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
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The myth of the open airwaves

There is a simple, yet overwhelming, difference between the print media and television journalism. Newspapers and magazines offer regular access to their pages to those who wish to rebut what has been printed. The major television networks do not.

Access to television is supposed to be governed largely by the Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine. That doctrine owes its existence to the theory that the airwaves are a scarce resource and must therefore be allocated among potential users. The doctrine requires owners of broadcast licenses "...to encourage and implement the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues..." and to play "...a conscious and positive role in bringing about the balanced presentation of the opposing viewpoints." In theory, the Fairness Doctrine doesn't preclude anything. In reality, the networks have turned it into a doctrine of unfairness.

Under a mandate to present all sides of a public issue, the networks confine debate through controls imposed by their own news departments. Through their news staffs, the networks exercise total control over the agenda of issues, and who may speak to the public. Unfortunately, the result of this network control, with no system or forum for rebuttal, has resulted in a narrow and selective discussion of major public issues—and the systematic exclusion or distortion of many viewpoints.

Mobil has often been denied the opportunity to rebut inaccurate television news broadcasts. Frequently, the broadcasts appeared at times when critical energy legislation was under debate in Congress—legislation regarding oil company divestiture, natural gas deregulation, oil decontrol, and the "windfall profit" tax. At such times, the networks' systematic exclusion of ideas and information impaired the public's ability to rationally decide fundamental policy issues.

Other companies have experienced similar frustrations in their attempts to gain adequate airtime to rebut erroneous television newscasts. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation had to threaten a slander suit and had to ask the FCC to order ABC to give it time to respond to charges made on a 1980 20/20 segment, before ABC finally gave the company the opportunity for an unedited reply. It took more than a year, however, before the rebuttal was aired on prime-time TV.

In response to a 1979 CBS 60 Minutes broadcast, Illinois Power Company produced its own tape to point out the network's distortions. Called "60 Minutes/Our Reply," the power company's rebuttal exposed the bias of the broadcast by including CBS film footage not included in the original segment. The program has been widely shown to various groups across the country, but it has not been aired on television.

The networks not only block rebuttals, they refuse to air advertisements on "controversial" issues, and have rejected Mobil advocacy commercials since 1974—despite evidence that public support for issue advertising is strong. (Network policies would preclude the very message you are currently reading.) A 1980 survey by the Opinion Research Corporation found that 85 percent of the American public think corporations should be allowed to present their views on controversial matters in television commercials. And most independent stations and network affiliates have opened their doors to advocacy advertising, without creating the chaos the networks profess to fear.

As the Supreme Court affirmed in its 1978 Bellotti decision: "The press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten."

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
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THE
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WINTER
1983

Editor's Comment

Since the early days of the Cold War, the discussion and analysis of American foreign affairs and defense matters have become the province of a new breed of "policy intellectuals"—often trained as economists, lawyers, academics. Some work under Pentagon contract, as at the RAND Corporation, or as staffers in the Pentagon, on Capitol Hill, and at the White House. Others are ensconced at universities or at "think tanks" of various political hues. Many move in and out of government as opportunity beckons. Their ideas, good or bad, flavor the rhetoric of political candidates, cabinet officers, and presidents.

Like economists, these analysts like to publish predictions and propose "solutions." Of late, they have given us "the planetary bargain," the "window of vulnerability," and the "North-South Dialogue." With some brilliant exceptions, their proposals variously tend to suffer from tunnel vision, from neglect of both history and the harsh realities of war and politics, from a fixation with technology, statistics, or "game theory" when it comes to strategy or arms control, from the assumption that our friends and foes see the world as we do.

The Wilson Center's young International Security Studies Program, under Samuel F. Wells, stresses a broader, longer-range approach, bringing together not only "policy intellectuals" but also historians, regional specialists, philosophers, scientists, and people from real life, notably military men and diplomats, both American and foreign. In this issue of the *Quarterly*, Mr. Wells and our other contributors go beyond the headlines to provide a brief overview of some of the key elements of U.S. national security in a dangerous world.

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

A Faster Pace In the Statehouses

"Power in the States" by Alan Ehrenhalt, in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (Sept. 3, 1983), 1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Being a member of the state legislature may seem about as glamorous as running a laundry. Yet the statehouses are currently in ferment, reports Ehrenhalt, a *Congressional Quarterly* editor.

Unobtrusively, state governments have extended their reach in recent years, as Washington has delegated more responsibility for federal-state programs—e.g., health, welfare, environment. The part-time citizen-legislators of the past—small-town lawyers, bankers, and businessmen—are giving way to a new breed of politicians willing to devote all their time to running for office and mastering the increasingly complex business of state government.

Another influence on the states is the U.S. Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" ruling in *Baker* v. *Carr* (1962), which required legislative districts of roughly equal population. The South and West, with many thinly populated rural districts, were most affected. There, rural districts that regularly elected conservative Democrats were merged; new districts were created in the towns and cities. Today, individual members of the Old Guard still wield power because of their seniority, but in many statehouses where they once dominated the legislature, the conservative Democrats have lost their working majority.

The new breed of legislator is strongly in evidence in the East and Midwest, Ehrenhalt writes. There, youthful Democrats, many of them former teachers or political aides, are making inroads by virtue of their sheer energy and willingness to work full-time for salaries under $20,000. The losers are rural Republicans and union-backed urban Democrats. The newcomers tend to be liberal on social issues but fiscally conservative. And they are independent. In Wisconsin, for example, young Democrats "mortified labor leaders earlier this year," Ehrenhalt says, by agreeing to freeze jobless benefits to keep the state's

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unemployment compensation system solvent.

Nationwide, Democrats control both legislative chambers in 34 states, Republicans in only 11. The GOP is finding it hard to convince potential candidates to give up lucrative careers in law or business to try to join an underpaid, frustrated legislative minority. In Rhode Island, a Republican comeback in the 1983 special state senate elections provided a possible portent of things to come: Half of the 14 new Republican senators are women, mostly young professionals or housewives willing to settle for a modest second income.

Explaining the American 'Malaise'

"The Decline of Confidence in American Institutions" by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1983), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-0148.

"Americans are losing confidence in the federal government" has become a political cliché. Yet, according to Lipset and Schneider, political scientists at Stanford and the American Enterprise Institute, respectively, it is not that simple.

The downward trend is well documented by public opinion surveys. [For evidence of a possible recent turnabout, see *WQ* Autumn 1983, p.10.] Between 1958 and 1964, for example, the percentage of respondents who believed that Washington could not be trusted "to do what is right" remained steady at about 22 percent. By 1970, amid America's Vietnam involvement, the percentage had doubled. It was up to 63 percent in 1976 and 73 percent by 1980.

Such attitudes do not stem from political apathy, the authors argue. If anything, Americans now take a slightly more activist view of political life than they did two decades ago. In 1964, 73 percent of those polled said that voting was the *only* way they could influence Washington; in 1980, 58 percent took this pessimistic view. (Ironically, however, only eight percent felt that the government pays "a good deal" of attention to "what the people think," down from 32 percent in 1964.) Nor have Americans' views of their duties as citizens soured: In 1980, only eight percent of those polled believed that it is not important to vote if your party has no chance of winning, down from 11 percent in 1952.

What Americans seem to be saying, the authors argue, is that "the system" works, but "it is not performing well because the people in charge are inept and untrustworthy." Yet there is another twist: Poll data on other institutions suggest that the public's antipathies vary. In a 1977 survey, for example, only 25 percent of the respondents expressed favorable views toward Big Oil, but *individual* oil firms —Exxon, Texaco—scored about 15 percentage points higher.

Indeed, a 1981 poll showed that even as citizens' trust in Washington was languishing, their faith in American institutions, overall, was intact. Two-thirds believed that "the system" was basically sound; those who disagreed generally favored standard remedies, such as running the government "more like a business."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Balancing Act

"The Warren Court—It Still Lives" by Stephen Gillers, in *The Nation* (Sept. 17, 1983), P.O. Box 1953, Marion, Ohio 43305.

The nine-member U.S. Supreme Court is now dominated—at least, numerically—by the appointees of conservative Republican presidents. Yet, for years now, the Court has confounded predictions that it would take a sharp Right turn.

The days of the liberal Warren Court nominally ended when Chief Justice Earl Warren retired in 1969 and was replaced by Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee. President Nixon later named three other Justices (Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist); Presidents Ford and Reagan each chose one (John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O'Connor, respectively). Counting Byron R. White, a Kennedy appointee and conservative Democrat, a conservative majority of seven evolved, on paper, to face liberals William J. Brennan, an Eisenhower appointee, and his Johnson-appointed colleague, Thurgood Marshall.

Yet the Burger Court "appears conservative only when compared with its predecessor," writes Gillers, a New York University law professor. It has restricted capital punishment, upheld affirmative action and abortion, and allowed lower courts to impose sweeping remedies for constitutional violations, notably in cases of prisoners' rights.

Why? Some of the Republican appointees simply did not turn out to be very conservative (Blackmun) or were not selected on ideological

Justice Potter Stewart's June 1981 resignation, opening a vacancy for a Reagan appointee, stirred new predictions of a conservative Supreme Court.

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grounds (Stevens). That allowed the two liberals—Brennan and Mar-
shall—to forge majorities in 31 of 57 close decisions during the 1981
and 1982 terms, albeit on fairly narrow grounds.

But Gillers attributes the Court's failure to go Right mostly to Bren-
nan's intellectual leadership. Brennan shaped or authored many key
Warren Court decisions, establishing precedents that today's Court
must consider, and he has special qualities—"clarity, a willingness to
listen, flexibility, and perhaps a gentle persistence"—that help him
persuade his new colleagues to share his point of view.

Yet Brennan, like Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, and Powell, is al-
ready well into his 70s. Conservative contenders who might lead the
Court to the Right are waiting in the wings. They stand a good chance
of winning appointment, particularly if President Reagan seeks and
wins re-election in 1984.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*War and Peace
And the Public*

"Why the Right Gets it Wrong in Foreign
Policy" by William C. Adams, in *Public
Opinion* (Aug.-Sept. 1983), American En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.

For all his talents as a "Great Communicator," Ronald Reagan has had
difficulty rallying support for his stoutly anticommunist foreign policy.

Conservatives blame the lukewarm popular response on the influ-
ence of the liberal national news media or the public's "post-Vietnam
syndrome." Actually, writes Adams, a professor of public administra-
tion at George Washington University, tough foreign policy talk in
peacetime makes Americans uneasy: Critics in the news media are
more in tune with majority sentiments.

Americans, he argues, have no first-hand experience with the kind of
centuries-old people-to-people enmity that divides, for example, the
Russians and the Poles. They distrust Soviet *leaders*, but not ordinary
citizens. And they believe that any U.S. president "genuinely interested
in peace is always prepared to talk" to anyone. It is no accident that
among President Richard Nixon's most popular moves, as measured by
public opinion polls, were his 1972 trip to Communist China and reach-
ing a (short-lived) détente with Moscow. Anti-Soviet rhetoric strikes a
few responsive chords, but White House appeals for "mutual under-
standing" strike even more.

Moscow's oppressive domestic policies reinforce the public's antipa-
thy towards communism. But Americans oppose human rights viola-
tions "wherever they occur," says Adams. Thus, White House calls for
aid to heavy-handed Third World regimes fighting Marxist rebels (e.g.,
in El Salvador) are likely to rouse little enthusiasm.

American antiwar sentiment, Adams adds, was not born during the Vietnam tragedy. In a Gallup poll taken in July 1941, five months before Pearl Harbor and a year after Hitler had conquered France, 79 percent of the respondents opposed U.S. entry into World War II. Immediately after war's end, one-quarter of those polled maintained that the United States should have stayed out. Today, advocates of a more "interventionist" U.S. role abroad face an uphill battle against lingering heartland traditions.

Raking Over Cold War Ashes

"The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" by John Lewis Gaddis, in *Diplomatic History* (Summer 1983), Scholarly Resources Inc., 104 Greenhill Ave., Wilmington, Del. 19805.

Among American historians, the debate over the causes of the Cold War is still a hot topic.

Until the late 1960s, the orthodox view was that Josef Stalin's aggressive stance forced America into the Cold War during the late 1940s. Then, New Left "revisionist" historians, such as Oregon State's William Appleman Williams and York University's Gabriel Kolko, stood the old orthodoxy on its head. The United States, they argued, emerged from World War II bent on acquiring a worldwide empire needed to ensure growing markets for American goods and to prevent the collapse of the capitalist system. Alarmed, the Soviet Union moved to safeguard its security in Europe and elsewhere.

Now, thanks in part to the opening of U.S. government archives from the 1940s, a new "post-revisionist" synthesis of the two opposing views is emerging, according to Gaddis, an Ohio University historian and himself a leader of the new school.

These records show that top Truman administration officials did not fear for capitalism's future. They used U.S. economic power (e.g., the Marshall Plan) to serve political, not material goals. They backed regional trading blocs, such as the European Common Market, that hampered U.S. overseas trade but strengthened anticommunist allies.

Moreover, Gaddis contends, the New Left revisionists based their benign view of the Soviet Union "upon faith, not research." Vojtech Mastny's scrutiny of the record in *Russia's Road to the Cold War* (1979) showed that Stalin rejected several major postwar opportunities for cooperation with the West, preferring to safeguard Soviet security unilaterally, notably by creating a buffer of satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Nor, Mastny showed, did Stalin alarm Washington alone: Greece, Turkey, and Iran were among the nations that looked to America for protection from Soviet hegemony.

Yet post-revisionism is more than the old "orthodoxy plus archives," Gaddis cautions. He and his colleagues reject the standard right-wing notion that the Kremlin had a blueprint for world domination. They view Stalin as "a cagey but insecure opportunist." And they agree with

their New Left counterparts that America built a postwar empire of sorts, though chiefly in self-defense and at its allies' request.

Does it all matter? Yes, says Gaddis. What historians write today "will affect [Americans'] historical consciousness in the future, and that in turn can . . . affect history itself."

Taking the UN Seriously

"Western Strategy in a Third World Forum" by Kenneth Adelman and Marc Plattner, in *Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring 1983), Longman Group Limited, Subscriptions Dept., Fourth Ave., Harlow, Essex CM19 5AA England.

To many Americans, the glass-walled United Nations headquarters in New York is both a symbol of hope for international cooperation and a source of chronic irritation.

Simple arithmetic makes a certain amount of U.S. frustration inevitable, note Adelman and Plattner, former member of the U.S. delegation at the UN (now director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and delegation staff member, respectively.

Western nations now comprise a distinct minority of the UN's 157 members. Delegates from the Third World—organized into the Group of 77 (now comprised of 123 members) on economic issues and, on political and military questions, the slightly smaller Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—fix the General Assembly's agenda and vote together, often against the West, their chief source of economic aid. (In the 15-member Security Council, the United States has veto power, but usually needs some Third World support to pass resolutions.)

Yet the Western powers sometimes make matters worse, the authors

In a 1982 Gallup survey, half of those polled said that the UN does a "poor" job, but only 12 percent favored giving up U.S. membership.

argue, by failing to work together. In 1981, for example, America's NATO allies sided with the United States in only 75 percent of the votes in the General Assembly. Most of the NAM's members, by contrast, voted for the group's official position more than 90 percent of the time.

Western disunity, the authors argue, stems from the cynical view in some Western European capitals that what the UN does matters very little. Europeans cast General Assembly votes with an eye to winning the Third World's goodwill "on the cheap." Yet UN resolutions—condemning Israel, urging a Law of the Sea Treaty, deploring Moscow's downing of a South Korean airliner—*do* influence world opinion, the authors contend.

A united Western bloc in the UN would not often prevail. But by standing together to demand changes in noxious resolutions and voting on principle, the West could arrest what the authors believe is the UN's "dreary downward spiral" into an anti-Western forum.

Israel's Value

"Israel as a Strategic Asset" by Steven L. Spiegel, in *Commentary* (June 1983), 156 East 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

In Congress, the State Department, and the news media, the complaint is often heard that Israel gives the United States nothing but trouble in return for massive aid. U.S. interests in the oil-rich Middle East, it is said, require an arm's-length relationship with the Jewish state, closer ties to the Arabs.

Yet "prodigious and generous efforts" to recruit reliable Arab allies have left Washington empty-handed, contends Spiegel, a UCLA political scientist. Despite receiving advanced U.S. F-15 fighters and AWACs aircraft, Saudi Arabia has refused to accept U.S. Rapid Deployment Force bases and has discouraged its smaller Persian Gulf neighbors, Oman and Bahrain, from cooperating with Washington in their own defense. Egypt is reluctant to risk its ties to the Arab world by working too closely with the United States. Jordan's King Hussein is too preoccupied with his own political survival to be a factor in the region. An (unlikely) U.S. partnership with Iraq would bar any restoration of American ties to Iraq's current battlefield antagonist, Iran, a country of far greater strategic value.

Israel, meanwhile, has proved itself the staunchest of allies. Its army helps deter Soviet military moves in the Middle East, and its leaders would gladly provide logistical support for U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. Jerusalem has even helped some of its traditional foes in the interest of regional stability—also a plus for the United States. In 1970, for example, an Israeli army mobilization, requested by Washington, deterred a Syrian invasion of neighboring Jordan.

Israel is also an asset in more mundane military matters, Spiegel contends. During their 1982 sweep into Lebanon, the Israelis downed advanced Soviet-built Mig-23 and Mig-25 fighters, inspected them, and passed the information along to Washington. Israeli fliers also learned

how to overwhelm Soviet-made Syrian anti-aircraft systems.

Not only does Israel test American-built weapons in battle, Spiegel adds, but it contributes innovations to the American arsenal. A minor example: Sand-clogged helicopter engines aborted the 1980 U.S. Iran rescue mission; the Israelis came up with a workable sand filter.

Close U.S.–Israeli cooperation may strain ties with the Arabs, Spiegel concedes, but it has not kept the United States from becoming the pre-eminent power in the Middle East. Indeed, Anwar Sadat turned from Moscow to Washington in 1975 precisely because he knew the Americans could influence the Israelis. Eventually, other Middle Eastern states may follow the same logic.

ECONOMICS, LABOR, & BUSINESS

Jobs of the Future

"The Declining Middle" by Bob Kuttner, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (July 1983), P.O. Box 2547, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

New technology often takes jobs away with one hand and gives them back with the other. But Kuttner, former editor of *Working Papers* magazine, argues that the overwhelming majority of jobs created during the 1980s will be routine and poorly paid. The result, he fears, will be a shrinking middle class and an increasingly stratified U.S. society.

The decline of America's "smokestack" industries—machine tools, autos, rubber—cost nearly three million highly paid production jobs during the last four years alone. Manufacturing accounts for one job in eight today, compared with one in four in 1950.

New jobs are replacing the old, but they are simply not as good. Of the 19 million additional jobs created by 1990, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, only 3.5 million will be for white-collar "professional and technical" workers; there will be twice as many openings for service workers and secretaries.

The fast-growing, "high-tech" industries offer no panacea. Few workers are needed to assemble computers, for example, and they earn little ($12,000) compared to their "smokestack" counterparts. Overall, electronics industries will not add many jobs: Some 120,000 new computer programmers and 125,000 more electrical engineers will be needed during the 1980s. Because self-diagnosing systems are now being built into computers, even computer repairmen face a tight job market: The American Electronics Association puts the need for new technicians at only 90,000 by 1990. The demand for janitors (600,000), salesclerks (500,000), and fast-food workers (400,000) will be far higher.

While computers are freeing executives and professionals from routine work, Kuttner says, the effects on the lower end of the job hierarchy are just the opposite. At one large Blue Cross/Blue Shield office in

Popular ambivalence toward technology is not new: In Modern Times *(1936), Charlie Chaplin emphasized the "dehumanizing" effects of factory life.*

Massachusetts, for example, clerks once started at the bottom—filing, sorting documents, keypunching, delivering mail—and worked their way up to supervisory positions. But now, says a company executive, because computers are eliminating the need for mid-level decision-making, "We have a lot more routine jobs at the bottom, and a few more complex jobs at the top."

While economists disagree as to whether the economy will eventually "self-correct" for such imbalances, Kuttner notes that there are two powerful agents for equality: labor unions, whose presence boosts wages by 10–20 percent, and government, which now provides entry level slots for well over half the nation's black and female college graduates. Both, he notes, are now in relative decline—which augurs ill for the "high-tech" society of the future.

Explaining Japan's Qualitative Edge

"Quality on the Line" by David A. Garvin, in *The Harvard Business Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1983), P.O. Box 3000, Woburn, Mass. 01888.

Japanese manufacturers produce many goods, notably autos, that are widely considered superior in quality to comparable U.S. products. Most analysts are vague about the reasons for the Japanese advantage.

Garvin, a Harvard Business School professor, carried out a 1981–1982 study of the room air conditioner industry (nine U.S. companies, seven Japanese) to find the answer. The Japanese manufacturers, he found, do indeed vastly outperform their American competitors in quality. On average, the Japanese companies suffered less than one

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defect per 100 units while the product was still on the assembly line, compared to 64 among the U.S. manufacturers. Once the air conditioners were sold, only .6 percent of the Japanese models but 10.5 percent of the American-made units required service calls.

The overall failure rate for the *worst* performing Japanese firm was only half that for the *best* U.S. company.

Management makes the difference, Garvin believes. Top Japanese executives convinced workers and supervisors that quality was the top priority. Company leaders set general goals for improved quality that were then fixed (e.g., "improve compressor reliability by 10 percent") by workers and foremen in shop floor quality control circles. Detailed reports on defects discovered on the assembly line and by field repairmen allowed the Japanese to pinpoint problems; top management met daily to discuss the reports.

Some U.S. air conditioner makers, by contrast, kept virtually no records on product failures, and none collected data as precise as the Japanese did. In the factory, quality almost invariably came second to meeting production schedules, and only three companies set specific goals for cutting failure rates. These three also recorded the largest U.S. reductions in product failure (25 percent or more). On average, American senior managers reviewed reports on defects only once a week.

Worker training also plays a part in ensuring quality: Most Japanese firms set aside six months to teach each employee every job on the line. American workers typically receive from a few hours to several days of instruction, and then only for one job.

There is a silver lining to all this bad news, according to Garvin: Better work habits or other cultural traits have little to do with the Japanese edge. American companies that adopted some Japanese management methods outperformed their domestic rivals. U.S. managers could close the quality gap if they really wanted to.

The Work Ethic Is Not Dead Yet

"Job Commitment in America: Is It Waxing or Waning?" by Janice Neipert Hedges, in *Monthly Labor Review* (July 1983), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Like chastity, respect for authority, and the corner grocery store, the work ethic is widely described as an endangered species in America. But, argues Hedges, a labor economist, there is little solid evidence that shows employee zeal is fading.

Some statistics that seem to show a waning commitment to work turn out, she notes, to reflect not long-term trends, but temporary economic slowdowns. For example, during recessions, many companies simply cannot afford to pay premium wages for overtime. Thus, paid overtime fell several times between 1960 and 1979, hitting a low of 2.1 hours per worker per week; but it also rebounded, reaching a high of 3.9 hours. Overall, overtime showed no long-term trend, up or down.

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Other trends that do hold up in the long run may only *appear* to signal a weakened commitment to work, Hedges argues. For example, the fact that job turnover is higher today than it was in the 1950s may mean merely that information about job opportunities is being disseminated more efficiently to a better-educated work force.

Married men are now less inclined to hold more than one job—about six percent did in 1979, down by nearly a percentage point from 1973—but mostly because more wives are bringing home a second paycheck. During the same period, the percentage of *women* with two or more jobs grew from 2.7 to 3.5, as a rising divorce rate made more women their household's chief breadwinner.

Overall, leisure time has actually decreased. When domestic chores —shopping, house-cleaning, home repairs—are added to work-for-pay, both men and women work about 57 hours per week, compared with 56 in 1975.

Meanwhile, some five million part-time workers were looking for full-time jobs in 1981, and the number appears to be growing. "If the data show major cause for concern," Hedges concludes, "it is that the desire for hours of work seems greater than the hours available."

SOCIETY

Recycling the American Family

During the past two decades, the American family changed so rapidly that its very future sometimes seemed in doubt.

From 1960 to 1980, the U.S. divorce rate doubled and the birthrate dropped from a 20th-century high to an all-time low. Cherlin and Furstenberg, sociologists at Johns Hopkins and the University of Pennsylvania, respectively, report, however, that the pace of change has now slowed; since the mid-1970s, the divorce rate has risen only modestly, and the birthrate has actually increased. The family will survive, they write, though "the 'traditional' family will no longer predominate."

The standard nuclear family—husband, wife, and kids—is no relic. But, thanks to high divorce rates, the typical Mom and Dad of the year 2000 will be almost as likely to be in their second marriage as their first. Half of all marriages beginning in the early 1980s probably will end in divorce—half of all today's children will live in single-parent families, at least for a time, before they reach 18. But 75 percent of all divorced people will remarry.

Most first marriages will yield only one or two children. Indeed, demographer Charles F. Westoff predicts that 25 percent of all women

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now in their childbearing years will remain childless, the highest proportion in U.S. history.

The recent changes in the family seem particularly radical because they followed an era when Americans married earlier and had more children than at any time during this century. But the Baby Boom of the 1950s was an aberration. Today's developments actually climax long-term trends: The birthrate has been dropping since the 1820s; divorce has been slowly rising since the Civil War.

Despite the travails of the past two decades, there is no evidence that Americans today are turning their backs on marriage per se. Of the children under age 18 today, the authors estimate, 90 percent will eventually marry; 50 percent will marry and divorce; and 33 percent will marry, divorce, and remarry.

Yet, as in the past, marital instability will impose social and family costs. For one thing, kinship responsibilities will be murkier. Who will have the first claim to Dad's paycheck: the child from the first marriage, the stepchild, or the offspring of the second marriage? And which of these dependents will eventually care for the aged parents?

Counting the Homeless

"The Homeless of New York" by Thomas J. Main, in *The Public Interest* (Summer 1983), 20th & Northampton Sts., Easton, Pa. 18042.

In most major American cities, it seems, homeless "bag people" are everywhere. The phenomenon is probably most acute in New York City. There, writes Main, managing editor of the *Public Interest*, the "street people" are a surprisingly diverse lot.

New York's homeless number up to 36,000, according to the Community Service Society of New York, but nightly attendance at the 19 city shelters averages 4,235 (and some clients remain for months at a time). City Hall now spends $38 million annually to house, feed, clothe, and provide medical services to the homeless, up from only $6.8 million in 1978. That, Main argues, is too much.

He believes that the "homeless" actually belong to at least three different groups. A 1982 survey of 173 long-term, male shelter residents by the city's Human Resources Administration (HRA), for example, classified 34 percent as psychiatric cases, eight percent as drug addicts or alcoholics, and 19 percent as "discouraged" workers—employable but jobless. (The remaining 39 percent fit in no single category.)

Main contends that few of these people actually belong in the shelters. Alcoholics and addicts, unless absolutely incorrigible, should be given treatment to enable them to live independently. The mentally ill, released from New York's mental hospitals during the "deinstitutionalization" movement of the 1970s, should be provided with the "halfway house" treatment that the state promised but never delivered.

The "discouraged" workers in the survey were young (median age: 32) and able-bodied. What draws them to the shelters, Main argues, is the relatively attractive conditions the city offers. On the street, all are

eligible for Home Relief grants of up to $152 per month to cover rent, but life in the shelters—with free food and medical services—is easier.

In fact, few of the "homeless" actually live day after day on the street. A second 1982 HRA survey of 681 new arrivals at the shelters revealed that, while 38 percent had spent the previous night outdoors, only five percent said that was their "usual" residence. Forty percent had been in their own apartments or with family or friends the night before.

Main warns that recognizing a "right to shelter" for all comers and spending more on the shelter system will encourage more of the jobless to seek aid. Needed, he says, is a work requirement, along with an emphasis on rehabilitation for the able-bodied, and better facilities for the mentally ill. Otherwise, the truly homeless may get lost in the shuffle.

Second Thoughts On School Reform

"Great Hopes May Go Unfulfilled" by Robert J. Samuelson, in *National Journal* (July 9, 1983), Government Research Corporation, 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Behind today's grassroots push for reform of the public schools is "the faith that strong schools represent a fundamental source of the nation's prosperity and international competitiveness," notes Samuelson, a *National Journal* contributing editor. He suggests that such faith may be a prescription for dashed hopes.

After World War II, Americans' educational attainment and standard of living rose in tandem. Hence, many economists concluded that more education brought both personal prosperity and national economic growth. Economist Edward Denison of the Brookings Institution attributed 20 percent of U.S. productivity gains between 1948 and 1973 to increased schooling.

But contradictory evidence also exists. Economic growth has been highest in the South, where local schools are poorest. Michigan, whose public schools and universities are among the nation's best, has suffered chronic unemployment (an average rate of 9.2 percent since 1970). Abroad, such economic successes as Japan and West Germany badly trail the United States in average levels of formal education. In 1979, 5.2 percent of the U.S. population was attending college, compared to 1.9 percent in West Germany and 2.1 percent in Japan.

The trouble, says Samuelson, is that "no one really knows how much formal schooling is necessary to sustain a suitable work force or, for that matter, precisely what skills it requires."

The question of what makes an effective school is equally perplexing. A recent study of 30 elementary schools by Gilbert Austin of the University of Maryland suggests, however, that successful schools share these common features: strong principals, parents actively engaged in their children's education, firm discipline, and high teacher expectations of their pupils' performance.

"To a considerable degree," concludes Samuelson, "education is and must be an act of faith." Schooling cannot be regarded "as a mechanical process leading to automatic rewards." Schools, he believes, "are being asked to cure problems of employment and economic stagnation . . . beyond their power to remedy." The old danger remains: Citizens of a nation confused about what schools *can* provide always risk being disappointed by what they get.

Black Income Vs. Black Wealth

"Wealth and Economic Status" by William P. O'Hare, in *Focus* (June 1983), Joint Center for Political Studies, 1301 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20004.

Americans usually compare the relative well-being of whites and blacks by looking at statistics on annual income. Measuring personal wealth—real estate, stocks, bonds—yields a slightly different picture.

The good news, according to O'Hare, a Joint Center for Political Studies researcher, is that, nationwide, blacks narrowed the "wealth gap" during the last two decades. While black families' incomes hovered at about 60 percent of that of white families between 1967 and 1979, their wealth doubled in comparison to whites'. The bad news: The wealth gap remains wider than the income gap. At $24,608 in 1979, the average wealth of black families was still only 36 percent of that of white families ($68,891).

Viewed another way, black households in 1979 held assets equal to

2.5 times their annual income; white households had amassed wealth equal to four years' income.

O'Hare cites a study of 7,000 families by economists Robert B. Pearl and Matilda Frankel to show where the two groups had their assets in 1979. Home ownership absorbed 46 percent of blacks' wealth but only a third of whites'—blacks had little money remaining for other "nonessential" investments. Another 21 percent of black and 15 percent of white assets were in rental housing. Household goods and vehicles accounted for 24 percent of black wealth; four percent of blacks' money and 13 percent of whites' was invested in small businesses or farms.

Only seven percent of black wealth was in the form of financial assets—stocks, bank accounts—and 22 percent of black households (1.9 million) had no such assets at all, not even a checking account.

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Washington's Elite Beats

"The Golden Triangle: The Press at the White House, State, and Defense" by Stephen Hess, in *The Brookings Review* (Summer 1983), 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

About 150 reporters regularly cover Washington's high-status "Golden Triangle"—the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. Although many have worked on two or even three of these prestigious beats, each of the three news contingents is different. Why? Because of the nature of the institutions they cover.

So argues Hess, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Under current practice, most of the roughly 75 print and TV newsmen who cover the President, for example, are those who covered his election campaign. The recent high turnover in the Oval Office is mirrored in the White House pressroom. The result, says Hess, is a press corps of "high energy and low historical memory."

These campaign-oriented reporters have not covered past presidents, and thus have no predecessor against whom to measure "their man"; they tend to see White House policy decisions chiefly in terms of domestic political impact and often give short shrift to substantive issues.

State Department reporters, by contrast, are often seasoned pros. They have to be. The department employs 42 full-time press officers and hosts a daily briefing for reporters. But due to the traditional secrecy shrouding diplomacy, Hess says, the prevailing official attitude around Foggy Bottom is that "ideally there should be no news at all."

Newsmen on the State beat learn "nuance journalism," a subtle system of code words, cues, and even body language from which they must infer what is happening. (An example: "No comment" usually means "yes"; "can neither confirm nor deny" might mean "yes.") Hess wor-

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ries that such practices leave "too much room for misunderstanding."

Contrary to popular myth, the most open of the Golden Triangle's three institutions is the Defense Department, regularly covered by 34 reporters. The Pentagon's large staff of press officers strains to be helpful. Conflict is kept to a minimum because, in military matters, it is far easier for journalists and officials to agree on what is an official secret, and what is merely embarrassing. Perhaps more important is the sheer size of the bureaucracy. As Richard Halloran of the *New York Times* put it, "If someone is promoting the M-1 tank, there are plenty of people around who will tell you what's wrong with the M-1."

Hess adds that while Golden Triangle reporters tend to be liberals, their shoptalk rarely reflects ideology; their chief preoccupation is how various officials help or hinder them as fact-seekers. "An administration never gets the press that it thinks it deserves," Hess observes, "it almost always gets the press that it brings upon itself."

Soft on Reagan?

"With Friends Like These. ..." by Michael Robinson, Maura Clancey, and Lisa Grand, in *Public Opinion* (June-July 1983), American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Ronald Reagan's personal charm has disarmed the news media—at least, that is the self-criticism circulating among many Washington print and broadcast journalists. Robinson, Clancey, and Grand, George Washington University political scientists, say that reporters are being too hard on themselves; they have been plenty tough on the President.

The authors sifted through some 100 "soft news" clips—commentary and feature stories—that appeared on the three major TV networks' evening broadcasts during the first two months of 1983, when midterm assessments were in full swing. Of the 29 segments that were unambiguously "positive" or "negative," 27 were the latter, yielding a bad-news/good-news ratio of 13.5 to one.

TV commentators criticized "just about everything but Reagan's personality"—his nomination of Kenneth Adelman as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency's sluggishness, and, repeatedly, his economic policies.

While the negative stories were often hard-hitting, the two positive ones were at best backhanded, the authors report. For example, NBC's John Chancellor opened his favorable commentary on Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's January 17 reception in Washington with a slap: "The administration has handled the visit . . . with the kind of skill and dexterity it does not always show in foreign affairs."

Examination of the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, and the three news magazines show that the print media have been even more critical of the President than have broadcast journalists. The *Times*, for example, flatly editorialized on January 9: "The stench of failure hangs over the Reagan White House."

Why, then, the *mea culpa*s? A hint of hubris, the authors speculate. The largely liberal Washington news corps believes that it is an important shaper of public opinion. If a conservative President remains popular in the polls, the newsmen assume, the media must not be getting the "truth" out to the public. They suspect they are too chummy with the President. And perhaps, the authors add, "the press is doing to the press what it does to all institutions—accentuating the negative."

Building Fires
From Straw Polls

"Is a Straw Poll Worth Reporting?" by Martin Linsky, in *The Hastings Center Report* (June 1983), 360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706.

The TV network news shows and top newspapers and magazines heavily influence the nation's political agenda, but newsmen are reluctant to acknowledge their power or to question how they use it.

Too often, says Linsky, a former *Boston Globe* editorial writer now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, they decide what is newsworthy "on the basis of crasser values such as time, convenience, and

Early in the 1980 presidential primary season, a cartoonist targeted the news media's zeal: "With two percent of the vote in, the CBS computer just projected the winners for tonight, next November, and 1984!"

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competition" rather than how best to inform the public.

A case in point is press coverage of the April 9 presidential straw poll conducted at the Massachusetts Democratic Party's "issues convention." Democratic officials cooked up the poll merely as a "diversion" from the "dull" or possibly divisive conference proceedings for both the media and the 4,100 delegates, Linsky says, and few politicians or journalists took it seriously—at first.

But then, presidential contenders Walter Mondale and Alan Cranston, recalling the media prominence Jimmy Carter won by his triumph in the Iowa caucuses that kicked off the 1976 campaign, began wooing the delegates in earnest. Other candidates, notably Gary Hart and John Glenn, followed suit. The major news media joined in, running daily stories on what had become a Massachusetts horse race.

By April 9, 400 reporters and back-up personnel were on hand in Springfield, Mass., including teams from the Big Three TV networks, *Time* and *Newsweek*, and every major daily in the country. To its credit, Linsky says, the *New York Times* buried the story in its middle pages; elsewhere, the poll results (Mondale won with 30 percent of the votes) were played as big news. Lost amid the straw poll hoopla was the original purpose of the meeting: discussion of state political issues.

The journalists themselves appeared troubled by the "hype," Linsky notes. Newspaper columnists constantly reminded their readers that the poll was meaningless—but covered it anyway. And as the real presidential campaign gets underway, working reporters and TV producers will have no time for reflecting on such contradictions. That is one reason, he argues, why news organizations' top management, more removed from the daily hubbub, should take a stronger hand in distinguishing between real news and hype.

A few have already made such efforts. During the 1980 presidential campaign, for example, ABC News emphasized comparisons of the candidates' positions on the issues, not campaign trivia. But more needs to be done, Linsky says, if election coverage is to be more than news about who's ahead on the merry-go-round.

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The Quiet Nuns

"The Cloistered Life" by Julia Lieblich, in *The New York Times Magazine* (July 10, 1983), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

To most Americans, the cloistered nun—silent, isolated, devoted solely to prayer—is a relic of the Middle Ages. But cloisters still exist, writes Lieblich, a freelance writer, and since the mid-1960s, they have opened their doors, if only a crack.

Until A.D. 1200, all nuns were cloistered. Most were the daughters of aristocrats who could afford the dowries demanded by the cloisters; many women were attracted by the independence and intellectual life not available elsewhere.

Today, more than 200 Roman Catholic cloistered convents in the United States house 3,800 "contemplative" nuns. While their "active" sisters (some 120,000 strong) teach, heal, and do missionary work, says Lieblich, these secluded women seek solitude "to witness the primacy of prayer in the Church, to serve as a reminder of the contemplative dimension in all lives, and to intervene for others before God."

Some cloisters conform to age-old practices—the 38 Poor Clare nuns in Roswell, New Mexico, go barefoot year-round and whip themselves with knotted cords three times weekly. But most have abandoned "the hairshirt habits and the almost total silence of the past" in the wake of the liberalizing 1962–65 Second Vatican Council, Lieblich reports. Most sisters can talk to outsiders or even leave the cloister to shop, vote, or see a doctor.

Even so, sisters, for the most part, lead lives of self-denial and unvaried routine. After the two years of college or other "real-life" experience required for entry into a cloister, another five to seven years must elapse before the nun takes her final vows. "We want women," says one prioress, "not girls."

Despite such demands, as well as the American public's vague dismay and the not uncommon resentment of the nuns' families, the cloisters' population rose slightly between 1977 and 1979. (During the same period, 3,807 "active" nuns left their orders.) Anachronistic as the cloisters may appear, the future of the contemplative life seems secure.

Discovering Judaism's Mystics

"The Greatness of Gershom Scholem" by Hyam Maccoby, in *Commentary* (Sept. 1983), 165 East 65th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Judaism seems the most earthbound of the world's major religions, focused on the conduct of everyday family and community life and on personal morality. Yet the faith has a powerful mystical dimension that went largely unrecognized for centuries before historian Gershom Scholem (1897–1981) brought it to light.

Scholem, born in Berlin, rebelled against the staid, assimilationist German-Jewish milieu of his youth. Early in his university career, he became fascinated with ancient Jewish mystical writing. Jewish scholars of the day disdained this "wild, strange subject," writes Maccoby, a librarian and lecturer at Leo Baeck College in London. Indeed, among rabbis, access to the texts was accorded to only a few.

