owed a $7,500 surcharge) within 30-35 years.

Unlike current student loans, the TAF obligation could not be defaulted through bankruptcy. Whenever the recipient had any income over $5,000 a year (the minimum for which TAF repayment is required), 2 percent of that income would be liable for collection as a special tax owed to the U.S. Treasury.

In the unlikely event that all of the 4.7 million eligible students in higher education participated to the fullest extent possible, the maximum annual cost would be $9.2 billion, offset by a $1 billion reduction in the use of federally insured student loan funds. A more realistic estimate, based on the assumption that TAF would be three times as popular as conventional loan programs, is $4.5 billion, less the $1 billion in current use of federal funds. Silber estimates that the fund would be self-perpetuating within 20 years on the strength of annual repayments and the interest earned on those repayments put aside in a trust fund. TAF would aid the financing of all higher education, public and private, he argues, and help assure "that the benefits of education are, as much as possible, paid for by those who receive them."

**Bearing Down on Serious Crime**


Since 1973, more than 24 cities and counties in the United States have set up major offense bureaus (MOBs) aimed at protecting society from the career criminal. They are credited with clearing clogged court calendars, winning high conviction rates, reducing serious crime, and ending the "revolving-door" procedures that released newly-arrested criminals on bail to prey on the public while awaiting trial for major offenses.

The Bronx MOB system, launched five years ago with federal money, has been the model for others in Boston and Indianapolis and for a $63 million statewide program in California, writes Noble, a *New York Times Magazine* editor. Certain police, prosecutors, and judges concentrate exclusively on serious crimes—armed robbery, burglary, kidnapping—by violent chronic offenders where there is a strong likelihood of winning a quick conviction. (In the past, such cases would be handled by an overworked prosecutor with as many as 100 major and minor crimes pending simultaneously.)

Of the more than 6,500 MOB cases tried nationwide, 94.7 percent led
to convictions (compared to 73 percent of serious cases handled in the traditional manner), plea bargaining was substantially reduced, the average prison sentence was 15.4 years, and the average elapsed time between arrest and disposition was 106 days. Two years ago, the Bronx Supreme Court had 105 long-term detainees jailed and awaiting trial for more than a year. As of July 1, 1978, it had none.

Defense lawyers view the MOB concept with suspicion, Noble notes. Conviction figures are high, they say, because MOB units only take sure cases. They say the system relies on “hanging” judges, often involves excessive haste that precludes a fair trial, and is unfair to the first-time offender who becomes involved with hardened criminals.

Nevertheless, Noble concludes, the MOB concept can have significant crime-reducing effect, if only by letting potential felons know what to expect. Setting priorities and concentrating on cases of widest social benefit is common sense, he says; “what is surprising is that it took [police and prosecutors] so long to realize this.”

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**PRESS & TELEVISION**

_Gloomy Portents_  
"Without a Champion" by Lyle Denniston, in _The Quill_ (Sept. 1978), 35 E. Wacker Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60601.

The Supreme Court term which ended on July 3, 1978, was a near disaster for the nation's news media. In seven major rulings and most of the two-dozen brief orders rejecting appeals in press-related cases, the Court ruled against First Amendment claims and displayed deep skepticism about fundamental press rights, argues Denniston, Supreme Court reporter for the _Washington Star_.

While the press did not lose every test, it registered few gains. In _Zurcher v. Stanford Daily_, the Court refused to read the First Amendment as a special check on government authority and granted police permission to search newsrooms. In _Houchins v. KOED_ (testing the right of TV newsmen to get inside a California jail to report on conditions), the Court flatly rejected the claim that there is a public “right to know” about all government actions and policies. The Court also placed further restrictions on the media's "right to gather news" by denying broadcasters access to the Nixon tapes played at the 1975 Watergate cover-up trial (_Nixon v. Warner Communications_).

Other negative signals appeared in the Supreme Court's refusal to interfere with orders of judges barring media access to some court sessions, sealing records, and issuing "gag" orders to lawyers, witnesses, and others in criminal cases.

There was one victory for the news media: an endorsement of the press's right to publish, without fear of prosecution, the facts about
secret investigations of the fitness of judges (*Landmark v. Virginia*). But the Burger Court showed characteristic caution in refusing to go further and rule on the constitutional theory that the press can never be punished for publishing truthful information about government.

Overall, says Denniston, the Court displayed a testiness about the press's role in society but produced no consistent view of the limits of press freedom. No single Justice can now be relied upon in every case to offer a firm defense of First Amendment rights—boding ill for future constitutional claims of the press.

"**Self-Regulation or Else!**"

The relatively unrestrained power of the news media may be a greater challenge to American democracy than the power of Congress and the Presidency, contends Kampelman, a Washington attorney, prominent Democrat, and former professor of political science at the University of Minnesota.

As the major media organizations have grown more powerful, they have also become more business and profit-oriented and enormously lucrative. Meanwhile, the restraint of competition is disappearing as a result of acquisitions and mergers; 60 percent of the 1,775 U.S. daily newspapers are now owned by chains, compared to 30 percent in 1960.

The press, like other powerful institutions, says Kampelman, must be accountable to the public. But instead, the media enjoy virtual immunity from prosecution for libel or invasion of privacy. Press and television compete for audiences by emphasizing the sensational while ignoring important policy issues; they indulge in bias and selective morality (e.g., by ignoring massacres in Cambodia while playing up minor misdeeds elsewhere); and they distort the political process by bestowing attention on some candidates while ignoring others.

"The cumulative effect of these shortcomings," says Kampelman, "is a diminishing confidence in journalism . . . that, in itself, is a danger to democracy." A Harris survey in March 1977 found that public confidence in TV news fell from 35 percent in 1975 to 28 percent in 1977, and confidence in newspapers fell from 26 percent in 1975 to 18 percent in 1977.

Self-regulation is preferable to governmental restraint. But at the moment, no procedures exist to assure that the media adhere to professional standards. Such leading newspapers as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* have refused to cooperate with a National Press Council established by the Twentieth Century Fund to help resolve disputes arising from alleged unfair press treatment. Journalists need a code of ethics to deal with the problem of personal bias. In addition, Kampelman writes, new laws should minimize the unfair advantages the press enjoys in libel litigation and restrain the growth of communications conglomerates.
Wonders to Behold

"Neovideo: One Step Away" by James Monaco, in American Film (Nov. 1978), P.O. Box 966, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

The history of nonprint media—film and broadcasting—has always been governed by two basic forces: technology and economics, mixed occasionally with some politics. It is well to keep this in mind, says Monaco, editor of Celebrity and Media Culture, as the electronic media revolution propels us toward "the bright age of neovideo."

Cable television promises to give us (by 1984) a "wired nation" with innumerable channels of communication, including two-way service. But it is still, at 19 percent, well short of the 30 percent saturation (the ratio of homes with cable TV to total television homes) regarded as the critical point at which cable would become a major competitor to network broadcasting. It may never get there, thanks to new technology, such as Texas Instruments' TI tuner, which can divide the electromagnetic spectrum so as to expand the number of television channels currently available.

Broadcasters expect technical breakthroughs, including new satellite relay systems inexpensive enough (at $100 per hour) to permit entrepreneurs to compete with the networks in distributing programs nationwide. On the horizon is "digital transmission," which could end all problems with interference and lead to flat wall screens with picture and sound quality far better than that provided by today's cathode ray television receivers.

With more numerous conventional noncable channels available, says Monaco, both cable and noncable broadcasters may move toward more specialized programming aimed at smaller target audiences that advertisers want to reach. Television programs on disc and tape may be sold in stores and through the mails. Reduced federal regulation of the entire communications industry seems very likely, Monaco warns, and we should brace ourselves for "chaotic" new developments in technology and marketing—and a fresh set of problems.

Saving a Church

"Trendier Than Thou" by Paul Seabury in Harper's (Oct. 1978), 1255 Portland Place, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

During the fall of 1977, the American Episcopal Church suffered schism when a small, conservative faction broke away to form a new Anglican Church in North America. Although the number of parishioners attracted to the new sect has not been large (an estimated 15,000), the split has been a traumatic experience for Episcopalians.
PERIODICALS

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Most journalists blamed the split on the decision of the Church's 1976 General Convention to allow the ordination of women to the priesthood. Seabury, a Berkeley political scientist and a descendant of America's first Episcopalian bishop, thinks the factional schism represents a more fundamental rift between Episcopal clergy and laity. Both bishops and ministers, he says, led the Church toward increasing secularization as they joined political and social causes in the 1960s, dispensing millions of dollars to radical movements (Black Power, migrant farm workers, Puerto Rican nationalists).

Seabury cites the actions of Bishop Paul Moore, who made available Manhattan's Cathedral of St. John the Divine for use as "a theatrical facility, for light shows, Shinto rites, Sufi workshops in dervish dancing . . . , ceremonies for striking farm workers and for Indians at Wounded Knee . . . and political protest rallies." Moreover, soon after the Church approved the ordination of women, Bishop Moore ordained an avowed lesbian.

This "new license," says Seabury, did not directly affect the majority of practicing Episcopalians, who were free to accept or reject what the "reformers" espoused. What provoked a storm was the 1976 General Convention's controversial adoption of a new Book of Common Prayer intended "to make the church, its language, and its practices conform to contemporary values." All 2 million Episcopal communicants were called upon to give the new prayer book equal status with the familiar 1789 liturgical manual, as revised in 1898 and 1928, the principal bond joining the High, Middle, and Low orders of the Church. (One straw poll found the new prayer book acceptable to only 11 percent of the laity.)

To avoid further "deterioration," Seabury concludes that the clergy of the Episcopal Church need to regain a sense of their essential calling, which is not social or political but "salvific" or soul-saving.

Fairness in a Finite World


Social theorists since John Locke (1632-1704) have argued that unrestrained production and technological development would ultimately insure a minimum standard of living for all. But in A Theory of Justice (1971), philosopher John Rawls introduced a new concept—"the equilibrium state"—that places a ceiling on social consumption to diminish the risk of serious injury to present and future generations. (Rawls calls this "intergenerational justice.") The shift to an equilibrium or no-growth perspective, says Hubbard, who teaches at the University of South Carolina law school, would require Western societies to accept new, less libertarian democratic principles based on civic responsibility rather than on individual rights.

Rawls' approach identifies a class of goods called "luxuries," defined as that which exceeds the basic resources of living, a culturally determined "appropriate" standard of living, or those "primary goods" that

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are "things that every rational man is presumed to want." However these luxuries are defined, Rawls would allow their consumption only if there is no significant risk that succeeding generations would thereby be denied a minimum standard of living.

The Rawlsian theory of justice is "pure" or "ideal," says Hubbard. What would be more useful would be an "applied theory of justice" that uses empirical data to determine, for example, if luxuries should simply be heavily taxed or their production completely prohibited in order to maintain a "just minimum" for society's least advantaged.

There are substantial costs involved in adopting an equilibrium strategy, Hubbard writes. Authoritarian controls, including surveillance and bureaucratic intrusions, might be required to insure that proper consumption levels are not exceeded.

The implications of an equilibrium state may be offensive to many, says Hubbard, but "there is no logically necessary connection between a reduction in economic growth and a loss in political liberty." Moreover, the equilibrium perspective deserves serious consideration if only because the limits-to-growth proponents may be right in saying that the earth cannot sustain exponential growth.

**The Issues in Abortion**


Is abortion a religious issue? No, says Brody, a philosopher at Rice University. Opposition to abortion need not be, and frequently is not, based upon any religious beliefs—any more than opposition to torture in Brazil becomes a religious position just because that opposition is led by Catholic bishops.

Moreover, even if opposition to abortion were a religious position, the question of the use of federal funds to pay for abortions need not be a religious question. "The issue is that of the use of coercively collected funds [tax revenues] to pay for abortions when many from whom the funds are collected believe that they are being forced to support what they believe is murder," writes Brody.

But Jaffe, president of the Alan Guttmacher Institute, argues that abortion is an issue between religious groups based on differences in theological beliefs concerning the morality of abortion, the circumstances (if any) in which it is permissible, and who has the right and obligation to make the moral decision. Orthodox Jews, Mormons, and some fundamentalist Protestant groups, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, oppose abortion. Other Protestant and Jewish groups teach that in some circumstances abortion may be a more moral course of action than bearing an unwanted child.

The belief that a fetus becomes a person at conception with a right to protection equal to or greater than that of the woman in whose body it
PERIODICALS

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

The Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights is comprised of religious groups—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and others—that support the right to choose legal abortion. The logo of the coalition combines a Christian cross with many branches and a menorah, symbol of the Old Testament, representing both the Jewish faith and the roots of Christianity.

is located meets every test of a religious belief, says Jaffe. It is a religious doctrine, based on religious values, expounded by religious leaders, and taught by religious institutions.

In the current debate over the federal funding of abortions, says Brody, the issue of separation of church and state is being raised by pro-abortion groups as an excuse to disregard the legitimate rights of believers. Jaffe disagrees. Laws embodying religious beliefs (e.g., restrictions on federal funding of abortions) should be enacted only when the beliefs are very broadly shared, he says. When there are irreconcilable differences on issues of morality, it is impermissible, in a pluralistic society, for legislatures to enact laws which embody one set of beliefs and impose them on those who believe otherwise.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

The Fateful Protein Markers

"A New Power to Predict—and Prevent—Disease" by Gene Bylinsky, in Fortune (Sept. 25, 1978), 541 North Fairbanks Court, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

Conventional medicine is strongly oriented toward the cure rather than the prevention of disease. This could change dramatically, says Bylinsky, a Fortune staff writer, with the recent discovery by immunologists at Palo Alto, Los Angeles, and London that people carry telltale markers of susceptibility to specific illnesses.
These signposts are human leukocyte antigens (HLA)—protein molecules that float in the cell membrane and trigger a rejection response to foreign substances, such as organ transplants. The antigens also signal the presence of genes that make a person susceptible to certain diseases. Scientists have found eight kinds of antigens that are associated—singly or in combination—with more than 40 afflictions ranging from rheumatoid arthritis to juvenile diabetes.

The HLA known as "B27," for example, is known to occur in 95 percent of all patients with ankylosing spondylitis, a variety of arthritis also called "poker spine" and frequently misdiagnosed as common low-back pain.

The prediction of susceptibility on the basis of HLA markers can be made for several different types of cancer, multiple sclerosis, chronic active hepatitis, ulcerative colitis, pernicious anemia, and a number of other conditions. Scientists at Rockefeller University, for example, have found that three different markers occur in 75 percent of people with rheumatoid arthritis. The children of some of these patients are now being screened for signs of these markers so that those with proven susceptibility can be monitored and treated promptly before overt symptoms of the disease appear.

While knowledge of susceptibility permits people to follow early preventive measures (e.g., appropriate diet), some scientists are concerned that employers and insurance companies may discriminate against persons tagged as susceptible to HLA-linked diseases. However, Bylinsky concludes that more sophisticated methods of prediction will eventually give rise to prevention and to methods of diagnosis and treatment "more specific, more individualized, less expensive, and considerably more efficient" than those we have now.

Super Machines of the Future


U.S. research and development in mechanical technology is in serious decline. As a result, the U.S. trade surplus in manufactured goods dropped from $20 billion in 1975 to $5 billion in 1977, contributing to the nation's overall trade deficit of $30 billion.

America's neglect of machine science, writes Tesar, professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Florida in Gainesville, actually dates from the turn of the century when U.S. companies began importing design experts from Europe and American universities virtually abandoned the field. Today, in Georgia, a new tobacco-processing plant, the country's third largest, uses European machines and is maintained by European technicians. And National Science Foundation funding for basic research is currently 30 times higher per faculty member for physics than for mechanical engineering and mechanics. American industry suffers the consequences; delays of five
to seven years between design and production are commonplace.

With oil imports ($42 billion a year) worsening the U.S. balance of payments deficit, Tesar recommends a vigorous government-university-industry research and development effort focusing on "robotics"—the creation of mechanical devices which combine microelectronics with sophisticated mechanical engineering. Such devices will soon be in great demand worldwide for the remote inspection and maintenance of nuclear reactors, offshore oil drilling equipment, space surveillance vehicles, microsurgery, artificial limbs, and industrial automation.

The United States must quickly shore up its vanishing technological superiority or risk losing valuable markets to Japan, West Germany, and Russia. The United States, says Tesar, "has rested on its industrial laurels too long."


The study of human evolution has undergone radical change in the last 30 years, thanks to new fossil finds, improved understanding of radioactive isotope dating, and revelations in plate tectonics (e.g., that the great land masses of Africa and South America were once quite close). And the application of new specialties, such as molecular anthropology and field observation of primate behavior, offer fresh clues to the relationship between man and other living primates and the dating of their evolutionary divergence.

Evidence gained by specialists in molecular taxonomy (measuring the relationships of species by biochemical techniques) suggests that man is
more closely related to the African apes than to other primates, says Washburn, professor of physical anthropology at Berkeley. On the basis of comparisons between their protein chains, some scientists estimate that man and the chimpanzee share more than 99 percent of their genetic material.

Meanwhile, new field studies of chimpanzees and their use of sticks and other simple tools indicate that Peking Man, the first true man (*Homo erectus*), who appeared about 1.5 million years ago, and even the 4-million-year-old hominid *Australopithecus* could well have used simple tools in spite of their small brains.

This further confirms the fossil record which shows, according to Washburn, that the early ancestors of man walked upright at least 3 million years ago and were making tools and hunting animals about 2.5 million years ago, long before they developed large brains.

Molecular biology will ultimately determine more precisely "the relationships between man and the other living primates and the times of their mutual divergence," says Washburn. But troubling questions about the differing rates of evolution still remain. At the moment, scientists tentatively conclude that man and the African apes separated in an evolutionary sense sometime between 5 and 10 million years ago. Until about 40,000 years ago, the process of human evolution remained exceedingly slow. Suddenly it accelerated. Modern man survived while primitive forms of man disappeared. The fossil record is still too sparse to reveal whether these creatures were victims of evolution, hybridization, or physical extermination.

The Consumer as Producer

The introduction of wind-generated electricity—permitting the electricity consumer to be an electricity producer as well—constitutes an interesting challenge to the electric utility industry and poses new questions for utility regulators.

The nature of this challenge, says Lodge, a Toledo, Ohio, urban planner, can be seen in an obscure tariff case before the New York Public Service Commission (the so-called *Windmill Case* of 1977) in which Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Ed), one of the nation's largest utilities, challenged the owners of a small, wind-powered electrical generator. The roof-mounted device was capable of producing 2 kilowatts of usable current for the occupants of a cooperatively-owned apartment house in New York City—enough so that surplus power occasionally flowed backward through Con Ed's meter causing a decrease in the overall measure of electricity usage.

The ability of private wind-powered generators to "backfeed" electricity into a power company system raises complex issues, writes Lodge. For example: What is a fair price to set for wind-produced
power? What would be the effect of several thousand windmills on the capital outlays of a utility company—an expense which helps determine the company’s rate base and hence its rate of return on investment? Should a federation of windmill owners be allowed to bargain collectively with a local utility on rate matters, outside the jurisdiction of government regulators? Can the utility be compelled to transmit power that the windmill owners wish to sell to third parties?

“Wind power is one of the most readily adaptable alternative technologies,” Lodge argues. Before it can prosper, however, state and federal regulatory systems may have to be changed to reflect a new and different view of energy production and its control.

Fooling With Mother Nature

The use of herbicides to increase crop yields by controlling weed growth has had a major impact on modern agriculture. Now, another family of agrochemicals—the so-called plant growth regulators—promises even more startling results.

Plant growth regulators, writes Nickell, vice president of research and development for Velsicol Chemical Co., are organic compounds (either natural or synthetic) which alter the life processes or structure of a plant so as to increase yields, improve quality, or ease harvesting. The first significant commercial use of a plant growth regulator came during the 1940s when naphthalene acetic acid was applied, as it still is, to prevent the preharvest drop of apples.

Today, plant regulators are used to promote rooting, speed up or delay flowering, induce or prevent leaf and/or fruit drop, control plant size, prevent postharvest spoilage, change the timing of crop maturity, and increase resistance to pests, air pollution, and extreme temperatures. A shortage of fruit pickers, for example, has led U.S. chemical companies and the Florida State Citrus Commission to develop compounds that loosen citrus fruit to speed harvesting.

How these plant-regulating chemicals work is still not thoroughly understood, but some are known to alter cell development and to synthesize enzymes. Results are sometimes spectacular. As little as 2 ounces per acre of the hormone gibberellin (which makes stalks grow longer) increases the yield of sugar cane by more than 5 tons per acre and the output of sugar by 0.2 to 0.5 tons per acre. About half the wheat grown in West Germany is treated with Cycoel, a product made by American Cyanamid that reduces stem length and gives the plants greater resistance to heavy winds and rain. A few grams per acre of another compound known as dinoseb boosts corn yields 5 to 10 percent.

The real value of growth regulators, says Nickell, may not be their ability to help increase gross crop volume so much as their ability to control the internal metabolism of a plant to produce more sugar, protein, or oil, and to prevent losses caused by failure to reach maturity.
When the consumption of a resource, such as oil or coal, is growing at a fixed rate per year, the growth is said to be exponential and consumption doubles at predictable intervals. We are ignoring the arithmetic of exponential growth at our peril, says Bartlett, physicist at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

When the rate of consumption of a resource grows at a mere 7 percent per year, the consumption of that resource in one decade equals the total of its previous consumption through history, and consumption continues to double every 10 years. The current energy crisis, says Bartlett, is due to exponential growth in consumption of a finite resource.

If geologists could discover as much oil remaining in the earth as we have used in the past, that new oil would be sufficient for only 10 years given the present annual increases in consumption (roughly 7 percent). Officials who confidently predict that U.S. coal supplies will last for centuries, regardless of increasing production, are ignoring the arithmetic of exponential growth.

Conservation alone cannot solve the problem of finite resources. For example, a 10 percent reduction in consumption of fossil fuels achieved through massive development of solar heating would be wiped out by two years of 5 percent growth in consumption of fossil fuels. "The most effective way to conserve," argues Bartlett, "is to stop the growth in consumption."

This can be done by educating people to abandon the dogma that "growth is good," by recycling everything possible, and by investing great sums in research to develop alternative energy sources (solar, tidal, etc.), while also solving the problems of nuclear fission and fusion.

Stirred up by 60-mile-per-hour winds, the dust storms of the 1930s did serious damage to almost 7 million acres of land in Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas. Even in areas where the storm damage was less severe, the consequences of the "Dust Bowl" winds were shattering because of prolonged drought and the economic depression.

The causes and prevention of wind erosion were well understood at the time, writes Lockeretz, research associate at Washington University’s Center for the Biology of Natural Systems.

But for 100 years, agriculture in the Great Plains had followed a
Despite improved conservation techniques, more acreage in the Great Plains was damaged by wind erosion in the 1950s than during the 1930s.

"boom-or-bust" pattern. The transition on the Plains from cattle grazing to cultivated crops, especially wheat, was accomplished by successive waves of farmers who arrived during periods of plentiful rainfall and later faced episodes of severe drought, dust storms, bankruptcies, and foreclosures. (Precipitation data for Dodge City, Kans., show five different periods between 1875 and 1936 when, for at least three successive years, annual rainfall totaled less than the 20-inch average needed to cultivate crops.)

When drought returned to the Dust Bowl region during the 1950s, strip cropping, windbreaks, and other measures helped to soften the blow; even so, some 10 to 16 million acres were damaged by winds each year between 1954 and 1956. And again, in 1976–77, says Lockeretz, wind erosion damage "reached levels comparable to the 1930s." Why? The boom-or-bust pattern continued. Sharply higher wheat prices, fostered this time by world food shortages, brought a rapid expansion of crop production on acreage that should have been left uncultivated as grassland.

The manmade cycle of overcultivation followed by attempts at conservation shows no sign of ending. With future droughts inevitable, says Lockeretz, this means more damaging dust storms are likely too.

Cleaning Up the Volga


In 1973, the Soviet Union launched its first large-scale environmental program, aimed especially at improving water quality in the Moscow area and the Ukraine, where 80 percent of Soviet industrial and agricultural production is concentrated and where demand for clean water for irrigation is growing.
Concerned by declining catches of freshwater fish and outbreaks of cholera in southern river basins, Kremlin leaders added an environmental division to the State Planning Committee, consolidated enforcement powers in the Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management (Minvodkhoz), and boosted funding (the equivalent of $11 billion for 1976–80).

Deterioration of the Volga River has been halted and Moscow's water quality slightly improved, writes Gustafson, a Harvard government professor, but the clean water effort still lacks clout; "the water quality program has simply not been given the weapons to fight with the large ministries in charge of industrial and agricultural development." Although Minvodkhoz, in principle, can levy fines, cancel the bonuses of plant managers, and shut down polluting enterprises, the ministry, in practice, cannot interfere with high-priority industries or local employment.

In 1975, only 23 of 38 Soviet ministries and agencies fulfilled their goals for physical and chemical treatment of wastewater. Bureaucratic resistance aside, the blame falls largely on the Soviet leaders, writes Gustafson. The new water control program did not stem from conservationist sentiment or public pressures, as in the West. The Kremlin sought only to promote economic growth by securing clean water for farm and industrial use. Given that objective, however, Soviet leaders will still have to give increasing political support and resources to the water quality program.

**Outsmarting the 'Climatic Factor'**


The tropics' heat, humidity, and rainfall patterns have long been known to curb economic activity. Studies have shown that man's capacity for work declines and his susceptibility to disease increases when the mean annual temperature rises above 70°F. "The climatic factor," says Bandyopadhyaya, professor of international relations at Jadavpur University, Calcutta, accounts for much of "the wide divergence in labor productivity between the North and South."

Tropical climates, moreover, affect soil conditions (e.g., by hastening organic decomposition and leaching out soil nutrients), as well as water supply, plant reproduction, and the raising of livestock. High temperature and humidity cause rapid deterioration of factories and equipment, while heavy monsoon rains disrupt transport and communications.

Bandyopadhyaya argues that no amount of Western industrial technology, even if available and affordable, can offset the harmful local effects of tropical weather patterns in the Third World. What is needed is an international effort, under United Nations auspices, to alter climatic conditions, either regionally or globally, through the ap-
application of modern science. One extreme proposal worth further study, he contends, is the suggestion of Soviet scientist P. Borisov (Can Man Change the Climate?, 1973) to enlarge the earth's temperate climate zone, where all successful industrialization in modern times has taken place. This would be done by pumping surface waters from the Arctic Basin through the Bering Strait to the Pacific, thereby pulling the warm waters of the Atlantic through the Arctic and making worldwide ocean temperatures more uniform.

Hot Satellites in Space


Until recently, public attention has been focused on the peaceful and scientific uses of outer space—cosmic ray research, weather reconnaissance, and exploration of the universe. The January 19, 1978, accident in which a Soviet military satellite containing a small nuclear power reactor re-entered the earth's atmosphere and spread radioactive debris over remote parts of Canada reveals the reluctance of governments to discuss candidly the dangerous side of space satellite programs.

Some 900 U.S. and Soviet space satellites are now orbiting the earth, says Leitenberg, a scholar at Cornell's Center for International Studies. Perhaps 90 percent of them serve military purposes, including reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications. The mission of the Soviet Cosmos 954, which ended over Canada's Northwest Territory, was to track the movements of U.S. Navy vessels, particularly aircraft carriers.

U.S. officials knew that Cosmos 954 was having problems remaining in orbit from four to seven weeks before it fell to earth. They queried the Russians in mid-January about the amount and nature of the radioactive material aboard and also notified NATO allies, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. After Cosmos 954 fell, U.S. authorities released few details and, Leitenberg contends, never pointed out that at least five other space objects carrying some kind of radioactive materials have re-entered the earth's atmosphere since 1964. Three were U.S. satellites without reactors but using plutonium-238 as a power source; two were Soviet space vehicles carrying unspecified radioactive materials.

While the United States has only one satellite now in orbit containing a nuclear reactor, there are orbiting the earth between 24 and 32 U.S. and Soviet satellites that contain some sort of radioactive substance.

None of the proposals currently before the United Nations to ban nuclear reactors in space or provide "fail-safe" methods for keeping radioactive materials from re-entering the earth's atmosphere will effectively limit the number of satellites carrying some form of nuclear material. With satellite programs growing and antisatellite systems likely soon to follow, Leitenberg warns that we can expect more frequent and more serious Cosmos 954-type incidents.
Americans are being inundated with culture. The mass marketing of art through highly-publicized special exhibits (e.g., the *Mona Lisa* in 1963, Michelangelo’s *Pieta* in 1964, the “Treasures of Tutenkhamun” in 1978) has drawn such enormous crowds that the viewing public seldom has more than a brief glimpse of what is being shown. (More than 1 million people pay to see the “Tut” exhibit at Manhattan’s Metropolitan Museum of Art while the museum’s own superb Egyptian galleries are virtually ignored.)

“The current trend toward wholesale dissemination of culture does not permit understanding on a profound level,” says art critic Muller. Concentration on the sheer number of visitors, she writes, is likely to worsen the already excessive emphasis by museums on what is safe and conventional.

Museum directors are being forced by tight budgets to draw the public any way they can, and the public can hardly be blamed for responding to the excitement of heavily-promoted cultural exhibits. The role of the responsible critic in this situation, Muller says, is to provide historical perspective (and thereby “neutralize the hysteria”), to encourage high aesthetic standards, and to remind the layman that spending an entire hour with one Cezanne painting is a more valuable personal experience than spending a half-hour with 100 Cezanne paintings.

With the release of *The Jazz Singer* by Warner Bros. in October, 1927, Hollywood launched the era of talking pictures, and the nation’s ailing film industry began to revive. Now, America once again seems “sound-obsessed,” writes Schreger, a reporter for *Variety* in Hollywood.

Younger audiences (the 18–30 year olds who also buy record albums and expensive stereo equipment), are demanding films that offer audio as well as visual excellence. Innovative filmmakers (Robert Altman, Michael Cimino, Francis Coppola, Milos Forman, Stanley Kubrick, Alan J. Pakula, and Steven Spielberg) have responded by introducing “the second Sound Revolution.”

Robert Altman is the filmmaker who has probably experimented most with sound to gain heightened realism. As early as *Countdown* (1967), he employed overlapping dialogue, or, as he calls it, “live sound effects.” He used eight-track recording systems and wired each per-
former with a tiny radio microphone. The sound was broadcast live to a central recording unit.

Besides distinguishing individual sounds more clearly, the system allows for greater improvisation. Actors can interrupt each other—as people do in real life—and the director need not worry about the sight, or shadow, of cables and overhead microphones.

Altman's search for the perfect sound system led him to Ray Dolby, the Englishman who invented the Dolby noise-reduction system that takes the hiss out of stereo tapes, FM radios, and records, and allows for sharper high and low tones (like the ominous low rumbling of the mother ship in Steven Spielberg's Close Encounters of the Third Kind).

Walter Murch, who created the beautifully intricate "soundtrack" of George Lucas's film, The Conversation, believes that the technical potential of film sound has been reached—now it is up to the movie directors to exploit it. With a general upgrading of theater sound systems, Schreger concludes, "we may truly enter a period in film history that will someday be labeled the Second Coming of Sound."

A Fear of Sinking

In 1880, Samuel Clemens wrote that he would eagerly live his life over if he could be recognized as the "Celebrated Master Pilot of the Mississippi." In fact, says Burde, professor of English at the State University of New York (Plattsburgh), Clemens was both fascinated and terrified by the memory of his earlier life as a riverboat pilot. This conflict provides clues to his creative imagination as the writer, Mark Twain.

Clemens' sense of the personal freedom and power of a Mississippi pilot (a power which came from instinct and intuition) was matched by a fear that he lacked the moral and technical competence for the job, that he was too timid. Horace Bixby, the master pilot in Clemens' "Old Times on the Mississippi" articles published by the Atlantic Monthly in 1875, explains, "You only learn the shape of the river: and you learn it

To Mark Twain,
the riverboat pilot was king—
proud, fearless, talented, and independent.
with such absolute certainty that you can always steer by the shape that’s in your head, and never mind the one that’s before your eyes.”

Mark Twain’s greatest work, writes Burde, was that which “drew upon intuitive memory rather than studied observations.” There was a connection between writing and piloting—both require a special quality of memory—and Clemens dreaded the thought of failing as a writer and being forced to make his living again as a pilot. He was unable to sustain his imaginative identification with Horace Bixby (who disappears from the last three of the seven “Old Times” articles), and the series ended after seven, rather than the promised nine, articles.

Clemens finally returned to the river in 1882, hoping to collect enough material to fill out the “Old Times” articles to book length (“Life On the Mississippi, 1883). He said he merely wanted to verify distances, but Clemens was really admitting, says Burde, “that his intuitive memory [had] failed him and he must return to direct observation—to the shape before his eyes.”

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“Indonesia: Testing Time for the ‘New Order’” by Seth Lipsky and Raphael Pura, in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1978), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Just ten years ago, Indonesia’s President Suharto scrapped the chaotic “guided democracy” of his predecessor, Sukarno, and ended Indonesia’s flirtation with China and the Soviet Union in favor of closer ties with Japan and the West. Now, as Suharto, 57, begins his third—and probably final—five-year term, his “New Order” faces severe tests, according to Lipsky and Pura, of the Asian Wall Street Journal.

Initially, Suharto brought a measure of political stability and economic progress. Prospects for rapid development, financed by oil revenues, looked good. Then came a worldwide recession in 1975. Pertamina, the mismanaged and overextended state oil company, foundered. Today, with oil no longer viewed as a “magic balm,” Indonesia still faces tough, down-to-earth problems: too many people, not enough food and jobs.

Population growth is the biggest challenge, the authors report, but there has been minor progress. In eight years, the overall annual population growth rate has slipped from 2 percent to 1.8 percent. Heavy concentrations of people on Java and Bali remain a grave burden; the two islands, totaling slightly more than a third the area of Japan, may hold more than 110 million people in 20 years.

The food and job situation is even less encouraging. Indonesia has become the world’s largest rice importer ($700 million worth in 1977), while more than 40 percent of the rural labor force and 20 percent of

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urban workers are unemployed or underemployed.

"If Suharto is on the spot now, so is the West," argue Lipsky and Pura. Indonesia needs $7.6 billion in foreign aid to help finance its current five-year plan. It welcomes foreign investment, but not the "quick buck" attitude shown by some U.S. investors in the early 1970s. The internal mismanagement, corruption, and bureaucratic red tape of the military-backed regime in Jakarta cannot be overlooked. However, the authors conclude, "It would seem a major setback for the West if Suharto's New Order, which gambled on the West, were to fall short of its goal because the West fell short of its promise."

China's Economy: Prospects Good


China's new "moderate" leaders have branded their ousted "radical" rivals (the "Gang of Four") as "economic illiterates" whose policies cost China $60 billion in industrial output during the turbulent 1974-76 period.

Actually, writes Prybala, a Pennsylvania State University economist, the Chinese economy grew steadily from 1966 through 1975, not counting 1967 when output dropped because of the political chaos caused by Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution. (Except for coal, iron, and steel, industrial output increased at an annual rate of 10 percent, according to CIA estimates.) The collapse of the radicals' economic program—with its emphasis on greater democracy in the work place and a narrowing of wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers—was due more to factional struggles than to any inherent unworkability.

Despite the turmoil of the last decade, China's economy performed well under leaders branded "economic illiterates" by the country's present rulers.

Adapted from Challenge.
of the radicals' basic economic concepts.

Changes in the pattern of industrial development since Mao's death in September 1976, says Prybala, have been "changes in degree, not in the quality of the administrative command system." The work incentive program is being revamped, and there is greater emphasis on cost control and profitability. Labor unions have been revived to help enforce worker discipline on the job. Technical experts enjoy greater authority. Moreover, priorities have been shifted slightly from agriculture and light industry to heavy industry—especially coal, iron, and steel.

While China's economy may have suffered in the short run from factional feuding, and while some radical reforms (particularly those which disrupted higher education) may have long term ill effects, the image of past economic disarray is misleading, Prybala concludes, and the prospects for continued economic growth are good.

Energy: Key to Russia's Future

"Oil, Wheat & the Soviet Union" by Herbert S. Levine and Daniel L. Bond, in The Wharton Magazine (Summer 1978), P.O. Box 581, Martinsville Center, Martinsville, N.J. 08836.

