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This WQ special issue focuses largely on "The News Media," now in rapid transition. To what? We don’t know. But our scholarly contributors challenge some notions widely held by journalists and others. One is that "Americans get most of their news from television," not daily newspapers. Another is that TV “turned the public against the Vietnam war” and, later, forced Richard Nixon out of the Oval Office.

We do not cover everything. Most media research (and criticism) emphasizes the Big League: the TV networks; the New York Times, no longer the “newspaper of record” but still unmatched in world coverage; the West Coast’s ambitious heavyweight, the Los Angeles Times; the aggressive, sometimes erratic Washington Post; the skeptical, business-oriented Wall Street Journal; Time and Newsweek.

Little studied are the Associated Press and United Press International, basic news services whose unsung operatives provide most of the out-of-town reports that Americans get on radio, TV, and many a Page One. Largely ignored are the (surviving) regional dailies, notably the Baltimore Sun; Dallas’s rival Morning News and Times Herald; Chicago’s Sun-Times and Tribune; the Boston Globe; the Des Moines Register. Unanalyzed are the hundreds of smaller dailies that millions of Americans read, such as the Frederick (Md.) Post, the Greenwood (Miss.) Commonwealth, the Bend (Ore.) Bulletin.

We know little, as yet, of what really happens to journalism, politics, and civic endeavor after a big-city daily dies. But we do know we need “the news,” and we prize those publishers, editors, and reporters who take seriously the task of providing it.
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**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**

**LBJ’s Legacy?**

"The Two Wars Against Poverty: Economic Growth and the Great Society" by Charles A. Murray, in *The Public Interest* (Fall 1982), P.O. Box 542, Old Chelsea, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” launched in 1964, spurred a sharp 16-year rise in social spending. Yet Murray, former chief scientist of the American Institutes for Research, argues that Washington’s new activism had a perverse result: It brought the gradual spread of American affluence to a “grinding halt.”

Thanks chiefly to economic growth, the number of people living in poverty (when income and government transfer payments are counted) declined from 33 percent of the population in 1949 to 18 percent in 1964. By 1968, it had dropped to 13 percent. Then, just when Johnson’s programs were shifting into high gear, progress slowed. During the next five years, poverty declined by only 1.9 percentage points, to 11.1 percent in 1973. Washington’s outlays for transfer payments grew by two-thirds in constant dollars during the 1970s, but by 1980, poverty had returned to the 13 percent level.

What happened? Murray contends that more generous social welfare policies increased dependency and encouraged family break-ups. In 1965, 21 percent of the population would have fallen below the poverty line without the help of government aid. By 1968, such “latent” poverty had fallen to 18.2 percent. But it reversed course thereafter, rising to 19 percent in 1972 and to 22 percent in 1980. A smaller percentage of Americans, especially black Americans, were “making it on their own.”

Other data suggest what lay behind the change. Black and white men long had nearly identical labor-force participation rates; in 1965, the rate for black men was only one point lower. By 1968, a 3.4 point gap had opened, widening to 5.9 points in 1972 and to 8.1 in 1980. Middle-income black and white men still had comparable participation rates; changes in the behavior of the poor account for the gap. Family break-ups followed a similar pattern. In 1965, two-parent families accounted...
for 73 percent of black households. But the percentage of black two-parent families dropped to 54 percent in 1980. [Fifty percent of black families headed by women are on welfare.]

By one measure, LBJ's War on Poverty was a success. If poverty is calculated counting income, transfer payments, and in-kind benefits (food programs, medical care, housing), the rates were 10.1 percent in 1968, 6.2 percent in 1972, and 6.1 percent in 1980. But, says Murray, the goal of the War on Poverty was to help people escape "the dole."

In retrospect, he concludes, economic growth proved to be the only real antidote to poverty. "If the War on Poverty is construed as having begun in 1950 instead of 1964," he says, "we were winning . . . until Lyndon Johnson decided to wage it."

The Balanced Ticket Myth

"The Electoral Significance of the Vice Presidency" by Danny M. Adkison, in *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Summer 1982), Center for the Study of the Presidency, 208 East 75th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Presidential nominees traditionally pick running mates on the basis of geography, ideology, or religion to boost their own chances on election day. But Richard Nixon, for one, did not put much stock in "balancing the ticket." "The Vice President can't help you," he asserted in 1968. "He can only hurt you."

By and large, Nixon was correct, argues Danny M. Adkison, a political scientist at Oklahoma State University. Using opinion surveys conducted by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, he analyzed voters' responses to the six major party tickets in the 1968, '72, and '76 elections. In four of the six cases, no more than 15 percent of voters who were unimpressed by a presidential nominee but pleased with his running mate voted for the party's ticket. Both exceptions involved Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. The first occurred in 1968, when 28.5 percent of voters who disliked Nixon but found Agnew appealing voted Republican. Yet, says Adkison, the Republicans triumphed in 1968 precisely because Nixon bucked the usual logic of ticket-balancing and found a running mate so unknown that voters simply had no initial reaction to him.

And Vice-Presidents can definitely hurt a ticket. Three-quarters of voters who liked both candidates on a ticket in the three elections voted for them. But only 46 percent of those who favored the presidential nominee but disliked the vice-presidential nominee cast their ballots for the ticket. Thus, a presidential candidate can cut his support by as much as 30 percent by picking an unpopular running mate.

One kind of ticket balancing—the "Home State Strategy"—does work. Since 1900, the winning presidential candidate has carried the Vice-President's home state 85.7 percent of the time. But the home state vote was decisive only once: In 1916, former governor Thomas R. Mar-
shall helped Woodrow Wilson carry Indiana and win the election.

Only a running mate who has his own national constituency can improve a ticket's chances. Ironically, the best example is Spiro Agnew, who was again a major Nixon asset in 1972—this time because of his own intensely loyal following. But, notes Adkison, politicians who bring such strength to a ticket rarely settle for second place.

**Reagan’s New Federalism**

"Who Will Care for the Poor?" by Walter Guzzardi, Jr., in *Fortune* (June 28, 1982), 541 North Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

President Reagan's proposal to turn over major federal programs to the states has been attacked as an attempt to institutionalize "benign neglect" of the nation's poor. Guzzardi, a *Fortune* editor, offers two cheers for Reagan's New Federalism, though he doubts that the states should be given all the responsibility the President intends to assign them.

Today's statehouses are peopled by professionals who manage money far better than do their Washington counterparts. Every state constitution except Vermont's requires a balanced budget. Thus, Guzzardi argues, it makes sense to give the states control of more than 40 federal programs worth $40 billion—school lunches, highway maintenance,
career education—and gradually trim Washington's contributions.

But the President also wants Washington to pay the $30 billion tab for Medicaid (medical care for the poor), while shifting to the states the entire $56 billion burden of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Medicare (medical care for the elderly). This, charges Guzzardi, amounts to "handing the states the leading social dilemma of our time"—caring for the poor.

The existing social welfare system is part state, part federal. Despite federal contributions designed to minimize wide benefit disparities among states, Mississippi pays a monthly AFDC benefit of $96 to a family of three; Wisconsin, $473. But Mississippi's poor make up almost 25 percent of its total population; Wisconsin's, only 8.5 percent.

Other inequities are unrelated to state wealth. Oil-rich Texas's monthly AFDC benefit, $118, is the nation's second lowest. Arizona offers no Medicare benefits at all. Giving the states full responsibility for social programs could widen such gaps.

Guzzardi believes that the current system of shared federal-state responsibility is inefficient. But he points out that while Reagan favors a federal takeover of Medicaid on grounds of economy, he does not seem to acknowledge that the same logic applies to AFDC and Medicare.

The states may be ready to handle more responsibilities in some areas, Guzzardi concludes, but "in modern times the expressions of our highest values . . . have come from the national government and from national leadership." That, he says, is not likely to change soon.

Lying to the Pollsters


Public opinion pollsters called the 1980 presidential election a "horse race" right up to election day. Yet a "closet Reagan vote" gave the Republican a comfortable 10 percent margin of victory. The public, it appears, concealed its intentions.

Pollsters have been aware of the problem for years, write Lewis and Schneider, Los Angeles Times poll director and American Enterprise Institute Fellow, respectively. While people tell pollsters things—about their income, for example, or their political preferences—they might not reveal to neighbors or friends, they also tend to slant their answers towards what is socially acceptable or, as in a test, "correct."

Researcher Theresa Rogers, for example, asked 171 New Yorkers in 1974 whether they had voted in the last year's mayoral election. Of the nonvoters, 40 percent claimed they had voted. And those interviewed in person were more likely to misrepresent themselves than those queried by phone, confirming the suspicion that social pressures affect poll responses. But other studies show that between 10 and 41 percent of
inaccurate answers are simply due to memory lapses.

Moreover, attitudes expressed in polls are not always a reliable indicator of behavior. During the early 1930s, researcher Richard LaPiere crossed the United States with a Chinese couple to measure discrimination. Only one of the 251 restaurants and other public facilities they visited refused them service. Yet when LaPiere later mailed questionnaires to the proprietors, 90 percent stated they would not serve Asians.

In 1970, political scientist Philip Converse reported encountering a different sort of inconsistency. People interviewed on the same issues three times over four years could be divided into two groups: 20 percent had stable attitudes, but 80 percent either had no opinion or repeatedly “flip-flopped” on issues. Yet, Converse found, the shifts tended to balance out, keeping the mean attitude “remarkably stable.”

Statistical techniques can correct for some distortions, but a certain amount of error will always remain, say Lewis and Schneider. Public opinion surveys cannot precisely delineate popular attitudes or predict behavior, but, carefully and cautiously conducted, they are useful as broad indicators of what the public is thinking.

The Pipeline Imbroglio

Detente is often said to benefit the Soviet Union more than the West. Ironically, says Stern, a London-based energy consultant, the Reagan administration’s recent attempt to get tough with Russia by opposing construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline to Western Europe also aided Moscow, by weakening the NATO alliance.

The importance of the pipeline, says Stern, has been vastly exaggerated. Western Europe began importing Soviet natural gas in 1968 and now buys some 26 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually. So far, West Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland together have contracted for an additional 21 BCM annually to be carried by the new pipeline. Soviet hard currency earnings on the new gas will amount to $3.8 billion per year, not the oft-cited $10 billion. (Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Greece may also sign contracts soon, though for a smaller total amount.)

Moreover, killing the project would have little effect on Soviet energy development. Regardless of the European pipeline, Moscow plans to build five other pipelines from its Urengoy gas field in Siberia, the world’s largest, for itself and its Eastern European allies. Natural gas production will rise from 28.6 percent of all Soviet energy production today to 35–40 percent by 1990.
Nor will the pipeline make Western Europe dangerously dependent on Moscow. West Germany, Italy, and France will indeed rely on the Soviets for 35 percent of their natural gas, or six percent of their total energy needs. But Stern notes that Soviet oil exports will dwindle after 1985, a year after the pipeline becomes operational, thus keeping down Western Europe’s total Soviet energy imports. A sudden cutoff of Soviet supplies would cause problems. But as France demonstrated when Algeria halted shipments of liquefied natural gas in 1980, remedies exist: other sources or kinds of fuel, reduced consumption. Far worse would be increased Western European reliance on OPEC—the only realistic long-term alternative to the pipeline.

The chief threat posed by the pipeline, says Stern, is to Western unity; the episode is a “classic example of how not to manage an alliance.”

**Gung Ho, Again**


Its ordeal during the Vietnam era “nearly left the Marine Corps a burnt-out case,” writes Wright, a *New York Times* editor. Now the Corps’ fortunes have improved.

In 1965–73, the Marines lost 13,066 killed and 51,392 wounded in their battles to defend northern South Vietnam. Meanwhile, race riots raged in barracks at home and abroad. Desertion rates soared. Recruiting declined. And in Washington’s sour post-Vietnam climate, think-tank analysts, Army critics, and Federal budget-cutters began to question (once again) the need for an austere but large (192,000-man) seaborne intervention force with its own aircraft.

Getting the Corps back to basics was the first task of two successive Marine commandants, Generals Louis H. Wilson and Robert H. Barrow. Starting in 1975, training was improved and discipline tightened; some 5,000 “undesirables” were discharged; many of the best Marines were assigned recruiting duty. Today, 82 percent of all Marine “boots” (trainees) are high school graduates—up from 50 percent seven years ago. First-termers’ re-enlistments are up to a record, nearly 50 percent, and the court-martial rate is down.

What gave the Corps new life in Washington were the 1979 Iran crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some 12,000 Marines were earmarked for President Carter’s standby Rapid Deployment Force for the Persian Gulf. President Reagan’s subsequent emphasis on a global “maritime” strategy meant a bigger Navy, including reactivated battleships, to help the amphibious Marines fight future “brushfires.”

On Capitol Hill, the Marines have friends among both the “reformers,” who like the Corps’ mobility and frugality (it absorbs only three percent of the Pentagon’s budget), and the “hard-liners,” who admire Marine combat-readiness. New jet fighters, armored vehicles, advanced antitank and antiaircraft missiles, and amphibious vessels...
are on their way to the troops.

With a revived mission and better weaponry to back up its traditional esprit, Wright concludes, the Marine Corps now again seems likely to survive as the nation’s proud “all-American anachronism” among the services.

Lebanon’s Future

“A House Divided” by Adam Zagorin, in Foreign Policy (Fall 1982), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Now that the worst of the fighting in Beirut has ended, peace and stability may be within reach. But U.S. foreign policy-makers must realize that trying to re-establish a strong central government may make peace harder to achieve, cautions Zagorin, a Time correspondent.

Political fragmentation has become economic fragmentation in Lebanon. Since Moslem-Christian strife broke out in 1975, more than 40 warring factions, split along religious and political lines, have developed. The economy has fared surprisingly well, quickly rebounding when factional fighting first died down in 1976, though slowing to a growth rate below three percent after hostilities were renewed in 1977. Bank deposits have quadrupled to $8 billion since 1975.

But the central government is in bad straits. Tax collection ceased almost entirely after 1975. In 1978, 1979, and 1980, the budget deficit...
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

reached one-third of outlays. Of $2 billion in aid pledged by Arab nations in 1979, less than 20 percent has been dispensed. The public debt has climbed to over $1 billion, more than an entire year's budget.

Meanwhile, the black market economy is booming, spurred by civil war factionalism. About one-quarter of Lebanon's 400,000 workers are employed in the "underground" economy. The hashish trade reaps some $1 billion annually. Other smuggling reduced government customs duties collections by 40 percent during the first half of 1981.

Lebanon's rival political chieftains control some $300 million in contributions from foreign governments, and some levy their own taxes. And the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had a budget larger than the central government's. The PLO paid 15,000 armed guerrillas and 10,500 workers employed in factories, hospitals, even a garbage collection service. Now its operations are up for grabs.

"The war was hell," writes Zagorin, "but in its course grew a well-articulated and now entrenched economic system." Trying to reimpose order from Beirut would hurt the economy and exacerbate factional jealousies. Instead, Zagorin favors rewriting Lebanon's constitution to establish an "umbrella" national government that would preside over autonomous local authorities. Such an arrangement, he argues, would merely legitimize the existing system and allow Lebanon's Moslems and Christians, rightists and leftists, to coexist peacefully.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

A Polite Fiction Among Bankers

"Producing Something from Nothing" by Robert B. Zevin, in The Atlantic Monthly (August 1982), P.O. Box 2547, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Since 1960, growing international trade and loans to developing countries have pushed the value of Eurocurrency from $10 billion to $1 trillion. Zevin, senior vice-president of the United States Trust Company, argues that this increase is largely a trick of accounting and that the Eurocurrency system today is in danger.

Eurocurrency is neither European nor a particular currency. It is a national currency deposited in a bank in any other nation. A Eurodollar is a dollar deposited in any bank outside the United States; a Japanese yen in a New York bank is a Euroyen. Three-quarters of all Eurocurrency deposits are denomined in dollars; more than half of the system's deposits are held in Europe.

Most deposits are in the name of "a few dozen" multinational corporations and OPEC countries. American multinationals started the Eurocurrency boom during the 1960s, and during the 1970s, oil-producing countries began stashing their excess profits in the Eurobanking system.
As in domestic banking in the United States, a bank holding Eurocurrency lends money, then counts the loan as a liability, the borrower's IOU as an asset. But Eurobanking differs from domestic U.S. banking in that loans need not be backed by cash reserves. Audits are not required, and no governmental authority stands ready to make good on depositors' claims if a Eurobank fails.

At present, outstanding loans far outweigh the Eurobanks' reserves, Zevin writes. Although loans to multinationals have been repaid out of profits, some $500 billion in loans to developing countries remain unpaid—and largely unpayable. Interest on these loans totals $60 billion annually. Eurobanks handle the problem by "rolling over" the debt—making new loans to help the debtors pay off the old ones.

As long as depositors don't ask for their money, the banks and the Eurocurrency system are safe. But, Zevin warns, the system "is being strained to the breaking point by political pressures"—e.g., the debate over whether to declare Poland in default—as well as by international economic ills and "the growing unease of the major participants."

The world's central banks must step in, says Zevin, to guarantee deposits and impose order.


Inflation giveth and inflation taketh away—that could be a capsule history of the American housing market over the last decade, according to Browne, vice-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

Housing prices were rising five percent annually by the end of the 1960s, but mostly because buyers were demanding higher quality homes. But during the '70s, "people were paying more for the same house rather than buying more house."

Between 1975 and 1978, new home prices rose each year by 14 percent, and existing homes increased in cost by 12.5 percent. Yet total sales climbed from 2.1 million to 3.3 million annually. By 1981, however, both price increases and sales had been cut in half. What happened?

One source of upward pressure on prices was the coming of age of the "baby boom" generation. During the 1970s, the population of 20-to-34-year-olds—the prime ages for first-time home buyers—grew by 40 percent. In 1970, only 26 percent of married couples under age 25 and 48 percent of those between 25 and 29 owned their own homes; by 1979, the proportions were 37 and 59 percent, respectively.

Rising inflation encouraged families to buy a home today for fear it would be out of reach tomorrow. Meanwhile, inflation, combined with the federal tax code's provisions for deducting mortgage interest costs,
greatly reduced effective interest rates. Home-buyers in high tax brackets actually enjoyed negative rates of real interest.

Then inflation showed its other face. Mortgage funds dried up and rates finally caught up with inflation, growing from 9.5 percent in 1978 to an average of 14.75 percent in 1981. Between 1975 and 1980, the size of monthly mortgage payments doubled, while family income increased by only 54 percent. In 1975, payments took 21 percent of monthly income; by 1980, 30 percent. Fewer families could muster the financial resources required to qualify for a mortgage.

Because today's large pool of young adults still needs housing, Browne believes the market will recover as soon as interest rates decline. But the boom of the 1970s, she says, is over for good.

**Trustbusters Change Course**


The Reagan administration's antitrust enforcers say big business is not necessarily bad business. This has roused the ire of small businessmen and liberals who claim the new stance gives a green light to anticom-
petitive practices. In fact, says National Journal correspondent Wines, the policy changes may be more psychological than legal.

The government's two chief antitrust watchdogs, the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have cut back their prosecutions for vertical concentration (when a manufacturer owns the companies that supply components of its products), as well as for "predatory" price-cutting and conglomerate mergers.

Administration spokesmen argue that certain forms of price-fixing are acceptable. Consumers, they say, are not hurt when a manufacturer fixes the retail price of its products. Those who disagree point to the Levi Strauss Company's 1978 agreement to allow blue jean retailers to set their own prices, which has saved consumers some $75 million a year, according to the FTC. Yet the Reagan antitrusters have stepped up prosecutions for such "hard core" anticompetitive practices as horizontal price-fixing (where several firms collude to set prices). Assistant Attorney General William Baxter maintains that his Justice Department Antitrust Division has put "three times as many businessmen in jail for price-fixing" during the Reagan administration's 18 months in office as in any comparable time since the 1890 Sherman Act was passed.

Nevertheless, critics charge that the administration has curtailed attacks on illegal industrial concentration. Last year, for example, the FTC dropped an antitrust suit accusing the three top breakfast cereal makers of operating a "shared monopoly."

Yet, Wines notes, while some companies undoubtedly have too much clout in particular fields, overall industrial concentration in the United States has probably declined since 1972. The number of corporate acquisitions dropped from 3,031 in 1972 to 1,223 in 1980 (though the capital involved climbed from $16.7 billion to $44.3 billion). The share of all U.S. profits reaped by the top 1,300 companies declined from 76.6 percent to 75.6 percent.

"Many experts do not view the Reagan policy shifts as revolutionary," says Wines. But the rhetoric of federal antitrust officials has left the impression that almost anything goes. And that, Wines argues, invites a public outcry and corporate abuse.

An Embargo That Worked

Amid all the debate today about U.S. embargoes on grain and technology, it may be useful to consider one of America's first embargoes—how it succeeded, and why it ultimately collapsed.

In December 1807, President Thomas Jefferson convinced Congress to bar all trade with Britain, then at war with France, to retaliate for "The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Great Britain" by Jeffrey A. Frankel, in The Journal of Economic History (June 1982), Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, P.O. Box 3630, Wilmington, Del. 19807.
seizures of neutral American ships. According to Frankel, a Berkeley economist, British imports from America dropped 73 percent the following year: exports fell 56 percent. Some trade continued because the Embargo Act was at first loosely enforced and because some ships had already embarked on their long Atlantic crossing when the Act was passed. Smugglers also accounted for some trading.

But not much, says Frankel. Cotton was the chief U.S. export to Britain, accounting for as much as 65 percent of sales. In 1808, British imports of cotton from all sources other than North America remained at the 1807 level, 31 million pounds, suggesting that little U.S. cotton was smuggled through third countries.

The embargo affected the two countries quite differently. In the United States, New England shipbuilders and seafarers were hit even harder than were cotton and tobacco farmers, who at least retained their domestic markets. But the cost of nails, glass, and other imported manufactured goods changed very little, as domestic entrepreneurs moved rapidly to meet demand. Britain, deprived of key raw materials, suffered more. Total production fell by 4.8 percent in 1808 according to one index, and textile output dropped by 33 percent.

In March 1809, Thomas Jefferson left the White House. Arguing that the embargo was damaging the American economy more than the British, Federalists led Congress in lifting the ban. But the real movers behind the turnaround, notes Frankel, were New England's shippers, the Federalists' chief backers. In the end, observes Frankel, it was not national economic considerations that brought down the embargo, but "a lack of political will."

### SOCIETY

**Blacks Win Better Jobs**


During the 1960s, a thriving economy and new civil rights legislation helped black Americans make strong economic gains. Three recessions slowed progress during the 1970s, says U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics economist Westcott, but blacks continued to climb the job ladder to more skilled and more lucrative employment.

Overall, blacks earned 81 percent of what whites did in 1980, up from 79.6 percent in 1973. Yet that small change conceals significant movements within the job market. Black employment in white-collar professions grew by 55 percent between 1972 and 1980, compared to 27 percent for whites. But for many blacks, the move into the white-collar
world occurred in lower paying professional jobs, such as nursing and teaching. As a result, black professional income actually declined as a percentage of whites' from 91 percent in 1973 to 86 percent in 1980.

Within blue-collar occupations, however, blacks moved from lower echelon jobs to more skilled work. By 1980, 32 percent more blacks worked in the craft trades—carpentry, plumbing, printing—while 15 percent fewer worked as laborers. The black-white income ratio in blue-collar fields was 81 percent in 1980, compared to 78 percent in 1973. Meanwhile, the number of black household workers dropped by 42 percent, and black farm employment fell by 32 percent.

The earnings of black and white women were more nearly equal than those of black and white men. The earnings ratio of black to white women was 92.2 percent overall, compared to 75.1 percent for black and white males. Black and white female white-collar workers earned virtually identical salaries, while the income of black men in white-collar jobs was 79 percent of their white counterparts.

Overall, the number of blacks in professional and skilled blue-collar jobs increased only about half as quickly during the '70s as during the '60s, notes Westcott; the rate of advance for whites also slowed. Still, between 1973 and 1980, black Americans posted a 68 percent earnings increase, compared to 65 percent for whites. The move up the job ladder slowed but did not stop.

Paranoid Politics

Several American historians have traced the "irrational" paranoia of 1950s McCarthyism back to a "paranoid style" of politics that took root during the American Revolution. But Wood, a Brown University historian, explains that the Founders' apparent paranoia was not the clinical variety we think of today.

In two 1965 essays, historians Richard Hofstadter and Bernard Bailyn demonstrated that the colonists were constantly on guard against British plots and conspiracies. Thomas Jefferson, for example, complained before the Revolution of London's "deliberate, systematical plan of reducing us to slavery." But Wood argues that such apprehensions were common throughout the West during the Enlightenment. Novelist Daniel Defoe (1670–1731) called it "an Age of Plot and Deceit, of Contradiction and Paradox."

Far from being irrational, the 18th-century conspiracy-watch was "a last desperate attempt . . . to hold men personally and morally responsible" for events caused by chance or such impersonal forces as industrialization and modernization. Leaders of the Revolutionary era lacked the faith of their forebears that "Providence" accounted for the inexplicable. They struggled to believe that men could understand "the
social order they themselves had made."

The writings of philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) and others had convinced them that society, "though no doubt ordained in principle by God, was man's own creation—formed and sustained, and thus alterable, by human beings acting autonomously," says Wood. Meanwhile, Enlightenment science fostered the belief that causes and effects in human affairs could be discovered, as they were in Newtonian physics. Faced with King George III’s declarations of good will and such shockingly hostile developments as the 1765 Stamp Act, colonial leaders assumed that British officials were conspiring against them.

Ironically, Woods observes, the Founders’ "paranoia" arose out of an optimistic faith in human reason and responsibility.

More Jails Won’t Really Help

President Reagan’s Task Force on Violent Crime concluded in 1981 that Washington could do little about the underlying social causes of crime, but could help the states build more prisons. Currie, a sociologist on the California Governor’s Task Force on Civil Rights, argues that simply trying to get criminals off the streets won’t stop violent crime.

The United States, with the highest crime rates in the world, already jails a higher percentage of its population than any advanced country except the Soviet Union and South Africa. Indeed, the U.S. rate of incarceration increased by one-third between 1975 and 1981. Still, crime rates have continued to climb.

Why doesn’t imprisonment prevent violence? A study in Columbus, Ohio, suggests two answers. More than two-thirds of that city’s violent offenders had no previous felony convictions. And Columbus police made arrests for only 40 to 50 percent of violent crimes. (Findings of a Rand Corporation study of repeat felony offenders in California were even bleaker: Only one of 10 robbers was caught.)

The National Academy of Sciences estimates that reducing serious crime by 10 percent would require jailing 157 percent more people in California, 263 percent more in New York, and 310 percent more in Massachusetts. But U.S. prisons are already jammed. Half of all state prison inmates in 1978 were living in overcrowded prisons. Tripling the current prison population of some 300,000 might reduce crime by 20 percent, but the cost would be high: $40 billion for new prisons and $8 billion annually for operating expenses.

Is there a better way? Currie believes so. Conservatives, he says, have ignored successful prevention and rehabilitation programs. A Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) project, for example, reduced crime by offering ex-addicts jobs and counseling. According to MDRC cost-benefit analyses, the program saved taxpayers $4,000 per client. Chicago’s Unified Delinquency Intervention program
Longer jail terms yield slim returns: By one estimate, a mandatory five-year sentence for felonies would reduce such crimes by only four percent.

dramatically reduced rearrests of youthful offenders—most of whom come from broken homes—by placing them in closely supervised group homes and providing jobs and education. The federal Child and Family Resources program produced similar results during the 1970s by providing counseling, tutoring, and meals for children at a cost of only $3,000 per family.

The way to make America's streets safe, argues Currie, is to rebuild families, not to build jails.

Who Will Support the Children?


Washington has long tried to pare Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) costs by prodding welfare mothers to work. Results have been mixed. Today, the most promising cost-cutting course may be a program designed to force absent fathers to support their children.

Enacted into law in 1935, AFDC was originally intended to aid children whose fathers had died. But by 1977, note Robins and Dickinson,
economists at SRI International, only three percent of 7.8 million AFDC children fell into this category. The parents of 85 percent of the children were divorced, separated, or not married.

In 1975, Congress established the Child Support Enforcement program, requiring each state to develop measures to establish paternity, locate missing fathers, and collect court-ordered support payments. The plan also required mothers to help locate missing fathers—or else lose benefits. In 1976, the program collected $200 million, a sum equal to two percent of all AFDC benefits. By 1980, collections were up to $600 million, five percent of benefits. Success varies from state to state. In New York, administrative costs exceeded collections in 1980, while Michigan rounded up $3 for every $1 spent. Nationwide, the program recouped $1.34 for each $1 of expenses.

One-third of all AFDC families with an absent parent should now be receiving child support, but only one in seven of those families does so. If collections could be improved and new awards won from other missing parents, the authors believe the program could recover 25 to 30 percent of all AFDC costs. Congress has already authorized withholding from federal tax refunds and unemployment benefits to increase collections. An even more effective (albeit radical) step, Robins and Dickinson argue, would be to have the Internal Revenue Service withhold child support much as it withholds taxes.

Improving child support enforcement might also yield one important fringe benefit. Some critics contend that AFDC encourages fathers to desert their families to enable them to collect welfare. If the charge is correct, an effective child-support program could reduce that incentive and keep more families together.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Rush to Judgment


Israel may have won impressive military victories in its June invasion of Lebanon, but it did not fare as well with American public opinion. Peretz, editor of the New Republic, blames distorted and superficial U.S. press coverage of the operation.

Early in the war, the media reported that the fighting had left 10,000 civilians dead, another 600,000 homeless. Government leaders such as Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who cited the figures as he criticized Israel, believed that the source was the International Red Cross or UNICEF. Actually, says Peretz, the estimate came from the Palestinian Red Crescent, headed by the brother of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat. Body counts by Israeli and
Pictures dramatized the recent fighting in Lebanon, but did they tell the whole story? Journalists were hard put to relate the history of seven years of bitter civil war and occupation by PLO and Syrian forces.

Red Cross officials later put the civilian toll in the towns of Sidon and Tyre, sites of the major early fighting, at some 300.

Reporters probably exaggerated the number of refugees as well, Peretz argues. Because Lebanon has had no census in over a generation, no reliable population estimates exist. Journalists' guesses for individual cities differed by as much as 300,000, and refugee counts varied widely as a result. The oft-cited estimate of 600,000 refugees, says Peretz, would include nearly everyone living in the war zone. And although the Washington Post reported on June 16 that the city of Jezzin "is said to have become a major refugee center" for 200,000 people, when Peretz visited the city a week later, he says, "they were not there."

The press has also "systematically ignored the fact that much of the destruction . . . it describes and portrays on television is a result of seven years of bitter fighting"—or of the PLO's tactic of choosing areas heavily populated by civilians for its strongholds. Many journalists who gave extensive coverage to the Israeli invasion paid little attention to Lebanon when it was occupied only by Syria and the PLO.

Peretz believes an anti-Israeli bias accounts for some of the media distortion. But constant deadline pressures for "new, vivid images of conflict, violent if possible," are also responsible. Unfortunately, he concludes, the public back home thinks it has gotten the whole story.
The election of telegenic former actor Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed to many observers to confirm the power of television in politics. Actually, says Greenfield, a commentator for CBS News, the 1980 election proved the opposite.

All of Ted Kennedy's charisma could not overcome his failure to provide voters with an appealing political program. The "irresistible" momentum (the "Big Mo") proclaimed by news pundits during George Bush's early primary victories came to naught. President Jimmy Carter's attempt to use his office to dominate the news backfired. The more media attention the President commanded, Greenfield contends, the more impatient the public became with his policies and personal attacks on Reagan.

Reagan, on the other hand, made countless supposedly fatal "media gaffes" (he replied "Who?" to a question on the Today show about French President Giscard d'Estaing), but confounded the media "experts" and pollsters by winning handily.

The untold story of the 1980 campaign, Greenfield says, is the media's failure to understand the limited electoral appeal of "political stagecraft." Reporters focused on the frivolous aspects of electioneering—"the bands, the balloons"—and downplayed political issues. "Covering Presidential campaigns, then, was like covering a marketing campaign: Don't report speeches in great detail; report the political strategy behind the speech," writes Greenfield. But the Republicans proved that effective organization (reflected in an eight-to-one fund-raising lead) and candidates' positions mean more to the voters than "a raised eyebrow by Walter Cronkite."

Non-Western political leaders and scholars often claim that their cultures have long records of respect for human rights. Actually, human rights are "an artifact of modern Western civilization," writes D'Onnelly, a political scientist at Holy Cross College. Traditional non-Western "human rights" are something else entirely.
Muslim scholars, for example, cite the Koran to show that Islam recognizes 14 distinct human rights. But the Islamic “right of free expression” is actually a duty to speak the truth; the “right” to life, a duty not to kill. Such injunctions do help ensure human dignity, which Donnelly sees as the aim of human rights. But unlike those in the West, these “rights” carry no guarantees. The Koran’s command that a ruler establish justice in his land does not give his people a right to justice.

Some non-Western societies have acknowledged certain rights, but without granting them universally. In traditional Hindu India, for example, rights were distributed according to caste; in Africa, according to “communal membership, family, status, or achievement.”

The modern Western concept of human rights assumes the existence of a large state, against which the individual must be protected, observes Donnelly. By contrast, traditional non-Western ideas of human rights have centered on “the small community based on groupings of extended families,” where a network of social support serves the same protective function as institutionalized Western human rights.

When Western philosophers began discussing human rights in the 17th century, the modern state was just taking shape. According to Donnelly, needs for human rights in the Third World today are “essentially the same . . . as they were two or three centuries ago in England and France.” But he worries that some governments may reject the notion of human rights out of misplaced resistance to Western “cultural imperialism.” Though a product of advancing Western culture, Donnelly argues, all human rights necessarily belong to all human beings. And non-Western governments that recognize the rights to liberty and property will, he predicts, win popular support and hasten economic development.

*The Prophet of Liberation*

"On Herbert Marcuse and the Concept of Psychological Freedom" by Myrtam Miedzian Malinovich, in *Social Research* (Spring 1982), 66 West 12th St., New York, N.Y. 10011.

The 1960s student generation hailed American Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) as an apostle of sexual liberation. But according to Malinovich, a CUNY philosopher, Marcuse’s theories were not what they seemed.

Like all Marxists of the decade, Marcuse faced a knotty intellectual problem: Marx’s indictment of capitalism for exploiting labor seemed irrelevant in view of the rising prosperity of most American workers. In such books as *Eros and Civilization* (1966), Marcuse charged that capitalism had merely satisfied “false” materialistic needs. To show how capitalism failed to meet man’s “true” psychological needs, he turned to Sigmund Freud’s notion that “civilization is built upon the renunciation of instinctual gratification.” Capitalism, Marcuse argued,
needlessly perpetuated the sublimation of biological needs even though prosperity put liberation within reach: Men no longer needed to repress their natural desires to provide for the necessities of life.

But, says Malinovich, Marcuse never clearly defined what "true" needs were. In dramatizing capitalist oppression, he suggested at times that liberation meant sexual anarchy. At other times Marcuse's "freedom" seemed relatively tame: taking greater pleasure in work and family life. "True" needs varied according to the philosopher's polemical requirements. Marcuse used Freud's ideas, says Malinovich, not because he believed them, but to make more palatable his own views about the mediocrity of American life.

Marcuse never explained how psychological liberation would work. What is the place, in his utopian society, of those who are content solely with material satisfactions? Must they be forced to be free?

Malinovich concludes that Marcuse's chief contribution to philosophy was raising the issue of psychological oppression. His prescriptions for psychological freedom were of little value. But though he was shunned by most other philosophers, he did force them to confront contemporary social questions they would have preferred to ignore. And many of his student followers in the '60s are now taking their places in the ranks of today's teachers of philosophy.

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**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

**New Memories**

"Micromemories" by John Douglas, in Science 82 (July-Aug. 1982), P.O. Box 10790, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

The computer wizards who put a calculator in every pocket are now at work on Phase II of the "microelectronic revolution." Phase I gave us microprocessors, tiny silicon chips that make millions of calculations in seconds. But today's microprocessors cannot store much information—which is where the new micromemories come in, says Douglas, a writer from northern California's "Silicon Valley."

While all microprocessors are made the same way—electronic circuits are etched on a chip of silicon the size of an oatmeal flake—the new memory devices come in several forms. The most important today is the Random Access Memory (RAM) silicon chip. RAM chips are made much like microprocessors and are the only micromemories that work as fast. They can retrieve stored information in ten-billionths of a second. But their capacity is limited. Even the latest "64K" RAM chips can stock only 1,300 words. (Forthcoming Japanese models will quadruple that capacity.) Magnetic bubbles and disks are alternatives with more storage space. Bubbles can store the equivalent of a 600-page novel and disks the equivalent of an unabridged dictionary, but both are one
million times slower than the RAMs.
Soon a new development—the optical memory disk—may over-
shadow all other memory technologies. Pinpoint laser beams encode
optical disks by burning tiny pits into them. Recently released by
Toshiba, the first commercial optical disks can store the equivalent of
33 books of 300 pages each; but they offer a "sluggardly" retrieval time
of half a second. Optical disks have one other serious drawback: They
cannot be amended or rerecorded.
The most promising micromemory technology, as Douglas sees it,
involves making silicon chips "superconducting"—cutting their resist-
ance to the passage of electricity by bathing them in cold liquid helium.
Computers using superconducting chips would require minimal power
and generate little waste heat. As a result, circuits could be packed
more tightly on the chips, and the shorter distances travelled by elec-
trical currents would mean faster retrieval times.
Until now, only corporations, universities, and governments with the
biggest computers have enjoyed large electronic memory capacities.
Putting big memories in small packages would allow the most complex
problems to be solved on inexpensive home systems. It might even
mean the advent of sophisticated robots.