Scholem's first task was to collect the widely scattered manuscripts written by many different Jews over 18 centuries. By dating and analyzing them, he discovered that Jewish mysticism had changed dramatically over time. Two chief bodies of writing emerged: the Merkavah, dating from the first few centuries A.D., and the more sophis-

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ticated Kabbalah, from the 11th century.

The mystics defied talmudic injunctions against speculation about God and his ways. Indeed, the Kabbalah offers a biography of God: "God is even provided with a wife," Maccoby reports, "and, eventually, with a cosmic love story . . . with tragic episodes and a happy ending." The mystics also broke down the traditional Judaic separation of matter and spirit, man and transcendent God. For example, says Maccoby, a 16th-century Palestinian Jew named Isaac Luria argued, "In order to create the world, God had had to exile part of Himself from Himself; and this creative withdrawal (*tzimtzum*) or exile was what was being re-enacted on earth by Israel."

The mystics can also be described in part as Jewish fundamentalists: "If the Bible speaks of the 'hand' of God," Maccoby notes, "this to the kabbalists is not just a metaphor for His influence on events, but a real hand." Scholem's greatest achievement, Maccoby believes, was to show how periodic outbursts of mysticism have changed Judaism and infused it with new energy. In *Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah* (1957), for example, Scholem chronicled the brief career of a 17th-century Palestinian Jew who publicly violated Jewish dietary and other laws and claimed divine status, a blasphemy that many local Jewish leaders accepted without protest. Sabbatai won a wide following, and although the movement collapsed after he was forcibly converted to Islam, he left Jewish law and liturgy altered.

Scholem's scholarship encouraged many Jews to acknowledge the hidden mystical aspect of their faith. "After his work," Maccoby concludes, "we can no longer think of the history of Judaism as one of outer tribulations but inner calm."

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Death by Trauma

"Trauma" by Donald D. Trunkey, in *Scientific American* (Aug. 1983), P.O. Box 5969, New York, N.Y. 10017.

The battles against cancer and heart disease top the list of U.S. medical priorities, but trauma—injuries from wounds, burns, or falls—takes, by some measures, a heavier toll.

In 1982, cancer and heart disease together took 1.2 million lives in the United States. Trunkey, a San Francisco General Hospital surgeon, reports that 165,000 Americans died from trauma last year. But because trauma claims primarily youthful victims—it is the leading cause of death among those up to age 38—it cuts more deeply into lifespans. The two well-known killers each reduced American lives by some 1.8 million years in 1975; the loss to trauma was nearly four million years.

Trauma claims most of its victims quickly. Half are "dead on arrival" at a hospital, casualties of highway accidents, homicide, and suicide. The most promising remedies are preventive and nonmedical: handgun control, stiffer penalties for drunk driving, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets.

Another 30 percent of trauma deaths occur between one and two hours after injury. Here, the critical factor is how fast the victim reaches surgery. The typical U.S. hospital's emergency room is inadequate, says Trunkey. A 1980 study of Portland, Oregon, hospitals showed that it took surgeons an average of one hour and 15 minutes to get to the hospital in response to emergency calls. Needed are specially equipped trauma centers with surgeons and anesthesiologists on duty around the clock.

In 1970, for example, West Germany opened special trauma centers along its high-speed *autobahns*. The result: Deaths from motor-vehicle accidents dropped from 16,000 annually to 12,000 during the 1970s. But few U.S. communities are willing to bear the high costs of modern trauma centers. The federal government, meanwhile, skimps on research into the little-understood multiple organ failures and infections that account for the remaining 20 percent of trauma fatalities, which occur days or weeks after the injury.

Trauma costs the United States some $50 billion annually in medical expenses and lost production, not to mention scores of thousands of young lives. That news, says Trunkey, deserves some headlines.

Computerizing Baseball

"The Microchipped Diamond" by Sy Weissman, in *Psychology Today* (Aug. 1983), P.O. Box 2990, Boulder, Colo. 80302.

Casually citing arcane statistics—"Reggie Jackson bats .367 under a full moon"—has become the stock-in-trade of television's baseball broadcasters. And slowly but surely, the computers that manufacture such hairsplitting data are finding their way into major league dugouts.

For the New York Yankees, Oakland A's, and Chicago White Sox, 1983 has been the second season of the computer age. According to Weissman, a TV science producer, the teams' managers can predict a batter's performance by "inning, score, the batter-pitcher match-up, number of outs, [and] number of men on base, as influenced by such physical circumstances as temperature, humidity, wind velocity and direction, park dimensions, playing surface, total attendance, and date." (One statistician has even uncovered a "Birthday Effect": Players exceed their season batting average by 50 points in games on their birthdays.)

Such data help managers decide, for example, which player to use as a pinch hitter. The Yankees' electronic "tenth player" offers odds on the

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results of using a particular tactic in any given situation.

Computers are also at work off the playing field. For example, Oakland's best pitchers were startled to learn at contract negotiation time that the team's computer attributed much of their success to extraordinary catches by their teammates in the outfield. Major league scouts track the careers of 3,000 U.S. minor league players by printout. Such traditional scouting reports as "He's got an arm that can throw a lambchop past a wolf" may no longer suffice.

But baseball romantics need not despair, writes Weissman. Discussions of America's favorite pastime have always been punctuated by statistics and probabilities—batting averages, earned run averages, strikeout percentages. Now fans will just have more numbers to chew over during the TV commercials. Computers will inevitably spread to the remaining 23 major league teams, but the point of the game will remain the same: to beat the odds.

As Casey Stengel observed some years ago, "Baseball ain't nothing more or less than the science of getting 27 outs."

When Scientists Betray Truth

"Madness in Their Method" by Nicholas Wade, in *The New Republic* (June 27, 1983), 1220 19th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

When scientific fraud comes to light, it is often cited as proof that "the system works." Organized science is self-policing, say its champions, and cheaters can count on being caught. According to Wade, a *New York Times* editorial writer, the surge of scientific plagiarism and data fabrication cases over the past 12 months suggests just the opposite.

In principle, science's self-regulation depends on "peer review." Specialists assess proposals for research grants and manuscripts submitted for publication. Other scientists repeat, step-by-step, the experiments reported by their colleagues in scholarly journals.

In fact, contends Wade, scientists rarely replicate colleagues' work; there is no glory in doing something already done by someone else. And peer review has failed to detect many recent scandals.

For example, noted heart researcher John Darsee spent 14 years, mostly at Emory University and Harvard Medical School, fabricating data, but he wasn't found out until Harvard colleagues skeptical of his productivity secretly observed him at work. Even then, the directors of his laboratory (who had happily shared credit with Darsee for some of his findings) and a blue-ribbon committee appointed by the dean of the Harvard Medical School cleared him of any wrongdoing. It took a truly independent panel of the National Institutes of Health to uncover Darsee's scam.

Modern science is not only a quest for truth, observes Wade. It is a career. And cutting corners can speed success. Prominent scientists hire researchers like Darsee who receive little supervision and are under pressure for publishable "results." The apprentice system should be re-

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
Scientific fraud has a long history: Ptolemy, who argued 1,800 years ago that the Earth was the center of the universe, cribbed observations from others. Yet public confidence in science is strong.

formed so that true collaboration (and oversight) is a prerequisite for co-authorship of scientific books and articles, argues Wade.

Journals so obscure that not even specialists read them also contribute to the problem. Otherwise, how could medical researcher Elias Al-Sabti have published 43 plagiarized articles over a six-year period before he was finally exposed in 1980?

It is hard to say how widespread scientific dishonesty is. But fraud is more than a problem of "a few bad apples," Wade concludes. "Fraud in science has a lot to do with the barrel."

A Challenge to Continental Drift

"Faulting Continental Drift" by Paul D. Lowman, Jr., in *The Sciences* (July-Aug. 1983), P.O. Box 356, Martinsville, N.J. 08836.

The theory of "continental drift" has settled comfortably into the minds of most geologists. But Lowman, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration geologist, believes that while portions of the Earth's crust move, whole continents do not.

Geologist Alfred Wegener first propounded continental drift in 1912. He argued that the seven continents began as one "supercontinent," which he called Pangaea, that fragmented 200 million years ago. Its descendants, according to the theory, are still drifting apart.

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Wegener's idea received a big boost in 1960, when Princeton's Harry Hess introduced modern "plate tectonic theory." Hess theorized that the continents sit above seven major "plates," which in turn rest on the Earth's mantle, a plastic base of hot and molten rock that Lowman likens to Silly Putty. The mantle pushes to the surface along mountainous ridges in the ocean floor that separate the plates, and in a process called "sea-floor spreading," forces them (and the continents above them) apart.

The congruent coastlines separated by the Atlantic Ocean are the strongest evidence for continental drift. Yet Lowman points out that when the east coast of North and South America is fitted together with the west coast of Eurasia and Africa, there is no room for a large chunk of southern Mexico. Similarly, the Arctic Ocean coastlines of Canada and the Soviet Union should mesh, but do not. And if all the continents have been moving away from one another, the Earth should have expanded over the last few hundred million years. In fact, it has, but not by enough to accommodate the movements in "drift" theory.

How, then, can the continents remain stationary if the sea floor spreads? Lowman asserts that shifting oceanic plates are pushed *under* the continents rather than against them. The continents appear to mesh, he adds, because sediment from the Earth's mid-Atlantic upthrusting mantle is distributed symmetrically on the coastlines by ocean tides.

Lowman concedes that few of his fellow geologists share his views. But soon there will be nothing to debate at all. Within the next ten years, sophisticated NASA telescopes now in orbit around the Earth will determine whether the continents really are moving, foreclosing any incipient rift in the community of geologists.

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Questions on Nuclear Wastes

"U.S. Charts Plans for Nuclear Waste Disposal" by Pamela S. Zurer, in *Chemical & Engineering News* (July 18, 1983), ACS, P.O. Box 3337, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

Members of Congress heaved a sigh of relief when, after years of acrimonious debates, they passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) late in 1982. However, another round of controversy can be expected before the new federal law is implemented.

The 1982 legislation calls for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to open by 1998 the first of a series of underground repositories for the permanent safekeeping of radioactive wastes from civilian nuclear power plants. Yet key technical questions remain unresolved: What kind of repositories? Where should they be located? Meanwhile, used

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reactor fuel is accumulating here and there at a rate of 2,000 tons annually. At West Valley, N.Y., there is an additional pool of 600,000 gallons of "high-level" waste—the leftovers of a 1966–72 project to salvage plutonium and uranium from spent fuel by reprocessing it.

Nobody is even sure how long wastes must be stored before they are safe, notes Zurer, a *Chemical & Engineering News* reporter. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency says 10,000 years; the National Academy of Sciences' estimate is 20,000 years. Until *that* question is settled, scientists cannot accurately judge the merits of various underground sites: The possibility of earthquakes or volcanic activity, the likelihood of groundwater contamination, and the characteristics of different kinds of rock must all be factored in.

Also at issue is the proper method of waste treatment. The DOE recently decided that encapsulating radioactive byproducts in special "borosilicate" glass is the way to go, but some scientists and manufacturers argue that high-tech ceramics used in the same way are more reliable and cheaper.

To complicate matters even further, many specialists now favor burying containers of wastes under the ocean floors, which are geologically stable and remote from human activity. And Zurer observes that Washington some day might want to retrieve such spent fuel to extract its plutonium.

Politics must also be considered. Few citizens in the states where repositories might logically be put—Nevada, Washington, and Louisiana—are likely to welcome them. Even though Congress has given itself the power to override objections by the states, private citizens could tie up any decision for years in the courts.

Meanwhile, the DOE is already starting to make some choices about waste storage—e.g., narrowing down the possible sites—even though the federal deadline is 15 years away. But, Zurer says, the stakes are too high (up to $40 billion in disposal costs over the next four decades) and there are too many unanswered questions. Prudence argues for delay on any final plan.

The Tides' Power

"Harnessing the Tides" by James A. Fay, in *Technology Review* (July 1983), Room 10-140, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

In colonial America, hundreds of small grain and lumber mills along the New England coast were powered by the tides. Today, North American engineers are thinking about using the tides again, this time to generate electricity.

Only two tidal generating plants are now in operation: a 15-year-old, 240-megawatt (about one-fourth the output of a large nuclear reactor) French facility and a far smaller one at Kislaya Guba in the Soviet Union. Fay, an MIT engineer, notes that the plants work by trapping

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water behind a dam at high tide and channeling it back to the sea through a turbine at low tide. (Special reversible turbines can be used to harness incoming tides as well.)

Most coastal areas are unsuited to tidal power schemes—the difference between the water levels at high and low tides (the "tidal range") averages only three feet around the world. But on the New England coast, the range reaches 20 feet; in Nova Scotia's Bay of Fundy, up to 40 feet.

The Canadian government is studying a plan to build a five-mile-long dam across the Minas Basin at the head of the bay. More than 100 turbines would generate some 4,000 megawatts of electricity, enough to supply the state of Nevada. But Fay believes that the environmental costs of such "megaprojects" are too high. Not only would the dam disrupt the vast mudflats of the bay, damaging fish and animal life, but it could raise the tidal range by up to one foot from Cape Cod to Nova Scotia.

Small-scale tidal generators of one to 100 megawatts, Fay contends, could do the same job for about the same cost per megawatt. The idea is already catching on. In Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, an 18-megawatt plant is nearing completion; Maine's Passamaquoddy Indians have in hand a preliminary plan for a 12-megawatt project that would cost $3–4 million per megawatt—roughly the same as a nuclear plant.

The technology of tide-generated electricity is ready and awaiting wider use. In the future, another method of tapping the ocean tides may well become more practical. Underwater "windmills" anchored offshore would pose no foreseeable environmental hazards and could be located practically anywhere in any ocean.

Success Story?

"Milk" by Daniel Jack Chasan, in *Science 83* (July-Aug. 1983), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

At about age 35, in many areas of the world, humans' physiological machinery switches off production of the enzymes needed to digest milk. Not in America.

That fact, says Chasan, a freelance writer, may help to explain the strong, if declining appetite of U.S. adults for milk, cheese, ice cream, and butter. Americans consume the equivalent of 541 pounds of milk per person annually. And the dairymen keep increasing productivity. Wisconsin, home to 46,000 dairy farms, still leads in output, but California's farms are larger and more efficient. Some dairymen in the West milk as many as 6,000 cows, although the average state herd numbers 400. Wisconsin's average is 50. A typical California cow yields 15,000 pounds of milk annually, 3,000 more than its Wisconsin counterpart.

Technological advances (and hard work) account for today's high dairy farm output. Cows still convert grass, hay, and grain into milk,

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but farmers now use computer programs to learn "the correct amounts of feed and protein for cows of a particular weight, age, and productivity," says Chasan. A 1,400 pound Holstein may eat as much as 56 pounds of food, including corn and soybean meal, every day. Many stall-fed California cows, milked by machine three or four times every day, may never set foot in a pasture.

The milk, Chasan says, "probably won't see the light of day until you pour it into a glass." From the cow, it travels through tubes to a refrigerated storage tank and then is trucked to a processing plant. There, it is pasteurized by heat to kill bacteria. It is homogenized (to keep the cream from separating) by being forced at high pressure through steel mesh that breaks fat globules into tiny particles.

Since 1960, weight-conscious Americans have reduced their annual per capita consumption of dairy products by more than 100 pounds, or 15 percent. Last year, 10 percent of the nation's milk products ended up in federal warehouses as a result of Washington's longstanding policy of buying up surpluses to maintain dairymen's incomes.

There is a certain irony in the booming productivity of the American dairy industry. As Chasan notes, American farmers "are increasing the production of a commodity for which no adequate market exists."

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Picasso's Newspaper

"Guernica and 'Guernica'" by Phyllis Tuchman, in *Artforum* (April 1983), P.O. Box 980, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Gripping newspaper stories often provide novelists with inspiration —Dostoevski is a famous case in point—but painters seem unlikely beneficiaries. Yet it was a newspaper that provided much of the raw material for Pablo Picasso's famous painting, *Guernica*.

Picasso was commissioned to paint a mural for the Spanish Loyalist pavilion at the Paris Exposition (world's fair) of 1937. The left-wing Spanish Loyalists were then slowly losing a bitter civil war to Generalissimo Francisco Franco's Fascists. On April 26 of that year, Franco's bombers, aided by the German Luftwaffe, destroyed Guernica, the ancient Basque capital, giving Picasso his theme.

Picasso worked at the painting for five weeks, beginning just four days after the bombing, writes Tuchman, an art historian and critic. The enormous (11½ ft. x 25½ ft.) black, white, and gray canvas synthesizes elements of cubism, collage, and surrealism, familiar echoes of Picasso's previous creations. It has its own cast of characters—four women, a child, a dismembered soldier, a bull, a horse, and a bird— much like a film or play.

Most of these characters and much of the painting's imagery appear to be drawn from dramatic accounts of the Guernica bombing in the

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LE PETIT CHAPERON ROUGE 1937

— Comme vous avez de grandes dents !

Picasso transformed the wolf in a 1937 cartoon in L'Humanité *into a horse's head. René Dubosc's "Little Red Riding Hood" series satirized the refusal by France and Britain to intervene against the Fascists in Spain.*

French communist newspaper, *L'Humanité.* The paper described the devastated city of 7,000 as "absolutely Dantesque," with farm animals, brought to town for market day, wandering through streets littered with human corpses. It emphasized that women and children were among the victims, as did Picasso in his painting.

L'Humanité also reported that the distant farms "burned like little candles among the hills," and (inaccurately) that only one building remained standing—an image recalled in a preliminary sketch for the painting by a figure in the window of an isolated building thrusting forth a candle. Near the end of Picasso's five weeks' labor, the newspaper reported that the general who directed the Guernica attack, Emilio Mola, had died in the crash of a sabotaged airplane and that only his head and arms had been recovered. Picasso had already sketched in a stricken soldier; now he changed plans and painted only the head and arms.

Picasso relied on the communist newspaper chiefly because it was one of the few in Paris sympathetic to the Loyalist cause. Yet he transformed the news as *L'Humanité* reported it into a canvas full of symbols that captured the horror of war. He remained inscrutable about what they meant. In 1947, he said of the images and symbols in his famous canvas, "It's up to the public to see what it wants to see."

Beautiful Trifles

"Marvels in Miniature" by Dale Harris, in *Connoisseur* (April 1983), P.O. Box 10120, Des Moines, Iowa 50350.

Peter Carl Fabergé (1846–1920) was the jeweler to the Tsars. In a way, his elaborate jeweled Easter eggs symbolized the decadence of Imperial Russia.

Most of Fabergé's creations were domestic items—picture frames, parasol handles, cigarette cases. "Playful, tiny, elegant, designed to enchant, not to dazzle, they must have helped to mitigate the formal splendor of court life," writes Harris, a Cooper Union art historian.

Fabergé, the son of French Huguenot immigrants, was born in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) and took over the family jewelry business there at age 24. He was the manager and chief designer. Though trained as a jeweler and goldsmith, he probably did not personally produce any of the House of Fabergé's famous baubles. As the firm prospered, he opened branches in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, and London, employing up to 500 craftsmen and salesmen. Legend has it that he kept a hammer at his desk to smash any work that did not meet his standards.

Fabergé was a genius in "the art of elegant diversion," says Harris, and never was there a more insatiable clientele than the privileged classes of turn-of-the-century Russia and Europe. In his designs, Fabergé looked back, as did his customers, to the royal fashions of 18th-century France. Harris says his emphasis on craftsmanship and design—in contrast to the ostentatious display of costly gems—set him apart from such rivals as Alfred Cartier and Charles Lewis Tiffany, whom he scorned as mere "merchants."

Fabergé's taste was not without its lapses—among his products was a saltcellar in the form of a bidet. But most of his creations hit closer to the mark. Harris cites, for example, an egg topped by an orange tree of gold, nephrite, pearls, and rubies with a tiny concealed gold-feathered nightingale that popped up and sang.

The 1917 October Revolution drove Fabergé into exile. He died in Switzerland in 1920, leaving, says Harris, a legacy of "beautiful trifles," which today are displayed in museums as objects of art.

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Saudi Slump

"Letter from Saudi Arabia" by Joseph Kraft, in *The New Yorker* (July 4, 1983), 25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

The impact of today's "oil glut"—and lower prices—on Saudi Arabia's economy is obvious to any visitor. The Saudis are curbing their free-spending ways: Huge new apartment complexes built for foreign workers stand empty, and once-bustling hotel lobbies are quiet. Yet, reports

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Kraft, a syndicated columnist, many senior Saudi officials welcome a breather after a decade of helter-skelter modernization.

Riyadh's revenues from oil and other sources are down this year from $90 billion to $70 billion. The resulting cuts in public works spending have hurt Saudi construction companies. But the Saudi government's savings will ease the pain; some $10 billion will be withdrawn from foreign banks to make up the deficit. No fiscal crisis looms.

Meanwhile, the Western-educated "technocrats" in the Saudi cabinet view the construction slowdown as an opportunity to shift the nation's emphasis from steel and concrete—schools, bridges, highways—to basic "people" services. Magnificently equipped new hospitals abound, for example, but many village water supplies are still polluted.

Culturally, the Saudis are undergoing a kind of restoration, says Kraft. The American influence is apparent in English-Arabic street signs and other ways, but Westerners are leaving as demand for their expertise dries up. The maintenance and operation of the refineries and factories built by Americans and Europeans is being assumed by a growing labor force of Pakistanis, Filipinos, and Koreans, whose customs conservative Moslems find less threatening to traditional mores.

Indeed, Islamic fundamentalism is resurgent, Kraft reports. The religious extremists who seized Mecca's Grand Mosque in 1979 accused the Saudi royalty of abandoning the true faith, and the resulting publicity stirred a back-to-basics movement. Public segregation of the sexes is enforced with growing rigor; Saudi Arabia is the only Persian Gulf state where women are not allowed to drive automobiles.

Still, the Westernization begun during the 1960s may be irreversible. Women are opening their own boutiques and beauty salons, and 25,000 women work for the government. Another 10,000 are enrolled in (single-sex) Saudi universities. "You can't keep women in the house if you educate them," remarked a Riyadh bureaucrat.

Saudi Arabia's economic revival, dependent on a renewed demand for oil, is likely to follow recovery in the West. But Saudi officials seem in no hurry to embark on the next round of growth. Said one, "We are in the position of an overweight man who goes on a diet."

South Africa's Grand Designs

"Destabilisation in Southern Africa" by Simon Jenkins, in *The Economist* (July 16, 1983), P.O. Box 2700, Woburn, Mass. 01888.

South Africa's political leaders spent much of the 1960s and 1970s trying fruitlessly to win friends overseas. Pretoria promised reform of its apartheid system, made overtures to black African states, and, for a time, worked closely with Washington. Now Prime Minister P. W. Botha has given up on popularity; his regime is trying to dominate its neighbors by force or subversion.

Jenkins, an *Economist* writer, traces the country's new go-it-alone attitude to two events: Washington's refusal to back a 1975 South African

*South Africa's neighbors are now free of European colonial
rule. But Pretoria is reluctant to end its control over Namibia,
first granted under a 1920 League of Nations mandate.*

military foray into Marxist-ruled Angola that it initially encouraged,
and leftist Robert Mugabe's 1979 election as Prime Minister of Zim-
babwe, a possible safe haven for hostile black guerrillas from South
Africa's exiled African National Congress (ANC).

Since then, Botha's government has used its economic power and
military strength to pressure its three weakest neighbors, Lesotho,
Swaziland, and Botswana, into banning ANC activity on their terri-
tory. And it has made life unpleasant for the leaders of other nearby
African states.

South Africa has armed and trained 10,000 members of the dissident
Mozambique National Resistance, challengers of Marxist President Sa-
mora Machel. Pretoria was probably behind the sabotage of two-thirds
of Zimbabwe's military aircraft in July 1982 and the destruction last
December of $12 million worth of its oil reserves. And it also supports
Jonas Savimbi, whose rebel UNITA guerrillas control the southern half
of Angola, despite the intervention of 18,000 Cuban troops; Savimbi's
men have inflicted some $7 billion worth of damage on Angola's roads,
railways, and factories since 1975.

South Africa's economy is three times larger than all its neighbors'
combined. It controls critical transportation outlets for Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana, and boasts a crack army.

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No one doubts its ability to "destabilize" the entire subcontinent.

But to what end? The South Africans would doubtless prefer a buffer of weak black states to the north and may hope for a full-scale "capitalist counterrevolution" against the self-styled Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. But success could spell disaster: Abetting rebellion is relatively easy; propping up new client regimes against rebels would prove too costly even for Pretoria.

South Africa can throw its weight about the subcontinent; it cannot rule it. If it tries, Jenkins predicts, "its achievement will be anarchy."

A False Crisis In Russia?

"Infant Mortality Trends in the Soviet Union" by Ellen Jones and Fred W. Grupp, in *Population and Development Review* (June 1983), The Population Council, 1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

To some specialists, the sudden jump in the recorded number of infant deaths in the Soviet Union during the early 1970s was a sign of drastic deterioration in the quality of Soviet life [see "A Different Crisis," by Murray Feshbach, *WQ*, Winter 1981].

Between 1971 and 1974 (the last year Moscow published official data on the subject), the number of Soviet babies dying before their first birthday rose by five deaths per thousand births, to 27.9, reversing a 25-year-long decline. But Grupp and Jones, analysts with the U.S. Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies, respectively, note that most of the upsurge occurred in the nation's five Moslem republics. There, they contend, an improvement in data collection produced the illusion of a massive increase in infant deaths.

In Moslem Tadzhikistan, for example, registered infant mortality doubled between 1971 and '74, while European Russia recorded a modest increase of 2.3 deaths per thousand births.

Vital statistics for the Moslem south have never been reliable. Data on infant mortality were not even collected there before the late 1930s. As late as the 1960s, official infant birth and death statistics relied on the reports of parents, not hospital or other medical records. Indeed, in some rural areas, more than half of all children were born at home.

The wider use of computers and a 1969 law that shifted responsibility for record-keeping from the republics to Moscow led to more accurate counts, the authors contend, spurring the 1971–1974 statistical increase.

Even as records showed more Soviet infants dying, other health indicators in the Moslem republics—maternal mortality, the ratio of pediatricians to children, and incidence of childhood disease—all showed improvement. In Tadzhikistan, for example, the 100 percent increase in reported infant deaths coincided with a 19 percent decline in stillbirths and a 29 percent drop in the number of women dying in childbirth.

Grupp and Jones believe that infant mortality in the Moslem republics actually declined during 1971–74, and has continued to fall. And

they speculate that, thanks to improvements in health care spurred by the shock of the early 1970s' statistics, the rising rates in European Russia have leveled off, and perhaps reversed. At the very least, they write, the Soviet Union during the 1970s suffered nothing like the "epidemic of infant deaths depicted in . . . the Western popular press."

Iberia's Fragile Democracies

"The Emergence of Democracy in Spain and Portugal" by Kenneth Maxwell, in *Orbis* (Spring 1983), Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

During the 1970s, decades-old dictatorships in Spain and Portugal gave way to democracy. But it is too early to cheer, warns Maxwell, a Columbia University historian. Both governments are fragile, and the full integration of the countries into the rest of Western Europe has yet to occur.

The two countries entered the 1970s under regimes linked philosophically to fascism. This unsavory legacy had long troubled the Western democracies, despite Portugal's role as a founding member of NATO and growing trade between the two and Europe during the 1960s.

Portugal's refusal to free her African colonies also drew criticism from the West. Finally, frustration over prolonged wars in Mozambique and Angola radicalized much of the Portuguese army; and in 1974, junior officers toppled strongman Marcello Caetano. The new regime moved rapidly leftward until national elections in 1976 temporarily put a middle-of-the-road coalition in power.

Spain's transition was more systematic. After Generalissimo Francisco Franco's death in 1975, his hand-picked successor, King Don Juan Carlos, guided his countrymen toward parliamentary elections in 1977. Carlos deftly used his prestige to stave off an attempted army coup in 1981, but oldline army generals remain a threat.

In both countries, Left and Right now seem to be gaining at the expense of the moderate center. Portugal's left-wing army officers are still active, drawing support from poor southern peasants, and the industrialized north remains a bastion of conservatism. Lisbon has seen 15 governments in the last nine years. In Spain's 1982 elections, the once-dominant Union of the Democratic Center lost ground to both the winning Socialist Workers' Party and the right-wing Popular Alliance.

Maxwell sees more trouble ahead. Lisbon is negotiating a new financial bail-out agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which will entail unpopular cuts in social programs. Spain's new Socialist Premier, Felipe Gonzalez, plans to cut military manpower from 300,000 to 160,000 and to reduce the officer corps by one-quarter. Politically, both are "tricky and potentially dangerous moves," warns Maxwell.

Stronger ties with the West could strengthen the Iberian democracies. But it may be premature to discard the snide dictum of 19th-century French diplomat Talleyrand: *"Europe* begins at the Pyrenees."

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"The Costs of Protectionism:
Estimates of the Hidden Tax of Trade Restraint."

Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, St. Louis,
Mo. 63130. 39 pp.
Author: Michael C. Munger

The United States champions free trade in international markets, but Washington has been busily erecting some protectionist barriers of its own.

Munger, a researcher at the Center for the Study of American Business, contends that the cost to U.S. consumers is staggering. In 1980, he estimates, U.S. tariffs and quotas on foreign goods snatched $58.4 billion from Americans' pocketbooks—$255 for every man, woman, and child.

Tariffs (direct taxes on such imported goods as shoes, jewelry, and copper) did most of the damage ($45.8 billion). Quotas and other restrictions accounted for the rest.

In part because their costs are "hidden," quotas are coming into wider use today. Most outright quotas are now prohibited by international treaty, but "orderly marketing agreements" and "voluntary" quotas have the same effects. In recent years, Washington has imposed such de facto quotas on imported autos, cement, and certain kinds of steel.

Ironically, says Munger, quotas are more harmful than tariffs. Foreign manufacturers faced with a tariff can still compete with U.S. manufacturers by cutting costs. But quotas offer no such incentive. Japanese automakers, limited by a 1981 "voluntary" export quota of 1.68 million units to America annually, have shipped fewer economy cars, more luxury models, in an effort to keep profits up. Thus, Detroit feels less pressure to keep prices down.

The costs of other trade barriers have not been calculated. Federal and state "Buy America" policies, for example, mean that domestic producers can submit bids for government work up to 50 percent higher than foreign competitors' and still win contracts. Taxpayers make up the difference.

Business and government backers of protectionism argue that it is necessary to save U.S. workers' jobs. But in many cases, Munger believes, it would make more sense to pay workers to stay home and do nothing. Proposed "domestic content" legislation for the auto industry, for example, would impose costs of $85,000 a year for every job preserved by increasing auto sticker prices; Detroit's average worker now earns $24,000.

Rather than build a higher protectionist wall around the United States, Munger asserts, Washington should fund job retraining for workers in industries hit by overseas competition.

"Cancer in the United States: Is There an Epidemic?"

American Council on Science and Health, 47 Maple Street, Summit, N. J. 07901.
31 pp. $2.00.

In 1983, about 855,000 Americans will learn they have cancer, and 440,000 will die of the disease.

This chilling estimate may not be quite as ominous as it seems. While alarmists have stirred popular fears of a new cancer epidemic in the United States caused by food additives and air and water pollution, the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH)

Age Adjusted White Male Cancer Death Rates per 100,000 population, Selected Countries, 1976-77

	Rate
Uruguay	294.6
Scotland	269.8
Belgium	266.7
Netherlands	261.6
Hungary	256.8
France	255.7
England & Wales	251.5
Austria	248.7
Germany, F.R.	244.8
Singapore	242.1
United States	213.6

Rate per 100,000
Numbers within bars indicate rank order among 46 countries.

Source: American Cancer Society, 1983 *Cancer Facts and Figures*, New York: 1982.

The United States is not No. 1 in cancer incidence but 17th, a 1983 American Cancer Society survey showed. (Not shown are those ranked 11 to 16, all Third World nations.)

maintains that there is no evidence of a significant *increase* in the disease.

Data adjusted for demographic changes —most recently, the aging of America—show that the incidence of cancer (number of new cases discovered per 100,000 people) dropped from 289 in 1947 to 278 in 1971 and then climbed by about 1.3 percent annually until 1976, the latest year for which figures are available. Among white women, for example, incidence fell from 305 in 1947 to 256.8 in 1971, then rose to 301.2. Overall, women and those under age 45 fared best during the 29-year period.

Among men, lung cancer has the highest incidence, followed by cancer of the prostate and of the colon or rectum. Breast, colon-rectum, and uterine cancers take the lead among women.

Lung cancer showed the biggest 29-year increase for both sexes—and its causes are hardly mysterious. Due in large part to the spread of smoking among women, the incidence of lung cancer among white females jumped from seven per 100,000 in 1947 to 24 in 1976. For white males, the figures were 30 and 78. (In most categories, nonwhites recorded sharper changes, chiefly because of improvements in di-

agnosis and care for minority groups.)

Indeed, when bladder, mouth, and throat cancers are included, ACSH notes, tobacco use is chiefly responsible for about 30 percent of all cancers in the United States.

Other big changes occurred in cancers of the prostate (up) and of the stomach and cervix (down).

Improved detection and treatment techniques, meanwhile, have pushed cancer *mortality* rates down slightly for men and women under 65, although the disease remains the nation's second leading killer behind heart and circulatory ailments. Again, only lung cancer, which now accounts for 26 percent of all cancer deaths, has increased markedly over the years.

Despite massive increases in air and water pollution and the widespread use of chemical additives over the past several decades, the United States has not suffered a major increase in cancer. (Cancer epidemiologists Richard Doll and Richard Peto estimate that such sources are responsible for about two percent of all cancers.)

Little is known about the causes of most cancers, ACSH concludes. But one thing is certain: The best preventive step against cancer now known is to stop smoking.

"Covering Congressional Campaigns: Journalism in Congressional Elections."

Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif. 94305. 151 pp. $17.50.
Authors: Peter Clarke and Susan H. Evans

Voter turnout in midterm elections for the U.S. House of Representatives has reached abysmal lows in recent years. Only 41.9 percent of the voters went to the polls in 1982. Such apathy among the electorate is often cited as a symptom of American political malaise, but its source remains obscure.

Clarke and Evans, both of the University of Southern California's Annenberg School of Communications, assert that an anemic local press must share part of the blame.

They studied 82 newspaper reporters' coverage of 86 congressional elections in districts across the country during the last six weeks of the 1978 campaign. (Radio and television newscasters virtually ignore such contests.) Their chief findings: Local newspapers pay scant attention to elections, skew what coverage there is in favor of incumbents, and do little "digging" or reporting that enhances public debate.

Covering his district's congressional election is only one of the typical political correspondent's assignments: He spends only one of every six working hours on the campaign beat, the rest on other political stories. Routine election coverage rarely lands on page one.

Moreover, few reporters live up to the image of the intrepid newshound. "They generally work hard when they know that usable copy can be easily mined," observe the authors. "They slack off in the face of difficulty." (Indeed, in 20 percent of the races the authors surveyed, neither candidate was contacted by any reporters.)

Such habits contribute to a decided "tilt" towards the incumbent in news coverage of most races. The authors found that even during the last week of 14 tight races, the incumbents were mentioned in 92 percent of the stories, the insurgents in only 78 percent.

The reason: The incumbent congressmen's records, professional campaign staff, and everyday involvement in newsworthy legislative issues make them easier subjects for reporters.

For challengers, the critical variable was money. Insurgents with respectable campaign war chests ($65,000, on average) were mentioned in the press nearly eight times more often than their poorer counterparts. (Nationally, *winning* challengers spent an average of $250,000.) A well-heeled challenger can hire regular press aides who provide newsmen with information and, just as important, informally hobnob with them.

Even so, the challengers faced long odds. Clarke and Evans broke down news coverage by paragraph in 14 close races. They found that while the underdogs stressed "the issues" in their campaigns, newsmen devoted, on average, only 12 paragraphs to challengers' positions on policy questions, 29 to incumbents'.

House members up for re-election enjoyed an even bigger advantage in coverage of such political assets as experience in office and service to constituents: 49 paragraphs versus only four for their opponents. Almost half (27 paragraphs) of the relatively skimpy political coverage of the latter group was devoted to the effectiveness of their campaign organizations.

Since 1960, 95 percent of House incumbents running for re-election have come out on top—a sure sign that new blood does not easily find its way into Congress. At the local level, the authors conclude, "press coverage provides a meager base for fueling vigorous public debate."

"Black Solidarity: The Tie That Binds."

National Urban League, 425 13th St. N.W., Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20004.
33pp.
Author: James D. McGhee

Have some black Americans found success, only to turn their backs on the impoverished majority of their race? According to James McGhee, research director at the National Urban League (NUL), income, education, and employment trends of the past two decades confirm the emergence of a "black elite." But McGhee rebuts the view of some conservative scholars that class divisions are polarizing the black community.

Since 1950, says McGhee, economic and educational progress among blacks has been real, but neither as great nor as divisive as is often assumed. The proportion of black families earning at least $25,000 (in constant 1981 dollars) increased from nine to 23 percent between 1960 and 1970, but this percentage has since remained unchanged. And gains have not been made at the expense of poorer blacks: In 1960, over half of all black families earned less than $10,000 (in 1981 dollars); today, the figure is 38 percent.

Nor, says McGhee, have wealthier blacks cornered the booming college education market. While black enrollment grew 93 percent in the 1970s, two-thirds of black college graduates were from working-class families.

According to McGhee, a 1979–80 NUL survey of 3,000 black families of widely varied economic and social circumstances showed a remarkable consistency in black attitudes. Respondents in all income categories cited unemployment most often as the major difficulty confronting members of their race. Among households earn-ing over $36,000 annually, 12 percent felt that racial prejudice was the most important problem for blacks; 10.5 percent of those earning less than $8,000 thought so.

Lack of racial unity was mentioned as a serious problem by 15 percent of blacks in the highest income bracket, compared to only 6.1 percent of those in the lowest bracket. McGhee interprets the heightened concern of wealthier blacks to mean that they are *more* committed to racial solidarity.

The NUL study shows that, in fact, the *most* militant attitudes are found in black households with $30,000 to $36,000 annual incomes. Frustration over the slow pace of progress in achieving equal rights was expressed by 83 percent of respondents in this relatively successful group (versus 73 percent in the lowest income bracket), and 76 percent (versus 62 percent of low wage earners) noted "a great deal" of racial discrimination.

A 1979 survey by researchers Kay Schlozman and Sidney Verba uncovered other evidence suggesting that successful blacks' social attitudes correspond far more closely to poorer blacks' than to whites' of similar occupational levels. While 82 percent of white professionals surveyed believed that their children had a chance to succeed, only 46 percent of their black counterparts—and 55 percent of unskilled black laborers—so believed.

As long as blacks continue to perceive that their progress is being blocked by discrimination, says McGhee, "race will continue to be the tie that binds."

Chinese, Indian, and Malay boys and girls are all represented in this throng of Singapore grade-school children. The government, in the words of Prime Minister Lee, is committed to "inculcating the virtues of group discipline and the overriding calls of society upon individual rights."

Singapore

In 1977, the Washington-based International Monetary Fund decided that Singapore was no longer part of the Third World and set about to strip the island city-state of its "developing country" status. With millions of dollars in multilateral loans, as well as other benefits and concessions, at stake, the Singaporeans sought (and won) a reprieve. They were, they argued, being penalized for success. With no resources except its people, Singapore today is the premier banker, refiner, manufacturer, handler, and harbormaster of Southeast Asia. In two decades, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has fashioned an orderly, sometimes idiosyncratic, version of modern welfare capitalism. Corruption is rare. Few go homeless, schooling and health care are available to all, and virtually everyone has enough money to buy a television set. Singaporeans pay a price, low by Third World standards, in political freedom and participation. Is the price too high? Here, historian J. Norman Parmer looks at Singapore's colonial past. Political scientist Thomas Bellows describes the mini-republic that Lee built.