For ten years, the Soviet Union has relied on Western technology to boost the sagging productivity of its domestic industries and massive purchases of grain to offset the failure of Soviet agriculture. Economists Levine, of the University of Pennsylvania, and Bond, of Stanford Research Institute, contend that this pattern will be increasingly difficult to maintain because of Russia's hard currency trade deficits and mounting indebtedness.

Between 1968 and 1976, the total volume of Soviet trade with the West more than trebled in constant dollars (to $25 billion in 1976). Imports, however, raced way ahead of exports, leaving a huge hard currency trade deficit (up from $100 million in 1968 to $6.3 billion in 1975). The Soviets have been able to support this deficit largely through gold sales and heavy borrowings from Western banks, and also by shipments of oil, gas, and coal, which by 1976 represented more than 50 percent of all Soviet exports to the West. (Most of the oil and gas went to Italy, West Germany, France, Britain, and Austria.)

Although the Soviets are taking steps to conserve energy and increase its production, the authors argue that Russia will face fuel shortages in the 1980s which could drastically affect exports and thus its balance of payments. They see three possible scenarios in the 1980s: (a) a continuation of present levels of energy exports and grain imports, as officially predicted by the Soviet government; (b) a drastic decline in energy exports combined with serious foreign exchange difficulties, as predicted by the CIA in July 1978; and (c) an intermediate situation, as forecast by Western oil and gas industry specialists.

Whichever hypothesis proves correct, Levine and Bond conclude, the key to future Soviet economic development will be Moscow's ability to maintain energy exports.
In September 1960, Fidel Castro publicly vowed to teach more than 1 million illiterate adult Cubans to read and write in 12 months. The literacy campaign that followed, says Kozol, a visiting lecturer at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, was not only "a pedagogical victory unparalleled in the modern world" but helped turn Cuba into a socialist country.

Kozol describes how the Cuban government in early 1961 enlisted 100,000 student volunteers (40 percent of them between the ages of 10 and 14) to go into the countryside and live and work with peasants while teaching them at night to read and write.

By late August 1961, the literacy effort was far behind schedule (only 119,000 had successfully completed the course). Thousands of factory workers and housewives were recruited to teach. With 800,000 Cubans still untaught by late August, Castro ordered more drastic measures—postponing the start of the regular school year from September to January, drafting teachers, and organizing "Acceleration Camps" and more rural teaching teams. By November, 345,000 people had completed the final literacy exam. Six weeks later, the figure was more than 700,000.

Kozol finds it remarkable, not only that Cuba reduced its adult illiteracy rate to less than 5 percent (UNESCO placed the U.S. rate at 6.6 percent in 1973) but that 500,000 former illiterates continued their studies and passed sixth-grade qualification exams by the end of 1968.

The key to the campaign's success, says Kozol, was not Marxist discipline but an "ethical exhilaration" spurred by the charisma of Fidel Castro and directed by a massive organizing effort. A major conse-
quence was the ideological awakening of large numbers of young Cubans whose sense of social responsibility was aroused by living with the country's rural poor. The literacy campaign, says Kozol, turned "utopian kids" into "incipient socialists."


Between February 1975 and November 1976, some 50,000 people were killed in Lebanon in a civil war in which Palestinians played a major role—as catalysts, combatants, and victims. Hudson, director of Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, describes the intricate moves that led the Palestinians into a conflict neither they nor their Christian Lebanese opponents could hope to win.

Amid prosperity, Lebanon (population 2.9 million) had fallen prey to sectarian and class tensions. The leadership in Beirut, both left and right, Christian and Muslim, was too fragmented to resolve these tensions through reform or through force. In this charged atmosphere, the Palestinians acted as a detonating factor. Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Israel, whether originating from Lebanese soil or not, brought strong reprisals: 44 major Israeli air or ground attacks against Lebanon between 1968 and 1974.

Unable to protect the country from Israeli incursions, the mixed Christian-Muslim, 17,000-man Lebanese Army was also incapable of restraining Palestinian guerrillas in South Lebanon bent on raiding Israel. The central authority of the Lebanese state, unable to control the armed Palestinians or prevent open conflict among Lebanese factions, collapsed.

This power vacuum was filled by well-armed, competing paramilitary groups. There were, for example, three Palestinian factions. In addition, there were half a dozen Moslem Lebanese leftist groups, while the more conservative Christian leadership was only superficially more unified. In the chaos, each group acted out of its own fear of political extermination. The result was a tragic, inconclusive war that has left Lebanon without the capacity for self-government.

Hudson contends that any solution to the Lebanese conflict requires self-determination for the Palestinians in territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 War. Then an extraordinary constitutional convention, with international support, might begin the process of "desectarianizing" Lebanon's political institutions.
U.S. presidential elections should be fair and democratic and should "maximize the likelihood" that the candidate with the most popular votes wins; they should encourage competition in a two-party system without undue restrictions on third parties; and they should both promote greater voter participation and retain the constitutional role played by the states in the presidential election process.

Having agreed on these basic principles, the Task Force, composed of both defenders and critics of the present electoral college system, proposes a "national bonus" plan. It would award a national pool of 102 additional electoral votes (two for each state and the District of Columbia) to the presidential candidate who wins the most popular votes nationwide. The candidate with the greatest number of electoral votes would be elected President. Establishment of the plan would require a constitutional amendment.

The most appealing feature of the national bonus, says the Task Force, is that it virtually eliminates the possibility of a candidate with the majority of popular votes being denied the Presidency, as happened in 1876 and 1888. The present system, in which a state's electoral votes equals the number of its Senators and Representatives, provides for 538 electoral votes and creates, according to the Task Force, unequal voter representation. For example, voters in sparsely populated states are guaranteed at least three electoral votes, while in large states relatively small numbers of voters can shift a great number of electoral votes. This representational imbalance would be reduced by the national bonus plan.

The new proposal would also abolish the position of elector and award states electoral votes directly, thus eliminating the possibility that an elector could cast his vote for a candidate other than the one for whom the elector's constituents voted. (Electors have been "faithless" 12 times since the first presidential election in 1788, 6 times since 1948.) The plan would discourage one-issue or regional candidates and would, in the "unlikely event" that no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, require a run-off election between the two candidates getting the highest number of votes, rather than allow the U.S. House of Representatives to decide the outcome.

The national bonus plan is preferable to direct election of the President for several reasons: It almost guarantees a clear-cut victor while direct election might produce a President with only marginal support; moreover, direct election could not only harm the two-party system by encouraging third-party candidates interested only in forcing a national run-off but also obliterate the role of states and state political parties in presidential elections.
Traditional reliance on "virgin materials" to be used once and then discarded must eventually give way to a sustaining system in which recycling becomes a central organizing principle. Today, most of what we use is thrown away. About 70 percent of all metal is used only once; the remaining 30 percent is recycled.

For the United States, which spends $4 billion each year to collect and dispose of its municipal solid wastes but recovers only 6 percent of what is discarded, Hayes proposes a three-point "sustainable resource policy." First, products should be manufactured to be easily repaired and to last longer. (Recapped tires can last up to 90 percent as long as new models, and it costs less to fix up an old building that to replace it.) Second, consumers should engage in "source separation"—the segregation of waste materials for recycling. This process, which the author estimates would consume 16 minutes each week for the average American household, would ease recycling of most materials, including copper, iron, steel, aluminum, glass, paper, most plastics, and food wastes. Finally, separated wastes should be combined into useful "secondary materials" at centralized waste recovery facilities.

Hayes, a senior researcher at Worldwatch Institute, lists several ways the government might ease the shift to an economy based on secondary materials. One change would eliminate regulations that allow railroads to charge higher rates for the transport of secondary materials than for virgin ore. He also proposes the imposition of taxes based both on the amount of virgin materials used in a product and on the cost to society of toxic emissions and other pollutants, land loss, resource depletion, and disposal of the material after use. Governments should subsidize and support a market for recycled products.

Widespread acceptance of a system that replaces "conspicuous consumption" with "conspicuous frugality" will require a great deal of public education, Hayes admits, but he points hopefully to a recent Harris survey in which 92 percent of those polled said they were willing to forego annual automobile model changes. "Voluntary simplicity," he says, "is finally acquiring a modern following."

"Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States"

The U.S. population is currently growing at 0.8 percent per year, and 25 to 50 percent of this is attributable to legal and illegal immigration. While legal immigration totals between 325,000 and 425,000 annually, no reliable figures are available for the number of illegal immigrants. However, this report by the House Select Committee on Population says there is
an emerging consensus among immigration experts that the number of illegal aliens in this country at any one time is between 3 and 6 million, of whom approximately 60 percent are Mexican.

Some other committee findings:

There is considerable evidence of two-way movement across the U.S.-Mexican border, reflecting a pattern of periodic, temporary migration between the two countries.

Legal immigrants are more likely to make use of tax-supported social service programs than illegal, undocumented immigrants. The latter apparently make little use of public assistance programs, but somewhat more use of medical and educational facilities. Overall, illegal aliens are more likely to pay taxes than they are to receive the benefits of tax-supported systems.

In 1977, the Immigration and Naturalization Service made more than 1 million apprehensions of illegal aliens in the United States, yet present border enforcement is largely ineffective.

The committee proposes a comprehensive review of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 to make U.S. immigration law "enforceable, equitable and flexible."

Other recommendations include: (a) stricter border enforcement to deter illegal migration, with special attention to smugglers and others who encourage surreptitious border crossings; (b) a concerted effort by the Census Bureau to collect more accurate data on the size and characteristics of the immigrant population; (c) a careful study of proposals for a legal "guest worker" program in the light of future U.S. labor force needs and domestic demographic trends; and (d) the granting of generous agricultural and trade concessions to the governments of Mexico and the Caribbean nations in return for their cooperation in halting the flow of illegal aliens from those countries.

"Welfare and Efficiency: Their Interactions in Western Europe and Implications for International Economic Relations"


Author: Theodore Geiger.

The recent growth in welfare payments and services in the six West European nations providing the highest levels of welfare benefits (Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) has been unprecedented. It has impaired the productive efficiency of those countries and pushed them to adopt protectionist production and trade policies that adversely affect the United States.

The rising costs of welfare benefits (which cover not only the unemployed and the disabled, but also pensions, sick pay, and a variety of subsidies) have sharply increased total government expenditures, e.g., from 35 percent of gross domestic product in Sweden in 1965 to 62 percent in 1977; from 38 percent of GDP in the Netherlands in 1965 to 55 percent in 1977. Greater government expenditures have brought higher taxes and increased government borrowing, which, in turn, have fueled inflation. Direct and indirect taxes paid by workers in these countries, writes Geiger, director of international studies for the National Planning As-
sociation, range from a third to half of gross earnings.

At the same time, rising employer contributions for social security and other payroll taxes, combined with higher wages and fringe benefits, are pushing production costs to levels that inhibit private investment and make some European products less competitive, both abroad and in their own domestic markets. This loss of competitiveness has forced European governments to impose new barriers against imports and provide subsidies to domestic enterprises. Rising protectionism and increasing subsidies in Western Europe are threatening to convert the world economy into an increasingly protectionist system.

Geiger argues that high inflation and rising taxes have made workers seek pay increases in addition to their improved welfare benefits. At the same time, guaranteed welfare benefits have led to increased absenteeism, labor turnover, and idleness. High marginal tax rates on additional earnings, and declining differentials between skilled and unskilled wages, discourage workers from training for skilled jobs or working overtime.

"It is neither realistic nor desirable to seek to reverse the long-term trend toward welfare improvements," Geiger concludes. "What is needed is to assure that national welfare systems are of a size and provide benefits of a kind that can interact positively with economic efficiency or at least do not impair it substantially."

### TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AS PERCENT OF GNP

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Exact comparisons between countries should be avoided because of the lack of a common statistical data base.

"Europe and the North-South Dialogue"

The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 120 rue de Longchamp, 75116 Paris, France. 78 pp. $4.00.
Authors: Wolfgang Wessels, Jonathan Carr, Louis Turner, Mary Hargreaves, Wolfgang Hager, Klaus Boeck, and Gérard Tardy.

The North-South dialogue—officially called the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC)—held in Paris between December 1975 and June 1977 brought the world no closer to the "new economic order" demanded by the Third World. But it could serve as a useful basis for future dip-
The demands of the less developed countries (LDCs) at Paris for some form of relief from the crushing debts owed to the developed countries came as no surprise, the authors note. The deficits of the LDCs skyrocketed from $10 billion in 1973 to $28 billion in 1974, mainly because of increased oil prices.

The developing countries also demanded the establishment of a "common fund" to finance buffer stocks of raw materials, such as coffee, tea, sugar, copper, tin, rubber, and cotton, to help stabilize commodity prices. They likewise sought to hold the Western countries to their promise to increase development aid to 0.7 percent of their GNPs. (Such aid currently varies from about 0.38 percent of GNP for most Common Market countries to 0.27 percent for the United States.)

Much of the CIEC was taken up by a discussion of energy issues. The Western countries sought assurances of sufficient oil imports from the OPEC members and showed no sympathy for OPEC insistence on maintaining the purchasing power of oil revenues. In turn, the non-oil-producing LDCs insisted on greater exploration and development of non-nuclear alternative energy resources as well as stepped-up transfers of energy technology to the developing world.

Despite the lack of results at Paris, the report's authors note that the European Economic Community (Common Market) nations fielded a single conference delegation, rather than nine separate ones, and thus provided a much needed boost to the stalled process of West European integration. Even so, the European delegates failed to develop many common positions and too often abdicated to American leadership.

"Inheritance and the Inequality of Material Wealth"


Author: John A. Brittain.

Studies over the past two decades have shown that the inequality of wealth in the United States is vast—a mere 1 percent of American families own approximately one-quarter of all personal wealth, while families comprising the bottom 46 percent own only 2 percent.

Economists have generally attributed all this to inequality of income that allows some people to accumulate savings through their high earning years, thereby making wealth a function of age. But Brittain, a senior Brookings Fellow, contends that a more important determinant of wealth inequality, especially in creating the wealthiest class, is material inheritance.

By studying Internal Revenue Service data on persons whose net worth was over $100,000, Brittain found that approximately half of the wealth of men and most of the wealth of women in this top category could be attributed to bequests and gifts and to the interest that normally accrues to such inheritance.

Brittain also used the IRS data to duplicate a 1962 British study that showed that wealth in England is just as unequal among members of the same age group as among persons of different ages. He found that the
INHERITED WEALTH IN BRITAIN: A sampling of three groups of British men leaving estates of more than £100,000 shows what percentage had wealthy, or not-so-wealthy, fathers.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>1956-57</th>
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<tr>
<td>£1,000,000</td>
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<td>4%</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>35</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>£1,000</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>79</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Valued at constant 1956-57 prices.

United States data offered a similar pattern, casting doubt on the importance of age as a primary determinant of wealth inequality.

Brittain emphasizes the more general importance of inheritance in determining economic success by citing pioneering studies in England of how the wealth of fathers relates to the eventual wealth of their sons. One such study showed that in 1956–57, 51 percent of a sample of sons with estates of over £100,000 had fathers of equal or greater wealth. The conventional view is that there is greater inequality of wealth in Britain than in the United States because of tighter class lines and less intergenerational mobility. But tentative findings by economist Paul L. Menchik at the University of Wisconsin indicate that the correlation between the wealth of fathers and sons is at least as great in the United States as in England.

Brittain concludes that bequests and gifts are appropriate targets for high taxation, since such taxation would reduce inequality of wealth without being a disincentive to individual productive effort.
A depiction of the genealogical tree of the Saud and Wahhab families, presented to King Ibn Saud during his state visit to Egypt in 1946. Together the two families created the first Saudi state in the 18th century. The alliance has endured to this day.
Saudi Arabia

Only in 1973–74, with the Arab oil embargo, did most Americans grasp the importance of faraway Saudi Arabia, the non-Communist world’s No. 1 oil producer, to the economic health of the West. Five years later, the Saudis are among the first to be consulted by Washington on Mideast matters; 30,000 Americans work in the arid kingdom on economic and military projects; 10,000 young Saudis study at universities in the United States. Even so, the Saudis remain a bit of a mystery, with their Islamic conservatism, their Bedouin ways, their quiet use of dollar diplomacy in Africa and the Arab states. Here William Rugh reviews the kingdom’s epic past and uncertain future; John Duke Anthony examines Saudi Arabia’s cautious foreign policy; and David Long looks at the complex world of oil.

A TALE OF TWO HOUSES

by William A. Rugh

In 1745, a Muslim scholar and preacher named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab rode into the small oasis town of Diriya in the center of the Arabian peninsula. A puritan reformer who preached a return to the simple, austere ways of early Islam, he had been expelled from other settlements in the parched interior. But at Diriya, he was greeted warmly by an ambitious local shaykh, Muhammad ibn Saud, a hereditary ruler of Bedouin stock who, like all of his countrymen, claimed descent from Ishmael, the son of Abraham. What happened next could have been a screenplay for Cecil B. DeMille.

Cemented by marriage, the Saud and Wahhab families forged a lasting alliance for conquest and crusade: The Saudis supplied an ever growing corps of town-dwelling Arabs and Bedouin (literally, "desert nomad") warriors; the Wahhabs in-
cited them to religious fervor. Soon, the vast, dry, thinly popu-
lated expanse of what is now Saudi Arabia, an area almost as
large as the United States east of the Mississippi, fell under their
sway.

Twice the House of Saud expanded over the desert penin-
sula in the 19th century, and twice its sword was broken. It
finally rose again under Ibn Saud at the turn of the 20th century.
It was Ibn Saud who brought the infidel's tools—the radio, the
car, the railroad—into the land; it was he who granted the first
oil concessions to Western companies. A shrewd but traditional
and pious ruler—on his way to meet Franklin D. Roosevelt in
Egypt in early 1945, he had his tents pitched on the deck of the
U.S. destroyer and five times daily asked the navigator to point
him toward Mecca—he could not foresee the wealth and power
that oil would place in his nation's hands or the changes it
would bring to a largely nomadic people who until the 1930s
had no word for "million."

§4 Million an Hour

In many respects, Saudi Arabia entered the 20th century
much as it had entered the 10th. Until World War I, the distant
Ottoman Empire, of course, was a potential menace—but little
more. And while the British in 1820 had strung a necklace of
"trucial" shaykhdoms—now the United Arab Emirates—along
the Western shore of the Persian Gulf, London's agents rarely
penetrated the forbidding terrain beyond the coast. There, the
nomadic Bedouin way of life, which began with the domestica-
tion of the camel thousands of years ago, went on undisturbed.
In 1900, a few Arabs dwelled in small towns or cities hugging the
coast or the oases. But most lived as herdsmen and hunters,
fiercely proud, proverbially unruly, and given to raids (ghazu)
on nearby tribes. Roads were nonexistent.

Today, the Saudi ruler can view his domains from modern
jet aircraft, and "all-weather" highways link the major cities.
And thanks in part to the kingdom's astounding oil wealth—$1

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Embassy, Cairo. Born in New York City, he received his B.A. from Oberlin
College (1958) and a Ph.D. in government from Columbia University
(1967). He has been a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow and has served
in Saudi Arabia as director of the American Cultural Center in Jidda and of
the English Language Center in Riyadh. He is the author of Riyadh (1969)
and The Arab Press (forthcoming). The views expressed in this article are
not necessarily those of the U.S. government.
million in revenue every 15 minutes—the voice of the government in Riyadh is respected from Washington to Tokyo. Once a city of sun-dried brick visited by fewer than a dozen Westerners prior to 1900, the capital now boasts a modern bureaucracy and gleaming glass and steel office buildings and hotels.

The Swing State

Yet in those same hotels, liquor is still not served; the Koran remains the country's constitution; and in many areas, Bedouin tribes, though now only 20 percent of the population, live much as they have since Abraham's time—except that they are peaceful. The House of Saud rules supreme, there are no political parties, murderers are beheaded, and thieves may lose a hand. In Saudi Arabia, it is not 1979, but 1398—according to the official Islamic hijra calendar based on lunar cycles and dating back to the time of Prophet Muhammad's flight to Medina. Slavery, sanctioned by the Koran, was not officially outlawed in the kingdom until 1962.

As with many nations pulled suddenly into the 20th century, contrasts and anomalies abound. They are apparent in the desert and the cities, within single generations, even inside the royal family. King Saud (1902–69), son of the great Ibn Saud, was a traditional ruler. His life revolved around the harem, the hunt, and the mosque, and like his father, he sired more than 40 sons. Saud paid little heed to sophisticated finance and, at one point in the mid-1950s, managed to put his kingdom $300 million in debt.

But Faisal, his brother and successor in 1964, was at home in Western capitals; his diplomatic experience began as a teenager at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. Of his eight male children, six attended U.S. or British universities, and one went to Sandhurst, the British military academy.

Yet even Faisal ruled in the age-old manner, maintaining the majlis, or ruler's court, where the king is more accessible to his subjects than is any Western head of state, and with virtually no ceremony. It was here that Faisal was assassinated by a demented nephew in 1975.

However irregular the 20th century's manifestations in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom has undeniably emerged as a force on the world scene. It is increasingly important to the United States, both as an oil supplier and as a Middle Eastern power. It has become a leader of the Arab world and the region's leading political financier. It is the "swing" state in the 13-member Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; its leaders can...
thus almost single-handedly determine the price of oil. Yet like much else on the peninsula, Saudi power cannot be interpreted in a conventional sense. Though strong in terms of money and influence, the Saudis are weak militarily. Power has come late to the House of Saud. Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), founder of the dynasty that has given Saudi Arabia its name and its monarchs, was merely the amir of a tiny desert principality when he met the evangelical Shaykh Abd al-Wahhab. As for the evangelist, his father and grandfather had been qadis (Islamic judges); steeped in theology and jurisprudence, he was appalled by the superstition and immorality among his fellow Muslims. His dour preachings did not sit well with high-living contemporaries.

Holy Alliance

But Muhammad ibn Saud liked him, and the alliance, maintained to the present day, was stunningly successful. The domains of the House of Saud grew outward from the old capital of Diriyah. At first the Saudis had only a seven-man expeditionary force; then, in a few years, a raiding party of 800, which swelled to an army of thousands. By 1780, the Saudis had won over the central (Najd) area of the Peninsula; by 1793, the eastern (Hasa) district; and by 1806, the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the western (Hejaz) district.

While representatives of the House of Saud collected taxes and administered secular affairs, the sons and students of Shaykh Abd al-Wahhab supervised the spiritual, judicial, and cultural activities throughout the territory. (The Justice Ministry, a religious entity governed by Sharia, or Muslim canonical law, is today headed by a member of the al-Ash-Shaykh family, descendents of Abd al-Wahhab.) They trained the local religious authorities, the judges, and the school teachers. They encouraged the activities of so-called mutawaeen, or volunteers, organized into Committees for the Encouragement of Virtue and Discouragement of Vice—the words are from the Koran—the mutawaeen enforced strict observance of prayer attendance, fasting, and the bans on smoking, drinking alcohol, and the wearing of gold or silk.

*U.S. advisors began training the Saudi army and air force in 1952. By the 1960's, turmoil in neighboring countries led to a quick upgrading of Saudi military capability. Currently, the kingdom's relatively modestly equipped ground forces are divided into a 45,000-man army (composed of individuals grouped together without reference to tribe or home) and a 35,000-man national guard (composed of intact tribal units). Each of these volunteer forces is headed by a brother of King Khalid. Total annual defense budget: $7.5 billion.
One percent of Saudi Arabia's 830,000 square miles is arable; only the southwestern Asir province receives regular rainfall. In elevation, the kingdom lies like a tilted playing card, raised slightly along the Red Sea and sloping downward to the Persian Gulf. Western estimates put the population of Saudi Arabia at 4-5 million.
The first Saudi state did not survive. Its conquest of the Hejaz, which includes Mecca and Medina, had interrupted three centuries of Ottoman rule and deprived the Turks of lucrative earnings from the Hajj—the pilgrimage to the holy cities that every Muslim must make at least once in his life during the lunar month of Ramadan. The Ottoman Sultan retaliated; by 1818, the Saudi leadership was under siege in Diriya. When the city fell to the Turks, most of the al-Saud princes were imprisoned. Amir Abdullah, the Saudi ruler, was beheaded.

With the breakup of the Saudi state, fragmentation returned to the peninsula. Because Ottoman rule, headquartered in Constantinople, was distant and indirect, tribal shaykhs and town barons resumed de facto control over their separate fiefdoms. For the remainder of the 19th century, the House of Saud sought to revive its power. But due to recurring intra-family rivalries, its successes were limited to the central plateau region, or Najd. Nine members of the Saud family, from their new capital of Riyadh, successively ruled all or part of the Najd between 1820 and 1891. Then they were evicted once again, this time by the up-and-coming al-Rashid family. Abd al-Rahman, last of these Saudi rulers, fled with his family to exile in neighboring Kuwait, his infant children tucked into his camel's saddlebags.

The Rise of Ibn Saud

Abd al-Rahman and his kin were treated well in Kuwait, but they nourished hopes of restoring the House of Saud to power. That task fell to Abd al-Rahman’s son, Abd al-Aziz, known in the West as Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud made his first move in 1902. This tall and charismatic young man—he was only 22 at the time—moved across the desert gathering Bedouin tribesmen into a small, 200-man expeditionary force. From among them, he selected 15 for a dramatic nighttime raid on Riyadh. Once inside the town’s mud walls, he waited until dawn; then, he and his cousin Jilewi led the small band in hand-to-hand combat against the surprised Rashidi governor and his guards as they emerged from a fortified castle. When the battle was won, the townsfolk welcomed back Ibn Saud to his ancestral home. In the days before the tank and the airplane, desert warfare was a not-too-bloody affair conducted on camelback with sabers and rifles. Opposing forces laid ambushes, made quick raids, and then generally retreated. By means of such age-old tactics, Ibn Saud steadily widened the circle of his rule. By 1906, he had recovered most of the Najd. In 1913, he drove the Ottoman gar-
risons out of the Hasa district on the east coast. But he had not forgotten the power of religion. Ibn Saud sent missionaries to the Bedouin tribes and encouraged the creation of agricultural-religious settlements based on Wahhabi ideas. After 1912, groups of the *Ikhwaan* (literally, "brotherhood") sprang up all over the Najd; Ibn Saud found them a reliable source of aggressive warriors who fought loyally for him and the Wahhabi cause.

**A House Restored**

World War I embroiled the decaying Ottoman Empire in a conflict with the Allies from which it never emerged. In 1914, the Hejaz district was still part of the Empire, but local control was exercised by the Sherif of Mecca, whose family, descended from the Prophet Muhammad, had traditionally ruled the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. With British arms and Colonel T. E. Lawrence's advice, the Sherif in 1916 declared an Arab revolt against the Ottomans. Ibn Saud, watching from the sidelines, could only applaud the move. But he was aware even then that he would have to face the winner. The winner was the Sherif.

Ibn Saud had periodically engaged his neighbor to the West in minor border skirmishes, but open warfare did not break out until 1924. In that year, the Sherif, emboldened by the progress of the Arab independence movement which he had initiated, declared himself King of the Arabs and Caliph of all Muslims. To Ibn Saud, the claim was preposterous; to the *Ikhwaan* and other zealous Wahhabis, the Sherif's rule of the Hejaz and the holy cities meant corruption, moral laxity, and religious backsliding of the worst sort. When Ibn Saud decided on a Hejaz conquest, the devout Bedouin tribesmen responded enthusiastically.

Indeed, their enthusiasm was excessive: They began the campaign with a mad sweep through the Hejazi resort city of Taif, which resulted in some 300 civilian deaths. Exaggerated tales of the so-called Taif massacre spread quickly in the Hejaz, caused panic in the towns, and helped lead the Sherif to abdicate in favor of his son, Ali. But Ali soon gave up all resistance; by 1926, Ibn Saud controlled the entire Hejaz and the neighboring Asir district, as well as the Najd and Hasa. The House of Saud had reclaimed its territory.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (as it was formally named in 1934) has survived intact down to the present day. Ibn Saud and his sons Saud, Faisal, and Khalid, who have ruled the country as successive monarchs throughout the 20th century, have kept the

*After World War I, two of the Sherif's sons were installed by the British as Kings of Transjordan (now Jordan) and Iraq. Jordan's King Hussein is the Sherif's great-grandson.*
INSIDE THE ROYAL FAMILY

When Crown Prince Khalid became King of Saudi Arabia in 1975, many Western observers concluded that because of his retiring demeanor and chronic poor health—he had had two heart attacks in 1969—he would be little more than a figurehead; his younger, more energetic brother, Prince Fahd, according to his view, would actually rule in his capacity as Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister. (The king is Prime Minister.)

This expectation, however, was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Saudi political process. Saudi Arabia is a traditional Islamic monarchy, and like the American President, the Saudi monarch cannot delegate his role as head of government. Moreover, King Khalid has shown much more interest in the governmental process than some had originally expected.

The belief that Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy is another popular misconception. The king is subject to two powerful constraints—Islamic law (which is the law of the land) and the royal family. In political terms, the royal family is the more visible constraint, for it serves, in effect, as the constituency of the kingdom. No king can rule without the expressed consent of the family. This role is given legal sanction through an ancient Islamic institution, *ahl al-aqad wal-hal* (the people who bind and loose). Composed of the

nation together, mindful that their ancestors failed to do so because of foreign intervention and internal feuds. But the major challenge facing the House of Saud has been to reconcile a traditional, millennia-old desert culture with the requirements of a growing, modern nation. As late as the 1930s, King Ibn Saud was able to exercise direct, personal rule in the traditional manner of a desert chieftain. There was little about the country that would have shocked or surprised his forebears. True, some of the more extremist *Ikhwaan* leaders mutinied in 1929 when it became clear that the king—although a devout Wahhabi himself—would not deal harshly with the non-Wahhabi Muslims of the Hejaz and, indeed, would tolerate all of the many Muslim sects coming on pilgrimage to Mecca. And true, many in the hitherto isolated towns of the Najd were perplexed when Ibn Saud returned from the Hejaz with airplanes, telephones, and motorcars—instruments, no doubt, of evil power. But the king easily suppressed the *Ikhwaan* and in the process crushed forever the Bedouin nomads as a military power in the kingdom. And he persuaded his people that Western technology could be
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royal family and high-ranking government officials (though totally dominated by the family), this institution must approve a new king and can depose a reigning one. In 1964, for example, King Saud lost the confidence of the family and was replaced by his brother, King Faisal.

The royal family expresses its support or lack of support for the king and his policies through the traditional process of consensus (ijma). Because the family shuns the limelight, no outsider is quite sure how consensus-building takes place. Age and seniority appear to be major factors, with senior generations taking precedence over junior generations, older brothers over younger ones. The key generation comprises the king and his 30 surviving brothers, all sons of the late King Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud).

The old king had many wives, and sons of the same mother also tend to gravitate toward each other in royal family dealings. The two most powerful sibling groups are the king and his older brother Muhammad, and Fahd and his six full brothers, sometimes known as the “Sudayri Seven” after the maiden name of their mother. After Faisal’s assassination, Muhammad, the oldest living son of King Abd al-Aziz, technically had a prior claim to the throne but deferred to his younger, blood brother, Khalid. He is still, however, very powerful in the royal family.

—David Long

useful.* In any event, such intrusions were minor compared with what was to come.

It started in the 1930s. Ibn Saud, as generous as he was impecunious, did not believe at first that his kingdom was potentially oil rich, although his neighbors to the East, in Kuwait and Bahrain, had already parlayed the dark green liquid into substantial wealth. By all accounts, Ibn Saud was more interested in drilling artesian wells for fresh water—understandable for a desert ruler; understandable, in fact, for any Muslim, whose vision of Paradise, gleaned from the Koran, was of a place of flowing streams and brooks.

Yet water would not pay Ibn Saud’s bills, and during those depression years, the revenues from the pilgrimage to Mecca—then the kingdom’s major source of revenue—were falling. At one point, according to H. St. John Philby, the eccentric Englishman who had befriended the king during World War I, Ibn

*According to one story, when the Ulema, or religious scholars, condemned the telephone as the devil’s invention, Ibn Saud had them assemble in one place, then gave them a call and read the Koran over the line. They were reassured.
Saud was prepared to sell all the mineral concessions in Saudi Arabia for one million pounds. The deal he got from Standard Oil of California in 1933 was somewhat better: 35,000 gold sovereigns down, and one gold sovereign for every 5 tons of oil, in return for drilling rights to a tract of shifting sands the size of Texas. On a sweltering day in Jidda, Philby watched as the sovereigns were counted out, one by one, and handed across a table to Saud and his treasurer, Abdullah Sulayman.

The "miracle" occurred five years later when Standard Oil, through its subsidiary, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, finally pierced the cap rock at a well known as "Dammam No. 7" to make the first great oil strike in the kingdom. Others followed. After the Allied victory in World War II allowed the commercial shipping trade to resume, petroleum was pumped out of Arabia; sovereigns were pumped back in. In the first year of postwar oil production, Ibn Saud received $10 million; within five years, he had amassed $240 million; by 1954, $3 million a week was coming into the kingdom. The king's treasure chests were overflowing.

**Tapping the "Miracle"**

Where did the money go? Some of it went for a new railroad; some, later, for roads and an airline. (The 1.5 million annual Hajj pilgrims quickly made Saudi Arabian Airlines one of the largest passenger carriers in the Middle East.) Eventually, the government began to provide amenities for its people: free education and health care, postal and telegraph service, electricity—and, of course, artesian wells. With the country's revenues at first defined in toto as the king's personal income, much of the new wealth also found its way into the hands of the royal family, many of whose members acted as nouveaux riches in all times and places have acted.

The government bureaucracy expanded rapidly. Before 1939, the only government "officials" besides the king himself were two of his sons (Crown Prince Saud and Foreign Minister Faisal) and Finance Minister Sulayman. But even they made no major decisions without consulting the king, who busied himself with every minute detail of government and met daily in majlis with individual citizens seeking his help. Today there are 20 separate ministries and some 100,000 civil servants, many of them Western-educated Saudi technocrats.

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*In 1952, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the kingdom's central bank was established to bring some order to the country's increasingly complicated finances. Headquartered in Jidda, it administers Saudi Arabia's monetary reserves, issues coins and notes, and regulates banking. SAMA's efforts have made the Saudi riyal one of the most stable currencies in the world.*
A merit-based personnel system is in place, but the princes of the House of Saud, now numbering more than 4,000, continue to hold the key posts. From among Ibn Saud's sons have come all three monarchs since the old king's death in 1953, as well as nearly all of the incumbents in the most powerful Saudi posts: prime minister; the ministers of defense, interior; and foreign affairs; and the governors of Mecca and Riyadh. Many other al-Saud princes, particularly the well-educated younger ones, have made names for themselves in the newer ministries—petroleum, agriculture, youth. Their cousins from the Sudairy and Jilewi families hold most of the provincial governorships.

Swift Justice

Islam, too, remains a vital feature of Saudi culture. It is the kingdom's official religion, and all of the king's subjects are Muslim. Most of them perform the prayers every day, in the prayer places in schools, mosques, and public buildings; many mosques are busy during all five of the prescribed daily prayer periods. Virtually everyone observes the dawn-to-dusk fasting period for the lunar month of Ramadan. Almsgiving (zakah) is a compulsory tax, not optional as in other Muslim countries. The Saudi national flag is the only one to carry the Muslim profession of faith—"There is no god but God, and Muhammad is His Messenger"—a phrase that also appears at the head of all official stationery and documents.

The Wahhabi interpretation of Islam continues to predominate. All other sects are respected and protected, but Wahhabi fundamentalism remains strong. Religious observances are simple and unostentatious. When a Saudi dies, be he king or commoner, he is still buried in an unmarked grave—a Wahhabi practice meant to discourage idolatrous veneration. There are no elaborate mosques, no tombs of saints, even the Prophet's birthday is not celebrated; the faithful concentrate their devotion solely on God. Saudi law is still based on a relatively literal interpretation of the Koran, which may lead, for example, to the stoning of adulterers and the flogging of drunkards. Justice is predictable and swift; Saudi Arabia has one of the lowest crime rates in the world.

Yet the Wahhabi influence, while strong, may be waning. Saudis regularly study and travel abroad; some 10,000 young Saudis are now studying in the United States. And tens of thousands of foreigners—not only other Arabs but Koreans, Pakistanis, Indians, Britons, and Americans—have been welcomed into the kingdom to live and work. (Still unwelcome are most Jews and firms doing business with Israel.) Radio and imported
television programs have brought the world, especially the West, closer to the Saudi public. (One in ten Saudis owns a TV set, one in four a radio.)