The Impact of Longevity

In 1945, the average life span in the Third World was 40 years. Today,
thanks to better health care and sanitation, it is 55 years. Will further
advances in Third World longevity only lead to intolerable population
growth? Gwatkin and Brandel, Senior Fellow and Associate Fellow,
respectively, at the Overseas Development Council, say no.
The Third World is now going through a demographic change that
the West experienced beginning around 1830—a switch from a popula-
tion equilibrium of high death and birth rates to one of low death and
birth rates. The shift begins with an increase in life spans, and in the
time it takes for the birth rate to drop, population jumps. The biggest
jump occurs at the very beginning of this adjustment, because the aver-
age life span grows chiefly as a result of declines in infant mortality.
More children thus grow up to have families. That stage, say the au-
thors, has already taken place in the Third World.
As life spans continue to rise, the people saved are increasingly older,
and effects on population are smaller. Boosting Third World life expect-
tancy from 55 to 60 years would mean a population jump only half as
large as that accompanying the increase from 35 to 40.
United Nations demographers predict that Third World population,
at current rates, will increase from 2.89 billion in 1975 to 4.80 billion in
2000, finally leveling off in 2100 at 8.46 billion. They expect the average

"Life Expectancy and Population Growth in the Third World," by Davidson R.
Gwatkin and Sarah K. Brandel, in Scientific American (May 1982), P.O. Box 5969,
New York, N.Y. 10017.
life span to reach 75 years around the year 2030. (Life expectancy in the West today is 73 years.) Efforts to increase life expectancy 50 percent faster—so that the average life span reaches 75 years by 2015—would put the total population at 4.90 billion in 2000, an increase of only 2.1 percent, and a modest price to pay for a much healthier population.

At this point in the demographic transition, the biggest population changes are likely to come from drops in the fertility rate. The UN projections assume an annual decline of .07; a 50 percent greater decline would mean an 18.8 percent decrease in the projected population by 2100. In fact, the most effective techniques for extending life expectancy cut infant mortality and reduce fertility. Education of women, for example, results both in fewer infant deaths and in raised aspirations that delay marriage and curtail childbearing.

First Bird

"Running, Leaping, Lifting Off" by Kevin Padian, in The Sciences (May-June 1982), New York Academy of Sciences, 2 East 63rd St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

How did birds learn to fly? Most paleontologists today believe that birds began as tree-dwelling reptiles that leaped from branch to branch. At first, their broadening primitive “wings” helped to break their fall; then, with further evolution, feathered appendages enabled them to glide and, finally, to fly.

But, says Padian, a Berkeley paleontologist, this theory errs in assuming that it is an easy step from gliding to flying. In order to sustain the “flight stroke”—which works on an entirely different aerodynamic principle—birds have a specialized bone structure, a high metabolism, and powerful muscles. Present-day gliders, such as flying squirrels, depend on little more than a membrane stretched between their limbs. Notes Padian, “there is no evidence that any group of gliding animals . . . are, or have ever been, ‘on their way’ to active flight.”

Recently, three scientists at Northern Arizona University—ornithologist Russell P. Balda, chemist Gerald Caple, and physicist William R. Willis—have developed another scenario, based on estimates of the evolutionary steps that might have been necessary to make the complex flight stroke possible.

The flight stroke consists of two motions of the wings—down and forward and then up and backward—which together describe a lazy figure eight. “Proto-birds,” the three scientists argue, were small, land-based dinosaurs that flushed out insects, ran them down, and caught them in their mouths. When a human runs he balances his stride by swinging his arms alternately. But in two-legged dinosaurs, the tail did the balancing and the forelimbs hung useless—ready to evolve a new function.

The proto-birds were able to achieve greater stability and lift as their finger bones enlarged to support a winglike surface. By swinging these “wings” forward—much the way a long jumper throws forward his
Archaopteryx, the first bird, evolved from the reptiles some 130 million years ago.


Arms—they were able to prolong their lunges. By repeating the swing several times and gradually developing a return stroke that minimized drag, they could leap even further. Once natural selection refined their wings and increased their endurance, they left the ground behind.

Science and the Old South

“By 1850 the cotton kingdom had killed practically every germ of creative thought.” When historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote those words in 1927, he touched off a heated debate among scholars over ante-bellum Southern attitudes toward science. Now historians have data to settle the question, according to the authors, a historian of science and a clinical psychologist at the University of Wisconsin.

In 1860, Southerners made up 20 percent of the U.S. nonslave population. But only 11.6 percent of the scientists who held office in, or presented a paper to, the American Association for the Advancement of Science were from the South; by contrast, New England, with half as many people, produced three times as many AAAS leaders. Other indicators—the number of Southerners who published or wrote for scientific journals, for instance—suggest that Dixie trailed far behind the Northeast (but not the recently settled North Central states) in scientific accomplishment.

What accounts for the disparity? Historian Clement Eaton in The Mind of the Old South (1964) blamed the rise of “religious and proslav-
**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

"...orthodoxies" after the 1830s. But the South actually improved its low standing in the scientific community during the decades just before the Civil War, even as support for slavery became more entrenched. And, as the record of the Border states attests, slaveholding itself was no impediment to scientific inquiry. Representing only 10 percent of the U.S. nonslave population, that region (Maryland, Kentucky, Delaware, Missouri, the District of Columbia) produced almost 20 percent of AAAS leaders. Slavery, say the authors, gave some Southerners—prominent scientists such as botanist Henry William Ravenel and physicist John LeConte—the leisure to pursue their researches.

The chief obstacle to scientific inquiry in the South was an agrarian economy. Rural libraries were poor; cities were few and small. Twentieth-century historian Thomas Cary Johnson, Jr., a Southern partisan, writes that "for the most part the scientists of the Old South led lonely lives, separated by many miles from fellow workers in their chosen fields." In the words of 19th-century geologist William Barton Rogers, "Solitude is, after all, no friend to Science."

**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

*The Last Ark*

"Zoos: Endangered Species' Last Hope?" by Joseph Wallace, in *Museum* (May-June 1982), Museum Circulation Services, P.O. Box 1300, Bergenfield, N.J. 07621.

Nowadays, zoos must be more than just showcases for exotic animals. As one zoo administrator puts it, "Zoos must be an ark, a place where animals can survive even when their natural habitat has disappeared."

The horrors of 19th-century menageries—cramped, smelly cages filled with bored and unhealthy animals—have rapidly disappeared now that many animals can no longer be replaced easily. Zoo directors today, observes Wallace, a freelance writer, must concentrate on encouraging reproduction in captivity. Spacious enclosures that resemble natural habitats and scientifically determined food regimens, along with ropes, swings, and branches for daily exercise, have made for healthier, happier, and better-looking potential mates. But, as the National Zoo's frustrated attempts to pair off its giant pandas attest, simply placing a male and a female in the same cage is not always enough.

Curators must determine, often through trial-and-error, the best environmental and social conditions for the mating of each species. The male zebra enjoys harems; the finicky rhinoceros requires a long 'courtship.' And the gila monster refuses to mate without an extensive, exact replication of the seasonal changes in its desert home.

There already have been notable successes. American buffalo, nearly extinct in 1907, now number 20,000; almost 800 Pere David deer have
been bred in captivity from an original 18 survivors. Lions reproduce so readily in captivity that some zoos now prescribe birth control pills. And new techniques such as embryo transfer and artificial insemination are proving effective. In August 1981, an ordinary Holstein cow gave birth to a rare Asian gaur at New York’s Bronx Zoo after a fertilized egg was implanted in the cow’s womb.

Nevertheless, by the end of this century an estimated one million species of plants and animals will face extinction. The expense of maintaining even one animal in captivity is high, and often an entire herd is needed to ensure successful breeding. Better communication among zoos has helped spread the responsibility. But zoo experts now face the weighty task of choosing which of the earth’s dwindling species will be saved and which will disappear.

Europe’s Oil

“On or Off? Oil and Gas Survey” by Roy Eales, in The Economist (June 12, 1982), P.O. Box 2700, Woburn, Mass. 01888.

Enough oil and gas lie offshore to make Western Europe self-sufficient for the next 20 years. Will it happen? Eales, a reporter for The Economist, sees two big obstacles: oil companies and governments.

In 1973, Western Europe depended on OPEC for almost all its oil. By 1981, one-quarter of its oil and all of its gas came from indigenous wells, mostly in the North Sea sectors apportioned to England and Norway. But development of known reserves has slowed lately, partly because of feuds between oil companies and European governments over taxes. Before 1980, host governments were so eager to increase production that few oil companies paid taxes at all. Today in England, the companies pay taxes at an average rate of 85 percent, according to Esso Petroleum’s reckoning. In Norway, the rate is 81 to 84 percent. Combined with today’s lower oil prices, these taxes have made the oil companies think twice before sinking up to $1.5 billion into an oil field that may yield no profits for 15 years.

"Oilmen," says Eales, "are never knowingly happy." While they complain about high levies and threaten to pack for Africa, South America, or China, they are still pushing—especially in England and Norway—for more exploration licenses. For them, the advantages of operating in "a politically stable area" are strong. But Europe’s governments are dragging their heels, keeping taxes discouragingly high and moving slowly to open new fields, partly to allow their economies to absorb the shock of oil prosperity.

Both England and Norway are better off because of their new-found resources (Britain enjoyed a £6.7 billion surplus in its balance of payments for 1981 versus a 1974 deficit of £1.25 billion). Yet both suffer from high unemployment and a weakened manufacturing base because of oil-induced high exchange rates and cheaper imports. These governments have another reason to stall: Today’s low oil and gas prices
will net them comparatively little in taxes and royalties.

If faster energy development poses problems for both oil companies and governments, the worst prospect of all, says Eales, is for Europe to remain dependent on OPEC and be caught “flat-footed, yet again.”

How Safe is Nuclear Power?

Since the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, Americans have been more worried than ever about the safety of nuclear power plants. Cohen, a physicist at the University of Pittsburgh, belittles many of the alleged risks.

Radiation occurs naturally—in outer space, on earth (e.g., in uranium), and in the human body (in the form of potassium). Human exposure to it varies widely. In Colorado, with its high altitude and heavy uranium deposits, the average exposure is 50 percent greater than the national average; in Florida, it is 20 percent lower. A person who lives in a brick house receives 20 percent less radiation than does a neighbor in a wood house. One medical X-ray can increase a person’s annual exposure by 25 percent.

Scientists have ample evidence for assessing the risks posed by high-level radiation—the early human guinea pigs for radiation therapy and the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example. But people who live near nuclear power plants receive a dose only one milirem higher than normal (100 milirems) each year. Tests with laboratory animals suggest that, at such low levels, any added health risk will be disproportionately small. “Nature provides mechanisms for repair of radiation damage,” writes Cohen; “a given dose of radiation is generally much less carcinogenic when spread out in time.”

The greatest public fear concerning nuclear power focuses on reactor meltdowns. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) anticipates one reactor meltdown per 20,000 plant-years. (Commercial nuclear plants have now been in operation for 1,000 plant-years.) In most meltdowns, says Cohen, “no fatalities are expected.” In the worst possible case—the collapse of a containment building—the NRC projects 48,000 deaths. But such a disaster is likely to occur only once in 100,000 meltdowns. The average death toll from a meltdown is estimated at 400 (the Union of Concerned Scientists, which opposes nuclear power, calculates 5,000). By contrast, notes Cohen, 5,000 people die each year from pollution caused by coal-fired plants.

If nuclear energy is so safe—there has not been a single fatal accident for over 15 years—why are Americans so worried? According to Cohen, a handful of scientists who predict doom have better luck attracting media attention than do their critics. “The price we are paying for this breakdown in communication,” he writes, “is enormous.”
Sigmund Freud looked at the writings and paintings of Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) and found evidence of a neurotic obsessional personality—a man whose repressed love for his mother prevented normal heterosexual development. Aaron, an educational psychologist, and Clouse, a historian, both at Indiana State University, see instead the effects of a peculiarly organized brain.

Most human brains are organized into two specialized hemispheres. The left (responsible for language) perceives the world sequentially and in bits, by analysis; the right (responsible for shapes and designs) takes in what it "sees" simultaneously and as a whole. But many left-handed and ambidextrous people have brains that are far less compartment-
talized: They tend to perceive the world in terms of shapes, while linguistic skills are often underdeveloped. Leonardo, according to contemporaries, was ambidextrous.

Leonardo was a poor writer, as he himself confessed. Freud seized upon one of his more garbled sentences—"On the 16th day of July Caterina [his mother?] came on the 16th day of July 1493"—as a sign of repressed emotion. But the authors say such lapses in sequence are common among ambidextrous people. They detect the same phenomenon at work in Leonardo's mirror-reversed writing, which scholars have long attributed to his fear of censorship. If Leonardo had really sought to avoid discovery, they note, he would have used a code whose solution required more than holding up a mirror. To Leonardo, mirror writing seemed as "natural" as any other kind.

Freud's interpretation of Leonardo also rests on two paintings. He saw the triangular arrangement of the Virgin Mary, St. Anne, and the infant Jesus in Virgin and Child with St. Anne and the "double meaning" of the Mona Lisa smile as illustrations of how "the two mothers of his childhood"—his real mother, who bore him out of wedlock, and his father's wife—were "melted into a single form." But triangular composition was common in Leonardo's work (for example, in The Last Supper), and the famous smile is probably the result of the ambidextrous artist's unusual ability to recall and reproduce in entirety what he saw—in this case, a fleeting expression on his model's face.

Leonardo's work, say Aaron and Clouse, does not betray early childhood obsessions; it reflects the organization of his brain.

Fakes Preferred

"Art Versus Collectibles" by Edward C. Banfield, in Harper's (August 1982), P.O. Box 2620, Boulder, Colo. 80321.

When former Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller began selling high-quality reproductions of his private art collection, the art world was shocked. Hilton Kramer, former art critic of the New York Times, lamented "a new era of hype and shamelessness." Banfield, a Harvard government professor, argues that Rockefeller had the right idea.

The same connoisseur who buys recorded Beethoven symphonies shrinks from the thought of high fidelity re-creations when it comes to paintings and sculpture. Yet to see art masterpieces today, the average citizen must travel to a major city and endure museum crowds for a glimpse. Why not show first-rate reproductions of masterpieces in schools and small museums nationwide? Don't university art departments teach students to appreciate art by showing slides?

As most museum heads have ruefully discovered, fakes need not be "inferior." The National Gallery long unwittingly displayed as "Vermeers" two paintings by the 20th-century master forger Hans van Meegeren. The Metropolitan Museum of Art exhibited several fifth-century B.C. Etruscan terra cotta warriors for 40 years before finding out they were modern. Much art is not created by the hand of the artist.
at all. In the 16th century, Hans Holbein drew designs on wood blocks, which were carved by his assistants and then printed by others. Sculptors today routinely make models in clay, wax, or plastic to be cast at foundries, often in sizes different from the original.

Two groups are responsible for the resistance to creating and showing high-quality reproductions, says Banfield. Art historians teach the public to value art "relics" as part of history, rather than as "something to be responded to aesthetically." And private art collectors make purchases for the same reasons they buy stocks—to see them go up in value. If museums began showing reproductions instead of originals, he suggests, "the multibillion dollar art business would fall into an acute and permanent recession."

Some museum administrators think the public would accept reproductions as a supplement to originals, but not as a substitute. Museum-goers want the glamor of originals. As Banfield notes, many of the people waiting in line to view Rembrandt's Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer, which cost the Metropolitan $6 million, "would as willingly have stood to see the $6 million in cash."

**Borges's Fiction**


"Glory is a form of incomprehension," wrote author Jorge Luis Borges in the early 1940s, "and it is perhaps the very worst." Until 1961, when he shared the Prix Formentor with Samuel Beckett, "glory" did not touch Borges personally. Now that it does, observes Neilson, editor of the *Buenos Aires Herald*, he seems to find the hubbub congenial. He should: It could well be one of his own stories.

Since 1961, Borges (born 1899) has been the focus of a still-growing cult. His followers range from academics, whom he has mocked throughout his life, to those fellow Argentines "who rarely read any books but who are infuriated" that he has not won the Nobel Prize, says Neilson. Last year, Borges, who "professes to regard the nation-state as an anachronism," was hailed by an Argentine general as a "national monument."

Borges has always believed that the writer is created by the reader and that "reading is just as creative as writing." His "The Circular Ruins," for example, is about an Indian mystic who tries to dream another man into existence only to discover that he is himself the dream of someone else. Similarly, everyone has his own Borges.

Latin American writers such as Octavio Paz and Gabriel Garcia Márquez see Borges as liberating them from traditional realism. Indeed, Borges has broken away from standard Western genres (he pens no dramas, novels, long poems). He refrains from developing his characters, and he ignores the details of everyday life. Borges's work resembles the writings of Taoist monks and Zen masters: The world is
transient and dreamlike and human personality impossible to fathom.

Borges’s independence from cultural tradition is characteristic of Argentines, writes Neilson. Unlike Anglo-Americans, who maintained close cultural ties with the “mother country,” Argentines rejected their Spanish forebears. Nor do they feel a part of the Western literary world generally. Latin American writers “pick and choose, gathering the best the world has to offer for incorporation into the new civilization they are trying to construct,” notes Neilson. Borges’s interest in Eastern literature may signal an important new development in that process.

Corporate Art Hounds

Public art museums may be strapped for cash today, but corporate art buying is on the rise. Chase Manhattan Bank’s collection, begun in 1959, is worth $7.5 million, and its art purchaser is looking for more—which is good news for contemporary artists, writes Brooks, assistant managing editor of The ARTnews newsletter.

Since the mid-1970s, corporate buyers have been aggressively seeking art they can display where employees work. Most of them want some compromise between quality and quantity—not high-priced historical “classics.” Of the 935 works bought by Chase Manhattan in 1981, at least a third were created in 1980 or 1981; many represented young artists’ first sales. Some corporations try to support local artists. Los Angeles Security Pacific National Bank boasts a 6,000-work collection, 70 percent of which is by Californians. General Mills buys many works by Minnesota artists.

Corporate art collections tend to be eclectic, but some have a clearly defined identity. Ciba-Geigy, the agrichemical company, focuses on abstract impressionism, while General Mills’s holdings, first acquired in the 1960s, are strong on 19th- and 20th-century prints—from Toulouse-Lautrec, Braque, and Picasso to Frank Stella, Robert Rauschenberg, and Jasper Johns.

At present, most corporate art remains in cafeterias, hallways, and offices, out of sight of the American public and “off-limits to the critics.” (Some subjects tend to be taboo: “anything sexually, politically, religiously or morbidly explicit.”) But, Brooks notes, more companies are now launching public exhibits. Security Pacific’s collection is on view only in public areas. BankAmerica, which started buying art in 1979, is beginning to show more of its 3,200-piece private collection in its three public galleries in San Francisco.

According to Tamara Thomas, a purchaser for Security Pacific, “It’s a common misconception that corporations collect for investment.” In fact, once a corporation buys a work of art, it rarely sells it. What these firms do want, Brooks says, is to improve both their public image and their employees’ working environment.
Storm Warnings for Mr. Castro


On March 20, 1980, a handful of Cubans sought asylum at the Peruvian embassy in Havana. Before the dust had settled, 125,266 Cubans had immigrated to the United States. Much has been made of their impact on this country. What does it mean for Cuba?

Fernandez, a political scientist at St. Olaf College, interviewed a sampling of "Freedom Flotilla" refugees in May 1980. He found them to be unlike the refugees of the 1960s and '70s, who were generally older, well-established skilled workers and professionals. The differences convince Fernandez that Castro's regime is losing support.

The refugees of the Freedom Flotilla are young—the average age is 25. And, while many are professionals (14 percent) and skilled factory workers (25.9 percent), unskilled manual and transport workers are disproportionately represented (they make up only 8.4 percent of Cuba's total population, but 35 percent of the refugees).

Less than a third of the refugees have been in prison. But 40 percent...
of these committed “economic crimes”—e.g., tax evasion or black marketeering. A black market, notes Fernandez, requires “the collusion of many in society,” and suggests widespread support for such activities.

With 40 percent of Cuba’s population under the age of 15, disaffection among today’s young people promises trouble. The younger refugees know Castro not as a revolutionary hero but as the head of an unresponsive government. They have been hit particularly hard by poor economic conditions. Unable to find jobs or housing, they must put off marriage and starting families. Others feeling the pinch include unskilled workers, thanks in part to Havana’s planned shrinkage of the construction industry. Only rural Cubans—beneficiaries of land reforms and tax breaks—seem to remain loyal to their leader.

It is premature to declare “a crisis of socialism in Cuba,” says Fernandez. But the Freedom Flotilla carried storm warnings for Castro.

Portugal since 1974

On April 25, 1974, a group of junior military officers ousted Portugal’s 40-year-old Fascist regime. Their aims were to stop 13 years of war in Portugal’s African colonies—Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique—and to establish democratic government. But the officers found themselves at the head of a socialist revolution they had not sought, writes Hammond, a CUNY sociologist.

The wars had cost Portugal dearly—in 1968, 42 percent of the national budget; by 1974, 4,800 lives. Massive popular rallies supporting the coup began almost immediately. Suddenly free to demonstrate, urban workers went one step further, launching strikes and “miniature coups” against business executives.

Hoping to consolidate its rule, the new regime obligingly lurched leftward. The army began overseeing radical farmworkers’ forcible seizure of the latifundios (plantations). The government nationalized banks and major industries, including oil, steel, railroads, and tobacco.

But there was resistance. Multinational firms shut down their Portuguese offices. Domestic anger grew over dislocations accompanying the end of the wars: the return of 700,000 settlers and 150,000 soldiers and the loss of colonial resources. Elections in the spring of 1975 showed the radicals, though highly vocal, to be a minority. In November, right-wing officers moved against leftist troops in Lisbon and arrested their leaders.

Today in Portugal, banks and major industries are still state owned (though run as profit-seeking ventures); workers retain their unions and the right to strike (though they no longer have much say in the man-
agement of nationalized firms); and some farm cooperatives continue in operation (though many others have been restored to their original owners). But the power of the old agricultural and colonial trade interests, says Hammond, has flowed to the middle class—to medium-scale capitalists, professionals, and technocrats, whose access to political influence and financial resources was made possible by the overthrow of the Fascist autocracy.

Czechoslovakia: the Party’s Over


The economic outlook for Czechs during the 1980s is bleak, says Kusin, a senior research analyst for Radio Free Europe. Already, even by optimistic official accounts, per capita income growth is at a standstill. Why? The trouble began more than a decade ago. The spirit of liberal reform that flowered in the Prague Spring of 1968 withered under the Russian invasion that soon followed. Czechoslovakia’s move toward a market economy was cut short. President Gustav Husák, who succeeded Alexander Dubček in 1969, established traditional Communist-style centralization. His plan: a program of industrial investment aimed at growth in the gross national product. Husák also purged the Czech Communist Party. One-third of all officeholders and tens of thousands of “able managerial personnel” were ousted.

Despite the turmoil, the system worked for a time. Czechs rallied behind the only cause they could safely support—increased production and consumption. During 1971–75, Czech personal spending shot up by 27 percent. In 1971, there was one car for every 17 people; by 1975, there was one for every 10.

But the worldwide oil shocks of the ’70s hit the Czechs hard, as the Soviets, their chief supplier, began gearing prices to OPEC’s. By 1980, the Czechs were paying five times the 1970 price of oil. Last year, under pressure from Moscow, the government announced a 10-percent cut in oil purchases that is certain to trim industrial production. Meanwhile, the heavy emphasis on investment has led nowhere because of chronic inefficiency. At the end of 1980, construction of 30,000 industrial plants—tying up 21 percent of all capital funds in the economy—was still unfinished. In October 1981, prices of gasoline and heating oil went up 25 to 75 percent; food prices, 17 to 41 percent.

Shifting back to a market-oriented economy, even if Moscow allowed it, would now completely discredit Husák’s government. Trying Poland’s approach—borrowing from the West—is anathema to “doctrinal purists.” The only way out, says Kusin, is to tinker with central planning policies, tighten discipline, and cooperate closely with the Soviets. That approach, of course, was tried before.
"The Reagan Experiment"
Urban Institute, 2100 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. 600 pp. $29.95 cloth, $12.95 paper.
Editors: John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill

President Reagan took office determined to chart a "fundamentally different [domestic] course" for the United States. But 28 specialists commissioned by the Urban Institute say that budget cuts and policy changes during the first 18 months of Reagan's tenure do little more than "turn back the clock" to the early 1970s under Richard Nixon.

Today, for example, federal outlays consume a record 24.2 percent of the gross national product (GNP). By 1985, Washington's share of GNP is expected to drop to 19 percent—a return to the level of a decade earlier.

In a few cases, such as job training programs, the $32 billion in Reagan fiscal year 1982 cutbacks radically reduced funding to pre-Great Society levels. But many of the affected programs were "of dubious value," write Palmer and Sawhill, co-directors of the Urban Institute's Changing Domestic Priorities Project. A loose legislative consensus already existed for cuts in such programs as guaranteed student loans, public service employment, housing finance subsidies, and trade adjustment assistance.

But in 1982, 77 categorical grant programs were consolidated into nine block grants, and aid fell by $14 billion from the projected level of nearly $100 billion. Financially strapped state and local governments were unable to make up many of these cuts.

Medicare and Social Security escaped nearly unscathed in 1982; by 1986, they will account for over one-half of all federal domestic spending. The $130 billion in revenue increases and/or spending cuts needed to balance the 1986 budget will force these programs to face the budget ax.

Moreover, note Palmer and Sawhill, "The Reagan counterrevolution in social and economic policy is potentially profound, but still in its infancy."

Reagan's greatest change so far has been to focus public debate on ideas that run counter to American public policy since the New Deal. The notion of helping only the "deserving poor" rather than redistributing income, for example, has not been officially embraced since Franklin Roosevelt occupied the White House.

And if Congress adopts President Reagan's "New Federalism," assigning welfare and other big social programs to the states, it will turn the clock back past the New Deal. Federal aid would comprise only three to four percent of state and local budgets by 1991, less than at any time since 1933.

"Government Support for Exports: A Second-Best Alternative"
Lexington Books, 125 Spring St., Lexington, Mass. 02173. 128 pp. $16.95.
Authors: Penelope Hartland-Thunberg, Morris H. Crawford

Industrializing Third World countries are a key market for Western and Japanese manufacturers. But American exporters are losing ground: Between 1972 and 1975, the U.S. share of manufactured exports to the Third
World dropped from 27 to 22 percent. One reason: Governments in other developed nations subsidize exports. Washington must respond with "countersubsidies" for American firms.

So argue Crawford, head of International Informatics, and Hartland-Thunberg, an economist at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, which sponsored this report. So far, they say, U.S. firms have remained competitive overseas by being on the leading edge of technology. In 1980, for example, aircraft, telecommunications gear, computers, and semiconductors alone accounted for $31 billion of the $144 billion in U.S. manufactured exports. But that lead is fading, due in part to competitors' more effective research and development (R&D) efforts.

While U.S. public and private sector R&D outlays ($45 billion in 1977) top those of 15 chief competitors combined, only 46 percent of the total has commercial applications—compared to 71 percent of Japan's $14 billion.

But the authors do not favor a larger U.S. research role for Washington. The federal government already spends half of all domestic R&D dollars, more than in any other industrial country. Instead, they say, Washington should spur domestic private-sector efforts by granting new tax incentives.

The authors also recommend bigger federal export subsidies. The U.S. Export-Import Bank is authorized to extend $4.4 billion annually in long-term, low-interest credits to foreign buyers. But other nations do more: There are virtually no limits on what French government export agencies can draw from the national treasury. And all industrial countries except the United States provide "mixed credits," combining loans with direct grants to customer nations through regular foreign aid programs.

Expanding Export-Import Bank financing and providing mixed credits would provide a quick fix. But to minimize government interference in markets, Washington could encourage exporters to make their own low-interest loans to buyers by allowing them to deduct from their federal taxes the difference between the interest they charge and the prevailing rate.

Why worry about exports at all? U.S. manufacturers need worldwide markets to survive. If they are driven from foreign markets, the authors warn, the United States will not only lose prestige overseas, but the damage to its domestic economy will be grave.

"Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities"

Authors: Katherine L. Bradbury, Anthony Downs, and Kenneth A. Small

Downtown revivals in some of America's blighted big cities—Detroit, Baltimore—have raised hopes of an urban "renaissance." But Bradbury, a Boston Federal Reserve Board economist, Downs, a Brookings Senior Fellow, and Small, a Princeton economist, see no turnaround in the fortunes of American urban centers.

Population in the biggest cities began falling off during the 1950s. By the mid-1970s, 97 of the 153 cities with populations over 100,000 were shrinking. And local government outlays rise as population goes down: During the 1970s, declining large cities spent...
roughly 35 percent more per capita than growing cities.

The changing composition of cities has made footing the bill harder. In 1950, central cities were 12.2 percent black; in 1980, 22.5 percent. From 1975 to 1978, males moving out of the cities had a median income of $12,411—compared to $10,240 for new arrivals.

The authors hold out little hope for change. Contrary to some predictions, higher energy prices will not lure suburbanites back to the cities. New price hikes of up to $1 a gallon for gasoline and $1.75 for heating oil would cost suburban commuters only $250 a year more than city-dwellers—and commuters hold only 18.6 percent of jobs in cities.

"Public policies," say the authors, "should not seek to reverse or even to halt" urban decline. Instead, they should address the problems faced by remaining residents.

Cities need more money and more flexibly designed policies. Federal policies, the authors say, could include wage subsidies to employers to encourage hiring of the jobless. Federal education "vouchers" would allow poor city-dwellers to decide what schools their children should attend, thus increasing competition (and quality) in the school system. Housing vouchers would enable poor urban-dwellers to escape "socioeconomic segregation" and move to the suburbs.

The authors also advocate replacing mandated federal programs with a system that would allot a lump sum of federal aid to each city, letting local officials "buy" only those federal programs that meet local needs.

Such changes, the authors concede, will not come quickly. But when Americans finally realize that the cities need help, they will act.

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**WILSON CENTER PAPERS**

*Summaries of key reports given at recent Wilson Center meetings*

**"A Century of United States-Korean Relations"**

Conference sponsored by the Wilson Center's East Asia Program, June 17-19, 1982. Ronald A. Morse, moderator.

During the 100 years since its first formal contacts with the United States, Korea has constantly looked to Washington for protection from hostile foreign powers—and has often been disappointed. That one-sided relationship is beginning to change, say the 21 participants in this Wilson Center conference, as South Korea's economic power grows.

Ties between the two nations date to 1882, when King Kojong signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States to counter the territorial designs of Japan, Russia, and China. But when Japan declared Korea its protectorate in 1905, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt refused to intervene.

After World War II, Korea was partitioned along the 38th parallel by the emergent superpowers, and the South became a U.S. protectorate. American troops were withdrawn in 1949 after civilian rule was established. Within a year the North invaded, and the United States once again stepped in.

But U.S. policy continued to be er-
ratic. President Nixon pulled one-third of U.S. troops from Korea in 1971, when he opened talks with mainland China. In 1977, President Carter proposed a complete troop withdrawal and criticized South Korean human rights violations. Ultimately, Carter dropped the plan. Today, some 37,500 U.S. servicemen remain in South Korea.


During the years ahead, Seoul will face two key problems. Its political and economic isolation from communist neighbors—North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union—limits foreign trade. And a poor human rights record—a decade of jailing domestic dissidents and the imposition of martial law in 1980—contributes to domestic disquiet and a marred image overseas.

Both stem from military insecurity, argues Senator Charles Percy (R-III.). North Korean troops massed on the border only 31 miles from Seoul outnumber the South's by two to one. To ensure progress on human rights and on the economic front, Percy says, Washington must offer a reliable guarantee of South Korea's security.

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"Observations on Measuring the Military Spending Gap"


Proponents of increased U.S. military expenditures point to CIA estimates that Moscow outspent the United States by $420 billion on defense during the 1970s. But Holzman, a Tufts economist, argues that the CIA estimates distort the budget comparisons.

For example, the Soviets probably spent $230 billion (15 percent of their 1971-80 military outlays) to maintain a 750,000-man army along the Chinese border—a force irrelevant to any East-West confrontation. And the CIA estimate excludes the defense budgets of the two superpowers' chief allies: Canada and the European members of NATO outspent Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies by $78 billion in 1980 alone.

Holzman also faults the CIA on technical grounds. Each year, the agency calculates in dollars how much it would cost the Pentagon to buy the same military hardware and manpower the Soviets do. The figures give the Soviets a 50 percent military spending edge for 1981. But the CIA method exaggerates Moscow's outlays: It costs the United States $20,000 annually to keep a soldier in uniform, far more than the Soviets pay.

Reckoning U.S. military spending in rubles gives a Soviet edge of only 30 percent—an understatement, says Holzman, since high technology weapons are relatively costly for the USSR to produce. A more accurate measure of the Soviet lead, according to Holzman, is 39.6 percent—the geometric mean of 50 and 30.

But when all NATO and Warsaw Pact spending is included, and Moscow's Far East military outlays are excluded, the picture changes. NATO, from this perspective, spent $500 billion more on defense than the Soviet bloc during the 1970s.

The Wilson Quarterly/Special Issue 1982
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If this pensive young woman in Alfred Leslie’s Seven A.M. News (1978) is an average American consumer of news, she does not favor “news as entertainment,” or TV news over print, or newspapers that strain to cater only to her whims. Surveys indicate that she just wants the news.
The News Media

Probably no business in America, of late, has seemed so prone to upheaval as the multibillion-dollar “news business,” with the prospective expansion of “electronic home delivery” of news via broadcast and cable, the death or illness of major newspapers, and the surge of media self-criticism. In this special survey, Lawrence Lichty concludes that TV is probably not most Americans’ chief source of news; Leo Bogart describes the newspaper’s changing character; James Boylan analyzes journalists’ self-perceptions in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate; and A. E. Dick Howard examines the health of the First Amendment.

VIDEO VERSUS PRINT

by Lawrence W. Lichty

So far, 1982 has been a good year for news, much of it bad news, but highly “visual” news—anguished faces last spring of the relatives of victims of El Salvador’s civil war, clouds of grey-black smoke billowing over the high-rises of West Beirut during the Israelis’ summer-long attacks, Iraqi tanks clanking into action against the Ayatolla Khomeini’s invading revolutionary youths, the demurely smiling face of the Princess of Wales with the newborn Prince William, Solidarity’s street demonstrations in Warsaw, Margaret Thatcher sending off the Gurkhas and Scots Guards aboard the QE 2 to humble the Argentines in the Falkland Islands.

For Americans, it was news from far away, a distraction, perhaps, from economic troubles at home.

Television’s handling of this “news,” more than ever, seemed to fit Walter Lippmann’s 60-year-old description of the workings of the press: “It is like the beam of a searchlight that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode then another out of darkness into vision . . .”

The three television networks, competing for ratings, exaggerated this chronic tendency, presenting the news, when possible, as one melodrama after another; they were often far more
compelling melodramas than those television could offer as regular entertainment. No star of any TV series was as vivid in 1982 as Yasser Arafat or Menachem Begin or as jaunty as Ronald Reagan, whose aides made no secret of their belief that the 40th President could—and should—play to the TV producers’ need for “visuals” and avoid the newspapers’ traditional preoccupation with words.

By coincidence, this big news year has also been a time of accelerating change, pushed by economics and technology, in the newspaper business. As suburban papers prospered, big city newspapers, here and there, continued to die or falter. The Philadelphia Bulletin folded in January. The New York Daily News, the nation’s biggest big-city daily (1.48 million weekday circulation), was offered for sale in December 1981 by its parent Chicago Tribune; then last spring, the Tribune dropped its sale plans, but the Daily News still may lose more than $20 million this year. Among the three major New York City dailies, only the Times makes a profit.

The Dog and the Tail

Unsure of the future, a dozen newspaper managements, from the New York Times to Times-Mirror, Knight-Ridder, and Copley, are starting or testing “teletext” or home “videotex” services in New Jersey, Florida, California, and elsewhere. (Such electronic services use cable or telephone lines to send textual matter and graphics to a TV screen at the viewer’s behest.) The Washington Post in early 1982 disclosed plans to provide local news and advertising programming for all cable TV system operators in the metropolitan Washington area. And publishers lobbied vigorously in Washington against moves to permit AT&T to send news via telephone lines into homes.

Yet a 1982 study of videotex usage in Britain found that most customers were usually seeking specific pieces of data (e.g., 60 percent regularly looked up classified listings; nearly half looked up stock exchange information at least every other day). “News” was not the main attraction. Indeed, as a Canadian operator observed, with videotex, information is “the tail not the dog. The dog is [electronic] shopping and banking.”

Lawrence W. Lichty, 45, is professor of communications at the University of Maryland College Park and a former Wilson Center Fellow. Born in Pasadena, Calif., he received an A.B. from the University of Southern California (1959) and a Ph.D. from Ohio State University (1963). He is the co-author, with Malachi C. Topping, of American Broadcasting (1975).
And now here’s Andy to horse around with the news.” Local newscasts—which “deliver” audiences to later network news and other shows—provide as much as half of a TV station’s profit. During the 1970s, “news doctors” prescribed such devices as “happy talk” to boost ratings.

The biggest expansion in news has come in television. TV news is the child of radio news, and of the Paramount newsreels of the 1930s and ’40s; it is not the child, or, in its basic attitudes even a very near relative, of the newspapers. In their rivalry for audiences (ratings) which govern TV advertising revenues, the producers of the evening news shows—local or national—can never relax; when Walter Cronkite retired as an anchorman in 1981, the question for CBS was: Could his successor, Dan Rather, officiate over the news as well, i.e., draw the most viewers? The answer was yes, but all three networks were changing their style and on-camera personalities in late 1981 and early 1982.

The spread of cable television (to one-third of all U.S. television households) prompted Ted Turner last January to start Cable News Network 2, a 24-hour Atlanta-based TV news service, in a direct challenge to the networks. The networks responded by announcing plans to present news from 2 A.M. to 7 A.M.—when 4.9 million TV sets are in use.

This impending surge in broadcast news seems only to confirm the ascendancy of video. Already, the TV viewer in a medium-to-large-sized city faces no shortage of “news.”
Washington, D.C., for example, the city-dweller has only one
full-fledged local daily, the Washington Post, but he can watch
"news" for nine and one-half hours each weekday, including two
stretches of three hours (6 A.M. to 9 A.M., 5 P.M. to 8 P.M). Another
five and one-half hours of news is available via Cable News
Network 2 from Baltimore's station WMAR-TV.