CITY OF THE LION

by J. Norman Parmer

For more than 2,000 years, the narrow Strait of Malacca has been among the busiest shipping routes in the world, a shallow corridor, bedeviled by shifting sandbars, between East and West. At the southern entrance to the Strait, several hundred yards off the tip of the Malay Peninsula and several leagues above the equator, lies a diamond-shaped island, roughly 30 miles across. The island has no natural resources. Its name, Singapore, means "city of the lion" in Malay, but there are no lions, and the origin of the name is obscure.

So is the history of the island before the arrival, in 1819, of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, then Lieutenant General of Bencoolen, a man as ambitious for Britain as he was for himself. Singapore was sparsely inhabited when Raffles first stepped ashore from the *Indiana*'s longboat—home to not more than a

few hundred fishermen and traders, ethnic Malays for the most part but even then including some Chinese on inland spice estates. There had once been a small, intermittently occupied urban settlement—known as Temasek at its birth in the 13th century and as Singapura by the time of its death three centuries later—but Raffles saw only the ruins. Chinese sources as far back as the third century A.D., and Arab sources as far back as the ninth, refer to a place that *may* be Singapore, though the association remains uncertain and not much is said about the island in any event. From later chronicles, we know that, politically, Singapore's fate was bound up with the changing fortunes of neighboring Malay, Thai, and Indonesian empires, a reality not lost on the island's leaders today.

Going Too Far

Thomas Stamford Raffles represented yet another empire. Though he could boast little formal education, Raffles was bright, perceptive, bookish, and, as he described himself, "meek as a maid." Malay scholar, botanist, historian, and founder of London's Zoological Society, he spent nearly the whole of his career in the service of the British East India Company in Southeast Asia. He sustained many bitter losses in the course of a short life—a wife and children, who died in the tropics; his plant specimens and ancient Malay manuscripts, which were lost at sea. His own health was poor, yet he drove himself with fierce energy. Raffles virtually single-handedly presented Britain with Singapore; and it became, as he foresaw that it would, one of the most valuable of all Britain's imperial possessions.

The story begins, as does so much of recorded 19th-century Asian history, in Europe. For two decades, Britain had been preoccupied with defeating or containing Napoleon, and after Waterloo, Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister, was determined to help the Kingdom of the Netherlands remain strong as a bulwark against a possibly resurgent France. For this and other reasons, the British agreed to return to the Dutch most of their former colonial possessions, seized during the Napoleonic Wars. In Asia, this meant Java (which Raffles had helped subdue in 1811 and had administered for several years) and Malacca, among other places.

Raffles was angered and disappointed by the move, for Java

J. Norman Parmer, 58, is professor of history at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. Born in Elkhart, Indiana, he received his B.A. from Indiana University (1949) and his Ph.D. from Cornell (1957). He is the author of Colonial Labor Policy and Administration *(1960).*

Map legend:
- Major industrial estates
- Extent of Singapore City
- Seaports
- Free trade zones

Singapore Island is half the area of Los Angeles and, on average, no more than 50 feet above sea level. Reclamation has added six square miles to Singapore and doubled the size of many offshore islands.

had long seemed to him a perfect base for British operations in the Far East. As it was, "the British have not now an inch of ground to stand upon between the Cape of Good Hope and China, nor a single friendly port at which they can water and obtain refreshment." Sir Stamford argued his case to friends in London and to his superiors at the East India Company in Calcutta, contending that the Dutch were aggressively expanding their claims in Asia in order to exclude British trade altogether. Raffles's motives, it should be noted, were as much idealistic as commercial. He was a passionate free-trader, an opponent of slavery, and a believer in "economic man." He was firmly convinced that "the cause of humanity and the improvement of society" would be well served in Southeast Asia by the establishment of a British presence.

Yet, for a time, Raffles made little headway. He was, to put it frankly, not universally liked. Among other things, he had a penchant for insubordination, forever going "beyond the limit," as Castlereagh once complained. Not surprisingly, the Dutch regarded him with downright mistrust. When Sir Stamford re-

turned to Southeast Asia from London in 1818, one Dutch official wrote that "the proximity of Mr. Raffles please[s] us not. He doesn't take his eyes off Java." Dutch concern was justified. Later that year, Raffles secured permission from the Marquis of Hastings, Governor General of India, to found a commercial settlement at the southern end of the Malacca Strait—providing he could avoid trouble with the "Netherlandish." A small fleet under his command appeared near the mouth of the Singapore River on January 28, 1819. The next day, Raffles came to terms with the Temenggong of Johor, an influential and semi-autonomous vassal of the Sultan who ruled the larger Malay state of which Singapore was a part. The Union Jack was quickly raised over Britain's newest trading post.

Free Port and Entrepôt

There was only one problem: Raffles needed the Sultan's formal approval, but no one knew who the rightful Sultan was. The old Sultan had died in 1812, leaving two sons and no instructions regarding succession. The Dutch recognized Abdu'r-Rahman, the younger son, who by 1819 had assumed de facto control of the crumbling Malay state. (Hussein, the elder son, removed himself to Pahang.) There was no chance, Raffles realized, that Abdu'r-Rahman would risk Dutch displeasure by ratifying the British agreement with the Temenggong.

The stage was set for an episode that illustrates the kind of behavior Sir Stamford's colleagues found so infuriatingly impulsive, even as they conceded that it could be quite effective. Raffles learned that Abdu'r-Rahman had never been officially crowned: The late Sultan's widow, who preferred Hussein, had refused to relinquish the royal regalia. Aided by the Temenggong, Raffles secretly brought Hussein to Singapore, where he was coronated amid all the pomp that circumstances would allow. And the treaty was signed.

The Dutch, of course, were furious, but from Calcutta, Lord Hastings supported Raffles, and London supported Hastings. British replies to impassioned protests from the Netherlands were polite, wordy, slow in coming, and devoid of offers to withdraw. Eventually, Britain did admit that some sort of territorial tidying up was necessary in the East, and a suitable Anglo-Dutch treaty was worked out in 1824. Under its terms, Britain agreed to give up all claims and possessions on Sumatra and the islands south of Singapore, while the Dutch did the same with regard to the Malay Peninsula, Malacca, and Singapore; the Netherlands also gave up its few territories in India and agreed

not to seek commercial or political hegemony in Southeast Asia. Thomas Stamford Raffles died two years later, aged 45, with the East India Company not only ignoring his application for a pension but also seeking reimbursement for money he had spent on its behalf.

If nothing else, he had the satisfaction of knowing that his gamble was already paying off. With its excellent harbor, the Singapore settlement was an immediate commercial success. A British-style city with formal squares and parks was soon established on the site of ancient Temasek. Ethnic *kampongs* (a Malay word meaning village) sprang up in and around the European downtown. Raffles laid out much of the city himself. He also laid down the law regarding Singapore's economic function: It was to be an entrepôt and a free port—collecting no import or export duties but providing a variety of lucrative services for commerce and shipping.* After only one year of British rule, Singapore's population had grown to 10,000, and no fewer than 160 ships had called at its port. As one of the three Straits Settlements—Malacca and Penang were the other two—the island was administered initially by the East India Company from Calcutta. In 1867, Singapore was elevated to the status of a Crown Colony, its governor general answering directly to London.

Luring the Chinese

By then, Singapore City with its bustling port had become a crowded, polyglot metropolis, attracting a population of 70,000, including Chinese (the largest group); Malays (the second largest); Javanese and Bugis from the Dutch East Indies; Filipinos; Bengalis, Sikhs, Tamils, and Parsees from India; Jews from Calcutta; Jaffna Tamils from Ceylon; Arabs; and Japanese. It was quite a collection. "The Native festivals here are, of course, numerous," a Major James Low wrote in 1840. "If every class was to have its own way, the town would be in a continual clamor by noisy and riotous processions."

Every group did not always get its way, but the Chinese, who made up more than half the island's population, often did. Singapore, as visitors never failed to remark, was essentially a Chinese city. Even Raffles had noted early on the "peculiar attractions of the place for that industrious race." The most im-

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*The Dutch tried to apply this formula themselves—as Southeast Asian nations still do— but could find no location as strategic as Singapore. The acquisition of Hong Kong by Great Britain in 1842 and the opening of British "treaty ports" in China at first spread panic among Singapore merchants, but in the end, these developments simply augmented Britain's total volume of trade in Asia, to Singapore's benefit.

portant attraction was its absence of regulation, taxes, or other government interference. Overseas Chinese merchants had great freedom to do what they pleased. No sooner was the settlement established than hundreds of Chinese traders, mostly from the Straits region, set up shop in Singapore. Thanks to long association with, first, the Portuguese, then the Dutch, and then the English, many of them were already familiar with Western ways. Not a few spoke English. This was precisely the type of immigrant Raffles had hoped to lure.

The Coolie System

The so-called Straits Chinese became the most visible Chinese class in Singapore—to the British. A few, such as Seah Eu Chin, risked their fortunes cultivating pepper and gambier—the island's only export crops. But most, such as the renowned Tan Che Sang, built on their experience as merchants, middlemen, and outfitters. Tan, perhaps the richest man in Singapore during its early years, was a miser with a paradoxical taste for gambling. (Torn between conflicting passions, he once cut off part of a finger in a futile attempt to curb his lust for gaming.) Yet, according to historian Song Ong Siang, he was so respected in the city—10,000 people attended his funeral in 1837—that "any day he said the word he could empty the place of all the Europeans but he never tried."

The influx of Tans and Seahs did not make the Chinese a majority. Their success did. As Singapore's economy expanded, merchants and retailers required an ever-increasing supply of workers. Because neighboring states in Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina had for centuries been short of labor, the Chinese turned, as they would have preferred to do anyway, to China, specifically, to south China. There, in Hokkien and neighboring provinces, isolated from the rest of the Middle Kingdom by rugged hills, lived a hardy people whose menfolk had a long tradition of seeking their fortunes abroad. The coolie system was born.

It was wonderfully efficient, its costs merely human. Singapore merchants and businessmen paid recruiters to round up *sinkhehs*, or newcomers, in South China and bring them to the island. They were put up in lodging houses and then contracted out to Chinese and European employers. The *sinkhehs* were mostly young and had never before been away from their farm communities. The overcrowding and enforced intimacy of shipboard life fostered outbreaks of disease. Commonly, as many as a fifth of a vessel's passengers failed to make port alive.

Raffles, high-minded as always, had abolished slavery in his

Chinatown as seen from Government Hill in 1852 and (inset) a bust of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. Settlements hugged the harbor, while the island's interior, where tigers roamed, went unexplored for years.

island outpost, but the coolie system replaced slavery with a highly profitable regime of indentured servitude. The ambitious south Chinese had to pay his way to Singapore. Along the route, money was demanded by the recruiter (always Chinese), by the ship captain (usually a European), and by the lodging-house owners (again, always Chinese). Few *sinkhehs* had enough money up front. They paid for their passage after the fact, in sweat. "Truck," the practice of supplying immigrants with food and other necessities (including opium) at high prices against future wages, exacerbated the newcomers' plight. For the individual worker to survive and get free of his employer took a minimum of three years, plus a great deal of self-discipline, good health, and luck. But many did so.

For several decades, the character of Singapore was that of a frontier boom town. The colony had been created, more or less, from whole cloth. Most of the streets were unpaved and the buildings made of wood; fires and floods did heavy damage in the early years. There were no local institutions to be co-opted and exploited—a far cry from the British experience in India. A thin veneer of civil authority belied the underlying chaos. Pros-

titution was legal and thriving, abetted by the fact that 90 percent of the island's population was male. Gangs of Chinese—a hundred or more at a time—occasionally roamed the streets armed with *parangs*, a machete-like knife still used today to slash through jungle underbrush. (Skillfully wielded, it can decapitate a man with a single blow.) No police force was established in Singapore until 1843; until then, unemployed British sailors were deputized as needed.

Public order was undermined in part by public policy—the practice of "tax farming" in particular. Because both the British and local merchants eschewed excise taxes, the cost of administering the settlement was borne by levies on liquor, opium, and gambling. The rights to collect these taxes were auctioned off to Chinese entrepreneurs, the government being anxious to avoid "frequent and odious collision with the natives." It was thus in the interest of Chinese tax farmers to promote the very activities that helped give Singapore its reputation as the most dangerous town in the Wild East.

Scrambling for Asia

The form of lawlessness most feared by traders was, to use the British word, piracy; the Malays who engaged in this pursuit might have preferred the term "revenue enhancement." Exacting tribute from passing merchant ships had for centuries been regarded by local rulers as a legitimate activity. A 14th-century Chinese account of Singapore noted that "everything the inhabitants possess is a product of their plundering of Chinese junks." As Singapore became the major choke-point of Oriental trade, a clearinghouse for manufactured goods heading East and produce heading West, Malay pirate fleets from as far away as the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos flocked to the Malacca Strait like bees to a honey-pot. And they did so with seeming impunity, putting into Singapore City itself for a respite between engagements. Goods lost to pirate attacks could often be bought in the open-air markets of Singapore a few days later.

The situation was so serious that George Bonham, who became Singapore's Governor in 1833, warned of the "total annihilation" of Britain's Asian trade. The British responded by sending two Royal Navy gunboats for a brief tour in the Strait. Steamships were not then a common sight in Southeast Asia, and the gunboats, not dependent on the wind, struck terror in the hearts of becalmed freebooters. But a new wave of piracy commenced during the 1850s. Piracy was never entirely suppressed in the Strait, where flotillas of *perhau* could easily elude

pursuers in coastal mangrove swamps. Piracy exists even today on a small scale, as attested to by occasional newspaper reports, and its adjunct, smuggling, continues to thrive in parts of Southeast Asia.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 transformed Singapore from a useful outpost into a strategic asset. The canal reduced the distance between Singapore and London by 3,500 miles, and spurred a new scramble by European powers for "unclaimed" parts of Asia and Africa. Commercial activity picked up rapidly, much to Singapore's advantage. During the four years after France's Empress Eugénie aboard the *Aigle* led the first procession of ships from the Mediterranean via the canal to the Red Sea, the value of trade passing through Singapore increased by 50 percent. After the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874, Britain began to extend its control north over the Malay states.* Vast quantities of tin and, by the early 20th century, rubber, began flowing down the peninsula and out through Singapore's New Harbour. Oil storage tanks were built on the island during the 1890s, and Singapore, by then the seventh busiest port in the world, became the principal oil distribution center for all of Asia, a function it retains.

The most important commodity passing through the island continued to be people. Whetted by the influx of British and European capital, the appetite for cheap labor became insatiable in Southeast Asia. Hundreds of thousands of workers were required to build roads and railroads and to work the British-owned tin mines and rubber estates. Strong backs were needed on the wharves and skilled hands in the factories. The demand now went far beyond Singapore, but Singapore's entrenched coolie system showed the way to a supply. A mechanism was already in place; it needed only to be expanded.

The Good Life

What had been a relative trickle of immigrants—amounting to mere tens of thousands of Chinese coolies a year during the 1830s and '40s—swelled to a quarter of a million annually during the later decades of the 19th century, with most of the newcomers destined for jobs in Malaya. The coolie trade was a Chinese operation from start to finish, and many of Singapore's most prominent Chinese residents, friendly to British rule, were

*Under the treaty, the Sultan of Perak agreed to accept a British Resident whose advice he would heed in all matters save those relating to Malay religion and custom. Sultans of other states in subsequent years signed similar accords. Four of these entities were grouped together in 1896 to form the Federated Malay States.

A stereoscope of Singapore, 1901. One British journalist described the Singapore River as such a "packed mass of boats that you hardly know when your foot has left dry land."

known to be deeply involved in this traffic.

Colonial administrators looked the other way. There was no constituency for interference. When employers complained to the government, it was not about the wretched living conditions of immigrants but about "crimping"—the stealing of one businessman's workers by another. If anything, such petitions indicated that the coolie system would benefit by growth.

The many Chinese secret societies (commonly referred to as *hueys* after the name of the most powerful one, Tean Tay Hueh) were deeply involved in the coolie trade. Secret societies, the principal form of Chinese organization in Singapore during the 19th century, were broadly political in conception, the aim being to overthrow the alien Ch'ing or Manchu dynasty back home in China. But their function in Southeast Asia was, on the one hand, to provide (however imperfectly) physical security, discipline, and social identity for incoming coolies and, on the other, to guarantee the enrichment of society leaders, who comprised employers, labor contractors, recruiting agents, lodging-house owners, and proprietors of brothels. So lucrative was the trade that rival societies often competed for business in the streets, with murder and mayhem as by-products.

The colonial government usually remained aloof from such disputes. Its strategy was to cultivate a few influential, English-speaking Chinese leaders and, in times of violence, to try to cajole and pressure them into persuading the combatants to make peace. Only rarely, as during the Post Office riots in 1876, did

the British intervene directly with troops.* Not until 1877, when
William Pickering was appointed "Protector" of the Chinese
community in Singapore, did colonial authorities even attempt
to regulate immigration or inhibit forced prostitution.

Yet for the affluent—English and Chinese primarily—life
was good in Singapore. The town itself began to take shape,
with handsome new buildings in the commercial core and com-
fortable stucco and tile villas in the suburbs. Theater groups and
country clubs amused prosperous residents, who could also in-
dulge in tennis, cricket, and golf. On Tuesday and Friday eve-
nings, there was music. "The band," wrote *Straits Times* editor
John Cameron, "which is that of the regiment on the station at
the time, or from one of the men-at-war which occasionally visit
the port, plays on a raised mound on the center of the esplanade
green." At dinner parties, the fare rivaled that of London, and
the drink, at least in volume, was often superior. "The good folks
of Singapore," Cameron noted, "are by no means inclined to
place too narrow restrictions on their libations."

Looking Homeward

Yet, a certain insecurity always existed—had existed, in
fact, since the founding of the settlement in the face of Dutch
hostility. Who would defend the place? Great Britain was, of
course, Mistress of the Seas, and her warships prowled the In-
dian Ocean and adjacent waters. But not until the 1870s, when
Singapore's strategic significance was plain, did London begin
contributing financially to the island's defense. (Until then,
local merchants grudgingly chipped in on an *ad hoc* basis when
crises arose—a procedure that helps explain the persistence of
piracy.) The revival of European imperialism during the last
half of the 19th century prompted considerable concern in Par-
liament over Singapore's safety, but for years nothing was done
about it.

And, for a while, nothing need have been done. When World
War I erupted in Europe, Singapore was barely affected. The
German cruiser *Emden* shelled nearby Penang in October 1914,
but that was the closest the Germans ever came, and the *Emden*
was sunk in November. Most Singaporeans simply looked for-

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*Chinese residents in Singapore generally remitted part of their earnings to families in
south China. Because the mails were slow and untrustworthy, they relied on an alternative
mail system created by Teochew merchants in Singapore. The British attempted to replace
this with a special remittance service, even though it was widely known that, while the
Crown could effectively convey mail to distribution centers like Amoy, it had no access in-
land. The Crown's effort resulted in a general strike, instigated by secret societies, and punc-
tuated by urban violence.

THE CHINESE MERCHANTS

In their First 150 Years of Singapore *(1969), Donald and Joanna Moore observe that the difference between British and Chinese merchants in 19th-century Singapore was summed up in an epigram: "Englishman have five dollar, make one dollar business; Chinese have one dollar, make five dollar business." They go on:*

The British possessed one inestimable advantage over their oriental colleagues: Their links with Britain enabled them to secure all the profitable agencies, or nearly all, for themselves.

But if an accident of birth placed an agency in British hands, an accident of race conferred upon each Chinese businessman an acumen so acute, so ingenious, and so resourceful, that he was more than a match for any monopolist. His improvisatorial style often concealed an approach to genius. While he appeared to peck at the crumbs that fell from the rich man's table, he was quietly amassing a fortune.

When the British merchant installed himself in a sumptuous mansion, his Chinese counterpart would tend to remain (but not invariably) in a more humble abode, lest those from whom he bought or borrowed stiffen their terms at the sight of so much opulence. He was accustomed to frugality, and he was never trammeled with the absurdity of bolstering a national ethnic superiority by a recourse to gracious living.

And if the British merchant inherited a racial bond with the manufacturer in the West, the Chinese merchant inherited one just as important with the consumer in the East. And again, if the British merchant was the principal exporter of raw Southeast Asian produce from Singapore, the Chinese was its collector, for he was dealing with his own kind who, even if they did not understand his language, understood his ways and he theirs. Throughout Southeast Asia, and most particularly in Singapore, the Chinese became the binding agent of international commerce.

In Singapore a partnership was forged which was eventually to transcend even political considerations. What the British lack, the Chinese provide; what the Chinese lack, the British provide.

*Wealthy merchant
Tan Jiak Kim*

ward to the end of hostilities and the resumption of business.

In British Burma, Dutch Indonesia, French Indochina, and the American Philippines, the decades after the war saw the emergence of popular nationalist movements. In China, Chiang Kai-shek strove to modernize his country while fighting off Communist revolutionaries and Japanese invaders. In India, Mahatma Gandhi galvanized his countrymen and moved the subcontinent toward self-rule. In Singapore, politics were different. What exercised most Chinese was not Singapore's own status but rather China's. The Chinese-language press in the city, led by Tan Kah Kee's *Nanyang Siang Pao* and Aw Boon Haw's *Sin Chew Jit Poh,* treated events in the increasingly troubled ancestral homeland almost as a local story.

Language and Loyalty

The overthrow of the Manchu dynasty and creation of the Republic of China in 1911 was greeted with enthusiasm by Singapore Chinese. Sun Yat-sen, father of the revolution, had visited the island several times and received considerable financial support from wealthy merchants. As early as 1912, a branch of Sun's Kuomintang (KMT) Party was established in Singapore. Later, the Nationalist government sent teachers and textbooks from China to Singapore to provide instruction in Chinese history and politics and, not to be overlooked, inculcate loyalty to the motherland. The language employed in the new private schools was not English or one of the south China dialects but Kuo-yu, or Mandarin, the national language of China.

Most Chinese favored the extension of education, but not all welcomed instruction in Mandarin. Singapore's Chinese community was not monolithic. It was divided by district of origin in China, by dialect spoken, by education, income, and occupation, by family history in the Straits. Millionaire entrepreneurs such as Aw Boon Haw, Tan Kah Kee, and Tan's son-in-law Lee Kong Chian (founder of the Oversea-Chinese Bank), were typical of the Chinese-oriented elite. They were educated in Chinese, supported Kuo-yu schools, dominated the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and had little contact with colonial officials.

By contrast, the Straits-born (also called Malacca, or Baba) Chinese made up the Western-oriented elite. Their leaders, educated in English at a handful of secondary schools such as Raffles College, were British subjects and proud of the fact. They adopted Western dress and many Western customs, played cricket, read English newspapers, and gratefully accepted honors from the King. Some embraced Christianity, and a few, like

Goh Hood Keng, a Methodist, entered the ministry.

In general, Straits Chinese took a dim view of a resurgent Chinese nationalism that threatened to dilute their identity and engulf their special, anglicized world. They pleaded with the British to expand public education *in English*. But the colonial government, regarding most of Singapore's population as transients, did nothing. The issue did not go away, however. It emerged during the 1950s as the single most important question of public policy facing Singapore's government.

The 'Tiger of Malaya'

At the opposite social extreme from the Straits Baba was the mass of Chinese and Malay laborers and seamen, often living in squalor. This was the fertile soil in which, during the 1920s, communism began to flourish. Though cooperating initially with the Kuomintang, the Communists moved out on their own after the fragile truce on the Chinese mainland between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists was shattered in 1927. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), formed in 1930, devoted most of its energies to organizing labor unions—a new phenomenon in Singapore, and quite illegal—for rubber estate workers, tin miners, seamen, and some 60 other trades on both the island and the peninsula. Helped by the poor state of the global economy (to which Singapore's well-being was and is exquisitely sensitive), by rising anti-imperial sentiment, and by the tragic course of events in China, the MCP by the late 1930s had become a force to be reckoned with and operated through a score of front organizations.

The British, notably Sir Cecil Clementi, did a great deal to alienate many Singapore Chinese. Clementi, appointed Governor of Singapore in 1929, was fluent in Mandarin and Cantonese and had served as Governor of Hong Kong. He believed he knew a thing or two about the Chinese and how to deal with them. No sooner had the guns at Fort Canning boomed their welcome than the new Governor summoned Singapore's leading Chinese to Government House. There, he announced a ban on all political activity, on fund-raising for Chinese causes, and on displaying the Chinese flag. Later in his administration, Clementi eliminated grants-in-aid to Chinese schools—to save money—and, hoping to reduce unemployment, placed tight restrictions on Chinese immigration.

The Communists also benefited from Japan's invasion of China in July 1937, bringing a new alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communists on the mainland. In Singapore,

The last issue of the Straits Times *before the British surrender, 1942. "Singapore Must Stand," said the Governor General. "It SHALL Stand." It did not stand.*

THE STRAITS TIMES

"Singapore Must Stand; It SHALL Stand"—H.E. the Governor

SINGAPORE, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1942.

JAPANESE SUFFER HUGE CASUALTIES IN SINGAPORE

R. A. GUNNERS STICK TO THEIR POSTS

CURRENCY NOTES: A WARNING

PEOPLE in the rural areas refusing to accept currency notes issued by the Board of Commissioners of Currency, Malaya, are warned that action will be taken against them and that they are liable to severe penalties.

Air Battle Over Java Sea

4 JAPS DOWN

THE N.E.I. communiqué issued yesterday was very short and had little to report.

It read: "Apart from enemy reconnaissance over various parts of the Netherlands Indies area it may be noted that on the morning of Feb. 11, a Japanese bomber approached Soerabaya but it immediately disappeared when our fighters went up.

"No further reports have been received from various parts of the Archipelago where the fighting against the invaders is still being continued."

"Some days ago, an aerial combat took place over the Java Sea between allied aircraft and enemy fighters ... of the ... Japanese Navy ...

THE Japanese have suffered huge casualties in Singapore, according to W. T. Knox, News Chronicle war correspondent. Our gunners are sticking grimly to their guns, and there have been many cases of whole crews dying at their posts.

Ian Fitchett, official war correspondent with the A.I.F. here, says that if it should be impossible to drive the Japanese out completely, the fight will find the fight long and very bloody.

War correspondent for the London Daily Telegraph, H. A. Standish, points out that the defenders are holding a long line.

MARSHAL NEY'S REMARK

WHERE TO GET YOUR PAPER

ARRANGEMENTS are being made for the widest possible distribution of the Free Press in the mornings and the Straits Times in the afternoons. For the present the principal distribution ...

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the MCP wisely exploited popular passions by spearheading a virulent anti-Japanese movement. After war came to the Strait, Chinese Communists from Singapore would win further popularity by leading the resistance to the Japanese occupation of the Malay Peninsula.

But war seemed very far away to Singapore's powerful and prosperous during the late 1930s. Besides, the new naval base was now in place at Sembawang on the Johor Strait: Shore batteries were aimed south and east to fend off attack by sea. To the north, the "impenetrable" Malay jungle seemingly provided as much protection as any army. There had been some unsettling developments in the Crown Colony since the Great War, but the island's small and rather snobbish elite found life neither too demanding nor too fast. There was a sense of *tida' apa*, of all's well with the world. Tennis in the late afternoon followed by a cool shower and a *setengah*—whiskey and water—on the verandah before a good dinner bred a sense of self-satisfaction. God was, after all, an Englishman.

The "Tiger of Malaya," unfortunately, was a brilliant Japanese: General Yamashita Tomoyuki. On December 8 (Pacific time), 1941, the Japanese bombed not only Pearl Harbor but Singapore. They invaded Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines. Two days later, not far from Singapore, they attacked and sank two of His Royal Majesty's battleships, the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse.* Yamashita now swept down the Malay Peninsula. Relying on boldness, speed, bluff, and command of the air, he outthought and outfought a larger, better-supplied force of

Indians, Australians, and Britons.

Much has been made of the fact that Singapore's gun emplacements faced seaward, leaving the northern coast opposite the Malay States vulnerable to land attack. But Singapore fell principally because of a failure of command, a failure shared by Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding, and Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell, Supreme Commander in the Far East. When Percival met Yamashita at the Ford automobile plant on February 15, 1942, to discuss the terms of Singapore's surrender, the Japanese had no more than three days' supply of ammunition remaining. Yamashita suspected that Percival's willingness to talk was a ploy to buy time. He was, unfortunately, wrong.

Starting Over

The Japanese renamed Singapore *Syonan*, meaning "light of the south." Intending their occupation to be permanent, they launched a campaign to supplant English with Japanese and purged Western influences from school classrooms. The populace was exhorted to take pride in being Asian and, following Japan's example, to undergo a spiritual revival. (General Yamashita once remarked that, since the Japanese were descended from the gods while the Europeans admitted to descent from monkeys, the choice of allegiance should not really be all that difficult.) Japanese business and banking enterprises were established in Singapore, and Mitsubishi and other *zaibatsu* took over and managed key industries.*

The occupation was a hard, dangerous time for Singapore. The Japanese did not, in Singapore as elsewhere, behave like philosopher-kings. Already hated by the Chinese, they soothed no feelings when the Kempeitai, or military police, indulged in a murderous *sook ching*, executing thousands of locals suspected of being enemies of Japan. The Kempeitai remained in business throughout the war, its personnel by far outnumbering that of Japan's civil administration on the island. Meanwhile, living conditions in Singapore deteriorated with each passing month. For a city dependent on trade for its livelihood, where almost all

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*The Japanese had little use for the Chinese during the occupation, except as targets of extortion. But they had special plans for the Indian population—amounting to about 12 percent of the island's 550,000 people. Those plans moved into high gear in 1943 with the arrival in Singapore from Germany of Subhas Chandra Bose, a former president of the Congress Party in India who advocated direct action against the British in India. Bose placed himself at the head of an Indian Independence League and breathed new life into efforts to organize an Indian National Army (INA) for the liberation of the subcontinent. The INA saw action in Burma alongside the Japanese but won no battlefield successes.

food, clothing, and medicine had to be imported, war was disastrous. With scarcity, the new Japanese-imposed currency became grossly inflated, and a black market sprang up.

It was with relief that Singaporeans greeted the return of their British colonial masters in 1945. Keeping the news of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to themselves, Japanese commanders had quietly planned for their own internment and arranged an orderly transfer of power. The end of the war was announced on August 17. British troops landed two weeks later, and the Japanese, in a public ceremony, surrendered formally on September 12 to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. The crowd cheered as the Union Jack was raised once more over the Fortress of Singapore and the cheers were real enough. But the colors seemed less cheerful now, the fabric somehow frayed.

One year later, a young man known to his English friends as Harry boarded the troopship *Britannia* for the long passage from Singapore to Liverpool. A graduate of Raffles College, he had earned a Queen's Scholarship and was now, aged 23, on his way to Cambridge. He was an ardent anglophile who had watched the Japanese humiliate the British in 1942 and had understood immediately that, however the war turned out, Britain's days of empire were numbered. And he knew that, in an independent Singapore, there would be a role for him to play, perhaps even one to write and direct. He later recalled—as Prime Minister—that the Japanese "never knew what they did to a whole generation like me. But they did make me, and a generation like me, determined to work for freedom from servitude and foreign domination. I did not enter politics. They brought politics on me."

His name was Lee Kuan Yew.

BIG FISH, SMALL POND

by Thomas J. Bellows

Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore, after 25 years of his rule, scarcely resembles the city young "Harry" Lee left behind him in 1946, and the transformation has been largely Lee Kuan Yew's own doing. But some things he has been powerless—or unwilling—to change. Some things are part of a city's nature. An elderly veteran of the prewar Malaysian Civil Service (ret.), returning after a long absence, might venture out of the old Strand Hotel on Bencoolen Street and encounter a city and an island in some respects still the same as he had known it.

The Raffles Long Bar is still there, as are many of the old Malay mosques and Chinese temples and Hindu shrines, and most of the fine colonial government buildings. Chinatown, with its red-tiled shop-houses and flapping window shutters and street hawkers, still exists, though, like the average Singapore family, it is continually getting smaller. The Selat Johor is still breached by a thin, umbilical causeway—the one the Japanese marched across in 1942—carrying a railway and a six-lane highway from the mainland, not to mention thousands of pedestrians and a pipeline pumping millions of gallons of cool, fresh water into Singapore from the rivers of West Malaysia. The calm blue surface of the Strait of Singapore is still dotted with freighters, and the murky green of the serpentine Singapore River remains choked with junks and sampans.

But downtown, a stand of striking new skyscrapers now dominates the city Thomas Stamford Raffles laid out. The tallest of them, I. M. Pei's 52-story Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation building, is higher than Bukit Timah, the highest (at a mere 581 feet) natural feature on the island. As in Houston or Miami, air conditioners aspirate the city. Singapore is clean, honest, efficient, and relentlessly rational, with heavy fines meted out for such offenses as littering or jaywalking or driving into center city during rush hour without a very good reason. There are virtually no slums. While the 238-square-mile republic is heavily urbanized, a policy of planting trees, shrubs, and flowers wherever bare ground is exposed lends a lush garden atmosphere to the whole island.

All of these accomplishments, and many others, can ultimately be credited to Lee Kuan Yew. As Prime Minister, Lee has governed Singapore since 1959—first during the period of receding British rule, then during the island's brief interlude as a component state within the Malaysian Federation, and finally,

after August 9, 1965, when it became a sovereign republic. The prospects for the tiny new island city-state, which is almost devoid of natural resources, were viewed skeptically on independence day. But Lee Kuan Yew insisted from the start that the only resource Singapore needed was its citizens; that "human skills and intellectual discipline can be expanded infinitely provided a people have the will and capacity to do so." And provided, one might add, that they also have Lee Kuan Yew.

It is helpful at times to think of Singapore not as a state but as a system, with Lee the governing intelligence. Brilliant, arrogant, and remote, fluent in Mandarin and Malay, his English as pure as that of a Cambridge don, Lee has shaped Singapore in his own image—but has not plastered that image, Mao-style, all over town. Cults of personality he finds abhorrent; there are no statues of Lee in Singapore, no portraits on billboards, no sycophantic paeans in the newspapers.

Indeed, Lee is not generally beloved. Little warmth flows to or from his people (to whom he refers coolly as "digits"). Even physically, he remains aloof, relishing the isolation of the Istana, the former residence of the British governor general, which is set in the middle of Singapore in an enclave of well-guarded parkland. Lee has no sense of humor and is ascetic in his habits. His public statements have tended to be crisply businesslike, bordering on the pugnacious. He reportedly visited his mother only once a year while she was alive, because each visit

The corporate towers of Singapore, self-proclaimed "global city," glisten on a summer night. "A socialist in Singapore," First Deputy Prime Minister Goh has said, "has to plan for a just society without upsetting the delicate machinery of trade."

required security police to sweep the area, a waste, Lee thought, of taxpayers' money. He remains distant from his brothers and sisters (though relations with his wife and three children are close). Some who have met Lee recently say he has "mellowed" in recent years, though it is hard to know what this means.

But Lee Kuan Yew is respected—that is all that matters to him—and Singapore has yielded to his will. "Whoever governs Singapore must have the iron in him or give it up," Lee once told his people. "This is not a game of cards. This is your life and mine. I spent a whole lifetime building this, and as long as I am in charge, nobody is going to knock it down." One measure of the awe in which Lee is held is that he can talk like this without needing the armed forces to back him up.*

Don't Litter, Study Hard

Today, three races—Chinese (76 percent of the population), Malays (15 percent), and Indians (seven percent)—live together harmoniously in Singapore, each striving, or at least urged, to live up to those ideals and standards of behavior decreed by the government to be appropriately Singaporean. Weed Out Industries That Use Manpower Poorly; Keeping Our City Clean Is A National Objective; Don't Litter, Study Hard; Learn From The Japanese: The slogans one reads on signs and hears on TV in Singapore reflect Lee Kuan Yew's personal habits: his passion for cleanliness, his austerity and capacity for working long hours, and his faith in an oligarchy of talent.

In business and the civil service, advancement is utterly meritocratic, highlighting Lee's belief that Singapore depends on that five percent of the population "who are more than ordinarily endowed physically and mentally. It is on this group that we must expend our limited and slender resources in order that they will provide that yeast, that ferment, that catalyst . . .

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*The military in Singapore is totally subservient to civilian authorities, there is no rank higher than brigadier general, and there is no surplus of general officers—a pork barrel item in many Third World nations. (Lee Kuan Yew's son, Col. Lee Hsien Loong, is chief of staff.) Singapore's 35,000-man Army and its small, 3,000-man gunboat Navy are maintained by a universal draft: At age 18, every male Singaporean undergoes at least two years of military training. What Singaporean officials call "our young arms industry" has since 1980 manufactured and sold 50,000 lightweight assault rifles to customers in Southeast Asia, Central America, and the Middle East.

Thomas J. Bellows, 48, is professor of political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio. Born in Chicago, Illinois, he received his B.A. from Augustana College (1957) and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale (1968). He is the author of The People's Action Party of Singapore *(1970) and* People and Politics *(with Herbert R. Winter, 1981).*

which alone will ensure that Singapore shall maintain its pre-eminent place in the societies that exist in Southeast Asia."

"Pre-eminent" is the right word. Economically, the city-state has (partly) traded its role as the warehouse of Asia for that of factory while retaining, thanks to a cluster of free ports at key harbors and air terminals, its critical function as an entrepôt. Thousands of European and American corporations have set up shop on the island—banks, manufacturers, stockbrokers, service industries—and many others, fleeing the long-term political uncertainties of Hong Kong, are arriving every year. The 1980 directory of U.S. firms with factories or representatives in Singapore totals 117 pages, with seven to eight companies listed per page. These include Westinghouse, Comsat, Digital Equipment, Sunstrand, Abbott Laboratories, General Electric, Union Carbide, and Texas Instruments.

Yet, though industry and trade are the lifeblood of Singapore's economy, and high finance its heart, Lee Kuan Yew's government has not neglected the island's stomach. Only about 28 square miles on the island are devoted to agriculture—barely more than 10 times the land area occupied by its main commercial airport—but it is intensive agriculture. Singapore is self-sufficient in pork (important in the Chinese diet), chicken, and eggs, and grows about half of its vegetables and fruits.

Life after Lee

The island has also become a sorting house and first stop for tourists in the Orient, three million of them every year, each with a yen (or dollar or Deutsche Mark) for "Instant Asia"—an antiseptic Disneyland of the East. Gleaming new hotels such as the Shangri-La and the Dynasty have appeared downtown, and rising next door to the venerable Raffles Hotel is the 21st century's answer to the 19th-century bazaar: a magnificent steel and glass emporium, part office building, part shopping center, part hotel, part convention center. The government estimates that Singapore will need to almost double its present number of 15,800 hotel rooms by 1986.

Unlike the situation in neighboring Indonesia, the 2.5 million citizens of Singapore have shared in the island's wealth. While there are many millionaires in the republic, inhabiting villas in the old residential neighborhoods clustered around Singapore City, there is very little poverty. Singapore's people boast the third highest (after Japan and Hong Kong) per capita income in Asia: $5,240 in 1981. Average life expectancy surpasses 71 years, about that of Scotland or Austria.