But there are no nightclubs or other such places of entertainment. Cinemas are still banned, and the government ensures that television programs conform to Saudi social and cultural norms. (So, too, with imported books and magazines.) Poetry writing and storytelling flourish, as they always have, but other forms of creative expression, such as representational art, have only been allowed in recent years.

**Strangers in the Land**

The social role of Saudi women is still restricted, though not as much as before. When women today leave the privacy of their homes, they are supposed to be covered from head to toe. Their pictures normally do not appear in their passports, on television, or in the newspapers. But they now have access to public schooling all the way through university, though co-education does not exist. And while they can enter such professions as radio broadcasting, teaching in girls' schools, and nursing for women patients, they must behave discreetly to avoid even a hint of impropriety. Such puritanical rules are justified by reference to Islamic scripture, interpreted strictly and literally in Wahhabi fashion. "Men are superior to women," says the Koran, "because of the qualities whereby God has made a distinction between them."

New ideas and concepts have come into the country through secular education, which has grown rapidly to meet the needs of a modernizing state. Secular grade schools were started first by Jidda merchant families—who still control much of the nation's commerce—at the beginning of this century. They expanded after 1926 to prepare Saudis for study at universities in Egypt and elsewhere. Today, the three Saudi universities, with their Saudi professors, offer a wide range of modern and traditional subjects and are flourishing.

Saudi elementary schools still place heavy emphasis on traditional subjects: Islam, Arabic language and literature, and Arab history and geography. Students—there are some 600,000 of them in elementary school alone—learn by rote, memorize parts of the Koran and other texts, and relate much of their learning to Islam. After sixth grade, the system divides into two tracks, both leading to university and graduate work. One is

*There are six major Arabic daily newspapers, and two English-language dailies. All are subject to "regulation" by the Ministry of Information.
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modern and secular. The other is religious, preparing graduates for careers in law and teaching.

The religious track produces scholars so well versed in classical Islamic subjects that the Saudis can claim the most learned religious intellectuals in the Muslim world. These graduates—as judges or legal experts, as teachers of religion, history, and Arabic—play a major role in reinforcing traditional norms and ideas. Americans and other Westerners working in Saudi Arabia's "modern" sector rarely come into contact with such people, yet they help shape the fundamental moral tone of the country.

But so, in a way, do the Americans and other foreigners, and the Saudis may be caught between the two. Indeed, perhaps the greatest change wrought by the kingdom's wealth and rapid development is that the "average" Saudi no longer exists. As a statistic, Saudi Arabia's annual per capita income is high—now well over $7,000, compared to $1,250 in oil-rich Iraq and an astonishing $15,000 in even richer Kuwait. But it only masks the wide disparities among the Saudi population not just in income but in occupation and way of life.

The oil industry, based in Dhahran, produces 90 percent of Saudi Arabia's income; Dhahran, as a result, is a major urban center with many Westerners and a growing Western-style Arab middle class. In Riyadh, the veneer of modernity is more recent; the skyline is new, as are the bungalow-type suburbs radiating from its sparkling downtown. Jidda, with its old palaces and

Jidda's waterfront during the pilgrimage season, 1920.
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busy markets, remains in many respects a city unto itself. Long
the diplomatic capital, still a commercial center (although most
Western companies have opened offices in Riyadh), the port on
the Red Sea has been a cosmopolitan trading city since Biblical
times.

In the interior, some oasis dwellers and nomads live as
before—if one discounts the omni-present motor vehicles. (One
in five Saudis owns a car.) Some Saudis straddle both the an-
cient and the modern worlds, working in the oil fields by day,
returning to their traditional villages at night. Industry is ex-
panding fast: In the mid-1950s, there were only five industrial
enterprises in the kingdom; now there are hundreds, involving
everything from steel to textiles, fish canning to petrochemicals.
But agriculture and herding still employ most Saudis.

The contrasts and contradictions apparent in Saudi Arabia
are not necessarily a cause for local concern. Unlike many de-
veloping nations, the Saudis have no legacy of colonialism to
overcome. The kingdom has been more or less independent for
200 years under the strong rule of the House of Saud. Radical
intellectuals rarely develop and never thrive in the country; its
economic troubles—such as a 20 percent inflation rate—stem
from a prosperity other nations would envy; the military seems
to be loyal; and the nation's leadership is intelligent, well-
educated, cohesive, and not given to delusions of grandeur.
Lacking military might, the kingdom is certainly more vulnera-
able in the international sphere—yet even here the caution and
shrewd diplomacy of its leaders have won the kingdom the re-
spect of most of the Arab world, most of the Third World, and
most of the industrialized West. Saudi Arabia's continued sta-
bility is not assured—but its chances are good.

In the eyes of Saudi leaders, there is much of value in the old
way of life—and much to be avoided in the new. And they be-
lieve, with some reason, that they will be able to pick the right
path between the two.
In the eyes of many Americans, the emergence of Saudi Arabia as the world's pre-eminent Arab state stems mainly from the 1973 oil embargo. What outsiders perceived as a sudden occurrence, however, had in fact been evolving gradually over a period of several years. Indeed, the kingdom, under the leadership of King Faisal (r. 1964–75), had been playing a growing role in Arab summit gatherings since the disastrous June 1967 war against Israel.

By the end of 1967, the Saudis had patched up differences with Egypt that had led the two nations to lock horns by proxy during the 1962–67 civil war in Yemen. Four years later, they helped wean the nine emirates along the kingdom's eastern border away from Great Britain and into full independence. In 1970–71, they played mediator in Jordan when the radical Palestinians were chased into Lebanon by the Hashemite monarchy of King Hussein. All of this was in high contrast to the earlier semi-isolationist stance of Saudi monarchs, including King Faisal during his first few years in power.

With the advantage of hindsight, it seems surprising that the more active Saudi role in everything from oil policy to the Arab-Israeli dispute went unnoticed by almost everyone except the oil companies and a few diplomats. Indeed, prior to the 1973 war, King Faisal had warned top oil company executives, including Frank Jungers, then chairman of Aramco, to expect an interruption in oil supplies in the event of another war with Israel. The warning was relayed to the Nixon administration and evidently ignored.

The interruption—in fact, a combination of production cuts and embargo—came during the October War of 1973. After that, it was clear even to the U.S. State Department that Saudi Arabia had acquired the status, unprecedented for a developing country, of both a regional and global power. It is the world's number one holder of external assets and is second only to West Ger-
many in holdings of foreign financial reserves. The kingdom distributes billions of dollars in aid to its neighbors and allies; in 1975, it was the foremost contributor to the International Monetary Fund. Though not a military power, even in the region, Saudi Arabia has helped finance the rebuilding of the war-shattered armies of Egypt and Syria, supplied the Palestinian guerrillas with arms, and underwritten almost the entire defense budget of North Yemen.

For Saudi Arabia's leaders, the rise to wealth and power has been a heady but worrisome experience, with a curious mix of benefits and burdens. Saudi Arabia's wealth has brought a huge influx of foreign laborers. More than 1 million unskilled Yemenis are toiling in the kingdom, not to mention the large Western contingent, including bankers, engineers, and other skilled professionals. While they are essential to the success of the $142 billion 1975–80 five-year development plan, these foreign workers, particularly those of non-Arab background, are diluting traditional Saudi society. (Ironically, a traditional antipathy among many Saudis toward manual labor and the employment of women outside the home has contributed to the labor shortage that makes foreign workers necessary.) The Saudis also believe that the kingdom has been too quick to grant requests for "development" assistance; Planning Minister Hisham Nazer has noted that some of the country's aid recipients (Egypt and Tunisia, for example) are in many ways more developed than Saudi Arabia itself.

Coming Full Circle

One benefit of the country's new status, however, seems clear: For the first time in history, foreign powers, in their dealings with the kingdom or with the Arab world as a whole, must weigh seriously the anticipated response of the regime in Riyadh. U.S. congressional approval of the sale of F-15 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia in 1978, for example, would not have happened five years earlier. According to Jim Hoagland, writing in

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the Washington Post, Saudi Arabia's King Khalid was the first foreign leader to be informed last summer that Egypt, Israel, and the United States had agreed to a summit meeting at Camp David. History has come full circle since 1946 when President Truman disregarded the solemn understanding of a year earlier between President Roosevelt and Saudi King Abd al-Aziz (Ibn Saud) on the matter of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  

Moral Leadership

Many Western specialists, not a few intelligence agencies (including the CIA), and most citizens of industrialized nations tend to evaluate Saudi foreign policy in terms of oil policy. For reasons of religion and geography, Saudi statesmen are more concerned with the country's relations with its Arab neighbors. To be sure, the kingdom's ability to affect the policies of other Arab countries stems largely from its oil-based financial power—and its willingness to use it. Yet Saudi Arabia would be in a position to pull strings in the Arab world regardless of its economic clout. Indeed, the Saudis have developed a kind of moral leadership on matters quite apart from oil. Among them: Islam, the Palestine problem, Arab solidarity, radicalism, and imperialism. A look at these concerns, which have preoccupied the country's rulers since the kingdom was established by Ibn Saud in 1932, may provide outsiders with some perspective on the desert kingdom and the influence it wields.

Islam. The religious heritage of the Saudi people is a major determinant of the kingdom's foreign policy. Saudi Arabia officially subscribes to the Islamic concept of Jihad ("to struggle in the right path"); it condemns any form of repression or persecution of Muslim peoples. This concept, enshrined in the Koran, was endorsed anew at the September 1969 summit meeting of Muslim heads of state in Rabat, Morocco, which was scheduled after a fire damaged Jerusalem's Aqsa Mosque, the site where Muslims believe the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven. With a self-imposed mandate to protect the Islamic holy places, dating from the conquest of Mecca and Medina in the 1920s, the Saudis bridle at the thought of Israeli occupation of the Arab sector of the city. In the wake of the Rabat summit, whose participants called upon Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967, a permanent Islamic Secretariat was set up to function in Jidda for as long as Jerusalem remains under Israeli

*FDR had promised Ibn Saud that he would make no move on the issue without consulting the Arabs; Truman, without consultation, called for lifting the curbs on Jewish immigration to the region.
occupation. Its duties: specifically, to press for the return of the Aqsa Mosque to Muslim control; in general, to promote Islamic values and oppose atheistic creeds.

Reports of discrimination against Muslims anywhere in the world usually elicit an immediate response from Riyadh. Religious zeal extends far beyond mere verbal support; Saudi Arabia is also willing and able to provide diplomatic and financial assistance to bolster the Muslim side in international disputes. For example, it has lent financial support to the separatist struggle of the Muslim-dominated Eritrean guerrillas against the predominantly Christian (and Marxist) military government of Ethiopia. And it has channeled impressive sums—at least $3.6 billion in 1976 alone, representing some 1.5 percent of Saudi Arabia's GNP and the bulk of its foreign assistance—to aid such Muslim countries as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, North Yemen, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, and Oman.

The Palestine Question. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly exerted pressure to regain the Arab lands seized by Israel in the June 1967 war. It supports UN resolutions 242 and 338, which call for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the conflict (in exchange for recognition of Israel's right to exist), and in addition it insists on Israeli evacuation of the old quarter of Jerusalem. The Saudis also demand recognition of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people.

Faisal Betrayed

In pursuit of these goals, the kingdom is financing Jordan's $250 million air defense network, and it funnels some $40 million yearly to the Palestinian guerrillas. It also funds the 30,000-man Arab peace-keeping force in Lebanon. Earlier, it was a founding member of the Arab League (1945); in 1948, the year Israel came into existence, the kingdom, at the league's behest, even committed troops in the first war against the new nation, despite King Ibn Saud's reservations. (Due to poor transportation, they never reached the battlefield.) In general, however, prior to 1967, Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict consisted mainly of verbal support for, and relatively modest financial contributions to, the various Palestinian liberation organizations. This somewhat distant stance came under harsh criticism from less moderate Arab leaders, among them Egypt's President Nasser.

*In addition to the Arab quarter of Jerusalem, Israel seized Jordan's West Bank, Syria's Golan Heights, and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip during the June 1967 war.
Since the Khartoum conference of Arab heads of state in September 1967, called to assess the fallout from the June War, the kingdom has disbursed generous sums to the "frontline" (bordering on Israel) states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon. The kingdom's quarterly payments to the first three countries, begun in late 1967, enabled them to pay for much of the damage inflicted by Israeli forces in the course of the war.

During the 1973 war, the Saudi government adopted its most militant position when it decided to use its oil against countries supportive of Israel. The Saudis regarded American security assistance to Israel during the war as tantamount to direct U.S. intervention. From October 10 (four days after the hostilities began) until the final cease-fire on October 25, the U.S. Air Force made over 550 flights to Israel bringing arms and supplies. Especially provocative, in Riyadh's view, was the White House request to Congress for $2.2 billion in emergency aid to the Jewish state while the fighting was still going on. King Faisal took this as a personal betrayal by President Nixon.
response: On October 18, Saudi Arabia joined Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and other states in agreeing to curtail its oil production. Two days later it proclaimed, as several of its neighbors had already done, an immediate and total embargo of oil to the United States. This action deprived the United States of nearly 650,000 barrels per day of Saudi crude, the largest single component of America's Arab oil imports. That the kingdom thereby succeeded in getting Washington to pursue a more evenhanded approach to the Palestine problem—and to become directly involved in the peace-making process—is testimony to the overall effectiveness of Saudi leadership on a highly volatile issue.

Riyadh is able to sway attitudes toward Israel—in the United Nations, in African and Asian capitals, and increasingly within the European Economic Community—not only through the threat of another embargo but also through its pivotal position with respect to oil prices and production levels and through generous use of its impressive financial resources. Following the example, first of Kuwait, then of Libya, Saudi Arabia has for several years been in the front ranks of those Arab oil producers who have used their wealth to counter Israeli diplomatic influence in Africa. It has invested heavily in economic ventures in African and Asian countries viewed as sympathetic to the Saudi position regarding Palestine.

No Provocations

Since the 1975 Sinai accords—and especially since the 1978 Camp David agreements—it has become clear that most Arab states are now aligned with Saudi Arabia. That is, they are generally receptive to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, within the limits of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. At the same time, they oppose the conclusion of separate, bilateral treaties between Israel and the frontline Arab states—notably Egypt. However, certain Arab nations—Libya, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen, along with the PLO—evidently still reject not only Riyadh's position, but Egypt's as well. They remain pessimistic about negotiations and unabashedly hold to the option of resuming hostilities.

*Black African recipients of Israeli aid have included Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Chad, and the Ivory Coast. Most African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the aftermath of the October 1973 war. Since then, in international and regional organizations, they have consistently backed Arab-sponsored resolutions condemning Israel. These include the UN's 1973 "Zionism-is-racism" resolution and its recognition in 1974 of the PLO. In more recent years, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil-producing states have underwritten the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa as a means of further consolidating their influence in the sub-Saharan region.
The American Connection

Official U.S. policy in the Middle East has been overtly pro-Israel for three decades but covertly pro-Saudi Arabia for even longer.

The American presence on the Arabian peninsula is now substantial. Saudi Arabia has awarded $25 billion in contracts to U.S. companies (for pipelines, power plants, and other "infrastructure") as part of its current $142 billion five-year plan. Some 400 American firms have offices in Saudi Arabia; 1,000 more have hired Saudi representatives.

Of the 30,000 Americans now residing in the kingdom, one-third are involved in defense-related projects. No formal treaties link Washington and Riyadh (diplomatic relations were established in 1940), but an American military mission has been training Saudi troops since 1951. Saudi Arabia now spends about $4 billion annually in the United States for military goods and services. One-quarter of this sum buys "hardware": Hawk missiles, jet fighters, armored vehicles. The rest goes primarily to the Army Corps of Engineers, thence to subcontractors like the Northrop and Vinnell corporations, for military construction and other services.

The relationship is not simply a matter of business. Implicitly since the early 1940s and explicitly since the 1950s, the State Department has defined U.S. access to world petroleum reserves as a matter of national security. The good will and stability of Saudi Arabia are essential. Thus, when World War II cut King Ibn Saud's oil revenues, President Roosevelt secretly funneled $40 million in Lend-Lease aid—earmarked for "democratic allies" only—through Britain and on to Saudi Arabia.

The State Department again came to the kingdom's aid in 1950 as Ibn Saud sought a greater share of Aramco petroleum revenues. Executives of the four U.S. oil companies that make up Aramco argued that higher royalties would boost the price of imported oil in America. The State Department's solution: Let Ibn Saud tax the companies for the money he needed, then let Washington give the companies a credit for that amount against their U.S. taxes. In effect, as its critics have repeatedly pointed out, Saudi Arabia has been receiving a tax subsidy from the U.S. government (estimated at $3 billion in 1974) in lieu of overt foreign assistance.

Support for Saudi Arabia has never been as strong in Congress as it has among U.S. diplomats. (There is no sizeable bloc of Saudi-American voters.) The Saudi connection came under harsh attack on Capitol Hill last spring when President Carter proposed to sell the kingdom 60 new F-15 jet fighters as one part of a $4.8 billion aircraft deal also involving sales to Egypt and Israel. Israeli lobbyists opposed the sale, even as Arab lobbyists crisscrossed the Hill seeking support. Crown Prince Fahd reminded Congress that the United States and the kingdom had certain "mutual interests." The Administration-backed plane sale squeaked by.
**Arab Solidarity.** For reasons quite apart from the question of Israel—including Saudi Arabia’s Muslim-Arab culture, its central geographic position, and its overwhelming dependence on a single natural source of wealth (which led Saudi Arabia to urge the establishment of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1965)—Saudi leaders place a premium on Arab unity. This emerges clearly from Riyadh’s opposition not only to the creation of Israel in 1948, but also to the occupation by Iran in November 1971 of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, islands previously administered by two Arabian emirates, and to the unilateral peace overture of Egyptian President Sadat to Israel in 1977–78—all of which were divisive issues within the Arab world.

**Encircled Kingdom**

Riyadh’s appeal for solidarity is reflected in Saudi development aid to Arab states as far afield as Mauritania and in its bankrolling of the new Arab Monetary Fund in Abu Dhabi. Solidarity has also motivated Saudi endorsement of several cooperative ventures (e.g., a dry dock in Bahrain, a maritime transportation company in Kuwait) supported by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. The kingdom was also a founding member of the Egypt-based Arab Military Industries Organization, an armaments manufacturer, and has supported the federation of seven previously independent states in eastern Arabia to create the United Arab Emirates.* More recently, the Saudis have been trying to hold the Arab world together in the aftermath of Camp David by not endorsing the accords and not rejecting them, since either move would only encourage the efforts of Arab radicals.

**Radicalism and Imperialism.** Saudi Arabia, more than any other Arab state, has made a concentrated effort to thwart both Big Power influence and radical tendencies in the Middle East. It has sought to block, for example, the establishment of Soviet military bases on Arab soil and to impede what they have on occasion considered the “imperialist” forces operating within or near Arab states’ borders, be they British, Israeli, or American. The kingdom has also tried to counter the influence of the Iraqis, Southern Yemenis, Omani rebels, and leftist elements among the various Palestinian guerrilla groups who adhere to hostile ideologies.

Saudi Arabia has spent sizeable sums—$300 million

*Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ra’s al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.

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Over the past decade, Saudi economic aid to Third World nations has quadrupled—to some $4 billion in 1977. Ending a long period of semi-isolationism, the kingdom's foreign policy has become more "activist."

But as correspondent Joseph Kraft notes, the obverse of activism may be insecurity:

Rich as the Saudis are . . . and promiscuous and patient as they may be in dispensing subsidies, they cannot play a role in the world, or even in the Horn or the Middle East, without important external help. . . . A sense of just how vulnerable the Saudis are, and to how many different parties, emerges from a look at the books that have collected in the outer office of the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal. The list includes two volumes (one a biography of Carlos, the terrorist who masterminded the kidnapping of practically all the oil ministers in the OPEC cartel in Vienna in December of 1975) on the dangers of the Palestinian radicals; The Crash of '79 by Paul Erdman, which sketches out fictionally the dangers of Iran to Saudi Arabia; two on the threat posed by Russia; one on the Israeli menace; and several copies of Arabia Without Sultans by Fred Halliday, which is a survey of the radical liberation fronts in the area and their opposition to the oil sheikhs. The Saudis by themselves cannot conceivably contain all these dangers simultaneously. They need—they are, indeed, the world's leading candidate to have—a protecting power.


Somalia, for example, and untold millions in the Sudan—to induce various Arab states to expel Soviet military technicians and reduce their reliance on Soviet weaponry and money. Saudi generosity led eventually to President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet military personnel from that country in 1972. It was an important feature of successful Saudi efforts to persuade Northern Yemen to freeze its relationship with Moscow.8

Most Saudis believe that the U.S.S.R. exercises excessive power internationally and represents an atheistic and imperialistic force antithetical to Arab nationalism and Islam. Fear of the Soviet Union is escalating in the kingdom, as con-

8 The Riyadh regime also established diplomatic relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1976, and offered to extend substantial amounts of aid to that country—up to $100 million—in an effort to further neutralize the Soviet role in the region. The means were clearly insufficient to the task, however, in part because the Saudis could not provide the Yemenis with certain goods (such as MiG jet fighters) and refused to underwrite weapons purchases from the Soviet Union. Since the overthrow in 1978 of moderate PDRY President Salim Rubayya Ali, the country has moved closer to the U.S.S.R. than ever before, backing Ethiopia against Somalia and allowing Soviet ships to dock at Aden, a former British base.

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cerned Saudis watch the consolidation of the Russian position on the Horn of Africa, in Southern Yemen, in Angola and Mozambique, and, since the 1978 coup, in Afghanistan. Riyadh also attributes much of the current unrest in neighboring Iran to leftist, probably Soviet-backed forces. In Saudi eyes, these trends portend a kind of "encirclement."

Nor do such fears apply only to the Soviet Union. NATO facilities in the Mediterranean, U.S. observers in the Sinai, and U.S.-backed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) involvement in the Indian Ocean–Gulf of Oman–Arabian Sea area are viewed by the Saudis and their neighbors as "imperialist" gestures that could threaten the Arab world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. This concern is only inflamed by conjecture in the West concerning the U.S. option of armed intervention to secure the kingdom's oil in any new crisis.

The Price of Peace

Lately, such talk has ebbed, and Saudi fears of intervention by either the West or radical Arabs have eased. In the case of several Arab countries, their economic and political fortunes are now so intertwined with Saudi Arabia's that to challenge the kingdom's paramountcy in Arab affairs is now virtually unthinkable. For other states, the room to maneuver is somewhat greater. Jordan, for one, has long had interests in the Fertile Crescent which do not always coincide with those of Riyadh. (Jordan's ties with Syria are especially close, and it has long since reached a modus vivendi with Israel, on the economic and social level, concerning the West Bank.) And Egypt, with its greater military power, more developed society, and not inconsiderable political influence in the Arab World, has clearly shown itself to be an independent force.

What has Saudi Arabia really achieved by its largess? In many respects, the impact of a dollar is perceptual and psychological, not economic. The other Arab states desire a close relationship with Saudi Arabia for a multitude of reasons—money, oil, and political support. The Saudis, for their part, acknowledge that cordial relations with the rest of the Arab world are a key to their own security. They feel threatened, they need good regional relations, and they can pay for them.
SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDI OIL POLICY

by David E. Long

Isaac Newton is said to have been the last man in the world who knew everything. This is not an indictment of subsequent generations but simply a recognition of the fact that the sum of human knowledge has expanded beyond the grasp of any individual.

So have the complexities of petroleum production.

To understand them fully one must be a geologist and a petroleum engineer versed in the mysteries of rock strata and seismography, an economist comfortable with the intricacies of supply and demand, and a political scientist familiar with the shifting eddies of domestic and foreign policy. An outsider, trying to understand how Saudi decision-makers perceive all these factors, also must be, to some degree, an anthropologist.

Yet the task is important. With proved reserves of roughly 150 billion barrels (possibly as much as 250 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia is sitting on one-quarter of the world's oil. Of the globe's oil producers, it has the greatest potential for sustained, large-scale expansion of production capacity—the amount of oil it could be pumping. The kingdom's production capacity has been increasing steadily for some time. Between 1960 and 1977, the Saudi share of OPEC production doubled; Saudi Arabia also accounted for 40 percent of the total increase in world production between 1970 and 1977. Some 20 percent of U.S. oil imports come from the kingdom: about 1.4 million barrels per day (b/d). What the Saudis do directly affects us all.

It is easy to forget that the kingdom was virtually penniless just 40 years ago. Until oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1938, the Saudis were barely able to make ends meet with earnings from the Hajj (the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca). During the 1930s, the Saudi Minister of Finance, Abdullah Sulayman, reportedly kept the financial accounts of the entire kingdom in a big, black ledger which he slipped under his bed at night.

The first concession to search for oil was awarded in 1923 to an entrepreneur from New Zealand named Frank Holmes. He
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didn’t find any. The agreement lapsed, and in 1933, Standard Oil of California (Socal) acquired a new concession, establishing the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc) to explore for oil. In 1935, Texaco joined Socal in the venture; in 1948, Standard of New Jersey (now Exxon) and Standard of New York (Mobil) also bought in. Meanwhile, in 1944, Casoc's name was changed to the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Commercial quantities of oil were not exported until after World War II. Since then, Saudi revenues have risen steadily, with the most dramatic jump occurring in 1973, with the four-fold increase in oil prices from $3.01 to $11.65 per barrel.

Under the terms of the original concession, virtually all Saudi oil belonged to Aramco. By the 1970s, however, ownership had begun to change hands under a policy styled “participation,” which was devised by the Saudi Petroleum Minister, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani. In 1972, the Saudi government bought 25 percent of Aramco’s equity; by 1974, the kingdom had acquired 60 percent. Ultimately, the Saudis are expected to buy out Aramco entirely. The company will be retained as essentially a service agency to operate the Saudi-owned fields and facilities.

Even seasoned diplomats find it hard to determine who really makes Saudi oil policy. To be sure, the royal family, through consensus, determines the general direction of most matters in the kingdom and sets the bounds within which subordinate officials may act. The family does not, however, become directly involved in government operations, despite the placement of a number of princes in key positions. Royal family politics and government politics, though closely related, are quite distinct. Some very senior princes in the family, like the King’s older brother, Prince Muhammad ibn Abd al-Aziz, are not even in government, whereas Princeton-educated Prince

*Japanese and some small American companies were awarded minor concessions in the former Saudi-Kuwaiti “Neutral Zone” and its offshore waters.

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Saud al-Faisal, who holds the very important Foreign Affairs portfolio, is considered to be a junior member of the family.

King Khalid acts as the link between the family and the government, being at once the head of the family, Prime Minister, and Chief of State. The key national security positions—First and Second Deputy Prime Minister, Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs—are also held by royal princes. While this places them in more powerful positions than the non-royal ministers, it does not guarantee that their views will always prevail.

In the latter part of the late King Faisal's reign, the chief officials with whom the King consulted on oil matters were appointed to a newly created Supreme Petroleum Council. The council has survived King Faisal (and many of the original members) to remain the principal "consultative" body on oil policy. Its members include two princes and four "technocrats." The make-up of the council allows for a broad expression of views. For example, Yamani, by expressing the Petroleum Ministry's point of view, may find himself at odds with Aba al-Khayl looking at the same problem from a fiscal standpoint, or Planning Minister Shaykh Hisham Nazer looking at it from an economic development perspective, or Saud al-Faisal looking at the foreign policy implications.

The New Conservationists

The proceedings of the Supreme Petroleum Council appear to be highly informal. There are no regularly scheduled meetings, and in the absence of a member, no provision is made for an alternate. Decisions are reached through the time-honored Saudi practices of consultation (shura) and consensus (ijma). Because of the press of business on each member, the Council meets infrequently. Nevertheless, it remains the institution most directly responsible for the formulation of Saudi oil policy.

There are three major determinants of that policy: (a) the need to generate oil revenues at a level compatible with the country's total economic development; (b) the need to ensure regional and international political and economic stability; and (c) the need to maintain a predominant influence over price.

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setting through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The matter of oil revenues is complicated. Whenever Saudi Arabia adjusts its oil production rates, it must weigh the advantages of increased revenue against the resulting depletion of its oil reserves. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has consistently produced more oil (about 7.5 million b/d in 1978) than it "needed" to. The kingdom, with a population estimated at 4 to 5 million and few natural resources other than petroleum, can only absorb so much investment. According to Planning Minister Nazer, it could probably generate sufficient income to meet its domestic economic needs by exporting a mere 5 million b/d. Other observers have cited lower figures. By producing beyond its ability to spend, Saudi Arabia can only watch its growing foreign exchange reserves (estimated at $70 billion) lose value through inflation and currency fluctuations. Indeed, some Saudi "conservationists," such as Nazer, argue that the oil may be worth more in the ground.

Over a Barrel

"Very high production raises serious problems for us," Nazer told columnist Joseph Kraft last summer. "It puts pressure on our institutions, which have to manage rapid growth. It creates more inflation. It brings in more foreigners. It gives us more assets than we can handle in investments." The conservationists believe lower production will boost oil prices, thereby dampening total world demand and further forcing consumers to shift to other forms of energy. This would slow the depletion rate of Saudi Arabia's principal marketable resource.

But setting production rates to meet only domestic financial requirements would jeopardize worldwide political stability, in which the Saudis have a major stake. Saudi foreign exchange reserves are invested mainly in the capital markets of Europe and the United States. If the world economy were to suffer as a result of Saudi oil cutbacks, the Saudis would suffer too.

As devout guardians of the Muslim holy places, Mecca and Medina, the Saudis feel a special responsibility to protect the Islamic way of life. One of the greatest threats to that way of life, in the Saudi view, is the expansion of communism or indeed any kind of radical, atheistic ideology. Only a healthy West can contain that threat. As Petroleum Minister Yamani candidly observed, "We cannot go to extremes in our nationalistic outlook and ignore the world economic situation by producing at levels which would satisfy our strict requirements alone. Such actions
Middle East oil deposits (including Saudi Arabia's giant Ghawar field) are clustered along the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia produced about 7.5 million barrels per day in 1978, 30 percent of total OPEC oil production. A barrel of oil, which cost $3.01 before the 1973 embargo, now sells for more than $12. In December 1978, OPEC approved a 14.5% price increase, deplored by the Saudis, while in strife-torn Iran, production dropped sharply, tightening supply.

would lead to a world economic recession, shake governments all over the world, and generate massive unemployment—factors which would inevitably lead to war in which we would be a party and a target."

With the recent introduction on world markets of new, non-OPEC oil from Mexico, Alaska, and the North Sea, and with the sluggish pace of the global economy, there is currently an abundance of oil on the market. However, this is expected to change in the 1980s, with world demand again exceeding available supply. The result could be an energy crisis worse than that of 1974. Saudi Arabia will be under tremendous pressure from the major oil consumers to further expand its productive capac-
ity in order to avert a major world economic crisis. Such a decision would have to be made soon; yet too rapid expansion of capacity could too quickly deplete Saudi Arabia's recoverable oil reserves. Expanded capacity would also be another step toward increasing actual production; as production increased, the problem of idle revenue would become even more troublesome than it is now. Moreover, an assured flow of petroleum from Saudi Arabia to the West would do nothing to lessen world dependence on oil—something Saudi Arabia dearly desires, for reasons of both long-term economics and security.

**Water and Salt**

The Saudis must also deal with the worrisome technical aspects of oil production itself, particularly as they take over the reins of Aramco. Lately they have begun to encounter problems associated with older oil fields. Salt has begun to encroach on some of the oil reservoirs, and there has also been a drop in the natural pressure which forces oil to the surface. Both problems, if unsolved, could lead to a permanent loss of recoverable reserves.

In order to combat salt encroachment, some wells have been shut in. In other wells, the oil and salt water are separated at the surface. To maintain production levels, meanwhile, natural gas and water are being injected back into the reservoirs to increase pressure. Thus far, the Saudis have been using ancient and slightly saline water from aquifers deep underground. Concerned that this resource, too, should be conserved, the Saudis have now decided to inject sea water, and sea water injection has been scheduled (December 1978) for Ghawar, the largest single oil field in the world. Initially, the lighter oil will rise and float above the water; but over time, the sea water could threaten to cause salt encroachment as it mixes with the oil. In any event, the Ghawar field is so big that the mechanics of water injection there may not follow the usual rules. The behavior of this field will be a critical factor in how rapidly Saudi Arabia expands production capacity, which in turn will help determine Saudi oil production in the 1980s.

The Saudi commitment to political stability is a second major influence on its oil policies. It has, for example, induced the Saudis to earmark much of their oil revenues for foreign aid to Arab states, Islamic states, and the Third World in general.

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*The Ghawar field comprises six distinct but interconnected structures: Fazran, Ain Dar, Shedgum, Uthmaniyah, Hawiyah, and Haradh. Two hundred kilometers long, it produced about 7.5 million b/d in 1977—9 percent of total world production.*
The greatest threat to regional stability, in the Saudi view, is Israel. Not only do the Saudis look upon the creation of Israel as an injustice to the Arabs, including Palestinians; they also see the persistence of the dispute as the greatest radicalizing force in the Arab world. The Saudis have been willing to use their oil resources to help nurture a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: They have resisted pressures within OPEC to raise oil prices and to abandon the dollar as the monetary unit for computing prices, at least in part to acknowledge the U.S. role in peace negotiations.

The Saudis have also used oil as a tool of coercion. An oil embargo, even the hint of one, is a powerful weapon indeed. But it has its drawbacks. A sudden embargo-induced oil shortage would seriously weaken the economies of those industrialized states on which Saudi Arabia ultimately depends politically, militarily, and economically. It is doubtful, then, that the Saudis would consider enforcing an embargo under any circumstances short of a major crisis, such as another Middle East war. Indeed, the only time an embargo has been declared was during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. King Faisal, reacting to the announcement of a massive $2.2 billion U.S. military aid program to Israel, imposed an embargo through the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) aimed primarily at the United States and the Netherlands (for its alleged pro-Israeli policies).* 

OPEC: Divided Cartel?

A third major factor in Saudi oil policy is the kingdom's commitment to OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The organization was founded in 1960 by Venezuela and Middle Eastern oil producing countries to influence the price of oil. While often characterized as a cartel, the political and economic interests of OPEC members are so diverse that OPEC functions almost exclusively as an organization to set oil prices and production rates.

In its early years, OPEC was relatively ineffective, primarily

*Americans tend to blur the distinction between OAPEC and OPEC, as well as between the oil embargo and the quadrupling of the price of petroleum. In fact, OAPEC and OPEC are not the same; the embargo and the price hikes were not (initially) related; and the so-called quadrupling actually resulted from two separate doublings. To set the record straight: (1) the first price rise, which coincided with the October 1973 war but had nothing to do with it, was called for by OPEC; (2) the oil embargo, unconnected with the price hike, was begun by OAPEC, in part through Saudi efforts; (3) the second doubling of oil prices, in December 1973, was influenced by the embargo, as OPEC set new rates to reflect the short supply of petroleum on world markets. This second price rise, led by Iran, was opposed by King Faisal, who feared the economic consequences for the industrialized West.
because there was a buyers' market in petroleum. Since the producing countries could not "eat their oil," they were forced to sell it at whatever price the oil companies would pay. This changed in the 1970s with the shift to a sellers' market; by 1973, OPEC had acquired total power to set prices.

At the time, there was a fairly wide-spread sentiment among Westerners who should have known better that as the growing world recession depressed demand for oil, OPEC would cease to function as the price setter. The reasoning behind this view was that, of the major producers, only Saudi Arabia could afford the revenue losses of major production cuts, but that at some point, the Saudis would tire of voluntarily bearing the brunt and call for pro rata cuts from all other OPEC members. At that point, OPEC solidarity would break down.

More of the Same

This view was naive in several respects. It overestimated the total production cuts necessary to keep prices stable. It overestimated Saudi revenue requirements and therefore the threshold at which the Saudis would halt further unilateral production cuts. But worst of all, it underestimated the psychological commitment to OPEC of all its members. Having been wholly dependent on market conditions and the oil companies for, in some cases, 40 years or more, OPEC members are absolutely insistent that they maintain the power to set prices through OPEC solidarity, even in a declining market.