All told, in the Washington area, there are more than 14
hours of programming—network, syndicated, and local—on
three network stations, two independent stations, and PBS's sta-
tion. If one includes such programs as the PBS Nightly Business
Report, as well as the lighter Phil Donahue and Hour Magazine,
the total comes to 24 hours.

No Time for Facts

What is striking, of course, is how thin and how much the
same all this video news is. On the three network evening news
shows, for example, there is about 50 percent duplication of
major stories, far more duplication than exists on, say, the front
pages of the San Francisco Chronicle and the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, leaving aside strictly local items.

The half-hour evening news show has room for 17 or 18
items in 22 minutes (commercials eat up eight minutes). Eight
or nine of these items are film snippets lasting from a few sec-
onds to one and a half minutes; the rest are the anchorman's
brief reports written by anonymous network writers from the
news dispatches coming in over the studio teletype from Associ-
ated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI). In Wash-
ington or the Mideast, the TV correspondent, as NBC's Douglas
Kiker put it, is "making little movies," directing a camera crew,
scribbling the words he will utter to give significance to the film.
He is no "reporter," in the sense that reporters for AP, UPI, and
newspapers are. He has little time for fact-finding, and little
time on the air to present any facts he does find.

The requirements of TV news do not, therefore, impel ABC,
CBS, and NBC to deploy large numbers of information-
seekers—although the logistics and technology require a sizable
supporting staff. In Washington, locale of 40 percent of CBS
News's stories and (not coincidentally) site of its largest bureau,
there are 200 CBS News employees. Of these, only 25 are re-
porters, for both radio and TV—versus 35 Washington reporters
for the New York Times and 100 for the AP. In Manhattan, station
WCBS-TV, like its local rivals, has no such creature as a City
Hall reporter, wise in the ways of Mayor Koch and the Board of
Estimate; the station usually sends a reporter and camera crew
to City Hall only when the AP ticker indicates in advance the probability of "good film."

Overseas, CBS has only 23 full-time correspondents, versus 32 for the New York Times, 36 for Time, eight for the Baltimore Sun, 19 for the Knight-Ridder papers—and about 300 for the AP, whose operatives and those of rival UPI supply most of the news that, without attribution, Dan Rather (like his ABC and NBC counterparts) reads off a teleprompter every weekday evening.

Television, as Newsweek columnist Jane Bryant Quinn observed, gives us "the faces," the voices, the scenery—albeit in highly selective bits and pieces. Its infrequent documentaries draw relatively small audiences but occasionally strike political sparks. At its best, TV provides us with a live view of the great spectacles: a space shot, a presidential inaugural, the national political conventions, the 1973-74 Watergate hearings (when the cameras were allowed to run without interruption), the World Series.

Thus, the further expansion of "video," even as it promises greater diffusion of the same news, does not add greatly to the array of information available to the public. Yet "electronic home delivery" has persuaded many analysts that the "news" in print, as it has evolved over the past 150 years in America, is all but dead. (Rare is the major publisher who has not invested in TV or cable, or both.) Predicts James Martin, author of Future Trends in Telecommunications (1977): By the early 1990s, there may be only a "minor intellectual press, a few picture newspapers for low-IQ readers, and some local newspapers," along with a few news magazines. Citing television’s pre-eminence at the DuPont Awards ceremony this year, NBC’s anchorman Tom Brokaw spoke of the young people who “have come to rely on us as their primary and only source of news.”

False Assumptions

Indeed, the conventional wisdom, widely echoed, is that Americans get most of their news from Brokaw and his colleagues in television. This assertion stems largely from surveys by the Roper Organization since 1959, indicating that TV became pre-eminent in home entertainment in 1960, and became adults’ primary source of news in 1970. The question Roper has asked his respondents since 1959 is “Where do you usually get most of your news about what’s going on in the world today?” In 1981, 39 percent specified television only, 22 percent newspaper only, and 20 percent TV and newspapers. Respondents were permitted multiple answers. When all were tallied, 64 percent
### USAGE OF INFORMATION MEDIA, 1981

(percent of 'audience' using particular source)

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<tr>
<th>AUDIENCE</th>
<th>ANY NEWSPAPER</th>
<th>2 OR MORE NEWSPAPERS</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>READER'S DIGEST</th>
<th>ALL NEWS RADIO</th>
<th>ALL TV &lt; 9 HOURS</th>
<th>DAILY</th>
<th>CBS EVENING NEWS</th>
<th>LATE NIGHT LOCAL TV NEWS</th>
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* "Professional/Technical" includes accountants, engineers, lawyers, librarians, teachers, artists, and entertainers, etc. "Others employed" includes skilled workers, farmers, service workers, and laborers. "Not employed" includes housewives, retirees.

* *Network affiliate late evening news program.


cited TV, 44 percent newspapers, 18 percent radio, five percent magazines, and five percent "another person."

From all this, it seems clear that most people now think that they get most of their news from TV. As we shall see, this is almost certainly not true, even though Presidents, Senators, and other politicians (to say nothing of TV journalists and TV critics)
have come to act on the assumption that it is true.

Those in the business of figuring out "audience exposure" to advertising messages have developed a number of surveys that give a far clearer picture of what sources Americans draw on for news and information. Simmons Market Research Bureau, based in Manhattan, does annual studies on "exposure" of Americans to various media.

Some 1981 Simmons data:

- More than two-thirds of U.S. adults (68 percent) read at least part of some newspaper every day. Twelve percent of all adults read two or more newspapers a day.
- Fewer than one-third of U.S. adults watch TV news, local or national, on a given day.
- About 31 percent of adults read Time or Newsweek or U.S. News & World Report. (One-fourth of all adults read Reader's Digest.)
- About 18 percent of adult Americans listen to one of the nation's 90 all-news radio stations as often as once a week, with the peak listening period being early in the morning.

**Did TV Lose the War?**

Other data suggest that TV is far from a dominant source of news. The number of American adults watching the three week-day network evening newscasts on a given night is very large (50 million), as is the audience for Dallas (47 million). But the audience for TV news fluctuates. It is far more fickle than the audience for newspapers or magazines. Slightly more than half of the nation's TV households watch one of the network evening news programs at least once in the course of a month. But only one percent of all 78.3 million American TV households watches CBS's Dan Rather as often as four or five nights a week, and Rather presides over the nation's most popular network evening news show. The average for households that watch his program at all is five broadcasts per month.

In short, the widely accepted notion that Mr. Rather and his rivals each command a vast, devoted nightly following seems far-fetched.

A related assumption, tenaciously held by both television's critics and its champions, is that the visual impact of TV nightly news "turned the American people against the Vietnam war"

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*The 1981 Simmons report is based on more than 15,000 interviews, but uses smaller samples for certain segments of the 40 volumes of data. The Simmons material is used here with permission.*
AND THAT’S THE WAY IT IS

In The Right Place at the Right Time (1982), Public Broadcasting System’s Canadian-born Robert MacNeil looks back at his globe-trotting days with the BBC and NBC and explains what is distinctive about TV reporting:

In most of the stories television cares to cover there is always “the right bit,” the most violent, the most bloody, the most pathetic, the most tragic, the most wonderful, the most awful moment. Getting the effective “bit” [on film] is what television news is all about. It is the bit you always recognize when you’ve got it and which you will go through just about anything to get because it means success and missing it consistently means you’d better look for a job other than a TV correspondent.

And to what purpose are thousands of men and women scrambling over the earth, sometimes at great risk, to get that bit? So that millions of people may be distracted for a moment from their own domestic concerns to witness another human being in great distress? To feel what? A moment of compassion? A second of titillation? A wisp of vicarious fear?

Does it not ultimately blunt and cheapen all those natural feelings to have them so often artificially stimulated? Does it not make human pity itself a banality? Does that not force competitive television producers to turn the screw a trifle harder each time to make the sensation fresher, to unbanalize it? Yes.

And what is the ultimate purpose of all this activity? The television journalists, like journalists everywhere, want to tell stories. The networks want to sell deodorant.

And that’s the way it is.

and, later, pushed Richard M. Nixon out of the White House. Yet there is no empirical evidence that TV news “shapes” mass public opinion—or that any news medium does.*

What “the news” probably influences is not how we think but what we think and talk about. But few subjects get much media attention for very long. When they do, politicians and other opinion-leaders may feel impelled to react. Even here, direct links between “news coverage” per se and the evolution of political decisions are not easy to establish.

Overall, the evening TV news audience is disproportion-

*See John E. Mueller’s War, Presidents and Public Opinion (Wiley, 1973). Critic Michael Arlen reminded us in the Aug. 16, 1982 New Yorker that “what a television viewer of the Vietnam war [usually] saw ... was a nightly, stylized, generally distanced overview of a disjointed conflict which was composed mainly of scenes of helicopters landing, tall grasses blowing in the helicopter wind, American soldiers fanning out across a hillside ... with now and then (on the soundtrack) a far-off ping or two, and now and then (as a visual grand finale) a column of dark billowing smoke a half a mile away, invariably described as a burning Viet Cong ammo dump.”
ately older (especially over 65), female (53 percent), and less well educated than are newspaper readers or the population as a whole. Two types of Americans emerge as the keenest viewers of TV news. One happens to see a lot of TV news largely because he watches a lot of television: The news is only a small part of his daily fare. This viewer is somewhat more likely to have had only a high school education, to be in a clerical, sales, or service job, and to live in the South. The other, far less common TV news watcher, is the younger, better-educated American adult, a heavy reader of news, who watches a lot of news and information but not much else on TV.

Few newspapers or magazines reap the profits of TV's three network evening news programs ($28 million in 1980 for CBS alone), and no print journalist matches the celebrity or the salaries of the self-assured, well-coifed men and women of television. Yet there is, as Simmons and others make clear, no sign that "video"—in its various forms—is about to eliminate its less exciting print competitors as sources of information. News as entertainment, as spectacle, as distraction—that was, to varying degrees, the role of the "yellow" press in the early 1900s, of *Life* and *Look* during the '40s and '50s, and of the *New York Post* in 1982. Here TV, already the distraction of the very young and the very old, has achieved pre-eminence. TV news is another show, and not a very habit-forming one at that.

What seems obvious is that most American adults get the "news" from many sources. And judging from the "exposure" data, most of what they get every day still comes from newspapers. This is not difficult to understand. Except for the illiterate, newspapers are easy and efficient: Scores of items can be scanned, selected, put aside, retrieved, pored over, even reread. This process occurs at the reader's convenience, anytime, anywhere. It takes far less time than the 60 to 90 minutes it takes to sit through the bits and pieces of the evening's local and national TV news shows, or to scan and select information from a computer. Barring a collapse in literacy or curiosity, or a total neglect of their responsibilities on the part of publishers, or a permanent walkout by the nation's newspaper delivery boys, Americans who want "the news" will probably continue to rely primarily on print for decades to come.
NEWSPAPERS IN TRANSITION

by Leo Bogart

When World War II ended, eight daily newspapers in New York City reported the story, as did seven in Boston, four in Philadelphia, five in Chicago, four in San Francisco. Now, not quite four decades later, New York is down to three (the Times, Post, and Daily News), and Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago have only two newspapers apiece. The most recent major casualties are the Washington Star, Philadelphia Bulletin, and Cleveland Press. In Toledo, New Orleans, Des Moines, Portland, Sarasota, Tampa, Duluth, Minneapolis—all one-ownership newspaper towns—publishers have discontinued their less successful papers, usually their afternoon papers. The troubles of other newspapers are still making news. In 1923, there were 503 cities with more than one separately owned daily newspaper; now there are only 49. And in 22 of those cities, competing papers have joint business and printing arrangements.

After the evening Minneapolis Star (circulation 170,000) was discontinued last April, its editor, Stephen Isaacs, responded to a query from Editor & Publisher: “What do I see ahead? I talked to many publishers recently and was startled by the number who have in effect told me that the newspaper business is a dying industry. A dinosaur. Some will survive—the very big and the very small—but the in-betweens are going to face rough going in the electronic era.... Frankly, I was stunned by their comments.”

The deaths of great metropolitan dailies are stunning events, and not only to publishers and editors. But do they mean that newspapers, as such, have outlived their function?

The fallen giants in the business have been stricken by the sickness of their home cities. In the 20 largest cities, newspaper circulation dropped by 21 percent between 1970 and 1980, while population fell by six percent. This does not tell the whole story, because the big cities have changed character even more than they have lost people. Their white population fell by 20 percent, and the whites now include a higher proportion of Hispanics and the elderly poor. In many blighted inner city areas, crime,
vandalism, and collection problems have wreaked havoc with both home deliveries and street sales.

Changes in the urban economy and social structure have also had disastrous effects on downtown retailers, who have been the mainstay of metropolitan newspaper advertising. Retail chains followed the middle class to the suburbs—and began to put advertising money into suburban papers, give-away "shoppers," and direct mail advertising. Metropolitan evening papers had to print earlier (usually well before noon) just to permit delivery by truck through traffic jams to the sprawling suburbs. Since their circulation was more concentrated in the central cities, they were more vulnerable than their morning rivals to the pressures of urban change. The deaths of metropolitan newspapers help explain why total daily circulation has declined since World War II; the ratio of newspapers sold to U.S. households dropped from 128:100 in 1948 to 79:100 in 1981.

The reasons are many and complex.

The price of a subscription has gone up, and some papers have stopped distribution in outlying areas because of the expense. Young people of the TV generation now read newspapers

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*Newspaper-reading commuters, like these in Reginald Marsh's Subway—Three People (1934) can still be seen in many central cities. But more Americans now live and work in suburbs and ignore the big "metro" dailies.*

*National Museum of American Art/Bequest of Dr. Frank McClure.*
less often than their parents did. Changes in family life have altered the use of leisure. With more wives at work, both husbands and wives have less time to read when they get home.

Still, the "worst" appears to be over. In spite of the losses in the big cities, overall newspaper circulation and readership have stabilized during the past five years, following eight years of steady decline. The real question is not whether newspapers will survive into the 21st century, but rather what kind of newspapers they will be. The answer lies both in the economics of the press and in the perceptions of editors and publishers.

Worrying about TV

Their perceptions have already led to rapid changes in newspaper style and character during the past decade, and to an extraordinary amount of editorial innovation.

One theory that quickly gained favor was that TV news was taking away readers—although there was no evidence that directly supported this notion. To the contrary, newspapers have done better (in terms of the ratio of circulation to all households) in metropolitan areas where TV news ratings are high rather than low. Television news viewing went down, not up, in New York City when the Times, Post, and Daily News were on strike in 1978.

Moreover, many editors appear to have been convinced during the 1970s that more and bigger photographs, and more "features" and "personality journalism" were necessary counters to the visual and entertainment elements of TV in general. Indeed, the Miami News billed itself as the newspaper "for people who watch television."

There were other less obvious changes, particularly among dailies with less than 100,000 circulation. One was the emphasis on local, staff-written news—leaving more of the wider world to the TV network news, the Wall Street Journal, or Time and Newsweek. Thirty-five percent of all editors who were asked about editorial changes in 1977–79 reported a shift toward "localizing" the news.

"What sells papers is the ability to identify with the news..."
content," said Milton Merz, then (1976) circulation director of the Bergen County, New Jersey, Record (circulation 150,796). "And people identify with things that affect them directly. Once you get outside their town, their interest drops like a rock."

Among big-city papers, in particular, zoned editions, aimed at specific regions within a metropolitan area, seemed a good response to competition for readers from the mushrooming smaller suburban dailies and weeklies.

Yet the belief that people are mainly interested in "chicken dinner" news runs counter to reality. First, Americans as a whole today are increasingly well educated, cosmopolitan, and mobile, with weak ties to their home communities. Second, as is well known, fewer of any big-city daily's readers now live or work in the city where the newspaper is published and where it deploys most of its reporters (only 35 percent of the Chicago Tribune's circulation, for example, is within the city limits); the suburban dispersion of homes and jobs in scores of distinct communities over hundreds of square miles means that any particular local event is likely to affect relatively few people. A high proportion of what editors think of as "local" items that appear in a big-city paper are actually "sub-local": they deal with events—school board disputes, village politics, accidents—that matter little to most of the paper's readers.

Enjoyable, Exciting, and Fun

What some editors forget is that TV network news, for all its "show business" flaws, has made national and foreign figures, from Reagan to Begin, vivid and familiar to average Americans, to a degree unimaginable 20 years ago. Of course, as always, people want both kinds of news, not just one or the other. Still, national research shows that the average item of local news attracts slightly fewer people who say they are "interested" or "very interested" in it than does the average item of foreign or national news. The same study shows that the "memorability" of local events as "big news," "upsetting news," or "good news" is extremely low relative to the amount of space they occupy in newspapers or relative to more dramatic stories from the wider world. *

The Chicago Tribune's Joseph Medill was once asked the secret of his success. "Just publish the news," he said. Today,

*This and other findings cited in this article are from a national survey of 3,048 adults conducted for the Newspaper Readership Project in 1977 by Audits and Survey, Inc. A more comprehensive description of the study will be found in my book, Press and Public, (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981).
SHARES OF TOTAL CIRCULATION, BY NEWSPAPER SIZE, 1980

The 12 largest newspapers (500,000+ circulation) sell . . . 18% . . . of all papers sold

The 23 next largest (250,000+)

The 86 next largest (100,000+)

The 145 next largest (50,000+)

The 1,479 smallest (50,000–)

Medium newspaper circulation: 10,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEN LARGEST CHAINS, March, 1981</th>
<th>Daily Circulation</th>
<th>No. of dailies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gannett Co.</td>
<td>3,621,800</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knight-Ridder</td>
<td>3,458,400</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newhouse Newspapers</td>
<td>3,133,500</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribune Co.</td>
<td>2,806,600</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dow Jones and Co.</td>
<td>2,433,400</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times Mirror Co.</td>
<td>2,315,500</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scripps-Howard</td>
<td>1,518,800</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearst Newspapers</td>
<td>1,362,300</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomson Newspapers (U.S.)</td>
<td>1,219,600</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox Enterprises</td>
<td>1,165,100</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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POPULATION VS. NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, 1960–1980
(In top 25 metropolitan areas)

*Twenty-five largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (1960): New York; Chicago; Los Angeles–Long Beach; Philadelphia; Detroit; San Francisco–Oakland; Boston; Pittsburgh; St. Louis; Washington, D.C.; Cleveland; Baltimore; Newark; Minneapolis–St. Paul; Houston; Buffalo; Milwaukee; Cincinnati; Paterson-Clifton-Passaic, N.J.; Dallas; Seattle-Everett; Kansas City, Mo.-Kans.; San Diego; Atlanta; Miami.

A TYPICAL NEWSPAPER'S EDITORIAL CONTENT*

*Pie shows each subject's share of all news items 5 column inches or longer.
not every publisher would agree. The most notable change in newspaper content since 1970 has been a new stress on "soft" features, often concentrated in special sections aimed at “upscale” suburban consumers, especially women. Under such umbrellas as "Lifestyle," “Living,” or “Style,” editors and writers have sought to impart the latest in television, movies, celebrities, “self-help,” “women’s issues,” fashions, food, parties, recreation, and manners. (Less regular coverage has been devoted to the old specialized side dishes of the traditional newspaper menu: stamp-collecting, chess, gardening, photography.) The new “sectional revolution” was led by the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune.

At the New York Times, "Weekend" (1976) was followed by "Living," “Home,” “Sports Monday,” and “Science Times.” The strategy worked; Times circulation rose by 33,000 during the 16 months after “Weekend’s” birth. In 1977–79, almost half of all newspapers with circulations of over 100,000 added weekday “lifestyle” sections (and many of the remainder already had them).

Said Derek J. Daniels, president of Playboy and a former Knight-Ridder executive: "If [newspapermen] are to meet the new challenges, they must, above all, recognize that reading is work. . . . I believe that newspapers should devote more space to the things that are helpful, enjoyable, exciting, and fun as opposed to undue emphasis on ‘responsible information.’"

In some ways, newspapers were coming to resemble consumer magazines. Editors had always used feature material as “good news” to lighten the “bad news” that dominates the headlines. But did readers really want newspapers to entertain them rather than to inform them?

**Misreading the Reader**

Not really. A majority (59 percent) of a national cross-section of people questioned in 1977 indicated they would prefer a newspaper devoted completely to news rather than one that just provided a news summary and consisted mostly of entertaining features.

This response should not be dismissed as merely the expression of a socially acceptable attitude. For what it really indicates is that people expect newspapers to do more than cater to their personal tastes. Americans recognize a newspaper’s larger responsibility to society, and they want it to cover a multitude of subjects, including ones about which they themselves normally would not care to read.
People perceive that some newspaper articles are "interesting," but others are "important." Thus, according to the 1977 study, half of those who found the average sports item "very interesting" also rated it as "not very important." When people's responses to specific newspaper items are surveyed, entertainment features—except for TV and radio program logs, advice columns, and travel articles—all score below average in interest. A typical entertainment feature is rated "very interesting" by only 20 percent of those surveyed, while a typical straight news story is rated "very interesting" by 31 percent.

**Winner Take All**

Editors, then, in remaking their newspapers during the '70s, may have underestimated their readers. But newspapers in those years were not just changing—they, collectively, were growing. In smaller and middle-sized communities, daily newspapers, most of them without local daily competition, continued to enjoy high levels of readership and prosperity. And the reader got more for his money. For a typical (surviving) major metropolitan daily, the number of pages of editorial matter went from 19.8 in 1970 to 28 in 1981, keeping pace with an increased volume of advertising.

So, despite the alterations, cosmetic and substantive, newspapers were actually providing more "hard" news and more national and world news. But the proportions were different. There was more icing on the cake, and often the cake itself was a bit fluffier. The character of newspapers was changing.

Editorial ingenuity and experimentation did not save the *Chicago Daily News* or the *Cleveland Press*. An article in the *Minneapolis Star*, after announcement of that paper's impending demise, recalled the editors' rescue efforts: "Suddenly, or so it seemed, the newspaper's most basic ingredients—City Council meetings, news conferences, speeches—were gone. In their place was an unpredictable front-page mixture of blazing illustrations, Hollywood features and all sorts of things that had once been tucked away inside the paper." The *Star*'s radical changes did not halt its decline in readership.

Yet the disease that kills off competing newspapers is not lack of readers—it is lack of advertising (which accounts for three-fourths of a newspaper's income). This disease has struck down even highly respected newspapers with considerable numbers of high-income readers, from the *New York Herald Tribune* (1966) to the *Washington Star* (1981). From an advertising point of view, "duplication" is considered highly wasteful.
The long war for Philadelphia began in 1969 when the Knight chain (now the Knight-Ridder chain) bought its first Northeast property, the morning Inquirer and the afternoon Daily News, for $55 million from TV Guide publisher Walter Annenberg. The two papers were well-positioned but undistinguished, except by their mediocrity and bias. Affluent Philadelphians disdained them.

The staid rival afternoon Bulletin, owned by the McLean family since 1895, enjoyed primacy in reputation (two recent Pulitzer prizes), weekday circulation (641,000), and general advertising (40 percent). But its managers had yet to devise a coherent strategy to cope with the continuing dispersion and attrition of its traditional readers in the suburbs.

After an initial overhaul of the Inquirer, Knight put two low-key workaholics, both North Carolinians, in place in 1972: Publisher Sam S. McKeel, then 46, a sometime reporter turned manager, and Executive Editor Eugene L. Roberts, Jr., 40, a seasoned newsman (Detroit, Atlanta, Vietnam) and, latterly, New York Times national editor. On most big newspapers, editors don't talk to the business side. Here, McKeel, Roberts, and their senior associates, despite inevitable differences, worked and planned as a team to try to "turn the Inquirer around."

They had little choice but to improve operational efficiency. The parent Knight organization in Miami would spend or commit $120 million in capital outlays (including the purchase price) in 1969–82; but for newsprint, reporters' salaries, and other operating costs, the Inquirer had to pay its own way or borrow from Knight.

The battlefield was the City of Brotherly Love, especially its shrunken middle-class neighborhoods, and seven burgeoning suburban counties, including three in southern New Jersey across the Delaware River. As late as 1975, in the suburbs, especially the affluent Main Line, the Bulletin held a crucial 56,000 lead in daily circulation; if the Inquirer could even halve that lead, its advertising salesmen could pull away a sizable share of retail advertising from the Bulletin. As a morning paper, it was easier for the Inquirer to reach the more distant suburban growth areas on time than for the afternoon Bulletin; the tabloid Daily News would hold the line with blue collar folk and blacks in the city.

On the news side, Roberts initially had to make do with less manpower and space for news than the Bulletin. Unlike many of his counterparts elsewhere, however, Roberts did not attempt to match the "chicken dinner" coverage of suburban dailies, or to pump up crime news (a former Inquirer staple) or to lean on "soft" features to counter TV's appeal. He had a different, overarching approach.

As Roberts put it, "We concentrated on the Big Story." He wanted to convince Philadelphians and suburbanites alike that when a Big
Event occurred, the now-respectable *Inquirer* would provide more information about it than anyone else. So it was with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which boosted daily street sales by 15,000, and the 1979 Three Mile Island episode, when Roberts sent virtually his entire staff, including "lifestyle" writers, into the fray.

What endeared Roberts to reporters—and attracted new talent—was his willingness to allow them many months, if need be, to research lengthy "investigative" stories or regional "trend" series (schools, religion, county government), some of them high-risk enterprises. But Coach Roberts did not rush them into print. He and his editors nit-picked every fact, every assertion; there was no Janet Cooke incident at the *Inquirer*. As the *Bulletin* reacted first with one news approach, then with another, the *Inquirer* won six Pulitzer prizes in a row, including one for a solid expose of Philadelphia police abuses, and one for Mideast reporting (by its first overseas man, Richard Ben Kramer, on his first big assignment). The *Inquirer* circulation staff daily promoted "hot items" on morning radio and display cards, and arranged extra deliveries.

Yet the *Inquirer* either lost money or barely stayed in the black for six years. (The 1974–75 recession hurt all Philadelphia papers.) Its readership, like that of the *Bulletin*, kept falling. But in 1976, its circulation stabilized and began to inch upward, while the *Bulletin*'s continued to slump. McKeel put his increased revenues into more news and more promotion to attract more "up-scale" readers.

One event signaled to McKeel and Roberts (and to advertisers) that the *Bulletin*, beset by management turnover and strategic confusion, was no longer a winner. During a 23-day strike in 1977 that closed down the *Inquirer*, its rival kept publishing and picked up 100,000 readers and much advertising. However, within two months after the *Inquirer* resumed publication, the *Bulletin*'s gains had largely evaporated. In 1978–79, the *Inquirer* won the edge in weekday advertising, as it overcame the *Bulletin*'s suburban lead.

By late 1981, the *Inquirer*'s annual revenues were up 80 percent over 1976; its total circulation had reached 425,000, surpassing its now-failing competitor's. The Charter Company, which had bought the *Bulletin* in 1980, finally shut down the paper last January.

"Nobody thought it would take us so long to turn the *Inquirer* around," said McKeel. "But I think we did it in the end by producing better newspapers for Philadelphia and by better operations."
Once a newspaper, good or bad, falls into second place even by a small margin, it becomes a "loser" in the eyes of advertising agencies and big retail chains; more of their advertising goes to the "winner," accelerating the decline of the "loser."

Why has this "winner-take-all" doctrine taken hold on Madison Avenue—with all its pernicious side effects on local diversity of information and editorial opinion?

Part of it stems from the desire of advertisers for an exact fit between the kinds of people who buy their products and the characteristics of the media audience. The computer has created an insatiable appetite for marketing data, and the result is that advertising is bought by the numbers, by formula.

This practice has been fostered by the overall trend toward concentration. An increasing percentage of all retail sales goes to chains that operate in a number of different areas, with most of the growth since 1960 in the suburbs. The top 100 national advertisers (e.g., Procter & Gamble, General Foods, and Philip Morris) account for 43 percent of all advertising outlays in all media, up from 35 percent 20 years ago; and the top ten advertising agencies (led by Young and Rubicam), all but one headquartered in Manhattan, direct the spending of 25 percent of all national advertising dollars, up from 17 percent in 1955.

The Only Mass Medium?

What this means is that the decisions to allocate advertising dollars among newspapers (or among newspapers, magazines, TV, cable, and other media) are increasingly made by fewer people in fewer places. And the decisions are increasingly made on the basis of strictly quantitative data, covering everything from income to personality types ("psychographics").

The established doctrine in marketing on Madison Avenue and elsewhere says this: If 30 percent of the people in a given area buy 60 percent of the product, then you target 100 percent of the advertising dollars at this group. (And for practical purposes you forget the others.) The media attracting the highest percentage of this group get the advertising dollars. What this means is that in Philadelphia, the Bulletin, with over 400,000 circulation, strangled on a deficit of $21 million in a market where advertisers spent $1.8 billion on all media in 1981. (See Box.) In that same year, the Press had 43 percent of the daily circulation in Cleveland, but only 28 percent of the advertising.

Advertisers try to direct their messages only at the most likely customers, and media have responded by defining their audiences in terms of particular market "segments" in which


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advertisers might be interested. There are thousands of specialized magazines from *House and Garden* to *The Runner*. Radio audiences have long been broken up into fractions identified with various tastes in music. As cable television spreads, the regular TV networks' share of "prime time" is waning. There are already 21 cable networks that advertisers can use to reach specific types of viewers. The newspaper will probably remain the only mass medium in a given community—supplying each day the body of information that provides a shared experience for people who share a geographic space.

**Looking Ahead**

To be sure, the death of a metropolitan newspaper is a dramatic story—big news. When a small-town weekly goes daily, that is not such big news. Yet since the end of World War II, newspaper births and deaths have approximately balanced each other so that the total number of daily newspapers now (1,730) is roughly what it was on V-J Day (1,763). Twelve daily newspapers stopped publication in 1980 and 1981, but 25 new ones were started. Despite the 1981 death of the *Washington Star*, total newspaper circulation in the Washington metropolitan area as of March 31, 1982, was down by only four percent from what it had been a year earlier. The reason: Five suburban *Journal* newspapers were successfully converted from weekly to daily publication when the *Star* fell.

Despite the funerals of great newspapers, the newspaper industry is, in fact, not faring badly. Daily newspapers are published in 1,560 American towns, more than ever before. Newspapers have held on to 29 percent of all advertising investments over the past dozen years (television, local and national, now gets 21 percent; magazines get six percent; radio, seven percent). In 1981, newspapers made capital investments of about $730 million, much of it in new production technology. The latter has transformed newspaper production and greatly cut blue-collar labor costs. Publicly owned newspaper companies have enjoyed considerable prosperity—with a profit rate double the average for all corporations.*

Nine out of 10 Americans still look at a daily newspaper in the course of a week—108 million on an average weekday. Sunday sales are bigger than ever. This decade will see a 42 percent increase in the number of people from age 35 to 44, a prime age group for newspaper reading. With smaller families, the number

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*For example, the Knight-Ridder, Gannett, and *Washington Post* organizations showed net incomes in 1981 of $100.4 million, $172.5 million, and $32.7 million, respectively.
of households will keep growing faster than the number of people, further improving opportunities for newspaper sales. Despite all the concern about the state of the public schools, the average level of education has been moving upward. Educators are beginning to respond to public concern about students' reading skills. Publishers (and school administrators) have belatedly begun encouraging the use of newspapers in the classroom. And the members of the TV generation are heavy consumers of paperback books and magazines.

What really makes newspapers indispensable is the fact that they give voice and identity to the communities where they are published, and their disappearance somehow diminishes local civic spirit and morale.

It has been suggested recently that newspapers should simply turn themselves into an "up-scale" product, aimed at just the top half or third of the social pyramid. This would be folly. There is enough advertising to sustain "elite" newspapers in New York, Los Angeles, and maybe a handful of other places, but certainly not in the average town. Newspapers are inescapably for everybody—and in an era of ever more specialized audiences and markets, that is a significant distinction. Newspapers have a powerful argument to make to the advertiser of mass merchandise, who needs to cast his net as widely as possible so as not to miss any prospective customers.

Still, the trend toward "target" marketing is irresistible, and newspapers are adapting to it. Many of them are able to provide advertisers with "pinpoint" coverage in specific areas and to extend their coverage with supplementary distribution of advertising through mail or home delivery to nonsubscribers. But to be able to do this selectively for the largest number and variety of advertisers, newspapers must remain a mass medium.

As it happens, that is also what newspapers must remain if they are to fulfill their principal function, which is not to serve as a vehicle for advertising or entertainment, but to communicate to America's citizens what of importance is happening in their communities, their nation, and the world—and so to sustain informed public opinion in a free society.
THE NEWS MEDIA

NEWSPEOPLE

by James Boylan

The press, wrote A. J. Liebling, is "the weak slat under the bed of democracy." Journalists have always liked to think the contrary—that the press keeps the bed from collapsing. They thought so even more after Vietnam and Watergate: Journalism, its champions then argued, deserves the privileges and immunities of a fourth branch of government, and its practitioners should enjoy the status, rewards, and invulnerability that go with being known as "professionals."

Unfortunately for the press, its critics have taken such claims at face value. The press, they say, has become imperial, and journalists an arrogant "elite." Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew put an official stamp on this interpretation back in 1969 when he denounced the power of the "eastern establishment press." Agnew soon left the scene, but he was succeeded by more sophisticated and tenacious critics. Their target was the same as Agnew's—the Big League press and not American journalism as a whole. The latter, in fact, is a potpourri of wire services and syndicates, newspapers ranging in size from big-city tabloids down to mom-and-pop weeklies, and hundreds of magazines and broadcasting outlets.

However, focusing generally on the New York Times, the Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, and TV networks, such critics as Stanley Rothman, Kevin Phillips, and Michael Novak developed a wide-ranging indictment of journalism's upper crust. These journalists, they charged:

¶ are better educated and better paid than most Americans, with ideas and values alien to those of "the real majority";
¶ are concentrated in a few national news organizations that exercise disproportionate power over the selection of the news that reaches the American public;
¶ seek to enhance their own power by taking an aggressive, even destructive, stance toward other major American institutions such as government, the political parties, and business, while making themselves invulnerable to retaliation by wrapping themselves in an absolutist version of the First Amendment;
¶ have abandoned standards of fairness, accuracy, and neutrality in news to pursue larger audiences and greater power.
Beneath the political animus that fuels such critiques is a residue of harsh truth. But what is not necessarily true is the assumption made by critics that the current state of journalism departs radically from what came before it, that there has been a distinctive break with the past.

As British historian Anthony Smith observed in Goodbye Gutenberg, "Each decade has left in American newspaper life some of the debris of the continuing intellectual battle over the social and moral role of journalism." For 150 years, journalists have sought success and power and respectability, usually in that order, and society has responded with unease and occasional hostility.

Four Generations

The press, in fact, has gone through at least four cycles of innovation and consolidation. America’s first popular newspapers were the penny press of the 1830s and 1840s, typified by James Gordon Bennett’s New York Herald. The penny press created a first generation of journalists by putting printers in waistcoats and turning young college graduates of literary inclination and poor prospects into reporters. So threatening was Bennett’s frank and sensational news coverage that New York’s establishment, led by the musty, older commercial papers that Bennett was putting out of business, conducted a “moral war” to stop him. Bennett survived.

A second and far larger journalistic generation appeared during the 1880s and 1890s. By then, the city newspaper had grown into the first mass medium, thanks to the showmanship of such entrepreneurs as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst. In the shrill Hearst-Pulitzer competition during the Spanish-American War, the sales of an individual newspaper for the first time exceeded one million. Critics again fretted over the power of the press to push the nation into war, to debase society. Like Bennett, Hearst had a “moral war” declared against him, on grounds that his papers had incited McKinley’s assassin. Like

James boylan, 54, is an associate professor of journalism and director of the Journalism Program at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. A native of Iowa, he received his A.B. from Cornell College (Iowa) in 1950, his M.S. in journalism (1951), and his Ph.D. in history (1971) from Columbia University. He was the founding editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, which he edited in 1961–69 and 1976–79. His books include The World and the 20s (1973) and The New Deal Coalition and the Election of 1946 (1981).
Bennett, Hearst survived.

Each journalistic generation set its own distinctive "style," but each progressed from rebellion to consolidation, from breaking old rules to laying down new ones. The penny press and its ragtag of "bohemians" angered and shocked the mandarins of the old commercial-political newspapers. Yet it was the old penny journalists who, during the 1870s, declared bohemianism dead and all journalists henceforth gentlemen of clean shirt and college education. Bohemianism reappeared with the "yellow" journalists of the 1890s. When that generation matured, it too set bohemianism aside: Its spokesmen began to claim that journalism was as much a profession as law or medicine, and universities established journalism schools in a flawed effort to prove the point."

For 40 years or more, newspapers rode high, but during the middle years of the 20th century, they were no longer unchallenged. Time and other magazines, radio, and TV began to claim a share of the news audience. (Even so, most journalists continued to ply their trade at newspapers, and 75 percent still do.) The character of the popular press, meanwhile, began to turn from yellow to gray, as befitted an aging institution.

Redefining News

The next generation, the third, rebelled not by reverting to impetuous iconoclasm, but by trying to change the harsh economic rules of the game. The Great Depression had sent reporters' salaries plummeting; by 1933, many newsmen were out of work. New York columnist Heywood Broun, summoning reporters to set aside snobbery and join together, wrote that he could die happy if, when a general strike began, he saw Walter Lippmann "heave half a brick through a Tribune window" at a scab trying to turn out a Lippmann column on the gold standard. Broun became president (1933-37) of the first national union for journalists, the American Newspaper Guild, and led it into reluctant affiliation with the U.S. labor movement.

Unionization's immediate effect was to take from management some of the power it had long enjoyed—the power to fix
newsroom wages and to hire and fire as it pleased. In the long run, unionization made newspaper life more orderly, more predictable, and made it possible for reporters to think of a career. During the years after World War II, as newspapers' staffs grew, the newsroom became bureaucratized, even tame. "Somehow," lamented David Boroff, author of a 1965 Ford Foundation study, "the glamor and magic of the craft have leaked out of it." As before, consolidation had followed rebellion.