MR. LEE KUAN YEW

Journalist T. J. S. George begins his Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore *(1973) with a quick character sketch of the man who has been Singapore's Prime Minister since 1959. Some selections:*

As he began to weld a family and a state according to his ideals, Lee Kuan Yew began to mold himself into a highly disciplined individual. Like Jomo Kenyatta with his fly whisk or Sukarno with his general's baton, Lee adopted a personal symbol: a thermos flask. It contained Chinese tea which he sipped throughout the day as he trudged from labor meeting to court appearance to press conference to political council. To this day, Lee is afraid of catching a chill and avoids cold drinks.

That is only part of his health fad. He is sensitive in a hundred different ways. Careful about his weight, he has given up on an early indulgence—beer—and is never seen to drink hard liquor. Once a pipe-smoker, he now detests all tobacco. He rarely eats the Chinese staple diet of rice and avoids bread. His breakfast is spartan and the principal meal, dinner, is light. He is fussy about keeping his nails trimmed and filed, washing his hands several times a day, polishing his shoes to a dazzling shine. . . . Air conditioners are adjusted to keep his bedroom at 66 degrees Fahrenheit, the office temperature at 72. He exercises religiously with a morning round of press-ups, skipping, and weightlifting. . . .

His austerity extends beyond physical matters to his habits of mind. He never listens to music, sees no movies, reads no novels, has no hobbies—golf is his only indulgence. To some people, his uprightness and singleness of mind are positively alarming. He is the only Asian politician about whom no personal scandal has ever been published. . . .

A personal and intellectual alienation completes the picture. Lee is so conscious of his intellectual superiority that others find him arrogant. . . . Most of those who work for him hint that he reduces them to the status of messenger boys. His wife is perhaps the only person with whom he can drop the mantle of super-ruggedness and can communicate on a basis of mutual respect. Professor C. Northcote Parkinson, who spent a career in Singapore teaching history at the University, wrote of Lee: "Utterly without charm, his expression is one of barely concealed contempt; for his opponents, for his followers, perhaps for himself. . . . One cannot imagine that he is even capable of friendship."

In the context of other Southeast Asian nations, the Republic of Singapore undoubtedly looks good. But it is not devoid of blemishes. The city-state has its problems, some of them serious, some of them perhaps insoluble. Can a young generation, reared in affluence, retain and pass on the more or less puritan ethic that has made Singapore what it is today? Can an island too small to support a large population but so industrialized that it requires a large labor force make a successful transition to capital-intensive, high-technology industries? Can the country survive the passing of its present generation of leaders, who have guided the republic for a quarter of a century? Above all, can it get along without Lee Kuan Yew?

Promoting 'Groupthink'

Clearly, too, there exists dissatisfaction with Singapore's brand of benevolent authoritarianism, no matter what the regime's achievements. Educated Singaporeans, of whom there are more and more each year, complain that they are made to feel like schoolchildren, incessantly exhorted, scolded, and cajoled. In private, they lament the excessive regimentation and the cultivation of "groupthink." Perhaps partly as a result of the government's *modus operandi*, some of the more intangible qualities necessary to sustain a modern nation over the long haul—civic consciousness, intellectual autonomy, self-sacrifice, social awareness—are still not firmly rooted in Singapore.

The republic's remarkable ruling elite, the handful of so-called "high-flyers" assembled by Lee Kuan Yew, many of them British-educated, demonstrate how quickly a dedicated cadre of astute administrators can create a materially successful country where "trickle-down" economics is a fact of life. Whether these men can nurture a "good society," not to mention a truly democratic society, much less something we might recognize as a "nation," remains to be seen.

But let us not be niggardly. The island has come a long way since 1950, when barrister Lee Kuan Yew returned from England with a Chinese fiancée (like him, a graduate of Raffles College and Cambridge) and every intention of entering politics. He found a Singapore where unemployment was in the double digits and overcrowding a fact of life—in some places as high as 1,000 persons per acre. In tenements, privacy was nonexistent, plumbing not even contemplated. Few schools or parks were available to most Singaporeans. Hundreds of thousands of people lived in squatter shantytowns.

Not surprisingly, Lee Kuan Yew also found not only Singa-

pore but all of Southeast Asia beset by Communist agitation —leading to riots and strikes if not outright insurgency—as the British prepared their Asian possessions for some measure of self-government. In neighboring Malaya, a bloody guerrilla war had been underway since 1948. (At its height, the conflict engaged as many as 100,000 British troops and Malay police; more than 11,000 combatants on both sides were killed.) Lee was not himself a Communist, but he admired the party's organizing skill and envied its popularity. Opening a law office with his wife, Lee sought and won Communist trust by defending radical trade union leaders and student activists in court.

Shaking Hands with Tomorrow

In 1954, he founded the People's Action Party (PAP)—symbolized by a lightning bolt—and a year later was one of three PAP candidates, all running as leftists, with broad Communist support, to win assembly seats in Singapore's first popular election. In office, Lee played a shrewd game, publicly defending the pro-Communist wing of the PAP, secretly aiding the British in their periodic sweeps against Party leaders, and then acting as attorney for his unsuspecting allies (usually, and conveniently, to no avail). The rationale was simple: Lee needed to keep Communist votes and lose Communist rivals. The strategy worked. Indeed, the PAP by the late 1950s had attracted a diverse following on both Left and Right. It was, as Lee's biographer, T. J. S. George, observed, "very much an Asian banyan tree under which nothing else would grow." In the 1959 elections, as Singapore was granted full responsibility for its internal affairs, the People's Action Party took 43 of the 51 assembly districts, and Lee Kuan Yew, aged 36, became Prime Minister.

Political bloodletting followed. Lee repudiated the Communists, who formed a new opposition party, the Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front), in 1961. Two years later, with the Malaysian experience in mind, Lee mounted Operation Cold Store—a roundup of more than 100 Communist leaders, some of whom, like Lim Chin Siong, would be held in prison, without trial, for many years. Calling elections a few months later, Lee resorted to a battery of "legal fixes" to make sure Barisan Sosialis was spurned at the polls.* It was. Since then, Lee Kuan Yew's lead-

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*In 1963, Lee resorted to such devices as flooding local printers with orders for government documents, ensuring that opposition candidates would be unable to print and distribute campaign literature. In subsequent years, he occasionally resorted to detention of candidates on technically legal grounds under the Internal Security Act. His favorite method of political intimidation now seems to be suing rivals for slander, usually with some success, for charges made during the campaign.

A Singaporean 10-spot, worth about U.S. $4.60. The average Singaporean spent only 16 percent of his income on housing but 45 percent on food and drink. American and European brand-name products, from Nescafé to Martell brandy, are making deep inroads according to a 1981 marketing survey.

ership has never been seriously contested, and even minor challenges have met major obstacles.

Lee Kuan Yew has kept himself in power by responding to his island's material needs rather than to its spiritual wants. During the early 1960s, those needs were chiefly two. First, he had to revive the island's sluggish economy—unemployment was regularly running at 15 percent and at times even higher. Second, he had to find places for his people to live.

In 1961, he set up an Economic Development Board (EDB) to promote industrial investment, provide financing, and oversee the creation and management of industrial parks. The first of its many successful ventures was the huge Jurong industrial estate on a tract reclaimed from swampland in the undeveloped southeast corner of the island. Foreign multinationals were wooed unremittingly. "Singapore is where it's happening," read advertisements in Western newspapers. "Yesterday shakes hands with tomorrow and it's yours—today!"

With its inexpensive pool of labor (in 1965, the average Singapore factory worker earned 31 cents an hour, the average American $2.61), its efficient administrators, and its relative absence of red tape, the island proved attractive. The first industries were labor-intensive—to relieve unemployment—and produced such items as nails, textiles, footwear, and paint. But as industrial employment expanded (from 31,000 people in 1959 to 126,000 in 1970), Singapore shifted away from polo shirts and plastic flowers toward more skill-intensive enterprises: chemi-

cals, petroleum products, machine components. By the late 1970s, the island was producing everything from batteries to pharmaceuticals to engines to oil rigs; with its four refineries, Singapore was the petroleum processing and distribution capital of Asia. Engrossed in economic pursuits, Singaporeans pretty much forgot about politics.

Singapore's economy is profoundly sensitive to regional politics and local demographics. The country first began to look outward—toward exporting its way to prosperity—after its expulsion from Malaysia dashed any hopes of participating in a Malaysian common market. The export strategy became even more crucial after the 1971 withdrawal of British military forces from "east of Suez" and the consequent shutting down of Britain's large naval base at Singapore. The lowering of the Union Jack over Admiralty House abruptly cost the republic 50,000 jobs and 20 percent of its gross national product.

A Choosy Customer

Singapore's problem today is a labor shortage. With an economy growing by eight percent annually during the 1970s, the island began to run out of people. To lure workers, companies began offering TV sets to new employees or enrolling them in special lotteries. Last year, some 150,000 foreigners, mostly Malays but also including Thais, Filipinos, Sri Lankans, Indians, and Indonesians, were granted work permits in Singapore, usually taking jobs that Singaporeans now find unacceptably menial or low-paying. Needless to say, the government's successful efforts at population control—required to prevent overcrowding on the small island—have done nothing to relieve the manpower shortfall.

The solution Singapore settled upon in 1979 was called the Second Industrial Revolution. To make room for new capital-intensive "brain industries" and services (mostly foreign-owned) that would yield more profit with fewer workers, the government began to weed out labor-intensive manufacturers (mostly Singaporean-owned companies whose profitability was waning as the island's prosperity drove up wages). It accomplished this simply: The National Wages Council decreed that all wages would increase by 20 percent in 1979, 19 percent in 1980, and 10–14 percent in 1981. The government estimates that by 1991 it will have eliminated the need for foreign workers— Singapore does not want a German- or Swiss-style "guest-worker" problem—while edging the island's economy further into the "postindustrial" world of banking, consulting, insur-

ance, electronics, and computers.*

With the political future clouded for Hong Kong—whose lease on the New Territories runs out in 1997—Singapore may even supplant the far more free-wheeling Crown Colony as Asia's financial Switzerland. Already, anxious individuals and corporations are quitting Hong Kong and seeking to relocate. Singapore has found it can be choosy. It gives preference to Hong Kong's electronics and computer companies, and the asking price for citizenship is S $1 million (U.S. $460,000). Not everyone with the cash is welcome. Singapore reportedly favors Shanghainese and Teochew businessmen because these groups are thought to have more industrial savvy than the Cantonese, who dominate Hong Kong's retail trade.

The bottom line of Singapore's role as the banking, manufacturing, repairing, refining, and service center of Southeast Asia is the foreign exchange surplus it has run in each of the past 19 years. First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee, the second most powerful man in the government, recently boasted that Singapore was "accumulating U.S. dollars every year—millions of them." A Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC), with assets of about $7 billion, was set up in 1981 to channel those dollars into holdings outside Asia. Among other U.S. properties, the GSIC owns 4 Penn Center, a $46.5 million, 23-story office building in Philadelphia.

Building Homes

Soon after Lee Kuan Yew assumed office, with his economic program barely underway, he launched a parallel drive for construction of public housing—at a rate of 9,000 one-, two-, or three-room units a year during the early 1960s. (Back then, a one-room flat rented for $15 a month.) In recent years, as many as 29,000 new units have been built annually by the Housing and Development Board. Today, more than 70 percent of Singapore's people live in government-built housing (versus nine percent in 1959). Most public housing units can be purchased outright by their occupants—a three-room flat outside the downtown area goes for about $14,000. For a downpayment or

*Singapore has a "mixed" economy—so mixed that public and private sectors are sometimes impossible to sort out. The government has several directly owned subsidiaries, such as the Development Bank of Singapore and Intraco (the state trading company, used principally for dealings with communist countries). Through statutory agencies such as the Economic Development Board and holding companies such as the state-owned Temasek Holdings Pte., Ltd., the government has also invested in hundreds of private companies. As a result, civil servants representing the Republic of Singapore sit on the boards of innumerable concerns, often with a controlling interest; they act in concert with the central government when it wishes to massage, stimulate, or redirect the economy.

to subsidize the monthly mortgage, citizens can draw on the compulsory contributions—22 percent of wages—that they have already made to the Central Provident Fund, which is Singapore's (solvent) version of Social Security.

Lee had many good reasons for pulling out the stops on public housing. Housing construction helped win over the poor. It provided employment for tens of thousands of workers. (Even today, stepped-up construction of new flats becomes, in effect, a jobs program during times of recession.) But the Prime Minister also had subtler motives. Historically, newcomers to Singapore had settled among their own in one of the many ethnic *kampongs*; Lee hoped instead to create a distinct Singaporean identity. As the slums were cleared, the inhabitants were dispersed—regardless of dialect or heritage—among the new flats. Not infrequently, Lee's aim was purely political: Neighborhoods with a history of opposing the government were often the first to "benefit" from urban renewal, the old tenements torn down and their occupants scattered throughout the island.

Lee Kuan Yew may not yet have brought forth a new race of Singaporeans, but he has certainly established a country of racially mixed apartment-dwellers while at the same time controlling urban growth. Admiring Third World delegations, their members resplendent in guayaberas and dashikis and Nehru jackets, frequently call on Singapore to learn the secret. And admittedly, some of the newer satellite towns, with their relatively spacious three- and five-room units clustered into small neighborhoods and built around markets and playgrounds, are quite attractive.

But many of the older highrise buildings—the row upon

"Singapore Wants Small Families." Family planning efforts in Singapore have succeeded beyond expectations. Contraception, legal abortion, and voluntary sterilization, backed by an array of financial incentives, have helped cut the island's population growth since 1953 from 5.7 to 1.4 percent a year.

row of shoe-boxes standing on end that every visitor sees—are inhabited by the less affluent and sometimes located far from jobs and schools. Grousing is contained by the residents' awareness of conditions in neighboring countries, but even so, circumstances may be far from pleasant. Crime, clutter, noise, and poor maintenance must often be stoically endured. One study reported that, in the high-rises, there was little social interaction among neighbors, and fewer than 10 percent of all children were allowed to play outside the flat, it being difficult to supervise the kids in play areas from the 10th or even the third floor.

With the erosion of community spirit—something the *kampongs* always sustained—life in many parts of Singapore is now intensely focused on the nuclear family, where isolation and over-familiarity can be two sides of one problem. The consequences are several. Among other things, as Riaz Hazzan observed in *Families in Flats* (1977), "the fact that the smaller children are continually underfoot and the TV is almost continually on makes it exceptionally difficult for older children to do their homework. As a result, children from the one-room flats are almost always well behind in their work."

Skimming the Cream

This is not a welcome state of affairs in a society where education is important. Primary and secondary education has been universally available in Singapore since the early years of Lee's regime. During children's first three years in school, the emphasis is on language—learning to read and write English and one other tongue (usually Mandarin). Only after third grade does instruction turn to science, math, social studies, and so forth. Students are "tracked" into academic or vocational courses as early as age seven or eight.

Schools are good in Singapore, but, like much else about the island, they have flaws where you might not expect them. For one, the regime never made primary, much less secondary, education compulsory. In part, it did not need to, since learning is prized among the Chinese. Yet the government's position also stems from Lee Kuan Yew's entrenched elitism, his belief that the cream will rise regardless. Lee may be right. But the happy few aside, what about the highly skilled work force a "high-tech" Singapore will need?

Adult literacy on the island today is only 75 percent, below that of much poorer countries like Jamaica or the Philippines. This is attributable to some extent, of course, to the fact that many Singaporeans reached maturity well before Lee Kuan

Yew and his school system appeared on the scene. But it also reflects high attrition. During the mid-1970s, 29 percent of all students dropped out at some point during their first six years in school. The proportion of all Singaporean first-graders who eventually enter the 10,000-student National University of Singapore or one of the island's polytechnics or who matriculate abroad is only nine percent, compared with 20 percent receiving higher education in Taiwan and 40 percent in Japan.

The New Mandarins

Meanwhile, the school system seems to be in a continual state of flux, as if learning in Singapore could be as finely tuned as the nation's economy. So frequently does the Ministry of Education tinker with local school systems that it is commonly referred to as the Ministry of Changes. The latest kick is an effort to inculcate Confucian values—an attempt, finally, to provide moral education as a firmer basis for national cohesion than self-gratification and "money-theism."* With its emphasis on hierarchy, order, reciprocity, loyalty, and rule by the most able and virtuous, Confucianism seems admirably suited to encourage the "team spirit" Lee Kuan Yew wants to see in Singapore. Increasingly, that spirit has given way to a "what's in it for me" attitude, reflected in widespread job-hopping and demands by workers for overtime pay for playing in company-sponsored athletic competitions. Newspaper editorials lament the rise in juvenile delinquency, drug use, and what the Prime Minister calls "yellow culture"—immorality, hedonism, and other "seamier by-products of prosperity."

Lee's educational reforms are designed in part to ensure that Singapore's next generation of leaders is as honest and able as the present one, and as devoid of "mediocrities and opportunists." While the government hopes to enlarge "the number of key digits," no one doubts that Singapore's 64,000 bureaucrats will continue to be dominated by a "coordinated hard core" of perhaps 300 high-flyers—skilled administrators and technical managers. (Lee Kuan Yew once observed that the country would disintegrate if "all 300 were to crash in one jumbo jet.") High-flyers make up Singapore's elite Administrative Service—a British legacy—which in turn is overseen by a 15-member cabi-

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*Confucianism will be introduced in the schools no later than 1984 as part of a broader religious knowledge program. Other courses include Buddhism, Hindu, Islam, Bible studies, and world religions. The humanities have not had high priority in Singapore in recent decades. One ironic result was that the country had to import eight Confucian scholars from Yale, New York University, Stanford, and other U.S. institutions to help determine which variant of Confucianism to teach.

A Singaporean child's depiction of the National Day (August 9) parade. It marks Chinese-dominated Singapore's final separation from Malay-dominated Malaysia in 1965 on grounds of mutual incompatibility. At the time, Singaporeans held their breath and wondered what was next.

net. The cohesion of the ruling class, and its ability to march in step, is enhanced by other Singapore institutions, such as the elegant Pyramid Club, whose membership is restricted to about 150 of the island's most senior ministers, members of Parliament, civil servants, businessmen, military officers, lawyers, and academics.

The integrity of those who exercise power in Singapore is ensured by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. (Its name in Chinese is the Foul Greed Investigation Bureau.) The Bureau is empowered to investigate all charges of corruption in both the public and private sectors. No individual is immune. The Bureau's powers of search and seizure are practically unlimited, and the efficiency and sophistication of its 70 staff members are held in awe by Singaporeans of whatever station.

Recruitment of younger men into the ranks of what used to be called the "mandarinate" has been underway for a decade. In the cabinet, for example, seven of the 15 ministers have served for more than 12 years but the other eight have held their portfolios for fewer than six. The average age of the younger ministers is 44. The selection process is designed to winnow out the merely ordinary. "We can find out a man's record in school and

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NO NONSENSE: A LEE KUAN YEW SAMPLER

On the importance of following the rules:

"We have all got to travel either on the left or on the right side of the road. We have all got to agree that when the light is red, we stop. When it is amber, we take heed. When it is green, we go."

On three hippie tourists whose hair was cut off by Singapore police:

"Things like this happen in the best of places. If any embarrassment has been caused, we can send them three wigs. We make wigs here."

On Singapore's leadership:

"My colleagues and I are by nature and by training calculators, not feelers; we like to make sure."

On training the young:

"We will be to blame if youngsters ten years from now become hooligans, ruffians, and sluts. They can be trained to be otherwise. Even dogs can be trained, as proved by the Police Training School where dogs, at a whistle, jump through a hoop, sit down, or attack those who need to be attacked."

To a group of university students:

"I often wonder whether you understand, whether you have a grasp of the realities of the society in which you are living. I have the feeling very often that because the administration is so effective, you are living like fishes in aquariums."

On "social delinquents":

"Our problem is how to devise a system of disincentives so that the irresponsible . . . do not believe that all they have to do is to produce their children and the government then owes them and their children sufficient food, medicine, housing, education, and jobs."

On his own intellectual capabilities:

"At Cambridge I got two firsts and a star for distinction. Harold Macmillan did not."

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the university," Lee has explained, "how active he was apart from his profession, and even simulate crises to put him under"—like giving him two or more demanding jobs at once and shuffling him around rapidly among ministries to see if he can handle a rapid succession of diverse responsibilities.

Finding capable young technocrats is one thing, finding capable young *politicians* quite another. Lee and his People's Action Party learned that lesson in 1981 during a by-election in the downtown Anson district, adjacent to the harbor. The PAP had many times before asked older members of Parliament to resign, making room for "new blood." But this time, as a test, PAP officials deliberately left the running of the campaign entirely in the hands of second generation politicians. The PAP candidate for the vacant seat in Parliament, hand-picked by Lee, was 32-year-old Pang Kim Hin, scion of a wealthy family and a mechanical engineer with a B.S. from Canada's McGill University. To everyone's surprise, Pang lost to a personable Sri Lanka-born lawyer, J. B. Jeyaretnam, the candidate of the Workers' Party.

What Next?

Since 1966, the PAP had never lost an election. In the 1980 general elections, it had captured all 75 seats in Parliament; in the 38 districts where one or more of Singapore's 19 opposition parties—most of them small "mosquito parties"—fielded candidates, the PAP had won with an average of 75.5 percent of the vote. In the aftermath of the Anson vote, the Prime Minister conceded with typical bluntness that the second generation, for all its costly training, had yet to demonstrate "that sensitive political touch which is essential for rapport between government and the people." Meanwhile, though his presence in Parliament hardly threatens the PAP's hold on power, J. B. Jeyaretnam receives considerable public sympathy and attention as the lone opposition MP. He is quoted but hardly lionized by the press, where self-censorship rather than overt government intervention is the rule.*

The critical question facing Singapore is what the future holds. "If I were in authority in Singapore indefinitely," Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, "without having to ask those who are being governed whether they like what is being done, then I have not the slightest doubt that I could govern much more effectively in their own interests." But he will not be in authority indefinitely, and his successors will probably have to seek popular approval for their policies to a greater extent than Lee has ever done or had to do.

*Censorship works in many ways in Singapore, and does not work consistently. All printing presses must be relicensed annually by the government—which amounts to a very short leash. The most prestigious newspaper in Singapore, the *Straits Times*, is run by S. R. Nathan, a former chief of Singapore intelligence, who has the full confidence of the government. At the same time, the National University of Singapore publishes academically credible books critical of government policies, and newspapers present the opinions of columnists who often hold the regime up to mild ridicule.

They will also have to deal with the sensitive issue of the quality of life. "One of the most important purposes of all this planning and effort," Lee has said, "is that at the end of each day's toil, life should be more than just existence and the business of making a living." Singapore is not there yet. Nor has a sense of national identity really begun to jell. On such matters as possible reunification with Malaysia, admiration for Lee Kuan Yew, the importance of bilingualism, or even acceptance of the word "Singaporean," cleavages in public opinion are evident to this day among Chinese, Malays, and Indians. On the two local television channels, there is little domestic programming. Most of it comes from the BBC or from U.S. networks— "Dallas," "Love Boat," and "Diff'rent Strokes" are all popular —or from Hong Kong in the form of soap operas, with the original Cantonese dubbed over in Mandarin.

Beyond this, Singapore may face the task of reconciling its need to function as a unified society with the growing demands for greater individual freedom and political pluralism. Perhaps the two are not reconcilable. Singapore is too small to readily absorb the shock of big mistakes. Prime Minister Lee noted once that, "put bluntly, the role of an opposition is to ensure bad government"—his rationale being that the opposition does not enter Parliament to help a government govern well. Yet, he has also come to believe that, with economic prosperity now a tenuous fact of life, opposition from political "sparring partners" may be the only way to keep the newest generation of PAP politicians fit and agile.

Shadows of one sort or another hang over all of Asia's "little tigers"—Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are the others —and by comparison, Singapore's lot is in some ways enviable. It faces no military threat; relations with neighbors may often be no more than correct but they are not hostile. There is no denying the republic's internal flaws, and the republic does not deny them. Its leaders, historically, have been alert to dangers and willing to confront them. They do not like washing their dirty linen in public, but they try to wash it somewhere.

There is a saying in Washington that God watches over fools, drunks, and the United States of America. I suspect that, out of one corner of His eye, He's had Singapore in view as well.

SINGAPORE

"We in Singapore have to cultivate a very small garden, and the seeds we import for our garden must be selected with care and discrimination, so that no poisonous weeds are allowed to overrun our little plot of earth. But what seeds we do select can be the best that either East or West has to offer."

That is as pithy (and earthy) an expression as any of Singapore's leaders' hopes and plans for the future. It comes from President C. V. Devan Nair, Singapore's titular chief of state since 1981, an Indian by heritage and in younger days an ardent Communist (jailed by the British), a prominent union activist, and, ultimately, a loyal supporter of the People's Action Party who survived Lee Kuan Yew's purge of the PAP's pro-Communist wing in 1961.

Singapore was not built by the overly meek, the studiously consistent, the scrupulously virtuous. In his **One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore** (Murray, 1923; Univ. of Malaya, 1967), Song Ong Siang quotes Sir James Brooke, writing only two decades after the settlement was founded in 1819. Brooke at once praised and lamented the character of the Chinese who dominated the island's commerce:

"Their industry exceeds that of any other people on the face of the earth, they are laborious, patient, and cheerful; but on the other hand they are corrupt, supple, and exacting, yielding to their superiors and tyrannical to those who fall into their power."

Nevertheless, such ingredients often added up to a recipe for success in Singapore. In addition, they so fla-

vored the island's history that respectable historians seem to have shied away, perhaps fearing that any general history would seem too "popular" (i.e., interesting) to suit academic tastes. Fortunately, C. Mary Turnbull was not deterred. For the specialist and nonspecialist alike, her illustrated, scholarly, and smartly written **A History of Singapore** (Oxford, 1977, cloth & paper) is the best survey available of Singapore's colorful path from antiquity to modernity.

Turnbull's study may be usefully supplemented by Donald and Joanna Moore's **The First 150 Years of Singapore** (Donald Moore, 1969), a compilation of documents with connecting text by the authors.

The "anything goes" capitalism that brought Singapore fortune, fame, and infamy during colonial days has been not so much diluted since independence as refined, sanitized, and institutionalized. Singapore today has a "directed" economy and centralized planning. But Iain Buchanan argues in **Singapore in Southeast Asia** (Bell, 1972) that the island's dependence on foreign investment and expatriate corporate management may be merely a disguised form of neocolonialism.

That aside, he also warns that the republic's role as wealthy middleman and regional processing center is increasingly aggravating to its two larger Moslem neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore may now be a pearl, he says in effect, but the surrounding oyster feels it as an irritating speck of sand.

While Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his associates prefer to

focus world attention on Singapore's high standard of living, clean streets, and incorruptible bureaucracy, they are aware that potentially serious problems—foreign and domestic—do exist. Parents and government alike worry about a younger generation that takes schools, jobs, housing, and health care for granted —and seems to lack ambition. A small intelligentsia decries regimentation and conformity. In **The Economics of Modernization** (Asia Pacific, 1972), even First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee complained of his island's "depressing climate of intellectual sterility."

Some observers attribute that climate in part to the paternalistic political system imposed by Lee after 1963. One such critic is T. J. S. George. In **Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore** (Deutsch, 1973, cloth & paper), a political biography of the island's long-time "headman," George strives to give the austere Prime Minister his due. But his overall assessment is negative.

Lee, in George's view, "casts a pall of conformity and caution over the lives of the people he controls. He seems to assume that a sense of national identity can be created from television sets, apartments, and jobs, disregarding the citizen's right to respect and equality."

One manifestation of the lack of truly national feeling lies in what economist Lim Chong Yah calls the "hotel-guest mentality." Lim, whose local newspaper columns are collected in **Commentary on Economics and Current Affairs** (Federal, 1981), discerns the phenomenon mainly among affluent professionals whose skills are in demand around the world—the very people who have gained the most from Singapore.

As long as times are good, these people are happy to remain in Singapore, writes Lim. But ask them to contribute something to the republic —allowing their sons to be drafted, for example—and they check out of their "suites" and move abroad.

Newspapers are watched closely in Singapore, but despite inevitable self-censorship, columnists still enjoy considerable latitude, and letters to the editor reflect a riot of opinion. Among everyone's favorite targets are the government's frequent attempts at moral or social uplift, its campaigns to curb (for example) spitting in public or to "make courtesy our way of life."

Two of the better newspaper commentators are B. J. Wu and Paik-Choo, each the author of a recent volume of essays: respectively, **Singapore Accent** (C. Nair, 1981) and **The Pick of Paik-Choo** (Singapore: Times, 1982). Both take aim at a variety of local initiatives, including government language policy—the requirement, in particular, that Singapore Chinese, most of whom speak south China dialects and are avid fans of movies in Cantonese imported from Hong Kong, make their children learn Mandarin, the official language of the People's Republic of China and of Taiwan.

Paik-Choo ridicules the proposal that even personal names be changed to their phonetic Mandarin equivalents. (In Chinese, the meaning of written characters is universal, but each dialect pronounces them differently.) She cites the case of two of her cousins, whose names in Hokkien are pronounced Ah Lok and Ah Loh—after their mother's favorite music, rock 'n' roll. In Mandarin, the connotation is lost.

Knowledge of standard English is a different matter. Government and populace are one in recognizing that

English is the language of trade and the government defends its purity. Citizens are reminded continually that local "Singlish" will not do.

Some characteristics of Singlish, as classified in **The English of Singapore and Malaysia** (Eastern Univ., rev. ed., 1979) by R. K. Tongue, include omission of the verb "to be" ("People will glad to buy it"); repetition of adjectives ("Do you speak English? Broken, broken"); omission of prepositions ("We go your home"); and confusion of the personal pronouns "he" and "she."

As an intensely mercantile community, Singapore long paid little attention to literature and the arts. Yet, more than a few outsiders, including Somerset Maugham and Joseph Conrad, found fertile ground for fiction in the ennui—hardly new or unique to Singapore—that is traditionally handmaiden to economic well-being in the tropics.

The portrait of jaded British colonial society before World War II presented by J. G. Farrell in **The Singapore Grip** (Knopf, 1979, cloth; Berkley, 1980, paper) is echoed in Paul Theroux's **Saint Jack** (Houghton, 1973, cloth; Ballantine, 1976, paper), the tale of a dissolute American expatriate who operates a seamy R & R hotel in Singapore for war-weary GIs from Vietnam.

Even the tales by Singapore's popular Catherine Lim—collected in **Little Ironies** (Heinemann, 1978, paper only) and **Or Else, The Lightning God, and Other Stories** (Heinemann, 1980, paper only)—present families and individuals adrift in materialism and amorality.

In "The Taximan's Story," a cabby decries the immorality of schoolgirls who "friend, friend, the European and American tourists, and this is how they make fun and also extra money" and reveals that he caught his daughter with Europeans and now won't let her out of the house. But he declines a passenger's request to wait because "must go off to the Hotel Elroy—there plenty of young people [with Europeans] to pick up."

Perhaps Singapore's best-known author—though few realize that he lived in Singapore and taught at the university there—is C. Northcote Parkinson, author of **Parkinson's Law** (Houghton, 1957, cloth; 1962, paper). Parkinson derived some of his droll but perceptive laws of bureaucratic behavior (e.g., "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion") from practices he observed in, among other places, "a certain British colony."

That was colonial Singapore. Today, on Lee Kuan Yew's efficient little island, many of Parkinson's laws seem to have been repealed.

—*K. Mulliner*

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Mulliner, 43, is assistant to the director of the Ohio University Libraries. He is co-editor of* Malaysian Studies II *(with John Lent, 1983).*

Ideas:

MUSIC AND LITERATURE

Anthony Burgess is known to most Americans as the prolific English author of witty, sometimes scathing novels ranging from his futuristic satire *A Clockwork Orange* to his massive meditation on *Earthly Powers*. But Burgess also has a strong attachment to music, perhaps inherited from his mother, "the Beautiful Belle Burgess," a singer and dancer in the music halls of his native Manchester. After listening at age 12 to Debussy's *L'Après-midi d'un faune* on a homemade crystal radio, Burgess began to teach himself musical composition. Since then, in addition to 25 novels, he has composed almost 100 pieces of music, including three symphonies. Here Burgess considers some of the connections between the two arts.

by Anthony Burgess

A quark is defined as "any of three hypothetical subatomic particles having electric charges of magnitude one-third or two-thirds that of the electron, proposed as the fundamental units of matter." The word is taken from James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*, where the gulls are ironically hailing the impotent King Mark of the Tristan legend: "Three quarks for Muster Mark!" It is very nearly an arbitrary borrowing (the *three* qualifies total randomness). In Joyce the vocable is imitative, in physics it is a deliberately chosen counter whose phonetic content has nothing to do with what it defines. It is a typical word, in other words.

Saussure, the father of modern linguistics, emphasized the arbitrary nature of words. The iconic word, like *moon* or *little*, where the nature of the vowel suggests an imitation of what is described, is very rare in language. Words are overwhelmingly seen to be arbitrary bundles of phonemes, or speech sounds, to which meanings are attached—either by fiat (as with *quark*) or by historic or prehistoric tradition, as with the greater number

of words in the human vocabulary. These are the units of the most efficient system of communication mankind possesses.

Does music have comparable units?

Evidently not. It has notes, and it has chords, and it has, in comparison with the number of words in even the smallest lexicon, very few of these. A note is atomic, like a phoneme. That word *quark* has, as a spoken unit, four phonemes for the British and five for the Americans, who pronounce r in it. To get the equivalent of a word in music you must choose a phrase of two or more notes; alternatively (an advantage language does not have and which literature envies) you can sound several notes simultaneously. Your basic musical unit can be extended in time or be virtually timeless:

That, as most readers will recognize, is the so-called mystic chord of Scriabin—an item in his musical vocabulary which had its own significance for the composer and has had rather less for his listeners.

Can a meaning—that is, a referent or item in the outside world—be attached to a musical phrase as it can be attached to a bundle of phonemes? The answer is yes, and the process can be quite as arbitrary as with *quark*. Wagner invented the principle of the leitmotif, and for his *Ring* he contrived a great number of musical phrases which have referents glued to them. I could follow his example and say: "I am about to make a statement on the keyboard. Here are the lexical items of the statement. The common chord of C means I, me, myself. The mystic chord of Scriabin means kill or kills. The diminished seventh, any diminished seventh, means my wife. What am I now saying?"

The statement will be understood, as will the other available orderings of the chords—I kill myself; I kill my wife; Kill I my wife?—but it is obvious that this is not the way music operates. The duration of a chord—crotchet, minim or semibreve—is of immense importance to a composer, but the duration of a word is a matter of mere rhetoric to the speaker: it is prosodic, or su-

prasegmental, and it cannot even be indicated in conventional script. Again, the first chord could be played pianissimo, the second mezzo piano, and the last fortissimo—mere devices of eccentric rhetoric in speech, but possessing a precise purpose in the statements of the musician.

In fact, the basic materials of the musical vocabulary are the purely suprasegmental ones of speech. Matters of speed, vocalic prolongation and, to a large extent, of intonation are not fundamental to the communication of verbal meaning, but it is out of these elements that music is made. A musician, too, would totally reject the notion that meanings can be attached arbitrarily to notes, as they are to words. He might accept that the personal pronoun, as representing the firm center from which the world is surveyed, the one item in the universe whose existence we cannot doubt, finds a correlative in a major triad. The major triad, being made of the lower harmonics of any given note, is a fact of nature, a basic reality. The diminished seventh, as used to designate "my wife," suggests dubiety, since it is a chord which could belong to any one of eight keys and, being homeless until resolved, it has connotations of anxiety. It cannot *denote* "my wife," but it can suggest an attitude to her. The Scriabin chord is an undoubted discord, and it might well serve to symbolize violent dissolution, but it is probably, especially nowadays, not violent enough. What the composer would certainly strongly reject would be the arbitrary use of the major triad to mean "kill," but he might not object to it as a correlative of death, so long as the death were both peaceful and desired by the dying.

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It is perhaps because the composer knows, through instinct and experience, what phrases and what chords can be used in the setting of words in song and opera, that he ascribes to such musical components meanings that do not need to be particularized by words. Before music became capable of the kind of instrumental independence which could produce a symphony, it relied, for its longer structures, on the setting of words, secular or sacred, and it learned a sort of consonance of phrase, or

In 1717, Johann Sebastian Bach served as Kappelmeister *of the chamber music group installed in the court of Leopold von Kö- then. Instrumental music of the time was free of literary themes.*

chord, and verbal meaning. Take away the words, an easier pro-
cess than setting them, and the verbal meaning remains, but it
seems now to be purely a musical meaning. Out of this is bred
the romantic arrogance of Berlioz and Strauss, which holds that
musical language can replace verbal language and the art of
music can take over the art of literature.

The arrogance of romanticism was encouraged by the
growth of musical resources in the romantic period. The verbal
resources of the great poets of the past, from Homer to Shake-
speare, do not seem to us to be inferior to our own, but, in
Homer's time, music hardly existed except as modal monody,
and, in Shakespeare's, it is hard to think of a Byrd or a Weelkes
being able to match the intensity and complexity, as well as vio-
lence, of *Hamlet* or *King Lear*. It is, as we all know, highly dan-
gerous to speak of the *progress* of music in the historical period,
since art does not progress, the limitations of his material are
never a source of frustration to the artist, and every age believes
it has achieved the highest conceivable pinnacle of art.

But the fact is that music has always depended, while litera-
ture has not, on technical innovation, and the 19th-century com-
posers were the beneficiaries of immense advances in both the
linguistic and instrumental resources of their art.

When we play the *Well-Tempered Clavier* of Bach, we are made to realize how comparatively novel are the blessings of the tempered scale. As a boy, I thought "well-tempered" was a whimsical epithet for a keyboard that did not fight back at the performer, and it was only slowly that I realized that the scale in nature was not the same as the scale on the piano in the living room. By a cunning flattening of fifths, our instruments have been made to accommodate an entire cycle of keys impossible to the virginals that Shakespeare's mistress played. The sonatas of Beethoven are adventures that range through all the keys and exploit devices of modulation that could have had no meaning for John Bull or Orlando Gibbons. In nature G flat and F sharp are different notes: in the tempered scale they are the same, and they permit movement from one key to another by means of auditory puns. The dominant seventh of D flat changes its G flat to F sharp (a pure matter of notation) and becomes the augmented sixth, whereby we land at once into the distant key of C major. The diminished seventh provides access to any one of four major or four minor keys: Samuel Butler called it the Clapham Junction of the keyboard.

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The pianoforte for which Beethoven composed was one of the great technical innovations of the Napoleonic age, and it was Beethoven who, using a valved horn in his Ninth Symphony, prefigured the revolution in the orchestra. The classical horns and trumpets were confined to the bugle calls of the harmonic series, but, with the provision of valves, they had the chromatic scale at their disposal. What the possibilities of the romantic orchestra are we begin to see, spectacularly, in the *Symphonie Fantastique* of Hector Berlioz, composed only a few years after the death of Beethoven, but those possibilities are forced into fulfillment by the pressure of imposed literary programs, not by the inner urgings of musical inspiration alone.

The *Symphonie Fantastique* uses all the devices of Beethovenian language, leaps about the entire terrain of the keys, exploits the mimetic possibilities of the instruments—*ranz des vaches* on English horn, multiple kettledrums for thunder, eight harps for a ballroom scene, drumrolls before the blade of the guillotine falls, squeak of an E flat clarinet at the witches' sabbath, tolling bells while trombones and tubas intone the *Dies Irae*—and all in the service of the story of a young artist who has lost his mistress and sees her apparition through opium clouds. The occasional clumsiness of the music, which all the commentators admit, is excused by the daring of the conception. It is as

if a novelist, in despair at the inadequacy of words to convey his vision, has taken a crash course in music because music is the only other available outlet. This is precisely what Berlioz intends to demonstrate: the superiority of music to literature as a literary medium.