Saudi Arabia, no less than its fellow OPEC members, is determined to keep OPEC strong and will absorb considerable economic costs to that end. Moreover, within OPEC, the Saudis want to maintain their predominant position. In this regard, their ability to cut production in order to maintain prices—without seriously affecting their economic development—is highly advantageous. They also have the capacity to increase production in order to keep prices from rising too rapidly.

Barring a major crisis, such as the resumption of Arab-Israeli hostilities, it is both logical and likely that the Saudis will follow a middle of the road policy on oil for the foreseeable future. Yet there is still room for some flexibility. For example, with the present excess in world capacity, the "conservationists" in the Saudi government have succeeded in adopting a policy allowing the kingdom's oil production to fall without placing undue pressure on the world economy. In February 1978, the government placed a ceiling on production of light crude not to exceed 65 percent of total production. (The move
was made to bring light crude production into line with the estimated proportion of light to heavy crude oil in total Saudi reserves, as well as to ease the strain on the Ghawar field.) The effect of this decision has been to reduce overall Saudi oil production to roughly 1 million b/d less than the present ceiling of 8.5 million b/d.

With a current capacity of over 10.5 million b/d, the Saudis can easily increase production as demand picks up in the 1980s. The real question, however, is not about future production within current capacity limits, but about future capacity itself. How fast will the Saudis expand capacity to keep up with anticipated demand? Some recent studies have stated that Saudi capacity will have to reach 20 million b/d by 1990 to keep up with world needs, a figure the Saudis reject out of hand. According to Yamani, studies "expecting the King to produce 20 million b/d are speculative and not to be taken seriously."

With world economic growth still below expectations, other Western observers have scaled down the figure of required Saudi capacity in the 1980s to about 16 million b/d. Even this figure may be high. And there is no evidence that the Saudis are gearing up to meet such demand. As they take over production responsibility from Aramco, the Saudis will naturally move somewhat cautiously; the technical constraints on production are great.

In the meantime, the Saudis will probably continue to exert a moderating force on prices within OPEC, though slightly less so than in the past. To avoid another energy crisis, they will probably support a gradual rise in oil prices, slightly higher than the rise in global inflation. "Unless oil prices are permitted to grow gradually in real terms throughout the rest of the century," Yamani stated in an address to the Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists in June 1978, "another sharp price increase is inevitable by the end of the 1980s."
BACKGROUND BOOKS

SAUDI ARABIA

All Muslims look to that part of the Arab world which today calls itself Saudi Arabia—the only kingdom ever named for a family—as the birthplace and cradle of Islam. The prophet Muhammad was born c. A.D. 570 in Mecca, already a place of pilgrimage for the tribes called the "People of Allah" or the "Protected Neighbors of Allah." He began preaching on the oneness of Allah— at a time when most Arabs were polytheists worshiping not only Allah but a pantheon of other deities.

Islam's emergence in world history dates from Muhammad's move to Medina in A.D. 622. En route to that city in the Hejaz, his men attacked a caravan under the protection of his kinsmen from Mecca, who thereupon dubbed him "divider" and sought, unsuccessfully, to overrun his Medina stronghold. The 1000-year period of wars, conquests, and conversions that saw Muhammad and the caliphs who succeeded him spreading Islam throughout the Mediterranean world and the continent and distant islands to the East had begun.

For the Westerner, the standard reference work on the Arabs and other Muslims is The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by P. M. Holt et al. (Cambridge, 1970, 2 vols., cloth; 1977, 4 vols., paper). This work, hailed by British and American scholars, is a target of a slashing new attack on studies of Islam by Westerners. In Orientalism (Pantheon, 1978), Edward W. Said, a Columbia University professor of comparative literature and winner of the first (1976) Lionel Trilling Award for criticism, writes that "none of the innumerable Orientalist texts on Islam, including their summa, The Cambridge History," can prepare the reader "for what has taken place since 1948 in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or the Yemens."

This is true—despite the fact that much early French, German, and British Orientalism was based on observations in just these countries, especially Egypt (site of the first great Islamic university, Al-Azhar, founded A.D. 1006 in Cairo). And far more has been written in recent years about these Muslim nations, where Muhammad's doctrine now appears to have been diluted, than about the long-isolated, more conservative Arabs of Saudi Arabia.

A few Western travelers did venture into the great desert interior of peninsular Arabia before its formal establishment as a nation in 1934. They included such exemplars of the archetypal British eccentric—explorer—writer—imperialist tradition as Charles Doughty, Richard Burton, Lady Hester Stanhope, Gertrude Bell, and others. Long before they had their turn, however, Travels in Arabia the Desart was published in London in 1718. Written in the 1690s by the Chevalier D'Arvieux soon after his return to France from many years in the East, it is an account of his service as a young French consular official. Laurence D'Arvieux learned Arabic, grew a beard, and negotiated a treaty to permit the Christian order of Barefoot Carmelites to resettle on Mt. Carmel (now in Israel). In what became standard practice for West-
ern visitors, he writes more about his own Arabian garb and the romance of the desert than about the Arabs, although the degree of civilization and courtesy he encountered in the tents of the amirs earned his astonished admiration.

"The sun made me an Arab," declared Charles M. Doughty, whose pioneering account of the Hejaz, *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (Cambridge, 1888), has appeared in many editions. An abridgement edited by Edward Garnett, *Passages from Arabia Deserta* remains available (Peter Smith reprint, 1978). Doughty's book is less notable for its content than for its historic influence on the Victorian archeologists, explorers, and missionaries whose imaginations he fired. For them, the empty sand wastes, exotic Bedouins, and oases of Arabia provided a setting against which the affairs of Empire were being played out, with a Kiplingesque White Man, not an Arab, in charge.

Sir Richard F. Burton, famed as a 19th-century traveler to India and other exotic lands, translated the harem tales known to most schoolchildren as *The Arabian Nights*. His original English text and notes on *The Thousand Nights and a Night* was privately printed for subscribers by London's Burton Club in 1905, a generation after Lady Burton's sanitized version "for household reading" (London: Waterlow, 1887) had achieved wide popularity. Among Sir Richard's many "true adventure" books, one describing Saudi cities is his sometimes fanciful, sometimes pedantic *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah*, also edited by Lady Burton (London: Longman, 1857; Dover, 1964, 2 vols., paper).

The 20th century's best known literary descendant of the Victorian Arabophiles was an Oxford graduate, Thomas Edward Lawrence, who first went to the Middle East on an archeological dig in 1913. Already it was clear that Turkey might side with Germany against England in the event of war. Young T. E. Lawrence was recruited by British intelligence to reconnoiter places where fighting might occur. He wore Arab dress, learned local dialects, sympathized with the tribal societies' desire for freedom from the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Soon after the outbreak of World War I, he was employed in Cairo as an intelligence officer. His dramatic role in the fierce hit-and-run fighting against the Turks, after the Arab Revolt of 1916 began, gave him his lifelong identification as "Lawrence of Arabia."

Much has been written about the man, including U.S. broadcaster-travelogue Lowell Thomas's highly colored, out-of-print *With Lawrence in Arabia* (London: Hutchinson, 1924, cloth; Popular Library, 1971, paper). Richard Aldington's debunking *Lawrence of Arabia: A Biographical Enquiry* (London: Collins, 1955; Greenwood reprint, 1976) helps to correct the record, although Aldington gives Lawrence less credit and credibility than is his due. Neither author notes the homosexuality that Lawrence hints at in his own powerful *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: a triumph* (London: Cape, 1935, cloth; Penguin, 1976, paper).

"I was sent to [the] Arabs as a stranger," Lawrence writes, "unable to think their thoughts or subscribe to their beliefs, but charged by duty to lead them forward and to develop to the highest any movement of theirs profitable to England in her war. . . . In my case, the efforts for
these years to live in the dress of Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and let me look at the West and its conventions with new eyes; they destroyed it all for me."

Another Britisher involved in the desert intrigues and battles of World War I was Harry St. John Bridger Philby, seconded by his government in 1917 as political officer to King Ibn Saud, rival of the Sherif of Mecca for control of the territory wrested from the Turks. Out of Philby’s experiences came several books, notably his *Arabia of the Wahhabis* (London: 1927 and 1977; New Jersey, Frank Cass, 1977), part of a trilogy, *The Heart of Arabia, His Arabian Jubilee* (London: Hale, 1952) is a colorful celebration of Ibn Saud’s achievements over half a century. Part genealogy, part military history, part desert lore, part political analysis, it closes with the king’s brother Abdul- lah gently quoting the Prophet: "The last hour will not come upon the world until the Island of the Arabs is transformed into a land of meadows and rivers."

British writers continued to recount their own adventures as the Saudis moved toward modernity. Freya Stark wrote *The Southern Gates of Arabia* (London: Murray, 1936; Transatlantic reprint, 1972) about her attempt to follow the old incense road across southern Arabia (where frankincense and myrrh are still produced) to the Yemen; she failed to reach Shabwa, the ancient capital. Bertram Thomas described his 1930 crossing on camelback of the "Empty Quarter"—a half-million-square-mile desert in the south that stretches 900 miles from the frontier of Yemen to the foothills of Oman—in *Arabia Felix* (London: Cape, 1938).

But the literature on Saudi Arabia soon changed as the result of the discovery of oil, in 1931, in the neighboring British protectorate of Bahrain. Today most of what little is written about the Saudis is highly specialized—economic, political, or sociological.

One British journalist’s book, *The Seven Sisters* by London Observer correspondent Anthony Sampson (Viking, 1975), analyzes the politics of oil, the role of the major companies in international diplomacy, and the 1973 crisis when OPEC solidarity showed the companies (and their world customers) that economic power had been snatched from them by the Arab governments."

In passing, Sampson tells how St. John Philby, by the 1930s no longer a member of the Colonial Service but an anti-British Arabist who had embraced Islam, persuaded Ibn Saud to bring in an American geologist (who had already tried, unsuccessfully, to find new water sources) to prospect for oil. He found it in 1938.

*Discovery* (Beirut: Export Press, 1971), an Aramco-supported company history of the years 1933–45, by Wallace E. Stegner (better known as a short-story writer) provides additional background on the Americans who drilled the first wells and built the first pipeline in 120º heat—and on the wives who accompanied them to the old Red Sea port city of Jidda, which quickly became a frontier boom town.

Karl S. Twitchell, the Vermont

*A special issue of Daedalus (vol. 104, no. 4, 1975) provides perhaps the best country-by-country account of the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo; as Western governments failed to coordinate their responses, the major international oil companies quietly reallocated available supplies and averted a more serious crisis.*
Yankee geologist who found the king's oil, later wrote *Saudi Arabia, with an Account of the Development of its Natural Resources* (Princeton, 1947; Greenwood reprint, 3rd ed., 1969). Twitchell's book briefly covers his own part in the oil drama, but is largely an enthusiastic account of agricultural development, small industries (pearling, boat building), and the Saudi government's hopes for extension of the nation's limited water supply despite Bedouin resistance to irrigation. Even the revised edition is now partly out of date, but academics still recommend it as one of the few good overviews available.

Another is the U.S. Foreign Area Studies *Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia* (Government Printing Office, 1977), dry but complete through 1976. *Saudi Arabia* by Mahmoud Samir Ahmed (Chase World Information Corporation, 1976), a volume in Chase Manhattan Bank's series on the Middle East and North Africa, is keyed to the needs of corporate executives. It provides the same kinds of basic information as the *Area Handbook* with more on financial opportunities (including the sale of professional and consulting services) and on transport, communication, and other expenditures under the nation's two five-year plans. One example: specific building costs and funding (3,228.4 SR millions, or roughly $920 million) for the transformation of a small private college into the full-fledged King Abd al-Aziz University, with five campuses in Jidda and two in Mecca, supplementing the University of Riyadh and the University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran.

Recent technical studies include *Saudi Arabian Development Strategy* by Donald A. Wells (American Enterprise Institute, 1976); *The Saudi Arabian Economy* by Ramon Knauerhase (Praeger, 1975); and *Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy* (Praeger, 1976) by Sheikh Rustum Ali, a Bangladesh foreign service officer.

What modernity means to the tribes is the subject of *Bedouin Village, A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition* by a Japanese sociologist, Motoko Katadura (Univ. of Tokyo, 1977). It was researched in the Wadi Fatima area in western Saudi Arabia—more liberal than the rest of the country. Author Katadura defines a village as any settlement where residents have built a mosque or a cemetery; it can range in size from as few as 5 tents or houses to as many as 600. Even before the massive post-1973 increase in oil revenues accelerated the process, she found former nomads and semi-nomads in the Wadi Fatima getting jobs as truck drivers and planting vegetables and melons for sale to markets as far away as Beirut. Their women, she discovered, traditionally enjoyed considerable independence (in one village, they initiated half of the divorces) that bodes well, she believes, for the Saudis' ability to cope with change ahead.

**EDITOR'S NOTE.** Help in selecting these books was provided by John Duke Anthony, among other scholars, and by Peter Sarris of the Bankers Trust Company in New York.
The history of black Americans has been unique—and enduring color differences prevent that uniqueness from disappearing. However, black experiences have differed. The legacy of slavery and racial discrimination, economist Thomas Sowell argues, does not explain everything, notably the current plight of the black "underclass" and the past achievements of many blacks. Rather, he suggests, Southern black latecomers to the Northern big city slums are undergoing the same harsh urban baptism, with its attendant crime, broken families, and poverty, that peasant immigrants from Europe went through almost a century ago. Elsewhere, Sowell has argued in favor of better urban education and against federal pressure for proportional representation by race in schools and occupations. Here, he focuses on the contrasting fortunes of three major black groups in an essay drawn from his chapter in a detailed new Urban Institute study, *American Ethnic Groups*.

by Thomas Sowell

Black people in the United States are usually referred to as a more or less homogeneous group—by sociologists, newsmen, government officials, even their own leaders. But the history of black Americans is really the history of three distinct groups, whose descendants have very different incomes and occupations, and even different fertility rates, in the 20th century.

The first of these groups is the ante-bellum "free persons of color," who in the 1830s constituted 14 percent of the American Negro population. The second and largest component of the black population consists of descendants of slaves emancipated by the Civil War. People of West Indian ancestry make up the third group, which now accounts for 1 percent of the black American population. To white employers, landlords, bankers, and college officials, these three black groups may "all look
alike.” But the differences among them in socioeconomic status raise important questions about the effect of color—as distinguished from culture—in the American economy and society.

The first “free persons of color” in America came from among the African captives who landed at Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619. They became indentured servants and, like white indentured servants in colonial America, became free after a specific term of service. Slavery in perpetuity developed later, perhaps toward the middle of the 17th century. But even after slavery was established, the ranks of “free persons of color” continued to grow through manumission, escape, and purchase of freedom.

For Some, a Head Start

By 1790, there were 60,000 free Negroes, and by 1860, their number had grown to 488,000. The “free persons of color” differed from the slaves in both racial mixture and geographic distribution. About 37 percent were mulattos, as compared to only 8 percent of the slaves. From the first census of 1790 on through the Civil War, virtually all slaves were located in the Southern and border states. Their work was agricultural, principally growing cotton. By contrast, the “free persons of color” were divided equally between the North and South, and almost half were urbanized—a higher proportion than among contemporary whites.

In the 30 years prior to the Civil War, the “free persons of color” faced progressively worsening economic, legal, and political discrimination. In various parts of the South, they lost the right to vote, to bear arms, to assemble peaceably, to testify in court against whites, to move freely, and to engage in various occupations. Throughout much of the ante-bellum era, black children were not permitted to attend public schools in most states. Some Southern states outlawed the education of black children altogether. However, private schools operated “underground,” and the census of 1850 showed most “free persons of color” to be literate even in cities where no black schools were officially recorded. (The importance of the tradition of private schools for blacks may be indicated by the fact that it was 1916 before there were as many Negro youngsters enrolled in public high schools as in private high schools.)

Despite ever more restrictions, the ante-bellum “free persons” of color advanced economically during the 30 years preceding the Civil War. Black property ownership doubled in Virginia between 1830 and 1860, and similar or larger increases
occurred in other Southern states. In the country as a whole, the free Negroes accumulated an estimated $50 million in real and personal wealth before the Civil War—at 19th-century price levels. The one right that was not rescinded during the repressive period of 1830–60 was the right to own property. The continued economic progress of “free persons of color” indicates the effectiveness of that one right in isolation.

While the “free persons of color” were, on the whole, very poor, they made great efforts to be self-supporting. Mutual aid societies existed among them as far back as 1787, and by the early 19th century, there were dozens of such organizations in cities like Baltimore and Philadelphia. Some of these later developed into insurance companies, among the largest of black-owned businesses today.

The enduring consequences of the urban, occupational, and educational head start of the “free persons of color” and their descendants are still evident in the 20th century. The family backgrounds of more than half of the black professionals in Washington, D.C., in 1950 included grandfathers who had been “free persons of color.” Nationally, this was true of an even higher percentage of black holders of doctoral degrees. The leading black high schools in the 20th century were in cities where there had been large concentrations of free Negroes before the Civil War—and the top black high schools (Dunbar in Washington, for instance) were founded by such people. Descendants of the “free persons of color” were prominent among the founders of the NAACP and as late as the 1940s constituted half of the students at Howard University.

The Slave Majority

The relative success of the descendants of ante-bellum free blacks raises serious questions. If there are large socioeconomic differences among subgroups that are indistinguishable to outsiders, then the behavior of outsiders—racial discrimination, for example—is not all-determining as regards the progress of those subgroups or of the group as a whole.

Thomas Sowell, 48, is professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Born in Gastonia, North Carolina, he earned his B.A. at Harvard in 1958, his M.A. at Columbia the following year, and his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1968. He is the author of Black Education: Myths and Tragedies (1972), Classical Economics Reconsidered (1974), Race and Economics (1975), and served as editor of, and contributor to, American Ethnic Groups (1978).
For the vast majority of American blacks, slavery is the dominant fact in their history—not only because it spanned more than half of that history but also because it continues to influence their geographic distribution, culture, and opportunities in a country whose racial attitudes were formed during the era of slavery.

The United States did not import as many African slaves as Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, or Cuba. Yet by 1825, it held more slaves than any of them. The reason was that slaves survived and multiplied here, whereas they died off under the more brutal conditions of other Western Hemisphere countries, which relied on importing replacements from Africa. Slaves in the United States had a level of food consumption, clothing, health care, and life expectancy not very different from that of the contemporary working poor.

**Latecomers to the North**

In most of the other slave societies of the Western Hemisphere, the black population achieved freedom in phases, either as individuals or as a group whose prospective emancipation was planned years in advance; in Cuba and Brazil, most blacks had already gained freedom before slavery itself was abolished. In the United States, freedom came with literally overnight suddenness.

After Appomattox, both blacks and whites in the war-ravaged South escaped starvation only through massive aid from the federal government. Grim economic conditions led whites to enter occupations, such as construction, once regarded as "Negroes' work" and to hold onto them long enough for the same jobs to become known as "white men's work." Along with economic and legal repression of blacks came an era of mass violence and terror unequaled before or since. In the 1890s, the lynching of Negroes reached a peak of 161 per year. One reaction of Negroes in the South was migration northward.

The Northern black communities to which these Southern Negroes moved were often culturally quite foreign to them. Like other migrants to the city (including European immigrants from peasant backgrounds), it would take them generations to adapt themselves to the requirements of urban life. By the late 19th century, Northern blacks in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago had made such adaptations and had achieved some modest economic advances as a result. In New York in the 1890s, for example, most Negroes were better off than most of the recent European immigrants. There were few unskilled laborers in the black community, and many held jobs as bar-
bers, waiters, caterers, and skilled craftsmen. Blacks even held a few municipal jobs.

The arrival of masses of unskilled, undereducated Negroes from the rural South not only enlarged the black urban communities; it transformed them. Although Northern migration was a longstanding pattern, extending back to well before the Civil War, the numbers had previously been within the range of absorption by the existing black communities. But in 1900, the proportion of New York Negroes born outside the state surpassed 50 percent for the first time. By 1910, more than three-quarters of the blacks in Manhattan were born outside the state. And this was but a foretaste of the massive migrations to follow. Nationally, the record-breaking number of migrants in 1900–10 was nearly tripled in 1910–20, and that in turn was almost doubled in 1920–30.

Urban Retrogression

This rapid, enormous influx of less educated, less acculturated, Southern Negroes reversed the trend toward better race relations. The rise of many Northern ghettos dates from this period, when housing restrictions hardened into rigid de facto
segregation. In Chicago, where in 1910 more than two-thirds of the black population had lived in predominantly white neighborhoods, attempts by Negroes to move into white neighborhoods were now met by bombings and mob violence. Older black Northerners bitterly blamed the new migrants from the rural South for the retrogression that all Negroes suffered.

Yet with all the serious problems of blacks in both the North and the South, slow but steady economic progress continued. The almost total illiteracy of the black population as it emerged from slavery was overcome. As late as 1880, 70 percent of blacks were illiterate, but by 1910, 70 percent were literate—a remarkable achievement made even more so by a lack of public schools in the rural South. Black incomes rose faster than white incomes in the last third of the 19th century. By 1913—50 years after emancipation—one-fourth of the blacks in the South were home owners rather than renters.

But the poverty, unemployment, overcrowded living, crime, disease, broken homes, and substandard educational performance common to many immigrant minorities in America struck blacks as well, sometimes (not always) harder than others. While it is tempting to call this a “legacy” of slavery, many of these problems were not as serious in earlier times (during and soon after slavery) as they have become in recent decades. Motherless homes were far less common among blacks in the 19th and early 20th centuries than during the past 30 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEW YORK</th>
<th>CHICAGO</th>
<th>PHILADEPHIA</th>
<th>DETROIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>749,000</td>
<td>493,000</td>
<td>376,000</td>
<td>299,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,088,000</td>
<td>813,000</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>482,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,667,000</td>
<td>1,103,000</td>
<td>654,000</td>
<td>660,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>
(Moreover, very similar proportions of broken homes have been found in various white minorities, past and present, living under similar poor economic conditions.) Unusually high rates of black unemployment and withdrawal from the labor force have also been more prominent phenomena during the past 50 years than in earlier times, nearer to slavery. Every census from 1890 to 1930 found a higher rate of labor force participation among blacks than among whites. Thus, the moral enormity of slavery does not make it a universal cause of social patterns found among blacks in America today.

The West Indian Contrast

This becomes especially apparent when considering social and economic conditions of the third group of black Americans—West Indians living in the United States. West Indians were also enslaved—under worse conditions than blacks endured in the United States (infant mortality rates among West Indian slaves were seven times those among slaves in this country). But their social and economic patterns are very different from those found among other black Americans.

West Indians have long been over-represented among prominent Negroes in the United States—from Marcus Garvey and Claude McKay in an earlier era to Stokely Carmichael, Shirley Chisholm, Malcolm X, Kenneth Clark, James Farmer, Roy Innes, W. Arthur Lewis, Harry Belafonte, and Sidney Poitier in more recent times. More generally, West Indians have significantly higher incomes and occupational status than native black Americans, and lower fertility rates. This can be seen in 1970 Census data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>American Negroes</th>
<th>West Indians</th>
<th>National Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median family income, 1969</td>
<td>$5,888</td>
<td>$8,971</td>
<td>$9,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median years of education</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent in professions</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent laborers</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of children per woman</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Public Use Sample, 1970 Census

The economic differences are paralleled by social differences and social separation between the two groups. A 1972 study of Barbadians living in New York City showed that 87 percent of them married other Barbadians. A 1962 study of
native blacks and West Indians in a suburban New York community showed that each had over 90 percent of their friendships within their own group or with whites.

Various reasons have been advanced to explain the economic differences between the West Indians and native black Americans. One is that West Indians are heavily concentrated in the New York City area, where incomes are generally higher than in the South, where about half the native black Americans live. Native blacks in New York City earn about $1,000 more than blacks nationally, which narrows the gap somewhat but does not close it. Other reasons suggested are that West Indians received a better education under the British school system in the islands, or that white American employers detect their accents and treat them better than native blacks. One way to test these theories would be to isolate second-generation West Indians (born in the United States of West Indian parents), who would have less accent or no accent, and who would be educated in American schools. Census data show second-generation West Indians in New York City surpassing not only native blacks but also first-generation West Indians, and the U.S. population as a whole—in 1969 family income ($10,900), education (11.5 years), and percent in the professions (18.3 percent). Color alone is apparently not as all-determining as is commonly supposed.

**Self-Reliance vs. Dependence**

The differences between slavery in the West Indies and slavery in the United States may offer some explanation of the socioeconomic disparities between West Indian immigrants and native black Americans. In the West Indies, slaves grew their own food and sold the surplus in the market, while slaves in the United States were issued food or were fed from communal kitchens. In other words, even under slavery, blacks in the West Indies had generations of experience with individual rewards for individual efforts, in at least part of their lives. By contrast, slaves in the United States lived in regimented dependence. Paradoxically (given the greater brutality of West Indian slavery), post-emancipation race relations and job opportunities for blacks were often better in the West Indies than in the United States. This reflected a greater need for black workers in countries without a large white working class. If Negroes there had been confined to the lowest level jobs, as they had been under Jim Crow laws in the South, most higher-level occupations could not have been filled at all. The greater self-reliance of West Indians today, evidenced by their greater entrepreneurial effort and success compared to that of native black Americans, sug-
In 1969, psychologist Arthur Jensen of the University of California, Berkeley, attributed the low average IQ among U.S. blacks (85 versus a national average of 100) to genetic traits. His conclusions stirred considerable rebuttal. Recent studies by Thomas Sowell, Sandra Scarr of the University of Minnesota, and other scholars have contested Jensen's thesis as they examined various segments of the black population.

For example, among all black Americans, Northerners score higher IQs than Southerners (90 versus 80), while black orphans raised by white families average 106. Black females perform better on tests than do black males (a 1956 study showed five times as many with IQs of 130 and above)—perhaps, says Sowell, because females have a "greater resistance to environmental influence," as shown by rates of infant mortality and epidemic survival.

Moreover, blacks are not alone in having a history of low IQ test performance. Among white ethnic groups who now rank at or above the national IQ average, many scored poorly at earlier phases of their existence in this country. In 1926, for instance, the median IQ of Slovak immigrants was measured at 85.6; for Greeks, 83; for Poles, 85; for Spaniards, 78; for Portuguese, 84. In 1921, 83 percent of the Jewish immigrants at Ellis Island were labeled "feeble minded."

Lastly, Sowell cites a 1942 report on the intelligence ratings of white east Tennessee mountain children, who, like most blacks, were isolated from the mainstream of American culture. The report showed them to have a low IQ, comparable to that of blacks. In general, Sowell contends, environmental and cultural factors have had a major effect on black—and white—test performance over time.

What do all these intragroup differences—especially evident in the history of "free persons of color" and West Indian blacks—say about our vision of racial problems and their solution? Among the popular explanations for black-white socioeconomic disparities are: (a) genetic or innate racial differences; (b) slavery, discrimination, and other immoral actions by whites; (c) education; and (d) government policy. We can look at these in order.

At one time, it was common to attribute the economic gap between blacks and whites to a racial or genetic inferiority of Negroes. The generally greater success of lighter-complexioned Negroes seemed to lend credence to this. West Indians, however, are decisive evidence to the contrary: They have a higher proportion of African ancestry than American Negroes in general,
so their substantial socioeconomic achievements can hardly be attributed to Caucasian genes.

Can even an enormity like slavery be automatically invoked to explain every black-white difference today? Not if the pattern in question is absent from descendants of other groups of enslaved people—and present in white groups who were never enslaved. In occupations, crime rates, alcoholism, and fertility rates, the history of blacks in 20th-century ghettos is very similar to the history of the Irish immigrants in 19th-century urban slums (which were worse) and very different from that of West Indian blacks. The moral horrors of slavery—including overwork, brutality, and sexual exploitation of women—were all worse in the West Indies than in the South. Why would the black pattern today resemble that of the 19th-century Irish immigrants rather than that of West Indians today if slavery were the cause?

**Culture, not Color?**

Racial discrimination by whites is another factor that has obviously affected black history, but it, too, cannot be held up as an all-encompassing explanation. Those West Indians who are the hardest to distinguish from native blacks—that is, second-generation West Indians—are the most prosperous.

The real differences between the two black groups are cultural, as further evidenced by their social separateness from each other even in an era of “black solidarity” rhetoric. That one group has a fertility rate above the national average while the other does not have even enough children to reproduce itself is indicative of fundamental differences in values and aspirations.

Education is also clearly an important variable, but here again the question must be whether it can be automatically invoked—as it so often is. The 1970 Census showed negligible differences in years of schooling between native and West Indian blacks nationally, and no differences at all in the New York City metropolitan area. Yet substantial income differences existed. What cannot be detected in gross statistics are the attitudes and values that determine the extent to which an education will “take.” A classic study of West Indians in 1939 concluded that they had significant advantages in this respect over native black youngsters. More recent data are consistent with that conclusion. Moreover, in those schools where native black children have been successfully educated, the principal difference has been the attitude of parents and students—not physical plant, student-teacher ratios, or “innovative” methods.
Government policy can be—and has been—a powerful influence in the lives of blacks. Slavery itself was maintained by the availability of governmental force. In the South, Jim Crow laws obviously worked to the disadvantage of blacks, as did separate-but-inferior public education, a historic handicap not yet overcome. More recently, government actions have been both detrimental and beneficial. Federal “equal opportunity” laws in the 1960s rapidly increased black incomes, both absolutely and relative to white incomes. Black family income doubled between 1960 and 1970, while white income rose by only one-third. However, federal “affirmative action” or racial “representation” policies have not produced comparable results in the 1970s.

In recent years, a rise in black incomes and occupational status has contrasted with growing negative indicators. Black teenage unemployment in the 1970s is five times what it was in 1950. The incidence of broken homes, female-headed households, and welfare dependency has also increased. Black jobless rates since 1950 have risen as the federal minimum wage has escalated and doubled in coverage, pricing less-skilled and less-experienced workers out of the market. Other economic and demographic trends influence unemployment, of course; but none of these other variables changed in so dramatic a fashion as to account for a fivefold increase in black teenage unemployment during a period of prosperity and increased general economic advance by blacks. A number of other governmental policies, at the local and national level, have foreclosed employment opportunities (through restrictive occupational licensing laws, for example) and made nonemployment (welfare) a practical alternative for those at the lower end of the economic scale.

All three black groups have shown determination and resourcefulness in advancing in the face of handicaps and opposition. Any national policy that attempts to facilitate their further progress must support these strengths rather than promote dependence and a sense of helpless victimhood.
Albert Einstein was born in Ulm, Germany, the son of a factory owner, on March 14, 1879. Centennial celebrations are planned around the world. Einstein's most revolutionary work, contained in a handful of articles, was published before he was 40; in his last decades, however, he shunned the quantum mechanics he had helped to develop. Why? Part of the answer can be gleaned from a 1927 essay he wrote for the *Manchester Guardian* on the bicentennial of Isaac Newton's death. We reprint it here, annotated and slightly abridged by the editors, following an introduction by the Smithsonian Institution's Paul Forman.

by Paul Forman

Albert Einstein composed tributes to many individuals but to only three men he had never met—Johannes Kepler (d. 1630), who formulated the laws of planetary motion; Isaac Newton (d. 1727), who derived those laws from general dynamic principles and a law of universal gravitation; and James Clerk Maxwell (d. 1879), who, by a mathematical formulation of Michael Faraday's concept of a physical state pervading all matter and space (a "field"), obtained the laws of electromagnetism. For Einstein, these three men defined the enterprise he adopted as his own life's work: the construction of a complete description of physical reality using the concepts of space, time, force, material point (matter), and continuous field.

Of these three men, it was Newton whom Einstein regarded as the father of theoretical physics. For it was Newton who invented differential calculus and thus laid the foundations of a mechanics providing continuous, pictorial, causal descriptions of physical processes. A profound natural philosopher, he brought undreamed of order and interconnection into Nature through his hypothesis of universal gravitation. With a single
mathematical law, he accounted for the tides, the motion of objects on earth, and the paths of bodies in the heavens. And yet—and this especially excited Einstein’s admiration—Newton was not so blinded by the brilliance of his achievement that he overlooked the logical and metaphysical weaknesses of his own mechanical axioms and physical hypotheses.

Still, Einstein, intent upon seeing in Newton the origins of his own scientific goals and tools, attributed to his hero much that does not fit the historical person. In his 1927 essay, he misrepresents Newton most seriously by attributing to him his own, deterministic belief that the entire future evolution of the universe could be calculated given its configuration and motion at any given moment. So rigorous an exclusion of God from any further influence upon the world He had created was, to Newton’s mind, too close to atheism.

Spraining the Brain

Nor did Einstein appreciate how extremely different Newton’s personality and values were from his own. Newton largely neglected the mathematical physics for which he was uniquely suited, devoting himself instead to intellectually less demanding investigations, such as Biblical chronology. In 1695, at the age of 53, Newton obtained appointment as Master of the Mint and abandoned his scholarly life in Cambridge for the bustle of London. Einstein, by contrast, never shirked the extraordinarily difficult assignment he had given himself. Nor did he bolster himself with romantic illusions about the nature of that task: “He who knows the pleasures of intellectual work does not go chasing after it,” he often remarked. But an unceasing “spraining of the brain,” he would add, was the fate of “a man of my type.”

In their relations with people, too, Einstein and Newton could scarcely have been less alike. The Briton was celibate, secretive, vindictive, variously fawning or haughty, tolerant only of sycophants—in short, a cold and unattractive personality. Einstein, on the other hand, at least in his mature years, displayed the greatest warmth, gentleness, openness to criti-
cism, disregard for social rank and convention, and the deepest concern for humanity. Only with his fellow physicists was Einstein's tone a bit impatient, ironic, mocking. Only from them did he expect something, and almost invariably they disappointed him. With his work, they seldom could help; their own seemed largely directed by academic fashion and opportunism.

As a theoretical physicist, Einstein was almost entirely self-taught. His formal higher education was limited to a four-year course at the Swiss Federal Polytechnic in Zurich, where he was trained as a high school teacher of mathematics and physics. A mediocre student, he neglected his course work (with first-rate scientists) in order to pursue his private study of the classics of theoretical physics, including the works of Gustav Kirchhoff, Hermann Helmholtz, and Heinrich Hertz.

Following graduation in 1900, Einstein lived and worked for nine intensely creative and productive years in a nonacademic environment; most of this time was spent as a patent examiner at the Swiss patent office in Bern. Here the young "Technical Expert, 3rd class" conceived the special theory of relativity (from which he deduced the equivalence of mass and energy, \( E=mc^2 \)); a general statistical mechanics (from which he deduced the laws governing the fluctuations in the motion of a particle suspended in a fluid, and thus made possible the experimental determination of the size of a molecule); and the idea that light really consists of particles, whose behavior is wave-like only on the average (thus explaining the circumstances
under which electrons are released from metals by light, and several other puzzling phenomena).

Remarkably, Einstein's first papers on all three subjects appeared not only in a single year—his twenty-seventh, 1905—but also in a single volume of the German journal, *Annalen der Physik*. (Compare Newton, who, in a single fruitful year—his twenty-fourth, 1666—discovered that "white" light is actually a rainbow of colors, invented differential and integral calculus, and worked out the basic laws of mechanics as well as the law of universal gravitation.)

In view of the novelty and ultimate importance of Einstein's ideas, in particular those three which he exposed almost simultaneously in 1905, it would be easy, and it certainly is common, to describe Einstein as a revolutionary in science. Yet, considering the case more closely, a revolutionary guise seems improbable for Einstein, who in these early years was isolated socially and intellectually from his fellow physicists. In fact, while his academic colleagues were behaving like self-conscious revolutionaries—striving to replace the old, mechanistic world view with one founded upon electromagnetism and the newly discovered electron—Einstein sustained himself with the notion that he was within the high tradition of theoretical physics, extending and perfecting the mechanical picture deriving ultimately from Newton. Certainly that was the intent behind his special theory of relativity, which, by obtaining the same results as were derived from the electromagnetic world view, but without any assumptions about the nature of the forces or substances involved, pulled the rug out from under the electromagnetic program.