In fact, the glamor and magic were by then already leaking back in as a fourth generation of newsmen came of age. Like its predecessors, the new generation challenged the rules—not the economic rules, for the 1960s was an era of unprecedented affluence, but the largely unwritten rules concerning the substance of a journalist's task: the definition of "news," the authority of the employing institution, the relation of journalism to the larger society. The groundwork for many of these challenges had already been laid. What the new generation did most successfully was to combine the individualism and flair of The Front Page (i.e., of yellow journalism) with the ideology and seriousness of "professionalism."

Farewell to the Colonel

The recipe had several ingredients.

The first was an erosion of "publisher power." By the beginning of the 1960s, most newspapers had lived down their colorful past. Although occasionally caught up in the fevers of, say, a Sam Sheppard murder trial, most newspapers no longer consistently sensationalized the news. Most major newspapers did not let advertisers regularly control news content. Most publishers had learned to conceal their hostility to labor and provide balanced coverage of strikes. And most newspapers at least claimed to offer balanced political coverage. The figures most prominently associated with the legendary abuses of the past were fading from the scene. Hearst died in 1951, the Chicago Tribune's Colonel Robert R. McCormick in 1955.

Professionalism was the catchword reporters invoked to insulate themselves from their employers. Newsmen were not required, like doctors or lawyers, to master a certain body of knowledge. But by defining themselves as professionals, journalists could, like doctors or lawyers, claim special rights, notably a degree of individual autonomy in writing and reporting. By the 1960s, reporters commonly agreed that efforts by a publisher to censor or dictate the news that appeared in his paper were unethical. They also agreed that attempts, by editors as
LIPPMANN AND RESTON

Walter Lippmann, the New York Times's James Barrett Reston once wrote, gave younger newspapermen "a wider vision of our duty."

And so did Reston. Lippmann (1889–1974) was the analyst-intellectual, the sage whose column appeared in newspapers around the world. "Scotty" Reston was the premier Washington reporter, the energetic model for younger journalists during the 1950s and early 1960s—before the rise of TV news and its stars. Time put him on its cover. He reveled in Times "scoops" (and got two Pulitzer Prizes), but he also sought "thoughtful explanations" of events. He was skeptical about politicians but optimistic about America.

Born in Scotland (1909), raised in Ohio, he served the Associated Press as a sportswriter before joining the Times in London during the Blitz. He expected much of his craft, perhaps too much. Journalists, he wrote in The Artillery of the Press (1966), should see "the wider perspectives... the causes as well as the effects."

As leader of the Times Washington Bureau (1953–64), Reston assembled some formidable talents—Anthony Lewis, Russell Baker, Tom Wicker, Max Frankel. He urged them to uncover U.S. policy-in-the-making, but to avoid error. "The Times is prime source material [for historians]," he once said. "We must never poison the stream of history." During the early 1970s, Reston's Calvinism became unfashionable. Some younger newsmen sneered at his earlier "pro-Establishment" reluctance to rush into print with CIA secrets (e.g., U-2 spy plane flights over Russia). They forgot that he urged the Times to publish the "Pentagon Papers" and stuck up for the young reporters in Vietnam.

Still writing about world affairs as a Times columnist, Reston is sometimes hopeful, sometimes exasperated—and a bit surprised to find himself now regarded as a kind of Elder Statesman.
THE NEWS MEDIA

well as publishers, to shape the news to make it fit predetermined "policy" were wrong. Theoretically, wrote journalist-sociologist Warren Breed in 1955, the only controls should be "the nature of the event and the reporter's effective ability to describe it." In the newsroom, the actual result was a chronic, usually muted struggle between editors and reporters, between managerial direction and reportorial autonomy.

A License to "Interpret"

In addition to the self-image of professional autonomy, the younger journalists inherited from their elders a long-standing antipathy to officialdom. Publishers during the 1930s had tried (unsuccessfully) to use the First Amendment to thwart New Deal legislation strengthening labor unions. In the years after World War II, the press's suspicions of government shifted to an editorial, and more subtle, level. Newspapers during the 1950s mounted a "freedom-of-information" campaign, implicitly suggesting that undisclosed records and closed meetings were a cloak for official misdeeds. Reporters who had submitted to the manipulations of Franklin D. Roosevelt now objected to those of Eisenhower and Kennedy. The term "news management" was coined by James Reston of the New York Times during the mid-1950s.

Pulitzer prizes, as always, went to exposer of instances of city hall corruption and Washington chicanery. But steady, continuous muckraking—unless embodied in an institutional "crusade" in the Hearst or Pulitzer tradition—was not yet the fashion; the press had not yet undertaken in its investigations—as Lippmann in his classic Public Opinion (1922) had stated it should not undertake—"the burden of accomplishing whatever representative government, industrial organization, and diplomacy have failed to accomplish."

News standards were also changing during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Increasingly, the old "objective" format for news was viewed as inadequate to the complexities of contemporary subject matter and to the reporter's desire to demonstrate expertise. The satisfaction of going beyond the facts, once reserved largely for Washington columnists, now came to ordinary reporters, given a new license to "interpret" the news.

One final element helped pave the way for the fourth generation: enhanced pay and popular prestige. Even after the Newspaper Guild helped to stabilize wages and working conditions, newspapers were justly accused of underpaying their employees. Polls taken during the late 1950s, moreover, ranked

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journalism low—near the bottom in fact—in occupational prestige. By 1962 or 1963, however, all of that had begun to change. The combined appeal of gradually rising pay and gradually rising status became attractive enough to draw college graduates from other fields.* Journalism school enrollments began to swell.

Newspapering became more secure. In 1965, Walter Lippmann pondered the overall metamorphosis of the American journalist since World War II—"the crude forms of corruption which belonged to the infancy of journalism tend to give way to the temptations of maturity and power. It is with these temptations that the modern journalist has to wrestle." It was these temptations that confronted reporters as the 1960s unfolded.

As it happened, the growing autonomy and self-confidence of reporters, led by those in Washington and overseas, coincided with the onset of a decade of divisive social and political upheaval unmatched since the Civil War. "Vietnam and Watergate" became the media's retrospective shorthand for this era, and, to a degree, the shorthand for journalists' mythic notions of their own profession's importance in these events.

The Old versus the Young

Although it was not the first Cold War press-government confrontation over "national security," Vietnam set a decade-long pattern of mutual antagonism that ultimately verged on mutual paranoia during the Nixon years. In reality, the New York Times's David Halberstam and other early birds in Saigon were not, as later painted, "antiwar" activists in 1963. Rather they heard (from U.S. military field advisors), saw, and wrote, not inaccurately, that U.S. policy in Vietnam was not working, even as Washington claimed the opposite.

This conflict between press accounts and official assessments of Vietnam was not all-pervasive, or even constant. But it grew, fed by the inherent ambiguities and rhetorical contradictions of an increasingly costly "no-win, no-sellout" war policy. And under Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, the resulting "credibility gap" began to extend to other matters—to CIA and FBI activities, to diplomacy, to government generally.

*Journalists' salaries vary considerably, even at the 147 Newspaper Guild-organized dailies. At the New York Times, a reporter with two years experience earns a minimum of $721.92 a week; at the Washington Post, after four years, $557; at the Sacramento Bee, $540.72 after six years; at the Terre Haute (Indiana) Tribune (circulation: 24,242), after five years experience, $302. The average top reporter minimum for all Guild papers: $465.64. At non-Guild papers (i.e., at most papers), the pay is usually lower.
And at the same time that he slowly committed America to Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson invited high expectations of government from newsmen and ordinary folk alike with his Great Society programs to “end poverty,” to “end inequality,” to “end hunger.” Few reporters then questioned the need for bigger government (they were, at heart, reformers too). But black riots in Watts in 1965, in Detroit in 1967, in Washington and a dozen other cities in 1968 seemed to show that government at home as in Vietnam was failing, even as universities seemed unable to cope with campus unrest, and churches and businesses and other institutions seemed unable or unwilling to respond to rising demands for, variously, more equity, more freedom, a cleaner environment, more truth in advertising, more autonomy. The 1968 Democratic convention, with its attendant Chicago “police riot” against antiwar demonstrators, seemed to show that the political party system couldn’t or wouldn’t respond either. Activists on behalf of Hispanics, feminists, homosexuals, the handicapped, the aged, followed blacks in claiming their due rights, not just in Washington, but in cities all over America.

The younger reporters who tried to keep up with all this were prepared to challenge authority, but they operated within the establishment. Unlike their “underground” contemporaries, they chose to work inside existing, and prospering, institutions.

"Hello, sweetheart, get me a rewrite!"

Evoking the reporter’s self-image of the “Front Page” era, this MORE magazine poster was popular during the 1970s among young newsmen.
which alone could offer them the full material, moral, and status rewards of journalism, "status" meaning, above all, status in the eyes of other journalists. The impression given by complaining editors later that they had been overrun by activists hostile to newspaper traditions is largely false.

The claim to professionalization had two striking implications—first, that the press as an institution ought to be a kind of free-floating body in society, encumbered by neither governmental nor social controls; second, that the individual journalist ought to be free of institutional restraint as well. In working terms, this meant that reporters would try to shake free of editors; in social terms, it meant generational conflict even more intense than usual.

Barriers to Truth

For the press as a whole, professionalization meant living more by one's own rules, living, in the words of communications specialist James W. Carey, "in a morally less ambiguous universe than the rest of us." This was the universe inhabited by many young newsmen as they covered the civil rights movement, urban decay, campus unrest, the peace movement, and the congressional debates over the Vietnam War. So many things were wrong. The issues seemed so simple. And so dramatic.

Some older newspapermen watched the new breed uneasily. One Washington Post veteran later remembered an "often mindless readiness to seek out conflict, to believe the worst of government or of authority in general, and on that basis to divide the actors in any issue into the 'good' and the 'bad.'" This readiness was heightened, perhaps, by the influence of television news and the "thematic" approach which flavored (and often flawed) its documentaries, e.g., The Selling of the Pentagon (1971).

The attitude was replicated in many newsrooms, big and small. The institutional structure of the press was looked on as a barrier to truth. Journalism would be purer and better if it were controlled by the reporters themselves. In the wake of the controversial coverage of the 1968 Chicago riots, young reporters throughout the country established new "journalism reviews"—sometimes in-house newsletters, sometimes magazines meant for a larger circulation. These usually attacked the residual power of publishers, the authority of editors, or the insufficient zeal of reporters in discomfitting politicians, business, and the military. The Chicago Journalism Review made its

These reviews were allied with a reform movement that advocated, at least implicitly, newsroom governance comparable to that of a Swiss canton; comparable to that of, for example, France's Le Monde, where newspeople elect their own rédacteur en chef. "Reporter power" enjoyed a brief heyday, then expired, along with MORE. It never achieved formally in the area of newsroom control what the Newspaper Guild had wrought in terms of security. In part, this was because the battle had been won—newspaper editors had already become more "permissive," and objectivity, as a journalistic standard like the straightedge and compass of classical geometry, was widely accepted as, if not obsolete, then insufficient.

The antagonism between editors and reporters was minor compared with the continuing clash of press and government. Amid the strains of the Vietnam War and civil disorders at home, the Nixon administration in 1969, through Vice-President Agnew and others, had launched a public counter-attack on the "elitist" media and their "liberal" bias. Then, in 1971, came the first serious confrontation, over the "Pentagon Papers."

"Fourth-branch" Rhetoric

Hawk-turned-dove Daniel Ellsberg had tried for a year to make public the secret Pentagon study of the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. He had approached prominent anti-war politicians, among them Senators William Fulbright and George McGovern, but had not achieved his aim. Finally, Ellsberg called New York Times correspondent Neil Sheehan, a former Vietnam reporter who had recently begun writing in opposition to the war. Sheehan was interested in the study—and so was his newspaper. ("You have permission to proceed, young man," James Reston has been quoted as telling Sheehan.) In June 1971, the Times began publishing the Papers.

At first, there was no great stir—except at the rival Washington Post (where editor Benjamin Bradlee hastened to order a "catch-up"). But when the Nixon administration decided to suppress further publication on national security grounds, the confrontation was joined. The Times's and the Post's subsequent victory in the Supreme Court became a landmark in journalistic history. But had the Big League press gone too far in substituting its judgment for Washington's? Had it arrogated to itself a power unsanctioned either by law or by the public it claimed to represent? The debate over such questions continues.

In Without Fear or Favor (1980), a history of the New York
Times centering on the Pentagon Papers case, Harrison Salisbury claims that the Times (and, one would like to think, the rest of the national press) "has quite literally become that Fourth Estate, that fourth coequal branch of government of which men like Thomas Carlyle spoke." The implications of such a claim are immense. "Fourth-branch" rhetoric has been around a long time, of course (Douglass Cater's The Fourth Branch of Government was published in 1959), but when Salisbury and others take the fourth-branch metaphor as literal truth, they imply that the press, like Congress, say, enjoys not only independence but also constitutional privileges and immunities. Time and again, this case, widely accepted among newsmen, has been made before the Supreme Court, but so far, at least, a majority of the Justices have refused to concur.

Breeding Myths

Former Timesman Salisbury puts forth another expansive claim in his book: that Watergate itself and hence the Watergate exposés (in which the Post took the lead) would not have happened except for the Pentagon Papers case (in which the Times took the lead). Given the security hysteria the case touched off in the Nixon White House, the proposition is supportable but unprovable, like much else about Watergate.

Watergate was a breeder of myths. The chief myth is that Joe and Frank Hardy (i.e., Post reporters Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein) solved the mystery and toppled a President. Actually, as political scientist Edward Jay Epstein noted back in 1973, the government itself cracked the case in its early stages. "What the press did between the break-in in June (1972) and the trial in January," Epstein wrote, "was to leak the case developed by the federal and Florida prosecutors to the public." Congress and Judge John Sirica carried the burden thereafter.

But it was difficult for the mere facts of a complicated story to compete with a glamorized version as compellingly presented in a popular movie, All the President's Men (1974). The "Woodstein" model was credited with filling the journalism schools (although, in fact, the influx of students had begun years earlier) and restoring to newspaper work much of its lost glamor.

Watergate also signaled the start of what some have seen as a period in which the press's confrontation with the federal government became excessive and unreasoning. Although some editors noted that the behavior of the government had been far from normal (necessitating, in their view, an abnormal response), others urged journalists to draw back. "The First
Amendment is not just a hunting license," warned Associated Press general manager Wes Gallagher in 1975. "We must put before the public ways and means of strengthening the institutions that protect us all—not tear them down," he said.

Under considerable criticism for a variety of sins, the media undertook during the Watergate era to overlay a veneer of public interest on their operations. In 1973, a coalition of foundations and media created the National News Council, a media-dominated, unofficial "ombudsman-at-large" for the national press. At the same time, many publications named their own in-house ombudsmen to handle readers' complaints, explain journalism to the public, and monitor the newspapers' performance. Reporters and editors often greeted these newcomers coolly; their presence seemed not only to promise the embarrassment that accompanies public discussion of newsroom frailties, but also to diminish professional autonomy. Newspapers also began running corrections regularly, sometimes in a reserved space, although victims of errors still complained that the corrections lacked substance and prominence.

"Jimmy's World"

The temper of journalism after Watergate, as these reforms suggest, was not that of Agamemnon after Troy. To all outward appearances, the press was still acquiring new influence. Investigative, even accusatory, journalism had become more rather than less popular. Yet journalists were still uneasy. Chris Argyris, a Harvard management consultant who published in 1975 a thinly disguised study of the inner workings of the New York Times, observed (perhaps with some malice) that "the innards of the newspaper had many of the dynamics of the White House. I found the same kinds of interpersonal dynamics and internal politics; the same mistrust and win/lose competitiveness."

Although surveys showed that most journalists liked their work, despite its deadline pressures, many reporters seemed fueled by a sense of being under attack or of being in a race; indeed, the Knight-Ridder newspaper chain administered tests to job applicants to gauge just such desirable qualities. Was it surprising, then, that journalists, especially during the 1970s, tended to see government and politics in the same terms of aggression and competition?

For a decade, the key issue remained "control." "Young reporters have always wanted to change the world," wrote Charles B. Seib, then the Washington Post's ombudsman, in 1978. But, he went on, "in the old days, when a reporter let his opinions..."
Actors Dustin Hoffman (left) and Robert Redford portrayed hard-working reporters Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward in All the President’s Men (1974). The film fed the myth that the press “cracked” the Watergate case.

show he was quickly brought to heel by an editor” and eventually was turned into “what we called an objective reporter—meaning a reporter who stuck strictly to the raw, unvarnished facts. Nowadays editors are inclined to be more permissive.” Seib said he was glad “the days of trying for blind objectivity are over,” but he warned: “Too often the new permissiveness is carried too far.”

That newspapers indeed at times carried the “new permissiveness” too far became very clear to all in the spring of 1981, when a story by a Washington Post reporter was awarded a Pulitzer prize for feature-writing. It turned out, however, that reporter Janet Cooke had simply made up “Jimmy’s World,” her tale of a (non-existent) eight-year-old heroin addict. Despite certain clues, Post editors, including Bob Woodward of Watergate fame, had failed to discern the deception. Cooke resigned, and the Post returned her Pulitzer. The next day, the newspaper assured readers in an apologetic editorial that “more of the skepticism and heat that [we] traditionally bring to bear on the outside world will now be trained on our own interior workings.
The uproar over the Cooke affair did not soon abate. Shortly afterwards, a Daily News columnist in New York was fired when he could not back up some of his reporting from northern Ireland. Reporters in Minnesota and Oregon were punished for inventing quotations. The Associated Press admitted that an account it had distributed about a California joy ride had been a "composite" story. In February 1982, the New York Times admitted on page one that an article written by a freelance writer about his trip to Cambodia, which appeared in December in the New York Times Magazine, had been a fabrication. The writer, in fact, had not left Spain.

A Romantic Haze?

As a result of the Janet Cooke affair and the ensuing "crime wave" of newly-disclosed hoaxes, fakes, and frauds, editors began reasserting their authority over reporters. A survey of 312 editors conducted for the American Society of Newspaper Editors' Ethics Committee found 30 percent of them had changed their policies because of the Cooke scandal. More than a third said they were keeping a closer eye on reporters and the accuracy of their stories. Fewer than two percent of the editors said they would allow reporters to keep identifications of sources from editors; 55 percent said identification had to be provided on request, and 41 percent said it must always be provided.

To outsiders, the press now seemed a little on the defensive. The first "hot" newspaper movie since All the President's Men appeared toward the end of 1981; Absence of Malice—whose script was written by former Detroit Free Press editor Kurt Luedtke—portrayed a venal press cloaking its mischief in the First Amendment.

As the pendulum swung back, journalists began asking tougher questions about their own performance. The Wall Street Journal in 1982 attacked other newspapers' coverage of El Salvador as cut from the same cloth as the journalism of John Reed in Russia, Herbert Matthews in Cuba, and David Halberstam in Vietnam. (Halberstam defended himself ably.) In the March 1982 Washington Journalism Review, Shirley Christian, a Pulitzer-prize winning correspondent for the Miami Herald, suggested that too many American reporters covering the civil war in Nicaragua during 1978–79 had seen the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front through a "romantic haze." New York Times reporter Alan Riding and Washington Post foreign editor Karen DeYoung offered rebuttals.
Such intramural debates, however acrimonious, may be a healthy sign that a dilemma, underlined by publication of the classified Pentagon Papers, is at last being brought into the open. Journalists are committed to serving the truth, or at least the "facts." Yet they are unable to avoid wielding influence. Any big story may produce some damaging social or political effect. The public knows this instinctively, but journalists have usually said, "Damn the consequences!" Now, it seems, they are being put on notice that they can be called to account. As AP's Wes Gallagher had warned seven years earlier: "The press cannot remain free without the proper functioning of the government, the judicial branch and private institutions in a democracy. The press also is an institution. All rise and fall together."

Journalism's responses so far have been imperfect. One of the most publicized was that of the New York Daily News's Michael J. O'Neill, in a May 1982 farewell address as president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He seemed to be accepting, almost point by point, the critique advanced since 1970 by neoconservative intellectuals. Journalists, he said, should "make peace with government," should cure themselves of their "adversarial mindset." Editors, he said, should exercise stricter control; they need to be "ruthless in ferreting out the subtle biases—cultural, visceral, and ideological—that still slip into copy." He brushed off "investigative" journalism as a series of chases after corrupt officials, to the neglect of more important, more complex stories.

Thus, the most recent generation of journalists, the one that grew up in the Vietnam and Watergate years, is now receiving the message from its elders that the heyday of autonomy has ended.

If they misinterpret that message, it will simply mean that journalism will become less courageous. But the real message is different: Journalists, however bright or idealistic, can no longer pretend to live outside society and to live by their own rules. Society wants and needs their services, but not if the price seems too high. In the long run, American society will determine what kind of journalism it wants; only to a far lesser degree will journalists determine what kind of society America will be.
THE PRESS IN COURT

by A. E. Dick Howard

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States consists of a single sentence:

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

When that sentence became law in 1791, the clause pertaining to the press rendered Congress powerless to enact any law restraining the press in advance from printing whatever it wanted. That, many people thought at the time, did not mean that the press should escape criminal penalty if it published "seditious libels," "licentious opinions," or "malicious falsehoods." Indeed, in 1798, during the Presidency of John Adams, Congress enacted the Federalist-sponsored Sedition Act. It prescribed a fine and imprisonment for persons convicted of publishing "any false, scandalous, and malicious writing" bringing into disrepute the U.S. government, Congress, or the President.

Was the act, under which 25 persons were eventually prosecuted, constitutional? The Jeffersonian Republicans, at whose publicists it was aimed, thought not. Some of them—including James Madison, the "father" of the Bill of Rights—took an expansive view of freedom of the press. "It would seem a mockery," wrote Madison, "to say that no laws shall be passed preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be made."

Thomas Jefferson himself harbored a more complex view. On the one hand, he thought the Sedition Act unconstitutional—and, when he became President, pardoned the 10 Republican editors and printers who had been convicted under the law. On the other hand, as he explained in 1804 to Adams's wife, Abigail, the law's unconstitutionality did not mean that "the overwhelming torrent of slander" in the country was to go unrestrained. "While we deny that Congress have a right to control the freedom of the press," he wrote, "we have ever asserted the right of the States, and their exclusive right, to do so."

A year earlier, New York State had, in fact, indicted a Federalist editor for "seditious libel" against President Jefferson. On the editor's behalf, Alexander Hamilton, though a sup-
porter of the Sedition Act, eloquently reasserted the principles enunciated in 1735 in the John Peter Zenger case. Hamilton championed the right of the jury (rather than the court) to determine if there had been libel, argued truth as a defense against libel, and defended the right of the press "to publish, with impunity, truth, with good motives, for justifiable ends, though reflecting on government, magistracy, or individuals." In 1805, New York passed a libel law embodying the Hamiltonian view. Other states soon followed suit. Ultimately, Hamilton's position came to prevail throughout the republic. Because the U.S. Supreme Court under John Marshall and his successors offered no guidance, there matters stood.

The Court as Oracle

Indeed, not until the 20th century did the Supreme Court begin actively interpreting the First Amendment's press clause. Even then most of its decisions had to await the 1960s when, amid the divisive tensions of war and rapid social change, Americans acquired a taste for litigation, and the press became more assertive in its coverage of local and national governments. The Supreme Court soon had its hands full.

The Court's freedom-of-the-press cases may be arranged into three principal categories:

1. Cases in which citizens, of various degrees of renown, seek damages for alleged libels against them by the press.
2. Cases in which the government seeks to keep the press from publishing what it wants to publish.
3. Cases in which the press claims special legal privileges, such as the right to refuse to reveal a news source's identity to a grand jury, or the right to be given access to government institutions or proceedings.

A $9.2 million libel judgment in 1980 against the Alton Telegraph forced the 38,000-circulation Illinois daily to file for bankruptcy to avoid having to sell its assets. Although a settlement was reached this year and the paper remains in business, the case—which involved a never-published memorandum by two reporters—pointed up a lesson that few in the news business have to learn twice: A successful libel action, painful even to a wealthy defendant, can be fatal to a small one. However, thanks to the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, the press has

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*Zenger, a New York printer, was accused of seditious libel. His lawyer, Andrew Hamilton, argued that the press should be free to print truthful criticism of a "bad" governor (meaning the unpopular Governor William Cosby). Hamilton urged the jury to decide the law as well as the facts. The jury did so—and acquitted Zenger.*
gained certain protective immunities.

The Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, handed down its most important libel decision in 1964 in New York Times v. Sullivan, a case involving supporters of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. In 1960, they had placed an advertisement in the Times criticizing, with some inaccuracies, officials' handling of civil rights demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama, and elsewhere in the South. L. B. Sullivan, Montgomery's police commissioner, sued the newspaper and the ad's sponsors (though he himself had not been mentioned in the ad). An Alabama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000. But the Supreme Court, harking back to Alexander Hamilton, ruled that a "public official" seeking damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct must prove that the statement had been made with "actual malice"—i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false, or with "reckless disregard" of whether it was or not. Otherwise, the Court contended, would-be critics might not speak out, for fear the truth could not be proven in court, at least not without great expense.

Changing Course

Newspapermen were delighted by this decision—which, said Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, "makes freedom of the press more secure than ever before"—and their satisfaction grew with each subsequent ruling by the Supreme Court. In 1967, the Court (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts) extended the Sullivan principle to cover "public figures" (not just officials), such as Wally Butts, a former University of Georgia athletic director. Butts had sued Curtis over a Saturday Evening Post report that he had given football plays to Alabama rival Bear Bryant. Four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, the Court (by a plurality) extended the Sullivan principle still further—to include private individuals involved in matters of "public or general interest."

But then the Supreme Court, under Justice Warren...
Burger, began to change course. Despite its 1971 decision, the Court in 1974 ruled (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.) that prominent Chicago attorney Elmer Gertz, who had defended a client in a widely publicized case, was neither a public official nor a public figure—and hence did not need to prove he had been libeled with "malice." Two years later the Court (Time Inc. v. Firestone) decided that Palm Beach socialite Mary Alice Firestone, who had been party to a highly publicized divorce proceeding, was also not a public figure. Still more sobering for the press was Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979), wherein the Court excluded from the "public-figure" realm a Michigan state mental hospital's research director who had received more than $500,000 in federal grants for research into monkey behavior. U.S. Senator William Proxmire had ridiculed Dr. Ronald Hutchinson's research, and Hutchinson had sued the Senator for libel.

Some prominent members of the press, however, were more upset in 1979 by the Court's ruling in Herbert v. Lando that the First Amendment did not protect CBS News correspondent Mike Wallace and 60 Minutes producer Barry Lando from having to
answer pretrial discovery questions about their editorial process. The case involved a program questioning the veracity of Anthony Herbert, a former Army lieutenant colonel who had accused the Army of covering up reports of atrocities against civilians in Vietnam. To win his libel case, Herbert, as an acknowledged "public figure," had to prove malice, hence had to probe CBS's decision-making. William A. Leonard, then president of CBS News, said the decision denied "constitutional protection to the journalist's most precious possession—his mind, his thoughts, and his editorial judgment." How a public figure was supposed to prove "actual malice" without inquiring into the journalist's state of mind went unexplained. Eventually, most editors seemed to realize that the Herbert decision was a natural corollary of Sullivan. It had just taken a while in coming.

**Properly 'Chilled'**

While the pendulum has swung back toward safeguarding the rights of individuals, nothing the Supreme Court has done of late compares in significance with the 1964 Sullivan case. That decision represented an immense shift in favor of the press—one so great that even some newspapermen regret it. Kurt Luedtke, former executive editor of the Detroit Free Press, argued before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last spring that, prior to Sullivan, "the burden on the press was not at all excessive; the 'chilling effect' which the threat of libel action posed chilled exactly what it was supposed to."

Most newspaper publishers, and their lawyers, accountants, and editors, think otherwise. They want not only to feel free to publish critical articles, but also to be assured that newspapers need not pay vast sums to persons deemed by juries victims of libel. While research by a Stanford law professor, Marc Franklin, has shown that between 1977 and 1980, media defendants won more than 90 percent of libel cases, "winning" is not everything, especially for small papers. Said John K. Zollinger, publisher of the Gallup Independent, a 10,795-circulation daily in New Mexico, "We're spending almost 2 percent of our net profit on 'legal.' It's no joke any more. ... You win and still pay."

If libel is the press's most publicized problem, one even closer to the heart of the First Amendment is "prior restraint"—the chief issue in another cluster of Supreme Court cases.

For centuries, authors and journalists have inveighed against censorship or "gagging" of the press by government. "And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth," advised John Milton in 1644, "so Truth be in
the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to mis-
doubt her strength." Yet the principle—and the First Amend-
ment embodying it—underwent a severe test in 1971. In June of
that year, the New York Times began publishing extracts from
the "Pentagon Papers," (a classified Defense Department history
of U.S. Vietnam involvement), and the Nixon Administration
grew to court to stop further publication. The Supreme Court,
however, by a 6 to 3 vote (New York Times v. United States) ruled
in favor of the Times—a landmark decision.

Newsmen in Jail

In subsequent years, journalists savored further gains, even
as lawyers and some judges complained of the new "arrogance"
of the media. Thus, in 1976 the Supreme Court (Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart) unanimously ruled invalid a Nebraska
judge's "gag order" preventing the press from reporting salient
details of a murder trial. And the Court, again unanimously
(Landmark Communications v. Virginia), in 1978 overturned a
verdict against Norfolk's Virginian-Pilot for publishing, despite
state law, an (accurate) account of proceedings before a state
judicial review commission. All in all, the press has largely had
its way in specific gag order cases, even though the Supreme
Court has not ruled gag orders per se unconstitutional. *

A third group of cases tackled by the Supreme Court—
dealing with questions of journalistic privilege—has perhaps
been the murkiest.

In 1958, Marie Torre, a New York Herald Tribune television
columnist, refused to divulge the identity of a CBS executive
whom she had quoted as saying that singer Judy Garland had
"an inferiority complex" and was "terribly fat." As a result,
Torre was cited by the judge for contempt of court (Garland, in
those pre-Sullivan days, had sued CBS) and eventually served a
brief jail term. During the tumultuous 1970s, perhaps a dozen
newsmen went to jail rather than reveal in court their sources
for stories. The newsmen included William T. Farr of the Los
Angeles Times, Peter J. Bridge of the Newark Evening News, and
Myron J. Farber of the New York Times. Farber, at the murder
trial of a New Jersey doctor, refused to turn over his reportorial

*In a related category of cases, government seeks to force the press to publish what it does
not wish to publish. Here, the Supreme Court has sharply distinguished between the elec-
tronic and print media. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969), the Court upheld FCC
regulations requiring radio and TV stations to give reply time to individuals criticized on
the air. But in Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974), the Court ruled that Florida's "right of reply"
statute requiring newspapers to print a political candidate's reply to editorial criticism
violated the First Amendment.
notes to a judge (although, it emerged, the reporter had signed contracts to write a book on the case). Farber's newspaper articles had been instrumental in the doctor's indictment. The jury found the doctor not guilty.

Journalists have argued that to gather news, they need to be able to preserve the anonymity of their sources. The First Amendment, they assert, puts them in a different category from other citizens. The Supreme Court, however, in a 5 to 4 decision (Branzburg v. Hayes, 1972) ruled that even a newspaper reporter (in that case, for the Louisville Courier-Journal) must respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation. The Branzburg ruling did not prevent state legislatures from enacting so-called shield laws of varying strengths, designed to protect reporters from being forced to reveal their sources. After Branzburg, 11 states amended existing shield laws or created new ones; 15 others retained shield laws already on the books.

Searching Newsrooms

Privilege of another sort was the issue in 1978 when the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 3 decision, ruled that the First Amendment does not bar police, if they have a warrant, from searching newspaper offices for evidence of crime. (The case, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, involved the Stanford University student newspaper, and the evidence sought was photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police.) Los Angeles Times editor Bill Thomas said at the time that Justice Byron White's written opinion showed he "neither cares much nor knows much about the problems of the press." Critics—notably the American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Society of Newspaper Editors—appealed to Congress, which in 1980 passed a law requiring police, in most situations, to get a subpoena before searching newspaper offices for criminal evidence.

Perhaps the most ambitious First Amendment claim advanced by the press has been that it has a "right" to gather news—a right, that is, to have access to government agencies, documents, and deliberations.

The Burger Court has not embraced this notion eagerly. The Court has ruled that journalists have no constitutional right to interview prison inmates (Pell v. Procunier, 1974) or to inspect local jails (Houchins v. KQED, 1978). Most disturbing, from the press's point of view, was the Court's 5 to 4 decision in 1979 to uphold the closing, to both public and press, of a pretrial suppression-of-evidence hearing in a murder case. Justice Potter
Stewart's majority opinion in *Gannett Co. v. DePasquale* actually revolved around the Sixth Amendment (with its guarantee of a public trial) rather than the First. (The Court said a trial was "public" for the benefit of the accused rather than the public.) But David F. Stolberg, a Scripps-Howard executive, said the decision was "so violative of our whole Anglo-American tradition of open government that the minority position must eventually prevail. In the meantime, it is not just a press fight—it is a freedom fight."

Newspapermen are prone to enshrine freedom-of-the-press as an absolute—and to become apoplectic when judges do not display a similarly single-minded zeal in their defense of the First Amendment. In fact, however, there are other freedoms, notably those in the other amendments in the Bill of Rights. When various rights conflict, courts must seek a resolution. In any event, the Supreme Court in 1980 (*Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia*) assuaged some of the fears inspired by *Gannett* with a decision assuring press and public of access to criminal trials, unless there be an "overriding interest" for closure.

When it comes to the First Amendment, the men and women of the press are—as is natural and no doubt useful—the first to take alarm when their prerogatives are even marginally encroached upon. But the Supreme Court over the past two decades has hardly been bent on gutting the press clause of the First Amendment.

The Court, to be sure, has manifestly rejected the notion that the press should enjoy any "preferred status" under the First Amendment (and so has insisted that journalists can be called to testify before grand juries). And in balancing a person's stake in his good name against the press's right to publish, the Court has unmistakably tended to limit the 1964 *Sullivan* ruling, in favor of individuals and their reputations.

However, when—as in the Pentagon Papers and later cases—government has tried to restrain the press from, or punish it for, publishing information already in its possession, the Court has strongly defended the press and its freedom. As Floyd Abrams, a media attorney and frequent critic of the Supreme Court, concluded in 1980: "The American press has never been more free, never been more uninhibited, and—most important—never been better protected by law."

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"News and truth are not the same things, and must be clearly distinguished." So, in 1922, wrote Walter Lippmann in Public Opinion (Macmillan, 4th ed., 1965, cloth & paper). "The press is no substitute for [other] institutions....Men cannot do the work of the world by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents, and eruptions."

Such lofty talk was long in coming to American journalism. In American Journalism—A History: 1690-1960 (Macmillan, 3rd ed., 1962), the University of Missouri’s Frank Luther Mott notes that the first continuous U.S. newspaper was the Boston News-Letter, founded in 1704 by Boston’s postmaster, John Campbell. The weekly did not thrive: 15 years later, Campbell complained that he could not "vend 300 copies at an impression."

Circulation remained small because Campbell and other early editors catered to a tiny mercantile elite, printing mostly shipping news and advertisements.

That all changed during the 1830s. Jacksonian Democracy, with its egalitarian politics and free-market philosophy, not only encouraged entrepreneurs to start newspapers, but helped to create an audience for them.

The new papers—the first was the New York Sun—cost 1¢, a sixth of the then-usual cost, and so were labeled "the penny press." They covered "not just commerce or politics but social life...the activities of an increasingly varied, urban, and middle-class society" writes University of Chicago sociologist Michael Schudson in Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers (Basic, 1978). In 1830, Schudson estimates, the combined circulation of all U.S. dailies was 78,000; within 10 years, the total shot up to about 300,000.

In the years after the Civil War, a muckraking manic-depressive Hungarian immigrant named Joseph Pulitzer further expanded the newspaper audience. Biographer W. A. Swanberg tells how Pulitzer (Scribner’s, 1967), wedding reform to sensationalism, developed the newspaper crusade as a way of hooking America’s giant new working-class immigrant population on the daily newspaper habit.

Expelled from Harvard in his junior year, William Randolph Hearst went to work at Pulitzer’s New York World. That served as an apprenticeship. In 1885, he took over the San Francisco Examiner, bought by his father with part of the proceeds from the Comstock Lode. Like Pulitzer, Swanberg writes, Citizen Hearst (Bantam, 2nd ed., 1963) was excruciatingly shy in person but explosive in print. Hearst took a lower road to success, following a "crime and underwear" recipe. He sent his reporters to hunt grizzly bears, or to fall overboard from ferryboats, or to escort Sarah Bernhardt to a San Francisco opium den.

By 1923, two young men fresh out of Yale, Henry R. Luce and Britton Hadden, decided news was so abundant that it needed to be organized, condensed, and (because dry facts
did not suffice) interpreted. Thus was born a new branch of journalism, the news magazine. With Time came a new style, notable for its Homeric epithets ("bumper-jawed," "long-whiskered") and odd linguistic shrinkages ("in time's nick"). Former Time editor Robert Elson tells the story in the company-sponsored Time Inc: The Intimate History of a Publishing Enterprise, 1923-1941 (Atheneum, 1968).

As the mid-20th century wore on, technology brought entirely new media, radio and television. Broadcast journalists faced a unique problem: People did not buy radios or TV sets primarily to get the news. "You've got to get them into the tent!" CBS evening news producer (and now 60 Minutes producer) Don Hewitt used to shout at his crews during the 1950s.

One of the first to get folks "into the tent" was Edward R. Murrow, a man who, in his own words, had not been "contaminated by the conventions of print." Murrow's great feat, notes former CBS writer Gary Paul Gates in his chatty Air Time: The Inside History of CBS News (Harper, 1978, cloth; Berkley, 1979, paper), was to shift radio news from the studio to the scene of the event—in his case, London during World War II. And Murrow succeeded, Gates argues, because he "mastered the art of playing himself."