□

The conviction that the romantic orchestra and the resources of the post-Beethovenian vocabulary were eloquent enough to absorb the materials of literature was corroborated by the new French view of Shakespeare. Berlioz, like Dumas, was overwhelmed in the 1830s by the performances of Shakespeare given by a visiting English company in Paris. (In the company was a young Irish actress, a Miss Smithson, with whom Berlioz fell symphonically nay fantastically in love.) It seemed to many that the greatness of Shakespeare was impaired by the theatrical conventions forced upon him by his own era. The situations were magnificent, the psychology profound, the speeches sublime, but what Shakespeare had really wished to write was not plays but novels. The romantic novel not existing in his time, only the picaresque, he was compelled to waste the wealth of his imagination on a far inferior form. It was a pity, but it was possible for Berlioz to put everything right by translating Shakespeare into music. And so he composed *Roméo et Juliette*, using words where it seemed necessary to call on a chorus, but handing over Mercutio's Queen Mab speech to the orchestra, and turning Romeo and Juliet into respectively a clarinet and an oboe.

Berlioz similarly remade part of Byron's *Childe Harold*—an act of arrogance wholly justified, since the concerto-symphony *Harold in Italy* (the old genres are certainly dying) is superior as art to the poem. He also remade Virgil in *Les Troyens*, one of the great operatic achievements of the century. There seems to be a romantic perverseness here, with an English dramatist turned into a symphonic novelist and a Roman epic poet converted into a dramatist.

But the division between post-Gluckian opera and symphonic fiction is not so great as it appears. The words on the stage are a mere pretext for the psychological complexities proceeding in the orchestra. We cannot doubt that the orchestra is discoursing particularities about human relationships, because the words up there on the stage are telling us so, if we can hear the words. The orchestra may, as in Wagner and Strauss, drown the words, but we can look up the words in the printed libretto. The words are a pretext for the sounds, which are the true state-

This 1863 caricature shows Richard Wagner's Tannhaüser *asking to see his little brother,* The Trojans, *held in the fatherly embrace of Hector Berlioz. Epic and legend provided themes for the music of both composers.*

ment, and as the statement is analytical there is little room on the stage for the dramatic action which denies the need for analysis. Eventually it will be unnecessary for Tristan and Isolde to do more than repeat each other's name, while the avowals of love, and indeed love's physical fulfillment, are left, with a certainty of eloquence that no mere words could encompass, to the players in the pit. It does not matter whether you hire a theater or a concert hall. The declamations of the singers and the printed declaration of the content of the *Symphonie Fantastique* share the same pretextual function. One word will be enough to call the music down from the sky of generality to the wrist of the particular.

The arrogance of Berlioz led to the greater arrogance of Strauss—meaning Germanic as opposed to merely Gallic. There comes a point in his opera *Salome* where it is clear that sung words have no further function. Salome gets the shorn head of John the Baptist and kisses the lips which are no longer living flesh but mere morphology. Her words are redundant: the huge orchestra is perfectly capable of dealing with all that pseudo-biblical imagery. Ring down the curtain. The orchestra will tell us when the soldiers are crushing Salome to death under their

shields. The orchestra can tell us everything. We have entered the world of the symphonic poem.

The symphonic poem represents the inevitable terminus of the development of the Beethoven symphony. Artistic unity, no longer to be fulfilled in the rococo manner through a mere selection of genres, has to be found in a literary program, and the symphonic poem may be said to begin with the "Eroica." Franz Liszt saw very clearly the direction the symphony had to take—a three-movement work like the *Faust Symphony* and a tone poem like *Les Préludes* differ only in the commitment of the one to the depiction of character and the other to the expression of (rather banal) poeticisms—but Richard Strauss consumed the possibilities of the new form in the huge *Ein Heldenleben*.

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This is, however much we may cry out against the excessive orchestral forces, the vulgarity, and the rampant egoism, a very great work. We have all reached the point of being able to take in the music as character and narrative without having to consult the program notes. It is genuine epic and genuine autobiography. It is the complete vindication of the new form, but very little can be done after it.

Don Quixote is successful in a different way. The concept is brilliant—fantastic variations on a theme of knightly character, as Strauss himself puts it in the subsidiary title—but the significance of the enterprise for the composer seems to be the extent to which the world of solid objects can be absorbed into music. It is not just a matter of making eight muted horns mimic the bleating of sheep but rather an implied declaration that music can give us the Platonic ideal of the bleating of sheep. The representative arts are usually humble in relation to their referents. Art, after all, is inferior to nature. But music is the mind of God, or Strauss, and the outside world is transfigured once it is transformed into organized sound.

Strauss was arrogant enough (or perhaps it was ironic arrogance) to assert that anything could be represented in music, and hence transfigured to a higher order of reality. It should be possible to represent a glass of lager, and to make it clear who the brewer is; to set knives and forks on the table of the musical imagination and show them to be either silver or pewter.

This sort of thing can, in fact, be done and ought to be done. Strauss demonstrated his method in the dinner music for *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme* (used as the prelude to and justification of *Ariadne auf Naxos*—the most brilliant of Hofmannsthal's confections). When Rhine salmon is served, we hear Wagner's

Rhine leitmotif; the roast lamb comes from that flock in *Don Quixote*. It has to be extra-musical or quasi-literary unless a label is directly attached to the representation. In William Walton's *Belshazzar's Feast* we are told which gods the Babylonians are praising, and the gods are carried in procession—strokes on the anvil for the God of Iron, slapstick for the God of Stone, xylophone for the God of Wood (more etymology than sound), brass for the God of Brass, woodwind for the God of Silver. A slapstick is not made of stone, nor are flutes and oboes silver, though a metaphor will make their tones silvery. Musical images thus demand a diversity of method—the literal, the associative, the metaphorical—but there is no referent which defeats them, so long as words are somewhere around.

We ought to note that practically all the developments in romantic and post-romantic music spring out of attempts to represent, or interpret, phenomena traditionally left to the other arts. A great deal has been written, including whole books, on the chord which opens the Prelude to *Tristan*:

Here we have a prophecy of the collapse of traditional tonality. Though that chord could be glossed as an ordinary secondary seventh in the key of F sharp or G flat major (notated differently, of course), it is revealed as not belonging to any recognizable key. The love of Tristan and Isolde is compounded of elements which deny traditional fealty and even the life-enhancing ends of the sexual relationship. In *Finnegans Wake* the seagulls may mock King Mark with their quark, but here the situation is tragic because disruptive of social order. Wagner is impelled to the formulation of a harmonic system which denies a fixed center, and he opens the door for Schönberg and atonalism.

Romanticism, after fulfilling itself grandiosely in Strauss, had either to be denied by Paris or broken down and remade into a new system by Vienna. Debussy could not compose music without employing extra-musical referents, whether derived from literature, the pictorial arts, or nature herself. In his two volumes of *Préludes* he is prepared to represent Mr. Pickwick or General Levine or seaside minstrels or a girl with flaxen hair, but his mode of representing them denies their humanity and

converts them into impersonal objects, like heather or fog or the
west wind or the perfumes of night invoked by Baudelaire.

The musical language has to deny the hierarchy of the dia-
tonic scale and its harmonies, since we are not in a world where
social values apply. A chord is a block of sound followed by iden-
tical blocks of sound further up or lower down the scale: there is
none of the old syntax which deferred to a tonal centre. New
scales have to be manufactured or imported—like the whole-
tone scale of Java—and the old modes are revived. But the new
language is not there to serve a self-referring art. Debussy is just
another post-rococo composer, like Berlioz, claiming to absorb
the external world into music.

□

The atonal revolution of Schönberg derives ultimately from
Tristan, but it was when studying the score of *Salome* in
1907—an opera which presents the final breakdown of order—
that he observed for the first time harmonies whose roots could
not be defined and a mere pretense of coherent language. It
could be said that Schönberg's democratization of the chro-
matic scale, with every one of the twelve semitones equal to
each other, was a denial not merely of the hierarchy by which
the Austro-Hungarian Empire of Haydn and Mozart had sub-
sisted, but a rejection of nature herself, since nature does not
recognize a scale artificially tempered to equal intervals. It is
certain, I think, that atonal music, even when structured accord-
ing to the rules of serialism, has referents of breakdown—not
only in society but in the individual psyche itself.

The test for evaluating music, ever since the death of Bee-
thoven and perhaps even before his death, has been the degree of
fidelity with which it has interpreted an extra-musical subject
matter. There was a period of roughly a century and a half when
instrumental music could subsist in a kind of self-referential pu-
rity—the period of the baroque and the rococo. Certain assump-
tions about God and human society permitted the production of
a kind of music—whether a fugue, a passacaglia or a sympho-
ny—which was an image of accepted order.

With the coming of Beethoven there was an attempt to con-
tinue this tradition, but it depended on a view of social stability
which could not last. The new philosophy found its center in the
individual, and the new music was a mirror of this. The work-
ings of the individual psyche are best presented in literature,
and it was to literature that the new musicians went for their
themes and structures.

I use the term literature loosely. I mean by it the representa-

tion of human thought, feeling and action—biographical or fictional—preferably in words but acceptably in media where the verbal element is minimal or even non-existent. In the sense that ballet, which is wordless, and film, which can be wordless, are art forms derived from the drama—traditionally a branch of literature—and depend on character and action, they are literary enough and, when music is applied to them, demand what may be called literary music.

Thus, music treats film as it treated drama: it tries to convert it into a kind of novel. Film is a popular art form which uses music to underline setting and action and to suggest unspoken currents of thought and feeling, but, unlike Wagnerian music drama, it cannot permit the narrative to be absorbed into the music. It is far closer to the literal melodrama (not necessarily the debased form which made the term pejorative) of the Victorian age.

□

In listening to the music of the cinema, we gain a diluted and popular idea of the vocabulary now available to the not absolutely serious composer. I have written a little film music myself, and know that the exigencies of the medium will not permit music to be too original or even too interesting. It must not intrude. It is permitted very few complete statements. Like a diffident speaker in the presence of an arrogant one, it must be prepared to be cut off in the middle of a sentence. It can rarely use an accepted form, like fugue or passacaglia. But it has an eclectic language, and this never, except in historical films where the music becomes part of the action, evokes the age of stability. Background music in the manner of Haydn or Mozart must always draw attention to itself as primary and not ancillary art. The sounds required are those of "literary" music.

We can particularize and say that the harmonic language of film music is mostly that of early Debussy—*The Blessed Damozel* rather than *Jeux*. There are plenty of secondary sevenths, and a sequence of these will be suitable for any meditative passage. Atonalism is to be admitted only when there are visual images of alienation. In composing the music for an Italian documentary called *The Eyes of New York*, I was drawn to the abandonment of a key center when the film showed the poor and outcast, the young drugged, or the sculpture of George Segal. But visions of skyscrapers call for major tonalities with added notes (seconds, sixths, sevenths, ninths) and the kind of melodic nobility which owes more to Rachmaninov than to Beethoven.

There is, despite its contrived functionalism, a certain hon-

esty in this kind of music. It represents what the ordinary listener can accept as intelligible language, and no composer can cut in and justify extravagances on the grounds of some new theory. An affirmation (Manhattan; the Rockies; a man satisfying thirst) cannot be accompanied by that Scriabin chord: a major triad is called for.

When composing film music, the musicians of our age are compelled to use an eclectic language which they must regard as old-fashioned. Writing "seriously" they have to abandon eclecticism; they are forced into making a choice which excludes old-fashioned tonality and uses a loose atonality or a serialism derived from Schönberg or Messiaen. There is also a view of music which sees composition as an exploration of the nature of sounds or, with John Cage, denies a distinction between the structured sounds of music and the noises of the external world. There is no generally accepted aesthetic of music, and this can do the art no good.

I have tried, for my own enlightenment, to use most of the musical idioms available today, from the Broadway show song to the rarefactions of Boulez, and I am disturbed by the lack of a synthesis. Music is no longer sure of itself. In the 19th century an attempt was made by Johannes Brahms to restore the old symphonic vision of stability, just as, in Edwardian England, Edward Elgar fixed an image of imperial serenity (though more scarred and hysterical than many suspect) before the darkness set in. But the real currents of musical development lay elsewhere. Music might have pretended, with Berlioz and Strauss, to absorb literature, but in fact it had turned itself into an adjunct to literature—critical, illustrative. Mozart was the last of the great composers.

It was, I suppose, a doubt about the capacity of music to provide me with a language that drove me to the craft of the novel, where there are solidities of character and *récit* and corresponding semantic and syntactical solidities. But, if literature has done so much for music, it may well be that music can do things for literature which only the musically trained *littérateur* is capable of envisaging. We can at least speculate about this.

One 1983 legacy of Vietnam: widespread hostility toward any U.S. intervention abroad, even in Central America, "America's backyard."

America's National Security

The past two decades have been extraordinarily difficult, so-
bering, even traumatic for the United States in matters of war
and peace. President John F. Kennedy's inaugural summons of
January 21, 1961, to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure
the survival and success of liberty" now may seem extravagant,
even naive—after Vietnam and Iran and the harsh complexities
of Lebanon and Central America.

In some ways, threatening as they were, the major confron-
tations of the Kennedy era—the 1961 Berlin Wall crisis and the
1962 Cuban missile episode—seem simpler than today's more
complicated long-range challenges to the security and well-
being of the United States and its allies. During the early 1960s,
the United States enjoyed economic and military pre-eminence
—and a high degree of domestic agreement on defense and for-
eign policy matters. "Containment" of communism—Soviet,
Chinese, Vietnamese, or Cuban—was the order of the day. And,
as even France's Charles De Gaulle noted after the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, America's nuclear advantage over the Soviets was
"the essential guarantee of peace" in the world.

Today, that clear advantage is gone, thanks to a long, mas-
sive Soviet arms build-up. Now, Americans and Europeans alike
differ on how best to handle the Russians. The Soviet downing
of a South Korean airliner last September did not end the argu-
ments, notably over NATO's decision to deploy U.S. cruise mis-
siles and Pershing IIs this winter to match the Soviet nuclear
missiles aimed at Western Europe—unless agreement can be
reached with the Soviets on some sort of mutual reduction.
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration is attempting to gain an
accord with Moscow on strategic nuclear arms to follow SALT I
and II. Both U.S. efforts involve bargaining with an adversary
whose world-view, shaped by history and ideology, is vastly dif-
ferent from that of the West, and whose only claim to parity with
the West lies in its military power.

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES, 1983

CONTINENTAL U.S.
1,600,000
2 Marine Divisions
10 Army Divisions

CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ABROAD:
Latin America: 2,000
Sub-Sahara Africa: 35,000+
Mideast and
    North Africa: 300
S.E. Asia: 100

HAWAII
1 Army Division
1 Marine Brigade

■ NATO, U.S. Allies
● U.S. Bases elsewhere
⚓ Deployed U.S. Carrier Task Forces
■ Soviet-Warsaw Pact Countries
■ Countries with strong Soviet ties

Shown above are the major deployments of U.S. ground units and forward Navy carrier task forces; in addition, 55 U.S. advisers are in El Salvador, and 1600 Marines are "peacekeepers" in Lebanon. The general pattern has not changed since the mid-1950s. Yet China is no longer seen as an adver-

The United States is also no longer dominant in the economic field. The Arab "oil shocks" of the 1970s, the rise of Japan as a domestic U.S. competitor, Western trade rivalries and worldwide financial troubles—all these make "global interdependence" sound a good deal less benign to Americans than it did before it became a reality. Differences with European allies over the Mideast, over El Salvador, over East-West trade, and over arms control have further complicated matters.

For all its worries, the United States is still Number One. But it has not presented the world with a coherent defense policy since Kennedy's day. Reacting to Vietnam and Watergate, Congress put unprecedented curbs on presidential discre-

SOVIET UNION
182 Army Divisions
30 in the Warsaw Pact Countries

NATO Countries
282,000 Servicemen
4+ Army Divisions

KOREA
41,000
1 Army Division

JAPAN (including Okinawa)
46,000
1 Marine Division

Diego
Garcia

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD:
Latin America: 4,700   Mideast and
Sub-Sahara Africa: 3,600   North Africa: 8,000
S.E. Asia: 2,500   Afghanistan: 105,000

sary; France has left NATO; U.S. manpower in NATO is down from 434,000 in 1962; U.S. access to overseas bases has sharply declined; Moscow now has a big "open ocean" navy, and deploys Cuban proxies and/or Soviet advisers in Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.

tion in foreign affairs. At the same time, weakened party leadership and other changes in Congress made it extremely difficult for any White House incumbent to negotiate a firm deal with the senior lawmakers on Capitol Hill; the latter often could not deliver their "troops." Hence, Ronald Reagan's resort to bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions (on the MX missile, on Central American policy) to achieve a consensus. Some of America's difficulties, now as in the past, are self-inflicted.

In the articles that follow, the authors variously describe four of the elements in the continuing debate on U.S. national security policy: the Soviet Union, our NATO allies, our commitments overseas, and our all-volunteer military force.

THE VIEW FROM THE KREMLIN

by David Holloway

When Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, died in November 1982, he left a Soviet Union more powerful in military terms than ever before. For more than twenty years, a steady supply of new missiles, ships, and tanks had strengthened the Soviet armed forces.

As a result, the Soviet Union has moved from a position of military inferiority to parity with the United States.

Yet the Kremlin's view of the world is by no means as rosy as one might suppose merely from counting up Soviet SS-20 missiles and T-62 tanks. In reality, Brezhnev bequeathed his country some serious difficulties both at home and abroad. And many of these difficulties stemmed directly from the drive to build up Soviet military power and influence.

Contrary to some Western analyses, the Soviet Union has not built up its armed forces simply in reaction to moves by the United States. Rather, the growth of Soviet military strength has its roots in historic Russian fears of militarily superior foreign powers. The Bolsheviks inherited from Imperial Russia—the victim of invasions by the Mongols during the 13th century and the French during the 19th—a deep anxiety about security, which went hand in hand with a determination to be strong and to dominate potential enemies.

Josef Stalin played on these feelings in forcing through his policy of rapid industrialization. "One feature of the history of old Russia," he told Soviet factory directors in 1931, "was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness." The Soviet Union, he said, must catch up with the advanced capitalist countries to avoid further defeats.

Stalin created a powerful arms industry. But he also destroyed the Red Army High Command in the purges of the late 1930s and failed to heed warnings that Hitler was planning to attack. When the German blitzkrieg came on June 22, 1941, it caught the Red Army by surprise. The Wehrmacht's rapid advance during the first months of the war called into question the very survival of the Soviet state. Only by a tremendous effort

Red Army riflemen on winter maneuvers. The Warsaw Pact has three times as many tanks and twice as many men on the Central Front as does NATO. Yet, the Soviets must watch their East European allies; Russian tanks suppressed revolts in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and Prague (1968).

was the Red Army able to stop the German drive, turn the tide of battle, and push forward to Berlin. Even so, 20 million Russians died in the war.

The trauma of the "Great Patriotic War" strengthened old Russian attitudes toward security. Hitler had attacked in the belief that he could smash the Soviet state with one blow. The Nazi aggression showed Stalin how important it was to avoid weakness, or even the appearance of vulnerability. He did not relax. The victory over Germany reinforced Stalin's hopes of playing a decisive role in future world politics. But he was conscious of relative Soviet weakness and showed restraint in the face of American opposition to the expansion of Soviet power during the late 1940s in Greece, Iran, Turkey, and West Berlin.

Stalin's chief gains had come in Eastern Europe. The Red Army's advance gave Stalin control over the political destinies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania and thus promised to enhance Soviet security by closing off the traditional avenues of attack against Russia. But the presence of the Red Army in Eastern Europe provided no defense against the atomic bomb. After the war, Stalin launched major programs to develop the new technologies in which the

Soviet Union lagged behind the West: nuclear weapons, jet propulsion, rockets, and radar.

Nuclear weapons finally became available to the Soviet armed forces during the mid-1950s, along with the bombers and missiles that could carry them to targets in Europe and the United States. Earlier, Stalin had barred any public assessment of the impact of nuclear weapons on warfare, but now military policy had to be revised. Paralleling the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," the Soviet armed forces were reduced from 5,763,000 in 1952 to 3,623,000 in 1959, and conventional arms production was cut as the transition to nuclear weapons was made. Military spending remained at about $30 billion a year during this period.

'Sufficiency' Was Not Enough . . .

But according to the CIA, Soviet defense expenditures then grew by four or five percent annually from 1960 to 1976, and by two percent each year after that.

The Soviet build-up originated in the transition to a defense policy based on nuclear weapons. In 1960, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party and Soviet Premier, outlined a new strategic doctrine, which stressed that the firepower of nuclear weapons was more important than the number of men under arms. Khrushchev acknowledged that "mutual deterrence" already existed, in the sense that if one side launched a surprise attack against the other, the attacker would suffer enormous destruction in retaliation. A new world war was not inevitable, he said, but if it took place, it would begin with missile strikes deep into the enemy's homeland and end with the victory of socialism.

The Kennedy administration reacted to Khrushchev's boasts about Soviet strategic power by rapidly building up U.S. forces. By 1964, the year of Khrushchev's fall from power, the Soviet Union still lagged by a ratio of four-to-one behind the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). But Moscow made a determined effort to catch up and by 1972 had achieved

David Holloway, 39, is currently senior research associate at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. A former Wilson Center Fellow, he has also served as a lecturer in politics at the University of Edinburgh. Born in Dublin, Ireland, he was graduated from Cambridge University (1964) and is the author of The Soviet Union and the Arms Race *(1983).*

a rough parity in strategic weapons. The pace and scale of the Soviet effort surprised U.S. officials. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, for example, had concluded in April 1965 that the "Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race" and were not "seeking to develop a strategic nuclear force as large as ours." As Soviet deployments continued, this comforting belief was superseded in Washington by the fear that the Soviet Union was aiming for strategic superiority.

It soon became clear, moreover, that the SALT Agreements of 1972 would not stop the Soviet Union from building up its strategic forces. Indeed, Brezhnev told President Richard Nixon at the Moscow summit in May 1972 that he would press ahead with the weapons programs not covered by SALT. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union has deployed a new generation of long-range, land-based missiles: the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19 ICBMs, and the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), targeted on Western Europe and the Far East. These missiles are MIRVed (equipped with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) and are far more accurate than their predecessors.

The Reagan White House has asserted that the new Soviet ICBMs give Moscow a clear margin of superiority by enabling it, in theory, to destroy approximately 90 to 95 percent of American ICBMs in their silos in a single strike. If the Soviet Union launched such an attack, the President (so the argument runs) would be faced with the choice between accepting this disaster, or retaliating with surviving U.S. forces against Soviet cities— in the knowledge that the Soviet Union could then demolish American cities in response.

Ambiguous at Best

But this kind of doomsday scenario can hardly look as promising to the Soviet leaders as it seems threatening to the Reagan White House. The men in the Kremlin would have to assume that all their missiles would function as well as they have on their best test flights, and that the U.S. President would not then retaliate against the Soviet homeland with SLBMs and bombers, which carry about 75 percent of U.S. strategic warheads.

Soviet political leaders have always stressed that nuclear war would be catastrophic for all concerned. Since the late 1970s, moreover, they have explicitly denied that they are pursuing strategic superiority. Brezhnev said more than once that "to try to outstrip each other in the arms race or to expect to win a nuclear war is dangerous madness." The Soviets apparently concede that, for the time being at least, they cannot escape

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

"At each stage of the SALT negotiations, and with each new agreement, the nuclear forces on both sides have increased," wrote Daniel Patrick Moynihan in 1979.

The ostensible U.S. (and Soviet) aim in arms control talks, of course, has always been just the opposite: to slow the arms race and to lessen the likelihood of nuclear showdowns. Some agreements have worked. Following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, Washington and Moscow created an electronic "hot line" to speed communications in a crisis and signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which barred nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. And in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, they pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons to other countries.

But the superpowers have failed to agree on how to slow the relentless pace of the arms race, and ironically, American arms control theory may have contributed to the problem.

By the mid-1960s, it became clear that the Soviets would soon achieve strategic parity with the United States. Defense Secretary McNamara convinced President Johnson that the best way to deter a Soviet attack would be to hold Soviet cities hostage. The idea was "mutually assured destruction" (MAD): Each side's missiles would be able to survive and retaliate, thus deterring a first strike. Consequently, the United States equipped its new Minuteman and Polaris missiles with small, one-to-two kiloton warheads powerful enough to devastate vulnerable Soviet cities, but not to destroy most protected ICBMs.

Strategic arms control talks with Moscow were the next logical step. In 1969, President Nixon renewed negotiations begun during the Johnson years. The two-part 1972 SALT I accords raised popular hopes of an end to the arms race. The Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms limits the number of ICBM (1,054 for the U.S., 1,608 for the USSR) and SLBM (710 for the U.S., 950 for the USSR) "launchers," and restricts modernization of ICBMs.

Technology, however, was advancing faster than the arms control process. By 1968, the Johnson administration had begun testing MIRVs (multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles) to insure that even if Moscow launched a first strike, enough U.S. warheads would survive to overwhelm any Soviet defense system. The Nixon White House did not seek limits on MIRVs during the SALT talks because it assumed that superior American technology would keep the United States forever ahead.

The Soviets, in fact, never accepted the logic, such as it was, of "sufficiency" or of MAD. Without openly breaking SALT I, Moscow produced so many highly accurate, MIRVed SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s during the late 1970s that Pentagon analysts began to suspect that the Kremlin sought a first-strike capability. And the Sovi-

ets' concurrent deployment of 243 mobile SS-20s trained on Western Europe threatened to upset the regional nuclear balance.

SALT II—begun by Nixon and Ford, and signed by Carter—was designed to stabilize the arms race by setting equal numerical ceilings (2,250) for U.S. and Soviet bombers and missiles and by limiting each side's MIRVed missiles. But the treaty disappointed liberals by failing to achieve real *cuts* in nuclear weaponry. And critics on the Right complained that SALT II allowed the Soviets to keep their big "silo-busting" SS-18s while denying the United States the right to build any comparable first-strike missiles.

Even SALT's strongest advocates could not overlook the implications of the Soviet build-up. President Carter had no sooner signed the SALT II treaty in June 1979 than he asked Congress to fund development of the MX, a strategic missile carrying 10 warheads. Carter also endorsed Helmut Schmidt's proposal to deploy new U.S. intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe beginning in December 1983 to offset the SS-20s.

But Carter's critics had no easy answers, either. During the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan attacked Carter and SALT II and promised to close the "window of vulnerability." Yet by April 1983, Reagan's bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces, while backing the controversial deployment of 100 MX land-based missiles, argued that nothing could *guarantee* their survival. It also implied that the vulnerability of land-based ICBMs did not really matter if the Triad's other elements—submarines and bombers—could survive and retaliate.

The prospects for arms control have probably never been bleaker. Technology keeps racing ahead: The current development by both sides of strategic cruise missiles—cheap, easily hidden, and mobile—may pose insurmountable problems of verification.

The lack of progress in the Reagan administration's Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks with Moscow has spawned proposals to stop the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. But a "nuclear freeze" would probably eliminate any U.S. leverage on the Kremlin to reduce its nuclear arsenal; it would be impossible to enforce as long as the wary Soviets continue to bar mutual on-site inspection.

"Any form of atomic escapism"—hoping the bomb will go away, or treating it as just another weapon—"is a dead end," the 1983 Harvard Nuclear Study Group concluded. As a practical matter, the superpowers cannot *abolish* nuclear weapons. But they cannot abandon their efforts to control the arms race, for without further progress, the security of each may be further imperiled.

from their relationship of mutual vulnerability with the United States. The pursuit of clearcut superiority would merely stimulate further costly and dangerous competition, in which the Soviet Union might well fare worse.

Still, the Soviet Union *has* tried to develop ICBMs capable of destroying hardened American missile silos, and Soviet strategic writings suggest that if the Kremlin leaders believed World War III were inevitable, they would strike first in order to smash a U.S. attack before it got off the ground. The Soviet military leadership also apparently has not accepted the American idea of "assured destruction"—the notion that a Soviet capacity to survive a first strike and retaliate against U.S. cities would be enough to guarantee Soviet security. In 1969, the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal N. I. Krylov, spoke of imperialist propaganda "to the effect that there will be no victors in a future nuclear war." He said: "These false affirmations contradict the objective laws of history."

The combination of an offensive military doctrine with the Soviet political leaders' peaceful rhetoric looks at best ambiguous, at worst ominous, to Western statesmen.

Strategic programs have been the key element in the Soviet build-up, but conventional forces also have grown. Khrushchev had hoped to cut military manpower by one-third, as Soviet nuclear firepower increased, but the High Command opposed this plan. Following the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviet Union has vastly strengthened its ground forces facing China, which has become a potential adversary.

Pressing the West

In Europe, too, Soviet forces have been built up. During the early 1960s, Soviet strategists apparently assumed that any conflict in Europe would inevitably be nuclear from the start. But by the end of the decade, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, responding to NATO's doctrine of "flexible response" (which envisages a conventional phase in a European war), began to prepare for nonnuclear and nuclear operations.

During the 1980s, Moscow's thinking about the role of conventional forces seems to have undergone a further shift, thanks to the changing strategic balance. Apparently, the Soviets seek to use their nuclear forces—notably the SS-20s and tactical nuclear weapons—to deter NATO from resorting to nuclear weapons, and thus prevent a land battle in Europe from "going nuclear." If successful, this strategy would allow the Soviet Union to exploit its advantage in men, tanks and artillery; it

would also undermine the credibility of NATO's policy, namely, seeking to deter a Warsaw Pact attack by threatening to use nuclear weapons if allied armies in West Germany were overwhelmed.

The Soviet Union's growing ability to intervene in the Third World is another element that has worried the West, notably the United States. During the 1970s, the Soviet press argued that increasing Soviet strength made détente possible, because Western leaders now realized that they could not deal with the Soviet Union from a position of superiority, and were thus willing to adopt a more "realistic" view of their relations with Moscow.

Mixed Results

While growing Soviet power provided the basis for East-West cooperation, in Russian eyes it also provided new opportunities for extending Soviet influence in the Third World. Encouraged by the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and by the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa, General I. Shavrov, chief of the General Staff Academy, pointed to the "process of change in the correlation of forces on the world arena in favor of the forces of progress and socialism." During the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union shifted to greater use of military power (arms supplies, advisers, Cuban troops) to gain influence in Africa and Indochina. The Kremlin had always claimed for itself the leading role in moving the world from capitalism to communism and had long been active (with very mixed results) in the Third World; the interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan marked a new and more energetic phase in Soviet policy.

During the 1970s, Moscow did not seem to acknowledge that its build-up of military power and its threatening actions in the Third World might undermine détente with the West. But there is little doubt that Soviet policy during the 1970s did contribute to the collapse of Soviet-American détente by the end of the decade.

Indeed, since the late 1970s, the United States, alarmed by the Soviet Union's growing military power and its intervention in the Third World, has embarked on major weapons programs (the Pershing II IRBM, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM, and the Trident submarine) that could pose serious problems for Soviet security. Brezhnev apparently slowed the rate of growth of military spending during the late 1970s; now it seems that the High Command has been pressing for military outlays to grow more rapidly, this time in response to the American effort.

Moreover, Moscow's vigorous policies during the late 1970s drove its main adversaries—the United States, China, Japan, and Western Europe—closer together. To shake this quasi-alliance, the Soviet Union has been playing (with limited success) on differences between Western Europe and the United States and seeking some sort of rapprochement with China.

In spite of these shifts of emphasis, the new Kremlin leadership is unlikely to undertake bold new initiatives. Nor is the Soviet Union going to withdraw completely from its global role, as its rearming of Syria after the Lebanese war makes clear. The Soviets will pursue arms reduction agreements as a way of "managing" the strategic relationship with the United States, but they will not feel impelled to make far-reaching concessions to gain such agreements.

No Great Hopes

Why is this so? Military power is the area in which the Soviet Union has come closest to achieving its goal of matching and then overtaking the advanced capitalist powers.The Soviets' view is that parity, as they define it, must be maintained.

The Kremlin is likely to pursue better relations with the United States, but it will not hope for too much. The Soviets found the United States a difficult and unreliable partner during the 1970s, partly as a result of the vagaries of American domestic politics, and partly because Washington was unwilling (the Soviet leaders felt) to recognize the Soviet Union as a global superpower. But Soviet-American relations will continue to preoccupy the Kremlin because they are, in Soviet eyes, the main axis of world politics.

As a result, the Soviet Union may well temper its activity in the Third World, since it has become clear that its actions there affect the East-West relationship. Besides, the Kremlin's optimism during the mid-1970s about the prospects for expanding Soviet influence seems to have been replaced by a more sober assessment of the costs and benefits involved. The Soviet Union is embroiled in a counter-guerrilla war in Afghanistan; the Soviet-backed regimes in Angola and Ethiopia face strong internal opposition; and financial aid for Cuba and Vietnam is a drain on the Soviet economy.

In Eastern Europe, too, the Soviets face difficulties. The political situation in Poland remains unsettled. And the region as a whole, staggering under foreign debts totalling $80 billion in early 1983, has become an economic liability to the Soviet Union, which must provide subsidies to its allies even while its

own economy is suffering from a declining rate of growth.

When the Soviet Union's domestic headaches are added to its uncertain prospects abroad, a rather different picture emerges of the Soviet position in the world than if one simply looks at the size and weaponry of its formidable armed forces. As Soviet publications make clear, industrial and agricultural production has fallen short of domestic requirements, and technological innovation is sluggish. The Politburo is finding it more and more difficult to allocate resources for both military programs and civilian needs.

It is not surprising, then, that the Soviet leaders feel beleaguered. In the month before he died, Brezhnev gave a speech to senior military leaders in which he painted a bleak picture of the Soviet Union's international position. The United States, he said, had "launched a political, ideological, and economic offensive" against the Soviet Union and begun "an unprecedented arms race."

Although we know in principle that East-West relations are not a zero-sum game, that one side's loss is not necessarily the other's gain, we tend in practice to assume that because the world now appears more dangerous and complicated to the West, it must be more hospitable to the Soviet Union. But that is not so. The failure of détente with the United States during the 1970s has created serious difficulties for the Soviet Union. The fact that these troubles are in large measure of the Soviet Union's own making does not make them any easier for the Kremlin leaders to contemplate.

THE UNEASY ALLIANCE: WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

by Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert A. Pollard

"In this century," Senator Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.) observed not long ago, "Americans have died in large numbers on European battlefields. We are prepared to do so again if necessary, but only for a Europe that is dedicated to its own defense."

Once again, with anti-American demonstrations taking place in England and Germany, Americans are asking if the costs of sustaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)* exceed the benefits, and if the Europeans really share the U.S. view of the Soviet threat. But this is nothing new. "It is a myth," as European affairs analyst Anton DePorte notes, "that there was once a golden age when Europeans followed American leadership compliantly and cheerfully and put their faith in American power and goodwill without question."

American ambivalence toward Europe goes back to the early days of the Republic. In his "Farewell Address" on September 19, 1796, George Washington warned that "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. . . . 'Tis our true policy to stay clear of any permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world."

As long as the United States enjoyed physical isolation from Europe, American energies could be directed westward toward conquering the frontier. Great Britain, by maintaining a stable balance of power in Europe and keeping world seaways open, shielded its former American colonies from the intrigues of continental diplomacy—"the pest of the peace of the world," as Thomas Jefferson put it.

The unequivocal threat that Josef Stalin posed to U.S. security led after World War II to the first long-term peacetime deployment of American troops in Europe and, in 1949, to the

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*NATO's members are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United States, and West Germany. President Charles De Gaulle pulled France out of NATO's integrated military command in 1966, but it remains a member of the North Atlantic Council, and, unofficially, does joint planning with the allies. Spain joined in 1982, but has yet to integrate its armed forces into NATO.

"It's getting dark in here . . . . Somebody turn on the lights," reads the caption of this 1983 cartoon. European protesters have largely ignored the Soviet deployment of 243 SS-20s trained on Western Europe.

founding of NATO. In 1983, alongside British, German, Canadian, and French units, the United States maintains 248,000 servicemen, 700 combat aircraft, and 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany alone.

The mutual interests binding together the Alliance are still strong. Neither the Americans nor the Europeans alone can preserve the democratic values or basic economic and security interests that all have in common.

Nonetheless, the Alliance has led a troubled existence. Americans and their NATO partners have repeatedly argued over four key issues: military strategy and nuclear weapons, relations with the Soviets, distribution of defense burdens, and trade and monetary matters. But at no time have these four problems afflicted the allies all at once—until now.

Since the creation of NATO, the European allies have depended upon the United States to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. As long as U.S. strategic forces—first B-29 bombers stationed in England, now ICBMs, SLBMs, and B-52s—offered an inexpensive and convincing way to deter a Russian blitzkrieg, the Europeans balked at massive conventional rearmament. In effect, leaders in European capitals con-

ceded conventional superiority to the Warsaw Pact and accepted a version of Secretary of State (1953–59) John Foster Dulles's "massive retaliation" policy that relegated NATO ground forces in West Germany to the role of a "tripwire" against a Soviet attack. Arguably, this deterrent theory has worked: The Soviets have, on occasion, threatened the West, but have yet to break the peace.

Yet once the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, the American nuclear "umbrella" began to look a bit fragile. European leaders, notably French President Charles De Gaulle, asked if Washington would unleash its ICBMs in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe once Moscow could retaliate against the continental United States with its own ICBMs. Would the U.S. President risk New York to save Paris, Bonn, or Copenhagen?

Since the late 1960s, Soviet strategic parity with the United States has renewed European anxieties. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conceded in 1979 that the U.S. pledge "to defend NATO against Soviet attack with its own weapons is losing credibility because of the risk of exposing American cities to nuclear devastation by the USSR."

Starting in the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying 243 intermediate-range MIRVed SS-20 missiles and 100 Backfire bombers in western Russia—all aimed at West European targets. Ironically, the SALT I agreements, by roughly stabilizing the Soviet-American strategic balance, had magnified the importance of the Warsaw Pact's overall regional advantage in nuclear and conventional weapons. The Europeans, Kissinger has written, feared that "the Soviet Union might be tempted to exploit its preponderance of intermediate-range missiles for blackmail against Europe—reasoning that no American response with strategic weapons would be forthcoming."

NATO's reaction was a unanimous "two-track" decision in December 1979 to deploy 572 American-manned missiles (108

Edward A. Kolodziej, 48, is director of the Office of Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois. Born in Chicago, he was graduated from Loyola of Chicago (1956) and received his Ph.D. (1961) from the University of Chicago. He is the author of French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur *(1974). Robert A. Pollard, 32, is an associate editor of* The Wilson Quarterly. *Born in St. Louis, he was graduated from Brown University (1973) and received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina (1983). He is co-author of "The Era of American Economic Hegemony, 1945–1960" in* Economics and World Power *(1983) and author of a forthcoming study on economic security and the origins of the Cold War.*

Pershing II, 464 cruise) in Western Europe (West Germany, Britain, and Italy) beginning in December 1983. With the new missiles in place, European officials believed, the superpowers could not use their nuclear weapons in Europe without risking a nuclear exchange between their homelands; specifically, the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles once more tied America's fate to Europe's. On the other hand, NATO's pledge to reduce its deployment if the Soviets followed suit won the European states a role in superpower nuclear arms talks (the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations now taking place in Geneva).

Come Home, America?