Philosophically, Einstein was much influenced in these years by Ernst Mach (1836–1916) and Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), who persuasively expressed certain views which were widespread among late 19th- and early 20th-century physicists. Mach and Poincaré emphasized, on the one hand, that only concepts and constructs capable of being defined in terms of sensory experiences—i.e., in terms of possible experiments—were to be admitted into science. On the other hand, they believed, the actual choice of concepts, especially fundamental concepts, was to a large degree arbitrary, a matter of convention. But while his fellow physicists persisted in this view, which they eventually regarded as strikingly confirmed by Einstein's own work, Einstein himself gradually moved "backward" philosophically to the *realist* view that scientific constructs—the conservation of energy, say, or the concept of the atom—approximate entities and connections that really exist.
In one crucial respect, Einstein never deviated from that “outmoded” realist metaphysics, namely, in his adherence to causality. In the years before the First World War, Einstein’s contemporaries declared the notion of cause-and-effect to have no place in physics, which, they alleged, dealt only with functional relations. Yet in these years, Einstein framed profound questions and hypotheses based on the idea of causality, believing firmly that the world is necessarily thus and not otherwise.

**God Doesn’t Play Dice**

“What is the reason,” he was forever asking, “that Nature behaves in this or that way?” And if no sufficient reason was to be found, he said, then Nature’s laws must be other than we have supposed. To carry out these logical investigations, Einstein adopted, primarily from Newton, the so-called thought experiment—an experiment conducted only in the mind, using idealized instruments (such as absolutely rigid rods and perfectly accurate clocks)—and made it his characteristic tool of conceptual analysis.

In 1909, Einstein received his first academic appointment; four years later, he was offered the most prestigious and advantageous position in the world of science, the research professorship in the Prussian Academy of Sciences, which he held until the Nazis came to power in 1933. It was, however, with very mixed feelings that, in the spring of 1914, Einstein moved from Zurich to Berlin, to the capital of the country whose citizenship he had deliberately renounced as a youth of 16 and whose social-political system he still disliked. Within a few months, the break-up of his marriage and the outbreak of the First World War would further aggravate his sense of personal isolation.

Einstein threw himself into his work and brought the general theory of relativity to completion. The end of the war gave Germany a (short-lived) democratic republic. It also marked the beginning of Einstein’s world renown—a result of the confirmation, by British scientists observing the total eclipse of the sun in 1919, of Einstein’s prediction that starlight passing close to the sun is deflected by its gravitational field.

Meanwhile, with the end of World War I, there swept over Germany a new romanticism—a “life philosophy” whose most popular prophets were Oswald Spengler, Ludwig Klages, Hermann Keyserling, and Rudolf Steiner. In their view, theoretical physics was the deplorable epitome of Western culture’s logical, abstract, unintuitive, and, above all, causal mode of apprehending the world. Surprisingly, many theoretical physicists in
German-speaking Central Europe proved susceptible to this anti-scientific spirit.

The concept of causality at issue in the 1920s, the concept many physicists then wished to banish from science, was not that old-fashioned, metaphysical notion of cause-and-effect which they (excepting Einstein!) had eliminated years before. Rather it was the essential, indeed indispensable, principle of functional relationship, of unambiguous determination of physical events. Causality in this heretofore accepted sense meant lawfulness: A system arranged in a definite way would evolve in a definite way. It meant that experiments can be replicated; that there are fixed rules; that God, in Einstein's celebrated phrase, "doesn't play dice."

As noted, Einstein's opponents, the anticausalist physicists were impelled to a radical departure from the traditional goal of science, not primarily by problems or theories within physics itself but by pressure from the general intellectual environment. Justification of the anticausalist position from within physical theory became possible only in 1925–26 with the development of quantum mechanics. Early in the following year—as Einstein was composing the essay on Newton reprinted here—Werner Heisenberg derived his "uncertainty principle," which denies the possibility of predicting in all detail the results of any experiment.

In this "violent dispute over the significance of the law of causality," as physicist Max Planck described it, it was, by and large, the politically and culturally more "progressive" in-
individuals who followed the fashion of the times, while more conservative figures insisted upon the traditional goals of their discipline. Thus, ironically, Einstein's allies were not his closest personal friends. They included not only Max Planck, whom he respected, but also Wilhelm Wien, whose personality and political views he found distasteful. Indeed, the subject and theme of the opening paragraph of Einstein's essay on Newton are virtually identical with those of several of Wien's popular essays and addresses of the preceding year or two.

In Defense of Reason

Einstein's essay on Newton, then, is only secondarily a tribute to the scientist; it is primarily a reaffirmation of allegiance to the goal of a causal description of Nature. It is the admonition of an avowed causalist to his contemporaries—layman and physicist alike. Thirteen times in less than 3,000 words we read "cause," "causality," or "causation." Fifteen years later, in 1942, when Einstein again wrote on Newton—on the occasion of the tricentenary of his birth—neither "causality" nor any of its variants were cited even once. What had changed? Not Einstein's understanding of the historical Newton—anyway, not significantly—but rather the world in which Einstein lived.

By the end of 1942, Einstein had been in the United States for nine years. In November 1940, as a recently naturalized citizen, he had cast his vote for a third term for Roosevelt. He welcomed America's belated entry into World War II and contributed both his prestige and his scientific knowledge to the war effort. "Causality" seemed a terribly abstract notion compared to the more immediate and comprehensive value, "reason," which was at that hour gravely menaced (as indeed it had been during the entire previous decade) by totalitarian dogma. Thus it was "reason," not "causality" that Einstein chose to defend in his second tribute to Newton.

Perhaps more important, Einstein's essay of 1927 belongs, essentially, to that early, acute phase of the causality crisis before the establishment of the quantum mechanics—a phase of ideological competition characterized by manifestos against causality and exhortations in its favor. In the following years, the Heisenberg-Schrödinger noncausal mechanics proved extraordinarily successful in accounting for physical processes at the atomic level and in withstanding Einstein's most determined efforts, over several years, to find gaps in its logical structure. By 1935, the debate between Einstein and his fellow physicists had shifted to a metaphysical plane. They maintained
that a theory which accounts for the results of all experiments—as quantum mechanics could—is complete. But Einstein contended that a theory which gives no account of the real world, but only of our imperfect (probabilistic) knowledge of that world, is incomplete.

Partly for this reason, the world's most renowned scientist, during the last 20 years of his life, felt almost completely isolated in his scientific work and goals. The situation began to change, however, shortly before Einstein's death in 1955. Today, the subjects of Einstein's own scientific efforts—the general theory of relativity and the unification of the various physical forces (gravitation, electromagnetism, and so on) in a single field theory—have gradually become two of the most important foci of attention in physics.

More to the point of Einstein's 1927 essay, physicists since the early 1950s have been less and less joyful about the indeterminism of our most fundamental theory, more and more ready to declare this feature of quantum mechanics unsatisfactory.

ON NEWTON (1927)

by Albert Einstein

It is just two hundred years ago that Newton closed his eyes. We feel impelled at such a moment to remember this brilliant genius, who determined the course of Western thought, research, and practice like no one else before or since. Destiny placed him at a turning point in the history of the human intellect: Before Newton, there existed no self-contained system of physical causality that was somehow capable of representing any of the deeper features of the empirical world.

Newton's object was to answer the question: Is there any simple rule by which one can calculate the movements of the heavenly bodies in our planetary system completely, when the state of motion of all these bodies at one moment is known? Kepler's empirical laws of planetary movement, deduced from Tycho...
Brahe's observations, confronted him and demanded explanation. These laws gave, it is true, a complete answer to the question of how the planets move around the sun. But they do not satisfy the demand for causal explanation. More important, these laws are concerned with the movement as a whole, not with the question of how the state of motion of a system gives rise to that which immediately follows it in time. They are, as we would say now, integral and not differential laws. The differential law is the only form which completely satisfies the modern physicist's demand for causality. The clear conception of the differential law is one of Newton's greatest intellectual achievements.

Galileo had already made a significant beginning toward a knowledge of the law of motion. He discovered the law of inertia and the law of bodies falling freely in the gravitational field of the earth (that is, that a mass, or mass-point, unaffected by other masses, will move uniformly and in a straight line; the vertical velocity of a free body in the gravitational field increases uniformly with time). It may seem to us today to be but a short step from Galileo's discoveries to Newton's law of motion. But both of Galileo's statements are so formulated as to refer to motion as a whole, while Newton's law of motion provides an answer to the question: How does the state of motion of a mass-point change in an infinitely short time under the total motion. How Newton, starting from Kepler's laws of planetary motion, performed this task for gravitation and so discovered that gravity and the moving forces acting on the stars were one and the same is well understood. But a causal concept of motion was still far away, for the motion could only be determined from the equation of motion in cases where the force was given. Inspired no doubt by the laws of planetary motion, Newton conceived the idea that the force operating on a mass was determined by the position of all masses situated at a sufficiently small distance from the mass in question. It was not until this connection was established that a completely causal concept of motion was achieved. How Newton, starting from Kepler's laws of planetary motion, performed this task for gravitation and so discovered that gravity and the moving forces acting on the stars were one and the same is well understood.

1Kepler's laws: (a) planets move in ellipses, with the sun at one focus; (b) the radius drawn from the sun to a planet sweeps equal areas in equal times (see diagram); (c) the ratio of the cube of the major axis of a planet's elliptical orbit to the square of the period of its revolution around the sun is the same for every planet.

2Integration and differentiation, roughly speaking, are inverse operations. That is, where differential calculus can represent motion over an infinitely short period of time, integral calculus represents the sum of those infinitely short periods (i.e., total motion).

3Newton's law: (a) a body will remain at rest or in uniform motion if no force acts on it; (b) force = mass X acceleration (F = ma); (c) for every force in Nature, there is always an equal and opposite force.
It is the combination

\[(\text{Law of Motion}) + (\text{Law of Attraction})\]

which constitutes that marvelous edifice of thought that makes it possible to calculate the past and future states of a system from the state obtaining at one particular moment, insofar as the events take place under the influence of the forces of gravity alone. The logical completeness of Newton’s conceptual system lay in this, that the only causes of the acceleration of the masses of a system are these masses themselves. On this foundation, Newton succeeded in explaining the motions of the planets, moons, and comets down to the smallest details, as well as the tides and the precessional movement of the earth—a deductive achievement of unique magnificence.

But the importance of Newton’s achievement was not limited to the fact that it created a workable and logically satisfactory basis for the actual science of mechanics; up to the end of the 19th century, it formed the program of every worker in the field of theoretical physics. All physical events were to be traced back to masses subject to Newton’s laws of motion. The law of force simply had to be extended and adapted to the type of event under consideration. Newton himself tried to apply this program to optics, assuming light to consist of inert corpuscles. Even the wave theory of light made use of Newton’s law of motion after it had been applied to continuously distributed masses. Newton’s equations of motion were the sole basis of the kinetic theory of heat, which not only was thought, then prepared people’s minds for the discovery of the law of the conservation of energy but also led to a theory of gases that has been confirmed down to the last detail, and to a more profound view of the nature of the second law of thermodynamics. The development of electricity and magnetism has proceeded up to modern times along Newtonian lines. Even the revolution in electrodynamics and optics brought about by Faraday and Maxwell, which formed the first great fundamental advance in theoretical physics since Newton, took place entirely under the aegis of Newton’s ideas.

Newton’s fundamental principles were so satisfactory from the logical point of view that the impetus to overhaul them could only spring from the demands of empirical fact. Newton himself was better aware of the weaknesses inherent in his intellectual edifice than the generations of learned scientists that followed him. This fact has always aroused my deep admiration, and I should like, therefore, to dwell on it for

\[F = \frac{G m_1 m_2}{r^2}\]
a moment.

I. Newton’s endeavor to represent his system as necessarily conditioned by experience, and to introduce the smallest possible number of concepts not directly referable to empirical objects, is everywhere evident; in spite of this, he set up the concept of absolute space and absolute time. For this, he has often been criticized in recent years. But in this point, Newton is particularly consistent. He had realized that observable geometrical quantities (distances of material points from one another) and their course in time do not completely characterize motion in its physical aspects. In addition to masses and temporally variable distances, there must be something else that determines motion. That “something” he takes to be relation to “absolute space.” He is aware that space must possess a kind of physical reality if his laws of motion are to have any meaning, a reality of the same sort as material points and their distances.

The clear realization of this reveals both Newton’s wisdom and also a weak side to his theory. For the logical structure of the latter would undoubtedly be more satisfactory without this shadowy concept; in that case, only things whose relations to perception are perfectly clear (mass-points, distances) would enter into the laws.

II. Forces acting directly and instantaneously at a distance, as introduced to represent the effects of gravity, are not in character with most of the processes familiar to us from everyday life. Newton meets this objection by pointing to the fact that his law of gravitational interaction is not supposed to be a final explanation but a rule derived by induction from experience.

III. Newton’s theory provided no explanation for the highly remarkable fact that the weight and the inertia of a body are determined by the same quantity (its mass). Newton himself was aware of the peculiarity of this fact.

None of these three points can rank as a logical objection to the theory. In a sense, they merely represent unsatisfied desires of the scientific mind in its struggle for a complete and uniform conceptual grasp of natural phenomena.

Newton’s theory of motion, considered as a program for the whole of theoretical physics, received its first blow from Maxwell’s theory of electricity. It became clear that the electric and magnetic interactions between bodies were effected, not by forces operating
EINSTEIN AND NEWTON

By field, Faraday meant "lines of force" capable of generating action at a distance. The most familiar example would be produced by a magnet.

Einstein alludes here to the electromagnetic world view that arose among physicists after discovery of the electron (1897).

In the General Theory of Relativity, as originally formulated by Einstein: (a) Newton's concept of a force acting at a distance was superseded by a description of how a massive body warps space-time in its neighborhood; (b) Newton's first law of motion, which determined the path of a particle under the action of the gravitational field, went over into a postulate that such a particle moved not uniformly in a straight line, but along a geodesic, the shortest possible line in warped space-time.

Einstein alludes field theory. At first, people tried, adhering to the point of view of mechanics, to interpret the field as a mechanical state (of motion or stress) of a hypothetical medium permeating space (ether). But when this interpretation refused to work in spite of the most obstinate efforts, people gradually got used to the idea of regarding the "electromagnetic field" as the final irreducible constituent of physical reality. By the time this point was reached, nobody any longer believed in immediate momentary action at a distance, not even in the realm of gravitation, although no field theory of the latter was clearly indicated owing to lack of sufficient factual knowledge.

The development of the theory of the electromagnetic field led also to the attempt to explain the Newtonian law of motion along electromagnetic lines or to replace it with a more accurate law based on field theory. Even though these efforts did not meet with complete success, the fundamental concepts of mechanics had ceased to be looked upon as fundamental constituents of the physical cosmos.

The theory of Maxwell and Lorentz led inevitably to the special theory of relativity, which, since it abandoned the notion of absolute simultaneity, excluded the existence of forces acting at a distance. It followed from this theory that mass is not a constant quantity but depends on (indeed, is equivalent to) the energy content. It also showed that Newton's law of motion was only to be regarded as a limiting law valid for small velocities; in its place it set up a new law of motion in which the speed of light in vacuo figures as the limiting velocity.

The general theory of relativity formed the last step in the development of the program of the field theory. Quantitatively it modified Newton's theory only slightly, but for that all the more profoundly qualitatively. Inertia, gravitation, and the metrical behavior of bodies and clocks were reduced to a single field quality; this field itself was again postulated as dependent on bodies (generalization of Newton's law of gravity or rather the field law corresponding to it, as formulated by Poisson). Space and time were thereby divested not of their reality but of their causal absoluteness. The generalized law of inertia takes over the function of Newton's law of motion.
This short account is enough to show how the elements of Newtonian theory passed over into the general theory of relativity, whereby the three defects above mentioned were overcome. It looks as if, in the framework of the theory of general relativity, the law of motion could be deduced from the field law corresponding to the Newtonian law of force. Only when this goal has been completely reached will it be possible to talk about a pure field theory.

The whole evolution of our ideas about the processes of nature, with which we have been concerned so far, might be regarded as an organic development of Newton’s ideas; but while the process of perfecting the field theory was still in full swing, the facts of heat-radiation, the spectra, radioactivity, and so on revealed a limitation of the applicability of this whole conceptual system, which today still seems to us virtually impossible to overcome notwithstanding immense successes in many instances.

Many physicists maintain—and there are weighty arguments in their favor—that in the face of these facts not merely the differential law but the law of causation itself—hitherto the ultimate basic postulate of all natural science—has collapsed. Even the possibility of a spatio-temporal construction, which can be unambiguously coordinated with physical events, is denied. That a mechanical system can have only discrete permanent energy-values or states—as experience almost directly shows—seems at first sight hardly deducible from a field theory that operates with differential equations. The de Broglie—Schrödinger method, which has in a certain sense the character of a field theory, does indeed deduce the existence of only discrete states, in surprising agreement with empirical facts. It does so on the basis of differential equations applying a kind of resonance-argument, but it has to give up the localization of particles and strictly causal laws. Who would presume today to decide the question whether the law of causation and the differential law, these ultimate premises of the Newtonian view of nature, must definitely be abandoned?

"Einstein sensed, and 20 years later would prove, that equations of motion in General Relativity were unnecessary: The field equations contain not only the laws of force but also the laws of motion.

Physicists Louis de Broglie and Erwin Schrödinger sought to retain continuity and causality by associating a wave field with every material particle. Max Born, a leader of the anti-causalists, challenged their conclusions, showing that such a field describes not the behavior of individual particles but the statistical distribution of a large number of identical particles under identical conditions.

EDITOR’S NOTE: The fullest biography of Albert Einstein is Ronald Clark’s Einstein: The Life and Times (1971). Interested readers may also wish to consult Einstein’s own Ideas and Opinions (1954).
Improvements in building materials, such as steel, glass, and concrete, have allowed architects to erect structures never before thought possible. The results have been mixed. Some modern buildings complement their environments while remaining aesthetic treats in themselves. Others seem to have been conceived by architects bent on erasing the distinction between art and parody.

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Architecture Today

The Swiss urban planner Le Corbusier regarded his own brand of high-rise, mass-produced architecture as the only alternative to political revolution. Four decades later, it seems, an architect's most revolutionary act is not to build at all. Facing public disenchantment with everything from skyscrapers to urban renewal projects to suburban tract housing, many architects are "thinking small"—or leaving their wilder schemes on the drawing board. Others taunt their colleagues and the public with towering glass-and-steel parodies. Unfortunately, architects, unlike doctors, cannot bury their mistakes. Here Peter Blake surveys the products of the past half century; Reyner Banham describes the latter-day tug-of-war between architectural "hawks" and "doves"; and Rem Koolhaas looks at the future.

THE MODERN MOVEMENT: WHAT WENT WRONG?

by Peter Blake

It is not too difficult to figure out what has gone wrong: The theorists of modern architecture simply promised too much. They promised that modern buildings would be cheaper to build, solve the problems of war and peace, and put an end to social and economic injustice. Modern architecture promised bliss. But the so-called Modern Movement, the clean-lined, often massive, essentially urban, "skin-and-bones" architecture that developed in Europe and the United States between 1910 and the 1950s, delivered on few of its promises.

The propagandists of the Modern Movement—Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Walter Gropius, Charles Edouard Jeanneret (Le...
Corbusier), and many others—were hardly con men, though they were, perhaps, a little starry-eyed. Yet the public and the critics—and those who commissioned buildings—certainly shared their belief that modern architecture was “functional and efficient.”

Modern buildings were thought to be cheaper to build, even after many buildings of lightweight metals and plastics proved to be much more costly than conventional structures built of conventional materials—brick, stone, wood. Because cheapness seemed to be a virtue, people were willing to overlook modern architecture’s frequent failure to stand up to normal wear and tear. Mies believed, in any event, that technologists were about to achieve a spectacular breakthrough and invent a new, universal, sound-, weather-, damp-, and heat-proof material that could be used to envelop us all—without leaking. The architects of Boston’s new, all-glass John Hancock Tower may have shared his belief—until they had to remove some 10,000 sheets of mirror-coated, double-glazed glass from the Tower before the winds did it for them.

“Machines for Living In”

People also felt that certain recurrent concerns of the modern masters—“public housing,” for instance—suggested that modern architecture would be a major weapon against social and economic injustice. Plato had observed long before that architecture (as well as the other arts) could help transform a society. But despite the graphic descriptions of slums by Western writers in the 19th century, not much was done in the way of public housing until the 1920s. The Siedlungen (“Settlements”) of Weimar Germany—medium-rise, concrete-frame buildings housing low-income factory workers—then began to enchant do-gooders around the globe. In the United States, similar, drab, windswept apartment clusters have been a mainstay of urban renewal efforts since the Housing Act of 1949.

While few echoed Le Corbusier’s assertion that modern architecture was an alternative to war, a good many people did.

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regard modern buildings as far healthier than old-fashioned ones. Richard Neutra, who helped import the modern movement from Europe to the United States, and who was something of a hypochondriac besides, actually thought that modern architecture would cure whatever ailed you, and he called some of his sunny, breezy California creations “health houses” to buttress that curious claim.

Le Corbusier and his students also believed that a city of tall skyscrapers, spaced far apart, separated by acres of parks, and linked by elevated superhighways, would be “radiant” and ideal for man; that narrow streets were disgusting; that large, monumental plazas were “for people” (and not for icy winds and driving rains). In Towards a New Architecture (1920), Le Corbusier argued that buildings should be designed in a functional manner, just as airplanes and ships were. A house was a “machine for living in”; a city, a machine for efficiently organizing industrial society.

Walter Gropius believed in much of the above. It was Gropius who in 1925 helped bring the Modern Movement to maturity by moving the Bauhaus, the German design institute in Weimar, to a new building in Dessau. There the institute’s fledgling architecture seminar grew into a full-blown department as the Bauhaus continued to preach the unity of design: in fabrics and paintings, in graphic art, furniture, and sculpture. A spare, industrial kind of design—“a program for Everyman”—came to be known as the Bauhaus Style. When Nazi pressure forced the Bauhaus to close in 1933, its staff fled to Harvard and the Illinois Institute of Technology, carrying the vision around the world.
Most of the architects commonly identified with the "international style" of the Modern Movement dreamed of a dazzling, geometric urban world of mass-produced prisms, vast and pure, surrounded by greenery and bathed in sunlight. They first gave form to that sparkling image at micro scale—designing houses, for example—whenever they got the chance. Their students continue to recreate it at macro scale, from Brasilia to Teheran, from Boston to Osaka and beyond. The charming sketches for Ideal Cities produced by Le Corbusier in the 1920s are today a grotesque reality on the edges of Isfahan and the outskirts of Munich and Zagreb.

Why? In part because the images created by these talented propagandists were rooted in a seemingly compelling logic. The
earth's population explosion surely dictated high-density living and mass production of buildings; high-density living just as surely dictated vertical cities. Vertical cities would need lots of space between their towers (to let the sun in), and high-speed, high-capacity transportation networks—including highways—to connect them.

That logic has turned out to be seriously flawed. High-density living turns out to be quite easily attained with clusters of low-rise patio-houses, and the densities achievable, without much trouble, are about five times the average densities now existing in New York City. Mass production of buildings has turned out to be more costly than conventional technology, and often much less efficient and durable. Moreover, transportation costs have gone up due to fuel prices and generalized inflation.

Life Mirrors Art

Still, at least two generations of younger architects—my own included—were seduced by the modern dogma. In the first place, the prototypes offered by pioneers like Mies, Le Corbusier, and others were easy to copy, as they were meant to be. Mies liked to say that he didn't see any reason to invent a new architecture every Monday morning—nor would mass production allow it.

But there was another reason, a rather more insidious reason. The Modern Movement surrounded itself with a certain aura that made all of us architects feel as if we were riding the crest of a wave. It wasn't just that modern dogma seemed to make sense in functional terms; it seemed to make sense in aesthetic terms as well. There seemed to be a straight and steady progression from the Purist paintings of Amédée Ozenfant to Machine Art, to Le Corbusier's and Charlotte Perriand's tubular, chrome furniture of the 1920s. There seemed to be a straight progression from Miro's paintings and Calder's mobiles, to Charles Eames's furniture and to some of Oscar Niemeyer's fanciful buildings.

We felt, in short, that we were part of a broad, all-encompassing movement, like Art Nouveau at the turn of the century, when all of the visual (and sometimes even the musical and literary) arts were clearly acting in unison. Just as Art Nouveau saw the whiplash curves of Van Gogh and Toulouse-Lautrec translated into the Paris Métro stations of Hector Guimard and the buildings of Antoni Gaudi, so architecture's

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[1] The population density in New York City is about 50 persons per acre.
Le Corbusier’s “Plan Voisin” for the center of Paris (1925) and Hector Guimard’s contrasting notion of Parisian architecture (Metro station, 1900). The former is consciously abstract, geometric, and mechanistic; the latter is regarded by critics as naturalistic and “organic.”

Modern Movement seemed to spring from new developments in the graphic arts.

Which was, demonstrably, silly.

Art Nouveau was so all-pervasive in part because it was rooted in “organic” forms found in nature, and these forms could be translated, without effort, into objects and other structures designed to serve humanity. There were, of course, certain limitations. The shape of a wave breaking on a beach might be a very good shape for a wave and a beach, but not necessarily for the facade of an apartment house. Still, natural forms by and large seemed to be appropriate as a source of design ideas.

By contrast, forms derived—as the Modern Movement derived them—from two- or three-dimensional geometry are much less flexible, much less adaptable to real life. For example, Piet Mondrian’s exercises in plane geometry, when translated by
abstract designer Gerrit Rietveld into the shape of a chair, resulted in some terribly funny, and totally un-besittable home furnishings. The Purist/Cubist abstractions of the 1920s became the aesthetic norm in architecture.

Modern architecture still strives to stay à la mode. It is right up there with the latest examples of pop or minimal art. In fact, some of its practitioners are really much better than the artists with whom they claim kinship. Joern Utzon, with his opera house in Sydney, Australia, can hold his own as a Futurist sculptor. And Robert Venturi’s design for a Football Hall of Fame (a huge football) exceeds a good many things that pop sculptor Claes Oldenburg has done. In short, the dictum of architect Louis Sullivan (1856–1924) that form should follow function often seems to be practiced in reverse.

And now some nasty questions have arisen. Is it appropriate for a building to be, primarily or solely, a Work of Art? Should not a building be a Work of Accommodation—accommodation to the human condition, to all of its demands, including, of course, the demand for beauty? The most important form to be considered in the design of the human habitat, is, after all, the human form—not that of the cube, the sphere, or the cone (Cézanne’s trilogy). Yet somewhere along the line, modern architecture became, almost exclusively, a captive of modern art. And it has not flourished in captivity. It is not necessarily all that much fun to live in a work of art, or to work, play, procreate, or learn in one. It may often be better to inhabit, say, a recycled loft or factory.

H. G. Wells once wrote of his own work: “I refuse to play the artist, . . . I write as straight as I can, just as I walk as straight as I can, because that is the best way to get there.” He added, parenthetically, that “if sometimes I am an artist it is a freak of the Gods.” Architects, too, should design as straight as they can: And if the end product turns out to be a work of art, then we may all be grateful for the windfall.
"Murky chaos" is how Philip Johnson saw the condition of architecture in 1960. But even one of America's most thoughtful architects could hardly have foreseen how much murkier the prospect would become.

Almost half of the qualified architects in the most depressed architectural centers, such as New York and San Francisco, are reckoned to have been unemployed in recent times. The profession has yet to recover fully from the 1975-76 slump, when the value of all new construction (including homes, factories, and public buildings) actually declined by 5 percent, compared to 10 to 15 percent increases in each of the previous three years. Recent graduates of the more than 100 U.S. schools of architecture are still having trouble finding jobs; half of those graduating since 1971 have taken work in unrelated fields. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, competition for jobs in architecture—where annual salaries for licensed professionals average $20,000 to $25,000—will be intense throughout the 1980s.

The problems are not only economic. Left leaderless by the passing of two generations of dominant father figures, from Le Corbusier to Louis Kahn, the architects of the once self-assured Modern Movement appear directionless, guilt-ridden, and divided in the 1970s. After a century or so of Messianic, reformist zeal (shared by politicians and social thinkers) that equated social progress with technological progress, the Movement now finds its products despised, its practitioners out of work.

The profession clearly has reason to be concerned, not the least because the demand for new architectural design has been declining far faster than the demand for buildings. One result: The support staff (e.g., landscapers, draftsmen) in architectural firms is actually growing faster than the number of architects, which has held steady in recent years at about 50,000.8 Archi-

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8Who are these 50,000? According to a 1975 survey by the American Institute of Architects, the typical AIA member is white, married, male, and 46; 0.7 percent of its members are black, 1.3 percent Chinese or Japanese, 0.9 percent women. Some 75 percent of all architects are AIA members.
tects are also beginning to do out of expediency what founding Modernists from William Morris to Walter Gropius had urged on principle: Eliminate the distinction between architect and builder. In practice, this has tended to happen at the great and small extremes of the profession. The very large, omnicompetent architectural firms like Houston’s Caudill, Rowlett and Scott—big enough to dicker with banks and argue with governments—serve at once as designers, engineers, consultants on law, lighting, landscaping and you-name-it. (Caudill, Rowlett and Scott employs 100 architects out of a total staff of 300.) They routinely deliver finished buildings for a comprehensive fee to such clients as multinational consortia and Arab oil shaykhs.

The Tough and the Tender

In like manner if not scale, individual architects in lower Manhattan, downtown Washington, and other areas have been turning themselves into expert recyclers of discarded buildings, drumming up their own financing, bending their own backs to the labor involved, often guinea-pigging as their own first tenants, and generally not behaving like members of a gentlemanly, liberal profession. Ironically, the recyclers are almost the only group of architects who have lately escaped public odium (although there is growing concern in some areas that inner city restorations are forcing low income families from their neighborhoods). They lovingly breathe new life into familiar old structures. Even big firms are getting into the act. If there is one piece of recent architectural work in the United States that seems completely beyond criticism, it must be the extraordinary restoration of Boston’s 18th-century Quincy Markets–Faneuil Hall area by Benjamin Thompson Associates.

Most architects, however, are neither in Kuwait nor Manhattan’s SoHo. They work not for corporations or themselves, but for small firms with a staff of perhaps a dozen. They still do business according to the written and unwritten rules of the

profession, keeping their fingers out of construction and high finance. Their relations with a client tend to be personal. But even this "silent majority" of architects experiences to some degree the conflict between the "tough" and "tender" approaches to the profession, between what might be styled the "hawk" and "dove" stances.

The architectural "hawk" takes a tough approach: "Glass is still the cheapest first-cost enveloping membrane, rectangular floor plans are still the most convenient, the energy crisis is not yet critical enough to rule out full air-conditioning, and whatever your old environment was like, I'm in business to provide you with a better one!" The most representative U.S. hawk at present (certainly the most envied) is John Portman, whose glitteringly faceted towers, such as Renaissance Center in Detroit, are now a standard adornment of striving U.S. downtowns. Portman's solution to urban problems is typically hawkish. He provides a cleaner, better, brighter (and violence-free) environment inside the glass fortress as an alternative to the urban mess outside. Unfortunately, it is becoming clear that the new glass "downtowns" can drain the streets of trade and people, leaving them more deserted and dangerous than ever."

Small Is Invisible

The "doves" have few conspicuous successes (or failures) to their credit, in part because their current approach tends to follow E. F. Schumacher's slogan, "Small is beautiful." This inevitably produces less visible results. (One of the few truly "visible" dove buildings is the Centraal Beheer office complex in Apeldoorn, the Netherlands. This "house for a thousand people" achieves an intricate intimacy by giving practically every office worker a desk on a semiprivate balcony overlooking interior courtyards.) In England, Sir Hugh Casson's new apartments in a historic neighborhood near Salisbury Cathedral are so inconspicuous that many would-be critics have apparently been unable to find them. In the United States, dove architects have begun to fill some of our more remote areas with highly individual dwellings of energy-conscious design (that is, run primarily on sun, wind, and sweat).

Ideally, dovish house design incorporates "user-participation" in the planning process. There has been one no-

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*One super-hawk building that has had exactly the opposite effect is the Centre Pompidou in Paris, a highly adaptable culture machine of glass, steel, and exposed, oversized, color-keyed plumbing. It makes no concessions to the neighboring 18th-century buildings, yet, mysteriously, has revitalized the area in a way American urban planners have yet to equal.*
### THE TOP TWENTY

In 1976, the American Institute of Architecture (AIA) asked 75 top U.S. architects to list what they considered the "proudest achievements" in American architecture. They named a total of 175 structures; the 20 receiving the most mentions are listed below.

Thomas Jefferson's University of Virginia led the field with 29 votes, trailed by Rockefeller Center with 22. Tastes change. An AIA poll in 1948 failed to elicit any mention of the University of Virginia and showed the Folger Shakespeare Library (Washington, D.C.) in the No. 1 spot.

The results of the 1976 survey:

1. **University of Virginia**, Charlottesville, Va.: Thomas Jefferson, architect, 1826.
2. **Rockefeller Center**, New York City: Reinhard & Hofmeister; Corbett, Harrison & MacMurray; Hood & Fouilhoux, 1940.
4. **Falling Water**, Bear Run, Pa.: Frank Lloyd Wright, 1937.
15. **Grand Central Terminal**, New York City: Reed & Stem; Warren & Wetmore, 1913.
table success in this area: The Swedish architect, Ralph Erskine, working out of a storefront office, produced in Newcastle, England, a mile-long, but varied, “megastructure” dotted with colored sheds of wood and corrugated plastic—a dramatic “humanization” of the giant apartment block that Erskine might have built had he not consulted the prospective tenants.

The Mystique of Draftsmanship

The average architect would prefer to give Erskine all the credit, anyway. Participatory design is a dove extreme that makes most architects nervous. If people can design their own accommodations, who needs architects? Why bother with the long (7-to-10-year) training in the niceties of design that the average professional must undergo? If there can be such a thing as a defensive hawk posture, a fair number of younger middle-aged, conspicuously well-educated, and internationally linked architects have now adopted it. They stand firmly on a traditional view of architecture as, above all, an art of form. Implicit in this approach is an abandonment of the moral imperative to improve society and change the world by the creation of totally original design. This retreat from Utopia is also an oblique retreat into erudition rather than originality. “Contrary to Modern Movement theory,” wrote Lance Wright, editor of the London Architectural Review, “imaginative copying is always a more architectural art than original invention.”

The most persistent hero of this trend has been Liverpool-trained James Stirling, who has looked to the 1920s and ’30s for inspiration. Stirling is animated by a fundamental preoccupation with drawing, the most secret ritual in the arcana of architecture. The mystique of draftsmanship is something that architects fall back on when they are in a falling-back mood, and most of the so-called Rationalists—an almost purely theoretical troupe of architects who lecture on college campuses and are masters at the drawing board, but produce few buildings—are falling back into much further reaches of history than Stirling. Their work persistently evokes elementary block-like forms, pitched roofs, the vault and the column, the circle and the square—in short, the geometric monumentality of the visionary architects of the French Revolution. “Visionary” is indeed their operative word. Anything goes so long as it’s not actually going to be built! Yet there are buildings that come perilously close to such exotic visions: The long “extruded section” of Cesar Pelli’s Pacific Design Center in Los Angeles, paneled out in ethereal blue glass that reveals nothing of its interior workings or con-
John Portman's hawkish Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles (1975), and plans for a dovish contemporary solar home in Illinois, designed by Michael E. Jentzen. Most architects avoid such hawk and dove extremes.

struction and makes it look like a giant perspective drawing on the sky; or the bent "extruded sections" of the roof of Arata Isozaki's library in Kita Kyushu, Japan.

Ever noted for the formalist qualities of its modern architecture, Japan seems to be where postmodern tendencies really thrive, in the work of Kisho Kurokawa above all others. Kurokawa has lately done a few urban business/residence towers that could almost be taken for a kind of running criticism of all the skillful anonymities of modern architecture. Thus, his Sony Tower in Tokyo has been "eroded" to reveal its stairs and prefabricated bathroom units for at least part of its height, as if its skin had fallen away, leaving the guts in public view. A similar "erosion" of the classic rectangular format can be seen in Hugh Stubbins's recently completed Citicorp Tower in Manhattan. Its top is sheared away at an angle to provide for an (inoperative) solar energy installation; its lower parts have been eroded until little more than four giant columns survive, rising
from an underground plaza containing a church, a modish furniture shop, and much else.