Media critic Edward Jay Epstein's more scholarly News From Nowhere (Random, 1974, cloth & paper) concentrates on NBC-TV News but finds a similar philosophy of news as entertainment.

New Yorker critic Michael Arlen suggests in The View From Highway One (Farrar, 1976, cloth; Ballantine, 1977, paper) that broadcast journalists should not be condemned for failing to provide the facts as well as do their print counterparts. Television news, he contends, seeks to convey not information pertaining to an event but the "feel" of it. Television critic Ron Powers concurs. Looking at local TV news in The Newscasters (St. Martin's, 1977), he concludes that during the 1970s it succumbed to the underlying "entertainment bias" of the medium.

Yet the harried gentlemen of the print media are also susceptible to manipulation. So says Edwin R. Bayley, who covered the erratic anti-Red crusades of Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R-Wis.) as a reporter for the Milwaukee Journal. In Joe McCarthy and the Press (Univ. of Wis., 1981), Bayley, now journalism dean at the University of California at Berkeley, argues that it was television, not newspapers, that did McCarthy in, when, in 1954, the televised Army-McCarthy hearings brought the ugliness of the senator's attacks into America's living rooms.

A little more than a decade later, the manipulators of the media came from the Left. "The media and the movement needed each other"—one for melodrama, the other for exposure, asserts radical-turned-sociologist Todd Gitlin in The Whole World is Watching (Univ. of Calif., 1980).

But the price the Left paid for exploiting the media was losing some of its leaders (e.g., Tom Hayden) to the delights of celebrity and having other "pseudo-leaders" (e.g., Jerry Rubin) foisted upon it. And when, after the Tet offensive shocked America in 1968, the press and TV turned against the Vietnam War, they ignored the radical Left and shifted to a sympathetic focus on the more moderate "Clean for Gene" (McCarthy) antiwar crowd.

Vietnam jarred notions of journalistic “neutrality,” as when, in October 1969, 500 Time Inc. employees used company facilities for antiwar protests and 150 *New York Times* employees staged an antiwar vigil in front of the newspaper’s offices. Within weeks, the new administration had turned on the press. University of Michigan journalism professor William E. Porter tells, in *Assault on the Media: The Nixon Years* (Univ. of Mich., 1976, cloth & paper), how the Nixon White House distinguished itself from earlier administrations by setting out “to damage the credibility not of a single journalist but of whole classes of them.”

But such clashes were not unprecedented in America. Historian Leonard Levy documents the early days in *Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). The great Nixon-era confrontation, the “Pentagon Papers” case, is well-illuminated in *The Papers and the Papers* by Sanford J. Ungar (Dutton, 1972).

Post-mortems on the media’s coverage of the 1972 presidential campaign indicate that Nixon got a fair shake not because of, but in spite of, his attacks. So contends former *National Observer* columnist James M. Perry in *Us and Them: How the Press Covered the 1972 Election* (Crown, 1973). Timothy Crouse suggests in *The Boys on the Bus* (Random, 1973, cloth; Ballantine, 1976, paper) that political writers are guided less by ideology than by a nose for blood.

Watergate soon followed. The best-known memoir on the subject is *All the President’s Men* (Simon & Schuster, 1974, cloth; Warner, 1976, paper) by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, then reporters for the *Washington Post*. Today that book is interesting for what it suggests between the lines, e.g., how late senior *Post* executives were in taking control of the story. By mid-September 1972, when *Post* executive editor Benjamin Bradlee took an active interest, the newspaper had already consigned its prestige and credibility to two worried young reporters.


Watergate was an exception for the press as well as the Presidency. In *Reporting: An Inside View* (Sacramento: California Journal Press, 1977, cloth & paper), longtime newsmen Lou Cannon presents a sober view of the profession in normal times, significantly devoting entire chapters to the biases, limitations, and frustrations of the craft. Cannon approvingly quotes columnist Russell Baker: “The print journalist has a lot in common with Willy Loman [of *Death of a Salesman*]
... living a rather dreary life with the reality of it romanticized by good booze."

Over the last two decades, increasingly sophisticated romanticizations have appeared. Before David Halberstam mythologized CBS, Time, the Los Angeles Times, and the Post in The Powers That Be (Knopf, 1979, cloth; Dell, 1980, paper), another former New York Timesman, Gay Talese, produced a melodrama, The Kingdom and the Power (Calder & Boyars, 1971, cloth; Dell, 1981, paper), which portrays executive struggles at the Times during the 1960s as personality clashes rather than conflicts caused by differing ideas about the paper's direction.


One major task of newspaper editors and sub-editors is selecting what "news" to print out of the information pouring into the newsroom from wire services and staff reporters. In The Information Machines: Their Impact on Men and the Media (Harper, 1971, cloth & paper), former Washington Post ombudsman Ben Bagdikian reports that during an ordinary seven-hour shift, the news editor of a small suburban paper makes rapid decisions on stories totaling "about 110,000 words, or the equivalent of a book."

But editors often fail to insist that staffers do their homework. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Stephen Hess surveyed The Washington Reporters (Brookings, 1981, cloth & paper) and found that they read one another's prose, and not much else. For example, only one quarter of the reporters covering law read law journals, and economics reporters follow only the popular business magazines, such as Forbes.

Who Owns The Media? (Knowledge Industries Publications, rev. ed., 1982) asks Benjamin Compaine; he provides details on newspaper chains (e.g., Gannett, Newhouse), multimedia conglomerates, and TV networks. Chain ownership may or may not improve a local monopoly paper's news coverage. Some big chains, e.g., Thomson, are more highly regarded for their cash flow than for their journalism. For all major media, Compaine predicts, slower growth but "substantial profits" lie ahead.

Whatever the '80s bring, old hands will no doubt continue to quote the definition of news provided by novelist Evelyn Waugh in Scoop (Little, Brown, 1938; 1977, cloth & paper), the hilarious satire that foreign correspondents recommend to neophytes for the inside story: "News," Waugh writes, "is what a chap who doesn't care much about anything wants to read."

—Tom Ricks

EDITOR'S NOTE: Tom Ricks is a contributing editor of the Washington Journalism Review. This essay is based on suggestions by George Washington University's Christopher Sterling. See also WQ Background Books essays on Television in America (Winter 1981), and TV News and Politics (Spring 1977).
"When nature has work to be done," wrote Ralph Waldo Emerson, "she creates a genius to do it." But how? A handful of Nobel laureates, among them physicist William Shockley, believe biology to be the essential catalyst. (Two offspring have resulted thus far from their cooperation with a California sperm bank's controversial experiment in eugenics.) Others contend that geniuses are not so much born as made, that prodigious feats of intellect owe more to diligence, training, and patience than to natural aptitude—as Thomas Edison would have it, "one percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration." The enigma of genius has long baffled or beguiled the best and least of minds. Here sociologist Robert Nisbet considers the subject anew.

by Robert Nisbet

Not many words in the English language have suffered from Romantic puffery and what H. W. Fowler calls "slipshod extension" to the degree that the word genius has. Prior to the 18th century it meant mostly a special talent or skill. But that meaning has for two centuries been buried in large measure by another which the word then took on: a person of greatness who achieves solely through the "genius" that is endowed in him by God or by nature.

Two influences brought about this new meaning of the word: the Philosophes in France and the Romantics in Germany. The former, in their running warfare with church, university, and other institutions of the old regime, saw themselves as minds of almost unprecedented brilliance, capable of every achievement from running governments to writing encyclopedias. Moreover, in their judgment, history had essentially been made by "geniuses" such as themselves: those of the ancient world, the Renaissance (by definition there were no geniuses in the Middle Ages), the Age of Science, and now in the Enlightenment. Nothing more irritated John Adams across the Atlantic about the French Philosophes than their incessant posturing about their own inner "genius."
At the same time that Voltaire and the other Philosophes were twisting and puffing the word, the Romantics in Germany seized upon it for special application to themselves and to others of Germanic descent. In the same way that the Romantics found a special genius in their racial ancestry, they found individuals in the past of towering intellect and spiritual being who had helped form and then express the Germanic soul or consciousness. These could be generals or poets, statesmen or painters, religious leaders or dramatists. Each was a "genius" because he had been formed of special clay and from this inner majesty issued forth the great works which characterized his life.

The cult of the genius was well formed by the time of Napoleon, and for a long time, in Germany and France alike, he was the focus of hero and genius worship. But he was far from alone. Throughout the 19th century in Europe, the Romantic infatuation with genius intensified and spread. Geniuses were believed to have minds of such surpassing creativity or heroism that their rational limits could sometimes give way, leading to an affinity between genius and forms of insanity. Geniuses, above all, were excused from the ordinary conventionalities and could indulge in vices denied ordinary mortals simply because these vices, eccentricities, and unconventionals sprang ineluctably from the individual's "genius." Given this kind of superstition, individuals, especially in France in literature and the arts, found it useful, irrespective of actual mental powers, to flaunt the attributes of genius, especially those of licentious nature. The fin de siècle was rich in poets and painters who were pronounced geniuses, not so much for the quality of their work as for their highly mannered eccentricities and pathologies.

What proved clinching to the myth of genius was the English biologist Francis Galton, cousin to Darwin, whose bestselling book *Hereditary Genius* was published in 1868. Galton posed the question of why the ancient Greeks were so much greater minds than any in Galton's own 19th-century England. The question is a legitimate one; what is not legitimate is Galton's thesis that the sole and exclusive cause is "hereditary genius," that is, a special intellectual and spiritual power that is inherent in a given person's nature and that transmits itself to succeeding generations through the germ plasm—until or unless, that is, this genealogy becomes corrupted through interbreeding with inferior physical and mental types.
Galton's view cast a wide spell, and the notion of the physical inheritance of genius became a veritable *idée fixe* in the Western mind. Intelligence tests were rampant in the schools; searches for what were called gifted children went on year after year, culminating in psychologist Lewis Terman's Thousand Gifted Children of the 1920s, all of whom were confidently expected to become Newtons, Shakespeares, or Einsteins simply by virtue of their IQ.

That there are individuals born of preternatural intelligence admits no doubt. There are people who from birth are swifter in comprehension, better able to concentrate, quicker to fuse or unite conceptually disparate things, and superior in fashioning with words or numbers or both. These people reach very high scores in intelligence tests, rack up perfect grade averages unless diverted by some alien force, and commonly show extraordinary capacity for solving puzzles.

The question is, however, what forces tend to lead some of them into highly creative work in the arts and sciences but lead others, equally rich in native endowments, to careers of puzzle-solving in its several forms, in as well as outside the sciences and the professions.

To make the gigantic assumption that nature endows some of these individuals more than others with great innate mental strengths and only gives issue to thesesupergifted minds sporadically in time, thus causing those clusters of genius which lie in so-called golden ages, would assuredly be naive. Far more likely is the proposition that the distribution of mental strength in the population remains about the same from one period to another. "Nature uses one paste," observed Blaise Pascal, "and she applies it evenly throughout time." Thus, the nonhereditary, nonbiological forces of history and culture would have to account for that high level of talent in the arts and sciences and for that uneven efflorescence of this level of talent which the historical record makes vivid.

Insight into genius is to be found not in some single and...
compact hypothesis but rather in the crucial experiences and traits which are common to those of highly creative being. The chief feature in common is milieu, which does not mean quite the same thing as the environment. John Addington Symonds clarified the concept: “The intellectual and moral milieu created by multitudes of self-centered, cultivated personalities was necessary for the evolution of that spirit of intelligence ... that formed the motive power of the Renaissance.”

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The concept of milieu is at once historical, psychological, and specific. Milieu is that part of the larger environment which is being shaped by the individual and which is also being participated in and swept into the individual's consciousness, so that environment and consciousness are fused into one.

Every individual above the level of moron is from time to time excited emotionally and intellectually by the people and things around him. It is a fair statement that the highly talented are the most excited in this way, and whether it is a poem or a scientific theory, what we witness is the capacity to internalize a social experience and to make the product socially available. W. H. Auden said that those who possess poetic talent stop writing good poetry when they stop reaching for the world they live in. D. H. Lawrence put the essence of all this admirably: “Everything, even individuality itself, depends upon relationship. ... The light shines only when the circuit is completed. ... In isolation, I doubt if any individual amounts to much; or if any soul is worth saving or even having.”

In one of their conversations, Eckermann asked Goethe how he would explain the extraordinary richness and maturity of mind of a young Frenchman still in his twenties who had just astonished them with his learning and agility. Goethe answered: “Imagine a city like Paris where the most excellent minds of a great realm are congregated in a single place and enlighten and strengthen each other in daily association, strife, and competition; where the cream of all the realms of art and nature on earth stands exposed for daily contemplation; imagine this metropolis, where every stroll across a bridge or square brings a great past to mind, and where a piece of history has been made at every street corner. And in addition to all this imagine the Paris not of a dull and unintellectual time but the Paris of the nineteenth century, where for a span of three generations such men as Moliere, Voltaire, Diderot and their like have been circu-
lated, the productive genius in such abundance as cannot be
found in a single spot anywhere on earth a second time, and then
you will understand how a fine mind like Ampère's can well be
something at age twenty-four. If a talent is to develop quickly
and joyously, it is essential that there be in circulation through-
out the scene an abundance of productive genius and of sound
culture. . . . We admire the tragedies of the ancient Greeks, but
upon proper examination we should admire the period more
than the individual author.”

In sum, it helps immensely, if one is destined for the arts or
sciences, to apprentice in a Paris as described by Goethe, an
Athens of the fifth century B.C., a Rome of the first century, or a
London of the 16th century. No doubt there is the occasional
exception, the mind of great creative force that from the begin-
ning buries its light and takes refuge in isolation. But this could
not possibly be more than vicinal isolation. It is better to assume
that this rare individual through reading, fantasy, and sheer
imagination creates his own milieu. Milieu is, however, essen-
tial. Great ages in the history of culture are made by their great
component individuals, but the reverse is also true, that in large
degree great individuals are made by great ages and by all the
intellectual circuits which operate at high intensity in such ages.
Goethe’s adjuration to admire the period more than the in-
dividual author is pertinent, since great artist and scientist that
he was, he was not likely to be indifferent to individuality. He
chose in due time to move permanently to the relatively se-
cluded Weimar, where his greatest works were done or com-
pleted. But Goethe never forgot for a moment that his early,
formative experiences had put him in continuous contact with
minds of superlative powers from whom he learned while they
were in turn learning from him; nor did he have to be reminded
of the stimulatory effects of the world’s light and leading who
came to visit him in Weimar. ‘‘I sense how it is,’’ Goethe said
once, ‘‘when men like Alexander von Humboldt visit me and in a
single day advance me farther in what I seek and need than on
my solitary part I otherwise could have achieved in years.’’

The past is a very important part of milieu, in the form of
tradition, convention, and memory. The great ages of genius,
starting with the fifth century B.C. in Athens, have never been
calculatedly revolutionary, contemptuous of the past, in avid
search for originality. People who seek originality generally
wind up with two-headed calves, just as those who use the word
creativity regularly in conversation are never creative minds.
Ages of genius have truth, beauty, and goodness emblazoned on
them, not modernism, post-modernism, and futurism. The
Impressionists did not, at least in the beginning, consider themselves to be breaking with the past; they believed they had recovered the spirit of the best of the past despite efforts of the establishment in their day merely to freeze or ritualize the past. Max Planck had a notably conservative, traditionalist mind, and it was only when he had carried classical or conventional theory to its absolute end that he found himself reaching the quantum theory, one of the truly revolutionary theories of the 20th century. Eliot, Yeats, Pound, Joyce, and other titans of the 1920s were one and all reactionaries in politics and profoundly traditionalist in their literary craft.

This suggests another vital element in the formation of genius: emulation. Velleius Paterculus, in his musings on the great Athenian dramatists from Aeschylus to Euripides, thought emulation a crucial desire. Emulation, not imitation. Longinus wrote that selection of a model early in life was vital to the emergence of great writing. To be as great as the master has surely lifted many an apprentice quickly through journeyman status to that of master or even greater-than-master. Models, like metaphors, are indispensable to the aspiring.

Again it is instructive to quote from Goethe and Eckermann. Eckermann suggested that Shakespeare, magnificent as he was, unique as he was, would have yielded somewhat different results had he not been the associate of Marlowe and others of his time, men he was obliged to respect and learn from, even occasionally steal from. “You are absolutely right,” responded Goethe. Shakespeare without his contemporaries would have been as it is with the mountains of Switzerland. “Transplant Mont Blanc into the great plain of the Lüfenburg heath and its size will leave you speechless with amazement. But visit it in its colossal homeland; approach it by way of its neighbors: the Jungfrau, the Finsteraarhorn, the Eiger, the Matterhorn, the Gotthard, and the Monte Rosa, and although Mont Blanc will still remain a giant, it will no longer amaze you.... Furthermore, whoever refuses to believe that much of Shakespeare’s power reflects the greatness of his time should ask himself whether he seriously believes this astounding phenomenon we know as Shakespeare would be possible in the England of 1824, during these bad days of journals of criticism and dissent.”

Accident and chance play their due roles in the formation of
high talent. Dr. Samuel Johnson defined "true Genius" as "a mind of large general powers accidentally determined to some particular directions." It is doubtful that any of the great creative minds in the arts and sciences—not to mention other spheres of existence—would ever have discounted the role of chance and the accidental. From Plutarch on, the biographies of the great are rich in the impact of the purely fortuitous upon human lives. Horace Walpole summed it up with his story of the Prince of Serendip, who never found exactly what he was looking for but who, in the process of incessantly looking for it, found other things he had not even imagined. Louis Pasteur went somewhat past mere chance or accident when he remarked, "Chance favors the prepared mind."

Indeed, it is not only the unremitting search that creates fertile soil for the benign accident, but also the well-filled mind that is capable of recognizing the entry of Fortuna. This is easy to overlook in those stories of great strokes of insight having come to artists or scientists while they were double-parked or while they were climbing a mountain.

Alfred North Whitehead remarked on "the monumental one-sidedness" of genius. This is doubtless the case with a great many people of highly developed talent in a field. Although they usually are not lacking in general knowledge up to a point and rarely push their special interest upon one in ordinary casual conversation, their minds and indeed their whole lives are dominated by a single interest. Large minds, but also narrow minds. It was also Whitehead who said that a good education "has got to be narrow; otherwise it won't penetrate." The role recently advertised by a celebrity hostess for the perfect guest, namely a "broad-gauged, wide-ranging, versatile and clever mind," is not likely to be filled by the true genius.

History affects the eruption of genius in various and subtle ways. Turgot, speculating in his Notes on Universal History (1750) on the singular absence of English artists of note for two centuries or more, as compared with the French, German, Dutch, and Italian, noted the desiccating effect of the Puritan Revolution on England. The Puritans, with their hatred of everything in religion that did not proceed directly from faith alone, set themselves to the destruction of works of religious art and, more to the point, of the numerous crafts which fed into religious art, one way or the other. These crafts produced little
but cheap medallions, crucifixes, and miniatures, but the craft ateliers were also the places where fathers apprenticed sons who had manifested any interest at all in art. From such apprenticeships often came the greatest painters. To have destroyed the many craft ateliers in England was to have destroyed the roots of the art of painting. No painters of talent were thenceforth even possible, no matter how many boys of potential talent were born.

Turgot’s point is well taken. It is said that in the Paris of Cézanne, close to 10,000 painters were at work, the overwhelming majority of whom were mediocre at best, but whose collective presence represented the flood tide upon which the few of signal distinction rode. To change the image, high mountains are almost always surrounded by others nearly as high. A Michelangelo stands out, but only in the company of those who are almost as good. As for the historical development of the scene within which the genius works, Michelangelo simply would not have been possible had it not been for the state of the arts within which he worked—the technological as well as the social and cultural state. Turgot, in his Notes, put it nicely: “Not every plowboy can aspire to be a Corneille, but had Corneille been confined absolutely to a village, he would have become only a good plowboy.”

Capacity for intense and sustained concentration of mind is also one of the qualities seen oftener in the great than in other people. Johnson’s remark on the concentrating effect upon the mind of a man’s certain knowledge that he is to be hanged in a fortnight has generally been misunderstood. Johnson was specifically answering Boswell’s question as to how it was possible for a particular condemned man, a cleric, found guilty of treason, to write the vast number of sermons he did while awaiting execution.

The final force that figures in the formation of genius is family—perhaps not universally but certainly overwhelmingly. Galton did not err in his linking of geniuses by family and genealogy; where he went wrong was in limiting family to physical genealogy rather than seeing it as the very microcosm of the whole social order, a social, cultural, moral, and intellectual entity as well as a continuity of germ plasm. Heredity, yes, but that word is also properly used when prefaced by the word social. Social heredity is the conventions, habits, incentives, coercions, disciplines, and punishments which, once they become ensconced in a household, tend to become traditional, literally “handed down” in the Latin sense of the word.

It is astonishing what three generations of exposure to the

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intellectual and cultural affluence of a family line can accomplish, granted that the family “handing down” also includes the transmission of those innate mental powers which are requisite to all activity of any worth. It is not economic affluence or material wealth of any kind that is vital here, but rather the closeness of the generations, the intimacy between parent and child, both intellectually and morally, which resembles a close form of apprenticeship, of emulation, and role modeling, allowing for assimilation of the many psychological and social insights, understandings, skills, and techniques which can be done only within the emotion-freighted circle of the kinship group.

It would be a mistake, however, to see family only through rose-tinted glasses. Family and love are by no means linked conditions. Family can house love and respect, but it can also, and frequently does, house hate, resentment, and exploitation. But where there is a deep determination by the father or the mother to teach, to instruct, and to cultivate, and an equally deep determination to accomplish this through whatever means seem necessary, the results can be as extraordinary in the absence of affection and tenderness as in their presence.

Beethoven’s father was a drunken brute much of the time, and he was not himself an outstanding musician by any means. But he knew music well, he recognized early the sheer physical-mental force contained in his son, and drunk or sober, abusive or laudatory, he knew how to implant the language of music into the young Beethoven’s soul.

What precise combination of fear, hate, dread, respect, even admiration, lay in Beethoven’s lasting response to his father would be difficult to determine. Winston Churchill has written, in partial description of the Duke of Marlborough: “It is said that famous men are usually the product of an unhappy childhood. The stern compression of circumstances, the twinges of adversity, the spur of slights and taunts in early years, are needed to evoke that ruthless fixity of purpose and tenacious mother-wit without which great actions are seldom accomplished.” Perhaps so. All that is known about Beethoven’s relation to his father is that the same hand that struck his ears punitively, leading to eventual deafness, struck also, in extraordinary ways, chords of a very different kind, chords of devotion, imagination, experimentation, and confidence.

To Beethoven’s experience could be added that of the young
Mozart, also at the hands of the father who, if he did not drunkenly abuse his talented child, exploited him egregiously. Samuel Butler, one of the most powerful and original minds of the nineteenth century, suffered abominably as a child. But Butler too learned things, experienced states of mind, which could only have been learned and experienced in a context as intimate and dependable as the family. Innumerable instances of the psychic wound as the fertile seed of genius are to be found in biographical accounts of the great, from Plutarch down to Churchill's Marlborough.

But without for a moment disparaging such accounts, the evidence is reasonably clear that love and affection serve far better than hate and pain as the family seeds of distinguished careers. Aristotle's loving relation to his father, the physician-scientist, Bach's relation as a child with his parents and then at their death with his older brother who reared and instructed him in music, and Goethe's relationships of continuing love and happiness with his family undoubtedly are more common in the lives of geniuses than are those of Beethoven.

What is true of individuals is true of peoples. By common assent the three most talented peoples of the past two and a half milleniums have been the Chinese, the Greeks, and the Jews. In all, the role of the family has been distinctively powerful. And in all three, the family extended itself into all aspects of the individual mind, becoming the nursery of education, moral precept, citizenship, piety, and craft skill.

To repeat, the family is not simply the microcosm, the formative nursery of things loving and good. It can be, as the Jews, Greeks, and Chinese have made clear in their religious and dramatic writings, the setting of greed, fratricide, incest, and other manifestations of evil. The Greeks at least were, on the evidence of some of their greatest works, more interested in the linkage of family and evil than of family and good. But family murder is the price to be paid, along with incest, blood feud, and other linked evils, for the uniquely intimate atmosphere of family, and it is, on the evidence of history, a price that should be paid. Better a society in which these specific evils will always exist as the consequence of the family tie than one in which, in order to abolish the evils, the family itself is abolished.

One can somehow live with the evils, but civilization could hardly exist without the nurturing ground of its geniuses.
“Flying Angel,” a mid-16th century Ottoman painting attributed to Shah Quli. In the 1920s, Kemal Atatiirk encouraged Turks to shed their Ottoman past. The role of Islam was circumscribed, and the arts acquired a European flavor. Arabic and Persian words were purged from the Turkish language. The difference between the Turkish used in 1920 and in 1982 is greater than that between Chaucer's English and ours.
Turkey

The Ottoman Empire was known to Westerners during its long decline as the "Sick Man of Europe." Few disputed the diagnosis when that sobriquet was applied, during the late 1970s, to the old empire’s modern successor, the Republic of Turkey, suddenly beset by economic disarray, political chaos, and outbreaks of terrorism. But what continent the Turks belong to remains a matter of dispute. Straddling Europe and Asia, Turkey is the only Islamic nation in NATO and the only NATO member in the Islamic Conference. The Turks pray in Arabic, converse in Turkish, and write in Latin script. Ethnically, a typical Turk is an alloy of a dozen races, from Hittites to Celts to Mongols. In one of his alliterative slogans, Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic, probably defined his people best: Biz bize benzeriz—"We resemble ourselves." Here Paul Henze describes the development of the Turkish nation and its recent bout with anarchy. George Harris explains how the world looks to Turkish eyes.

ON THE REBOUND

by Paul B. Henze

Every November 10, Turkey’s daily newspapers display vivid full-color portraits of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on their front pages beneath such headlines as: “With You We Are Happy—Proud—Strong.” Every November 10, most of Turkey’s 46 million people stand silent at 9:00 a.m. as all activity in the country comes to a standstill. At that moment on that day in 1938, an ailing Atatürk breathed his last in Dolmabahçe Palace on the European shore of the Bosporus. Yet Atatürk lives on in the daily life of the Turks in a way that probably has no counterpart anywhere else in the world.

By present-day standards, the life of the blue-eyed, Macedonian-born Mustafa Kemal was brief. He died in his 57th year, only two decades after leading his people out of defeat in World War I and launching a successful drive for the creation of a Turkish state. "How happy I am to say that I am a Turk," he declared to a people for whom the very word Turk had, under
the Ottomans, become a term of derision, reserved for country yokels. "Turks—Be proud, be industrious, be confident!" he ad\- jured them as he set independent Turkey on a path toward Westernization, modernization, and democracy.

The Republic of Turkey has proved itself resilient. It survived the Great Depression and World War II relatively un\- scathed. Since 1950 it has experienced three great bursts of prosperity, two near-collapses of its economy, two waves of ter\- rorist violence. Through it all, the Turks have remained united behind the ideals laid down by Kemal Atatürk. And for all the turmoil, the nation's economic development has in general proved more orderly, and more beneficial to a greater share of the populace, than that of any other nation in the Middle East (excepting, perhaps, Israel). The standard of living in Turkey today is roughly on a par with that of Western Europe at the beginning of the 1950s, and London's Financial Times recently predicted that Turkey in 1982 will boast the highest rate of eco\- nomic growth of any nation in Europe or North America.

The transformation of Turkey since the 1920s has been pro\- found. The country's biggest cities—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana—are crowded with gleaming modern buildings and throngs of people wearing Western dress, the young women as stylish as any in Paris or Rome. Turkish-made Murats and Anadols speed along the modern highways that link all parts of the country; an elegant suspension bridge spans the Bosporus, joining Europe and Asia. On the high Anatolian plateau, irrigation has opened vast stretches of land to agriculture, while at plateau’s edge the mountains rise green from reforestation.

Islam once dictated the rhythms of Turkish life; Atatürk sought to undermine its primacy. Today, the new mosques are well-attended and the old ones carefully refurbished, but Islam no longer dominates daily life as it does in Iran, Libya, or Saudi Arabia. Religion is simply a part of life, as in the Western Euro\- pean societies Atatürk admired.

Bright billboards and signs on shops everywhere reveal how universally the Latin alphabet has ousted the old Arabic script, and it is in Latin characters that Atatürk's hortatory pro-

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nouncements are carved and painted everywhere: over schoolyard gates, in public buildings, on mountainsides. ("School is a door that opens the way to civilization"—youngsters in Eğirdir see those words on their way to class every day.) Atatürk's statue graces every town square, and there are foundries in Turkey turning out nothing but busts, statues, and monumental equestrian effigies of the Father of the Turks.

Much of what Mustafa Kemal loved about Turkey has not changed. Long brown loaves still come fresh from the oven several times daily, crisp and flavorful, the flour milled from wheat cultivated on the broad plains of Thrace and Anatolia. Yogurt
Turkey remains a dietary staple, though it is often sold now in plastic containers with an expiration date marked on the caps. Visitors are still offered hot tea in small glasses by their hosts, and Turkish hospitality and social ritual remains largely unchanged. Allaha ismarladık ("We have commended you to God"), says a person taking leave of another. Güle, Güle ("Smilingly, smilingly"), says the one remaining behind.

 Atatürk shared Woodrow Wilson’s view that “democracy is unquestionably the most wholesome and livable kind of government,” although Turkey did not become a truly democratic state until after World War II. But Mustafa Kemal would find today that even in the countryside, even in places where old men chat away their days in tea-houses and backgammon parlors, Turks are interested in public affairs (voter turnout is high—about 80 percent) and are avid readers of newspapers and viewers of TV (color television has just arrived). His attempt to transform his people into active citizens has largely succeeded. As a result, he is more profoundly appreciated now by a larger proportion of the Turkish population than he was in his lifetime.

End of Empire

Given his raw material, Atatürk’s achievement appears all the more remarkable. What was left of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 did not look like the foundation for a modern nation. Beginning in the 13th century, the Ottoman Turks had ruled a dynamic multinational state encompassing North Africa, the Mideast, the Red Sea, and the Balkans, as well as the Anatolian heartland. The Empire began to crumble during the 18th century. That it survived at all during the 19th century was due less to any virtues of the ruling Sultans than to the support of France and Britain, eager to check an acquisitive, southward-moving tsarist Russia.

Admiring Teutonic efficiency and cooperating with Germans who were eager to expand into the Middle East, the “Young Turks” allied the Empire with Germany and Austria-Hungary during World War I. The price of defeat was dismemberment. The Ottoman territories were spun off into various colonial “mandates” (e.g., Iraq and Palestine), with Anatolia itself sliced for a time into French, Greek, British, and Italian zones. The Sultan’s domain was reduced to a few provinces. Mehmed VI, last of the House of Osman, acquiesced in these humiliating terms, but General Mustafa Kemal, a career army officer and popular hero who had defeated the British at Gallipoli in 1915, found them unacceptable. He rallied his coun-
TURKEY

trymen and turned back an invading Greek army at the Sakarya River (1921) in the shadow of ancient Gordion. Ultimately, after Mehemd fled to Malta, Mustafa Kemal won recognition by the Allies, in the Treaty of Lausanne, of an independent Turkish state. The Turkish Republic formally came into existence on October 29, 1923, with Atatürk as its President.

The Republic’s territory was large by European standards—three times the size of the United Kingdom—but it had been devastated by war and foreign occupation.* In some respects, the Turkey Atatürk inherited had not changed greatly since ancient times. The inadequate railways, part of the German-built Berlin-to-Baghdad system, provided the only modern transport there was; much merchandise still moved by camel caravan. Old Persian and Roman roads were still in use. Electricity was almost unknown in rural areas.

Abolishing the Past

Some 13 to 14 million people, most of them villagers tilling the soil, inhabited this new nation. Life was dominated by tradition: The turban, the veil, and the fez (Muslims are not allowed to pray while wearing headgear with a brim) were worn everywhere. Literacy stood at less than 10 percent. In Istanbul, of course, European ways had flourished since the 19th century, but Istanbul was out of touch with the rest of the country. Mustafa Kemal chose Ankara as the new capital to underscore the fact that Anatolia was the true heart of Turkey. It was then a small country town clustered around a towering stone citadel whose history stretched back beyond the Hittites.

The Republic of Turkey started life with significant handicaps but also significant assets. Unlike most of the other states that would be carved out of the Mideast, Turkey had not been anyone’s colony since the days of the Caesars. Unlike Saudi Arabia or Egypt, its geography was varied and rich; three-quarters of the countryside is rugged or mountainous, but the valleys are fertile, the high steppes and rolling eastern hills ideal for livestock grazing. The coastal provinces are blessed with the Mediterranean climate: cool, moist winters; hot, dry summers, perfect for olives, tobacco, and fruit. Turkey had always been self-sufficient in wheat (Anatolia was one of the breadbaskets of the Roman Empire); it also produced more than enough lamb, fresh vegetables, and citrus fruit. Fish were plentiful off the rugged, 5,178-mile coast.

*The French returned the small southern province of Hatay in 1939, bringing Turkey to its present size: 301,380 square miles.
Moreover, Turkey was not riven by class conflicts. Even in its decline, the Ottoman Empire had honored the concept of advancement on merit. No hereditary nobility had gained a grip on land or political power. Atatürk, son of a minor provincial official, made his way into the best academies in the country on the basis of outstanding academic performance. In this respect, Turkish society is easy for Americans to understand.

It is clear that what Atatürk did not do was as crucial to Turkey’s successful development as what he did do. Unlike the Pahlevi family in Iran, he was firmly committed to republicanism; the notion of founding a dynasty was repugnant to him. Equally important, he declared that Turkey would stay within its borders and make no claims to neighboring territories inhabited by Turks. He made his peace with the Soviet Union, and kept it, but brooked no compromises with communism (which was and still is proscribed).

Mustafa Kemal took a no-nonsense approach to creating a modern state. Atatürk abolished the Caliphate and the religious courts and schools. The veiling of women was discouraged and the fez outlawed (to be replaced, in Atatürk’s words, by “the hat, the headdress used by the whole civilized world”). A Western-style constitution was adopted in 1924. The Western time system (replacing the sunrise-to-sunset method) and Gregorian cal-
endar (instead of the Muslim lunar calendar) were introduced in 1925. In 1926, Turkey adopted new European-style civil, penal, and commercial codes and abolished polygamy. In 1928, the Latin alphabet was adopted, eventually making all of Ottoman literature, composed in Arabic script, inaccessible to the average Turk unless transliterated. In 1934, women gained the right to vote and to hold public office, and Turks were required to take surnames. In 1935, Sunday was made the day of rest (instead of the Muslim Friday).

Towards Democracy

Atatürk moved quickly to get reforms established in principle and he permitted no opposition. On the other hand, reforms were never implemented by brute force, as they were in the Soviet Union. As he traveled about the country, Atatürk used rhetoric and ridicule to press his case, singling out, for example, a man in baggy pants and turban and asking the crowd, “Now what kind of outfit is that?”

Mustafa Kemal was not opposed to capitalism, nor was he a socialist, but the path to development he chose for Turkey was “êtatism”—creation and management of key industries by the state. At the time, there was no other choice. Few Turks had much experience as businessmen. (Commerce, initially regarded by the Turks as degrading, had fallen into the hands of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, of whom only the latter did not leave the new Turkish Republic in large numbers.) During the 1930s, moreover, amid a worldwide depression, domestic private capital was scarce and foreign investment hard to attract. Thus, state-owned enterprises—in textiles, mining, finance, transport, chemicals—came to dominate the Turkish economy.

This would prove a mixed blessing in the long run. While étatism got industrialization off the ground, the “state economic enterprises” (SEEs) were not profit-oriented. They developed the habit of drawing funds at low interest from the central bank to finance expansion and relied on the government to cover operating losses. As private industries developed on a large scale during the 1950s, they were protected by high tariffs. Turkey

*Many Turks took the names of trades and professions either directly—e.g., Doğramacı (Carpenter), Avçi (Hunter)—or by adding -oğlu (“son of”), e.g., Cobanoğlu (Shepherdson). Others emphasized personal qualities: e.g., Demirel (Iron Hand), Özkan (Trueblood). Some preferred the names of animals and birds, others place names, others military names: e.g., Topçu (Cannoner), Binbaşoğlu (Major’s Son). Several million Turks descend from refugees from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Many of these stressed their origin in their new names: e.g., Cerkes (Circassian). All surnames are now inherited and taken by wives on marriage, as in Europe and America.
aimed to produce everything it needed. When Ankara accepted Soviet economic aid during the 1960s, it was used to finance huge, state-owned industrial combines that had little chance of ever becoming profitable. One of these, the Iskenderun Steel Complex, has come to symbolize the illogic of such methods of development. Located far from raw materials, many of which are actually imported from Sweden and the United States, its steel costs three to four times the world market price.

 Atatürk gave the Turkish Republic a parliamentary system of government and set up the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP), but he was unsuccessful in his efforts to create other parties. His final legacy to his countrymen was to designate a capable successor: İsmet İnönü, born only three years after Atatürk. İnönü was blessed with longevity. Serving as President for 12 years (1938–50), he steered Turkey through World War II, joining the Allies near the war's end and then setting into place at home a multiparty democracy which led ultimately to his own defeat at the polls. He returned to serve as Prime Minister in three coalition governments during the 1960s and died in 1973, mourned by the whole country.

**Going on a Spree**

It was İnönü who edged Turkey toward an alliance with the West, culminating in full NATO membership in 1952. Soviet territorial demands (for cession of the Kars and Ardahan regions in the east), and Moscow's pressure for “joint defense” of the Dardanelles and Bosporus (meaning Soviet military bases) had unmistakably signaled Soviet ambitions in the area. The United States responded with the 1947 Truman Doctrine and the strategy of containment, and Turkey received generous military and economic assistance.* Ankara dispatched 4,500 Turkish troops to South Korea in 1950 to fight alongside U.S. troops against communist aggression.