Yet this two-track approach to re-establishing a "balance of terror" in Europe soon ran into difficulties. The refusal of the Reagan White House to push Senate ratification of the SALT II treaty and its acceleration of Jimmy Carter's strategic nuclear build-up reactivated the European Left, notably Germany's Green Party, and generated the most violent anti-American demonstrations on the continent since the late 1960s. Perhaps most unsettling to the Europeans were President Reagan's remarks of October 1981, suggesting that he "could see where you could have the exchange of tactical [nuclear] weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to push the [ICBM] button." Reagan's November 1981 "zero-option" proposal, issued without full warning to his allies—to cancel U.S. "deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles if the Soviets [would] dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles"—did not quiet European fears. Washington's terms seemed too stiff to bring the Soviets to any kind of agreement.

Leaders in Bonn, London, and Rome soon felt that they were facing the worst of all worlds: a destabilizing arms race, the overall deterioration of East-West relations, reduced prospects for genuine arms control, and strong criticism at home from the Left for having tied European interests to seemingly more bellicose U.S. policies.

Another source of discord has been American ire over Europe's failure to beef up conventional forces to meet the Warsaw Pact's three-to-one advantage in tanks and two-to-one edge in manpower along the West German border—the Central Front. (See chart, p. 117.) Georgetown University's Earl Ravenal points out that "Europe will continue to be the main beneficiary of American defense resources in 1984, accounting for $115 billion." A phased U.S. pullout of its nonnuclear forces, he argues,

U.S.–SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE, LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADS, 1962–1982

The number of Soviet and U.S. strategic "launchers" (above) has leveled off, thanks to the SALT I and SALT II talks, but the quantity of warheads has soared as both sides have MIRVed their ICBMs and SLBMs. Reagan's 1984 defense budget (below) calls for $274 billion to pay, train, and equip nearly 2.2 million active duty personnel (783,000 Army, 613,000 Air Force, 572,000 Navy, and 197,000 Marine Corps).

AMERICA'S 1984 DEFENSE BUDGET

BY FUNCTION

BY COMPONENT

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies; Congressional Research Service.

U.S.–SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING AND MANPOWER, 1962–1981

Moscow has outspent Washington on defense since 1970 (above), and the Warsaw Pact maintains a wide margin over NATO in men and tanks (below). But numbers can be misleading. In combat conditions, such as the 1967, 1973, and 1982 Middle East wars, U.S.–built fighters and tanks out-classed Arab-manned Soviet weapons. Moreover, 52 of the Red Army's 191 divisions (not all at full strength) are tied up on the Chinese border.

NATO–WARSAW PACT TANKS AND GROUND FORCES
ON THE CENTRAL FRONT, 1970–1982*

*Graph does not include French forces, which were withdrawn from NATO's integrated command in 1966, or Soviet forces in the Western districts of the Soviet Union.

would ease federal deficits and reduce the risk of this country being dragged into another war in Europe. At the very least, many U.S. Senators and Congressmen expect the Europeans to pick up a larger share of the defense burden, even if, realistically, they cannot forego dependence on U.S. nuclear weapons.

Differing Visions

But our European allies have in fact done more on defense. While Americans were preoccupied with Vietnam and Watergate, the continental members of the Alliance steadily modernized their armed forces. The Europeans now provide 70 percent of the manpower, combat aircraft, and tanks on the Central Front. Although the United States still outspends its allies on defense, the European share of overall NATO expenditures rose from 23 percent in 1969 to 39 percent in 1981. And West Germany and most other NATO allies retained conscription while the United States abolished it in 1973.*

Europeans and Americans also do not see eye-to-eye on "détente." For Americans, détente is vaguely associated with a brief period under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford that was climaxed by SALT I, the 1975 Helsinki accords normalizing post–World War II boundaries, and hopes for expanded trade. Many Americans believe that the West received little or nothing from détente, that Moscow used it to legitimize the oppression of Eastern Europe, and that it placed Western Europe in danger of being seduced—or "Finlandized"—by the Russian bear.

For Europeans, notably West Germans, détente has had a longer life, bringing gains in trade and cultural exchange. From 1970 to 1981, West German exports to the Soviet Union roughly quintupled. The Germans believe that importing Soviet natural gas ($4 billion worth, or 2.6 percent of their total energy needs, in 1982) has reduced their dependence upon uncertain Middle Eastern supplies.

Trade and monetary problems pose perhaps the greatest long-term difficulty for the Alliance. In European capitals, disenchantment with alleged U.S. economic mismanagement is widespread. High U.S. interest rates draw capital from Europe and force up rates on the continent; the exceptional strength of the U.S. dollar raises the cost of oil imports (which are paid for in dollars) and disrupts domestic economic programs, notably

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*Only Canada, Great Britain, Luxembourg, and the United States have all-volunteer forces. The five European members of NATO with the largest armed forces in 1982—Turkey (569,000 men), Germany (495,000), France (493,000), Italy (370,000), and Spain (347,000)—have all maintained some form of conscription.

in France. Moreover, Washington's tight money policy and its tilt toward protectionism appear to prolong the worst recession and highest unemployment in Western Europe in 50 years. At the Williamsburg economic summit in July 1983, Reagan promised to cut government deficits, lower the cost of borrowing, and stabilize the dollar. But European leaders and financiers fear that unless Washington drastically reduces its budget deficits, their countries will suffer from high interest rates and unemployment for the foreseeable future.

Washington's effort to restrict East-West trade is also irritating to the Europeans, notably the French and the Germans. The United States has repeatedly sought to use curbs on trade, investment, and technology transfer as economic weapons against the Soviets, as with President Carter's curtailment of grain exports and Reagan's restrictions of computer sales. Yet, the Soviets have usually found ways to circumvent U.S. controls, to find other suppliers, or to build plants whose output could substitute for imports from the West.

American Hypocrisy?

The prospects for effective economic pressure against Moscow today are even more remote. The Europeans now depend upon exports to the East to help sustain domestic employment and production. No wonder, then, that the leaders of West Germany, France, Italy, and even Britain's Margaret Thatcher refused to accede to President Reagan's requests during 1981–1982 to cancel their multi-billion dollar gas pipeline contracts with the Soviet Union. As European officials have made clear, they must answer to domestic interest groups every bit as vocal and volatile on foreign trade issues as their American counterparts. Reagan's decision, under pressure from American farmers, first to lift Carter's post-Afghanistan partial grain embargo and then, in 1983, to raise grain sales to Moscow by 50 percent, seemed blatantly hypocritical in European capitals.

Despite all the problems confronting NATO, it is likely that the Western allies will once again muddle through this most recent of its several postwar crises. The two-track decision remains NATO's position, despite massive protest demonstrations in London and Bonn. Even with its powerful Communist Party opposing the move, Italy is quietly preparing bases in Sicily for 112 U.S. cruise missiles. The Thatcher government, fortified by a resounding electoral triumph in June 1983, will begin installing 96 U.S. cruise missiles in England by December 1983 if U.S. talks on Intermediate Nuclear Forces with the Soviet Union

break down. And amid continuing demonstrations against the missiles, West Germany under Helmut Kohl remains America's good friend. As former Chancellor Willy Brandt argues, "It would be wrong . . . if people in the United States took the European anti-missiles attitude for anti-Americanism. . . ."

François Mitterand's France, out of NATO since 1966, has supported the two-track decision and helped to steady wavering West German resolve. Without abandoning its independent nuclear force, the *force de frappe* (18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, five submarines with 80 SLBMs, and 34 Mirage bombers), France is willing to station Pluton tactical nuclear missiles in West Germany to reinforce the three armored divisions (48,500 troops) that it maintains in the western region of that country—forces that could serve as a backup for NATO in the event of a Soviet invasion.

The conflicts remain. On occasion, the Europeans still fear that the United States will either abandon them or go too far, blundering into war with the Soviets. They need our nuclear deterrent to protect them from Moscow; not surprisingly, they feel uneasy with their lack of control over its use. Americans worry about "Finlandization," especially of West Germany. And, through periodic threats and blandishments, the Soviets will seek, as they have since 1945, to divide Americans from Europeans, Frenchmen from Germans, Norwegians from Britons, Left from Right. Yet, international economic upheavals, such as another Mideast oil crisis or a world financial breakdown, may do more to test the Alliance than anything the Soviets can do short of war.

In the long run, the strength of the West depends as much on European and American confidence as on raw military power. If Americans and Europeans, two centuries after the American Revolution, must hang together or hang separately in assuring their defense, they must also learn to "hang loose," to remember that NATO, for all its flaws, has kept the peace in Europe for 35 years, and, with common sense, flexibility, and consistent leadership, will continue to do so for some time to come.

LIMITS ON THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

by Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

"You can't send soldiers off to war without having the support of the American people," Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer told newsmen just before retiring last June. "I think that's one of the great lessons that comes out of Vietnam."

Meyer urged "a face-to-face discussion between the President and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the military as to what the hell they want us to do" before the White House sends troops off to fight in Central America, or elsewhere.

A Vietnam veteran, America's top soldier was voicing the "never again" sentiment that has permeated the officer corps since 1973: no U.S. military intervention abroad without a decisive strategy and an unequivocal congressional mandate. A clearcut U.S. strategy will be hard to achieve—in good part because Congress, in its present mood, is unlikely to give the White House a mandate for action anywhere, short of World War III. In brief, President Ronald Reagan enjoys much less freedom of action than did Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1965, when he sent the first Marine units to Vietnam. The 1973 War Powers Act, for instance, bars presidential dispatch of troops abroad for more than 90 days without congressional approval; the House of Representatives has sought to prevent Reagan from giving covert aid to rebel groups attempting to overthrow the Soviet-supported, anti-American Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Indeed, Congress, fearing "another Vietnam," has sharply curbed U.S. efforts to assist, with money and advisers, the lackluster El Salvadoran regime's economic and military campaign against 6,000 Marxist-led guerrillas. And, in so doing, Congress may be bringing on the very dilemma it (and the White House) wants to avoid: sending in U.S. combat troops or accepting a guerrilla victory in America's backyard.

More broadly, what has also changed since the early 1960s is that America's military capabilities do not match its diplomatic commitments overseas, notably in the Middle East.

In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter stated that the United States would intervene "with any means necessary, including military force," to repel any "attempt by any outside

force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region." Responding to the Khomeini revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force (actually a new designation for already existing home-based Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine units) to protect the area stretching from the Horn of Africa to Egypt and Pakistan. In the same spirit, Congress revived draft registration (but not draft call-ups). Yet the ability of U.S. forces to protect American interests in this vast region remains questionable—for a variety of reasons.

First, although the likeliest current threats to U.S. security—in the Persian Gulf and Central America—are nonnuclear, the forces designed to meet them are usually underfunded and hence left in a state of relatively low readiness. Most U.S. troops overseas are stationed in Western Europe, regarded as the most crucial "front," but, thanks to the nuclear deterrent, the least likely scene of hostilities.*

For most of the postwar era, its nuclear superiority gave the United States the edge in any major showdown with its prime adversary, the Soviet Union, notably in the 1962 Cuban missile affair. It also permitted Washington and its allies to maintain far smaller ground forces than did the Soviets. This "age of cheap security" finally ended around 1970, as the Russians won nuclear parity; but by then, other factors, notably the drawn-out Vietnam War, had revived the popular American aversion to large conventional forces in peacetime.

The Vietnam War, of course, is the central episode in the development of U.S. defense policy since 1945. Most analysts now agree that the Vietnam conflict was the first war in U.S. history that the armed forces were materially prepared to fight, and where American troops won every major battle. And yet, North

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*The 19 active U.S. Army and Marine divisions, each with 15,000–18,500 men at full strength, would be hard pressed to meet NATO and other overseas commitments. Four divisions are in West Germany and three in the Pacific; six in the U.S. are pledged to reinforce NATO. The Rapid Deployment Force can call upon another four-and-one-third divisions, leaving only one-and-two-thirds uncommitted divisions. Fifty-nine of the U.S. Navy's 63 amphibious ships scattered from Okinawa to the Mediterranean would be needed to transport a single division overseas. The only pool upon which the Pentagon could draw to fight any prolonged "small" war, without over-committing its active forces, would be the nine divisions, 34 air transport squadrons, and 170 transport ships of the U.S. reserve forces.

Samuel F. Wells, Jr., 48, is currently on research leave from his duties as secretary of the International Security Studies Program at the Wilson Center. Born in South Carolina, he was graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1957 and took his M.A. (1961) and Ph.D. (1967) at Harvard. He is the co-editor of, and contributor to, Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789 (1984).

Salvadoran officer candidates at Fort Benning, Georgia. More than 5,600 Salvadorans have been trained by U.S. advisers at Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, N.C., in Panama, and in El Salvador. Reagan has tried to use aid and diplomacy as a substitute for U.S. troops in Central America.

Vietnam triumphed, primarily because President Johnson tried to "save South Vietnam" on the cheap. To avoid political attacks from Left or Right, Johnson variously refused to assess the true long-range costs and benefits of U.S. intervention, to seek explicit congressional approval, to sacrifice his Great Society programs to the needs of the war, to frame a decisive strategy, to mobilize the reserves, or to prepare the American public for a long, costly struggle. This intellectual and moral confusion in Washington soon led to demoralization and division across the country, exacerbated by Richard Nixon's 1973–1974 Watergate scandal, and ultimately, to Communist victory.

The legacy of Vietnam lives on. The immediate results included the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which placed the primary burden for regional defense on American allies; the abolition of the draft in 1973; the 1973 War Powers Act; the 1975 Clark Amendment, which forbade U.S. covert involvement in the Angolan civil war; deep cuts in the defense budget during the early 1970s; and a generalized readiness in the press and Congress to believe the worst about the military, the CIA, and U.S. commitments abroad.

"By 1975," Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution ob-

serves, "the dominant 'lesson' was that Washington should take no risks, that it should not begin messy involvements in the Third World if there is *any* danger that they cannot be concluded without considerable sacrifice."

The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 may largely have signified a reaction to Watergate rather than to Vietnam. Nonetheless, the former Georgia governor promised to cut defense spending. He harbored mixed feelings about Vietnam. "We have an aversion to military involvement in foreign countries," he said in response to a newsman's question about troubles in Zaire in May 1977. "We are suffering, or benefiting, from the experience that we had in Vietnam." During his first year in office, Carter cut the Pentagon budget (from $132 billion in FY 1976 to $124 billion in FY 1978), canceled the B-1 bomber, and first advanced, then retracted under protests from Congress and our Asian allies, a proposal to withdraw 30,000 U.S. troops from Korea.

El Salvador Is Not Vietnam

The Soviet dispatch of 17,000 advisers to Ethiopia and South Yemen and 23,000 Cubans to Angola did not bring on U.S. military intervention, but the sudden collapse in Iran of the pro-American Shah's regime in January 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the seemingly endless captivity of 53 hostages in the Teheran embassy did stir the American public. By the end of 1980, Americans had begun to feel "troubled, aggressive, tough, and resentful," according to pollster Daniel Yankelovich.

Like the 1950 Communist invasion of South Korea, an international crisis had galvanized popular support for rearmament. In January 1980, President Carter sought to increase defense expenditures by more than four percent annually (after inflation) over five years, while Ronald Reagan campaigned for an even higher rate of Pentagon spending.

In the newly elected administration's plans, most of the additional "Reagan money" was earmarked for ships, missiles, and aircraft with the Navy and "strategic deterrence" the chief benefactors.

But the current trouble spots lie elsewhere.

In "the American backyard," the six-year-old guerrilla war in El Salvador poses the most immediate threat to U.S. interests. This low-intensity struggle is partly sustained by assistance from Nicaragua, which is in turn supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Happily for the White House, El Salvador is very different "on the ground" from South Vietnam, despite the seemingly similar images on U.S. television of jungles, moun-

tains, guerrillas, helicopters, and U.S. advisers.

The guerrillas, mostly led by admirers of Fidel Castro, belong to five different factions; they lack the tenacity, organization, and willingness to die that characterized the Vietnamese Communists. They have no counterpart to Ho Chi Minh. Their spokesmen concede that they do not have, as yet, the peasant support necessary for a true popular revolt. Nor do they enjoy sanctuaries in neighboring countries; both Honduras and Guatemala are run by pro-American regimes. The greatest asset of the rebels has been the sloth, corruption, and factionalism of El Salvador's military leadership, which has been unable—or unwilling—to curb right-wing death squads, and unable to win many hearts and minds. The people simply try to survive.

In El Salvador, as elsewhere in the region, the United States could benefit from the fact that Western ideas of democracy and pluralism are less alien than they were to the Indochinese. But prospects for a negotiated settlement seem slim in the absence of an effective political center and of any real incentive for either side to make a deal. Indeed, as Americans should know, civil wars, by their very nature, seldom end in compromise.

Almost no one, least of all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *wants* to commit thousands of U.S. troops to Central America. To avoid this prospect, calm Congress, and still ward off a Marxist victory, the Reagan administration has adopted an *ad hoc* mix of diplomacy and covert (CIA) and overt (military training and economic aid) assistance to help friendly forces in Central America.

Good-bye to Pluralism

In nearby Nicaragua, the United States had helped to maintain the corrupt and cruel regime of the Somozas, father and son, since 1936. In a reversal of policy, the Carter administration granted recognition and some $75 million in economic aid to the Sandinista rebels after they ousted Anastasio Somoza in June 1979. Since then, the Managua regime under Rafael Cordoba, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, and Daniel Ortega Saavedra has moved sharply to the left, started a Soviet-supplied arms build-up, invited 3,500 Soviet and Cuban advisers into the country, jailed opponents, curbed the press, and, generally, failed to live up to its pledges to the Organization of American States to promote democratic "pluralism." Several leading Sandinistas have fled into exile or joined the guerrilla opposition. At the behest of President Reagan, the CIA is supplying 8,000 to 10,000 anti-Sandinista guerrillas, or "contras," on the northern (Honduran) and southern (Costa Rican) borders with light

THE DOLLARS AND POLITICS OF DEFENSE:
CARTER AND REAGAN

With annual $200 billion federal deficits in prospect, and national elections approaching, the "guns versus butter" debate over President Reagan's projected $1.8 trillion, five-year Pentagon budget is likely to continue.

Senator Gary Hart (D.-Colo.), for example, has called the Reagan plan "excessive and inappropriate in view of the condition of our economy and the severe budget cutbacks the administration proposes in other areas." But others, such as the Hoover Institution's Albert Wohlstetter, reply that the critics treat "what the founding fathers called the 'common defense' as if it were only one more domestic interest group clamoring for an entitlement or a larger share of the domestic pie. . . ." Defense spending, Wohlstetter contends, must be determined by a careful calculation of external threats to American security.

Today's difficulties stem in part from Vietnam and the uncompleted rearmament efforts of the early 1960s. The Kennedy administration greatly expanded U.S. strategic and conventional forces. But the $130 billion Vietnam War intervened, slowing both strategic weapons procurement and the research and development needed for overall modernization.

Presidents Nixon and Ford, reflecting the public's post-Vietnam antipathy to the military, cut defense spending (in constant 1972 dollars) from $98.1 billion in 1969 to $66.9 billion in 1976. Only part of the decline can be traced to the winding down of the war: U.S. military manpower shrank to its lowest levels since 1950.

Both friends and foes of Reagan's build-up often forget that the current upsurge began in earnest under Jimmy Carter. Carter did slash Ford's *projected* budget for FY 1978 by several billion dollars, but real spending (adjusted for inflation) actually rose slightly as Carter sought to meet his 1977 pledge to NATO to increase real defense spending by three percent a year. And the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Carter to ask Congress for even higher increases.

Carter's public vacillation on defense issues made him an easy target for candidate Ronald Reagan during the 1980 election campaign. But Carter began many of the key programs now associated with Reagan: the MX strategic missile, the M-1 tank, the Rapid Deployment Force, the Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, and the improvement of communications and command. The Democrat's 1980 partial grain embargo also anticipated Reagan's economic pressure against the Soviet bloc. "Apart from the SALT II agreement," Harvard's Samuel Huntington notes, "no broad military concept or policy of the Carter administration was rejected by the Reagan administration."

Yet Reagan shows far more determination. He displays no doubts about the value of military strength in superpower relations; rearmament does not take a back seat to arms control. In another break with Carter, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has promised to answer Soviet aggression (presumably, against Western Europe) by launching counteroffensives against the enemy's outposts (e.g., Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam), rather than simply relying on traditional defensive strategy in the NATO area.

The Reagan program's most striking features are new conventional weapons and forces designed for combat outside Europe, including the Persian Gulf. The lion's share of the new Reagan funds would go to the Navy to build 112 new warships (for a total of 650 combat vessels by 1995)—amphibious assault ships, two new large $3.4 billion nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Aegis guided-missile cruisers, SSN-68 attack submarines, and the reactivation of Iowa-class battleships with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Congress has already trimmed Reagan's defense program (by eight percent in 1983), in part to meet domestic outcries, but also because the White House plan contains some major contradictions. Reagan, like some of his predecessors, has emphasized long-term purchases of shiny new cruisers and bombers but has slighted "readiness" of existing forces and refused to revive conscription.

And Reagan may someday regret his frequent claims—designed to arouse popular support for his defense budgets—that the Russians have won strategic superiority over the United States. As the Brookings Institution's William Kaufmann observes, playing the "numbers game" can only backfire: No matter how much the United States spends, it will probably never catch up with the Soviets in manpower, tanks, and even strategic weapons, thus reinforcing the very perception of American weakness that Reagan seeks to avoid.

Finally, the Reagan administration has yet to launch a comprehensive review of its foreign and defense goals, spurring doubts even among its allies that it has matched means to ends. For example, the early confusion within the White House over U.S. aims in Central America has made it difficult to win congressional votes for covert aid to Nicaragua's "contra" rebels. As budget deficits stir opposition to rearmament, the Reagan White House will have to set clearer priorities—or leave the choices to its adversaries on Capitol Hill.

arms, advisers, and other assistance.

For all its strong rhetoric and military maneuvers in the area, the Reagan White House has been unable to move directly either to force reforms on the Salvadoran regime or to supply friendly forces with adequate military and financial aid. Vietnam haunts the debates in Congress. Indeed, the administration has been reluctant to increase the small number (55) of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador partly because of congressional outcries and partly because of the apparent popular U.S. indifference toward the fate of Central America. In a *New York Times*/CBS poll conducted in June 1983, only 25 percent of those surveyed knew that the United States was supporting the Salvadoran government, and only 13 percent realized that Washington sides with the insurgent "contras" in Nicaragua. With the growing debate in Washington, public awareness may increase.

"Power Projection"?

In the Middle East, which in early 1983 supplied nine percent of U.S., 49 percent of French, and 66 percent of Japanese oil imports, Washington has a major commitment. The United States has pledged not only to safeguard the independence of Israel but to preserve the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the Western industrial countries and Japan. In keeping with the Carter Doctrine, President Reagan asserted in October 1980 that "There's no way that we could stand by and see [Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf] taken over by anyone that would shut off the oil."

The big question is whether the United States could execute the military effort and muster the political fortitude required to honor this commitment, should the worst happen.

For the moment, no grave menace exists, even though the border war between Iran and Iraq that erupted in September 1980 has threatened more than once to spill over into other oil-producing Gulf states, notably Kuwait. The most likely trouble in the Gulf would be an externally aided rebellion against a pro-U.S. regime. To help meet such a contingency, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theoretically can summon 300,000 men from all four services to fill the ranks of, or support, the Rapid Deployment Force. But as of mid-1983, the RDF for all practical purposes consisted of 17 loaded supply ships at anchor in the lagoon of Diego Garcia, five to seven steaming days from the Gulf, ready to support 12,500 Marines for about 30 days of fighting. The Marines would be flown in from California to "marry up" with the supplies. In the words of Senator John Glenn (D.-Ohio), a former Marine, the RDF "has just three prob-

HMS SHEFFIELD: The killer blow

After the 1982 sinking of H.M.S. Sheffield by a single Argentine Exocet off the Falklands, congressional critics urged the U.S. to build smaller, more numerous ships that may offer less inviting targets to enemy missiles than do a few huge but vulnerable $3.4 billion super-carriers.

lems: It's not rapid, it's not deployable, and it's not a force."

Even if the President, in the event of a crisis, could win congressional approval for a U.S. troop deployment in the Gulf, the RDF would face major obstacles. The local geography is unfavorable. And the realities belie easy Washington talk of "power projection." Consider, for instance, an intervention by the RDF to secure the five main Saudi oil fields, which cover an area (10,000 square miles) about twice the size of Connecticut. In an emergency—e.g., the imminent destruction of the Saudi oil fields by hostile sapper groups—the RDF's designated Navy, Marine, Army, and Air Force personnel would have to reach their destination very quickly. Just to air-land a 15,000-man division with three days of supplies would require numerous roundtrip flights by the limited U.S. fleet of 234 C-141 and 70 C-5 giant cargo planes. Even under the best conditions, a Marine Corps study estimated in 1981, "the initial forces deployed [would] run out of rations (and bullets, if committed) before the last of the division is landed," and before the ships at Diego Garcia could reach the Gulf.

Other difficulties could plague an airlift of even modest proportions. The United States has air landing agreements (for re-

fueling) with Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey, as well as access to ports in Somalia and Kenya, but in every case, full cooperation by the host government would depend upon the politics of the emergency. Other facilities once available to U.S. air or naval forces—in Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, and Malta, to name a few—are now gone, and the growing unwillingness of our European allies to offer landing rights in advance could require eleventh-hour negotiations to secure them. The U.S. airlift to Israel during the 1973 October War illustrated some of the problems: NATO allies, such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands, refused the Americans permission to use their bases to resupply Israel for fear of offending the Arabs, and the U.S. C-5As and C-141s had to be refueled in flight by tanker aircraft at long intervals. To deliver one ton of materiel to Israel required five tons of fuel, and therefore greatly reduced the supplies that could be airlifted.

Yet despite its limited ability to intervene decisively, the RDF—with 1,800 Marines sometimes stationed in the Indian Ocean and a large backup force, including 12,500 California-based Marines, in the continental United States—may, by its very existence, serve as a useful deterrent to local conflagrations.

However, the chief deterrent to any massive Soviet thrust through Iran—the oft-cited "worst case"—would not be the RDF, but the strong prospect that such a move would risk setting off World War III.

It seems clear that in order to help NATO offset a Soviet threat in Europe, to diminish reliance on nuclear weapons, to deter attacks on South Korea, and to be prepared to fight in the Gulf and the Caribbean, the United States must mobilize, train, and equip its conventional combat forces more effectively than in the past. Yet the early Reagan defense budgets give top priority to the procurement of big-ticket, high-technology weapon systems—the B-1 bomber, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Trident submarines, the MX missile, and F-15 fighter aircraft. In the likely event that Congress cuts Pentagon outlays, the readiness of the general purpose forces will probably suffer disproportionately. Budgetary constraints aside, the nation has yet to determine when and how it would use its forces in all of the places it is pledged to defend.

THE HUMAN ELEMENT

by Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and Peter Braestrup

"I'm telling you," Command Sergeant Major Ronald Hammer told a *New York Times* reporter at Fort Hood, Texas, last spring, "we are so much better today than we were a year ago." Because the Army is signing up better-qualified soldiers and discharging those who do not perform well, the "[one] thing you don't hear," added Sgt. Major Malachi Mitchel, "is that old standard: I came in the Army to keep from going to jail."

This marks a major change. After the demise of the draft, a domestic political casualty of the Vietnam War, in 1973, the nation's armed services suffered well-publicized recruitment and retention problems. One result was low morale and combat capability. A study during the 1970s, for example, showed that more than 20 percent of the U.S. Seventh Army's tank gunners in West Germany facing the Soviets could not properly aim their battlesights. The services were forced to undertake remedial reading programs for their recruits and simplify training manuals to comic book level.

Such trends were especially alarming to the military chiefs in view of the services' shrinking size, the nation's unshrinking overseas commitments, and the demanding new battlefield technology. Since the Korean War, the United States had been developing a "capital-intensive" military force, with a heavy emphasis on high technology, air mobility, communications, flexible tactics, and command and control. Gone were the days of World War II, when the ground and air forces, in particular, relied on *mass* to overcome the foe. Today, to offset the quantitative advantages of its chief adversary, the Soviet Union, in men and weaponry, the United States (like the Israelis) must depend on *quality* in both. Mobile tactics, heat-seeking missiles, new radar, helicopter gunships, more complicated tanks, ships and aircraft—all require smarter fighters and technicians than did the simpler warfare of old.

Since 1980, the Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Navy have enjoyed something of a windfall. The dramas of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis stirred more public support for the military, even in academe; the number of colleges with Army Reserve Officer Training Corps units has grown from 287 to 315 since 1975. Higher recruit pay ($573 per month) and fringe benefits have helped. And above all, the dearth of civilian

jobs, aggravated by the 1982–83 recession, has made a three-year hitch, or even a 20-year service career, attractive to more young Americans.*

Although the Army is the least popular of the services, 86 percent of its enlistees during the first half of fiscal year 1983 were high school graduates, compared with 54 percent in 1980. Efficiency and unit morale have risen; rates of unauthorized absence and desertion have gone down. In fact, the Pentagon is now worried that its brighter recruits may be serving under too many not so bright sergeants and petty officers—those who entered service during the 1970s when enlistment standards were lowered in order to fill up the ranks.†

No More Mutinies

Problems still remain. Contrary to the predictions of the 1970 Gates Commission, which recommended the all-volunteer force, U.S. peacetime military strength has declined from more than 2.6 million men and women in the early 1960s (before Vietnam) to around 2.1 million today, affecting manning levels of U.S. Navy ships and U.S. Army units assigned to back up NATO. Nine of the Army's 16 active divisions, for example, now depend on call-ups of designated Reserve or National Guard units to bring them to full combat strength.

To maintain even the current reduced force level, the four armed services must recruit each year about 350,000 enlisted men—or roughly one in four of all eligible males. Similarly, the end of the draft has hurt recruiting for the National Guard, although organized Ready Reserve units of the Navy, Air Force, and Marines now approach 100 percent of authorized strength.

In both active and reserve units, minority members account for a rising proportion of the enlisted ranks, particularly in Army and Marine Corps rifle companies. Blacks made up 37 percent of all Army entrants in 1980, thrice their proportion of the

*In mid-1983, the unemployment rate for male Americans aged 18 and 19 stood at 21 percent (versus 13 percent in 1978).

†Half of all first term re-enlistees in 1982 were in the Army's lowest mental category (Category IV).

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., 49, is professor of sociology at Northwestern University, a former Army draftee, and a former Wilson Center Fellow. Born in Chicago, he received his B.A. from Princeton (1956) and his Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles (1963). His books include The American Enlisted Man *(1970) and* Public Opinion and the Military Establishment *(1971). Peter Braestrup, 54, is editor of* The Wilson Quarterly.

Unlike peacetime military service, war pushes men to their limits. Life's Tom Lea sketched an exhausted Marine on Peleliu in the South Pacific in 1944. "His mind had crumbled in battle, and his eyes were like two black empty holes in his head," Lea wrote.

population as a whole. Yet, during the recent economic recession, more whites have entered the services; only 23 percent of Army recruits were blacks in 1983. Because blacks re-enlist at a 50 percent higher rate than do whites, the percentage of blacks in the Army is still increasing, but at a much lower rate than before. More important, the racial violence that jarred the military during the 1970s (including sabotage and near-mutinies on board Navy aircraft carriers) has receded; black Americans are, increasingly, in leadership positions.*

Still under way is the Pentagon's bold experiment in using more women in more military jobs. With the end of the draft in 1973, Pentagon civilian planners, over the objections of the military chiefs, pushed the recruitment of women as a politically painless way to make up for shortfalls in male enlistments. In the heyday of ERA, Congress did not object. All told, the proportion of women in the ranks rose from one percent in 1973 to nine percent (or 196,000) in 1983, ranging from 11 percent in the Air Force to four percent in the Marine Corps.

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*Blacks now account for 25 percent of the Army's senior sergeants, nine percent of the officers; 26 are generals.

NATIONAL SERVICE?

A number of proposals for reviving the draft in various guises have cropped up in Congress and academe since the end of conscription in 1973. Some advocates emphasize equity: Is it fair to rely on market-place incentives to fill the armed forces' ranks, hence allowing more affluent Americans to avoid service? Or, like France, Sweden, and most other European countries, should the United States insist that every young man do his bit? Others, notably senior military men, de-plore the "divorce" between college-educated youths and the experi-ence of service to the nation. Still others believe that reinstating conscription would serve as a clear sign of the U.S. "resolve" that the Reagan administration wants to demonstrate to the Soviets.

A broader notion of "national service," military or civilian, for young men and women seems to have more popular support. In Feb-ruary 1982, Gallup found that 71 percent of its respondents favored some sort of obligatory plan. A study of various plans—and their likely effects on the military, the job market, and college enrollments —has been commissioned by the Ford Foundation for completion by year's end. The foundation's president, Franklin A. Thomas, has sug-gested that some form of universal service (properly debated, tested, and managed) might not only fill the needs of the armed services for high-quality personnel, but also help local civilian governments. About four million boys and girls now turn 18 each year.

"No one believes that national service will work magic on all its enrollees," Thomas observed. He cited the Pentagon's "mixed suc-cess" in uplifting below-average recruits (under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's "Project 100,000" during the 1960s). Nor, said Thomas, could such a service plan substitute for higher economic growth and better education as a solution to high youth unemploy-ment, especially among minorities. But it might provide a useful and satisfying experience for most of the participants.

On the civilian side, a 1978 Urban Institute study found that with-out displacing older workers, some three million "real" (not make-work) jobs existed that could be filled by college-age youths—in local police and fire protection, public health, forest conservation, day care, tending the elderly. One precedent: the much-praised Ci-vilian Conservation Corps (CCC) of the 1930s. As Thomas suggests (and the Pentagon emphasizes), there exist major imponderables in terms of selection, complexity, management, training, costs, and discipline, even if local governments share responsibility and ex-penses. The crucial test of any national service plan, of course, would be the response of American youth to an official revival of President John F. Kennedy's 1961 appeal: "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country."

Women were admitted to ROTC in 1972 and to the service academies in 1976. The separate branches for women—the Women's Army Corps (WAC), the Women Marines—were abolished: *Integration* was the watchword. By 1978, excepting direct combat roles (e.g., fighter pilots, infantrymen, aircraft carrier crews), most "nontraditional" positions were open to women at home and overseas—to a degree that astonished America's allies, including the Israelis, who restrict army women to rear-echelon duties.

The Army found that its women recruits were better educated (at least during the 1970s), more highly motivated, and less likely to desert than men. Yet, as congressional committees later learned, there were also unforeseen difficulties: "fraternization" between senior males and junior females, disruptive to unit morale; pervasive male resentment, notably at West Point and Annapolis, over perceived "double standards" in discipline and physical requirements. Attrition among women assigned to nontraditional tasks, e.g., driving trucks, was far higher than among women assigned to "traditional" office and health-care jobs. Overall, women enlistees dropped out faster than men.

Readiness for War

The Pentagon also discovered that young women have babies. After 1973, pregnancy was no longer cause for automatic separation from the service. It became common to see obviously pregnant soldiers at missile batteries in West Germany or pregnant sailors aboard Navy supply ships.* Seven to 10 percent of all service women, married or unmarried, become pregnant in the course of a year.

Amid such realities, the push toward a "gender-neutral" military may be ending, although recruiting of women will continue. Congress decided to exclude women from the reinstituted draft registration of 1980. There were few ensuing protests from feminists. In the fall of 1982, male and female Army recruits were again segregated in basic training, following Marine Corps practice, and, during the spring of 1983, certain heavy-duty occupations were again restricted to men. Early reports indicated few complaints from either sex.

In plain fact, the Pentagon, without much protest from Congress but with some bitterness among women officers, has

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*In 1979, Jimmy Carter's Army Secretary, Clifford Alexander, warned U.S. commanders in Europe that in case of Soviet attack, they would have to evacuate an estimated 1,700 pregnant Army soldiers from the war zone at once.

quietly decided to put the emphasis on "operational readiness" for war, not new career opportunities for women, whenever the two goals conflict.

As time goes on, the Pentagon's heavy reliance on "market-place" incentives, i.e., money, and "front loading" of pay may hurt the military's effectiveness. The pay scale for junior enlisted men is now three times greater in constant dollars than it was during the draft era. An 18-year-old recruit, for example, can expect to start earning the annual equivalent of $14,500 (including $8,000 in cash wages) within 12 months. Yet an Army first sergeant, E-8, after 20 years of service, earns only about twice that amount; as he sees it, his relative status has diminished in the all-volunteer force.

A Political Problem

Moreover, the young soldiers' large discretionary income—and more permissive Army regulations—have probably undercut the group cohesion, so vital in wartime, that barracks life used to encourage. A visitor to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or Fort Hood, Texas, can see the signs: parking lots full of sports cars and stereos in almost every barracks room. Fewer and fewer soldiers eat in the "dining facility," as the old mess hall is now called. Forty percent of Army junior enlisted personnel are married, twice the proportion common during the draft era. More and more soldiers, male or female, rent apartments off base and leave the military environment promptly at 4:30 P.M.

The service chiefs have resisted the Pentagon's post-Vietnam shift to a more "civilian" ethos, even as the Labor Department this year, for the first time, counted service personnel as part of the nation's "labor force." Indeed, the military services have renewed their emphasis on the distinctive "institutional" and "professional" aspects of life in uniform. The Army, for example, is moving toward a British-style "regimental" system, with a permanent home base for the units of each regiment to which they return after, say, a tour in South Korea or Europe. It is also trying to reduce personnel turnover in units, notably among officers. It wants more housing, more services-in-kind, not just more pay, to bind the Army closer together and encourage re-enlistments of needed specialists.

In the long run, such approaches (characteristic of most modern armies) run at odds with the "job"-oriented philosophy of the civilian econometricians who have dominated Pentagon manpower policy since the end of the draft. To hold key technicians, the Pentagon civilians are pressing for pay scales gov-

erned by specialty, not by rank, to reduce "fringes" and services in favor of cash.

Both the econometricians and the military chiefs have yet another contingency to face. The Reagan administration's plans call for a gradual increase in military manpower (from 2.1 million in 1983 to 2.3 million in 1987), mostly for the Air Force and Navy. Yet the annual number of Americans who reach the age of 18 will decline by 20 percent over the next decade, and the current influx of better-quality male recruits is unlikely to continue if economic recovery persists. The question then will be how to preserve (and improve) the quality of service manpower required for America's capital-intensive defense forces.

By one reckoning, just to maintain the *current* strength in 1986–1993 of the active and organized reserve forces (a total of three million men), the military will need to enlist one out of three eligible males—"eligible" meaning able to meet current physical and mental standards. If all college youths are excluded, one out of two eligibles will have to be recruited.

Inevitably, the question of reviving the draft—presumably a two-year draft by lottery with low pay but with some sort of G.I. bill—will come up again shortly. Even as the Defense Department's 1982 military manpower task force contended that any recruiting shortfalls could be overcome by higher cash incentives, it admitted that its assumptions "may not stand up in practice." Yet, resuming the draft, the task force said, would exchange "one set of problems for another," mostly political.

Neither the President, who has publicly opposed reviving the draft, nor his Democratic critics have recently taken up the question. The libertarian Right has regarded peacetime conscription as an unwarranted government curb on individual freedom. The Democratic Left sees a revival of the draft as a prelude to "another Vietnam" (although only 25 percent of those who served in Vietnam were draftees). Public support for a draft has swung widely, as measured by Gallup polls, from 36 percent in 1977 to 59 percent in 1980 (after Afghanistan). Last year, 51 percent favored (and 41 percent opposed) mandatory military *training* followed by eight years in the reserves.

Given the demographics, some sort of service requirement for America's young men seems likely by 1986 unless the White House, Congress, and the public are willing to accept still smaller active and reserve forces, still higher emphasis on pay, or a return to the low-quality, low-readiness days of the 1970s.

AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

"The art of war is of vital importance to the state," Chinese strategist Sun-tzu wrote 2,500 years ago. "It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances can it be neglected."