This more fanciful formal mode, with its elements of spoof and satire, appeals to all sorts of architects, as is now demonstrated by one-time Modernist and sometime hawk Philip Johnson. Johnson's design for the new Manhattan headquarters of AT&T, revealed to a bemused press last March, calls for a tower with its top slashed off two ways for plant and equipment, with a curved gap in between, producing what has been described as a neo-Chippendale cresting. At the street level, Johnson proposes the classical geometry of columns and vaults, derived ultimately from the Renaissance architect Alberti, and presented in a manner that must make the Rationalists feel they are being subtly teased. The architectural cognoscenti have so far tried to treat the AT&T building as some kind of joke: "They'll never build it like that!"

Won't they?

Philip Johnson's design for the new AT&T headquarters in Manhattan. Even if it is never built, the project may well survive in history books as an appallingly accurate jibe at the present state of architectural art.
THE FUTURE’S PAST

by Rem Koolhaas

"Why do we have a mind if not to get our way?"

DOSTOEVSKY

In 1929, architect Ivan Leonidov designed an office building for the center of Moscow called the House of Industry. It was conceived as a tall, rectangular slab. Its facades consisted of a steel lattice with sliding glass panels that could "disappear" in the summer, making the walls, in effect, a transparent scaffold of human activity. Two-thirds of the way up, several floors were omitted: The gap formed a park in the air. An exposed elevator-stairwell tapered toward the top to reflect the diminishing volume of vertical traffic; a separate, freestanding lift led directly from the ground to the roof to make it easily accessible to Moscow’s inhabitants.

But the most unusual feature of the building was the floor plan, a drastic architectural revision of the idea and mechanics of work itself. A square grid divided two-thirds of each floor into identical areas for every worker. These subdivisions were marked on the ground by white lines on a cushion-like rubber surface meant to combine psychological comfort with acoustic control. Potted plants further demarcated individual territories.

The remaining third of each floor was conceived by Leonidov as an antithetical zone, an area for nonwork that included a swimming pool, a sauna and high-pressure shower, a kiosk for news and announcements, a lavish arrangement of chaises-longues, a small library, an acoustic console, and a TV-like screen.

Leonidov was convinced that a human being could concentrate on any given task for only about 20 minutes. Then fatigue would begin to erode performance. He built on this thesis by making each floor of the office complex into a recuperative plane, where work is only one of many possible activities, each erasing the exhaustion left by the previous effort. The "office" thus became a cultural apparatus, holding out to its occupants the promise of a perpetual peak condition. (Soviet officials rejected the whole idea, and Leonidov’s building was never constructed.)

Not long afterward, in Manhattan, several architects, whose names have not come down to us, conceived the Downtown Ath-
letic Club. Like Leonidov’s House of Industry, the Club, built in 1931, is essentially a stack of therapeutic planes. But where each of the floors in the Moscow building was to have offered identical combinations of activities, each story of the Downtown Athletic Club is emphatically different, and the building as a whole strives not so much for an efficiency of work as for an efficiency of pleasure.

An Incubator for Adults

Each floor is devoted to a particular interpretation of “athletic” activity. But as a climb through the structure demonstrates, the layout transcends athletics.

The lower 15 floors are accessible only to men. Their sequence from ground to top corresponds to an ever-increasing refinement of activity. Floor 7 is an interior golf course, a synthetic English landscape with grassy hills (real) and a small stream that curls invitingly across the terrain. After nature’s near-total eclipse in the Metropolis, it is now re-created as merely one of the city’s congested layers. Stopping on the ninth floor, the guest finds himself in a vestibule leading directly to a locker room. There he undresses, puts on trunks and boxing gloves, and enters an adjoining space equipped for boxing and wrestling. On the southern side of the locker room, there is also a small oyster bar.

Eating oysters with boxing gloves, near naked, on the ninth floor—such is the “plot” of this rectangle.

The 10th floor is devoted to preventive medicine. There are sections for massage and rubbing, an 8-bed station for artificial sun-bathing, and a 10-bed rest area, all arranged around a Turkish bath. In one corner, there is a medical facility, with a capacity of five patients. A doctor here is in charge of the procedure of “colonic irrigation”—the literal invasion of the human body with cultured bacteria to modify and improve its natural metabolism.

From the 17th to the 19th floors, the men, perfected in the lower part, are allowed to communicate with the opposite sex. The final 20 floors are devoted to hotel accommodations.

Rem Koolhaas, 34, is a partner in London’s Office for Metropolitan Architecture, which is devoted to “further development of a Culture of Congestion.” He was born in Amsterdam and studied architecture at the Architectural Association in London, where he still teaches. He is the author of Delirious New York (1978) and co-author of a forthcoming study of Russian architect Ivan Leonidov.
The Downtown Athletic Club (1931) is in Manhattan on Washington Street near Battery Park. Almost indistinguishable from surrounding towers, the 38-floor club contains a unique environment.

Such fanatical pursuit of a transcendent peak physical and mental condition amounts to a form of human redesign. The Downtown Athletic Club provides its clients with traditional athletic pastimes that have been crossbred with modern technology. The result is an incubator for adults, who, impatient with the pace of evolution, can reconstruct themselves into new beings.
Melnikov's Laboratory of Sleep (1929). Beds were to be built in, with the floors sloping gently to obviate the need for pillows. Beneficent technicians would enhance the sleeping environment with sounds and scents.

Again in 1929, again in Moscow, Konstantin Melnikov drafted Green City as an entry in a competition to design a combination of vacation resort and Communist suburb. Melnikov's proposal envisioned, among a variety of other therapeutic inventions, a system of diagnostic "laboratories" that would encircle the Russian capital somewhat like a chain of motels. Soviet workers would check in after an exhausting stint at the factory (Stalin's policy of rapid industrialization was just beginning) and be assigned to special dormitories that were filled with mixtures of oxygen and other gases. These would induce appropriate types of sleep and dream, and in the process cure whatever psychic or organic imbalance had been diagnosed by teams of paramedical receptionists. From a control booth at the end of each dormitory, sleep supervisors could adjust the gas composition, humidity, and air pressure; they could also add smells and reproduce, on a special acoustic installation, the "rustle of leaves, the cooing of nightingales, the soft murmur of waves." The beds could even be made to rock gently.

Synthetic Nature

Like the Interior Golfcourse at the Athletic Club, Melnikov's Laboratory of Sleep represents an approach to architecture that absorbs all of the new technology at its disposal and assembles it into larger-than-life visions. "Cure through sleep and thereby alter the character," Melnikov proclaimed in one poster; "anyone thinking otherwise is sick." This architecture was not inhuman. It was an attempt, in the early days of the Soviet Union, to make clients of the masses. The creation of a "new Soviet man" was a task not just for ideology but for architecture.

So too the task of creating a "new Metropolitan man." In 1930, the famous Manhattan impresario Samuel ("Roxy") Rothafel went on a fact-finding tour of Europe in search of inspiration for Radio City Music Hall, which was being designed...
under his personal supervision. With his architects, he went to Moscow, where Melnikov showed him his "Sonata of Sleep" designs (the scheme had been rejected by Soviet authorities). Roxy was impressed by Melnikov's vision of a beneficial, synthetic environment and saw its relevance to his own enterprise. Back in Manhattan, he incorporated several of the themes of the Laboratory of Sleep into the new Radio City Music Hall.

The Music Hall is more than an entertainment palace; it is the first completely synthetic resort in the heart of a Metropolis; it offers a replica of nature, appropriately intensified, to the inhabitants of Manhattan.

**Return to Disneyland**

The theater's vast ovoid interior is covered with plaster rays that extend across the entire ceiling, containing the audience like a firmament. The curtain is made of a specially developed synthetic fiber, so reflective that it "outshines the sun." When the lights are slowly dimmed, the impression of a sunset is inescapable. When they are switched on again, the theater offers the spectacle of a sunrise. There are three or four such complete cycles in each performance. If the metaphor is taken seriously, the audience lives through three or four accelerated days.

In a further escalation of the artificial, Rothafel used the air-conditioning system for more aggressive purposes than simple cooling. At first he considered adding laughing gas to the hall's atmosphere, so that his 6,200 daily visitors would be transported to another world at once. He gave up the notion only after urgent pleading by his lawyers, substituting for the N₂O emanations what he believed was health-giving Ozone.

In the end, his theater combined super-time with super-health, a union that was caught perfectly in his Melnikovian boast, used in advertising, that "A visit to Radio City Music Hall is as good as a month in the country."

The House of Industry, the Downtown Athletic Club, Green City, and Radio City Music Hall reveal the conceptual core of what is now called—usually with a sneer—Modern Architecture. All manifest an ambition to conquer a new territory. Their creators—Leonidov, Melnikov, and the rest—shunned traditional architecture with its passive reliance on dignified urban decors as a means of generating a dignified culture. They wanted to contribute to the modern age directly. The blueprint was all, in their view, not for its formal niceties and promise of spatial quality, but because, with its inscribed functions, it was the equivalent of a musical score, a notation of the roles per-
formed by the human occupants. To establish a world totally fabricated by man, to live inside fantasy—this was the ambitious program they had set themselves, a program that to be realized could never be openly stated. Who would allow it?

This view of architecture was triggered by a specific mutation in the forms of human coexistence: hyperdensity, the simultaneous explosion in certain parts of the world of both modern technology and human population. From this mutation, modern architects derived their vision of an architecture equally mutant, and perhaps compensatory and retaliatory as well. Their object—dangerous, manipulative, artificial, experimental, and behavioralist in the extreme—was the transformation of the Metropolis into a colossal laboratory, not only, as in Melnikov’s case, of sleep, but of life itself.

But there are opportunities commensurate with the dangers of this approach. It claims for architecture a role in human experimentation, not just in designing the laboratory. If the Metropolis is already transforming its inhabitants, why not take the process into our own hands? Only in this way can we invent the "plots" for the disinherit, scriptless urban masses, the drifting castaways of the 20th century.

At this moment, however, a persistent if unspoken coalition of the two major architectural avant-gardes—the Rationalists in Europe and the Post-Modernists in America, both of them susceptible to a misguided "historicism" in their designs—threatens this 50-year-old Architecture of Congestion with deliberate extinction. The best minds in modern architecture are ready to abandon the claims staked out in the 1920s for an activist profession with a capability, and indeed a responsibility, for redesigning the human environment. The new architects are determined to pose the issues of architecture in traditional terms once more. Doric columns, pediments, moldings, piazzas—all are making their prodigal return.

This conflict makes it both simple and difficult to predict architecture’s future. If this reactionary coalition wins, there will be no future—only an empty imitation of the past that will make Disneyland a monument to authenticity. If the coalition loses, the future of architecture will be as unpredictable as ever.
Architects and builders have always had more in mind than mere shelter or work-and-storage space. Old and new buildings celebrate the glory of religions (the temples of Angkor Wat in Cambodia, Istanbul's Hagia Sophia, Chartres Cathedral); of governments (Britain's Houses of Parliament, the Kremlin, the U.S. Capitol); of families (the Marlboroughs' Blenheim Palace, the Rockefellers' Japanese house in Pocantico Hills, N.Y.).

Renowned designers and unknown masons have collaborated on monuments to victory in war (the Arc d'Triomphe); on tombs for the powerful (Egypt's Pyramids, the Taj Mahal); on huge complexes for public gatherings (Athens' ancient Theatre of Dionysius, Australia's modern Sydney Opera House, Houston's futuristic Astrodome).

Yet despite architecture's importance, its history is still largely taught in colleges as part of art history. Hence, the excellent bibliography in J. M. Richards' illustrated Who's Who in Architecture; From 1400 to the Present (Holt, 1977) cites many volumes in the Pelican History of Art series.

One of the few books that purports to cover world architecture over the centuries is Sir Banister Fletcher's A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method, first published in 1896 (Scribner's, 18th ed., 1975).

Fletcher's old-fashioned text is illustrated with black-and-white photographs and diagrams. He includes every kind of Western architecture from Stonehenge, through the medieval kitchen and buttery, to Rome's Palazzo Farnese (atop which Michelangelo added a story), and to the Johnson Wax buildings in Racine, Wis. Most later writers fail to follow Fletcher's good example in going beyond the Western tradition to describe the architecture of the East (from the Mesopotamian clay-brick fortifications, c. 3500 B.C., onwards) and the indigenous design of Canada, Mexico, and Central and South America.

R. Furneaux Jordan's A Concise History of Western Architecture (London: Thames & Hudson, 1969, cloth; Harcourt, 1970, paper) provides strong chapters on Christendom's Romanesque (4th–11th centuries) and Gothic (12th–16th centuries) ecclesiastical construction. Jordan calls Henry VII's Chapel at Westminster, with the lace-like stone of its vault, "the end of English Gothic. There was nothing more to do."


American architecture has been well-served by historians, sociologists, and writer-practitioners like Frank Lloyd Wright (1867–1959) and Louis Henri Sullivan (1856–1924). Wright's An Autobiography (Horizon Press, 1932, 1977) was followed by his book about Sullivan, for
whom he once worked. In *Genius and the Mobocracy* (Horizon Press, 1949; enlarged ed. with photographs, 1977), Wright laments both Sullivan's death—alone and penniless—and "our present servility in the art of architecture."

Sullivan, considered the first master architect of the skyscraper, designed many Chicago buildings and The Bayard on Bleeker Street in New York. An artist, he decorated the facades of his buildings with terra-cotta ornamentation. His own story of his life, told in the third person, is *The Autobiography of an Idea* (AIA, 1924; Dover, 1956, cloth & paper).

John Burchard, M.I.T.'s emeritus Dean of Humanities, and Albert Bush-Brown, head of the Rhode Island School of Design, ask some interesting questions in *The Architecture of America: A Social and Cultural History* (Atlantic-Little, Brown, abr. ed., 1966, paper): Did the confused American architecture of the 19th and early 20th centuries reflect the turmoil of a people "who had lost the values of a unitary, agrarian, Protestant society and were trying to come to terms with a pluralistic, technological-urban, heterogeneous" one? Have any building types emerged on which Americans "would lavish "extra money, extra labor, extra love," such as were brought to the Acropolis or to Mont St. Michel? Not yet, it seems.


Kidder Smith drove 130,000 miles to photograph some 3,000 structures. He moves from the gable and chimney detail of the Ironmaster's House, in Saugus, Mass. (1646), to the sun-struck court of the Salk Biological Research Institute at La Jolla, Calif. (designed by Louis I. Kahn, 1967) and "The Strip" in Las Vegas, Nev.

The Strip provides the focus for a much-talked-about work on "vernacular" architecture in the United States, *Learning from Las Vegas* (M.I.T., 1972; rev. ed., 1977, cloth & paper). Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour note that modern architects see in the suburban residential landscape, with its Regency, French Provincial, and "Prairie-Organic" modes, its carriage lanterns, mansards, and "split-level sheds," the debased values of a consumer economy. These architects, they argue, throw out "the variety with the vulgarity."

The history of the stark Bauhaus influence on American architecture and design (in fabrics, furniture, graphics, even art education) has its own superb monument in *The Bauhaus* by Hans M. Wingler (M.I.T., 1976). Harvard, where Walter Gropius was appointed a professor in 1937, and M.I.T. became centers of the U.S. Bauhaus movement.

*The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* by Charles A. Jencks
BACKGROUND BOOKS: ARCHITECTURE

(Rizzoli, 1977, cloth & paper; rev. ed., 1978, paper) says what has gone wrong with modern architecture. A New York Times reviewer wrote that Jencks's “basic point—if God wanted chapels to look like boiler houses he would have given Chartres a smokestack—comes through with clarity.”

In Kicked a Building Lately? (Quadrangle, 1976, cloth; 1978, paper), the Times' own architecture critic, Ada Louise Huxtable, sees burgeoning public sensitivity to what architects and builders are doing to harm or enhance cities and neighborhoods. “My obsessions are now shared,” she writes, “and my co-conspirators are everywhere.”

Many of Huxtable's co-conspirators are in the growing architectural preservation movement. In Presence of the Past: A History of the Preservation Movement in the United States before Williamsburgh (Putnam's, 1965), Charles B. Hosmer, Jr. chronicles the saving of Philadelphia's Independence Hall, Virginia's Mt. Vernon, and other historic landmarks, along with unsuccessful efforts to prevent the destruction of many more prior to the 1949 creation of the National Trust for Historic Preservation.

A new surge of interest in saving the best of the older suburban houses (Tudor, Norman, Spanish, Dutch Colonial, Georgian) may lead to more books like Scarsdale: From Colonial Manor to Modern Community by Harry Hansen (Harper, 1954). This interesting mix of social journalism and architectural history was commissioned by the Town Club of Scarsdale, N.Y.—a village founded in 1701 that grew up to be a commuters' haven for upper-middle-class families moving out of Manhattan.

Until the 1940s, the typical Scarsdale dwelling was a two-story, 8-to-12-room house, often with dormers. The post—World War II threat from "hit-and-run builders of look-alike houses," as one Scarsdale old-timer called them, led to new local regulations in 1950 that restricted dimensions, roof shapes, and other elements of design.

Hansen's book is far more readable than Herbert J. Gans' sociological work, The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Community (Pantheon, 1967; Vintage, 1968, paper). Gans lived in Levittown, N.J., for the first two years of its existence; oddly enough, he has next to nothing to say about the mass-built houses he and his neighbors occupied, beyond the fact that the "mixture of house types" had little social impact ("the variations in number of bedrooms encouraged people to make family-size rather than class distinctions").

More than 50 years ago, Lewis Mumford, master critic of the urban scene, published Sticks and Stones: A Study of American Architecture and Civilization (Dover, rev. ed., 1955, cloth & paper). His conclusion, as good now as it was then: "Sooner or later we will learn to pick our way out of the debris...towards the things that are symbolized in the home, the garden, and the temple. Architecture sums up the civilization it enshrines."

EDITOR'S NOTE. The American Institute of Architects' librarian Susan Molton, assistant librarian Stephanie Byrnes, and Mary Rapp, librarian of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, assisted in the research for this essay.

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CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

THE COLLECTED POEMS OF HOWARD NEMEROV
by Howard Nemerov
Univ. of Chicago, 1977
534 pp. $20
L of C 77-544

For 30 years Howard Nemerov has been one of America's most consistently graceful formalist poets. This rich collection, which won the National Book Award for Poetry in 1978, gives a clear picture of the scope and moral urgency of his work. Nemerov's attention has always been fixed on the bewildering wealth of America's cultural inheritance and on the ways in which poetry can make our lives not just tolerable but joyful. A poet who has become, in a serious sense, a religious writer, Nemerov has fulfilled a vocation he describes in "The Map Maker on His Art": My fluent pen/ Wanders and cranks as his great river does./ Over the page, making the lonely voyage/ Common and human.

—Frank McConnell (78)

THE HORSE OF PRIDE: Life in a Breton Village
by Pierre-Jakez Hélias
Yale, 1978, 378 pp. $15
L of C 78-4099
ISBN 0-300-02036-8

We are engulfed today in a flood of media-made nostalgia—for the corrupt 1920s, the desolate '30s, and more recent uneasy decades. Even the catastrophic years of World War II are made to seem attractive as they recede in time. Professor Hélias's rambling memoir of his Breton childhood (he was born in 1914) is different. The work of an eminent ethnologist, fond, even glowing at times, it has the ring of truth to it. Much that he reports could apply to any self-sufficient rural community a generation or more ago: Anne G. Sneller's elegant Vanished World, a 1964 book about upstate New York, immediately came to my mind. But rural Brittany had a special problem. French was a foreign language to many Bretons even in the 1920s. It was rarely heard in Pouldreuzic, Hélias's village (he learned it only in school). Thus, the peasantry about which he writes experienced
not only general economic modernization but also a remarkably rapid integration into another language and culture in the course of one lifetime. Only an insider who had lived through this change and remembered the oral traditions of Brittany’s “civilization of the soil” could so compellingly transport us to the world of his grandfather, a man “too poor to buy any other horse” who said, “at least the Horse of Pride will always have a stall in my stable.”

—Walter M. Pintner (’78)

FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity
by Karl Rahner
Seabury, 1978
485 pp. $19.50
ISBN 0-8164-0354-6

Germany’s Karl Rahner, 74, is the world’s best-known Catholic theologian, renowned for his breakthrough thinking on a vast range of difficult questions. At the age of 72, having published many volumes of his collected essays, he composed his first full-scale work of theology, setting forth his reflections on the basic idea of Christianity. His goal was to show the overall intelligibility and credibility of Catholic Christianity without getting entangled in detailed historical or exegetical investigations. This fruit of a lifetime of study and meditation glistens with original insights into nearly every aspect of the Catholic message. Although it lacks the timeliness and passion of some of Rahner’s shorter pieces, readers with a taste for the philosophical analysis of religious experience will spontaneously hail Foundations as a classic of its kind.

—Avery Dulles, S.J. (’77)

A PRETTY GOOD CLUB: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service
by Martin Weil
Norton, 1978, 313 pp. $12.95
ISBN 0-393-05658-9

At the outset the author quotes I.F. Stone: “To do a book on the State Department, you would need Drew Pearson for gossip, Karl Marx for social forces, Henry James for social nuances, and Max Weber for institutional patterns.” On his own, Weil does a fine job of telling the story of “a small group of Christian gentlemen who founded the profession of diplomacy on a permanent basis in America” during the first half of this century. Few emerge as heroes. Many emerge as second-raters: in their snobbism, their aping of aristocratic European diplomats, their disdain for Washington and for domestic politics, the

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dislike for Jews that some openly displayed. Penultimately, the members of the club (Loy Henderson, Hugh Gibson, Joseph Grew, Sumner Welles, and others) succeeded in re-establishing the State Department’s primacy over foreign policy after President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death in 1945. Ultimately, their vision of the ideal Foreign Service and their policy preferences both lost out, but many of the contradictions in today’s U.S. Foreign Service hark back to their ascendancy: “pink peppermint protocol” (versus unabashed politicking); closed (versus open) diplomacy; Europeanism (versus globalism). Fortunately, the club’s old-time Ivy League dominance over foreign policy has given way to dominance by an Ivy League that has been “diluted” to its own advantage—as well as the country’s—by people like Martin Well, Harvard ’66.

—Herbert J. Spiro (’78)

WOODROW WILSON: The Years of Preparation
by John M. Mulder
Princeton, 1978
306 pp. $16.50
L. of C 77-72128
ISBN 0-691-04647-6

Arthur Link, Henry Bragdon, and others have already revealed a great deal about Wilson. Do we need to know more? Is more to be known? Mulder’s account of the 28th President’s academic years, from student days to the presidency of Princeton, is a supplementary volume to the formidable Papers of Woodrow Wilson. It does not change the established view of the man as someone both obdurate and sparkling—to borrow a phrase from Woody (no Woodrow) Allen. However, Mulder is a careful, sensible historian, neither debunker nor idolater. He analyzes the cautious modulation of Wilson’s opinions, showing how much (via his eloquent, ambitious, thwarted clergyman-father) Wilson’s Presbyterianism shaped his attitudes. Young Wilson framed compacts and covenants—including one with his fiancée, promising achievement and outlining the support they would provide each other in a quest for future greatness. Professor Wilson preached innumerable sermons. He believed: in God, in himself, perhaps in their partnership. An extraordinary man in sum, yet in his parts almost an “Identikit” American of his era.

—Marcus Cunliffe (’78)
SIMONE WEIL: A Life
by Simone Pétrement
$15 cloth, $5.95 paper
L of C 76-9576

Simone Weil thwarts classification. None of the labels of 20th-century political philosophy can be applied without contradiction to this woman who believed that expression of truth was incompatible with the word "we." Weil supported all causes that she considered just and lived her convictions—in discourse with the Catholic Church, in political struggles in the streets, in the Spanish Civil War, working in fields, in factories, in trade unions, in schools. Yet as a philosophy teacher and writer (Waiting for God, 1951; Gravity and Grace, 1952), she always remained a solitary searcher for the truth. This calling, incompatible with complete subordination to any party, church, or ideology, made her a disappointment to many, as her lifelong friend and biographer Pétrement shows. Born of Jewish parents but almost anti-Semitic in her religious writings, Weil died at 34 in 1943 of tuberculosis exacerbated by the near-starvation diet she had adopted to identify herself with the plight of Jewish compatriots under the German occupation of France.

—George F. Putnam (’78)

WAR: Controlling Escalation
by Richard Smoke
Harvard, 1977
(released 1978)
419 pp. $18.50
L of C 77-6248
ISBN 0-674-94595-6

The term escalation, as now generally used in describing conflicts between nations, conveys the sense of a steady upward movement toward greater violence. In this tightly reasoned book—one of the most important products of academic social science to appear in the last decade—Smoke, a Research Fellow at the Wright Institute in Berkeley, Calif., shows that escalation does not necessarily work so simply. He emphasizes how nations often blindly cross limits at which conflict might be contained and move instead to higher levels of violence in all types of confrontation short of total war. He analyzes five historical cases, beginning with the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39 and proceeding backward through the Seven Years' War of 1756–63—when the British and French engaged in an action-reaction spiral of increasing cost and intensity before each side realized belatedly that the other had been acting defensively at every step.

—Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (’77)
In 1308, Church officials arrested the entire population (200 souls) of Montaillou, a remote Pyrenees town. A decade later, Jacques Fournier, Bishop of Famiens (and the future Pope Benedict XII), again visited the Inquisition on the still heretical village. Fournier was a tenacious interrogator, avid for detail. From the bishop's records, historian Ladurie has woven a wry, moving account of 14th-century rural life. It became a surprise best-seller in France in 1976. Via the stories of individual villagers, we learn of sorcery and illness, of greed and envy, of family squabbles, and of the brutal libido of Pierre Clergue, the parish priest. (There are still Clergues in Montaillou.) We are told that the population "carried around a whole fauna of fleas and lice." Delousing one's companion was a sign of affection, and the common word for thumb was tue-poux, or "lice-killer".

They should have paid more attention to the fleas. Plague decimated Europe in 1348–50. Pulitzer-prizewinning historian Barbara Tuchman (The Guns of August; Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945) reports that the flea-borne disease killed one-third of the population between India and Iceland. (In Montaillou, the figure was one-half.) It was a "violent, bewildered, suffering, and disintegrating age," Tuchman writes of the 14th century, "a time, as many thought, of Satan triumphant." The Hundred Years War had split France and England; schism within the Church had placed rival Popes in Rome and Avignon. Roving brigands swarmed upon the land. Tuchman pegs her tale to the life of Enguerrand de Coucy VII, the last of a great French ducal dynasty. His mother succumbed to plague; he himself survived to fall in battle against the infidels 50 years later during the disastrous Sixth Crusade.
The British Experience 1945-1975
by Peter Calvocoressi
Pantheon. 1978
253 pp. $8.95
L of C 77-90401

Empire was external to the lives of most Englishmen, writes Calvocoressi, a London publishing executive, in this provocative socio-economic study of Britain since the end of World War II. Only for a few did the post-1945 loss of empire connote loss of purpose and perspective. But Britain's postwar drive—to build a welfare state that could end glaring inequalities of income and opportunity—proved far more expensive and inefficient than anybody had imagined. In time, the disappointments of welfarism, coupled with economic slumps, left a good many Britons with an uneasy sense that the nation did indeed lack purpose. "The principal weaknesses of postwar Britain," Calvocoressi writes, are continuing "unequality" and official "secretiveness." Secrecy, he believes, denotes mistrust and has no place in a society genuinely free of tyranny. But he remains optimistic. Britain's post-imperial goals were good ones, and, though reasonable men may differ about the causes of the failures, what matters most is that "British democratic instincts and institutions remain intact."

Marx's Fate:
The Shape of a Life
by Jerrold Seigel
Princeton, 1978
460 pp. $16.50
L of C 77-85563

As husband and father, Karl Marx's "life was one of recurring suffering, privation, and sorrow." He once confessed that his idea of happiness was "to struggle" and his idea of misery "to submit." Struggle and submission, egoism and self-sacrifice, activism and withdrawal—these were the dialectics that ruled his life. Karl Marx (1818-1883) has had many biographers, none better or more succinct than Isaiah Berlin (Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 1963). But Seigel delves more deeply than earlier writers into the attitudes behind Marx's "alternation between political commitment and withdrawal," including his failure to finish Das Kapital, and the extraordinary amount of time he devoted to political and literary feuding. He effectively (if somewhat ponderously) describes the stresses of Marx's seemingly comfortable German middle-class childhood: His father's conversion to Christianity before the boy's birth, as a condition of being allowed to practice law
in Trier, meant that the son "would have a score to settle for his father" against authority and governments; also, "obeying his father on one level required rebelling against him on another." Marx was graduated from the classical Gymnasium in Trier at 17 and went on to Bonn and Berlin for further schooling. As an adolescent, he embraced and then rejected the humanist philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, turning in 1843 to the central role of the proletariat in history. Until his father's death, he was generously supported while earning his doctorate. After 1838, however, his mother refused him further funds, and he turned to journalism. From the time his friendship with historian Friedrich Engels began in 1844, Marx knew "where I'm going and who's going with me." The revolution of 1848 in Germany brought him to the literary and political forefront. But his moment of glory was followed by 34 years of exile and frequent isolation in London that plunged him into new cycles of gloom—and disabling attacks of carbuncles.

Many Americans may remember one or more of the following facts about Margaret Fuller (1810-50): She was a friend of the most prominent men and women of her time, including Ralph Waldo Emerson; like him, she was a leader of the Transcendentalists and an editor (the first) of that group's famous magazine, the Dial. Her widely quoted statement, "I accept the Universe," prompted Thomas Carlyle to remark, "By Gad, she'd better." Other key details emerge in biographer Paula Blanchard's portrait of Fuller as brassy New England child, inspiring teacher, avid conversationalist, writer, editor (who wounded Henry David Thoreau by returning several of his Dial pieces for revision), and first American female foreign correspondent (for Horace Greeley's crusading New York Tribune). Blanchard's low-key feminist analysis of the contradictions in this formidable woman's life differs markedly from the Freudian approach taken by Mason Wade in Margaret Fuller:
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Whetstone of Genius (1940). She argues that within the confines of contemporary society in Cambridge and Concord, Mass., Fuller could never consider combining a literary career with marriage or sex outside of marriage. Only in Europe did the two aspects of life she coveted appear compatible, and in Italy, when she fell in love with a young nobleman (he was 26, she nearing 37), she happily had a son by him. Biographer Blanchard leans to the theory that they were not wed until shortly before they sailed for the United States in 1850 aboard a merchant ship, the Elizabeth. It was wrecked off Fire Island, N.Y. The child's body was washed ashore. Those of the Marchese and Marchesa Ossoli were never found.

FIRST GENERATION: After introducing us to her Jewish grandmother, Minnie Kasser Needle, and 30 other 20th-century immigrants to the United States, Namias skillfully elicits each person's story. Among the speakers in this exemplary oral history are a Greek Horatio Alger, a Filipino organizer of the 1965 California grape pickers' strike, a teenager growing up Italian and American, East European and Vietnamese refugees from political oppression, and victims of racial intolerance. All tell of homes left, lost, missed, and of their lives in America. "This is not a different country, this is a different world," one comments. The author describes three periods of immigration (1900–29, 1930–45, 1946–78), each affected by changes in U.S. laws. All her newcomers to America retain a certain ethnic pride, as in these words from Valeria Kozaczka Demusz (Dorchester, Mass.; formerly of Dgbrowa, Poland): "The Polish people [in Europe] have got to belong under some bigger nation, because they are too small to survive. Here [they] were slighted for a long time. They never spoke up. There is an awful lot of smart Polish people, big people, but nobody knows about it. They've lived in this country and they've done a lot of good, they've lived as beautiful citizens."
THE VIOLET DOTS
by Michael Kernan
Braziller, 1978
170 pp. $7.95
L.of C 77-94496
ISBN 0-8076-0887-4

Tom Easton, a third-generation coal miner, volunteered for France with the Tyneside Scottish Regiment in 1914. He survived the "bloodiest day in British history" when 57,470 men became casualties as the Battle of the Somme opened on July 1, 1916. He survived the last months of the war as a P.O.W. —working in a German mine. He survived the harsh life back in the Northumberland coal pits. Happily, Easton kept a diary. And journalist Michael Kernan weaves interviews, observations, other material, and excerpts from the diary into a compelling portrait of the life and times of this sturdy soldier, union organizer, community leader, and finally, past the age of 80, Member of the Order of the British Empire, invested by Queen Elizabeth II.

Contemporary Affairs

PEOPLE AND POLITICS: The Years 1960-1975
by Willy Brandt
Little, Brown, 1978
524 pp. $16.95
L.of C 78-7598

In The Other German: Willy Brandt’s Life and Times (1976), journalist David Binder wrote a fine full biography of the ex-Chancellor, from his illegitimate birth in Lubeck in 1913 through his resignation in 1974. Brandt deals only with the recent past in this first volume of a planned Life. The drama opens on August 13, 1961, five weeks before his election as mayor of West Berlin, with the Russian announcement that Berlin had been divided (the first rough Wall went up three days later). It moves on through the hectic Berlin years and his subsequent stint as West Germany’s Ostpolitik Foreign Minister. Brandt closes with reflections on what has occurred in his own country and the world since May 6, 1974, the day he stepped down from West Germany’s highest political post following the arrest of one of his top advisers as a Soviet spy. Readers who look for new disclosures about his relationship with the spy, Gunther Guillaume, will be disappointed. “This was dealt with by the competent court and a parliamentary committee of inquiry,” Brandt says, in his single reference to the devastating episode. “I have nothing to add here.” He is somewhat less reticent when
it comes to anecdotes about VIPs. Lyndon Johnson, then Vice President of the United States, on an early visit to Berlin persuaded Mayor Brandt, whose shoes he admired, to take him shopping on a Saturday night long after closing time. LBJ bought two pairs of each style he liked, Brandt reports, because his feet differed in size.

A PRISON AND A PRISONER
by Susan Sheehan
Houghton Mifflin, 1978
285 pp. $10.95
L of C 78-2728

After the bloody 1971 prison riot at Attica, N.Y., a surge of media interest in prisoners and their plight led to ideological polemics among both journalists and sociologists. New Yorker writer Susan Sheehan, already widely known for her Welfare Mother (1976), destroys the clichés—brutal guards, innocent convicts—as she coolly examines life in New York’s Green Haven maximum security prison, and, in particular, the comfortable existence of robber George (“Popeye”) Malinow, 57, who has been “in and out” for 40 years. Without moralizing, Sheehan makes it clear that institutional “rehabilitation” of criminals is a costly illusion. Moreover, she suggests, the American system of justice makes it fairly easy for convicted murderers and thieves to resume their old ways.

THE TEAMSTERS
by Steven Brill
Simon and Schuster, 1978
414 pp. $11.95
L of C 78-16610
ISBN 0-671-22771-8

Oddly enough, despite its continuing power and economic importance, the American labor movement has lately received little serious attention from either newsmen or academics. Lawyer-journalist Steven Brill’s detailed portrait of the scandal-ridden 2.3 million-member International Brotherhood of Teamsters cannot fill the gap. But even as he traces the various corruptions, vacillations, and intrigues of Jimmy Hoffa, David Beck, Harold Gibbons, Anthony (Tony Pro) Provenzano, and the other Teamster chieftains, Brill does not overlook the workers’ everyday lives or the Teamsters’ hard-won gains in wages and benefits in a tough industry. In the end, he says, the Teamsters have produced “some good deeds, some bad deeds, and . . . a sad bottom line that it could have been much better.”

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Arts & Letters

MARCEL DUCHAMP:
Appearance Stripped Bare
by Octavio Paz
Viking, 1978
218 pp. $10.95
L C 78-17560
ISBN 0-670-45502-4

Mexico's Octavio Paz—poet, philosopher, teacher, and essayist—believes that the greatest influences on 20th-century art are Pablo Picasso and Marcel Duchamp. Picasso did it with his astonishing productivity and the metamorphoses his paintings went through; Duchamp with his "no less astonishing" and "no less fruitful" inactivity. The famous Nude Descending a Staircase shook the New York art world when it appeared in the Armory Show in 1913; by then, Duchamp, born in Normandy in 1887, was already beginning to substitute what he called "painting-idea" for "painting-painting." He worked thereafter on studies of The Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, Even (also known as Large Glass), which he left "finally unfinished" in 1923, did a few "Readymades" of commonplace objects, and became a self-styled "chess maniac" who spent much of his time competing in international tournaments. Manhattan became his permanent home in 1942. Not until after his death in 1968 on a trip to France was his last major work, Given: i. The Waterfall, 2. The Illuminating Gas, 1946–66, uncovered in his secret East 11th Street studio. It is hard to believe that any critic could penetrate the vision of an artist—especially this artist—as well as Paz has done in the essays that comprise his book. But vision "is not only what we see," the poet reminds us. "It is a stance taken, an idea, a geometry—a point of view in both senses of the phrase."