In describing the transition from Atatürk to İnönü, some Turkish writers have compared Turkey to a woman who, upon the death of her lover, finds security in the embrace of her husband. With the election of Adnan Menderes, a lawyer and cotton grower, as President in 1950, Turkey left her husband and went

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*Turkey's 600,000-man armed force is the largest in NATO after that of the United States. The military has always occupied a special place in Turkish life, and Atatürk gave the army an important role in mobilizing the country. Especially in the remote eastern regions, Westernized army officers and their wives provided role models for the ambitious. Illiterate conscripts, meanwhile, were taught to read and write, and new draftees learned modern mechanical skills: how to use tools, how to drive, and how to install electric wires.
on something of a spree. The chief impact of Atatürk's reforms had initially been on the urban middle class and the military, but Menderes's Democrat Party looked to the countryside, the source of its electoral majority. During the 1950s, the Republic experienced a burst of economic and social development that brought the peasants fully into the mainstream of national life. Rivers were dammed, generating electricity for small farmers and bringing new industries. A team from the Wyoming highway department was brought in to demonstrate road-building techniques, and Turkey's rural road network as a result is one of the best in the Middle East and far superior to the USSR's. Tractors became common. New factories and schools were built—and new mosques as well.

Troubled 'Yokistan'

Indeed, Menderes was often accused by Turkish intellectuals and military men of exploiting religion for political gain in rural areas and of backsliding on Atatürk's principle of separation of state and religion. There was some truth in the charges. Among other things, Menderes built schools to train new imams and allowed the call to prayer to be read once again in Arabic (instead of Turkish). But the secular and religious spheres of Turkish life are nevertheless to this day well defined. Turkey is no Iran. It is not even Utah.

Some 98 percent of all Turks are Muslim, and religion is important in Turkey. But the state is responsible for education—even religious education—and only civil marriages are legal. The two major Islamic holidays, Şeker Bayramı (the Sugar Holiday) and Kurban Bayramı (the Sacrifice Holiday), are celebrated for three days and are legally recognized in the same way as Christmas in predominantly Christian countries. Circumcision ceremonies are major events in boys' lives, and it is a rare Turk indeed who is buried without Muslim rites. Every year, tens of thousands of Turks go by bus, jet or private car on the annual pilgrimage (Hacı) to Mecca, and pilgrims still advertise their piety on return by painting their front doors or garden gates green. The whirling dervishes perform for two weeks in Konya each December. But officially, this is a "cultural" event.⁸

The economic boom presided over by Menderes was not entirely benign. He had wanted to sell off many of the state-

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⁸ Most Turks are orthodox (i.e., Sunni) Muslims, but Turkish censuses, taken every five years, do not include religious information, so the exact size of various sects is unknown. Shi'ite Muslims, called Alevi in Turkey, are generally believed to constitute about 10 to 12 percent of the population, versus 93 percent in neighboring Iran.
FATHER OF THE TURKS

As a young major in the Ottoman Army before World War I, Mustafa Kemal would frequently pass part of the night with brother officers in the cafes of Salonika. One evening he looked around at his comrades and predicted what high government job each would someday hold. What position did Mustafa Kemal foresee for himself? A companion asked at last. "I will be the man," he replied, "who will be able to appoint you to all these posts." It was no idle boast.

Born to a Macedonian civil servant in 1881, Mustafa Kemal ignored his mother's wish that he become a hafiz (reciter of the Koran). Instead he enrolled at the Salonika Military Academy at age 12 and five years later was accepted as a cadet by the prestigious War College in Istanbul. There, in addition to studying French, mathematics, and military science, he steeped himself in the forbidden works of Rousseau, Voltaire, Mill, and the Turkish nationalist poet Namik Kemal.

His criticism of Sultan Abdülhamid II's despotic regime repeatedly landed Mustafa Kemal in trouble and in jail. In 1905, as a newly minted staff captain, he was posted—in effect, exiled—to remote Syria, where he joined and reorganized the nationalist Vatan (Fatherland) society, eventually merging it with the underground Committee of Union and Progress. From the Committee came the army officers who led the Young Turk revolt in 1908 and briefly restored constitutional government. Mustafa Kemal became es-

owned companies, but when no buyers were found ended up expanding them with borrowed money that Turkey could not pay back. For a country that had largely slumbered through the late Ottoman centuries and was still adjusting to the Atatürk reforms, the economic pace of the 1950s was dizzying. Rising income, rising expectations, and rising demand brought inflation—the Turkish lira lost 75 percent of its value during the Menderes decade—and shortages of consumer goods. Newspapers began referring to the country as “Yokistan,” a pun on the word Yok (meaning “there isn’t any”).

As economic strains intensified, Menderes and his Democrat Party became increasingly authoritarian. Journalists were jailed, opposition politicians harassed, property confiscated. Ultimately, Menderes attempted to restrict the activities of the opposition political party, the RPP, still headed by İsmet İnönü.
tranged from the Young Turks—and Enver Pasha, who emerged as their leader—as the rule of law quickly degenerated into a military dictatorship. He remained a loyal officer, however, and during World War I, led the successful defense of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. Enver Pasha suppressed all official reports of these exploits, but word of mouth made Mustafa Kemal a national hero. At war’s end, he became the focal point of resistance against the humiliating Treaty of Sèvres, imposed by the victorious Allies. In 1923, he became the first President of the new Republic of Turkey.

The name later bestowed on Mustafa Kemal by the National Assembly—Atatürk—suited him; the “Father of the Turks” behaved like a patriarch.

Once, as the National Assembly was about to approve a bill he found objectionable, Atatürk interrupted the session saying, “Please, will you put down your hands. I see I have failed to explain this point to you,” and persuaded them to reject the legislation by an overwhelming margin. He was Turkey’s teacher, often using a blackboard to explain the new Latin alphabet to people in the countryside. When adoption of surnames became compulsory, Atatürk devised patronymics for those closest to him (e.g., Gökçen, meaning “of the skies,” for his adopted daughter Sahiba, a pilot).

Atatürk’s personal life was less than exemplary. Vain of his appearance, he waxed his eyebrows and often strutted about in white tie and tails. He used women casually, and his one attempt at marriage failed quickly. Atatürk also spent long hours gambling and drinking raki, a strong Turkish liqueur, instructing his household that any orders he gave be confirmed when he was sober. The heavy drinking took its toll. After a long bout with cirrhosis, Atatürk died on November 10, 1938.

At that point, a group of colonels overthrew Menderes and installed General Cemal Gürsel, who had fought alongside Atatürk at Gallipoli, as Prime Minister.

The colonels’ coup of 1960, which came to be called a “revolution,” was the first of three military interventions (the others occurred in 1971 and 1980) in the Turkish political process over a 20-year period. In each case, the army intervened to preserve democracy, not to supplant it. Western intellectuals, who cling to a stereotype of Third World generals, have always found the Turkish military hard to understand. Atatürk taught his officers to regard themselves as trustees of democracy, but always to remember that “sovereignty belongs without condition or limitation to the people.” The Turkish armed forces, whose officers are drawn from a wide spectrum of the population and trained at Western-style service academies, have adhered to this princi-
The officers who seized power in 1960 took a hard look at the mechanics of the parliamentary structure. Turkey's first multiparty elections in 1946, and every election since then, had involved a “winner-take-all” system. This had made it relatively easy for Menderes to keep his Democrat Party in power against growing but fragmented opposition. In rewriting the constitution, the colonels, advised by professors, introduced proportional representation, along with other checks and balances to prevent abuses of power. As it happened, the progressive 1961 Constitution proved too progressive. It prevented not only the abuse of power but also its legitimate exercise.

Meanwhile, Menderes and other former officials endured lengthy trials on charges ranging from misuse of public funds to “forcibly changing, modifying, and abrogating the Constitution.” The former Prime Minister and his Foreign and Finance Ministers were sentenced to death and hanged. Many Turks were ashamed of this at the time, and most today consider the executions a blot on Turkey's record. The Democrat Party was proscribed, but many of Menderes's followers joined engineer Süleyman Demirel's new (and pointedly named) Justice Party.

Elections were held again in 1961. Four parties competed and while none won a majority, Ismet İnönü was able to form a coalition and the colonels went back to their barracks. A political pattern was thus established for the next two decades: parliamentary horse-trading, tenuous coalition-building, chronic bickering and factionalism, the emergence of new leftist and rightist parties, and the trivialization of important issues. Proportional representation, fine in theory, in practice encouraged political fragmentation. Compared to Turkey, the ill-fated French Fourth Republic was a marvel of cohesion.

The bright spot was the economy. From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, economic development accelerated. Oil was cheap and Turkey's GNP grew steadily at a rate of at least seven percent a year. Turks learned to make their own light bulbs, refrigerators, and automobiles. City families moved into roomy apartments with washing machines and kitchen appliances, paid for in installments or with VISA and other credit cards. A vigorous new private sector took advantage of the protective tariffs and a new class of businessmen emerged in fields as diverse as plastics and heavy construction. Vehbi Koç, who started out in Ankara during the 1920s with a small hardware store, became Turkey's most successful entrepreneur. His industrial empire, Koç Holding, now comprises 88 companies making everything from automobiles to ketchup.
Elementary education became universal in the cities, and literacy nationwide reached 62 percent. New universities were founded, many on the American land-grant model and specializing in agriculture, ranching, mining, and industrial engineering. (There are more than 20 colleges and universities in Turkey, almost all government-run, with a total enrollment of about 125,000; few Turks leave the country to get undergraduate education.) Among city intellectuals, typically, socialism became fashionable during the 1960s and the works of Marx and Mao appeared in Ankara bookstores. As a political movement, however, communism remained proscribed.

**Terrorism: The First Wave**

Prosperity reached down to the countryside, where more than half of all Turks still live. Pharmaceutical distributors like Pfizer and Squibb, subsidized by the Ankara government, made common drugs available through pharmacies everywhere. The popular Ministry of Roads, Water, and Electricity tapped springs and dug wells and strung utility lines to the most inaccessible rural enclaves. Peasants gave up homespun for nylon double-knit and even when old styles were retained—for example, the broad pantaloons farm women still wear to work in the fields—bright, flowered colorfast prints were used.

The rural population was growing, of course; underemployment was widespread. Anatolian peasants who for centuries had rarely ventured beyond the provincial capital now sought work in the cities. Great tracts of *gecekondu*—"houses put up overnight"—appeared around Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana. Other Turks moved abroad, seeking better wages. By 1970, it was hard to find a village in the most primitive portion of Anatolia that had not temporarily exported menfolk to West Germany, Austria, Holland, or Sweden. Money sent back every year by Turks working abroad—which passed the $1 billion mark in 1973 and should approach $3 billion this year—became a major factor in Turkey's favorable balance of payments.

Amid growing affluence, no one in Turkey foresaw the crises that materialized suddenly, continued unabated for more than a decade, and sorely tested the nation's cohesion and resolve.

It began with an outbreak of urban violence. As in Western Europe and the United States, universities suddenly became hotbeds of left-wing agitation. Soon students, or young people purporting to be students, were forming armed bands, fighting skirmishes with police, and threatening NATO and U.S. military personnel. There were riots and killings. On one occasion in
1968, U.S. Ambassador Robert Komer's car was burned.

What lay behind the unrest? It was partly an intellectual phenomenon—leftist radicalism had acquired a certain cachet among professors and journalists. In part, students were imitating what they saw going on in the West, just as they wore blue jeans and listened to rock music. The fragmentation of the small, Marxist-oriented Turkish Labor Party (TLP) contributed to the unrest. When the TLP's leader, Mehmet Ali Aybar, condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, his extremist colleagues had denounced his views as "unscientific" and bolted, forming a variety of "liberation armies" and "liberation fronts." Meanwhile, as evidence brought out at subsequent trials would suggest, Soviet operatives were active among Turkish Gastarbeiter in West Germany, setting up a "support structure" there to channel funds and weapons into Turkey. *

From Bad to Worse

The government of Süleyman Demirel soon found it impossible to maintain public order. The kidnapping of four U.S. airmen by leftist guerrillas in March 1971 proved to be the last straw. Charging that the Demirel government had "driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest," the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces suspended parliament and invited academics and technocrats to form a series of "above parties" governments. Turkey remained under martial law for two and one-half years as the army cracked down. More than 4,000 suspected terrorists were rounded up and tried.

Elections were held in October 1973, and Bülent Ecevit, a would-be Swedish-style socialist who had pushed an aging İnönü out of the leadership of the RPP, managed eventually to put together a shaky coalition. There were to be seven governments during the next seven years as Ecevit and Demirel leaptfrogged one another into office. It was the 1960s all over again, but worse. This time the economy became part of the problem.

Even as the 1973 elections were underway, war broke out between Israel and neighboring Egypt and Syria. The Arab oil embargo and the OPEC price rises that ensued led to a quadrupling in the cost of petroleum. Ecevit opened the way to the ruin

* A good overview of the origins of civil unrest in Turkey is George S. Harris's "The Left in Turkey," in Problems of Communism, July-August 1980. One of the pervasive myths among Turkish and Western journalists and academics is that the gecekondus were breeding grounds of discontent. The Turkish-American historian, Kemal Karpat, discovered, to the contrary, that gecekondu dwellers had a positive attitude toward democratic politics, had a higher voter turnout than the national average, and were among the least likely to vote for extremist candidates. See Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondus (Cambridge, 1976).
of a still-booming economy by raising the minimum wage while neglecting to increase the price of fuel oil or gasoline. He ignored the mounting cost to the treasury of subsidies to agriculture and to the state-owned companies (which then accounted for 40 percent of all industrial production).

The oil crisis soon induced a worldwide recession. Fewer Turkish workers were needed in Europe; remittances dropped as Turkey's oil bill climbed rapidly, eating up all foreign-exchange earnings. Belated official decisions to pass on oil price rises to the consumer prompted sudden inflation, which by 1978 was running above 50 percent annually.

Everything was made worse by a second wave of terrorism that began in 1976. If the Soviets had indeed masterminded the terrorist wave of the 1960s and early 1970s, as Ankara privately believed, they learned important lessons. The aim this time was not simply to disrupt Turkey's relations with its NATO allies but to destabilize Turkish society and undermine democracy. Soviet arms and money went not only to leftists but also to rightists, not only to students but also to labor activists, idle small-town

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youths, the urban unemployed, and the veteran terrorists whom Prime Minister Ecevit had amnestied in 1974.

In early 1979, as killings mounted to the rate of several per day, Mehmet Ali Agca, later known for his attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981, murdered one of Turkey’s most respected newspaper editors, Abdi İpekçi. Visiting Western journalists sipping Türk Tuborg at Ankara’s Bulvar Palas Hotel composed brooding essays for their readers back home: Were the Turks capable of self-government?

A Fresh Start

The economic tide, at least, began to turn in January 1980 when the Turkish government, in the hands again of Süleyman Demirel, announced a sweeping economic reform program and gave its principal architect, Turgut Özal, son of an imam-turned-banker, unprecedented authority to implement it. High inflation had brought into existence an “underground” economy; Özal quickly eliminated this by raising foreign exchange rates to the black-market level and adjusting them daily. Subsidies to the SEEs were trimmed drastically. New export subsidies were decreed, taking effect immediately. Steps were taken to lure foreign investment. The shift towards free enterprise was popular and quickly began to produce results.

While economic decline had been arrested, terrorism had not. Arms were shipped in by land and sea from Bulgaria, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. Some terrorists boasted to police or on radio of the months they had spent training in PLO camps. The leftist teachers’ union, TÖBDER, became a major channel for distributing money, arms, and tactical guidance. The radical labor federation, DISK, ruled its own “liberated” enclaves in major cities. Parents began keeping their children home from school as random terrorist killings peaked at 25 a day.

On September 12, 1980, General Kenan Evren, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and former commander of Turkish troops in Korea, announced that the military leadership was taking control of the government. There was no resistance. Most Turks heaved a sigh of relief, even as Western European governments gasped in self-righteous dismay. A government of civilian professionals was quickly put together, with Turgut Özal elevated to the post of Deputy Prime Minister.

The shipments were massive: The Turkish government eventually seized some 800,000 firearms, including 1,371 Soviet-made Kalishnikov AK-47 rifles, plus some 500 anti-tank rockets and more than five million rounds of ammunition. Total value of this weaponry has been put at $250 million, which was 50 times the take from all of the bank robberies and all of the successful extortion attempts in Turkey during the late 1970s.
It is already clear that what Turks call the "September 12 Action" represents a much more decisive turn in Turkey's national life than did the "Revolution" of 1960.

The first order of business was public safety. The army and police fanned out. All highway vehicles were stopped and searched at regular intervals. Informants' tips were followed up. By early 1981, some 43,000 terrorists and their supporters found themselves in jail, and about 30,000 are still imprisoned or on trial. The military crackdown enjoyed overwhelming popular approval. While restrictions on the activities of former politicians, along with isolated instances of torture (neither condoned nor covered up), have resulted in press criticism abroad and frictions with the European Left, no one who visits Turkey today can honestly maintain that military rule has resulted in an oppressive atmosphere or serious erosion of elementary freedoms.

With order restored, Turgut Özal's economic program got a new lease on life. Inflation was slowed from 94 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 1981 and the national budget was balanced. Real economic growth last year, after two years of decline, reached 4.5 percent. Exports rose by 62 percent in 1981 to almost $5 billion. Much of the trade has been with the Middle East, where Turkish construction companies have secured more than $10 billion in contracts. Turks see no contradiction between expanded commercial ties with their Middle Eastern neighbors and close links to Europe and America. "Turkey is a European country," General Evren declared in April 1982, "at the same time it is also a Middle Eastern country." Atatürk might have put it differently, but times were different then.

On the political front, the military is eager to turn responsibility for governing back to civilians and get on with the modernization of the Turkish armed forces. A new constitution, long in the drafting, will be submitted to popular referendum this year. Borrowing from German and French models, the new system is designed to correct the weaknesses of the "professors' constitution" of 1961. Turkey's previous crop of politicians is barred from participating in the first elections. The betting is that General Evren, shedding his uniform, will become the next President.

Among all groups in Turkey today, especially the military, there is readiness to do the necessary to make the new constitution work. Perpetuating the old cycle of chaotic civilian politics punctuated by military house-cleaning is simply too dangerous. As one of the five generals on the ruling National Security Council told me last August, "We want to do it right this time because we might not be able to intervene again."

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The Turks have been having their difficulties of late with old friends and old foes. The “Greek lobby” in the United States (there is no corresponding “Turkish lobby”) joins Hellenes in Greece and Cyprus in pillorying Turkey for its 1974 occupation of the northern third of the island. Radio broadcasts from Eastern Europe, speaking in the name of the outlawed Turkish Communist Party, regularly assail Turkey’s two-year-old military government. Around the world, Armenian nationalists, based outside Turkey and seeking to split off several eastern provinces for themselves, have taken the lives of 23 Turkish diplomats or members of their families since 1975.

In an interview published earlier this year, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Ilter Türkmén, emphasized these and other “points of distress” as he described how the world looked to him. The picture was mixed.

The Europeans: Since General Kenan Evren and his brother officers seized power in 1980, Turkey’s European NATO partners have raised insistent questions about civil rights and the pace of return to democratic government. The Turks withdrew from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe earlier this year after members of that body castigated the Turkish military regime for “particularly flagrant and intolerable violations of the rule of law.” Meanwhile, the arrests of Turkish labor leaders and politicians (including former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit) now threaten to stop completely the flow of financial assistance from Europe—currently about $500 million a year—that has helped tide Turkey over its latest economic crisis.

The Greeks: Andreas Papandreou’s socialist government, after coming to power in autumn 1981, stepped up the level of rhetoric against Turkey’s military government and at the same time authorized oil exploration projects in disputed areas of the Aegean Sea. Last March, Greece abruptly withdrew from NATO military exercises scheduled to be held jointly with the Turks, alleging Turkish violations of Greek island airspace. After two decades, moreover, the future of divided Cyprus is still unresolved. With the Turkish Cypriot minority demanding to share political power equally with the far larger local Greek community, and the Greek Cypriots insisting on a unified island admin-
July 1923: The signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, establishing the Turkish Republic, by representatives of Turkey, Great Britain, Greece, France, and Italy. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü is at center. This contemporary caricature was drawn by the French cartoonist “Derso.”

administration under majority rule, no accord on the island’s future appears to be in sight.*

The Soviets: Relations with Moscow, never really warm, have cooled considerably. The Soviet Union, source of some of Turkey’s electricity, chemicals, heavy machinery, and oil, and buyer of its cattle, vegetables, tobacco, and cotton, greeted the generals’ 1980 takeover with open disapproval, expressing concern lest the new regime in Ankara fall in with Washington’s new plans for the defense of the Persian Gulf. “Promising new dollars to Turkey for military purposes,” Moscow Radio commented recently, “the United States makes demands of its small partner that are to be followed to the letter.” For their part, the Turks, not inclined to worsen the situation, have refrained from publicizing any complaints they may have against the Soviet Union. In any event, as Foreign Minister Türkmen pointed out, media tirades from the USSR “are in contrast with what the Soviet Union has been communicating officially.”

The Americans: Strong ties with the United States remain

*The Enosis (“union”) movement to join Cyprus and Greece exacerbated differences between the Turkish Cypriots (just under 20 percent of the population) and the ethnic Greek Cypriots (about 80 percent of the population) during the 1950s. Creation of the independent state of Cyprus in 1960 under Archbishop Makarios stilled inter-communal violence for a time, but by December 1963, clashes had resumed. In 1974, the military junta in Athens sponsored a coup unseating President Makarios. Thereupon, Turkey, citing the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee which authorized it to defend the Cyprus constitution, landed troops on the island. They have remained there ever since.
at the heart of Turkey's foreign policy. Washington's sympathetic understanding of the reasons for the generals' intervention, and the fading memory of the 1975 vote by the U.S. Congress to curb arms sales to Turkey in the wake of its Cyprus invasion, have paved the way for renewed intimacy, with visits to Turkey within the past year by then Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger. The United States has strongly backed the effort by an OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) Consortium to provide about $1 billion a year in relief for the hard-pressed Turkish economy. U.S. military and economic aid to Turkey in 1982 totaled $700 million. Foreign Minister Türkmen specified that "we have no problem with the United States."

The Mideast: Here, Ankara has scored unusual successes over the past two years. Commercial dealings with Libya and Saudi Arabia, for example, have grown dramatically. In March 1982, Ankara concluded a trade deal with Iran worth more than $1 billion—Turkish food and manufactured goods for Iranian oil. The Turks' trade with the Middle East—involving nearly $2 billion in exports in 1981—now exceeds in value that with Western Europe. Thanks to the near-capacity operation of the 450-mile Iraqi pipeline through Turkey to the Mediterranean, transit fees are up, and the Iraqis have been willing to provide oil on favorable terms ($26 per barrel in 1981, versus a world price of $34). Not by coincidence, Turkey has assumed a more prominent role in the 43-nation Islamic Conference.

Turkey's preoccupations are not altogether new. While the republic itself is only six decades old, it is the successor to an empire that goes back six centuries. It was not during the past decade or even the past century that the Turks first traded with Arabs, fought with Greeks, haggled with Europeans. The lands and peoples now bordering the modern Turkish state were once all under the rule of the Ottomans (20 countries represented at the United Nations contain territory of the old Ottoman Empire), and the relationships and enmities between Turks and their neighbors are of long standing. More than most people, perhaps, Turks have a deeply ingrained sense of place.

Since Ottoman days, the Turks have sat astride both the exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Since the time of Peter the Great (1672–1725), the Russians have perennially sought control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits in their quest for a warm water outlet to the open sea. That goal long made Russia the Turks' most ambitious foe, and warfare between the two was frequent. It was always a cardinal principle of Ottoman diplomacy, therefore, to seek a powerful ally against the empire's Slavic neighbor. France and Britain historically alternated in this role, and it is played today by NATO.4

Accentuating the Positive

Geography is a constant the Turks can do little to change. Thus, with the defection of the Arabs from Ottoman rule during World War I, the Turks forever lost control of territories that now produce the bulk of the oil moving in international trade. In a final act that condemned Turkey to an energy-deficient future, the British in 1925 forced Kemal Atatürk to abandon his claims to the oil-rich province of Mosul. Had this area, inhabited by Kurds and Turkomans and now part of Iraq, been left to the Turks, they would today be a net exporter of crude oil and thus able to maneuver a bit more freely in the world arena.

Typically, the Turks have accentuated the positive, stressing that the end of empire allowed the formation of a relatively homogeneous national state with a clear Turkish identity. Still, a memory of the Ottoman riches lingers. Hence the dispute with Greece (a nation born out of the empire in 1830) over the Aegean seabed. The catalyst was the discovery, during the early 1970s, of oil deposits in Greek waters off the island of Thassos. The Turks quickly advanced their own seabed claims under international waters but in areas spoken for by Athens, arguing that it was hardly fair to deny Turkey the use of large tracts of the Anatolian continental shelf simply because some Greek islands were in the way. Ankara was by no means trying to abrogate the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (which gave Turkey only two Aegean islands, Imbros and Tenedos, the rest going to Greece and Italy), but it was determined not to lose out once again in a scramble.

4 With development of ICBMs and long-range reconnaissance aircraft, Turkey's importance as a frontline NATO staging area has declined somewhat. After Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Incirlik airbase near Adana figured heavily in U.S. Strategic Air Command planning for possible wartime operations. U-2 reconnaissance flights over the USSR from this base ended after Francis Gary Powers was shot down by the Soviets in May 1960. U.S. Jupiter missiles installed in Turkey during the early 1960s were withdrawn in 1963 after the Cuban missile crisis.
for natural resources to which it might have a claim.

Those eastern Mediterranean islands remain a sore point. Greece seized many of them in the waning days of the weakened Ottoman empire and got the rest from vanquished Italy after World War II. Enough hug the Turkish coast to screen much of it from access to the open sea, leaving the Turks largely hemmed in by Greek territorial waters. It should come as no surprise that Ankara is sensitive to the possibility, oft-threatened by Papandreou, that Greece will one day claim a 12-mile (versus the current six-mile) territorial limit around each of its 2,383 islands. This would put all of Turkey's normal navigation channels into the Aegean under Greek control. Under such circumstances, Foreign Minister Türkmen has said, "it would become necessary to redefine all elements of the status quo"—meaning the Aegean would be up for grabs.

**Atatürk’s Legacy**

All of this helps explain "the importance of Cyprus to the Turk," as Shakespeare put it in *Othello*. The perception of being cut off lay behind Ankara's contention, initially voiced during the 1950s, that Cyprus in Greek hands would complete a ring around Turkey. A Turkish journalist, Ömer Sami Coşar, wrote in 1955: "One look at a map would be enough to see that all of our routes are under Greek control and blocked by countless Greek islands. . . . Should our neighbor become a Communist state one of these days, all of Turkey would be encircled with a strong Communist ring. . . . Cyprus sits astride the only route that connects us with the free world." This concern with unimpeded sea access clearly animates Ankara's insistence that independent Cyprus never unite with mainland Greece, no matter what the island's Greek majority may desire. That is why a Turkish invasion became almost inevitable in 1974 when, after years of confrontation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Athens installed Nikos Samson as puppet President of Cyprus. In Ankara's eyes, this amounted to a de facto union of Cyprus and Greece.

The Ottoman past has served for some 60 years as one reference point in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy. The Turks have drawn other lessons from Kemal Atatürk's 15 years as Turkey's first President. Atatürk shaped Turkish thinking in quite new ways. He was a pragmatist and experimenter. Though determined to see Turkey accepted as a modern, European-style nation, he never tried to pursue this goal by locking the country into a single ideology or foreign policy.

Atatürk renounced empire and the dream of "pan-
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Turanism” (which would have ensured perpetual conflict with Iran and the Soviet Union, both home to many ethnic Turks). Once the Republic was established, he also preached “peace at home, peace in the world.” Atatürk was willing to risk war only for high ends of state—as when, to guarantee unmolested navigation, he joined Britain and France in 1937 to hunt down unidentified (but thought to be Italian) submarines prowling the Mediterranean. He did not intend to be supine, and his successors have not been, as they proved by sending troops to South Korea in 1950 and to Cyprus in 1974.

“No to NATO”

Atatürk adopted the policy, followed by all subsequent Turkish leaders, of establishing especially close working relationships with Iraq and Iran (no matter who happened to hold power in Baghdad or Tehran). These countries, like Turkey, are home to large numbers of Kurds, many of whom are willing to fight (and regularly do so) for enhanced autonomy or outright independence. Atatürk also advocated formation of regional groupings of nations to enhance security. His 1934 Balkan Pact (with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia) was complemented in 1937 by a similar alliance with Middle Eastern states (Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan) to protect his southeast flank. The image of Atatürk, evoked during the 1970s by some Turkish leftists, as a leader who would have spurned the U.S.-sponsored Baghdad Pact and Central Treaty Organization—and who might even have said “no to NATO”—is thus fundamentally misleading.

Finally, recalling how European creditors had exploited the country after the Ottoman government was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1881, Atatürk advocated self-reliance (autarky) for Turkey in principle.* In practice, he accepted first Soviet loans (during a thaw in relations during the 1920s and 1930s) and then German and British aid, in order to develop a rudimentary industrial base. Atatürk’s legacy in this respect is his most ambivalent, and vacillation has bedeviled Turkish economic strategy ever since. Skittish about “economic imperialism” but also desirous of Western capital and technology, Turkish governments have alternately put out the welcome mat for foreign investors and nationalized their operations. This per-

*The Decree of Muhairem of 1881 gave the Europeans, acting through a Public Debt Administration, the right to collect a large portion of all Turkish customs revenue. European agents were actually stationed inside Ottoman customs booths. The Public Debt Administration could also levy new taxes Istanbul wished to impose on its own population. The PDA was virtually a state within a state. This regime existed up to World War I.
formance helps explain why Turkey has never been able to attract sufficient capital from wary businessmen in the West.

Atatürk's successors during the past 35 years have largely followed his lead. All of Turkey's modern leaders have been devoted to the goal of making Turkey the developed, Westernized state Atatürk hoped it could become. But, like Atatürk, they have all felt free to experiment and adapt to new conditions.

Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s diplomatic acrobatics kept Turkey out of World War II (until 1945, when a pro forma declaration of war against the Axis powers was the price of membership in the United Nations) despite treaties of alliance or friendship with all of the European belligerents. Atatürk would probably have approved. But the early postwar years were dominated in Turkey by the threat from the USSR. Even if Turkish leaders on occasion exaggerated the danger to extract the maximum in military and economic aid from the United States ($2.5 billion during the Eisenhower years), the pressure from the Soviet Union for the surrender of two of Turkey's eastern provinces and for joint control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles was certainly real. The Soviets pushed Turkey into NATO's arms and the Turks were glad for the embrace. Joining the Atlantic Alliance, moreover, was construed by Turks as providing the cachet of Western acceptance that Atatürk had coveted.

Changing Perceptions

By the mid-1960s, however, a series of events had altered the single-minded emphasis in Ankara on containing Moscow.

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 shocked Turkish leaders into the realization that NATO could, under some circumstances, bring insecurity rather than protection. Having accepted nuclear Jupiter missiles when most other NATO partners refused, the Turks found themselves an object of Soviet wrath as John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev negotiated their way out of military conflict over an issue far from Turkey's shores. The Turks also felt let down when the Jupiter missiles were withdrawn as part of the implicit quid pro quo for removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.

The Cyprus crisis of 1963–64 reinforced this disillusionment. In a four-page letter, President Lyndon Johnson threatened to withhold aid in the event of a Soviet attack if Ankara carried out military operations against Cyprus. The "Johnson letter" called into question the very basis of Turkey's foreign strategy. "In half an hour we would be left without an ally," complained Prime Minister İnönü.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union modified its behavior. With the Jupiter missiles gone, Moscow began to see Turkey as less of a menace. Khrushchev’s successors in the Kremlin took advantage of Turkish-American strains to improve ties with Turkey, moving toward a more even-handed position on the Cyprus dispute and assisting in various development projects.

Finally, by the mid-1960s, the United States no longer felt able to provide the increasingly huge amounts of foreign aid needed to make a significant contribution to Turkish GNP. This gap was filled for a time with remittances sent back by the millions of Turkish “guest workers” who poured into Western Europe during the 1960s and ’70s.

The upshot of all this was that Turkey, like many of its European NATO partners, began to shed its substantially “bipolar” view of the world for a more sophisticated assessment of the nature of things. Determined to avoid provoking Moscow, the Turks now banned active U.S. air reconnaissance over territory adjacent to the Soviet Union and later adopted a liberal interpretation of the 1936 Montreux Convention concerning the

Nothing but the Black Sea lies between the U.S.-Turkish “listening post” on a bluff at Sinop and the Soviet Union’s underbelly, 200 miles to the north. One leftist Turkish journalist has complained that Turkey’s role in NATO is to be “1. an advance post, 2. a big ear, and 3. the first target.”

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passage of Soviet naval vessels through the Straits. The Montreux Convention bars aircraft carriers; Turkey has allowed Soviet warships such as the Moskva, Kiev, and Minsk, officially designated as cruisers though equipped with canted flight decks and fixed-wing aircraft, to pass unchallenged.

While Ankara has sought to "normalize" relations with Moscow—expanding trade, exchanging state visits—Turkey has remained an active member of NATO, participating regularly in its military exercises. The Turks promptly reopened joint U.S.-Turkish military facilities in Sinop, Diyarbakir, and elsewhere in October 1978, despite Soviet entreaties, as soon as Washington lifted the last vestiges of its post-Cyprus arms embargo. But Ankara is also sensitive to perceived infringements on its sovereignty. Turkey will not allow foreign combat troops to be based on Turkish soil (as NATO forces are deployed in West Germany), and the current military regime regularly rebuts the notion that the new U.S. Rapid Deployment Force would ever be permitted to use Turkish bases.

What Next?

Although the subject draws few headlines in the United States, the Turks have also been branching out into the Middle East, a region long slighted politically and commercially by Ankara in favor of Western Europe and the United States. The initial impetus for a shift in orientation was, ironically, Cyprus, as Turkey sought to cultivate other Islamic states during the early 1960s in the hope of winning support for its position in the United Nations. That effort proved disappointing. But it coincided with an upsurge of religious observance by Turkish Muslims and the emergence of an Islamic political party, the National Salvation Party. In 1969, Turkey became a member of the Islamic Summit, and "Islamic diplomacy" slowly acquired both prominence and legitimacy.

In the end, however, what proved decisive in building up Turkey's ties with Middle Eastern and North African nations were the massive increases in the price of oil decreed by OPEC in 1973–74 and again in 1979. As a result of this double shock, the Turkish economy began to deteriorate. Belatedly launched in 1980, Turkey's economic counter-offensive—a free-enterprise, export-oriented program backed by the International Monetary Fund and the OECD—unleashed a determined sales campaign abroad by nearly 200 Turkish firms. Exports aside, in 1981 some $10 billion worth of construction contracts were signed with Libya (the main customer), Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
Turkey's burgeoning “Mideast connection,” though a boon, entails certain risks and makes certain demands. It means, for example, that the Turks must avoid being caught up in inter-Islamic disputes, such as the Iranian-Iraqi War raging near the Persian Gulf (a conflict that Turkey has unsuccessfully tried to mediate). It means embracing, if tepidly, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), despite the indirect supporting role the PLO seems to have played in the political violence that ravaged Turkey during the late 1970s. It greatly complicates Ankara’s relations with Israel, warmed for years by common concern over Soviet inroads in the Middle East. Along with its Arab neighbors, Turkey has deplored the policies of the Begin government, but it has refused to sever ties with the Jewish state (which Turkey was among the first to recognize in 1948).

The Turks are a self-confident people, and that spirit has been buoyed by their recent success in putting the home front back in order. In general, and despite the familiar aggravations of their foreign affairs, they are optimistic about the future. The generals are going forward with a timetable for resumption of democratic government. When that happens—in 1983 or ‘84—some of Turkey’s difficulties abroad will ease. Moscow, for example, will no longer have Turkey’s military regime as a whipping boy. Cordial official ties with Western Europe (and full-scale economic assistance) will be revived. On the other hand, with civilian politicians back in power, relations with the United States may cool somewhat; in Turkey as in America, there are votes to be had in “running against Washington.” But the Turkish leaders will no doubt realize, as they always have in the past, that Islam or nonalignment is no alternative to NATO.

The most significant trend of the past few years—the turn to the Middle East—is unlikely to end soon. The benefits are apparent to both Turkey and its Arab neighbors. Even the recent slowdown in Arab payments to Turkish contractors, caused by the current softness in the world petroleum market, has not curbed the enthusiasm. With commercial activity, of course, comes political interest. All of this virtually ensures that, in the coming decades, overall Turkish involvement in the Mideast will be greater than at any time since the dissolution of the Ottoman state in the wake of World War I. In a sense, the Turks didn’t lose an empire, they (eventually) gained a market.
"Westward along the high Eurasian steppe, from the borders of China across Turkestan and beyond it, there flowed through continuous centuries waves of nomad peoples. Widespread among them were a vigorous people who became known as the Turks. To the Chinese and other neighbors they were the Tu-Kueh or Dürko, a belligerent race deriving the name (so it is said) from a hill in their region which was shaped like a helmet."

So begins Patrick Balfour's *The Ottoman Centuries* (Morrow, 1977, cloth; 1979, paper), a fast-paced and authoritative history of the rise and fall of the Turkish empire. Balfour (Lord Kinross), a British scholar-traveler of the old style, has produced numerous books on Turkey, including *Europa Minor* (Murray, 1956, cloth & paper) and *Within the Taurus* (Morrow, 1955). His biography of Ataturk (Morrow, 1965, cloth; 1978, paper) is by far the best available and, though not always flattering to its subject, has long been a best seller in Turkey.

According to legend, Kinross writes, the Turks were guided in their ancient wanderings by a gray wolf. As Islam spread north and east from Arabia after the sixth century, the Turks, dominated by the Seljuk tribe, moved from Central Asia into the Middle East, eventually substituting the teachings of the Koran for their own pagan shamanistic worship of earth, air, fire, and water. In 1071, a date as important to Turks as 1066 to Britons, the Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan humbled the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV Diogenes at the battle of Manzikert, gaining a permanent Turkish foothold on the Anatolian peninsula.