Anyone hoping to build a library on U.S. defense policy should beware: Most books on the subject are out-of-date before they reach print, and few make for easy bedtime reading. "Policy intellectuals" tend to chase headlines—nuclear disarmament is a current favorite—and to ignore the past.

The United States has traditionally kept its military forces as small as possible. Even after it joined the ranks of the recognized world powers in 1898, America relied on a small cadre of regulars and on a citizen army mobilized after a declaration of war. When the Nazis invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, for instance, the U.S. Army had obsolete equipment and only 190,000 men and officers.

After World War II, the United States, no longer isolationist, first demobilized, then, facing Soviet threats abroad, revived the draft in 1948. But only after the 1950–53 Korean War began did the United States start to rearm. Since then, reflecting American technological gains, the U.S. military has become increasingly capital-intensive. Machines and firepower are substituted as much as possible for men, requiring in turn intensive training and a long logistical "tail."

This system often stirs complaints on Capitol Hill about a "fat" Army and Air Force, but it is precisely this system that allows the United States to support sustained, highly flexible operations overseas in wartime. In Vietnam, as Zeb B. Bradford, Jr., and Frederic J. Brown observe in **The United States Army in Transition** (Sage, 1973), there was an unprecedented substitution of mobile tactics and firepower for the traditional costly ground assault. Where possible, Army rifle companies acted as "a finding and fixing force—an anvil against which the enemy could be destroyed by artillery and air power."

A common notion is that the generals are more likely than civilian leaders to favor military solutions to overseas crises. This is the thesis of Richard J. Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies in **Roots of War: The Men and Institutions behind U.S. Foreign Policy** (Atheneum, 1972, cloth; Penguin, 1973, paper). Since World War II, he contends, the military has "supplied to the rest of the government the conceptual framework for thinking about foreign relations."

Not so, argues Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution. His study of **Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises** (Harvard, 1977) shows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lesser military men were generally *no more* eager to intervene in postwar crises than were the President's top civilian advisers. Sometimes, they were *less* eager, as in the case of Laos in 1961. Once U.S. troops were in battle, however, the military tended to urge more forceful policies than did the civilians, as in Vietnam after 1965.

For better or worse, "military advice," writes Betts, "has been most persuasive [to Presidents] as a veto of the use of force and least potent when it favored force."

"To a remarkable degree," Ohio University's John Lewis Gaddis adds in **Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy** (Oxford, 1982, cloth & paper), U.S. defense spending has been "the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, or of what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces operating within the United States," notably changing political fads and budget priorities.

Today, Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory D. Foster observe in **Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties** (Ind. Univ., 1983), senior officers still answer primarily to their own service—Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps. They regard the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense as a "foreign power with which their organization is forced occasionally to deal," and concentrate in peacetime on "maximizing" their service's share of the defense spending pie.

The seeming unmanageability of defense programs—costing $240 billion and employing 5,656,000 military personnel, Pentagon civilians, and defense plant workers in 1983—has spawned a "military reform" school of thinkers on national defense. In **National Defense** (Random, 1981, cloth; 1982, paper), the *Atlantic Monthly*'s James Fallows attacks the professional military's penchant for extremely expensive, "high-tech" weapons over simpler, but equally effective ones.

Not everyone thinks high-tech is superfluous. The reformers may be right when they allege, for instance, that the 106mm Recoilless Rifle not only sells for a fraction of the cost of the TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missile, but is just as effective as the TOW in knocking out enemy tanks within 1,000 meters. But the TOW, unlike the 106mm, can also engage targets up to 3,750 meters away at night and has a special passive sighting device that, unlike infra-red devices, does not give away its position.

Moreover, conclude the authors of **The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis** (ed. by Asa A. Clark *et al.*, Johns Hopkins, forthcoming), many of the problems that the reformers have identified—poor Pentagon decision-making (notably through the ineffectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), unwieldy "force structure" (e.g., heavy Army armored divisions are unsuitable for Persian Gulf conditions), and weapons design and acquisition—are not the exclusive province of the armed services. Pentagon bureaucrats, Congress, defense contractors, and the news media all share the blame.

Nuclear strategy gets big headlines. But much of the literature on the subject remains almost theological in its complexity, the product of a small clique of policy intellectuals cloistered in California's RAND Corporation and other "think-tanks," notes freelance writer Fred Kaplan in **The Wizards of Armageddon** (Simon & Schuster, 1983). One exception is Bernard Brodie, who, in his classic **Strategy in the Missile Age** (Princeton, 1959), foresaw that the American abhorrence of preventive war would lead the U.S. military to develop "deterrent" retaliatory strategic forces whose survival had to be ensured.

Defense analyst John M. Collins in **U.S.–Soviet Military Balance: Con-**

cepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980 (McGraw-Hill, 1980) outlines alarming *quantitative* deficiencies in the strategic and tactical forces of the United States relative to those of its chief adversary. Yet the popular "bean-counting" approach obscures the uncertainties of how weapons (and national leaders) would perform in wartime, observe Samuel Huntington and the other authors of **The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security** (Ballinger, 1982). While the Kremlin seeks to exploit opportunities when and where the West appears weak, Harvard's Adam B. Ulam suggests, in **Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982** (Oxford, 1983), that their calculation of the "correlation of forces" in Europe necessarily depends not just on raw numbers of men and tanks.

And, as Richard Betts argues in **Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning** (Brookings, 1982, cloth & paper), various factors—the ascendancy that the defense usually enjoys over the offense, the questionable loyalty of Polish and other East European forces, the superior NATO pilot training—help to offset the Warsaw Pact's considerable advantages in numbers and geography (e.g., shorter supply lines).

On the other hand, Betts warns, a Warsaw Pact surprise attack could pose a serious danger to the Alliance. With a little bit of luck, the Soviets could quickly divide West Germany and push allied troops to the Rhine within a week, long before major reinforcements could arrive from America or NATO politicians could agree on a united response.

In the end, concludes London's International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual review of **The Military Balance** (IISS, 1982, paper

only), neither side could be assured of victory in a European war: "The consequences for an attacker would be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, incalculable."

Those risks are the subject of Jonathan Schell's controversial sermon, **The Fate of the Earth** (Knopf, 1982, cloth; Avon, 1982, paper). The *New Yorker* writer observes that a single 20-megaton bomb (of which the Soviets have an estimated 113 in their arsenal) exploded over Manhattan's Empire State Building would produce a fireball four-and-a-half miles in diameter and flatten an area of 1,450 square miles, killing millions.

But even serious efforts to cap the arms race may fail in the absence of trust between the superpowers. Both John Newhouse in **Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT** (Holt, 1973) and Strobe Talbot in **Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II** (Harper, 1979, cloth; 1980, paper) show that dissimilarities between Soviet and American strategic forces and the technical difficulties of verifying Soviet compliance with the arms control agreements nearly wrecked the SALT I and SALT II talks with Moscow.

Détente was doomed from the start, contends Robert W. Tucker in **The Purposes of American Power: An Essay on National Security** (Praeger, 1981), because Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter took too rosy a view of Soviet intentions. According to Tucker, the underlying premise of détente was badly flawed: that Western economic incentives, mutual recognition of the status quo in Europe, and arms control accords would lead to lasting cooperation between communist and Western countries.

The 1982 conflict between Great Britain and Argentina showed, as recounted by reporters of the *Sunday*

Times of London in **War in the Falklands: The Full Story** (Harper, 1982), that the booming export sales of modern arms (notably that of France's Exocet missile to Argentina) can dramatically narrow the gap between great (or near-great) and lesser powers. In the end, superior British training and esprit decided the battle.

Soviet inroads in the Third World during the late 1970s catalyzed a neoconservative reaction against détente in this country. *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz, addressing **The Present Danger** (Simon & Schuster, 1980, cloth & paper), charged the Carter administration with "Finlandizing" America and called for a major U.S. arms build-up to contain Soviet expansion.

The problem of winning localized, conventional wars in a nuclear age has perplexed analysts (and statesmen) throughout the postwar era. In **Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy** (Chicago, 1957), Robert E. Osgood develops the theory of using small wars to support containment of the communists. He argues that the danger of limited conflict escalating into total war requires an American President (e.g., Truman in aiding South Korea) to seek something less than the unconditional surrender of the enemy; to maintain a diplomatic dialogue looking toward a negotiated settlement; and to restrict the geographical scope of the war. (This has been, in some respects, the 1983 Reagan strategy in Central America.) Yet, be-

cause Americans value human life so highly, Osgood believes, they "are disposed to demand that the sacrifice of life serve some purpose of commensurate value; and total victory seems like the minimum compensation."

But even "small" wars like Korea and Vietnam may impose an unacceptable cost in U.S. blood and treasure, according to Russell F. Weigley in **The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy** (Macmillan, 1973, cloth; Ind. Univ., 1977, paper). Nowhere in the Third World, he concludes, "does the use of combat offer much promise [of decisive outcomes] for the United States today."

The lessons of the Vietnam War are still hotly debated, but most military analysts would agree with Harry Summers's contention in **On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War** (Presidio, 1982) that the American defeat in Indochina was primarily *political* in origin: U.S. leaders failed to define their objectives in Vietnam clearly, to pursue those aims with determination, and to mobilize the nation for war.

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make," the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote in **On War** (ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, 1976), "is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking. . . . This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *For further reading see* WQ*'s Background Books essays on Strategic Arms Control (Autumn, '77), Vietnam as History (Spring, '78), The American Military (Spring, '79), and Vietnam as the Past (Summer, '83).*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER
by Robert Reich
Times Books, 1983
324 pp. $16.60

As candidates begin to gear up for the next presidential election and debate quickens over public policy issues, politicians and voters alike have begun to pay more than usual attention to new oracles who explain and prescribe. Prominent among liberal diagnosticians is Robert Reich, a former Federal Trade Commission staffer who now teaches business and public policy at Harvard.

Reich's concern is America's lagging economic performance, and his explanation for it is concise: From approximately 1920 to 1970, the United States enjoyed an era of economic dominance based upon "high-volume standard production run" industrial organization. It was America's innovative "scientific" management even more than improved machinery, Reich believes, that accounted for the American worker's productivity, which grew at a rate of 2.3 percent per year during that fifty-year span— higher than in any other industrialized nation.

The 1970s brought a painful and confusing transition, as Third World nations, following the examples of Japan and West Germany, learned to compete with our industrial output from a lower wage base. America will now either suffer declining living standards and rising internal tensions, or adapt to changed conditions by discovering new economic strengths. These, Reich argues, lie not simply in "sunrise" industries—the "high-tech" solutions touted by so many governors and chambers of commerce —but in the adoption by both older and newer industries of a different organization of production. Reich calls for "smaller batches of more specialized, higher-valued products" (such as precision castings, customized software, fiber optics, and lasers) requiring nonhierarchical, participatory and flexible work teams. While he offers no models for workplace relations between management and labor, he points to a number of foreign firms (particularly Japanese) that have developed democratic industrial arrangements allowing workers a greater share of power, responsibility, and rewards.

The second ingredient of a renascent U.S. economy is a more active federal role. Reich conceives of new agencies charged with monitoring international competition and steering a collaborative effort with business and labor to stay ahead of economic change. Without using the words, he proposes what others call "industrial policy" or "planning."

Specialists will find many flaws in this book. Historians will object to the presentation of the 1920–1970 era as one rather seamless economic

continuum. Economists will deny that the sources of U.S. growth come down to the organization of production, and will cite resources, infrastructure, technology, and the spur of competition. Experts in resource and environmental issues will be aghast at the absence of such matters in a book about economic prospects. Reich leaves largely unexplained how the Japanese and West Germans have adapted more smoothly than the English and Americans. He has nothing to say about the political steps that will lead us toward new organization. Everywhere, he simplifies in order to drive home his main point.

Yet, even those conversant with these complexities must grant the power of the book's central idea. Human capital *will* decide the future of "first world" societies facing the Third World's low-wage competition, and Reich dismisses the regnant notion (without ever specifically mentioning President Reagan) that market forces alone will call forth either the creativity or the educational investment required to move into higher value-added production. But unlike many earlier liberal writers who wished to hamstring or punish business, Reich relishes successful entrepreneurship. Indeed, he would like nothing more than to see government and labor join capitalists in a common search for economic advance. And nowhere does he express doubts about government's capacity to play such an ambitious role.

This is really the faith of the New Deal, undiscouraged by 50 years of governmental experience, or oblivious to it—one cannot tell. But when the pendulum swings back to the liberals, Reich's proposals will surely be part of their economic strategy.

—*Otis L. Graham, Jr.*

F. SCOTT FITZGERALD:
A Biography
by André Le Vot
Doubleday, 1983
393 pp. $19.95

"Fitzgerald has been left with a jewel which he doesn't quite know what to do with. For he has been given imagination without intellectual control of it; . . . he has been given a gift for expression without many ideas to express." It was the critic Edmund Wilson, Fitzgerald's fellow Princetonian and life-long friend, who penned that stinging appraisal, and though it was partly the product of envy, it nevertheless came close to the truth.

F. Scott Fitzgerald *is* America's great literary prodigal. His life seemed to parallel the course of the Roaring Twenties, whose symbol he became: Profligate days led to a nearly disastrous end. Yet, from the waste and wild living issued forth works that have become national classics— *The Great Gatsby* and *Tender is the Night* among them. Those books prove the inadequacy of Wilson's criticism. For if Fitzgerald had few ideas— the cost of success and the fear of failure—they were central to the American experience. And no other writer has explored them so well.

Not surprisingly, the man has attracted more than his share of serious biographers, the best of whom is probably still Arthur Mizener, author of *The Far Side of Paradise.* But Le Vot, professor of American literature at

the Sorbonne, after working more than two decades on this book, has come very close to matching Mizener. He has done so not by coming up with new facts about Fitzgerald's life, of which there are few, but by paying scrupulous attention to the connections between the life and the work.

So while the reader is led across much familiar terrain—the St. Paul boyhood, the strained relationship with his parents ("Why shouldn't I go crazy?" he wrote in a moment of depression. "My father is a moron and my mother a neurotic, half-insane with pathological nervous worry"), the idyllic but academically unfocused years at Princeton, the mutually destructive marriage with Zelda, the Paris years, the career-long rivalry with Hemingway—he is made to see how each little fact bore upon the art.

Le Vot is perhaps best in discussing Fitzgerald's lifelong sense of inferiority—a sense that was heightened by his contact with Hemingway during the '20s. Indeed, it was this feeling of inferiority, as much as the deterioration of his marriage to Zelda, that contributed to his own total collapse. But if Fitzgerald created his own hell, he also survived it heroically. Le Vot demonstrates how *The Crack-Up*, Fitzgerald's account of his decline, is not just self-therapy but perhaps the author's best book. Even more than *The Great Gatsby*, it was Fitzgerald's way of coming to terms with those demons of success that had haunted him for so long. In uncharacteristically stark prose, Fitzgerald declared, "I speak with the authority of failure—Ernest with the authority of success. We could never sit across the same table again."

Fitzgerald's life may have been crowded with personal failures, but it was not without the consolations of hard-won wisdom. As Le Vot puts it, Fitzgerald "struggled and sacrificed without the help of faith to achieve self-renunciation." He had, as this biography proves, the help of his art.

—*Frank McConnell, '78*

THE BRANDEIS/ FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices
by Bruce Allen Murphy
Oxford, 1982
473 pp. $18.95;
Doubleday, 1983
473 pp. $12.95

Except for Robert Allen and Drew Pearson's *Nine Old Men* (1936), few other books on the Supreme Court have been so widely debated as this one. Before formal publication in March 1982, newspapers throughout the country called it to public attention in front-page articles and editorials. After publication came some 50 reviews in popular and professional magazines and law journals. And the commentary continues to appear. Why?

Murphy, a political scientist at Penn State, treats the personal and public relations of two of the 20th century's most brilliant and influential Justices, Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter. Overlapping for two weeks, the two Justices' consecutive terms on the Supreme Court totaled almost 50 years—Brandeis's from 1916 to 1939, and Frankfurter's from 1939 to 1962. During that time (together and individually), they advised presidents, drafted legislation, pressured Congress and state legislatures, led American Zionism, and participated in foreign affairs.

As active political men called to the Supreme Court, Brandeis and Frankfurter had a problem. And it was, as Murphy shows, the connection between them that proved to be the solution.

Born a generation apart in the 19th century, both men held Harvard law degrees and both joined private law firms. Brandeis became a millionaire twice over, took on *pro bono* cases and became the "People's Lawyer." He was completely committed to turn-of-the-century Progressivism. Frankfurter became an assistant U.S. attorney in New York after a year of private work. A strong friendship had already developed between the two men when, in 1913, the elder advised the junior to return to Harvard to teach. Frankfurter did.

Meanwhile, Brandeis, an avid supporter of Woodrow Wilson, had become an influential "outsider-insider" of the newly elected administration. Wilson later remarked that he needed Brandeis "everywhere, but I must leave him somewhere." "Somewhere" was the Court. The surprising nomination sparked one of the longest confirmation debates in the history of the Senate. Brandeis was attacked for his crusading radicalism and his lack of "judicial temperament." When finally confirmed, the new Justice promptly gave up his public and private causes (except for Zionism) and put his money in a blind trust. He quietly continued to influence Wilson's policies, but he faced a problem as to how he could contribute to the unfinished business of Progressive reforms.

Here the connection came into play. At Harvard, Frankfurter took over Brandeis's consumer activities, wage-hour cases, aided with Zionism, and aired Brandeis's views without attribution in the *Harvard Law Review* and the *New Republic*. Reluctantly, Frankfurter accepted reimbursement from Brandeis for expenses. And in 1925 (when Frankfurter needed money to pay for his wife's medical bills), he began receiving an annual stipend of $3,500. This arrangement, which was continued right up to 1939, when Frankfurter was appointed to the Court, gave him the financial security to work for Brandeis's Progressive causes. Once named to the Court by FDR, Frankfurter proceeded to work behind the scenes to pursue his own cause: vigorous support of European allies, particularly of the British, both before and after U.S. entry into the war.

Murphy's book persuasively demonstrates that Brandeis and Frankfurter never ceased to be the kind of men they were before they went to the bench—political men. Not that their behavior was unique or unprecedented. Murphy reminds readers that two-thirds of those who have sat on the highest court have engaged in "off-the-bench political activity." Yet the hullabaloo surrounding this book attests to the durability of a popular myth: that of an apolitical Court independently meting out impartial justice.

In fact, disavowal of a political role has long been one of the judiciary's more powerful political weapons. Frankfurter himself described the Court as a monastery, and he certainly knew better. Perhaps this book continues to stir emotions precisely because it establishes so convincingly the political effectiveness of two remarkable judges—men who have too long been esteemed as models of a pristine judicial probity that in our nation probably cannot exist.

—Victoria Schuck, '80

NEW TITLES

History

**BASEBALL'S GREAT
EXPERIMENT: Jackie
Robinson and His Legacy**
by Jules Tygiel
Oxford, 1983
392 pp. $16.95

**INVISIBLE MEN: Life in
Baseball's Negro Leagues**
by Donn Rogosin
Atheneum, 1983
283 pp. $14.95

Baseball, the all-American game, was once, like so many other all-American pastimes, all-white on one side and all-black on the other. How the barrier fell is the subject of Tygiel's book: an intelligent history of the events leading up to and following the dramatic moment on April 18, 1946, when Jackie Robinson stepped onto the field of Jersey City's Roosevelt Stadium as a batter for the Brooklyn Dodgers' farm team, the Montreal Royals. Tygiel, a historian at San Francisco State, tells how Dodger president Branch Rickey went about finding a black ballplayer who could match exceptional skill with an unflappable temperament. It is hard to imagine a better choice than Robinson: Ambitious, talented (he had a .349 batting average his first season, despite injuries and a long slump), quietly determined, he endured racial insults and jeers from crowds whenever he walked onto the field. While Robinson battled "Jim Crow," Rickey won influential sportscasters, such as Red Barber, to the cause of integration.

Robinson's career before 1946 has usually been scanted, but Rogosin, a Texas public television executive, reminds us that the "dark destroyer" was once one of baseball's "invisible men," a player in the forgotten Negro leagues. Founded in Kansas City in 1920, the Negro leagues fielded up to 15 teams and nurtured such outstanding players as Satchel Paige, Monte Irvin, and Willie Wells. These talented teams won "over 60 percent of their encounters with white major-league opponents," writes Rogosin. Poor, they were frequently forced "to barnstorm," traveling from town to town in search of audiences and opponents, sometimes playing as many as three games a day. After Robinson's success in 1946, attendance at Negro league games fell drastically, and soon the enterprise folded. Rogosin's elegiac account is studded

with the personal reminiscences of several star players from the defunct leagues, athletes who finished their careers "cheering on the youngsters they trained, never tasting what they most coveted," a chance at the major leagues.

LOW CITY, HIGH CITY:
Tokyo from Edo to the
Earthquake, 1867–1923
by Edward Seidensticker
Knopf, 1983
302 pp. $20

From a feudal capital in 1867 to a modern metropolis leveled by the Kanto earthquake in 1923, Tokyo underwent a profound transformation that altered neighborhoods and a long-established way of life. Seidensticker, a professor of Japanese at Columbia, explains how strict class lines divided Edo (ancient Tokyo) during the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1867). Commoners, including a growing mercantile class, occupied the flatlands of the east and north—the Low City. The High City, an area of temples and aristocratic dwellings, filled the hills to the west and south. Liveliest was the Low City, where Kabuki theaters and geisha establishments thrived next to lumberyards, fishmarkets, and brothels. Aristocrats from the High City, "slumming" in grand style, shopped the stores and supported the popular arts. But this arrangement began to break down with the accession of Emperor Meiji in 1867 and his introduction of Western ideas and technology. Merchants, no longer checked by social barriers, began moving into the High City; the rich, both new and old, turned from traditional entertainments and experimented with imports—operas and masked balls; baseball arrived triumphantly upon the scene, though, unaccountably, anglophile Tokyo spurned cricket. New forms of transportation, including the steam locomotive, allowed businesses and ordinary folk to move outside the Low City, further diluting the old neighborhood life. The 1923 earthquake dealt Low City culture its death blow. But Seidensticker has admirably re-created the vibrant, even tumultuous, spirit of those days when kimonos, parasols, and topknots were first traded for trousers, derby hats, and horn-rimmed glasses.

**MARTIN VAN BUREN:
The Romantic Age of
American Politics**
by John Niven
Oxford, 1983
715 pp. $35

In April 1844, former President Van Buren wrote to a Mississippi Congressman announcing his opposition to the immediate annexation of Texas. Van Buren's worries about adding another "slave state" to the Union were published in the newspapers and immediately alienated the Southern members of the Democratic Party. The letter thus shattered any chance Van Buren might have had to receive the Democrats' 1844 nomination for the Presidency; it also laid to rest his reputation as a simple opportunist. Niven, a Claremont College historian, has described the four decades of U.S. politics in which Van Buren had a discreet but powerful hand. The career of the Magician (as he was nicknamed for his mastery of manipulation) included stints as a New York legislator and U.S. Senator, Secretary of State, Vice President, and President (1837–1841). Through it all, he fought to uphold such traditional Jeffersonian values as economic decentralization and to establish a strong party system as a check against oligarchy. A trusted adviser of Andrew Jackson, he succeeded as President in fulfilling Jackson's wish for an independent treasury system. His Presidency was jarred by economic crisis (the Panic of 1837), and in 1840, he was soundly defeated by William H. Harrison in an election rife with fraud. Van Buren devoted a lifetime, writes Niven, to "promoting a political system that was based squarely on measure, not men, on nation, not section . . . where politics reflected clear divisions on public policy, not aspirations of individuals or separate interest groups."

**METROPOLITAN
CORRIDOR: Railroads
and the American Scene**
by John R. Stilgoe
Yale, 1983
397 pp. $29.95

"Railroad iron is a magician's rod," observed Ralph Waldo Emerson, "in its power to evoke the sleeping energies of land and water." Stilgoe, a Harvard professor of landscape architecture, recalls the railroad's transformation of the American scene between 1880 and 1930. Drawing on contemporary accounts in magazines, movies, poetry, and novels, Stilgoe evokes America's romance with the rails: the luxury passenger express (The Orange Blossom Special, The Crescent Limited)

"booming over grade crossings"; the hoboes "staring from empty boxcars"; the small-town depots that attracted small boys and their grandfathers. The train, mused one *Atlantic Monthly* writer, was "the poetry of the machine age." Not all was perfect, however. Despite guardrails, signs, whistles, and flashing lights, grade crossings meant death for thousands of pedestrians and passengers in horse-drawn buggies. Residents along the "metropolitan corridor" wandered the tracks dangerously confident of the trains' ability to meet their scheduled comings and goings. One child, explaining the accidental death of his friend, charged that the express was "running on the wrong track." For well over a half-century, writes Stilgoe, the train was the "herald of the future," as modern America outgrew its rural, small-town origins. But once unleashed, progress vanquished even the empire of the rails. Taking the form of the automobile, "the future" left the railroad behind.

Contemporary Affairs

DANGEROUS CURRENTS:
The State of Economics
by Lester C. Thurow
Random, 1983
247 pp. $16.95

Nearly everybody now concedes that our leading economic theories, from Keynesianism to monetarism, are unreliable. Economists and others concur that these "macroeconomic" systems (dealing with the relations between the big variables—inflation, unemployment, and growth) are flawed chiefly because they do not mesh with the bedrock "microeconomic" knowledge about how particular markets work. But long-held notions about the workings of the microeconomic world are just as faulty, insists Thurow, an MIT economist. The shibboleth of the supply-demand mechanism simply does not account for such intangibles as the effect of workers' motivation upon productivity. Yet econometricians proceed to construct abstruse mathematical models that exclude the human factor. Most economists also continue to base their theories on the outmoded behavioral assumption that people are "rational individual utility (income) maximizers." This

despite ample proof that people often seek some jobs that pay less well than others. In a long and devastating march through contemporary economics, Thurow repeatedly shows where his colleagues have gone astray. Needed, he insists, is a more sophisticated set of assumptions about how people respond to economic incentives and disincentives and how other factors affect human behavior in the marketplace. Thurow's book is free of jargon and mathematical formulae. Even so, nonspecialists will encounter some rough going in these *Dangerous Currents*.

THE HEARTS OF MEN: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment
by Barbara Ehrenreich
Doubleday, 1983
206 pp. $13.95

What made so many middle-class American women of the 1960s quit the traditional "housewife" role that seemed so much a part of the 1950s scheme of things? Was it boredom, anger, or feminist arguments? Ehrenreich, a former New York Institute Fellow, argues that it was, ironically, men's growing discontent with the breadwinner role that induced women to kick over the traces. Among the many sources of male unrest was Hugh Hefner's *Playboy* philosophy (appearing first in 1953), which proclaimed that a man could be a real (and happier) man outside of marriage. Mainstream publications such as *Life*, *Look*, and *Reader's Digest* worried about the gray flannel rat race. Men were in danger of becoming robots, or at least victims of stress and heart disease. Though the mass media routinely censured the rebels—the beatniks and, later, the hippies—all the attention was itself a sign of fascination. Ehrenreich describes the growing chorus of doctors, sociologists, and psychologists who diagnosed the problem and offered a variety of remedies —alternative lifestyles and various pop-psychologies that put "looking after Number One" above all else. Middle-class women, abandoned (often without alimony or child support) by self-seeking husbands, began to heed the feminist message. Ehrenreich, deploring the hedonistic selfishness of the 1980s, calls for a return to strong, two-parent families and responsible fathers, but not to the rigid sex roles of the '50s.

Arts & Letters

**REVISIONS: Changing
Perspectives in Moral
Philosophy**
edited by Alasdair
MacIntyre and
Stanley Hauerwas
Notre Dame, 1983
320 pp. $19.50 cloth,
$9.95 paper

All 13 contributors to this excellent collection address the philosophical gap introduced by Immanuel Kant in the 18th century: "the *unbridgeable* separation," as Stuart Hampshire describes it, "between moral judgements and factual judgements." Believing that the Kantian "separation" has turned moral reasoning into a subjectivist muddle, Hampshire, Iris Murdoch, Peter Berger, Simone Weil, and others variously attempt to restore those arguments that undergirded earlier moral traditions (such as those of classical antiquity and medieval Christendom). Many arguments are frankly theological: Murdoch, for example, defining God as a "single perfect transcendent nonrepresentational and necessarily real object of attention," proceeds to attack those delusional forms of ethics (e.g., existentialism) that rely on the self as the determining judge. All such ethics, she argues, result in a "tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one." Though many of these essays have long been in print, they still provide a tonic in a field dominated by dry analytical arguments.

**LITERARY THEORY:
An Introduction**
by Terry Eagleton
Minnesota, 1983
244 pp. $29.50 cloth,
$9.95 paper

Literary studies in America have recently fallen in thrall to a host of esoteric European critical theories. Bearing such names as semiotics, structuralism, and deconstruction, these approaches have progressively stripped literary works of their connections with history, society, and even with the authors themselves. How did the study of literature come to this? Eagleton, an Oxford professor of English, traces its development from the 19th-century British workingmen's colleges, where English (the "poor man's Classics") was considered to be an ideal form of moral uplift. But Matthew Arnold's notion of the "civilizing" role of literature gave way during the 1940s and '50s to the New Criticism. Deeming the author's intentions irrelevant, American New Critics (e.g., Cleanth Brooks, Robert

Penn Warren) considered literary works in terms of their "tensions," "paradoxes," and overarching "unity." Thus, the ground was laid for the most recent theories, which try to make the criticism into a kind of neutral, "scientific" analysis. A good explainer, Eagleton points out connections between European literary theories and other intellectual currents and disciplines (e.g., existentialism, linguistics). Structuralism and semiotics, for example, borrow techniques from formal linguistics and treat a poem or story as a system of signs in which "meaning exists only contextually, governed by sets of similarities and oppositions." Eagleton, a Marxist, faults formalistic approaches for dismissing questions of readers' and authors' beliefs and of ideology. One can agree with his conclusion that literary criticism should be seen as a value-laden activity. But only Eagleton's fellow Marxists will agree with him that all real critical values are tied to class conflict.

MONTAIGNE'S TRAVEL JOURNAL
by Michel de Montaigne
translated by Donald Frame
North Point, 1983
208 pp. $10.50

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) may not have invented the essay, but his short prose pieces have become models of the form. Shortly after publishing the first two books of his *Essais* in 1580, Montaigne set off from Bordeaux on a journey to Rome, a city he already knew from Seneca, Juvenal, and other Roman authors. The journey took 17 months; as he reminded his impatient travel companions, "he was not going anywhere except where he happened to be." Travel, like the essay form, was a prod to his powers of observation and self-examination. In his journals, among notes on food and lodging, are comments on theology, Jewish ceremonies, local sights and manners, and, always, the effects of baths and waters on his kidney stones, whose painful presence often led to more general reflections upon suffering, illness, and death. Little of Montaigne's skepticism emerges directly in his accounts of his meeting with Pope Gregory XIII or other churchmen. But everywhere his comments recall the religious and political turmoil of the 16th century. (His copy of his *Essais* was seized in

Rome and inspected for heresy; when changes were suggested, he graciously refused.) The reader traveling with Montaigne shares the author's melancholy sense of the vanities of prelates, kings, and travelers alike.

THE AENEID
by Virgil
translated by
Robert Fitzgerald
Random, 1983
403 pp. $20

Some translations seem so "right" as to be set forever. John Dryden's 286-year-old "Arms, and the man I sing . . ." stands as the classic English rendering of the opening words of the *Aeneid*, announcing straight-away the poem's central conflict: between the iron demands of war and the more "human" demands of love, family, and comrades. Fitzgerald's "I sing of warfare and a man at war" comes as a rather lackluster successor translation. But despite the inauspicious beginning, Fitzgerald's handling of Virgil's poem proves to be as sure and (to the American ear) as natural as his earlier versions of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This is no small feat, since, in an epic, naturalness must not be gained by sacrificing the necessarily elevated tone. The epic, after all, speaks for a whole people, a nation. Readers must be made to feel the full weight of Aeneas's sacrifice when he leaves the beautiful Dido to get on with the brutal but necessary business of founding Rome: *"Duty-bound,/ Aeneas, though he struggled with desire/ To calm and comfort her in all her pain,/ To speak to her and turn her mind from grief,/ And though he sighed his heart out, shaken still/ With love of her, yet took the course heaven gave him/ And went back to the fleet."*

Science & Technology

FROM ARISTOTLE TO ZOOS: A Philosophical Dictionary of Biology
by P. B. Medawar &
J. S. Medawar
Harvard, 1983
305 pp. $18.50

Anyone who confuses meiosis with mitosis, believes theories and hypotheses are virtually the same thing, or simply savors odd bits of scientific arcana, such as the fact that the king crab, belonging to the *Arachnida* group, is closer to the spider than to the blue crab, will be well served by this unusual "dictionary." It is also a pleasure to read. Written by a husband-wife team, both Oxford biologists, the short-essay entries reflect the authors' un-

compromising professional standards. They show, for example, little respect for the scientific aptitude of the venerable Aristotle; his biological works, they write, are a "rather tiresome farrago of hearsay, imperfect observation, wishful thinking, and credulity. . . ." Ranging from barnacles to sociobiology, they also clear up a few old controversies, including the famous chicken-egg debate: To believe that the egg came first, they explain, is to be a "Mendelist" and "in the Western Hemisphere a trustworthy and regular guy (some compensation, perhaps, for the odium of being classified in the Soviet Union as a 'genetic elitist . . . ')." The authors conclude with a good-humored cheer for zoos.

THE MONTGOLFIER BROTHERS AND THE INVENTION OF AVIATION, 1783–1784
by Charles Coulston Gillispie
Princeton, 1983
210 pp. $35

On June 4, 1783, in a small town in southern France, two sons of the wealthy paper-manufacturing Montgolfier family successfully launched the first hot-air balloon. Rising some 3,000 feet above the astonished citizenry of Annonay, the brazier-heated sackcloth globe drifted a mile and a half before gently returning to earth. Gillispie, a Princeton historian, has commemorated the aeronautic bicentennial with a charmingly vivid account of the inaugural liftoff and its early sequels. Among the latter: the first livestock-carrying flight, the maiden voyage of a hydrogen balloon (called "charlières" after inventor J.-A.-C. Charles), the first manned flight, and the first fatal crash. The two brothers Montgolfier—Joseph, an absent-minded inventor, and Etienne, a mathematician and practical man of affairs—occupy center stage, but a host of colorful characters fill out the drama. Benjamin Franklin, on hand for the first manned flight in November 1783, was asked what use the contraption could serve. "What use," he replied, "is a newborn baby?" Gillispie easily conveys his intimate knowledge of the era—of its learned societies and academies, of court life and rural politics. A wealth of firsthand commentary complements the period drawings and engravings of the first magnificent flying machines.

PAPERBOUNDS

LAWS OF THE GAME: How the Principles of Nature Govern Chance. By Manfred Eigen and Ruthild Winkler. Harper Colophon, 1983. 347 pp. $8.95

"Chance and law (or principles) are the basic elements of games." With this disarmingly simple observation, German physicists Eigen and Winkler begin a brilliant, if sometimes dizzying, symposium on, among other things, quarks, creativity, and molecular biology. Chance, they explain, originates in the unpredictability of individual physical processes in the microcosmic world of atoms and molecules. Patterns appear in the macrocosm, where vast numbers of these processes begin to "make up what we recognize as the behavior of matter." The governing law is Darwin's still-debated principle of natural selection, whereby nature maintains order. The authors provide directions and drawings for 16 illustrative board games requiring only dice and markers. Readers seeking clues to the workings of the universe will find this a good, but by no means easy, primer.

SIGN OFF: The Last Days of Television. By Edwin Diamond. MIT, 1983. 273 pp. $6.95

The title misleads. Diamond, director of MIT's News Study Group, comes less to bury TV than to shame it. Many of the 20 essays treat the television coverage of such events as the 1980 Miami riot, the Iranian hostage affair, and the 1980 presidential campaign. Diamond dismisses notions of media cabals and of the power of TV journalism: "The press," he writes, "picks up on the prevailing atmospherics of the dominant social institutions, in part shaping some of the currents and eddies, but mostly being shaped by them." But he faults TV news for sacrificing thoughtful coverage to the slick, fast-paced "disco" look that the big networks strive for. Looking beyond the news, Diamond considers sex in daily programming, the "electronic church," and the way "sitcoms" depict working men (research shows that so-called blue-collar attitudes are just as much those of white-collar folk). Rather than indulging in easy jabs, Diamond shrewdly assesses the ways in which a powerful medium usually fails to present a full and accurate picture of the world.

MARTIN'S HUNDRED: The Discovery of a Lost Colonial Virginia Settlement. By Ivor Noël Hume. Delta, 1983. 343 pp. $9.95

In 1970, while directing explorations of the Carter's Grove plantation on Virginia's James River, Noël Hume came across the earliest evidence of an English settlement in America. The story of this colony dates back to 1618, when the *Gift of God*, bearing 220 passengers, set sail from England. Sent by the Martin's Hundred Society (a subsidiary of the Virginia Company of London), the group was to inhabit and farm 20,000 acres in Virginia. But life proved almost impossible for these early pilgrims. Coats of mail, a skull crushed by an iron spade, helmets, and other findings corroborate contemporary accounts of an Indian uprising in 1622, which reduced the settlement's population from 140 to 62. And local graves suggest that half of those survivors died after a few more years. There is no sign of what happened to the rest. Noël Hume, director of Williamsburg's archaeological program, sometimes forces skimpy evidence (e.g., stoneware, weapons) to work overtime, but the larger picture of colonial life is convincing.

The Rise of American Advertising

The first advertising specialists in America, eager to distance themselves from patent-medicine vendors and confidence men, strove to write prose that was simple and factual. That approach proved short-lived, as admen, beginning at the turn of the century, started to develop more indirect, "psychological" techniques, using strategies that have since been vastly extended to promote politicians as well as to sell cars, perfume, and low-calorie beer. Historian Jackson Lears here explains this change and how it helped shape not only consumer demand but also the visual environment in America.

by T. J. Jackson Lears

In older downtowns across America, the casual observer may still happen upon spectral presences from the commercial past. Where there is available space on brick or stone, ancient advertising murals preside over parking lots, littered playgrounds, construction projects. Often partly obscured by banks and fast-food franchises, some announce products: Uneeda Biscuit, Wilson's Whiskey; others are populated by fading fantastic characters: the Gold Dust Twins, the winsome White Rock Girl. Once part of the landscape of everyday life, these cultural graffiti somehow exert more fascination as they recede from view.

Those advertisements were part of a new visual environment that emerged around the turn of the century, as American corporations be-gan to advertise "brand-name" products to a national market. Advertisers painted brick walls and billboards, caught the gaze of straphangers with subway car cards, and bought acres of space in metropolitan newspapers and the new mass-circulation magazines. And they played a major part in the evolution of a new way of life, in which the acquisition of specific goods was, somehow, associated with psychic self-betterment, fulfillment, and happiness.

The earliest advertising agencies sprang up in the 1870s and 1880s. Two- or three-man operations, they were mostly clustered on Park Row in lower Manhattan, in stuffy backstairs rooms that smelled of printer's ink. As the business historian Daniel Pope observes, early advertising

agents merely procured "a shadowy, uncertain commodity—advertising space" from publishers and provided it to "businesses whose own products were often equally obscure"— magic elixirs, investment opportunities, self-help schemes.

Like jobbers and merchants, advertising agents were middlemen, mistrusted by farmers, manufacturers, laborers, and anyone else who believed himself more engaged with the realities of production. Indeed, the agents' work was even less tangible than that of other middlemen: The only commodity they sold was their own skill as space brokers. For that (sometimes dubious) service, they received a commission from the publisher on the value of the space bought by the advertiser.