AMERICAN INDIAN
FICTION
by Charles R. Larson
Univ. of New Mexico, 1978
208 pp. $9.50
L C 78-55998

In 1899, Potawatomi Chief Simon Pokagon became the first American Indian to publish a novel. His Queen of the Woods was followed by three novels from Cherokee John M. Oskison, published in the 1920s and '30s, and Osage John J. Mathews' Sundown (1934). All were "conventional in form, traditional in subject, . . . indistinguishable from hundreds of other fictional works of the time." Each of the authors was well-educated (Mathews a

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geologist with a second B.A. in the natural sciences from Oxford). "If we did not know," writes American University's Charles R. Larson, "we might conclude from their novels that they were white." Not so with later Indian authors. Thirty years separate The Surrounded, by D'Arcy McNickle, a Flathead born in western Montana, and F. Scott Momaday's Pulitzer-prizewinning House Made of Dawn (1968). But a strong sense of lost identity unites the two. McNickle's book sometimes echoes white writer-about-Indian-life Oliver LaFarge's Laughing Boy (1929). Momaday's work is less derivative and more ambiguous, Larson finds. It blends Navajo traditions with the author's maternal Cherokee and paternal Kiowa inheritance. A Stanford English professor, Momaday sees his "New Indians" as unable to cope with the white man's world. Their own "is dead-ended." Larson's groundbreaking critique of "native American" fiction is not his only contribution to publishing's current list: his own first novel, The Insect Colony (Holt), holds up for inspection a group of Peace Corps volunteers in West Africa in the 1960s.

In 10 relaxed essays, critic Roger Sale, who teaches English at the University of Washington, explores the literary merits of children's books. Treating authors whose work "contributed to defining . . . what I seem to find most important in life," Sale examines how it is that successful children's literature works on its readers, adults or children. He moves deftly through analysis of such favorites as Beatrix Potter's Peter Rabbit ("permeated with need and power that readers can feel without inquiring into its source") and E. B. White's Charlotte's Web ("a sweet interlude of a book"). Where biographical material can cast light on a story's construction (as in Rudyard Kipling's Kim or Kenneth Grahame's The Wind in the Willows), it is gracefully provided. Sale carries out the delicate task of exploring how something magical works in literature without exposing that magic as trickery or losing a sense of wonder.
HELLO, DARKNESS: The Collected Poems of L. E. Sissman
Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1978, 313 pp. $9.95
L of C 78-54091
ISBN 0-316-79311-6

L. E. Sissaman wakes at dawn, / Showers, shaves, 
calls William Shawni (Busy), boards his motor 
bike, / Stops at a truck stop truckies like.

Why the terse staccato rhyme? Poet running 
out of time. Advertising executive and Atlantic 
columnist Sissman (he added that extra 
syllable to his name in the lines quoted) con-
tracted Hodgkins disease in 1965; modern 
medicine could give him only a decade more. 
His poetry and preoccupations matured in-
stantly: silence and small things, hospitals, 
parties, sunlight, friends, embalmed mo-
ments snatched from time—these are his 
staples. John Updike found an "antic exact-
itude" in Sissman's work. Others have com-
pared him to T. S. Eliot or Ogden Nash. Per-
haps more people would read poetry if more 
poets wrote like Sissman in—to take another 
example—"Concerto for the Left Hand 
Alone" (for cartoonist Charles Saxon):
Late, late, when BAL played Wittgenstein/ Inter-
preting Ravel, one hand behind/ Him in 
the First World War, I thought of you—/ The 
hand that waited and the hand that drew/ My gauche hand drawing on the drawing 
pad,/ A sinister, undextrous fiddler-crab/ Claw caught and fixed in the links of your 
hand,/ Left high and dry ashore upon 
the sand/ Of a lost world where all is wither-
shins,/ And every left hand sidles for its sins.

THE MIDDLE PARTS OF FORTUNE: Somme and Ancre, 1916
by Frederic Manning
St. Martin's, 1977 (released 1978)
247 pp. $8.95
L of C 77-72368
ISBN 0-312-53185-0

This memoir-novel of World War I trench life 
was first published anonymously in England 
by London poet-essayist Frederic Manning in 
1929, thirteen years after he survived the Battle 
of the Somme as a private. It was hailed as 
a masterpiece by Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, T. E. 
Lawrence, and Ernest Hemingway (who ex-
cerpted it for his 1942 Men at War anthology). 
It is full of the talk and look of the men in and 
out of the trenches: "There is a gulf between 
men just returned from action and those who 
have not . . . as unbridgeable as that between 
the sober and the drunk." Manning's nominal 
hero is Lance Corporal Bourne, an educated 
chap who resists pressures to go to officer 
school, lives through the Somme, and dies, 
finally, hit by a stray German bullet during a
raid. His real heroes are Bourne's fellow soldiers: "If a man could not be certain of himself, he could be certain of nothing. The problem which confronted them all equally . . . did not concern death so much as the affirmation of their own will in the face of death; and once the nature of the problem was clearly stated, they realized that its solution was continuous, and could never be final."

Science & Technology

Critics—there were many—of Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) have been stirred up again by the Harvard biologist's insistence that "the question of interest is no longer whether human social behavior is genetically determined; it is to what extent." At the heart of Wilson's genetic hypotheses is the proposition that the traits of human nature were adaptive when the species was evolving over the 5 million years prior to civilization; consequently, genes that predisposed their carriers to develop these survival traits spread through the earth's population. Examining human aggression, sex, altruism, and religion on the basis of sociobiological theory, he detects a "hard biological substructure" of human nature that gives rise to genetically influenced predispositions (among them, the subordination of women to men). Can cultural evolution completely replace genetic evolution? No, says Wilson. For the time being, "the genes hold culture on a leash." Future generations may choose to tinker with the essence of humanity by molecular engineering, but Wilson seems in no hurry to see it tried.

Nor does Australian geneticist and Nobel Laureate Sir Macfarlane Burnet. A scientist who perhaps even more than Wilson views the genetic forest steadily through its trees, Burnet writes clearly for the nongeneticist: "Birth is the most blatantly mammalian of all human functions. It is painful, messy, and undignified." The infant emerging "greets life with a cry"—and with his genetic lot. He may
be bright or beautiful, aggressive or sickly. But when he reaches his mid-twenties his brain cells stop reproducing (most geniuses have made their major contributions by that time of life). After middle age, his bodily immunity weakens, and cancers, especially sarcomas and leukemia, and cardiovascular disease strike him more frequently. All this appears to be written in his genes; the oddities in people, Burnet argues, stem from errors produced by DNA-handling enzymes.

Natural history? Or art? These three books combine both—though Britain’s John Chancellor calls his illustrated study of John James Audubon (1785–1851) a biography. Chancellor combines material from the naturalist-painter’s collected letters and journals with the findings of earlier biographers and his own shrewd observations. Audubon would kill 25 brown pelicans in order to draw a single male bird, writes Chancellor, partly for the fun of killing them and partly for the sake of giving accurate anatomical descriptions of the species and their individual variations. Many of the famous bird studies are splendidly reproduced.

Oxford ethologist Tim Halliday, also a painter of wildlife, has illustrated his careful, conservationist text with 16 well-rendered color plates and 46 drawings, plus his own maps. Halliday makes a strong plea for more effective worldwide measures to save such vanishing birds as the Eskimo Curlew, Abbott’s Booby, and the small falcon called the Mauritius Kestrel.

This kestrel is among the unusual fauna that Gerald Durrell describes in the latest of his chatty little illustrated books about humans and other animals. He reports on an expedition to the Mascarenes to save three rare species of Round Island reptiles, the Golden Fruit Bats of Rodrigues Island, and the Pink Pigeons of Mauritius from the fate of the latter island’s long-gone Dodo. All these creatures were rescued and are now safely installed on the Channel Island of Jersey under Durrell’s protection.
GIMPEL THE FOOL and Other Stories.  
By Isaac Bashevis Singer. Farrar, 1957, republished 1978. 205 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $9.95)

Two years before the 1978 Nobel Prize for Literature was awarded to Isaac Bashevis Singer, 74, the Polish-born American writer told a reporter: "I don't think I am famous but if you say so, who am I to say no?" Deliberate or not, the echo of Gimpel the Fool, one of the writer's most unforgettable creations, could not escape any devoted Singer fan (Gimpel, for instance, told by the townspeople that the moon had come down in Turbeen, asking plaintively, "What was I to do? I believed them"). For years, Singer's publishers have been steadily making paperback editions of his novels, short stories, fables, and allegories available to an ever growing public. In addition to Gimpel's title story, crisply translated by Saul Bellow, there are 11 vivid village tales—of marriage beds and deathbeds, of saintly rabbis and evil dybbuks, of four generations of industrious little shoemakers, and of a man called Pelte the Wife Killer, who had four wives "and, may it not be held against him ... sent them all off to the other side." Most were first published in Yiddish in New York City's Jewish Daily Forward.

KINSHIP IN BALI. By Hildred Geertz and Clifford Geertz. Univ. of Chicago reprint, 1978. 226 pp. $3.95

This tightly woven piece of scholarship is not for everyone. But it is interesting and important in its field. Time was, note the Princeton-based authors, when all anthropologists agreed that every people possess a vital "kinship system" that can be identified, described, analyzed, and classified. Nine months of fieldwork in 1957-58 on the densely populated island of Bali off the coast of Java led the Geertzes to a different conclusion: "Whatever may be the case in West Africa, or Australia, Balinese society is in no way dominated by the institutions of kinship. Are there substitutes? Religion, they say, to a degree. Also, the concept of "origin-point," with distinctions between "core and peripheral..."
houseyards” or “founding” and “way-station” temples. “Impersonal role designations” enforce a “systematic genealogical amnesia” among both gentry and commoners (one such title, anak iero, literally “insider,” refers to persons who dwell within palace walls). Most important of all is a social institution peculiar to Bali called the dadia. This untranslatable word can mean a group of people who serve a certain temple, or who are members of a particular irrigation society, or who share some other kind of togetherness important to the “delicate,” “tremulous” Balinese culture.


In this updated edition of their noted text in political sociology, first published nearly a decade ago, authors Lipset and Raab conclude that the history of the 1970s “gives us good cause for satisfaction about the viability of the American polity, but no reason to feel that we can let down our vigilance.” The ultimate test of democratic restraint and “prophylactic American political institutions” may await “more dire and comprehensive circumstances.” Among its several virtues, this book serves as a sobering reminder of the scare tactics of Wallacites and Watergaters—and of the long line of extremists on the right who have gone before. The authors see a continuity down the years, from the first full-fledged conspiracy theory introduced in the 1790s, which had the Illuminati, a secret Masonic society in Bavaria who opposed the Jesuits, plotting with the Jesuits themselves against Protestants. (In the excitement, Yale’s President Timothy Dwight delivered a Fourth of July speech in which he asked, “Shall our sons become the disciples of Voltaire, and the dragoons of Marat; or our daughters the concubines of the Illuminati?”) As recently as 1957, efforts were made by the John Birch Society and other rightists to link Senator Joseph McCarthy’s death to the Illuminati, who by then were said to control world Communism.
New Books by Fellows and Former Fellows


New Books by Wilson Center Staff Members


The Quiet Trade: Russian Art and American Money

During the last decade, art sales have made headlines—the $5.54 million purchase of Velázquez's *Juan de Pareja* by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, for example. In 1970, it was the highest price ever paid for a painting. Last June's $13.4 million sale of masterpieces from the Robert von Hirsch collection of Gothic, Romanesque, and Renaissance art was described as the largest one-day receipt in the history of art auctions. But in the late 1920s and '30s, a series of art sales of still unequalled magnitude—involving works by Rubens, Rembrandt, Watteau, Van Dyck, Titian, and Raphael—took place without fanfare. Here historian Robert Williams relates how the Soviet government under Stalin acquired badly needed American dollars through its quiet sale of art and imperial treasures.

*by Robert C. Williams*

In early 1931, rumors were flying in the art world that U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon had pulled off an astounding coup by purchasing several Western European art masterpieces from the great Hermitage Museum in Leningrad. On May 10, the *New York Times* observed under a Washington dateline: "A report that Secretary Mellon has purchased Van Dyck's *Portrait of Philip, Lord Wharton* was authoritatively denied here tonight. Mr. Mellon has bought no pictures from Russian collections for his art collection."

But the gossip persisted, spurred by the new rumor that Mellon had purchased Raphael's *Alba Madonna* for $1,166,400. On August 18, 1934, the *Times* dismissed talk of such a transaction as pure fantasy:

If this is not the time when an American citizen would be likely to buy the most expensive painting in the world, neither is it the time when the Soviet government would be likely to sell the rarest of its national treasures. Selling off the family
Raphael's Alba Madonna (c. 1510) was one of the last paintings bought by Andrew Mellon from the Soviet regime. Purchased in April 1931, it drew at the time the highest price ever paid for a single painting: $1,166,400.

The Times Kremlinologist was as misinformed as most Americans—and just as uninformed about the massive Soviet effort to sell art abroad to help finance industrialization at home during Stalin's First Five Year Plan (1928–33). Andrew Mellon was not the only beneficiary of this campaign, nor the first, but he was perhaps the most famous.

The fact that the Soviet government quietly sold art treasures confiscated from former royal Romanov and private collections to wealthy foreigners during the Great Depression is simply not discussed in the Soviet Union. Missing masterpieces are generally described as casualties of a 1931 fire in the Hermitage or of German bombardment during World War II. In one case, a 1950 Soviet article on the Hermitage included a reproduction of the Alba Madonna without mentioning that the painting had been sold to Mellon 19 years earlier.

Yet, for a time, the sale of Soviet art played a prominent role in Stalin's economic policies, especially in Soviet-American trade.

Imperial Collectors

The Soviet art sales of 1928–33 reversed the traditional flow of art from West to East. The Imperial Russian government had been a buyer, not a seller, of art. Catherine
the Great, who ruled from 1762 to 1796, was only the first of many Romanov rulers whose agents fanned across Europe in search of art to enrich the great imperial collections of the Hermitage. Before World War I, wealthy Moscow merchants were also avid buyers of Western art. In 1909, the *Burlington Magazine* reported, "St. Petersburg is rich in pictures of old masters, for the most part unknown to art critics;" but these pictures were rarely for sale.

**The St. Louis Fair Fiasco**

Around 1910, the British art dealer Joseph Duveen offered to buy the famous *Benois Madonna* of Leonardo da Vinci from Madame Benois, only to be outbid by Nicholas II, who bought it for the Hermitage. In 1911, the Philadelphia collector P. A. B. Widener tried to buy two Rembrandt portraits owned by the Yusupov family, but discovered that they were not for sale at any price; only after the Russian Revolution would his son Joseph acquire them—from an émigré family member in need of cash, Prince Felix Yusupov, the murderer of Rasputin.

When the Imperial Russian government did try to sell art abroad, it was not very successful. Russian paintings, sculptures, and bronzes formed a colorful part of the Tsarist Ministry of Finance's many exhibits at foreign trade fairs before World War I, but these were usually works by contemporary Russian artists, not European masterpieces. The best paintings were often only exhibited on loan, not for sale, and were buried among the sealskins, sables, and wood products designed to attract the Western businessman. The 600 paintings in the Russian art exhibit at the 1904 St. Louis fair met a particularly ignominious fate. When the agent of the Ministry of Finance attempted to sell them in New York in 1906 without paying the tariff on imported art objects, the entire collection was confiscated by the U.S. Bureau of Customs. They were finally sold at public auction as "unclaimed merchandise" in February 1912 by order of the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of President Taft. No further Russian government art displays were launched in America until the first Soviet art exhibit visited New York in early 1924.

Throughout the 1920's, while the Hermitage was being greatly enriched by the new regime's seizure of private art collections, there were persistent reports in the West that the Soviets were about to sell European masterpieces and other art treasures from the national collections. In 1924, the head of the Soviet trade delegation in London declared, "These rumors are absolutely without foundation."

But to Stalin, such art was bourgeois, European, or religious,

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and also a potentially profitable foreign trade commodity. By 1928, his drive toward industrialization made the sale of art objects to earn foreign currency seem necessary.

**Unhappy Task**

The Hermitage curators had little heart for these sales. They generally carried out their orders from on high with great reluctance, saddened by the depletion of the museum's collection but fearful of the consequences of resistance. The head of the West European Painting Section, V. F. Levinson-Lessing, found himself assigned in 1928–33 as an art appraiser to the Soviet art export agency Antikvariat and to the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, the exchange point for most sales to the West. Lessing was not enthusiastic about his job; 30 years later he was perhaps the only Soviet scholar to admit in print that former Hermitage masterpieces were now in foreign museums such as the National Gallery of Art in Washington.

The man ultimately responsible for the Hermitage and other Soviet museums was Anatoly Lunacharsky, Commissar of Education. Lunacharsky tried to resist the pressure from Stalin to begin selling art works abroad. On September 28, 1928, he persuaded the Armenian-born Commissar of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, to cosign a Main Customs Administration order forbidding the export of valuable art objects, including paintings by "artists whose production is systematically collected in the museums of the U.S.S.R." as well as works "necessary for the study of the general history of art."

But Lunacharsky himself was under fire at this time for resisting party control of art and education, and his efforts proved to have little effect. In November 1928, two months after the issuance of the customs order, the first Soviet sale of art abroad began at the Rudolf Lepke auction house in Berlin under the direction of Lunacharsky’s cosigner, Mikoyan.

One Hermitage curator, Tatiana Chernavina, told what happened, in her book *Escape from the Soviets*, which was published in the United States in 1934:

We were commanded in the shortest possible time to reorganize the whole of the Hermitage collection "on the principle of sociological formations.” No one knew what that meant: nevertheless, under the guidance of semiliterate, half-baked "Marxists" who could not tell faience from porcelain or Dutch masters from the French or Spanish, we had to set to work and pulled to pieces a collection which it had taken more than one hundred years to create.

As Chernavina soon discovered, reorganization was a prelude to foreign sales. In the spring of 1930, she was ordered to remain after hours in the Hermitage, remove Van Eyck's *Annunciation* from the wall, deliver it to a high government official, and hang another painting in its place.

Unknown to Tatiana Chernavina, the sales of art masterpieces to the wealthy U.S. Secretary of the Treasury had commenced.

**The Sales Begin**

The decision to sell art objects abroad in the autumn of 1928 was ultimately the Politburo’s, but the principal agent was Mikoyan. Mikoyan had become Commissar of Foreign Trade in 1926; by the autumn of 1927 he was already exploring the possibility of foreign art sales through Yuri Piatakov, the Soviet trade representative in Paris.
Piatakov proposed a "commercial venture" to the well-known French art dealer Germain Seligman, invited him to Moscow, and showed him great storerooms full of crystal chandeliers, malachite tables, jewelry, and paintings. Seligman, however, was more interested in recovering lost Watteaus and Matisses for France. Moreover, the French government was justly fearful of lawsuits in French courts by Russian émigrés who had owned the art the Soviets seemed intent on selling. The deal fell through, although Seligman was told that he could have a completely free hand in organizing auctions and deciding on the make-up and sequence of the railroad-car shipments of art to be sent from Moscow.

Mikoyan then initiated public auction sales in Berlin and Vienna in November 1928, but the works offered were not masterpieces, and Western dealers knew it. Prices were low, sales were disappointing, and there was indeed a lawsuit by Russian émigrés who claimed that the Soviet government was selling stolen property rightfully theirs. (Their case was upheld in Berlin but overturned by an appellate court in Leipzig.) When the public auctions proved less profitable than anticipated, Mikoyan decided to negotiate private sales of the best works from the Hermitage.

The American art market offered the best prospects. For several decades wealthy Americans had been steadily draining Europe of some of its finest art and antique collections.

Mikoyan therefore turned to one of the few Americans he knew in Moscow, Dr. Armand Hammer. Hammer had come to post-Revolutionary Russia in the summer of 1921 along with a number of other Americans associated with the New York

Philip III, 15th-century Duke of Burgundy, is the first recorded owner of Van Eyck's Annunciation (c. 1425). It passed to William II of Holland in 1819, then to the Hermitage in 1850, during the reign of Nicholas I. Andrew Mellon acquired it in June 1930.
“Bureau” of the first Soviet trade representative, Ludwig C. A. K. Martens. Hammer, through Martens, obtained a concession to mine asbestos in the Urals and another in 1925 to manufacture pencils. In the meantime, his Allied American Corporation was handling the sales of several dozen American companies in Soviet Russia, among them the Ford Motor Company. By the winter of 1928–29, however, it was becoming clear that foreign concessionaires were no longer welcome under the First Five Year Plan and that the Hammer pencil concession would soon be nationalized. Art objects provided an intriguing alternative commodity.

Foreign Geese

The first Mikoyan-Hammer art venture turned out to be a failure. In late 1928, Mikoyan hinted to Hammer (whom he had known since 1923, when the young industrialist arrived at Novorossiisk with the first shipment of Fordson tractors) that works from the Hermitage were now for sale and promised Hammer and his brother Victor a 10 percent commission on any paintings they could sell in New York. The Hammers promptly wired their brother Harry to get in touch with the world’s leading art dealer, Joseph Duveen.

Duveen, in turn, set up a syndicate of New York art dealers capable of raising sizable sums of money, told his appraiser, Bernard Berenson, to get ready for a trip to Leningrad, and sent the Soviet art export agency Antikvariat a list of 40 Hermitage paintings for which the syndicate was prepared to pay $5 million.

The head of Antikvariat was insulted. “What do they think we are? Children? Don’t they realize we know what is being sold in Paris, London, and New York? If they want to deal with us seriously, let them make serious offers.” The arrangements fell through, but Mikoyan was still determined to sell paintings in America.

The abortive Duveen negotiations were part of a more general campaign by the Soviet government to distribute and sell art objects in America in 1928. That year, VOKS, the All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations Abroad (known to its U.S. critics as the Society for Stuffing Foreign Geese), working through Amtorg, the Soviet trading agency in New York, launched the first of its many Soviet art exhibits. The principal American organizer was a Philadelphia art critic, Christian Brinton, who signed an agreement to exhibit and sell contemporary and folk art for a 10 percent commission. Eight such exhibits were held in New York and other American cities from 1928 through 1934, featuring icons, rugs, textiles, toys, woodenware, and other objects familiar to any visitor to Soviet book outlets today. In 1929, Amtorg’s income from such sales amounted to over $1 million, more than double the 1928 figure.

Gulbenkian’s Passion

Meanwhile, Mikoyan, thwarted by Duveen’s inadequate offers for Hermitage paintings, decided to eliminate the middleman and sell directly to a fellow Armenian, Calouste Gulbenkian, head of the new Iraq Petroleum Company. Gulbenkian was then a British citizen living in Paris, who had been most helpful, some said, in helping Moscow dump its oil on the Western market. He was interested in buying European masterpieces from the Hermitage.

By June 1929, Gulbenkian had signed a contract with Antikvariat to make his first purchases from the
Hermitage. These included Dirk Bouts' *Annunciation*, a Louis XVI writing desk, and 24 gold and silver 18th-century French pieces. The objects were packed by Antikvariat officials in Leningrad under the watchful eye of Gulbenkian's agent, shipped to the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, and exchanged for a bank draft in pounds sterling, payable to the Soviet trade delegate in Paris.

Gulbenkian wrote one Soviet official that he was compelled to buy because of "this passion [to collect art] which is like a disease," but that his hair was "growing whiter" from arguments over prices. After endless haggling, he bought a number of other objects from the Hermitage between the summer of 1929 and the autumn of 1930. By late May 1930, he had purchased Houdon's statue *Diana* and six major paintings: Rubens' *Portrait of Helene Fournier*, Rembrandt's *Portrait of Titus* and *Pallas Athene*, Watteau's *Le Mezzetin*, Ter Borch's *Music Lesson*, and Nicholas Lancret's *Les Baigneuses*. Gulbenkian ultimately sold four of these to the Wildenstein Gallery in New York (in 1934 the Gallery sold the Watteau to the Metropolitan Museum of Art). He later acquired Rembrandt's *Portrait of an Old Man*.

"A Great Mistake"

Having consummated his purchases, Gulbenkian wrote to a friend, the head of the Russian state bank, on July 31, 1930, that the Soviet art sales were really a great mistake. "The objects which have been in your museums for many years should not be sold," he now maintained, adding that "the conclusion will be that Russia is indeed in a bad way if you are obliged to get rid of objects which will not in the end really produce large enough sums to help the finance of the state." Finally, he admonished the Russian official not to forget "that those [capitalists] from whom you would ask for credit are precisely the same as the potential buyers of the objects you wish to sell out of your museums."

The United States was then the major foreign creditor of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet government desperately wanted to reverse its trade deficit with the United States, which ran as high as $90 million in 1930 and 1931.

A New Buyer

In 1930, Andrew Mellon learned of the recent Hermitage sales to Gulbenkian from his New York art dealer, M. Knoedler & Co. Mellon, an avid collector, could not resist the new opportunity to buy. He put Knoedler to work.

At the same time, as U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Mellon was involved with a number of issues related to unprecedentedly high levels of Soviet-American trade. The United States had become a major supplier to Russia of goods and raw materials (primarily automobiles, trucks, tractors, nonferrous metals, cotton, and rubber). Most of these sales were made possible by long-term credits extended by U.S. companies to Amtorg, which represented Mikoyan's Commissariat of Foreign Trade in New York. Imports from Russia (furs, hides, lumber, and manganese) were minuscule by comparison, and a highly unfavorable balance of trade had developed.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union badly needed American capital, technology, and engineering know-how to carry out its First Five Year Plan. In 1929 Amtorg suddenly tri-
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<tr>
<th>PAINTING</th>
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<tr>
<td>Portrait of a Young Man</td>
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<td>Portrait of Isabella Brant</td>
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<td>The Annunciation</td>
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<td>A Woman Holding a Pink</td>
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<td>Suzanna Fourment and her Daughter</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. George and the Dragon</td>
<td>Raphael</td>
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<td>Pope Innocent X</td>
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<td>Botticelli</td>
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<td>Joseph Accused by Popiphar’s Wife</td>
<td>Rembrandt</td>
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<td>The Finding of Moses</td>
<td>Veronese</td>
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<td>William II of Nassau and Orange</td>
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<td>Portrait of an Officer</td>
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<td>The Crucifixion</td>
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<td>Venus with a Mirror</td>
<td>Titian</td>
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<td>Total for twenty-one paintings</td>
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came fierce in the first half of 1930. That year, primarily because of U.S. exports, Soviet-American trade reached an all-time peak of $114.4 million (or $509.3 million in current dollars).

Mellon's major headache in Soviet-American trade relations in 1930–31 concerned the “dumping” of Soviet goods abroad at prices below the “fair” market value. At precisely the time he was negotiating his Hermitage purchases, Mellon was being pressured by American businessmen to issue strict orders against Soviet dumping. He bought his first paintings in April 1930; in May he issued an embargo against Soviet matches; in July he issued another embargo against Soviet lumber produced with the use of convict labor. Between January and April 1931, Mellon consummated the greatest of his Hermitage purchases—almost $4.5 million for 11 paintings, including the Alba Madonna. In February he ruled in favor of the Soviet government in the case of manganese ore. Throughout the years 1930 and 1931, he proved a reluctant enforcer of the protectionist will of Congress—and of many businessmen—as expressed in the Smoot-Hawley Act of June 1930. Only on April 22, 1931, did he impose a temporary embargo on Soviet asbestos, an embargo soon lifted by the new Roosevelt administration in April 1933.

Art by the Ton
Mellon chose a propitious moment to buy his paintings. The Soviet government was selling art objects in large quantity. Exclusive of the secret private sales to Gulbenkian and Mellon, 1,681 tons of art objects, jewelry, and antiques were sold by the Soviet government abroad during the January–September 1930 period; 117 tons went directly to America, and more undoubtedly came into the country indirectly, through Europe. The dollar value ($7 million) of Mellon's paintings alone amounted to almost one-third of all officially recorded Soviet exports to the United States in 1930.

From Titian to Tractors
The Treasury Secretary's purchases were never negotiated directly with the Hermitage but involved M. Knoedler & Co. and the subsidiary organizations of Mikoyan's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, namely, Antikvariat, the Soviet trade representative in Berlin, and Amtorg in New York. When a purchase was to be made, Mellon would deposit the amount in pounds sterling at Knoedler's, which would then make payments to the Russians' Berlin or New York trade representative, 10 percent down, the balance on delivery. The crucial intermediary between Knoedler's and the Soviet government was the Matthiessen Gallery in Berlin, whose lawyer was the contact with Nicholas Ilyn, the head of Antikvariat in Leningrad and Moscow. When the final purchases were negotiated in New York in the spring of 1931, the president of Knoedler's dealt directly with Ilyn and an Amtorg representative at the Hotel Biltmore. In this complicated way, and with a good deal of transatlantic cable traffic, 21 Hermitage masterpieces changed hands between April 1930 and April 1931.

The fact that Berlin was the point of delivery was not accidental. As the Soviet Union turned away from America to Germany for credit in the winter of 1930–31, Mellon's money could be placed in a Berlin “blocked account” and shifted directly by the
Soviets to pay German bills. The same bank teller could literally convert Mellon's payment for a Titian into a Soviet payment for German tractors.

Whether the Soviets saw the final flurry of Mellon's purchases in early 1931 as a last opportunity to obtain American credit is impossible to say. It is likely, however, that by saving his greatest purchases until the end, Mellon took advantage not only of the steadily dropping values of the art market but also of the desperate Soviet need for credit. Few Americans at the time knew of his purchases. Blamed for the Depression and accused of conflict of interest, Mellon was driven from office in 1932 under threat of impeachment and became U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James in London. He retired a year later. In the years following his purchases, Mellon, when he said anything at all about the matter, denied owning paintings from the Hermitage. The paintings meanwhile rested quietly on the walls of his Washington, D.C., apartment or in the basement of Washington's Corcoran Gallery. They became public knowledge only in 1935, when Mellon was taken into

*Representative Wright Patman (D-Texas) accused Mellon on January 6, 1932, of violating the law which forbade the Secretary of the Treasury from being "concerned or interested in carrying on a business or trade or commerce." Charged with owning stock in 300 corporations, Mellon countered with the argument that in no instance did he hold a majority interest. The push for his impeachment abated when he accepted the ambassadorship.

Detail from Crucifixion. The Soviets sold Van Eyck's diptych Crucifixion and Last Judgment (1426) in May 1933 for $185,000. Its value today is $2 million.

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court by the Internal Revenue Service for alleged tax fraud; he had made the mistake of trying to claim his paintings as a charitable deduction on his 1931 income tax. Eventually, he was acquitted of fraud and his estate paid his back taxes. In 1937 Mellon died, and his great treasure trove of paintings went to the National Gallery of Art, which he himself had created and financed. Here they will undoubtedly remain—at least until America herself needs oil more desperately than oils.

**The Boom Ends**

Soviet foreign trade largely collapsed after 1931. Moscow's exports (of grain the Russians desperately needed as well as other commodities) led to antidumping measures by foreign governments, including Great Britain and Nazi Germany in 1933. Soviet trade policy resulted in shortages at home and a massive trade deficit abroad.

Soviet art sales faced the same pressures as Soviet foreign trade in general, and prices plummeted. The May 1930 public auction in Leipzig of prints and drawings from the Hermitage netted less than $1 million; similar low prices prevailed the following year, when the highest price paid for a single drawing was $5,000. The May 1931 sale of the entire contents of the Stroganov Palace through the Lepke house in Berlin brought a net of only $613,000, less than the Soviet government had received for several individual works sold to Mellon. The drop in prices was most evident in the case of the Van Eyck diptych *Crucifixion* and *Last Judgment*, sold to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York through M. Knoedler & Co. in May 1933. When negotiations began in 1931, the Soviet government was asking $600,000 for the work. When they finally sold it two years later, the price was only $185,000.

By the summer of 1933, Soviet art sales abroad had reached the point where *Burlington Magazine* bemoaned the “ever increasing impoverishment of the Hermitage.” Many works of art had been sold abroad, the magazine reported, “for a profit that to a great state must be negligible, apparently in accordance with the orders of politicians whose boast it is that they are apostles of culture.”

Other art treasures were disposed of during those years. In 1931, the Soviet government had begun selling off the confiscated possessions of the Romanovs, including great quantities of jewelry, icons, photograph frames, chalices, Easter eggs, and other art objects. Many of these were by the famous court goldsmith and jeweler Peter Carl Fabergé and had been stored for years at Tsarskoe Selo, Gatchina, and other palaces around Leningrad and Moscow. (Even the private library of Tsar Nicholas II ended up in the Library of Congress in 1931, via a New York bookseller who had obtained it from Antikvariat.) During this period of socialist construction, the Soviets saw these art objects as little more than unpleasant reminders of the Romanov past.

**Marketing a Treasure**

In January 1931, a German art syndicate calling itself the Import Antique Company began selling such objects through the Wallace H. Day Gallery in New York, but was temporarily stopped by a court injunction on behalf of Grand Duchesses Olga and Xenia; in March the sale went on but netted only $69,136. That summer Duveen himself
COLLECTING ART IN MOSCOW

Armand Hammer published Quest for the Romanoff Treasure in 1932. Illustrated with photographs of imperial jewels (but devoted almost entirely to Dr. Hammer's mining and manufacturing activities), the book supplies this account of treasure-hunting in the Soviet Union at a time when priceless religious and imperial art objects were being "dispersed among the people" or melted down for gold and silver:

The collecting of these art treasures and intimate household articles of the Romanoff family had been the principal hobby of my brother [Victor] and myself. . . . Some articles [had] found their way to little shops where their acquisition was relatively simple, while others were in the hands of individuals who would part with them only after considerable negotiating. . . .

One day my brother Victor and I were eating at a small hotel in Moscow. He looked at one of the plates and called my attention to it. The plate had been turned out at the Imperial Porcelain Factory. It bore on its back the words "Nicholas I, 1825." It was more than one hundred years old and of exquisite workmanship. We asked the manager of the hotel where he had gotten the plate. He said it was from the palace, but he didn't like the plates because they broke too easily. We bought his supply, giving him some thicker plates which would stand harder usage by the dishwashers in the hotel. . . .

Our fellow collectors were very few. The most important were the French Ambassador, Ebert, and the German Ambassador, Count Brockdorf von Rantzau, who, on account of their diplomatic privileges, had no difficulty in sending their possessions out of Russia.

Whenever something of value would turn up in Moscow, we would be sure to meet the French Ambassador or his wife, who would appear on the scene, magnifying glass in hand. The German Ambassador rarely appeared in person. He apparently depended more on his agents.

Our home in Moscow became a virtual museum, filled with relics of the bygone splendour of the Romanoff Dynasty.

© 1932 by Armand Hammer. Reprinted by permission.

traveled to Russia and began buying great quantities of tapestries and other art objects from the imperial palaces.

But the most successful seller of the "Romanov treasure" turned out to be Dr. Armand Hammer, the industrialist who had first interested Duveen in the possibility of purchasing paintings from the Hermitage in 1928. Hammer shrewdly perceived in 1931–32 that the glittering debris of the last Romanovs could be sold in great quantities to wealthy American women, fascinated with European royalty and aristocracy but fated to live in a democratic society.

In 1929, the Hammers had signed an agreement whereby the Soviet government would take over their highly profitable pencil factories. By way of compensation, the Hammers would receive the equivalent of several million dollars but not in hard currency; some of it would be in rubles cash, and some in three-year
Soviet bonds. In addition they would be granted permission to leave Russia with their "household effects."

These "effects" included large quantities of art objects, mainly religious and imperial, which had been acquired cheaply. How and from whom they were acquired is not clear, but it is worth noting that Hammer's Allied American Corporation occupied the Fabergé shop in Moscow after 1922, that the Hammers had been in contact with Duveen for several years, and that the Hammer acquisitions occurred in the larger context of massive Soviet art exports.