The Ottoman Turks, led by the charismatic Osman, replaced the Seljuks during the 13th century. "Osman's historical role," observes Lord Kinross, "was that of the chieftain who gathered around him a people. His son Orhan was to weld the people into a state; his grandson Murad I to expand the state into an empire." Constantinople, last bastion of the Byzantine Empire, fell to the Ottomans on May 29, 1453.

Kinross follows the Ottoman Empire in detail up to its collapse at the end of World War I. More concise accounts of the Ottoman period may be found in Geoffrey Lewis's *Turkey* (Praeger, rev. ed., 1965) and Bernard Lewis's *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford, 1961, cloth; 1968, 2nd ed., paper).

The Ottoman Empire at its height was an innovative, tolerant state. "Religious persecution as such," Geoffrey Lewis observes, "was a rare occurrence." Rather, the millets, or religious communities (e.g., Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christians, Jews) were left to look after themselves.

In modern Turkish, the word millet is translated as "nation," but the word has not entirely lost its Ottoman sense. "If you tell a Turk that your millet is Ingiliz," says Lewis "he will assume not only that you have a British passport but that you are a member of the Church of England."

Some of the flavor of life in Ottoman times is captured in *Turkish Art* (Smithsonian and Abrams, 1981), a
lavishly illustrated volume edited by Esin Atil. During the 15th century, Atil notes, a nakkaşane or imperial studio was established "to undertake all forms of decorations and arts and crafts required by the state." Talented youths were recruited and trained. The artists of the nakkaşane always accompanied the sultan on his military campaigns, leaving to posterity a wealth of superb "documentary" paintings.

Americans and Turks have been doing business since the early 19th century. Americans built much of the empire's Navy and introduced the Turks to cotton, rum, and Christian missionaries, coming away with opium in return. U.S. relations with the Turks during this period are chronicled in James A. Field's America and the Mediterranean World 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969, cloth; 1976, paper). The fine travel and guide books written about the Ottoman Empire and Turkey during the past 300 years would fill a small library. Three volumes deserve special mention.

John Freeley's Companion Guide to Turkey (Collins, 1979), enjoyable as armchair reading and useful on the road, blankets the country with good maps and good local history. His earlier Strolling through Istanbul (Istanbul: Redhouse, 1972, paper), written with Hilary Summer-Boyd, surpasses all previous introductions to the city.

Thanks to the extension of the national highway system, eastern Turkey is now far more accessible than it used to be. Gwyn Williams's Eastern Turkey: A Guide and History (Faber & Faber, 1972, cloth) not only indicates the appropriate scenic routes, but also provides concise historical summaries of the 20 different peoples who have lived and ruled in the region.

Perhaps the greatest modern traveler in Turkey has been Britain's Freya Stark, a contemporary (and friend) of Lord Kinross. Her writings, spiced with allusions to the classics as well as bits of conversation with people met along the way, are to be savored slowly, like a selection of Turkish mezeler (appetizers).

Five of her books cover the western and southern parts of the country: A Quest (Harcourt, 1954), The Lycian Shore (Harcourt, 1956), Alexander's Path (Harcourt, 1958), Riding to the Tigris (Harcourt, 1960), and Rome on the Euphrates (Harcourt, 1967).

The reader with time to peruse only one book on Turkey should obtain David Hotham's The Turks (Murray, 1972). Hotham, longtime correspondent in Ankara for London's Economist, distills a millennium of history, politics, economics, and culture into 220 pages. The result is impressionistic, opinionated, and colorful—yet grounded in deep familiarity with the land and people.

As a foreigner, Hotham is more aware than most Turks of the general ignorance (if not indifference) in the West about the country. He recalls one visit to a London doctor shortly before heading off for Ankara. "So, you're off to Turkey!" the physician said. "Going through the Canal or round the Cape?"
Academic literary criticism in America has lately become a mess. Current approaches to theory and explication—whether "structuralist" or "deconstructionist"—have evolved into jargon-ridden, tortuous disciplines, comprehensible, if at all, only to the initiated. What they all lack is a simultaneously intellectual and emotional response to literature.

For this reason alone Frye's splendid book should be welcome; it is, to use one of the Biblical metaphors that Frye himself examines, water in the desert. For The Great Code reminds us that the only purpose of reading is, as Samuel Johnson observed, to render life joyful—or at least tolerable.

Frye, who teaches at the University of Toronto, has already produced two major works of modern criticism, Fearful Symmetry (1948), his study of William Blake, and Anatomy of Criticism (1957). But The Great Code goes beyond his previous work in audacity, energy, and relevance. It is an attempt to see the Bible—that odd, contradictory, frustrating, and indispensable book—as central to the entire Western conception of what literature is, what it is for, and what it is about. This effort involves recovering the Bible from narrowly literal readings, from partisan interpretations, and even from trivializing literary discussions. Rightly read, Frye argues, the Bible leads to the "open community of vision." And to read correctly, one must consider the language and "all the structures, including literary ones, that language produces."

Frye's approach, here as in his other books, can loosely be called "mythic"; that is, he is concerned with the way written stories incarnate those archetypal tales that people have always told to give order to their lives. In chapters on Biblical language, myth, metaphor, and typology, he demonstrates how an intelligent reading of the "Great Code" leads us to understand more profoundly the shape and the sense of those minor
 codes—all of western writing—that have been written under its shadow. He also explains how certain features of the Bible distinguish it from most other works of literature: The Bible's structure, for example, depends on its typological pattern—the relationship between Old Testament and New Testament events (e.g., Jonah’s release from the belly of the whale prefigures Christ’s resurrection)—not, as with most narratives, on a pattern of cause and effect.

In tracing the seven major “phases” of revelation in the Bible (creation, exodus, prophecy, wisdom, law, gospel, and apocalypse), Frye sketches a complex web of allusions, echoes, and images which illuminates not only the sacred text but also Dante, Milton, Blake, Dickens, and even such moderns as Wallace Stevens. Typically acute is his discussion of Kafka’s The Trial as a revision and commentary on the Book of Job.

To be sure, this is not a work of original Biblical scholarship. Nor does it fit comfortably into any of the categories of contemporary literary theory. It is, rather, an articulate, witty, and moving meditation on the crucial text of Western culture.

—Frank McConnell (78)

CHINABOUND At a time when the fashion in analyzing China has once again swung from one extreme to another—this time from the breathless apologetics of the 1970s to the more recent accounts inspired by Chinese dissidents—Fairbank’s memoir of his 50 years as America’s foremost China specialist provides an unusually dispassionate perspective.

What motivates someone to devote his life to studying China? Describing his education (Exeter, Wisconsin, Harvard, Oxford) and his personal ambitions, Fairbank, the son of a South Dakota lawyer, tells us, “I was headed for the Establishment.” Unlike some other Americans discussed in the book (such as anarchist writer Agnes Smedley) who were attracted to China because of a sense of commitment or personal mission, Fairbank says he decided to study China as a means to a successful career. “The state of China itself, about which I knew nothing, had little to do with my decision,” he writes, with astonishing candor. “I was much more concerned about my own performance than about the state of the world.” This may partly explain why this memoir reveals far less about China (where he lived in the ’30s and ’40s and to which he returned on many occasions) than about the man and his career.

The career was successful beyond imagination. During his 40 years as professor of history at Harvard, he built the library collections, wrote bibliographies, and trained graduate students who became leaders in the field of Asian studies. He served on all key organizing committees at the national level (e.g., the National Academy of Science-sponsored Joint
Committee on Contemporary China) and took his turn as president of the major academic associations. Amidst it all, he authored or co-authored over 20 major works on China, including textbooks which came to be accepted as standard.

Fairbank's greatest contribution to Chinese studies was organizational rather than intellectual. More than any other person, he helped to found and shape a structure of institutional support (such as the Association for Asian Studies) for the study of modern China in the United States. For Fairbank, the structure had to be of a particular kind—one that would "get beyond the McCarthy-era split in the China field" and the extreme "emotional involvement" of China specialists on both sides of that schism. Fairbank saw himself as an "area specialist" dedicated to training other area specialists—whom he saw as onlookers, "privileged to watch how the human drama unfolds without being caught in it." Those who studied under Fairbank confirm that he practiced what he preached.

Yet Fairbank paid a price for his success within the Establishment, for his detachment, and for his preoccupation with the middle-of-the-road, consensus view of China. For a memoir encompassing such volatile times, exotic places, and important people, his book is surprisingly dry. How risk-free was the life he chose in such dangerous times—while other Americans such as Edgar Snow crossed the battle lines in North China to interview Mao Zedong, and John Service put his Foreign Service career on the line to report the facts about the Communist movement in Yenan. By the end of his story, one wonders who helped us to understand China better: Professor Fairbank pursuing his career, or those contemporaries who took chances to gain new insights into Chinese society—people for whom China was a life, not merely a career.

—Peter Van Ness (74)

**NIGHT THOUGHTS OF A CLASSICAL PHYSICIST**
By Russell McCormmach
Harvard, 1982
217 pp. $15

Through techniques of institutional history and collective biography, historians of science have frequently attempted to describe the "ethos" of a scientific generation or of a scientific culture. The greatest difficulty in this enterprise has always been to interpret intellectual developments in their personal and cultural contexts.

McCormmach, a historian of science at Johns Hopkins, addresses the problem through a remarkably effective narrative—part history, part novel—set in Germany in 1918. Through the eyes of Dr. Victor Jakob, an invented but wholly believable witness, McCormmach conveys the anguish of a diligent but unapplauded German scientist, frustrated by lack of advancement at his provincial university. On the eve of his 70th birthday, Jakob reflects not only on his personal unhappiness but also on the collapse of his world.
That collapse is twofold. In science—specifically physics—the mechanical explanations of Isaac Newton and Hermann von Helmholtz are being overtaken by new mathematical abstractions (particularly those of Albert Einstein and Max Planck) which threaten Jakob's classical "world picture." The new science appears to undermine the intellectual confidence of the traditional physicist, and even to challenge his authority "right here in his sanctuary, the German university!"

The impending defeat of Germany in the "Great War" and the sacrifice of a generation of young men for the Fatherland is Jakob's other nightmare. In his darkest moments, he wonders whether the idealism of his youth, founded on the tradition of Goethe and Bach, has not been superseded by the political culture of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany. And though he supports that culture out of patriotism, he increasingly fears its pretentious, militaristic, and irrational tendencies. Jakob feels the loss of order, clarity, truth—and even faith in progress—as a personal tragedy too great to bear. In the end, on a hill overlooking his town and institute, he takes his own life.

As historical method, McCormmach's footnoted "composite" history has limitations. We are never quite sure, for example, whether the protagonist speaks for himself or for the author; we miss a sense of biographical three-dimensionality, as the professor delivers his lines in a moving stream of consciousness.

Still, these are technical matters. For students of German history and the German "spirit," the book dramatizes the tradition of scholarship which insisted on the relationship of morality, idealism, and an understanding of the physical universe. American readers accustomed to viewing the carnage of World War I as the price of defending freedom, individualism, and even "civilization" will now reflect more carefully on the intellectual position of the "other side." For accomplishing all this, McCormmach's book bears reading alongside Ernest Jünger's 1924 Storm of Steel and Erich Remarque's 1929 classic All Quiet on the Western Front.

—Roy MacLeod

BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES
Intellectual Roots of Modern Feminism
by Rosalind Rosenberg
Yale, 1982
288 pp. $19.95

That many Americans consider feminism a recent movement (and an academically unpedigreed one at that) is but one reason to applaud the publication of this book. Focusing on American women who entered the new social science disciplines—psychology, sociology, and anthropology—in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Rosenberg, a Columbia historian, depicts their efforts to overcome rigid, often highly moralistic notions of women's "proper" place in the world. Weaving anecdote and analysis, she shows how the women's experiences in academic and institutional set-
tions influenced the direction and content of their theoretical work.

Attending universities was itself no simple matter for women of the Gilded Age. In 1881, Marion Talbot, a recent graduate of Boston University, joined her reform-minded mother in founding the Association of Collegiate Alumnae (ACA). A major goal of the ACA was to repudiate Dr. Edward Clarke's *Sex in Education* (1873), which warned that women's "relatively underdeveloped brains" and fragile health could not withstand the rigors of an "education developed for men." An 1882 ACA survey of all 1,290 of its members found them quite as healthy as other American women.

Fortunately, not all male academics were so condescending as Dr. Clarke. Professors John Dewey, Franz Boas, and George Herbert Mead vigorously championed women's entry into universities and, furthermore, helped direct the women scientists into new areas of social research.

The women learned well from their mentors. They had to. Psychologists Helen Thompson Woolley and Leta Hollingworth, and sociologists Elsie Clews Parsons and Mary Coolidge were among the many female social scientists who discovered that their own chances for survival in the academic and professional worlds depended largely on discrediting theories about innate sexual differences. Woolley and Hollingworth demonstrated that intelligence was not a "secondary sex characteristic" and criticized such notions as the "maternal instinct." While the psychologists attacked the prevailing ideas about biological (or "natural") differences between the sexes, sociologists explained the role of cultural determinants. Building on the work of earlier women researchers, anthropologist Margaret Mead (with whom Rosenberg closes her survey of the major figures) went on in her extensive field work among primitive societies to amass evidence of the cultural relativity of sex roles.

Despite their iconoclasm, most female scholars remained thoroughly Victorian in their refusal to acknowledge that women's sexual drives could be as strong as men's, or even that sex could be enjoyed. But with the publication of such books as Mary Coolidge's *Why Women Are So* (1912), which cautiously argued for an "evener distribution of sexual feeling," the groundwork for the modern "sexual revolution" was laid.

The greatest weakness of the early feminists, suggests Rosenberg, was their naive belief that "separate spheres" would disappear with growing recognition of the "arbitrariness of sexual classification." They did not understand that it would take a social revolution to translate their revolutionary intellectual insights into reality. Rosenberg does not foresee such a revolution until men assume more of those traditionally female roles—including child care and social welfare—still borne largely by women.

—Kathryn Kish Sklar
American slaveholders justified their "peculiar institution" with the paternalistic belief that men were born to their stations in life—or so runs the interpretation advanced by Eugene Genovese and other scholars. But according to Oakes, a Purdue historian, the average Southern farmer, who owned fewer than five slaves, experienced considerable moral discomfort. Though he considered slaveholding an inalienable right, he championed democracy and free-market commercialism and accepted the Founding Fathers' belief that "all men are created equal." Protestant evangelicalism, with its stress that everyone—white or black—was equal in God's sight, troubled the conscience of many a small farmer. A few slaveowners were driven by guilt to release their slaves. Some were convinced of their own damnation. Others claimed that God had entrusted blacks to the care of white men. Most farmers swallowed their moral scruples for the sake of material advancement. Success in the Southern economy (whose workings Oakes thoroughly details) was virtually impossible without slaves. The absolute number of slaveholders grew to 400,000 by the Civil War, though the percentage of slaveholding white families actually declined. As abolitionist sentiment was spreading in the North, a rapidly growing white population and a declining number of slaves were already threatening the Southern economy.

Just after the turn of the 19th century, Halet Efendi, the Turkish ambassador to Paris, warned in a letter home that any Ottoman who praised Europe was a "spy," "an ass," or a Christian. Efendi was a man behind the times: By the 19th century, the Muslim world had recognized the superiority of Western
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warfare, science, and medicine and had even
turned an ear to the social ideas of the French
Revolution. But Efendi's attitude had pre-
vailed among his countrymen since the
seventh century. The Muslim scholars, travel-
lers, and diplomats whose works are exam-
ined by Lewis, professor of Near Eastern
Studies at Princeton, regarded Christian
Europe as the enemy of Islam. Islamic
scholars such as Avicenna (980–1037) and Av-
erroes (1126–1198) drew upon the works of
the pagan Greeks. But for centuries “Frankish
religion, philosophy, science, literature” ex-
cited little interest. In many ways more toler-
ant of outsiders than Christians, Muslims
were slow to develop a curiosity about other
cultures. To learn a Western language was a
useless, even impious, pursuit. The French
Revolution shocked them into greater aware-
ness: The new French government, printing
the first newspapers (in French and, later, in
Arabic) ever to appear in the Muslim world,
spread Enlightenment ideas that broke
trough anti-Christian feelings. And Napo-
leon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 drove home
the message of Western military superiority.

THE REVOLUTION OF
1525: The German
Peasants’ War From a
New Perspective
by Peter Blickle
trans. by Thomas A. Brady,
Jr, and H. C. Erik Midelfort
Johns Hopkins, 1982
246 pp. $20

In 1525, German peasants took up arms
against their lords in an attempt to create a
just society. Long treated as a footnote to the
Protestant Reformation, the German Peas-
ants’ War of 1525 was not, in fact, exclusively
German, peasant, or military. It was, accord-
ing to Blickle, a historian at the University of
Bern, a revolution of the common man that
spread to French- and Slavic-speaking re-
gions and included town-dwellers, jour-
neymen, and miners as well as peasants. Even
the date is misleading: The War of 1525 was
only the culmination of events that began
with the weakening of feudalism in the mid-
15th century. Landowning nobles and ecclesiastics, losing wealth and power, in-
creased their demands on the peasantry, re-
imposing a kind of serfdom. At the same
time, they curtailed the common man’s hunt-
ing, land-use, and wood-gathering rights. The

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afflicted commoners at first appealed to the "old law”—customary rights and principles of fair treatment. Unsuccessful, they turned to religious reformers such as Martin Luther and Thomas Müntzer and found in their preaching a new justification for social justice: "godly law." The "Twelve Articles," penned in 1525 by a German furrier, marshaled Biblical support for its radical demand: "the abolition," writes Blickle, "of all rights and privileges specific to particular social groups." This, of course, was unacceptable to the ruling elite (and even to Luther). The resulting war crushed the commoners' dreams but did prompt modest reforms (e.g., restoration of rights) that for a time preserved the old order.

Contemporary Affairs

THE TRUANTS: Adventures among the Intellectuals
by William Barrett
Doubleday, 1982
292 pp. $15.95

From 1945 to 1952, when Partisan Review was publishing some of the outstanding writers and critics in America, Barrett, a philosopher-critic in his own right, served as one of its associate editors. Under the direction of Philip Rahv and William Phillips, the review broke with its original sponsor, the U.S. Communist Party, and championed containment of the Soviets even before Harry Truman did. Avant-garde in its aesthetics, the journal also became a major forum for the latest European ideas. Hannah Arendt introduced American readers to existentialism on PR's pages. And Clement Greenberg's critical essays on the new native movement, abstract expressionism, explained that bewildering visual explosion. Barrett demonstrates how pervasive the journal's influence was, but he wonders now if it was altogether salutary. Among other effects, the fuzzy leftism of Rahv and the other "truants," with its strains of fashionable nihilism, may have contributed to the more infantile aspects of 1960s' radicalism. "Follow the zigs and the zags of any given intellectual," as Barrett puts it, "and you may turn out to be reading the fever chart of the next generation."

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BRITAIN AGAINST ITSELF:
The Political Contradictions of Collectivism
by Samuel H. Beer
Norton, 1982
231 pp. $18.95

One of the few growth industries in Britain in recent years has been the business of diagnosing the national malaise. To the already burgeoning literature, Beer, a Harvard political scientist, contributes this balanced assessment of the contradictions running through British society and politics. He also challenges many of the current clichés. The failure of the political parties to cope with a souring economy—particularly during the 1960s—was due not to extreme policy differences but to their ideological convergence, which gave rise to opportunistic bidding for votes with costly social welfare measures. The trouble with unions is not so much their strength but their internecine rivalries: Competing with each other during the 1970s to maintain their members' relative incomes, union leaders fueled inflation (creating a wage-wage as well as a wage-price spiral) and burdened both Labour and Conservative governments with an intractable economic crisis. Beer describes a breakdown of the traditional class basis of the major parties and the rise of a populist movement threatening the traditional practice of deference to party leadership. The new populism is largely responsible for opening up the leader selection process within the parties (Margaret Thatcher, an outsider, would not have been chosen under the old Tory system), and for spurring a number of disillusioned Labourites to found a new party—the Social Democrats.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
by John Lenczowski
Cornell, 1982
318 pp. $25

During the 1970s, the era of detente, the Soviet Union achieved "strategic parity" with the United States. One consequence was a surge of interest among Soviet scholars in American foreign policy. Lenczowski, a University of Maryland political scientist, divides these America-watchers into two groups. The "traditionalists," who share a "ritual optimism" about the inevitable triumph of communism, see the United States as an economic and ideological monolith, controlled by 500 corporations. Yet they are actually
more fearful of American strength than are the "realists," who detect weaknesses and divisions within the United States. The realists believe that the growing power of American public opinion (exemplified by resistance to the Vietnam War), disagreements among U.S. leaders, and recognition of new Soviet strength have caused a "retrenchment of American influence throughout the world." The realists are clearly the more sophisticated, but Lenczowski discerns a basic "harmony of interests" between the two groups, stemming from their common need to justify the Soviet state and its role in global affairs. With their major analysts in fundamental ideological agreement, Kremlin leaders are unlikely to abandon their Marxist-Leninist program. Thus Lenczowski has little hope for reconciliation between East and West.

**Arts & Letters**

**THE FAMILY IDIOT:**

*Gustave Flaubert, 1821–1857, Vol. I*

by Jean-Paul Sartre

translated by Carol Cosman

Univ. of Chicago, 1981

627 pp. $25

**SARTRE & FLAUBERT**

by Hazel E. Barnes

Univ. of Chicago, 1981

449 pp. $25

With Gustave Flaubert (1821–80), the novel in France came to its culmination—or, as some critics lament, to its end. The author of *Madame Bovary* (1857) strove to create fiction in which style was all, believing that the perfect work of art would be about "nothing." It was partly this retreat from the real to a purely imaginary world, and the effect of this aestheticism on subsequent French literature, that prompted Jean-Paul Sartre (1904–80), advocate of the politically "engaged" writer, to devote his last major intellectual effort to a biography of Flaubert. In Volume I (the first of four to be translated into English), Sartre analyzes the young Gustave: his tardy intellectual development (marked by possible autism, uneasiness with language, inability to read until age seven); his passivity (probably resulting from his mother's disappointment at not having had a daughter); his sense of inferiority to his brother, the bright sibling who so easily fulfilled their physician father's expectations. Sartre shows how the "family idiot" transformed his sense of inadequacy into an artistic strategy. Flaubert anes-
thetized himself against the injustice and stupidity he saw in his middle-class world by creating a literature of ironic, aloof disdain.

Barnes, professor of humanities at the University of Colorado, places all four volumes of The Family Idiot in the context of Sartre's larger intellectual career and measures them against other treatments of Flaubert. Good at detecting points where Sartre twists the evidence to suit his own elaborate theories (a fusion of existentialism and Marxism), Barnes judges The Family Idiot a fitting conclusion to the philosopher's life-long meditation on questions of history, art, human dignity, and freedom.

Throughout their history, Americans have seen themselves as a "redeemer people." This messianism has fueled belief in a sacred right to territorial expansion as well as a humbler commitment to the protection of "inalienable" human rights. But not all messianic visions in America involve national destiny, writes Moses, professor of Afro-American studies at Brown University. Oppressed groups, particularly blacks, have often viewed their own kind as God's chosen people. In the ante-bellum era, black ministers such as Methodist Richard Allen cited scriptures to show that slavery was God's way of tempering those whom he would soon raise up. Martin Luther King, Jr., later summoned the same spirit when he preached that "the Negro may be God's appeal to this age—an age drifting rapidly to its doom."

Some whites, too, have seized on this image. Harriet Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Tom" (a character frequently misinterpreted as a lackey, contends Moses) exemplifies the notion of blacks as Christ-like "suffering servants." Though occasionally exploited by con artists, the theme of black messianism has been good for the nation's blacks, Moses maintains. Adapting the myth of divine favor to a history of deprivation has helped them reconcile their sense of separateness with the faith that they are "truly American."
THE FROG WHO DARED TO CROAK
by Richard Sennett
Farrar, 1982
182 pp. $11.95

A good number of scholarly tomes have dissected the self-deceptions of 20th-century intellectuals, particularly those of the Left. Sennett, director of the New York Institute for the Humanities, has dramatized their shortcomings through the fictionalized persona of Tibor Grau, a Hungarian Marxist, modeled, in many respects, after the philosopher Georg Lukaćs (1885–1971). A pastiche of documents—letters, police reports, journal entries, memorandums—tells how the bright son of a wealthy Jewish banker becomes a political radical. Searching for young men in Budapest’s Municipal Park (homosexuality is his inadmissible secret), he sees the poverty of the uprooted peasants and workers forced to live there. Working for the revolution, he goes on to serve Hungary’s various Communist regimes as a middle-rank official, producing cultural propaganda even as he writes serious philosophy for posterity at home. Grau’s life is full of compromise and self-deception, disturbed by moments of troubling self-awareness: “Caution is a disease of the mind, and I am chronically ill.” More often, though, Grau offers his standard excuse: “I am a realist. I believe in survival.” Sennett’s accomplishment is to have recreated the times and events—from the late Austro-Hungarian Empire, to the struggles against Fascism, to the horrors of Stalinism—that make the sins of Grau, and others like him, almost forgivable.

Science & Technology

UR ‘OF THE CHALDEES’:
A Revised and Updated Edition of Sir Leonard Woolley’s Excavations at Ur
by P.R.S. Moorey
Cornell, 1982
272 pp. $24.95

Beneath the sands of modern-day Iraq, Sir Leonard Woolley (1870–1960) and a team of 400 Arab workmen unearthed dazzling evidence of a sophisticated urban center whose origin dates back almost 8,000 years. From 1922 to 1934, Woolley conducted systematic excavations of the ancient site of Ur below the once-fertile Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Remains of temples, schools, homes, and a vast array of artifacts allowed the English archaeologist to trace the fortunes of Ur from its
days as an agricultural center in 6,000 B.C. through its cultural zenith in the second millennium B.C. to its last days as a religious cult site in the fourth century B.C. Situated on the shore of the Persian Gulf, Ur was for centuries the center of a far-flung empire. A succession of Sumerian, Babylonian, and other rulers traded agricultural products for precious metal and stone (used for magnificent crafts), encouraged widespread literacy, and employed women and slaves in a "cold-bloodedly businesslike" weaving industry. In this revision of Woolley's original Excavations at Ur (1954), Moorey, also an archaeologist, tempers Woolley's vivid imagination and strong Biblical bias, but preserves the flavor of his mentor's prose. "Our object," Woolley averred, "was to get history, not to fill museum cases." His historical account remains largely unchallenged to this day.


Working in 1948 to solve a problem of sending radio and telephone messages, Bell Laboratory engineer Claude Shannon hit upon the central insight of information theory: Systems—including the physical universe, biology, human languages—are limited and defined by innate codes or "grammars." Furthermore, these codes (such as DNA in biology) account for progressive changes within their systems. With mathematical theorems, Shannon demonstrated that codes correct random change and lead to reliable information in an often unreliable world. Offering a full history and lucid explanation of this theory, Campbell, an English journalist, also shows how its principles have been supported and developed by work in several disciplines. Information theory conforms, for example, to Jung's proposition that dreams are messages from the archetypes of the unconscious to the conscious, ever-developing mind. Information is present throughout the universe; therefore, Campbell concludes, the universe must tend toward order and complexity, not, as the theory of entropy proposes, toward disorder or randomness.
THE LEOPARD. By Giuseppe di Lampedusa. Pantheon, 1982. 320 pp. $5.95

Garibaldi's landing in Sicily in 1860 and the larger movement of Italian unification brought an end to one of the last remnants of Europe's ancien régime. These historical events provide the backdrop to Lampedusa's novel of a noble family in decline (first published in Italy in 1958; in America in 1960). As much a comedy of manners as a study of politics, it depicts the social jockeying of opportunistic peasants and merchants, nervous priests, confused retainers, and increasingly superfluous aristocrats. Amid the turmoil broods the imposing figure of Prince Fabrizio. Proud, reflective, scientific, he learns to accept change while arranging the marriage between his ambitious nephew and the daughter of one of the "new men" of Sicily's ascending middle class. Behind his acquiescence is his deeper conviction that no mere mortal—or class of mortals—will ever govern Sicily. The sun alone, "which annulled every will, kept all things in servile immobility," is sovereign. In this, his only novel, Lampedusa (1896–1957) re-created the world of his ancestors at the precise moment of its passing. There are few finer swan songs in prose.

THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE. By Julian L. Simon. Princeton, 1982. 415 pp. $7.95

Raw materials are not in short supply ("scarcity" is "a price that has persistently risen"); there are no ultimate limits to food production ("the main reason why more food has not been produced in the past is that there was insufficient demand"); the dangers of pollution have been absurdly exaggerated; extreme conservation measures will only guarantee that the poor remain poor; population growth, rather than being a Malthusian curse, is responsible for great social improvements, "especially in transportation and communication, which are crucial to economic development." These and other claims made by Simon, an economist at the University of Illinois, have already sparked wide controversy and have been challenged as reactionary propaganda. But Simon has done a painstaking job of researching and evaluating reams of studies and reports on resource, demographic and environmental questions. His conclusion—that the human imagination is the ultimate resource—deserves to be taken seriously.


Morris belongs to the best breed of British travel writers in possessing a vision so individually eccentric that it leads, almost unfailingly, to what is most fundamental about the places she chooses to describe. Whether discoursing on the power of the work ethic in Los Angeles ("beyond the flash and braggadocio, solid skills and scholarship prosper") or the recently acquired provincialism of Manhattan (where telephone operators, "who used to be mere human mechanisms, call one 'dear' nowadays"), she grounds her generalizations in a wealth of precisely rendered details. Fixed mostly on cities (Washington after Watergate, Cairo under Sadat, Delhi in the late 1970s), her view occasionally expands to take in whole countries—Panama, Rhodesia, South Africa. Social commentary, concise history, and personal anecdote run in roughly equal measure through these essays, all of which first appeared in Rolling Stone.
REFLECTIONS

The Metropol Affair

Metropol means many things to a Russian. It is, literally, a "mother of cities," a capital; it is also the name of a Moscow hotel, noted for its modernistic façade, and of Moscow's extensive and architecturally splendid subway. But to a number of Soviet writers, Metropol, a special publication, represents a brave, last-ditch effort to promote free expression. Vassily Aksyonov is one of those writers. Born in 1933, the son of a famous, persecuted author, Evgeniya Ginsberg, he belongs to a group of artists who came of age during the 1950s and early '60s. These iconoclasts and experimenters scoffed at hollow Communist "principles" and at those who passively accepted the status quo. Fortunately, those were relatively permissive times, and novels such as Aksyonov's 1961 Ticket to the Stars (which featured jazz-loving young rebels) were tolerated, if not encouraged, by Soviet officialdom. Tolerance soon gave way to a new dogmatism. Once again, the Soviet Writer's Union (founded in 1932) insisted on literature written in conformity with the canons of "socialist realism"—a rigid aesthetic aimed at "the ideological transformation and education of workers in the spirit of socialism." Not all artists accepted this return to dogma; the "Metropol Affair" is one important chapter in the story of their resistance.

by Vassily P. Aksyonov

Since the time of our great poet Alexander Pushkin (1799–1837), Russian literature has sustained its own peculiar tradition: The most important events take place on the pages of the so-called "thick journals." One cannot imagine an author attracting a respectable share of public attention without his or her work first appearing in one of our tolstyi zhurnalny. At times, these weighty tomes have served as battlegrounds for rival groups of writers—for the Slavophiles and Westernizers in the 19th century, for example. At others, they have functioned as ideological barometers gauging those slight but all-important shifts in official literary policy. Beginning immediately after the death of Stalin and lasting until around 1968, restrictions on literary production in my country were loosened somewhat. During this not...
altogether peaceful idyll — this "thaw" as we call it — the struggle between the left and right wings of post-Stalinist society found its way onto the pages of two major thick journals, Novy Mir (New World), the champion of progressive liberalization, and October, the defender of conservative "socialist realist" principles. Under the able guidance of Alexander Tvardovsky, Novy Mir seemed for a time to gain the upper hand in the debate; it certainly succeeded in publishing some of the liveliest literature then being written in the Soviet Union. Yet another journal, Yunost (Youth), began in the late 1950s to introduce the Russian public to a new generation of writers who had grown up during the darkest years of Stalin's rule. It was to this generation that I myself belonged.

Indispensable as the thick journals were to our lives, they could not satisfy the desires of all the readers or all the writers all the time. For this reason, unusual collections — non-periodical "almanacs" such as Metropol — have on occasion come into being.

Among the most remarkable predecessors of Metropol were the almanacs Moscow (1956), established under the aegis of the Moscow branch of the Writer's Union, and Tverskije Stranitsy, or Papers of Tver (1961), put out by a provincial publishing house but containing the work of Muscovites Konstantin Pau-
stovsky, Boris Balter, and others. Those two almanacs were born of hopes for better times. But unfortunately the party made it clear that such hopes were premature. After the publication of each of these collections, the guardians of ideological purity demonstrated, through a series of punitive actions, that they considered literary matters to be strictly within their own domain, and that they took their responsibility seriously—with an animal seriousness as we Russians say.

Born of a Toothache

Unlike our predecessors, we Metropol authors and editors were less sanguine about "new times." By the late 1970s, the warmth of the "thaw" had become no more than a distant memory. (After the "Prague Spring" in 1968, it seemed as though winter had settled in and forgotten to leave.) "New times," many of us thought, were beginning to resemble all too depressingly the old times of Stalin’s "terror." Others among us—the more forward-looking pessimists—thought that the "new times" were moving much too briskly toward that fateful year, 1984.

Perhaps because the atmosphere was so bleak, many of us writers felt the need, a desperate need, to achieve some degree of autonomy within that most unusual of colonial empires: the Soviet literary establishment. Merely contemplating a small act of defiance, however token, we recaptured some of the optimism of our youth.

As to the actual genesis of Metropol, an enigmatic line from our preface provides a clue: "One could say that this almanac was born as a result of a toothache." A figure of speech? No; the idea simply occurred to two authors (Victor Erofeev and, I must confess, me) in February 1978 while we were having our teeth filled at the Moscow Stomatological Center. That happens to be the name of our dentists' office. Our dental factory, I should say. Imagine, if you can, a vast Kafkaian space—a hall with three hundred gleaming dentists' chairs and a huge slogan painted on a snow-white wall: "We guarantee the five-year plan of quality." An inspired pain-killing idea!

Writing by Numbers

We two survivors of the Stomatological Center (for we did survive, teeth intact and guaranteed) were not sure our idea would receive much support. But in a short time we were joined by 20 others, including those enfants terribles of Soviet literature (enfant terrible, you must realize, here means a good writer, as opposed to a writer who writes by numbers, a "socialist realist")—Andrei Bitov and Fasil Iskander. By March 1978, so many authors were offering their work to us that we had to become selective.

Unlike our predecessors at Moskwa and Tatarskie Stranitsy, we decided to make no deals with literary officials. We knew that if we went to the Writer's Union for assistance, they

Vassily Aksyonov, 50, a former Wilson Center Fellow, was born in Kazan, USSR, and was educated at Kazan University and Leningrad Medical Institute. After practicing medicine, he became a full-time writer. His fiction includes Oranges from Morocco (1963), The Steel Bird and Other Stories (1978), and The Scorched Mark (1980). He came to America in 1980 and has just finished a novel entitled Paperscape. This essay was adapted from an address delivered at the Wilson Center.
REFLECTIONS: THE METROPOL AFFAIR

would crush the project at the outset—or at least disfigure it beyond recognition. To remain within legal limits, we produced only 12 homemade copies of the almanac; any more would have constituted illegal book production.

Moving Bouquets

These 12 volumes, when they appeared in early January 1979, looked like pre-Gutenberg folios, each approximately the size of a gravestone. Bulky as they were, we nevertheless managed to smuggle two copies out of the country. So when you hear people talking about the “Russian Connection,” you should keep in mind that they are talking about books, not drugs.

The next step in this literary event, set for January 1979, was to be a large brunch—champagne, caviar, and hot kalatchi pastries—at the Rhythm, a Moscow cafe. We had invited jazz musicians, top models (moving bouquets), and journalists from home and abroad.

After the gathering, we planned to go to Comrade Boris Stukalin, chairman of the State Committee for Publishing, and offer him a volume of our almanac. But we were going to insist on one condition: no censorship. Thus, while avoiding the Writer’s Union—that 8,000-member bureaucracy-within-a-bureaucracy—we hoped to remain within the framework of Soviet officialdom. Success in publishing even a small edition of this unusual collection, we believed, would signal a triumph in the history of Soviet literature.

But a week before the Rhythm brunch was to take place, the alarm bells began to ring on the upper deck.

In January 1979, the state’s ideological apparatchiks launched the “Metropol Affair.” Before I go into the dirty dealings of our glorious state officials, though, it is worth asking what exactly the stir was all about. What did this Trojan horse, Metropol, contain? And who were these voices threatening the fortress of “socialist realism”?

Well, first of all we were different from some of those more aesthetically unified innovators of the 1920s, since we were united more by ethical than by artistic principles. Our ethic was simple: opposition to the totalitarian state of mind, and commitment to overcoming it.

Something for Everyone

Aesthetically, we contained multitudes. The realistic prose of Friedrich Gorenstein could not have been more different from the modern “black” prose of Evgeny Popov and Victor Erofeev; nor could the traditionalist poetry of Inna Lissianskaya have been more unlike the avant-garde poems of Heinrich Sapgir. Two philosophical rivals found themselves side-by-side on the pages of our almanac: Victor Trosnikov, a Christian who had abandoned his scientific career to pursue revelation, and Leonid Batkin, a neo-positivist philosopher.

We ranged widely in age as well. Our youngest contributor, Peter Kozhevnikov, was 44 years the junior of Semyon Lipkin, venerable poet and translator of Oriental poetry. Though the almanac was dominated by writers born in the 1930s, we also had representatives from the generations born in the ‘40s and ‘50s.