Banishing Hokum

During the next 50 years, this method of compensation survived, but the agencies themselves were transformed. The more successful firms grew flush with money, moving from Park Row to more elegant midtown headquarters. Their clients were no longer marginal patent-medicine firms but established corporations selling brand-name products—Camel cigarettes, Dodge automobiles. As the agencies expanded, they became more bureaucratically organized and functionally specialized, providing a widening spectrum of services: advice on the choice of appropriate media, marketing information, and most important, design of the advertisements themselves.

The question of designs, and of the strategies that lay behind them, was of particular concern to the first admen. Throughout the early days of the industry, agency spokesmen sought to establish their dignity as

part of "the great distributing machinery brought into existence by the era of great combines." Yet they never fully banished the taint of hokum, the sense that their profession, like that of circus impresario P. T. Barnum, merely manufactured appearances to bemuse and bilk the public.

No Frills

Fearing that they would be lumped with patent-medicine vendors or even with confidence men, members of the fledgling industry— most of whom were from the Midwest, many of them sons of Protestant ministers—resorted to the rhetoric of sincerity. It was a time-honored Protestant tradition. Throughout the 19th century, the sincere man had been the antidote to the confidence man—a reminder that morality could somehow be preserved amid the amoral ambiguities of the marketplace.

But achieving sincerity in one's copy was no easy matter. Sincerity required that the advertisement be seamless, that its artifice be concealed, that it seem straightforward and honest. For advertising men, as for other "impression managers," truth was insufficient and sometimes irrelevant. The important job was, in the words of the leading trade journal *Printers' Ink*, "making the Truth 'Sound True'." Sincerity had become at once a moral stance and a tactic of persuasion.

Few advertising spokesmen were willing to acknowledge that ambiguity. As advertising images became more fantastic and surreal during the 1910s and 1920s, many admen clung to 19th-century notions of reality, truth, and meaning. Debate over strategies revealed a persistent conflict within the industry.

During the 1890s, the trade press had generally been suspicious of the ad that was "too pretty." As one adman wrote in 1895, "It's the great public you are after and they don't give a continental whether you have been to college or not, what they want is facts; if they are reading your ad for amusement in all probability you don't want their trade." The no-frills, informative approach helped aspiring professionals to distance their methods from the sensational tactics of their patent-medicine predecessors.

At the same time, admen realized that they faced a novel difficulty. As advertisements for brand-name commodities multiplied, the description of a product's qualities, such as one finds in a Sears catalog, proved an inadequate strategy for selling.

Reasons Why

As early as 1903, a writer in *Judicious Advertising* complained that "there is so much that is exceedingly good, it is harder than ever to know how to devise creations that are 'different' enough to attract attention." By the early 20th century, slogans, jingles, and trademarks were familiar sights in the advertising landscape—all designed to catch the eye of a busy and distracted public. Illustrated advertising, containing virtually no information, aimed at "general publicity" for the product by associating it with attractive girls, healthy children, prosperous family scenes.

Proponents of fact fought back, first by ridiculing the "epidemic of originality," then by invoking the formula that advertising was "salesmanship-in-print." That phrase was coined by the copywriter John E. Kennedy in 1904 and popularized by Albert Lasker and Claude Hopkins as "reason-why" copy.

Flat on the Brush

Each piece of reason-why copy contained a vigorous sales argument, crammed with facts and pock-marked with dashes, italics, and exclamation points. For a time, this approach threatened to sweep all before it. In December 1906, a prominent trade magazine contained an obituary for "advertising ideas," the puns and pretty girls that bore no relation to the product: They "passed with the notion that advertising is literature or art."

The obituary proved premature. Many advertising men continued to define their task not as "salesmanship in print" but as "the persuasive art." As Clowry Chapman, a legal consultant to ad agencies, argued in 1910, "mental images," not rational arguments, move the prospective buyer to buy.

According to this view, the advertiser's task was not merely to con-

struct product-oriented arguments, but to turn the potential buyer's emotion into money. Fact men fumed. In 1906, one of them wrote an article bewailing the lack of information in American car ads. He noted that one maker claimed "his car is the Car of Destiny. What does that mean? Who could find any meaning in such a fact, even if it were true?"

Troubled by the absence of clear-cut meaning, opponents of "atmosphere" warned that it was time to talk sense to the American people. But automobile advertisers increasingly surrounded their product with emblems of style, status, and personal fulfillment. In 1910, the Chalmers Motor Company revived lagging sales by switching from reason-why to "word painting the auto's seductive joys. . . ." The strategy won praise in the trade press. By 1920, the factual auto advertisement had virtually disappeared.

One reason for the decline of factual auto ads was the increasing difficulty of distinguishing one brand of product from another. The problem was not confined to automobiles. Confronted by standardization born of technological advances, advertisers sought to make a particular beer seem "special" (1907) or to establish "that Bread Isn't Just Bread" (1930). Marketing journals urged manufacturers to devise new specialties, new ingredients, new features.

Colgate dental cream provided a model. In 1911, Palmolive Peet spent a huge sum of money on advertising to demonstrate that their toothpaste lay "flat on the brush like a ribbon." The key, as one adman had observed in 1902, was to recognize "the importance of trifles." The search for trifles led to a proliferation of new, improved features, secret ingredients, and fantastic product claims. As

Fuel system of the new Ford has been designed for reliability and long service

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

A bit dull, a bit stodgy, "reason-why" copy gave the consumer the facts, and almost nothing but.

product differentiation became more difficult, reason-why copy became less reasonable.

Ultimately, reason-why and atmosphere advertising converged. There had always been potential for irrationality in reason-why. It could include not only sober statements of a product's merits, but also strings of superlatives, inflated sales arguments, and an insistence that the product could transform the buyer's life. In 1925, when corset advertising rejected "the Bolshevik figure," promising an "ideal posture" that would "reflect good breeding and class distinction," advertising analysts found it possible to praise the copy because it appealed to intelli-

gence rather than to emotion. "Romance and reason-why" could coexist in the same advertisement or in different campaigns for the same product.

But admen were wrestling with challenges even greater than the debate over romance and reason. The trade press, shifting its orientation from the product to its potential buyer, began to advise "Putting Yourself in the Consumer's Place," puzzling out his or her yearnings and anxieties.

The important change in trade press usage from "customers" to "consumers," which began around 1900, reflected a growing awareness that the audience for national advertisements was remote, impersonal, and difficult to visualize. Customers carried on face-to-face relations with local entrepreneurs; consumers were the target of standardized persuasion sponsored by corporations. The problem for advertisers was how to bring the target into sharper focus. Slowly, admen inched toward the "science" of modern marketing. In the process, they increasingly viewed consumers as a manipulable, irrational mass.

Grown-up Children

Early speculation about consumers combined confident pronouncements about "human nature" with lists of consumer traits. The first composite portrait to emerge was that of a shrewd customer—subject to flattery but suspicious of bombast, capable of cupidity but essentially reasonable.

But as early as the turn of the century, the picture began to change. Some spokesmen, pointing to "the breathless rush and scramble" of 20th-century life, noted that "men and women take their knowledge,

like their lunches, on the run."

This perception called for either brevity or novelty to catch the busy eye. And for some admen, the power of silly or emotional copy stemmed from human nature itself. "You must take [people] as they are," wrote a *Printers' Ink* contributor in 1897, "grown-up children to a great extent . . . tired and bored by too much argument, by diagrams and prosaic common sense." From this perspective, the most effective advertising was aimed at consumers' irrational impulses.

Consumer as Connoisseur

In the emerging conventional wisdom, the typical consumer was especially susceptible to emotional appeals because he was bored much of the time. "His everyday life is pretty dull. Get up—eat—go to work—eat—go to bed," wrote freelance copywriter John Starr Hewitt in 1925. Yet Hewitt also believed that the typical American compensated "for the routine of today by the vision of what his life is to be tomorrow. It is the vision of getting ahead. Everything he buys comes as a partial fulfillment of that vision. . . ."

The notion of consumption as compensation was given a further turn by Paul Nystrom, professor of marketing at Columbia University. In *The Economics of Fashion* (1928), Nystrom noted the importance of boredom, "the desire for a change in personality," and among "not a few people in Western nations . . . something that may be called, for want of a better name, *a philosophy of futility*." With the decline of religious faith, Nystrom believed, the "tendency to challenge the purpose of life itself" grew and made superficial consumer choices seem all the more important. This view of the con-

sumer as anomic "mass man" strengthened advertisers' faith in the manipulability of the public.

There remained a rival faith in the consumer as rational individual, making knowledgeable choices. "In 1911 when the consumer buys," *Printers' Ink* asserted, "he does the *choosing*. He asserts his particular individuality." Advertising made choice possible: "It has *educated* the consumer into being a connoisseur—which apt word means 'one who knows'."

But the image of the consumer as connoisseur did not strictly conform to the rational economic man of liberal lore. The new model man exercised his sense of self not through labor or civic responsibility, but through consumer choices, often quite trivial ones.

Enter Psychology

Notions of "consumer individuality" ended up promoting the strategy of "personal appeal" rather than genuine respect for the diversity of the mass market. By seeming to single out the individual ("Imagine *your* picture here"), the personal appeal sought to create a sense of uniqueness in the consuming self, to make the buyer forget he was part of a mass market, to convince him that he was a conscious, choosing person.

Psychological theory underwrote that indirect approach and reinforced notions of consumer irrationality. Beginning in 1903, when Walter Dill Scott published the *Psychology of Advertising*, admen flocked to psychological lectures, hired psychological consultants, and wondered "Can You Sell Goods to the Unconscious Mind?" The long flirtation between psychology and advertising was consummated in 1925, when John B. Watson dedi-

cated *Behaviorism* to his employer, Stanley Resor of J. Walter Thompson. The vogue of psychology provoked grumblings among nononsense business types, but to many advertising men, it held the key to the mysterious mind of the consumer.

The most alluring use of psychology lay in the area of suggestion. Marketing professor Arthur Holmes summarized the conventional view of the process in 1925: "People unacquainted with psychology," he wrote, "assume that men have the power to say 'Yes' or 'No' to an advertisement. The assumption is only partly correct. A man has the power to decide in the first stage of the game, not in the last . . . if the printed word can seize his attention, hold him chained, drive from his mind all other thoughts except the one 'Buy this!,' standing at the head of an organized sentiment from which every opposing idea, perception, feeling, instinct, and disposition have been driven out or smothered to death, HE CANNOT SAY 'NO!' His will is dead."

Golf, Maids, Tuxedos

Few admen would have uncritically embraced Holmes's inflated view of the power of suggestion, and some, such as Claude Hopkins, lamented "the fearful cost of changing people's habits." But growing numbers of advertising men were confident they could do almost anything with a consumer through unconscious manipulation, and psychological theory bolstered their confidence.

Besides psychology, the other major effort to understand consumer behavior was the infant "science" of market research. By the 1910s, a number of advertisers were trying to

THE FORD TOWN SEDAN

VALUE *far above the* PRICE

In reviewing the many advantages of the Ford car, it is particularly interesting to note the relation between value and price.

The low first cost is a point to keep in mind at all times because it means a considerable saving to you in the purchase of a car.

Of even greater importance, however, is the reason for this low price and the manner in which it has been achieved without sacrifice of quality or performance.

Every purchaser shares the benefits of the Ford policy of owning the source of many raw materials—of making thousands of cars a day—of selling at a small margin of profit—of constantly giving greater and greater value through the vast industrial organization that has been built up for the making of this car.

A new degree of excellence has been brought within reach of all the people through the development of new manufacturing machines

and the discovery and working out of new manufacturing methods.

Evidence of this is found in the extremely close limits of measurement maintained in the manufacture of vital parts. Some of these are held true to within a maximum variation of three ten-thousandths of an inch (.0003), reducing friction and wear and resulting in greater reliability, longer life and better performance.

As the quality of workmanship has been increased through the accuracy of the machine, so has the quality of materials been increased. The savings resulting from new manufacturing economies have been put back into the car. Through typical Ford methods, materials once thought too expensive for a low price car have been made available for use in the Ford.

Today, more than ever, it is an outstanding example of high quality at low cost. Were it made in any other way,

under any other policy, it would unquestionably cost you much more than the present price.

The use of the Triplex shatter-proof glass for the windshield is a definite indication of the quality that has been built into the Ford car. So are the four Houdaille hydraulic shock absorbers. The five steel-spoke wheels. The silent, fully enclosed six-brake system. The aluminum pistons. The chrome silicon alloy valves. The simplicity and efficiency of the lubrication, cooling, ignition and fuel systems. The large number of ball and roller bearings. The extensive use of fine steel forgings instead of castings or stampings. The many other mechanical features that count so much in reliability, economy and long life.

All of these are important considerations to every man and woman who is contemplating the purchase of a motor car. All are important reasons why the Ford delivers a value far above the price.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Detroit, Michigan

This ad is on the road to Xanadu. Facts are still packed into the copy, but it's clear that the buyer of the Ford will be getting much more than a reliable means of transportation.

base their strategies on information derived from questionnaires; by the 1920s, at least a few were convinced that "the research basis of copy" had been established. The rise of market research offered new possibilities for admen such as J. George Frederick to assert their superiority over "the mere 'word-slingers'."

By 1925, Frederick asserted, copy had become "the apex of a solid base of merchandising plan" that included data questions for advertisers as well as research into consumer types and preferences. The marketing approach was compatible with psychology. In the final stage of Frederick's merchandising plan, an analyst used proofs of varied copy to "conduct a carefully guarded test upon consumers (so planned that their unconscious judgment and not their conscious judgment would be obtained)."

The spread of a marketing orientation, by revealing the diversity of the audience and its predilections, might have made more advertising men question their tactics. Every few years, a writer in the trade press remarked that most Americans did not employ maids, play golf, or wear evening clothes to dinner; perhaps the working class majority could be represented in national advertisements. But these early calls for "market segmentation" were largely ignored, as advertisements continued to present a homogeneous portrait of the American people.

Justifying this homogeneity, advertising spokesmen revealed some fundamental assumptions about their craft. To critics who charged that "art directors snootify homely products," an agency art director replied that the homely scene had been "touched by the wizardry of the clever artist." He went on to argue that modish clothes and fine furnishings were "the kind our wives yearn for but seldom have enough pin money to buy." One industry magazine reasoned that this sort of "idealism" was "understood by consumers who do not take life too literally" as an inducement to strive for an ever higher standard of living. From this, it was only a short step to the admission that advertisements were primarily marketing fantastic visions rather than products.

Like Ezra Pound

Many advertising spokesmen had already taken that step. As early as 1912, a writer in *Judicious Advertising* had proposed that it was "possible through advertising to create mental attitudes toward anything and invest it with a value over and above its intrinsic worth." By the 1920s, mention of a product's "intrinsic worth" had virtually disappeared, as advertising spokesmen argued that consumers could "buy" all sorts of ethereal qualities. James Wallen, who started his own agency after working with the flamboyant Elbert Hubbard, agreed that "you do not sell a man the tea, but the magic spell which is brewed nowhere else but in a teapot." What made an effective advertisement, in this view, was not the product but the symbolic context that surrounded it.

This was a long way from the older, business-oriented approach to advertising, but many admen em-

braced the newer perspective. One herald of the new strategy, James Collins, argued in 1901 that advertising had created an "economy of symbolism," in which symbols, not commodities, were exchanged. Within 20 years, it was a common view that the product could be subordinated to its symbolic attributes. Face powder, for example, could be sold to both flappers and antiflappers—depending on whether the copy appealed to restless sexual energy or self-conscious sophistication.

The most commonly used symbolic attributes were meant to animate the inanimate commodity with "richer, fuller life." Like many of their contemporaries, advertising strategists were preoccupied by the pursuit of "life" amid a culture that seemed increasingly to deny it. Restless men, they moved from job to job, eager for variety and stimulation. In their preoccupation with escaping ossified forms and capturing movement in design, they resembled artists such as Braque and Picasso. In their reverence for what one copywriter called "the divinity of common things," they resembled Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams, who sought to reconnect words with things and rescue poetry from the vapors of Victorian abstraction.

The Breath of Life

But for admen, the problem of animating the inanimate was specifically commercial: how to make inert commodities resonant with vitality. The trick lay in the imagining.

One avenue to animation involved the imaginative use of language. In the early years, though most admen preached the gospel of simple and direct, there were many calls for "ginger" in copy; ad writers were advised to "pick out the vital words and form

them into sentences that possess the breath of life."

By the 1920s, a more overtly literary viewpoint emerged, as writers discussed ways of using the "magical powers" of words. One such writer, Richard Surrey, argued that literary metaphor soothed people by assimilating human travails to larger natural processes. Advertising metaphor moved in a different direction: "Machine-made products, turned out by the millions, must be assimilated to the destiny of things not machinelike; must be translated . . . into human terms."

A Pat of Butter

A number of rhetorical devices served that purpose, but perhaps the most striking was the "'I am' vogue," which lasted throughout the early 1920s, personifying commodities, ideas, and technical processes. Progress, electricity, and light joined adding machines, radios, and locomotives in adopting personae and speaking directly to the audience, often with what was thought to be Biblical eloquence. ("Verily I shrink the world. . . . But never am I my own master," intoned one modest radio.)

In visual strategies, the movement toward magic and fantasy was even more apparent, but it developed alongside a powerful countercurrent of realism. One approach incorporated the techniques of cartoonists and avant-garde artists; the other sought increasing proficiency in illustration and photography. In either case, the aim was to avoid the wooden and "unreal."

But real life remained an elusive quarry. Even photographs could be full of "'rubber-stamp' faces and expressions," the advertising art critic W. Livingston Larned complained in 1930. Unless the faces seemed to project spontaneous emotion, the "advertising language" remained unpersuasive.

"What do the faces in your advertising illustrations *say*?" asked Larned. "Are they animate with action?" There were realistic ways to escape still life—placing a pat of melting butter on a stack of pancakes, for example—but ultimately the quest for "sparkle" led realists to the borders of fantasy.

While realism persisted, surreal images proliferated. In 1922, the same issue of *Printers' Ink* that contained a commercial art manager's plea for "Real People, Doing Real Things" also presented an ad for Poster Advertising, Inc., with an example of their work: a billboard showing the earth afloat in space, encircled by a gigantic Goodyear Tire, with the slogan "Goodyear means Good Wear." This technique, according to the ad, had "Strength Beauty Dignity."

Sunny Jim

Surreal attention-getting devices stretched back several decades, but by the 1920s, an infusion of "foreign art ideas" had generated a wider array of nonrepresentational modes. In 1925, the trade press noted that "Futuristic Monstrosities are all the Rage"—distorted figures, vaguely cubist designs in backgrounds and borders. Technical advances also accelerated the movement toward the bizarre. Airbrushing, double exposures, fadeaways, and various means of "doctoring" photographs could all help the advertiser "write a sales message across the human face"—as Pompeiian Massage Cream did when it showed a man's face in a hairnet with the caption "your face is a net . . . it traps the dirt." Like Barnum's hoaxes, these tactics called as much

attention to the techniques of illusion as to the article for sale.

The more common means of visual animation were cartoons and allegorical figures. Since the turn of the century, advertisers had enlisted cartoon figures as trademarks—Sunny Jim for Force Food, the Campbell Soup twins. But as cartoonists began to realize that anything could be animated—not merely human figures but trees, butter, buildings, automobiles—advertisers embraced the more advanced forms of cartoon art.

By the 1920s, trade journal writers were praising a host of animated characters: the oat who "experienced the thrill of a lifetime" when

he was judged plump enough to be ground into three-minute Oat Flakes, the fairy characters who embodied the vitamins in Comet Rice.

Strategists seeking animation had one other option: to approach the ad as a drama in which the consumer could participate. "Even a casual examination of a few magazines proves that many of the national advertisers are borrowing dramatic appeal from the motion picture," a writer in *Judicious Advertising* noted in 1925. Static compositions could be vitalized by small details: an open box of bonbons in a living room set piece advertising radios; a lighted candelabrum atop a piano in a candle ad.

By 1936, the consumer was clearly not being sold cigarettes but a way of life—full of leisure, surrounded by friends. A winner's life, if there ever was one.

All sought to create the impression that the scene had just been vacated and was about to be occupied by the consumer.

The advertising man thus became a stage manager, charged, as one copywriter put it, with "introducing the thing advertised in a natural, unaffected, casual manner, with no outward signs of the commercial."

Moving to TV

By the late 1920s, American advertising had acquired the characteristics it would retain for at least six decades—and perhaps will retain for as long as there is a competitive market economy. This "highly organized and professional system of magical inducements and satisfactions," as social critic Raymond Williams described it, has continued to have as its goal the selling of a panoply of goods among which there are frequently few salient differences. Working from the premise of the irrationality of the consumer, this vast fantasy machine employs every conceivable visual gimmick and rhetorical device to turn the public's attention from the product to its symbolic attributes.

In retrospect, perhaps the two most remarkable aspects of the advertising business are, first, how quickly after the emergence of mass media it assumed its shape, and, second, how durable that shape has proven to be. Its perdurability is all the more remarkable when one considers that advertising is the business of manufacturing evanescent appearances.

Not that things have remained unchanged on Madison Avenue since 1930. The rise of color magazines such as *Life*, *Look*, and *Vogue* allowed advertising artists and photographers to hone their skills, creat-ing scenes of such voluptuousness and sensual ease that readers might *almost* overlook the item being sold.

And, of course, the electronic media—radio and particularly television—have greatly extended advertising's magisterial sway, further complicating and obscuring elusive "reality." Indeed, television seems almost tailor-made for the advertiser's art: Its speed, its shallow but alluring slickness, and its combination of the visual and aural make it the perfect medium for serving up 30-second segments of idealized life.

Television also makes it possible for the advertiser to use the most powerful device of suggestion—repetition. Thanks to endless, hypnotic repetitions, even the most sophisticated consumers find themselves in the thrall of the jingle of the hour, whether they are reaching out, with the help of Ma Bell, to touch someone, or receiving, from a generous Gino's, the precious freedom of choice. Whether it convinces all of the people some of the time or just some of the people some of the time, TV advertising *does* sell goods.

On to Politics

Riding on an extensive media network, advertising began to move beyond the world of commerce and into such areas as government and politics, particularly during the 1960s. Today, of course, the packaging and selling of politicians has become so widespread and professionalized as to seem commonplace. It is now almost inconceivable for a candidate for high office to undertake a campaign without the help of media consultants, acting coaches, and the usual speech (and joke) writers. And, though it is perhaps too easy to say so, one wonders if the outcomes of elections in America will

not soon be determined even more strongly by the candidate's image and appearance—his "fatherly reassuring aura" or his "youthful confidence"—than by his current policies or his political record.

Advertising, then, has conquered important new terrain since 1930, and done so with new forms and appeals. But despite outward changes, it remains, at bottom, what it was sixty or more years ago: the business of manufacturing illusions.

To some degree, it remains so because the admen of today, like those of the past, have experienced the same confusions felt by other members of 20th-century American society. These confusions stem from a contradiction between our democratic ideology, with its emphasis upon individual choice and freedom of expression, and an economic arrangement which encourages, and indeed depends upon, conformity and predictability among both producers (employers as well as employees) and consumers.

Ours is also a society that has traditionally valued spontaneity, risk, and adventure; largely for that reason we cherish the myth of the frontier, where those qualities, we believe, once flourished. Yet most Americans today inhabit an urban or suburban world that is overly regulated, hemmed in by routine, and presided over by scores of specialists and experts. "Adventure" itself has become a commodity, a packaged trip down the Colorado, an organized trek across the Himalayas, a fortnight on a dude ranch. Room for real adventure is limited, if it exists at all.

Advertising men have not been immune to these and other contradictions. Many have been, after all, creative and original thinkers, some outstanding artists (René Magritte), photographers (Richard Avedon), and poets (James Dickey and Allen Ginsberg). Yet even the least talented advertising people have recognized that their skills were harnessed to large, impersonal organizations and that the end of their efforts was to convince millions of consumers that they would be happier, even better, human beings if they used Whiz instead of Duz. Given the conditions of their work and of ordinary life, it is not really surprising that generations of advertising men have aimed to transform a prosaic world of commodities into a magical place of escape, illusion, and fantasy—an ephemeral empire of images.

Confessions of a Wild Bore

For the first half-century of this country's existence, there were apparently no such things as bores or boredom. At least, there is no recorded use in English of the word "bore" until 1812, of "boredom" until 1852. Once Americans woke up to the endless possibilities of boring and being bored by one another, of course, they more than made up for the deficiencies of their forebears. In this classic 1960 essay, John Updike lightheartedly examines from a bore's perspective the joys of nonstop talking.

by John Updike

Pity the poor bore. He stands among us as a creature formidable and familiar yet in essence unknowable. We can read of the ten infallible signs whereby he may be recognized and of the seven tested methods whereby he may be rebuffed. Valuable monographs exist upon his dress and diet; the study of his mating habits and migrational routes is well past the speculative stage; and statistical studies abound. One out of 312 Americans is a bore, for instance, and a healthy male adult bore consumes *each year* one and a half times his own weight in other people's patience.

But in all this vast literature one grave defect persists: The bore is always described externally, in a tone of distance and distaste. Hence the central question—what makes a few people bores when the rest of us are so fascinating—remains cloaked in mystery. Yet bores, unlike Red Indians, were not here to greet the Pilgrims. They do not, like rabid bats, come up from Mexico. No: The shameful truth, suppressed by both the public press and the spokesmen of our federal government, is that bores are created *out of our own number*. Each year, a few healthy Americans, whether by alchemy, infection, or unscrupulous recruiting methods among the alumni, are converted into bores.

How can this happen? The riddle of borogenesis has defied solution for several reasons. For one thing, by their very natures bores are the most difficult and unappetizing class of society to interview, and have been shunned where prostitutes, alcoholics, and juvenile delinquents have been (sociologically) embraced. For

another, bores have themselves *heavily infiltrated* the very psychological sciences that should be grappling with the problem! But the chief, and most impressive, obstacle is that *bores are oblivious of being such.* A mature, fully feathered bore absolutely believes that he is just like anybody else—if anything, cuter; so he has no recollection of becoming one. Hence superstition continues to hold court, and what is actually a disease is still widely regarded as a vice.

I have been prompted to these reflections by a remarkable document pressed upon me, with a wild, pleading look of apology, by an insufferable person as I was leaving a dinner party he had utterly ruined with his ceaseless prattle. Though it will strike some tastes, no doubt, as too morbid for print, I submit it in the interests of sunlight, reason, and mercy:

How innnocently (*the document, written in a fluent hand on several hundred sheets of lawyer's yellow foolscap, begins*) it all began! I noticed a faint, not disagreeable itching in the back of my throat whenever anyone else talked for as long as two or three minutes. I would shake my head vigorously, and think that the sensation would pass, but by the fourth minute the itching became so unbearable that I *had* to interrupt. At first, my remarks bore a deceptive pertinence to the topics under discussion, and I flatter myself that in those early months no one but my wife, whose canny blue eyes developed a defensive narrowing tic, noticed anything amiss.

My first total blackout occurred toward the end of August. It had been a very warm August, but that evening a little breeze sprang up off the bay, and my wife and I attended a dinner party with a few of our dearest friends. Never, I thought, had the food been so delicious, the wine so subtle, the ladies so lovely, and the gentlemen so sturdy, acute, and wry. Our conversation on the veranda seemed a veritable dance of ideas, counterthrusts, and graceful laughter. I was dazzled to think that here, in this specific house on the North American continent, Mankind's tortuous climb toward civilization had at last borne fruit. Imagine, then, my amazement when, in the private closeness of our car, as I hummed a popular air in celebration of a perfect night, my wife turned to me and snapped, "Why did you talk so much? You bored everybody silly."

The Bore

"I?" I protested. "I said little, but that little, well."

"Stuff!" she snapped. "Your tongue didn't stop for four hours. You drove poor Maggie Wentworth absolutely to sleep. And as for Horace, you brought on a bilious attack that had him hiccupping like a cricket." Even now, I find it difficult to believe that her impression of the evening is the correct one. One piece of evidence, however—admittedly circumstantial—emerged to support her case. The Wentworths never had us back, though *they* owe *us*.

After this seizure I was more watchful of myself. I deliberately curtailed my conversational offerings, even in relation to subjects upon which I was plainly the best informed and possessed the most lively and intricate opinions. I made myself, as it were, a mere supplier of footnotes, and artificially withheld from my fellow humans the riches of information and nuance I knew to be within me.

I was on the verge of shucking this (as I thought) foolish and inhibiting cocoon when late one night, as I was briefly qualifying something someone else had said—scarcely, indeed, qualifying; merely restating his gist in more lucid and understandable terms—I noticed, to my horror, that a delicate but distinct glaze had overspread the faces of my auditors. It is impossible to convey the macabre effect. It was not so much that their eyes had gone out of focus (for some eyes were staring fixedly at me) or that their mouths had sagged open (for some mouths were rigidly clamped shut): It was the curious uniformity of complexion, as if with one swipe their faces had been painted with the same lacquer. And, though I paused, gagging on my terror at this disgusting omen, *I went right on talking*. It was then that I realized that I was a hopelessly ill man.

My subsequent decay was not without its pretty phosphorescences. One of the most vivid, and in a way mystical, sensations is that of *repetition*. As words issue from one's mouth, one is conscious of having said them before, but with no idea of whether it was an hour ago, a week ago, or in another world altogether. The feeling is not unlike the universally experienced intuition of having been in a strange place at a previous time, which offers to some a comforting proof of the doctrine of reincarnation. The bore's repetition wears a kindred nimbus of romantic reassurance; though I know I have pronounced these words before, perhaps to this identical company, yet I have no inclination to stop. Indeed, the words seem enhanced by repetition, as in some aesthetic credos furniture and utensils are improved in beauty by the marks of wear left upon them by humble thumbs.

Becoming a bore is far from a simple, simultaneous decline of the mental and sensory faculties. On the contrary: Some are unhealthily heightened. As one's stock of anec-

John Updike, 51, was born in Shillington, Pennsylvania. He was graduated from Harvard in 1954 and studied art for a year before joining the staff of the New Yorker. *Among his prize-winning novels are* The Centaur *(1963) and* Rabbit is Rich *(1981). His most recent book is* Hugging the Shore. *This essay originally appeared in the* New Yorker. *Copyright © 1960 by John Updike.*

dotes and topics dwindles to a precious few, one's ability to relate these obsessive subjects to a running conversation increases. It is truly astounding with what ease the mind of the bore creates an illusory relevance! If, as has been said, the mark of the rational mind is the ability to perceive connections between unlike things, then the bore is truly in the forefront of rational beings.

For instance: I am oppressed by a peculiar vague emotion, or circular set of propositions, about my hometown that, boiled down to its essence, might go as follows: "It seems extraordinary to me that the town where I was born, and spent all my formative years, had nothing extraordinary about it. Yet is not this, in a sense, extraordinary?" Not that I ever state it so baldly. My effort to unburden myself of this strange message usually takes the form of a sentence beginning, "In the town where I grew up," and going on to describe some innocuous condition like the way the mailman walked up one side of the street and then down the other.

Nonbores can have no conception of how many opportunities I perceive in the course of an hour to intrude this kind of information. A conversation on, say, cybernetics seems to my deranged but active brain an immense sieve full of holes crying to be plugged with a sentence beginning, "In the town where I grew up." The glaze on the faces around me is no longer a deterrent, since that particular varnish is applied now the moment I enter a room. I am indifferent to it; I am indifferent to sniggers, to yawns, to the creeping net of ostracism that is tightening around me and my family. There is one delight left in my life, one music toward whose enchanted strains my whole being is bent. My throat itches, my larynx inflates with air, my tongue contorts; and I am drowned in bubbling syllables of bliss.

Yet, between the luminous day of normality and the ecstatic night of boringness there exists a twilight, brief for some, agonizingly long for others, in which the sufferer flitters ambiguously among phantasmal shapes of embarrassment and shame. While his tongue happily lopes along, a remote corner of his mind involuntarily observes the dismal effects he is producing; in intervals of extreme lucidity he is even bored himself. It is in such a twilit moment that I have sat down to pen, before the black curtain falls finally, these hasty words, this quick cry. In the town where I grew up. . . . (*The remaining hundred and eighty thousand words of the confession, while of indubitable interest to the specialist, are well in excess of the needs of the general reader.*)

COMMENTARY

Who's Got the Guns?

I am at a loss to see how the editors could assert that "one-half of all adult Americans are believed to own handguns" ["Crime," *WQ*, Spring 1983, p. 108]. The handgun issue is prone to inflated numbers as both sides expand figures to show how terrible the problem is or to present handgun ownership as a widely accepted and normal practice.

There are 170,000,000 adult Americans. If one-half of them owned only one handgun, at least 85,000,000 of these weapons would be circulating. But the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms estimates that only about 65,000,000 handguns have been manufactured and sold in the United States since the turn of the century. No one knows how many have been confiscated by police, discarded by owners, or become unserviceable. We believe that there are probably no more than 35–40,000,000 handguns circulating today. Including multiple ownership, there are probably no more than 30,000,000 handgun owners, about 18 percent of the adult population. Our political bias may lead us to low figures, but even the National Rifle Association would find it hard to prove that more than one-fourth of adults own handguns.

Although we have a good idea of the damage done by handguns, no one really knows exactly how many there are, who has them, or for how long.

> *Paul Lavrakas, Field Director*
> *National Coalition to Ban Handguns*
> *Washington, D.C.*

Old Tales

Re "Vietnam as the Past," [*WQ*, Summer 1983]:

Thomas Babington Macaulay's comments on the military campaigns preceding the regicide of England's Charles I (1649) are appropriate for Vietnam:
" . . . to carry the spirit of peace into war is a weak and cruel policy. The time of negotiation is the time for deliberation and delay. But when an extreme case calls for that remedy which is in its own nature most violent, and which, in such cases, is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle to think of mitigating and diluting. Languid war can do nothing which negotiation or submission will not do better; and to act on any other principle is not to save blood and money, but to squander them" (review of Henry Hallam's *Constitutional History of England*, 1828). Macaulay provides another apt remark in his review of George Nugent Grenville's *Memorials of John Hampden* (1832): "When [Hampden] drew the sword, as Clarenden has well said, he threw away the scabbard. . . . He knew better than any public man of his time how to value and how to practice moderation. But he knew that the essence of war is violence, and that moderation in war is imbecility."

> *J. Neil Morton*
> *St. Paul, Minn.*

Economy and Policy

The several articles on Poland [*WQ*, Spring 1983] prompt these observations.

One need not be a supporter of the Polish (or Russian) Communist government to acknowledge that no government, least of all a totalitarian dictatorship, could tolerate indefinitely the crescendo of politically oriented activities undertaken by Solidarity at its zenith in 1981.

Poland has for some time not been self-sufficient in food production, and the immediate cause of the 1980 Gdańsk uprisings that spawned Solidarity was the government's long overdue decision

to increase the prices of key foods. The Polish government had been subsidizing food by diverting Western loan money to purchases of imported foods.

Having insisted on autonomy in administering these loans, Polish leaders chose to use Western capital to allay domestic pressures rather than to rehabilitate industry. For example, prior to 1980, Poland had been the world's largest exporter of "thermal" or steam coal, but by then exports to Western markets had fallen about 10 million tons compared to 1979.

Poland had over the years established an enviable record as a reliable supplier of good quality coal to Finland, Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Italy, and even, in small quantities, Argentina and the United States. But the most important mines, in Upper Silesia, needed new equipment and technology to remain major sources of foreign exchange.

Certainly the Polish people must be commended for their courage to stand up repeatedly against disliked and inept authoritarian regimes. Yet the early successes of Solidarity may have contributed to a headiness that led to political measures threatening the regime. These early successes also led to unrealistic euphoria in the United States, not matched in most Western European countries. Unfortunately, both were bound to be deflated. And if one puts the entire matter in perspective, it is hard to believe that our own President Reagan, who imposed sanctions against the USSR because of the Polish martial law, would have long tolerated comparable threats against the security of our own government without calling out the National Guard.

Otto E. Zwanzig
Denver, Colo.

Practicing to Govern

Riordan Roett ["Staying the Course," *WQ*, Summer 1983] suggests some notable differences in the evolution of the present military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. While the armed forces in Brazil have been moving towards a resumption of civilian rule in a gradual,

controlled fashion, the transition in Argentina is taking place in the midst of the disintegration of some existing military, political, and economic institutions. In Chile, the government of General Pinochet has yet to accept liberalization. This raises the question of what factors have allowed Brazil to embark on a course of *abertura* that, according to Roett, holds out the promise of a return to relatively stable civilian government.

Since the early 1970s, the proliferation of popular, labor, student, professional, and church organizations that have encouraged participation in civic life in Brazil has increased the likelihood of future civilian governments being able to consolidate stable popular bases.

This level of political and civic involvement in Brazil contrasts sharply with that in Chile and Argentina, where cynicism and fear are frequent reactions of the ordinary citizen to suggestions of involvement in politics, even in the face of elections projected for later this year. In neither country is there the network of organizations for making political and economic demands like the Brazilians'. The question is whether there are any elements in the evolution of the Brazilian situation since 1964 whose study could serve to facilitate similar developments in Chile and Argentina.

The portrayal of the role of the church [pp. 70–71, "Brazil's Changing Catholic Church"] raises the issue of the accuracy of the historic image of the Catholic Church as a bulwark of the status quo and its more recent image as the vanguard of progressivism. Closer examination of the role of the Brazilian Catholic Church in the 19th and 20th centuries suggests a much less monolithic reality.

Experimentation from the 1920s to the 1950s had multiple effects, at times reinforcing existing political and economic elites and at times challenging them. The recent impact of the Church, including such innovations as the *comunidades de base* (CEBs), has varied. The CEBs may diminish political participation and the building of secular means for making economic and political demands. With increasing pressure from Rome for the CEBs to focus more strictly on evangeli-

zation and increased demonstrations of strength of moderate and conservative bishops, the Catholic Church may not play in the future as progressive a role as projected. That makes the development of secular mechanisms for popular participation even more essential for the consolidation of democratic civilian government.

Margaret E. Crahan
Luce Professor of Religion, Power,
and the Political Process
Occidental College
Los Angeles, Calif.

Social Security Bonanza?

Several readers have written to express astonishment at Peter Peterson's assertion that the average retiree will collect $520,000 in Social Security payments between retirement and death ["The Other Social Security Crisis," WQ, Spring 1983, p. 25]. An explanation:

Mr. Peterson's office replies that he based his $520,000 estimate on the U.S. Social Security Administration's (SSA) "pessimistic" projections on inflation for the rest of the century. (The SSA also issues "optimistic" and other intermediate projections.)

The average worker with a nonworking spouse who retired at age 65 in January 1982 began receiving a monthly Social Security check for $803. But benefits are indexed to the inflation rate and adjusted every July: The monthly benefit increased to $862 in July 1982, bringing annual income to $9,992.

The SSA inflation estimate for the 1980s hovers between seven and eight percent annually (and declines to five percent in the year 2000). By a process akin to what bankers like to call "the miracle of compound interest," the retired couple is receiving $24,881 annually in 1995, when, actuarial tables say, the male will die.

His widow's benefits are then reduced by half. But, thanks to annual cost of living increases, she is receiving $30,336 when she dies in 2006.

Given that rate of inflation, it would be possible to collect $520,000. It should be noted that Mr. Peterson's *New York Review of Books* articles appeared in December 1982, before inflation appeared to be well under control—for the time being.

—*ED.*

In 1968, Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs." The Center opened in October 1970 and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 500 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, journalists, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation. The Center—and *The Wilson Quarterly*—seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and points of view.