**Prices Plummet**

By late 1932, the Hammers were marketing the "Romanov treasure" through retail department stores in St. Louis and other American cities. In October, Armand Hammer published his *Quest for the Romanoff Treasure*, which proclaimed that "business is business, but Russia is romance." In fact, the book was more about business than romance. It recommended American dealings with the Soviet government but did little to enlighten the reader about how the Hammers had actually acquired their art treasures. (Hammer was an active advocate of American-Soviet trade relations. On July 28, 1932, he wired the then Democratic presidential candidate, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt, from Germany: "PRESS DISPATCHES HERE FEATURE YOUR INCLINATION TOWARD RECOGNITION OF RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT STOP AFTER BUSINESS EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA AS AMERICAN CITIZEN LAST THREE YEARS I HEARTILY FAVOR SUCH RECOGNITION."

Still, the book was a splendid advertisement for the impending sales at the Lord and Taylor department store in New York. The sales opened in January 1933. Lured by an illustrated catalogue of "crown jeweled objects of art" (brocades, vestments, silver, porcelain, glassware, icons, and jewelry) and enticed by the prestigious Fabergé double-headed eagle on all the price tags, wealthy American women began buying at "bargain prices." Paradoxically, the Hammer sales reflected the low prices of the Depression in that only the rich could afford the trinkets of a vanished Romanov world. With their Lord and Taylor venture, the Hammers had started a profitable enterprise, which led a year or so later to the founding of the Hammer Gallery in New York as an outlet for Russian art.

The sales of 1932–33 marked the end of massive Soviet art sales in America and the beginning of more conventional means of marketing art through dealers and galleries abroad. The great German art auctions came to a halt with the coming to power of Hitler in 1933. Russian art exhibits in America, after the United States had recognized Soviet Russia in November 1933, had less to do with economics and more to do with cultivating Soviet-American friendship through exhibitions of contemporary Russian arts and crafts.

The last major sale to an American occurred in 1937–38, at the height of Stalin's purges, when Ambassador *As of this writing, Dr. Hammer is still going strong at age 80. Having acquired M. Knoedler & Co. in 1971, he merged the art gallery with a Swiss holding company to form Knoedler-Modarco S.A., a $40 million art export firm. The company's purpose? To sell art to Arabs, Ira-

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and Mrs. Joseph E. Davies purchased large quantities of icons, chalices, and contemporary paintings in Moscow and Leningrad just before the government reinstated the 1928 restrictions on art exports. This time, the Soviet objective in permitting these sales was not so much to obtain hard currency as to win the political friendship that later found expression in Davies's rosy 1941 best seller Mission to Moscow. The Davies bought so much art in 1937-38, utilizing cheap black-market rubles deposited in Berlin banks by the Soviet government for the use of foreign diplomats living in Moscow, that they more than quadrupled the cost of these rubles, infuriating other diplomats who had to use the inflated rubles to buy food and pay salaries and rent.

The exchange of Russian art for American money would continue after 1938, through purchases by diplomats and tourists and occasional sales abroad, but never again would the Soviet government sell national art treasures in such quantity or of such quality on the Western market.

The Great Tradeoff

American buyers never publicized the fact that they had acquired art that was originally the property of murdered Romanovs or purge victims, and the Soviet government was equally reluctant to admit it had sold its art treasures to Western capitalists. Crucial to Soviet-American trade, the sales were also seen by the Kremlin as a political weapon for influencing high-ranking Americans and thus an important element of Soviet foreign policy—aimed at exploiting the capitalist world, not overthrowing it.

Although war and revolution have been traditional forces in the international art market, only in the 1928–38 period did a government, rather than private individuals, sell off much of its art to wealthy foreigners who were its avowed enemies. As a result, American art collections were enriched by the debris of Stalin's revolution (which the acquisitive urges of Western collectors helped to finance).

In the art world, ideology rarely inhibits acquisition. The exchange of Russian art for American money suggests that in at least one aspect of the Soviet-American relationships of those days, trade overcame public antagonism and made art a force for détente, long before that word came into fashion.
William Shakespeare, Gentleman

Martin Droeshout's engraving of Shakespeare from the title page of the First Folio (1623). At the time, Ben Jonson was satisfied with the picture as a likeness, but some critics have since dubbed it a "pudding-faced effigy," asserting that the playwright appears to have two right eyes.
Almost 15 years have passed since I first visited Holy Trinity Church in Stratford-upon-Avon. I have returned many times. In this handsome old building, William Shakespeare was christened on April 26, 1564, and 52 years later buried. In the same church, Shakespeare’s brothers and sisters were baptized, as well as his own offspring. There his daughters were married. Prominent locals were buried within the church itself; more ordinary folk, including Shakespeare’s father and mother, were laid to rest in the churchyard (despite the fact that the poet’s father, before he fell on hard times, had been bailiff of Stratford). Above Shakespeare’s grave in the chancel appears the famous curse, which he may or may not have composed himself:

Good frend for Iesus sake forbeare,  
To digg the dust encloased heare:  
Blest be ye man yt spares thes stones,  
And curst be he yt moves my bones.

Yet the bones are gone, the malediction incurred by Time itself.

A cave-in early in the last century exposed the vault’s cavity; a witness reported that, when he peered in, he saw neither coffin nor bones, only a little moldering dust on the dank floor.

The details of Shakespeare’s life have held up somewhat better, although it is sometimes said that all our information could be bounded in a nutshell. As the eminent Shakespearean scholar George Steevens put it in 1780:

All that is known with any degree of certainty concerning Shakespeare, is: that he was born at Stratford-upon-Avon; married and had children there; went to London, where he commenced actor, and wrote poems and plays; returned to Stratford, made his will, died, and was buried.

Steevens exaggerated then, and we have learned a lot since. True, much of the ground has been vexed by controversy and speculation. But thanks to the pertinacity of investigators over the centuries, we know more about Shakespeare than we do about almost all his fellow playwrights,

by S. Schoenbaum
even though intimate records—diaries, letters, and the like—are totally lacking. We must content ourselves with the mundane details of his life, which may in their own way be revealing.

In Shakespeare's day, the population of Stratford stood at less than 2,000 souls (compared to 15,000 today), but in some ways this provincial market town on the meandering River Avon must have looked very much as it does now. The Guild Hall, today badly in need of repair, stood then just a stone's throw from the great house (since destroyed) which Shakespeare bought after he had established himself as a financial success and a leading figure in the London theater. Then as now, Clpton Bridge spanned the Avon with its 14 massive arches, pointing the wayfarer toward London, 100 miles to the southeast; Shakespeare crossed this bridge on his way to and from the capital. The basic street plan, with three principal thoroughfares running parallel to the Avon and crossed by three others at right angles, has remained intact over the centuries. If anything, Stratford was more attractive then, before the advent of souvenir shops, a Hilton hotel, and Dutch elm disease.

In this neck of Warwickshire, Shakespeare first tasted life, love, and learning. Unlike a number of his fellow playwrights—Christopher Marlowe, for example—Shakespeare never attended a university. Such formal education as he received must have taken place at the King's New School of Stratford-upon-Avon for boys aged 6 or 7 until around 14. Before completing the course, (according to an early biography) he was obliged by his family's declining fortunes to leave school, perhaps to snip gussets for his father John, a master glover.

"Small Latin, Less Greek"

Many have marveled that a writer who demonstrates in his work such wide and varied learning with respect to literature, rhetoric, music, and the law, as well as British and Roman history—not to mention his profound understanding of the human heart—should have succeeded so astonishingly well without the advantages of a university education. Hence the "anti-Stratfordian" impulse among those who would deny Shakespeare his writings and attribute them instead to someone better educated and more highly born—Francis Bacon, or the Earl of Oxford, or even Queen Elizabeth.

Yet patient investigation of the 16th-century grammar-school curriculum reveals how broad and thorough a grounding young students received during their long hours in the classroom. Here, in the King's New School, Shakespeare would have acquired the "small Latin and less Greek" with which his colleague

S. Schoenbaum, 51, discusses some of the topics taken up in this essay in greater detail in Shakespeare's Lives (1970) and William Shakespeare: A Compact Documentary Life (1977). He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University (1953) and is now Distinguished Professor of Renaissance Studies at the University of Maryland as well as a trustee of the Folger Shakespeare Library. His film reviews appear regularly in the Times Literary Supplement. With Stanley Wells, he is coeditor of the Oxford Standard Authors edition of the complete works of Shakespeare (forthcoming).
Ben Jonson credits him, although the attention to Latin, at least, was lavish by today's standards: Cicero and Quintilian for rhetoric; Sallust and Caesar for history; Ovid, Virgil, and Horace for poetry. (Ovid's Metamorphoses would remain Shakespeare's favorite classic.)

A university education in those days would not necessarily have better equipped a young man for a career in letters: We do well not to confuse the modern liberal arts curriculum with the narrower course of study, inherited from the Middle Ages, of an English university in the 16th century. (The formidably learned Jonson never went to a university either.) What Shakespeare did develop in his youth, if the plays are any evidence, was a taste for reading, an interest in ideas, and a retentive memory.

Education of another kind, less sophisticated but fatefuly relevant to Shakespeare's later career, was also available in Stratford. Elizabethan actors, in much the same fashion as the players at Hamlet's Elsinore, often went on tour. The first professional troupe to visit Stratford was the Queen's Men. They arrived in 1569, when John Shakespeare was bailiff. Did little William, then five, sit restlessly (or enthralled) beside his father in the Guild Hall when they performed? Other companies followed—Leicester's Men, led by James Burbage, in 1573; Warwick's, Strange's, Derby's, and other troupes afterwards. Records show that no fewer than seven different troupes acted in the Guild Hall between 1579 and 1584. This despite the fact that the theatrical industry, as such, was then new to England.

When Shakespeare was born, a building expressly designed for the
representation of plays did not yet exist in Britain; the first theater (called, appropriately enough, The Theatre) opened its doors in London in 1576. But plays had been acted for centuries before the advent of playhouses. During the Middle Ages the cathedral towns—York, Chester, Coventry—had their elaborate cycles of Biblical plays, mounted as a matter of religious faith and local pride by the various craft guilds. Few of these plays survived the Reformation. But at Coventry, only 18 miles from Stratford, the cycle depicting the events of Biblical history from the Creation to Doomsday was still being performed in Shakespeare’s time. As a boy, he no doubt acquired a familiarity with such plays, for verbal echoes from them find their way into the secular works he later wrote for the London companies.

**Poacher or Player**

We do not hear of Shakespeare in London, where he would make his fortune and his reputation, until 1592. Just when, and under what circumstances, he joined the stage, history has not revealed; this is the phase of his life that biographers call the Lost Years. A venerable legend holds that Sir Thomas Lucy, master of the nearby estate of Charlecote, caught Shakespeare poaching and punished him so severely that the malefactor penned and circulated a bitter ballad, whereupon Sir Thomas redoubled his prosecution, until at length William left the family glove business in Stratford to find shelter in the capital.

A more likely, and only slightly less romantic, possibility is that Shakespeare joined a cry of players passing through Warwickshire. When the Queen's Men stopped in Stratford in 1587, it is recorded that they were short a man, actor William Knell having been lately killed in a brawl. Perhaps Shakespeare took Knell's place, and thus found his way to London and the stage. No one knows.

**Shakespeare in London**

With a population of 160,000 or thereabouts, Elizabethan London scarcely qualified as a great metropolis by modern standards. Yet Dr. Samuel Johnson’s famous judgment, delivered almost two centuries later—"When a man is tired of London, he is tired of life"—applies no less aptly to the capital city in which Shakespeare lodged and worked. On the silvery Thames, where swans glided and wherries served as water-taxis, tall merchant ships arrived laden with cargo: spices from the East, currants from Turkey, and in due course tobacco from the New World. Shops encrusted London Bridge—Britain was already on the way to becoming a nation of shopkeepers—while at the southern end of the span the heads of executed criminals mounted on pikes reminded all who passed of the law’s severity.

In the Royal Exchange, the huge quadrangular bazaar modeled on the Great Bourse in Antwerp, tradesmen hawked everything from jewels to mousetraps. St. Paul’s, the largest and most magnificent cathedral in England, drew visitors not only for divine services but also for such secular pastimes as the display of fashions by gallants and tailors, conferences between lawyers and their clients, and the picking of pockets. In the churchyard, bookstalls exhibited the latest sermon or catchpenny pamphlet; here, before the advent of public libraries, Shakespeare would have encountered the literary
Detail from a 19th-century view of London (based on a 1616 panorama by Claes Jan Visscher). St. Paul’s Cathedral dwarfs the landscape as eel boats ply the Thames. In the foreground (right) is the Globe Theatre, outside the purview of puritanical London authorities.
sources for his plays. If Raphael Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland gave him detailed accounts of the kings whose reigns he dramatized, the stones of the massively forbidding Tower mutely recalled intrigues and violence past.

Much like today’s West End, the playhouses served as a magnet for foreign visitors: There was nothing quite like them elsewhere in Christendom. Then, as now, the theatrical industry was vigorously competitive. Shakespeare’s company, the Lord Chamberlain’s Men, had Dick Burbage to act Richard III and Hamlet and the other great tragic roles, while Edward Alleyn mesmerized audiences by declaiming Marlowe’s “mighty line” for the Admiral’s Men at the Rose playhouse.

In this London, Shakespeare first attracted notice in 1592. The earliest surviving report, unlike all others, is hostile. As he lay dying in pitiful squalor, Robert Greene—poet, rake-hell, and Cambridge graduate—penned his swan song, Greene’s Groatsworth of Wit, bought with a Million of Repentance. In better days, Greene had made a name for himself with his plays, romances, and muckraking exposés of the London demi-monde. Now, his possessions pawned, reduced to hand-outs, he could feel only bitter envy toward the 28-year-old Warwickshireman who had set up shop as a rival playwright. In the Groatsworth, Greene warns of an “upstart crow”:

beautified with our feathers, that with his tiger’s heart wrapped in a player’s hide supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you; and, being an absolute Johannes Factotum [Jack-of-all-trades], is in his own conceit the only Shake-scene in a country.

The “tiger’s heart” alludes snearingly to a line in Shakespeare’s 3 Henry VI: “O tiger’s heart wrap’d in a woman’s hide!” About the target of
Greene’s impotent venom there can be no question.

The intemperateness of Greene’s attack was recognized at the time. Shakespeare found a perhaps unexpected champion in Henry Chettle, by trade a printer and by inclination a litterateur who turned out catch-penny pamphlets and perishable plays. To Chettle fell the undulying task of preparing Greene’s papers for the press. But no sooner had Greene’s Groatsworth appeared than Chettle made amends with a handsome apologia prefacing his own prose pamphlet, Kind Heart’s Dream:

I am as sorry as if the original fault had been my fault, because myself have seen his demeanor no less civil than he excellent in the quality he professes: besides, divers of worship have reported his uprightness of dealing, which argues his honesty, and his facetious grace in writing, that approves his art.

The reference to the “quality he professes” acknowledges that Shakespeare served his company not only as a dramatist but also as an actor, and helps account for Greene’s sneer at a mere player who dared, like the crow, to imitate his betters. Notwithstanding such audacity, Shakespeare had made friends in high places, the “divers of worship” to whom Chettle alludes. Who were they? Had Shakespeare, as some biographers infer, already found a noble patron? Probably not. Eliza-

"WHAT HE HATH LEFT US"

Shakespeare lives. His language forms part of the texture of our own, so that whether we realize it or not, Shakespeare is always at our tongue’s tip. When we commend the glass of fashion, lament the law’s delay, or reflect that ambition should be made of sterner stuff; when we make a virtue of necessity, pounce with one fell swoop, or are frightened by false fire—on all such occasions, and many others, we are quoting Shakespeare.

In my youth, almost all high school students, it seems, read Julius Caesar and Macbeth. These plays remain set readings, but in recent years, I have begun to encounter college freshmen with no high school Shakespeare. On the other hand, more people are seeing Shakespeare on the stage than ever before.

Indeed, no dramatist, living or dead, has been more frequently reprinted or performed in so many languages. A collected edition is usually the first choice, along with the Bible, of someone asked to plan his reading matter in the event of shipwreck on a deserted island. All 37 plays live on the stage. In the United States, Shakespeare festivals dot the summer landscape from Alabama and Vermont to Colorado and Utah, Oregon and California. Throughout the school year, campus productions are regular features of university theater groups across the land. Shakespeare is reaching larger audiences than ever before, as the BBC moves ahead with plans to produce the entire Shakespeare canon over a period of six years, beginning this February. It is the most ambitious dramatic programming in the history of television.

—S.S.

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bethan Englishmen made careful distinctions in their forms of address. Worship, as has now been established, applied to untitled gentlemen; aristocrats Chettle would have described as “divers of honor.”

Whoever these supporters mentioned by Chettle were, they remain as anonymous as the multitudes who applauded Shakespeare’s plays in Shoreditch, the northern suburb where the first theaters were built, comfortably outside the purview of the London City fathers who took a puritanical view of such idle pastimes. (Eventually Shakespeare’s company would move across the Thames to the Globe playhouse and the pleasure resorts of Bankside.)

Meanwhile, by the early 1590s, Shakespeare, not even 30 years old, had established himself as a major figure in the theater. He had demonstrated his youthful mastery of the several genres: history with the Henry VI plays, tragedy with Titus Andronicus, and comedy with The Taming of the Shrew and The Comedy of Errors.

The distinctive power of 1 Henry VI was evoked by a contemporary of Shakespeare, Thomas Nashe, who described the effect on audiences of the death of Talbot, forsaken by rivalrous peers to die valiantly on a field in France:

How would it have joyed brave Talbot (the terror of the French) to think that after he had lain two hundred years in his tomb, he should triumph again on the stage, and have his bones new embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators at least (at several times), who, in the tragedian that represents his person, imagine they behold him fresh bleeding.

These tears were all shed in the playhouse, not the library; none of Shakespeare’s plays had yet seen print. That would come soon—without his consent or approval, for it was not to the company’s advantage to make the plays publicly available for acting to anybody with sixpence to put down for a published quarto.† Shakespeare was a company man, his days now spent in the service of his troupe: Strange’s Men perhaps, or the Queen’s; later, we know definitely, with the Lord Chamberlain’s Men. During his idle hours he could plunge into the life of the town; London, which conferred no degrees, became his university.

An “O’erhasty Marriage”

In the taverns, Shakespeare hobnobbed with other playwrights and poets; the Mermaid in Bread Street, not far from where he lodged for a time, is associated in legend with his name. In St. Paul’s and other meeting places, he observed the several estates: country folk bemused by the ways of the metropolis, courtiers and hangers-on, citizens with their wives and apprentices. When Shakespeare’s company acted at Court, at Richmond or Whitehall, he caught glimpses of how the movers and shakers conducted themselves in the corridors of power. At some time, probably in the early 1590s, he met a Dark Lady—not positively identified despite numerous candidates—who, according to the Sonnets, loved and deceived him.

*By 1593, Shakespeare had found a noble patron, the Earl of Southampton, to whom he that year dedicated his Venus and Adonis. The next year his Rape of Lucrece bore a dedication, more warmly phrased, to the same lord; but this time there was no follow-up. The collected edition of Shakespeare’s plays, published seven years after his death in 1616, was dedicated by the compilers to William Herbert, third Earl of Pembroke, and his younger brother Philip, first Earl of Montgomery, both of whom had reportedly “favored” the dramatist.

†His first published plays were Titus Andronicus and 2 Henry VI, in 1594.
Whatever the allurements of the metropolis, however, Shakespeare maintained his ties with Stratford. Other London dramatists of the Elizabethan age had come, like him, from the provinces—men like Greene from Norwich, Marlowe and John Lyly from Canterbury. Most forsook their roots; Shakespeare nurtured his. An early memorialist, John Aubrey, tells us in his "Brief Life" (1681) that Shakespeare was wont to go to his native country once each year. In Stratford, with growing income from the playhouse, Shakespeare invested in houses and land. There he drew up his will, using the services of a local solicitor. There he visited his wife and children, and there, still in his 40s, he retired.

Since Shakespeare returned annually to his family—and eventually settled permanently back home—his marriage could hardly have been disastrous. But was it tolerably happy? The circumstances—he had wed Anne Hathaway in 1582—give one pause. He was only 18 at the time; his bride, some eight years older than he, was pregnant; and the vows were exchanged in haste, after only one reading of the banns, instead of the usual three. There is no evidence, however, that Shakespeare married Anne unwillingly.

In 1583, just six months after the wedding, she gave birth to a daughter, Susanna, christened on May 26, 1583. Less than two years afterward, she bore twins, a boy and a girl, Hamnet and Judith Shakespeare, named after Shakespeare's friends and neighbors, the Sadlers, were baptized on February 2, 1585. Thus Anne gave William a male heir.

Did Shakespeare ever repent his "o'erhasty marriage"? Biographers, conscious of the discrepancy in years between this husband and his older wife, have combed Shakespeare's works for passages that might give some clue to his feelings. In A Midsummer Night's Dream, Hermia and Lysander have the following exchange:

Lysander. The course of true love never did run smooth; But either it was different in blood... Or else misgarr'd in respect of years—Hermia. O spite! too old to be engag'd to young.

More striking is the passage in Twelfth Night, where the Duke speaks

*As a shareholder in the profits of the Globe and the Blackfriars (from 1609, the company's second theater) Shakespeare earned perhaps $200 a year. The figure may not seem great by modern standards, but it was ten times what a well-paid Elizabethan schoolmaster made.

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thus to Viola, who is disguised as a man:

Let still the woman take
An elder than herself; so wears she to him,
So sways she level in her husband’s heart.
For, boy, however we do praise ourselves,
Our fancies are more giddy and unfirm,
More longing and wavering, sooner lost
and won,
Than women’s are.

The difficulty for the biographer,
of course, is that these and similar
passages occur in plays, not in memoirs, and the writer does not
speak with his own voice, but with
that of his dramatic imagination.
How can we safely say that the sen-
timents I have quoted represent
Shakespeare’s own views?

The Second-Best Bed

Shakespeare’s Sonnets are more
intimate. “With this key,”
Wordsworth wrote of them, “Shake-
peare unlocked his heart.” Since
they deal, in part, with an intense,
and intensely unhappy, liaison with
a woman herself married, they sug-
gest that the marital bed was, for
Shakespeare, not always a comfort-
able one. But in these poems, too, ex-
perience is shaped by imagination.
It is at our peril that we read the Son-
ets as straightforward autobi-
ography.

Shakespeare’s last will and testa-
ment, however, does provide a clue
to his marital relations. The will con-
tains only one reference to the
woman Shakespeare had married
some 30 years previously: “Item [the
will reads], I give unto my wife my
second best bed with the furniture,”
i.e., with the hangings, bed linen, and
the like, that make up this elaborate
item of Jacobean domestic furnis-
ning. That is it; not a word more.

What are we to make of this be-
quest? Some biographers see it as a
husband’s scornful dismissal of his
wife.

But another interpretation is pos-
sible. May not the best bed have been
kept in a special room, and there re-
served, out of gracious hospitality,
for overnight visitors to the fine
house Shakespeare had bought in
Stratford? If so, the best bed would
have been regarded as an heirloom
and would have naturally formed
part of the estate he wished to keep
gether primarily for his legal
heir—in this case, his daughter
Susanna. (His son, Hamnet, had died
in 1596, and his daughter Judith had
made a poor marriage to a local man
of good family who was destined
never to amount to much. Just after
the marriage, and only a month be-
fore his death, Shakespeare altered
his will, apparently lowering
Judith’s share.)

The second-best bed, according to
this interpretation, would then have
been the matrimonial bed, with a
special, intimate significance. Other
wills of this period refer to such beds
with tender associations. In fact, we
can only speculate as to what Shake-
peare had in mind when he made
his wife this bequest; but he did not
have to make other testamentary
provisions in order for her to be
looked after properly when he died.
By English common law, enforced by
local custom, a widow was auto-
matically entitled to a life interest in
one-third of her husband’s estate.

A Man of Property

The first extant reaction to Shake-
peare’s will was set down in 1747 by
Joseph Greene, a Stratford curate,
who had come upon a 17th-century
transcript. He expressed positive
disappointment when he described it
in a letter to a friend; quite simply, Greene found the will dull:

so absolutely void of the least particle of that spirit which animated our great poet; that it must lessen his character as a writer, to imagine the least sentence of it his production.

There is nothing in this document about Shakespeare's life in art; only references to fellow players—Richard Burbage, John Heminges, and Henry Condell, to whom, after the fashion of the time, he left a small bequest for the purchase of mourning rings. Shakespeare mentions no manuscripts of his plays or his personal library. No wonder the will has stoked anti-Stratfordian fires!

But testaments are eminently practical documents that tend to follow a set form, and Shakespeare's lawyer, Francis Collins, may have discouraged personal flourishes. Moreover, in those days, Shakespeare's scripts would have become the property of the acting company for which he wrote them, and so were not at his disposal. The books comprising his library are another matter. We don't know how large a collection he assembled, but we can be sure he read widely, and any catalogue would of course hold inestimable interest for the study of his sources. Such a catalogue may well have existed as part of the inventory of possessions made, as a matter of routine, upon Shakespeare's decease. Unfortunately the inventory has never surfaced.

William Shakespeare's coat of arms, from a 1602 compilation by the York Herald, Ralph Brooke. Brooke cited 23 cases, including Shakespeare's, where, he alleged, arms had been awarded to ineligible persons. The appellation "player" was no doubt pejorative.
The letter makes no reference to Shakespeare as the esteemed poet and playwright of the London stage; he is seen as a man who might, when properly approached, help a fellow townsman out with a substantial sum. Presumably it was the dramatist who, in his father's name, applied to the Heralds' College for a coat of arms, and took pleasure, after it was awarded, in subscribing himself Gentleman. Shakespeare became a pillar of his community. "The latter part of his life was spent," accord-

Yet the will we have, first drafted less than three months before the poet's death, tells us a good deal about the position Shakespeare had achieved for himself in the world, not as an artist, but as a Jacobean gentleman whose art had brought him the material rewards and social prominence in his Warwickshire town that apparently mattered to him. His substantial investments included $320 in cash for arable land in the neighborhood. That was in 1602. Three years later, he laid out $440 for a half interest in a lease of tithes in some hamlets near Stratford, an expenditure that netted him $60 per annum. In London, just a few years before his death, he purchased Blackfriars gatehouse, although he seems never to have lived in it—this appears to have been purely an investment. Thus, Shakespeare became a man of property. In his will, he was careful to hold together this considerable estate, and the status it conferred, for his heirs.

There is little in this testament that accords with the romantic idea of the poet, but of course Shakespeare lived before the Romantic period. In an age that valued tangible success, he was not indifferent to its allure. No letters of Shakespeare survive, but we have one letter addressed to him. It was set down in October 1598 by Richard Quiney, who wrote to his "Loving good friend countryman Mr. Wm. Shake-
ing to an early biographer, “as all men of good sense will wish theirs may be, in ease, retirement, and the conversation of his friends. He had the good fortune to gather an estate equal to his occasion, and, in that, to his wish.”

Some may be dismayed that the testament of William Shakespeare—behind whose creativity lies God knows what sensitivities and sufferings—should reveal him to be a man of common sense. Yet to my mind, there is great and salutary evidence in the will’s very ordinariness. Shakespeare must have been in so many ways like other folk. His personality, when he rubbed shoulders in the taverns with the wits of his day, made no such impression as did Ben Jonson’s, so forcefully assertive. Stanley Wells, editor of the Oxford Shakespeare, has acutely observed that Shakespeare must have been a great listener rather than a great talker. He spoke in his art.

A Worthy Friend

Surely the ordinariness belongs to the fabric of his achievement, for his plays express, more profoundly than any that Jonson or the others wrote, fundamental human relationships between parents and children and husbands and wives and lovers. Never mind that Shakespeare found literary inspiration in Ovid or Plutarch, or that blue blood courses through the veins of his dramatis personae, or that he chose for his settings Ephesus or Illyria or Rome: The men and women he portrays experience such passions as he himself must have felt or observed.

Good company he must have been, too. Indeed, one of the legends recounting his death holds that he expired after a “merry meeting” with Ben Jonson and the Warwickshire poet Michael Drayton. True or not, it is at least certain that he was highly regarded by friends and colleagues. Heminges and Condell, Shakespeare’s fellow actors with the King’s Men (as the company was known after the accession of James I), were the editors who finally brought together the first collected edition of his plays in 1623. They described their task as a labor of devotion, undertaken “without ambition either of self-profit or fame; only to keep the memory of so worthy a friend and fellow alive, as was our Shakespeare.”

That volume, the First Folio, is graced by one of the noblest poems of tribute in the English language, Ben Jonson’s “To the memory of my beloved, the author Mr. William Shakespeare and what he hath left us.” I’ll let Jonson have the last word:

Triumph, my Britain, thou hast one to show,
To whom all scenes of Europe homage owe,
He was not of an age, but for all time!
And all the Muses still were in their prime,
When like Apollo he came forth to warm
Our ears, or like a Mercury to charm!
COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in The Quarterly and react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

Ending the Anti-Inflation "Slows"

Until he found Grant, Abraham Lincoln lamented the "slows" of his field commanders: despite lavish equipment and superior numbers, they preferred the security of the drill camp to combat. After almost 22 months' incumbency, President Carter finally shed his administration's "slows" for some moderately innovative anti-inflation gestures last October 24. Wage and price voluntarism, and some novel sanctions and rewards, formed the line of attack. Recognition of the issues constituted the encouraging feature.

Obviously the President has never condoned inflation. [But] perversely, while his "talk's the thing" policy reigned—and double-digit price bursts disturbed the perfunctory chitchat—the White House muzzled its most canny inflation adviser, Barry Bosworth.

The President's October message stood five-square for cutting government waste. Prevailing mythology notwithstanding, government expenditures have surged more as a result of inflation than they have been a cause of it. The $500 billion federal 1979 budget would total about $240 billion in 1963 prices. When wages go up in the private sector, the costs of military hardware and other government purchases mount, and, with civil servant pay rising (to match private sector wages), federal outlays swell nearly in proportion to the pay hike.

The current national wage bill is about $1.4 trillion. Compounded by 10 percent annual pay boosts, the wage bulge alone will surpass the $500 billion 1979 budget in just over three years! But to focus on government outlays as the inflation demon simply nourishes popular fantasy.

Beyond Carter's homily on extravagance, his announced anti-inflation campaign relies on labor's continued voluntary holding of average annual pay boosts to 7 percent (exempting employees earning $4 or less per hour).

Business firms were asked to keep price increases under a 5.75 percent ceiling per annum, or ½ percent below their 1967-77 figures. Government procurement officials are to shun firms that puncture the price norms, a feature borrowed from the United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey. To buy labor compliance, the President [promised to] recommend that Congress enact a tax bonus for unions that abide by the 7 percent rule, to protect labor from price level lunge exceeds the wage increment.

Some costly environmental regulation of business was to be deferred, trimmed, or eliminated.

The Carter plan thus paid homage to the theory that the stagflation trauma of the last decade will not be terminated without an "incomes policy" aligning employee compensation with average productivity trends. [But] it is a fact that in the economy-wide industry spectrum, average price markups above unit labor costs have been falling. Any rise in average employee compensation in excess of labor productivity drives up business costs, elevating prices from the cost side.

Simultaneously, the augmented money incomes—employee compensation comprises about 85 percent of the total—augment consumer demand. Prices are thus coaxed upward, from both the cost and demand side.

Annual increases in U.S. labor productivity, 1950-70, ranged just under 3 percent. The 1970s pace was an abysmal 1.3 percent. With incomes bounding and
productivity barely creeping up, the pay-productivity gap has inevitably been filled by price inflation.

Monetary policy (i.e. tightening credit) is clearly potent against jobs and production, particularly in the construction industry; it has been futile in inhibiting the wage inflation ordeal. Yet successive Federal Reserve Board chairmen have reminded us of their eternal vigilance even as they transmitted the lugubrious price statistics and heaped unemployment on top of inflation, inflicting double trouble on the economy.

The target numbers provided in October by the President’s advisers show wages growing by a 7 percent average, productivity by about 1.25 to 1.00, and prices by 5.75 percent. I think that the President could have aimed for a 5 percent pay hike to force a more abrupt halt to the stagflation merry-go-round, projecting a 3.5 percent 1979 price move dropping to ground zero in 1980.

In encouraging imports or denying government contracts to inflation violators-news reports indicate that price policing will cover 400 of the largest firms—the [anti-inflation] operation should provide a fascinating test of government agencies’ teamwork. It will probably spawn episodic bureaucratic snarling (“Yes they did; no they didn’t; anyway, what difference does it make?”).

Among those who favor a less bureaucratic and less hassle-prone program such as TIP, the tax-based incomes policy devised by Fed Governor Henry Wallich and myself, or the Okun and Seidman variants [Laurence S. Seidman, “A Tax-Based Incomes Policy,” WQ, Autumn 1978], the Carter initiative tended to reinforce the feeling that precious time was being wasted with too much fanfare on too limited a price goal. The administration’s mild effort at price containment could generate a wave of labor and business bellicosity impeding passage toward a more promising alternative. Nonetheless, the anti-inflation campaign was finally launched—though a mere 18 months late.

Sidney Weintraub
Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, and co-editor, the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.

Science and Paradox

The essays by Nathan Reingold ["OPioneers!"] and John Holmfeld ["Dilemmas Down the Road"] in The Wilson Quarterly [Summer 1978] consider the paradoxical relationship between basic research and technology. The belief that serendipitous technological results are equally likely to appear in all fields of research should be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny... The first order of business for any federal agency concerned with R&D appropriations should be to study the relationship of advances in basic science to the inventive and innovative processes. [This] relationship is not simple, and historians of technology as well as of science should be involved in the effort. Unless we improve our understanding of “the foundation of technological progress,” we shall continue to misplace our hopes and our funds.

Mrs. Irwin Singer
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University of Pennsylvania

If the scientific community cannot justify its work through the intrinsic values of basic research, it is not legitimate. The stories of Ptolemy and Lysenko clearly show the “dead end” that a comfortably socialized, conventionalized, and institutionalized scientific program can be.

James M. Bryant
Woodrow Wilson National Teaching Fellow
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Korea and America:
Worst of Both Worlds

We have faced in Korea one of the most perplexing foreign policy problems—how to deal with success. As Ralph Clough brings out in his article ["The Two Koreas and Washington" WQ, Summer 1978], our intervention in 1950 (it is significant that the word “intervention” in this context carries no adverse connotation) brought major benefits.

We now have the worst of both worlds in Korea. Our single division of ground troops is too small to serve a military purpose and far more than is necessary to
serve a political purpose. Except for a few hundred yards at Panmunjom, there are no American troops directly on the armistice line. The American commander has no independent source of intelligence on what is happening on the ground. He has responsibility without control.

Our military presence has brought stability to the peninsula, but we have also stabilized things that should be allowed to change. Both regimes have been strengthened by our presence, and have developed a vested interest in the hostility. Since 1953, we have provided over $12 billion in economic and military assistance to the South. We have also furnished the North with the unifying asset of an external threat, and allowed Kim II-sung to posture before his own people and the world as a self-reliant, communist David holding at bay the imperialist, superpower Goliath.

Francis Underhill
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Foreign Service Officer Underhill served in Korea, 1971–74. The views he expresses do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State.

Corrections

Contrary to Edward A. O'Neill’s article ("Unreal Expectations," WQ, Autumn 1978), India signed the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union several months before the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. [Also,] close Sino-Indian relations actually began in 1954, with Chou En-Lai’s first visit to India, not following the courtship-visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin. Nor is it strictly accurate to say that India failed to protest the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; Mrs. Gandhi’s statement of "profound concern and anguish" was simply not as strong as the Western countries would have liked.

Professor Donaldson is correct about the timing of the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty. It was signed before the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan. However, my listing of world leaders who came through New Delhi was not meant to reflect India’s relations to their countries. In 1949, India was the second country in the world (after Burma) to recognize the People’s Republic of China; Nehru and Chou En-Lai met in New Delhi in July 1954, in Peking in December 1954, and in Bandung in April 1955 before Chou joined the "procession." And Indira Gandhi’s concern over the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not—this was my point—considered a “protest” by the U.S. government.

We regret that in the title information for "Short Is Beautiful" by Thomas Samaras [Periodicals, WQ, Autumn 1978] the word "Is" was shorted out.

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(signed) Peter Braestrup, Editor
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