Among our ranks were well-known figures, favorites of the Soviet intellectual world, including Bella Akhmadulina (who, though a poet,
contributed a sophisticated prose work, "Many Dogs and The Dog"), as well as less-known writers, notably Evgeny Rein, a Leningrad poet who works in the tradition of Anna Akhmatova (one of the great poets of the 1920s, the "Silver Age") but who, in over 20 years of writing, had succeeded in publishing no more than three pages in Soviet publications. We also ran a novella by Boris Vakh- tin, one of the most remarkable representatives of the Leningrad School of Prose—and an equal of Rein in terms of official neglect. That, perhaps, was our major goal; to show the rich variety of Russian literature, whether above or under ground, and to underline its distinctiveness from monotonous official Soviet literature.

We also decided to run the work of two foreigners. John Updike responded to our invitation by sending us an excerpt from his recently completed but still unpublished novel, The Coup, which appeared in both English and Russian. The second "foreign" guest was Andrei Voznesensky, representing, as usual, his own state. For a while, we even considered using the following lines from one of his poems as the epigraph for our collection:

Such solitude, soaring above
The dark and silent Empire...
I envy you, double-headed Eagle.
You can talk to yourself
From time to time.

But then we discovered this poem was being run at the same time in an official Soviet journal under the title "Derzhavin" (an 18th-century Russian poet) and that therefore it was simply a safe historical "snapshot." (Incidentally, at the hottest moment of the "Metropol Affair," Voz-

nesensky took a trip to the North Pole with—who else?—the Kom- somol ski team. From the hottest spot to the coldest: a poetic parabola.)

I should add, lest it seem that we were trying to be provocative, that we were extremely moderate in our selections. We shunned work that posed too direct a challenge to the ruling powers. No, I believe authorities were far less upset by the content of the almanac than by our action, our solidarity, and our disregard for the usual official channels.

"Trench Warfare"

Unlike a typical samizdat (underground publication), Metropol was intended to be more than a stack of papers secretly circulated among the "right" readers. We wanted it to be an attractive public object—and to that end, working according to the "aesthetic of poverty," we had the almanac bound with the best "high chic" shoelaces. David Borovskv, designer-in-chief at the Taganka Theater, designed Metropol, while the frontispiece was the work of another theater artist, Doris Messerer.

That was Metropol—a collective endeavor—and none of us really expected it to provoke one of the greatest crises in the history of Soviet literature.

Still, it is not hard to imagine how the entire anti-Metropol campaign was put together, nor who planned it. After the first alarm was sounded by a dutiful lackey in the secret ideological service, a special division of the KGB, the matter was taken up, at least on the surface, by the first secretary of the Moscow Writer's Union, Felix Kuznetsov. This was, as one French journalist put it, "trench warfare inside the Union of Soviet Writers." Outside the union's paper,
Muscovskaya Literatura (which has a very limited readership), there was little evidence of conflict—almost no indication of the endless secretarial sessions and party rallies, and of course no mention of the campaign of intimidation, blackmail, and rumor that had begun.

The editorial board members (Bitov, Iskander, Popov, Erofeev, and I) were called before the leadership of the Moscow branch of the Writer’s Union and subjected to the oldest technique of colonial control: divide and conquer. I was denounced as the ringleader and mastermind of the conspiracy. That was intended to let the others off easy, as long as they went along with the party line. But the board had badly underestimated our courage and our sense of solidarity. As far as I know, it might have been the first time in Soviet history that authorities failed to find a single turncoat or coward in an “opposition” group.

**100,000 Suspects**

Later, we learned that Metropol was being used at the party rallies (those delightful Soviet variations on the Theater of the Absurd) as a sort of litmus test of Union loyalty. The apparatchiks tried to force Union members to condemn Metropol, even those who had never seen it. If a certain writer was reluctant, he or she was reminded that his or her book was soon coming up for publication, or that his or her request for a new apartment, a new car, or a trip abroad was now coming up for consideration. It was enlightening to discover who submitted to the pressure and who did not. There were more than a few surprises.

Kuznetsov himself seemed particularly preoccupied by possible leaks to foreigners. At the first session of the board’s “Star Chamber,” he pursued his question in the best KGB interrogatory style: “Have any foreigners seen this almanac?” he asked. “Of course,” I answered. “Do you realize, Kuznetsov, how many foreigners are to be found in Moscow on any day? About 100,000.” Our interrogators appeared to be overwhelmed by the number of possible suspects.

**Anti-Semitic Jews**

*Metropol*, it was obvious, had thrown a wrench into the state bureaucracy’s attempt to restore the isolation of Russian culture. The apparatchiks were enraged by the ease with which we Metropol authors had established contacts with Western intellectuals and publishers. They certainly did not enjoy the close scrutiny of the world’s leading newspapers. But if our links with the “Western propaganda machine” exposed us to the charge of treason, they also proved to be our salvation—at least for a time.

Imagine the surprise of both the Metropol authors and the ideological watchdogs that evening in January 1979 when American publisher Carl Proffer announced over the Voice of America (VOA) that his company, Ardis, was planning to publish “this unique collection of contemporary Russian literature.” The very next day, the day of our intended brunch, the Rhythm cafe was closed for “sanitary inspection.” Purely coincidental, of course.

The next step in the anti-Metropol effort was a more public campaign of gossip and rumor-mongering, carried out by a certain disinformation service. All Metropol contributors were Jews, though many, strangely enough, were anti-Semitic. It went almost without saying that they were
all homosexuals and agents of Western intelligence services. Andrei Bitoff's real name was Von Bitoff. And Aksyonov—that was just a pen-name for Ginsberg, who incidentally had a million dollars in a Swiss bank account and had fomented the whole affair as a publicity stunt, hardly caring that he had dragged in dozens of innocent people, even if they were all devious, self-interested Jews.

**Flanking Maneuver**

We were informed that the case was being handled by a special committee—for “The Investigation of Extreme Anti-State Crime.” Our case was brought up in the Politburo, by Kremlin kitchen-cabinet member Andrei Kirilenko himself. All our talks and meetings, we learned, were to be bugged and monitored by the secret service. One of the “Heroes of the Soviet Union,” the author Vladimir Karpov, demanded publicly that we be placed under martial law restrictions and that we be considered for the firing squad.*

Strangely enough, we Metropol authors found this to be one of the more exhilarating periods of our lives. The parties and lunches came one after another, and we even managed to arrange a reception in honor of the German novelist, Heinrich Böll, an event televised by a West German crew. We were all so close at this time that it was difficult for the Writer’s Union to expel even one of us: If I were ejected, many others would resign.

So the apparatchiks tried a flanking maneuver, dismissing the two younger and relatively unknown writers, Popov and Erofeev. That forced me to resign in protest, while other writers among us, including a few whom the Writer’s Union wished to preserve for Soviet literature, threatened to go if the younger writers were not restored.

Meanwhile, Kuznetsov and company were busy trying to convince the various literary circles that there was really nothing to get worked up about. Metropol was just second-rate literature, pornography, a bag of modernist tricks. The hypocrites in the Writer’s Union were delighted to hear this: It justified their complicity in the KGB-style persecution. Too many writers seemed to forget that this was precisely how they justified themselves during the anti-Pasternak and anti-Solzhenitsyn campaigns—“First of all, old fellow, this is bad writing.” Of course, it was a level of “bad writing” that most of them could not hope to attain.

**A “Final Solution”?**

At the peak of the government’s campaign, a message was published by five American authors in the New York Times and subsequently broadcast over VOA. John Updike, Arthur Miller, Kurt Vonnegut, Edward Albee, and William Styron urged Soviet authorities to halt suppression of Metropol and to restore the younger writers to the Union. Moscow’s literary big shots were actually a bit upset by the statement. They didn’t want their “dialogue” with Western writers to be broken; that would deprive them of one of their major excuses for foreign travel. Besides they didn’t want the Soviet ideal to be exposed for what it truly was—a haggard old lady, and a nasty one at that. Popov and Erofeev, it was announced, would be restored.

Of course, the apparatchiks were lying. Popov and Erofeev soon learned that they had been duped—they were not going to be taken back

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*Karpov was recently appointed editor-in-chief of Novy Mir, in order, no doubt, to advance its liberal tradition.
into the Union. Shortly thereafter, Semyon Lipkin and Inna Lisnianskaya joined me by resigning.

This clumsy and indecent campaign, which lasted, all told, about two years, resulted ultimately in my departure from the Soviet Union and the loss of my citizenship. But I will not go into the details of that story—at least not now.

A journalist once asked me how we Metropol people managed to create such a tempest. I can only say in truth that we had not intended to. Our intentions were limited: to open a few windows, to air out the musty house of Soviet-literature, to give people a chance to breathe something other than “socialist realism.”

Why then did authorities react so violently? In part, it was the typical response of provincial and ignorant apparatchiks to the threat of literature—of literature itself. At the same time, though, it provided the occasion for a few cynical people to promote themselves as guardians of the Communist Party and socialist ideals. As far as I know, those who helped orchestrate the performances and played their roles correctly were delighted at their success. Kuznetsov even received a shiny new medal for his jacket. But I cannot help thinking that they were a little too hasty with their self-congratulations. Most of them failed to notice that something new had been introduced into the atmosphere, something that I do not think will be forgotten.

Authorities certainly didn’t expect any further disobedience after their crackdown on Metropol, which is perhaps why they lost their composure when a new literary almanac, Catalogue, appeared in the fall of 1980, when the echoes of the Metropol scandal were still in the air. This time they responded a little more directly and heavy-handedly. Contributors were arrested on the street; their apartments were searched; manuscripts and typewriters were confiscated—all in response to a group’s request for permission to establish a small literary club independent of the Union. Philip Berman was forced to leave the country; Evgeny Kharitonov, who was only 40, died of a heart attack after a series of interrogations and searches; many others were placed under close watch. Evgeny Kozlovsky, a novelist and the rising star in the current literary firmament, was arrested and put into the KGB’s Lefortovo prison. He is soon to go on trial on charges of “manufacturing and disseminating works of literature with anti-Soviet content.”

By all signs, it appears as though somebody at the top is seeking a “final solution” to all literary problems. And from this, we might conclude that any attempts at even moderately independent literary activity in the Soviet Union are doomed to failure. But perhaps we, like the Soviet leaders, are rushing to conclusions. For just as the apparatchiks have repeatedly overestimated the danger posed by Russian literature, have they not also underestimated its stamina?
Nehru's Quiet Daughter

When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of Emergency in India in 1975, the recently retired U.S. envoy to New Delhi, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, noted sardonically that her suspension of constitutional government had at least made the United States the world’s largest democracy. The United States slipped back to No. 2 in 1977 when 200 million Indians answered Mrs. Gandhi’s call for an election by voting her out of office. Returned to power three years later, Indira Gandhi may now hold the key to the future of Indian democracy. Here Nayantara Sahgal, the Prime Minister’s first cousin, traces the development of Indira Gandhi’s personal and political character, and the ties that link the two.

by Nayantara Sahgal

On January 19, 1966, the parliament of the Indian National Congress Party elected Indira Gandhi Prime Minister of India.

No one knew quite what to expect. The 48-year-old daughter of former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi was a familiar figure, but she had never sought political leadership. She was to most observers an unknown quantity. The New York Times, noting that her selection had come at the hands of party kingmakers, observed enigmatically, and prophetically, that “those who chose her are likely to find that they picked a master and not a servant.”

The uncertainties created by the death of Nehru, in May 1964, were a factor in the choice of Mrs. Gandhi. Nehru, the nation’s first Prime Minister (1947–64) and leader of India’s struggle for independence from Britain, had so dominated national politics that his party, anxious to ensure a smooth succession, chose as its next leader the least controversial figure in their midst, Lal Bahadur Shastri, whom Nehru had appointed his special adviser several months before his death. They thus avoided an open contest and the possibility of damaging political divisions.

The unexpected death of Shastri on January 12, 1966, reopened the question of national leadership, as it happened, in a period of economic difficulties. The strongest candidate to succeed Shastri, Morarji Desai, had not been close to Nehru, though he had served in his Cabinet. Ideologically a conservative, Desai was strong-willed, stern, inflexible—not at all what the Congress Party was seeking at the time.
They turned instead to Indira Gandhi. A reserved woman, Mrs. Gandhi had been largely an onlooker, albeit one close to the center of power, during her father's lifetime. She had served as his official companion and hostess. She had also been appointed in 1955 to the Congress Working Committee (the party executive) and in 1959 had served as the party's president, a post traditionally given to veteran political leaders.

Both the party presidency and her appointment to the Working Committee had been bestowed on "Nehru's daughter." She had not had to work her way up through the vast organization of the Indian National Congress Party, or show outstanding talent, in order to be singled out. And she had shown no desire to shine as a political or public personality.

Her predominant public image was one of extreme reserve. The country knew her as her father's companion and the mother of two boys. She and her husband, a Member of Parliament, were unofficially separated, though they were briefly reconciled before his death in 1960.

If her father was grooming her for the Prime Ministership, there was little evidence of it in his actions or in his own pronounced aversion to undemocratic procedure. He had, for example, been quoted by the Times of India in 1959 as saying, "It is not a good thing for my daughter to come in as Congress President when I am Prime Minister."

Above all, her own personality...
seemed to exclude any ambition. She recalled her role as her father’s hostess: “My father asked me to come and to set up the house for him. There was nobody else to do it. So I set up the house, but I resisted every inch of the way about becoming a hostess. I was simply terrified of the so-called social duties.”

In the Background

When Indira Gandhi was elected Prime Minister of India, she had what mattered greatly to the Congress Party leaders who master-minded her rise—a reticence that made her apparently content to stay in the background of events. She had never been embroiled in political rivalries, and her subdued public manner seemed to insure respect for the principle of collective leadership. She looked manageable. For her part, Mrs. Gandhi knew she needed the party bosses, who did not favor her so much as oppose Desai. She tactfully refrained from canvassing for votes or formally declaring her candidacy. She said she would abide by the wishes of the party. Her reticence was noted and approved.

Mrs. Gandhi was so far from being immersed in Indian politics that she was chosen Prime Minister even before she had been elected to a seat in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. The party, solicitous of their new leader’s reluctance to engage in a heated political contest, prepared a safe, inconspicuous constituency in Rae Bareli, in northern India, that was guaranteed not to tax the fledgling campaigner.

Nine years later, this same Indira Gandhi would threaten democratic institutions by jailing about 100,000 citizens, imposing censorship, and riding roughshod over constitutional rights. Ironically, the reserve, detachment, and self-absorption that made her such an attractive candidate in 1966 figured prominently in the near-collapse of Indian democracy in 1975.

A Question Mark

Despite her election as Prime Minister by the Congress parliamentary party in 1966, Mrs. Gandhi remained for the country at large a question mark. Her first year in office was not impressive. She performed poorly in debates in Parliament. Often hesitant to act, she occasionally moved hastily—as in her 57.5 percent devaluation of the rupee—leaving popular opinion far behind her.

Yet her public remarks began to reveal her belief in herself as special to the Indian scene, by virtue of her background, judgment, and, above all, family heritage. Her childhood frequently figured in her speeches, suggesting that since her tender years she had borne a heavy burden in the struggle for freedom: “Having lived in the midst of crisis from my earliest childhood, I am not overawed by present difficulties.”

The Indian public knew her father

Nayantara Sahgal, 55, a former Wilson Center Fellow, was born in Allahabad, India, and was educated at Wellesley College (B.A., 1947). A journalist and novelist, she is the author of six novels, including A Situation in New Delhi (1977) and the forthcoming Rich Like Us. She has also written two autobiographical studies, Prison and Chocolate Cake (1954) and From Fear Set Free (1962), as well as numerous political commentaries. This essay is adapted from Indira Gandhi: Her Road to Power (copyright © 1978, 1982 by Nayantara Sahgal).
intimately. His life, intellectual development, and even private anguish were part and parcel of the events and literature of the nationalist movement. He was in all his strength and weakness a thoroughly familiar figure. Mrs. Gandhi was not. The heavy, brooding self-portrait she now revealed by stages seemed curiously at odds with what was generally known about the spirit of her family home, Anand Bhawan.

A Brilliant Family

The extended family revolved around her paternal grandfather Motilal Nehru, a successful lawyer and politician. A natural leader, his personal magnetism and professional prestige made his home the meeting place of brilliant, vital, and dedicated people. His zest for life carried the family with elan through an almost revolutionary change in lifestyle, beginning in 1919 when he and his son Jawaharlal met Mahatma Gandhi, leader of the nonviolent struggle against British rule that led to Indian independence in 1947.

Incontestably a man of "family," in the great tradition of shelter and nurture, with the personality and instincts of a patriarch, Motilal reserved his most inviolable love for his only son. Jawaharlal, with his wife and daughter, were thus the focus of an entire clan's attention and concern in a way that princes and heirs apparent are.

Father and son entered with passion and humor into the freedom crusade. To some extent all members of Anand Bhawan, even visitors to it, were touched by the aspirations, the glow, and the romance of the national movement.

In Mrs. Gandhi's recollections, however, another picture emerges: somber, tense, aggrieved. Not surprisingly, as an only child, she used the circumstances around her to exaggerate and dramatize her own importance in a busy, politically committed household. Her games, she told interviewers, had consisted of fiery political speeches to her dolls and servants and triumphant encounters with the British police. Whatever speeches she had made recently, Mrs. Gandhi once said, she had been making since she was 12 years old.

Home and childhood were associated for her with the demonstrations, searches, arrests, and police violence that were a part of civil disobedience. "So from September 1929 a part of the house was turned into a hospital. In the beginning doctors came only at dead of night and the women of the house, including myself, aged twelve, were the nurses."

Imprisonment

Her first and only imprisonment, resulting from the Congress Party's refusal to support England in World War II, lasted from September 11, 1942, to May 13, 1943, in Naini Central Jail, Allahabad. She told an interviewer in 1969, "I was regarded as so dangerous that I wasn't even given normal prison facilities"—a recollection not supported by the evidence. Mrs. Gandhi, aged nearly 25, shared a barrack with her aunt, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, her cousin, Chandralakha Pandit, aged 18, and a number of women friends and acquaintances—all of whom were subject to the same rules and regulations. Mrs. Pandit writes in her preface to the prison diary she kept: "The treatment given to me and to those who shared the barrack with me was, according to the prison standards, very lenient—the reader must not imagine that others were
equally well treated."

Jawaharlal Nehru, a man bowed by many burdens as the years of the fight for freedom took their toll, remained curiously unbowed in spirit. In a conscious effort to share himself and to communicate with his child, particularly during his long absences in prison, he wrote his Letters from a Father to His Daughter and Glimpses of World History. These pages reveal an approach to life composed of buoyancy, optimism, and good-humored tolerance of life's foibles and even its trials.

Indira saw life in more solemn perspective, cast in an austere mold, as if lightness were a weakness, a trap to be avoided. The written word could not take the place of flesh-and-blood human beings. Absent parents, though absent for well-understood and admired reasons, left a void that was never quite filled, though few parents could have given of themselves to an only child as Indira's did. Because of her mother's invalidism, her father had sole responsibility for major and minor decisions concerning her. He wrote to his sister in Allahabad from Geneva on May 6, 1926, recounting his search for a proper school for his daughter and his twice daily accompaniment of her to and from school. He added in a postscript: "I enclose two recent snapshots of Indu. Compare them to the snapshots taken in India in February and you will notice how she is growing."

The Cherished Child Withdraws

The parent-child relationship always has its unanalyzed loves and hostilities, but, given the keen awareness Nehru had of his daughter, this relationship might have become a close mutual bond. That it did not partake of real human response and sharing—though it did of attachment—may have been because, though she spent most of her adult life in her father's house, there was a point beyond which Indira could not go in simple give-and-take.

The intellectual and emotional labor her father expended on her did not bring the cherished child to flower. Her delicate health, a problem throughout her childhood, continued into womanhood. Not disposed to study, and with no special aptitude, she was never driven to the kind of discipline that might have been expected of a sturdier child. She could not keep up with her studies at Oxford and did not get a degree, while her earlier schooling had been uneven because of her parents' jail terms and her mother's ill health.

Indu, center of the larger family's loving concern, seldom lowered her guard. Her unresponsiveness troubled her father during her adolescence. She was 15 when he wrote to his sister, Mrs. Pandit, from Dehra Dun District Jail: "During the last four-

Indira as a nine-year-old student at the International School in Geneva.

Courtesy of Nehru Memorial Museum & Library.
teen months or more I have written to Indu regularly and have hardly missed a fortnight. It has been a very one-sided correspondence as my letters have evoked practically no response. After a couple of months of silence on her part, a hasty letter would come with many apologies and excuses, and with no reference at all to my letters or the questions I had asked in them. I gather that Kamala is treated in much the same way. It is not casual; it is persistent. And in spite of numerous efforts, it continues. I know that Indu is fond of me and of Kamala. Yet she ignores us and others completely. Why is this so? Indu, I feel, is extraordinarily imaginative and self-centered or subjective. Indeed, I would say that, quite unconsciously, she has grown remarkably selfish. She lives in a world of dreams and vagaries and floats about on imaginary clouds, full probably of all manner of brave fancies. Now this is natural in a girl of her subjective nature and especially at her age. But there can be too much of it and I am afraid there is too much of it in her case."

The difficulty of getting through to Indu was painfully clear when she made her decision to marry. Feroze Gandhi was a native of Allahabad, where his family owned a general store. As a student active in the national movement, he was no stranger to the Nehru household. In fact, he was something of a protégé of Indira's parents.

Nehru’s reaction to Indira’s decision, made while she was still in her teens, to marry Feroze arose chiefly from his regret that she had too early closed her mind and feelings to the wide world of opportunity around her. His suggestion that she should think the matter over at home before making a final decision resulted in a scarring experience for him. Indira, at Oxford at the time, wanted to remain in England with Feroze for her vacation and told her father she would not speak to him unless he agreed. He did not take her seriously, but she kept her promise.

A fortnight’s silence on the sea voyage to Bombay continued unbroken on the train journey to Allahabad. On their arrival home, Nehru was too shaken to endure the ordeal further. He asked his secretary to book Indira’s passage back to England. Her marriage took place in March 1942, in Allahabad. Indira was 24 years old. Although her
father's advice, and later Mahatma Gandhi's, to think again about her choice, had not prevailed, the marriage had their blessing. The relationship, however, inevitably foundered in the role she later chose—being at her father's side at the nation's political center.

**Into Her Father's Shoes**

As Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi viewed herself as her father's natural successor. Asked by a journalist the significance of her election as the country's leader, she replied, "Perhaps it ensures some kind of continuity—continuity of policy, and also perhaps continuity of personality." She believed she had taken over from her father as the rallying point for all Indians. Yet Nehru had been a man of his party, shaped and molded by his service to it and profoundly conscious of his debt to it. Mrs. Gandhi already saw herself as something more. Asked if she represented the Left, there was more than a touch of impatience in her reply, "I am a representative of all India, which includes all shades of opinion."

In her capacity as leader, Mrs. Gandhi simply did not feel accountable to her party, and she regularly became estranged from those in it who exercised independent judgment. In 1964, she felt that the Congress Party was drifting rightward, already betraying her father's socialistic principles. Her own decision to enter the leadership fray may have been prompted by this.

In 1969, when she was ignored in what would normally be a routine exercise to choose a successor to President Zakir Husain, she signaled her disdain for opponents in her party by by-passing normal parliamentary procedures to nationalize 14 Indian banks by decree. She imposed her will on the presidential selection process when she refused to back her party's candidate, and as a result of this, split her party into two irreconcilable factions. To make up for lost support, she allied herself with the small Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India, using the rhetoric of class warfare to fuel popular support for her self-proclaimed war against vested interests.

The parliamentary elections of 1971 gave Mrs. Gandhi a decisive mandate surprising for its uniform majorities for the Prime Minister's hand-picked unknown candidates. Suggestions of voting irregularities were dismissed as the accusations of cranks. Mrs. Gandhi took little notice of corruption charges against two key colleagues, Bansi Lal, chief minister of Haryana, and L. N. Mishra, Union minister for railways.

**Opposition Arises**

The next several years were difficult for India. Poor harvests in 1972 led to inflation, famine, and unemployment on a huge scale. Opposition to the Gandhi policies coalesced around Jayaprakash Narayan. A disciple of Mahatma Gandhi and one-time colleague of Nehru, Narayan had suddenly retired from politics in 1952 to pursue his ideal of socialist reform through the Bhoodan (land gift movement). Narayan's return to politics to lead the opposition to the Gandhi government galvanized millions of Indians.

Through it all, Mrs. Gandhi maintained a monarchal remoteness, treating the gathering tide of protest as a plot to remove her, rather than as the expression of genuine popular distress.

The idea of a single person as the focus of admiration and adulation was not new to Indians, a people...
more willing than most to follow a leader. But modern India's leadership had been built and based on professional excellence or personal example, not on the emblems or heavy-handed exercise of power. Mrs. Gandhi's leadership resembled that of a reigning medieval monarch surrounded by all the panoply of a royal court—its flattery, its intrigue, and the swift retribution that visits offenders.

**Above the Storm**

The pedestal she occupied, high above the Congress Party, seemed at first to serve her well. It created the necessary regal distance between her and the politicians and the crowd so that, though the muddy tide of corruption and confusion lapped at her feet, it could not overwhelm her. She could appear to remain unsullied.

This became harder to do after 1972 as a storm broke in Parliament over the nonappearance of the native Indian automobiles that Maruti Ltd., her son Sanjay's corporation, had been licensed to produce; Sanjay failed to account both for the delay and for his personal financial gains from government contracts. There was critical comment in the press and in marketplaces and coffee houses.

On June 12, 1975, the Allahabad high court indicted Indira Gandhi on two corruption charges in the conduct of the 1971 elections. The court declared her election invalid and barred her from holding political office for six years. The verdict was not unexpected. Yet it made a sensation. The national newspapers exhibited a rare unanimity in their support of the high court verdict that required the Prime Minister, in effect, to step down from her office and let her party choose a new leader.

The enormity of the high court's blow to Mrs. Gandhi must be understood in terms of her assessment of herself as indispensable to the Indian scene. That anyone should regard her as a politician, subject to normal political processes, was a gross impertinence. "Had this [crisis brought on by the court ruling] been a question about me as an individual I would have been unconcerned," she said in a November 10, 1975, broadcast. "But it involved the Prime Minister of India."

She had come to believe she was India. At the party's annual session in December, the national anthem was followed by a new song "Indira Hindustan Ban Gai" ("Indira has become India"). By that time, Mrs. Gandhi had passed through the looking glass into the full-blown exotica of make-believe.

**Resisting the Court**

Rather than resign, Mrs. Gandhi resisted. On June 26, she proclaimed an internal Emergency which virtually stopped constitutional government in its tracks. Executive ordinances, later converted into law, enlarged the government's powers to arrest and imprison without trial. Meetings of more than five persons without permission were forbidden. Officially backed "spontaneous" demonstrations in support of Mrs. Gandhi appeared everywhere.

The double standard of law already in evidence was now practiced quite openly. Posters of Mrs. Gandhi appeared in the streets, bazaars, and thoroughfares proclaiming her the savior of law and order. Shopkeepers were required to display her picture prominently and to post alongside it a pledge supporting the Twenty-Point Program, a set of economic priorities announced on July 1, 1975.
The government propaganda department claimed the police had obtained clues to secret hordes of arms and ammunition with the "discovery" of "weapons" in the offices of the RSS, a Hindu revivalist organization associated with the conservative Jan Sangh Party. Film documentaries alternated shots of Jayaprakash Narayan and other opposition leaders with rows of skulls being "discovered" by the police. In a standard speech made, with minor variations, over the next 12 months to interviewers and different audiences, Mrs. Gandhi claimed there had been a "plot" against established authority. The charge was never substantiated, and no one accused of conspiracy was brought to trial.

Pinnacle of Power

The Emergency was designed to guarantee the Prime Minister the pinnacle of power—a position above the multitude, unaccountable and unchallengeable. Three amendments to the Constitution and an act of Parliament provided the underpinnings. The 38th Amendment put the declaration of Emergency beyond the scrutiny of the courts. The 39th Amendment removed election disputes relating to the Prime Minister, President, Vice-President, and Speaker from court jurisdiction. This overturned the Allahabad high court judgment retroactively and ensured a Supreme Court judgment in Mrs. Gandhi's favor.

The proposed 40th Amendment conferred complete immunity on the Prime Minister, President, Vice-President, and Speaker, for past or future criminal offenses. A new law banned the publication of "objectionable matter," making criticism of these officials a penal offense.

India's leader was a woman whose childhood, education, and family tradition had provided her with unusual opportunities for training in democratic ideals, yet who had never been temperamentally comfortable with this inheritance. The stages of her career as Prime Minister made it plain she was not a democrat by belief or instinct. She firmly believed in her own indispensability. Concessions, compromise, and discussion signified weakness to her, and opposition jarred and angered her.

"I am a democrat"

Democracy was not Mrs. Gandhi's style, but it remained an insistent craving. In a world where leadership had to be one of two kinds, coercive or persuasive, she could not resolve her dilemma and fell between the two, debasing democratic values and destroying the system while avowing her dedication to it. The confusion gave her pronouncements during the Emergency a ring of imbalance. With tens of thousands of citizens jailed without charges or trial and her critics silenced, she could repeat calmly and with conviction, "I am a democrat." The repetition carried that element of yearning we often have for what we ourselves are not and cannot be.

Elections, twice postponed during the Emergency, were finally called in March 1977, and swept her and her party from power—to all appearances ending ignominiously her political career, and her son Sanjay's chances of succeeding her. Their astonishing comeback and Mrs. Gandhi's return to office as Prime Minister in January 1980 resulted from a failure of the ruling party—this time the Janata Party—to cope with the difficulties of the day.

A coalition of widely disparate
groups, ranging from the Socialist Party to a right-wing splinter of the Congress Party to the nationalist Hindu Jan Sangh Party, the Janata Party was united only by a shared opposition to Mrs. Gandhi. Its leaders allowed their factional quarrels to interfere fatally with their obligation: to bring to justice those responsible for the Emergency. As they fought among themselves, they ironically opened the door to Mrs. Gandhi’s return by arresting her in October 1977 without sufficient evidence for conviction.

When Mrs. Gandhi was released, she charged that she was being persecuted. In January 1978, she gathered her loyalists from the Congress Party into the new Congress-Indira Party, and in November she won a by-election victory that returned her to Parliament. The collapse of the Janata coalition in July 1979, the absence of national leadership, and a deteriorating economy paved the way for Mrs. Gandhi’s return to power in January 1980.

The triumph, however, was cut short by the death of Sanjay in an airplane crash the following June. A Prime Minister’s personal tragedy does not usually become a political dilemma, but Mrs. Gandhi’s political career had been shaped by family considerations, and her increasing reliance on Sanjay had made it clear that she believed in family rule. Sanjay’s death left her in a political and psychological vacuum of her own making.

Mrs. Gandhi could at this stage have abandoned dynastic notions and trappings, using her own now
undiluted authority to end dissen- sions in the Congress-Indira Party and restore it to the kind of organization that would admit new political blood. She appeared, however, to take it for granted that her elder son, Rajiv, an Indian Airlines pilot, should now enter politics. In June 1981, Rajiv was elected Member of Parliament from Amethi, Sanjay's old constituency, and he took his place at his mother's side. All this laid bare the extremity of her isolation and her estrangement from normal parliamentary government.

Already, there are unmistakable signs of her authoritarian style. Not long after the 1980 election, the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, rejecting the autonomy pledged by the Janata government, announced that radio and television would continue under government control. In September 1980, Mrs. Gandhi armed her government, as she had done in 1971, with arbitrary power to arrest and detain anyone "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community." Early in 1982, 25,000 Indians were arrested—most only briefly—for participating in a general strike protesting preventive detention.

In November 1981, the Illustrated Weekly, an English-language news magazine, lamented the pervasive corruption of the Indian political system: "All the institutions which are supposed to keep a free society going have taken a severe drubbing." Yet, charges of corruption against an ally of Mrs. Gandhi, A. R. Antulay, chief minister of Maharashtra, were belittled by the Prime Minister, who said that the people of Maharashtra believed the charges were not genuine. In early 1982, however, Antulay resigned after being indicted for extortion.

Last January, the newly retired President of India, Sanjiva Reddy, speaking on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of India's Constitution, expressed his anxiety over public immorality. "What we find today," he said, "is the very antithesis of the noble spirit that animated the nation only a few decades ago."

The "noble spirit" has lived on in the dreams of Indira Gandhi. The irony is that her leadership of her country has twisted that spirit almost beyond recognition.
We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer’s telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors’ requests for comment.

Social Conservatives?

Neither Robin Winks nor Kristin Shannon and Peter Regenstreif [“Canada,” WQ, Summer 1982] do justice to the cultural revolution that Canada underwent in the 1960s.

In pre-1960 Quebec, priests walked the streets in cassocks; in 1956, the socialist poet F. R. Scott saw a sign in a Montreal skyscraper which read: “This elevator will not run on Ascension Day.” The Church was a cultural power to be reckoned with. Then, in the middle ’60s, it started preaching from different texts. Its new message was: “Secular is Beautiful.” Cassocks were exchanged for jean suits, tonsures for beards and mutton chops.

Inevitably there were repercussions outside Quebec. The Catholic Church had long been the one effective bulwark of social conservatism in Canada. With 60-odd French-Canadian Catholic M.P.s in Parliament, proposed amendments to laws governing abortion, divorce, and birth control were simply not worth the bother of printing. But once the church lowered its guard on these matters, the last obstacle to opening the floodgates of change was removed.

And opened they were, with vengeance. Pierre Trudeau, a French-Canadian liberal Catholic appointed federal justice minister in 1967, proved the ideal man for the job. It is a tribute to his reputation for enlightened loyalism, as well as to the antirevolutionary rhetoric of our national myth-makers, that with abortion-on-demand in place, homosexuality legalized, divorce automatic after three years of separation, and the equivalent of E.R.A. entrenched in the new charter of rights, Canada can still be thought of by Winks, Shannon and Regenstreif as a socially conservative land.

John Muggeridge
Welland, Ontario

American Canadians

These articles, particularly Professor Winks’s essay in condescension, tend to obscure the fact that no people in the world are more like Americans than Canadians. Even French-Canadians are Americanized.

In the 1960s, however, some Canadians developed a superiority complex about their country as it experienced neither the Vietnam War nor urban and racial disorders. This nationalism, which has resulted in a serious attempt to limit American influence on Canada, is an elitist, statist, and probably transitory phenomenon. Ordinary Canadians have always held generally the same values as ordinary Americans, and pay little attention to nationalist posturing. The country is diverse and decentralized partly because most Canadians see no great national crusades worth undertaking.

Had Walt Disney’s grandfather not immigrated to the United States, Canadian nationalists would have been proud to claim Mickey Mouse as one of their own.

Michael Bliss
Professor of History
University of Toronto

Mind over Matter

The unprepared reader of Richard Restak’s article [“The Brain,” WQ, Summer 1982] may conclude that the Mind/Body issue is chiefly a matter to be settled by scientists; that philosophers enter with no more than opinions; that opponents of materialism can come only from the quarter of religious conviction. What the reader may miss is that questions like

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“Can the brain understand itself?” should be recast in the form, “Can the lung understand itself?” if the silliness of radical materialism is to be disclosed. The optic nerve doesn’t “see” anything; we see, and we do so using the machinery of the (visual) nervous system. This no more confers experience on the nervous system than a handshake confers friendliness on the hand.

Daniel N. Robinson
Professor of Psychology
Georgetown University

An Idle Protest?

Restak belongs to the category of Reductionists linked with promissory materialism. Sir Karl Popper and I criticized this view strongly in our book The Self and its Brain (1977), and I have again in my two more recent books, The Human Mystery (1979) and The Human Psyche (1980). But Restak writes as if I had never existed, so I feel it is idle to protest!

Sir John Eccles
Contra, Switzerland

Phrenology Dies Hard

In relating the brain’s structure to its formidable array of functions, there is a strong urge to associate each definable region or substructure in the brain with some brain function. But the way we now perceive brain function is very different from the way it will be perceived a century from now. We seem to be as unable to unravel the present tangle of ideas about brain function by analyzing our “thoughts” as to understand liver function simply by thinking about our liver.

Phrenology dies hard, however, and it seems more comfortable to think of many artificially defined mind functions (love, speech, honor, hearing, patriotism, vision, humor, etc.) as discrete entities, each occupying its own little niche somewhere in the caves of our heads.

William Oldendorf, M.D.
Los Angeles, Calif.

What is Consciousness?

Restak has the courage to admit that we are still very far from any exact or comprehensive understanding of how the brain functions. Considerable progress has been made in correlating conscious experiences such as visual perception, memory, and emotive responses, with underlying neurological structures and processes, but we are as mystified as ever as to how these conscious experiences arise. Do they depend upon the interaction of an ontologically distinct soul or mind, as Sir John Eccles concludes after years of brain research? Is consciousness an emergent, sui generis “field” produced by neurological discharges, analogous to electromagnetic fields? Are conscious phenomena inner aspects, as experienced by the individual, of neurological processes, the outer aspects of which are manifested to neurophysiologists? Or should we accept the reductionists’ or materialists’ views that conscious experiences are really “nothing but” complex patterns of nerve firings?

Since there is no compelling evidence in favor of any of these theoretical alternatives, each should be explored as a possible solution to the problem rather than a final explanation.

Richard H. Schlager
Professor of Philosophy
The George Washington University
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Ships that didn't pass in the night

Remember a few years back when the big news turned out to be no news? We saw stories about mysterious ships alleged to be lurking offshore awaiting an increase in oil prices—phantom tankers that no one, not even the Coast Guard, could ever find.

Maybe the media's enlightenment over these spurious articles did some good—because nowadays we encounter far fewer energy stories based on phantom facts. Energy reporting has been gaining stature—more depth, more expertise, more sophistication—and one result is a public that's much better informed on energy issues. And we're a lot less upset by what we read about our business.

We've tried to keep up our own record of being forthright and forthcoming when a story involved Mobil—or, for that matter, any energy subject on which our information and insights are sought. We try to tell it like it is. Actually.

And let the ships fall where they may.

Mobil
In 1968, Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

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