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Does this sound familiar? The price of oil rises from 43 cents a gallon to $2.55. Oil producers have to go farther and farther out to sea to find new supplies, as exploration becomes less productive. People warn of the day when they will have to douse their lights to conserve oil. The cry goes up for alternative fuels.

It all happened around 1850: The big difference—the scarce fuel was whale oil, then the prevalent fuel for lamps. Instead of places like Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, and the North Sea, it was the Atlantic off Nantucket that served as the center of this country’s “oil” exploration and production.

Just as there are various grades of crude oil today, whale oil came in different qualities. The premium products were sperm oil and spermaceti, a liquid wax found in the noses of the whale species now known as sperm whales. They were an elusive breed, because they fancied deep water, and they gave rise to an industry that made boom towns out of New England harbors such as New Bedford, Salem, Nantucket, and Mystic. And for good reason—sperm oil made lamps shine brighter and spermaceti made it possible to manufacture smokeless candles.

Of somewhat lesser quality was ordinary whale oil, most often derived from a species called right whales. The right whale was a slow swimmer, had thick blubber, and floated when dead. He was easier to catch and yielded large quantities of oil.

You might say sperm oil and whale oil were the nineteenth century equivalents of “high-test” and “regular.”

Eventually, readily accessible reserves of whale oil were depleted, prices rose, and, by 1879, Thomas A. Edison ended the kerosene lamp era with his incandescent light bulb. Sperm oil, once a predominant fuel, was relegated to a few specialized uses. Now, in the interest of protecting nature, the sperm whale is listed as an endangered species by the U.S. government.

This case of déjà vu contains some lessons for today. Sure, the nation faces an energy crisis. Certainly a workable energy program is needed, particularly one that stresses research into new, alternative sources of energy. Just as kerosene supplanted whale oil, the odds are that solar, nuclear, and other energy forms could some day take the place of petroleum if the technology is there and the price incentive is there.

What it takes is intensive research into innovative energy forms and an even-handed approach to nuclear power by which acceptable safety and environmental standards are applied—along with a national commitment to developing coal and the petroleum resources that remain.

History can repeat itself—if we let it.
POLITICAL PROCESSES AND THE PRESIDENCY

PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS, 1976
By Austin Ranney
Ranney compares voter turnout in the 1976 primaries with that in the general election and concludes that the proliferation of primaries has failed so far to increase the rate of participation in the political system. He reviews the different ideas held by American academics and politicians about who should participate in choosing the major parties' presidential candidates. 37 pages / $2.25

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Steven A. Grant for the Kennan Institute

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The main body of the Guide is divided into two parts. The first covers various types of collections, especially libraries; archives and manuscript depositories; museums, galleries, and art collections; collections of maps, film and still pictures, music and other sound recordings. The second part of the Guide discusses organizations which are involved in the study or reporting of Russian/Soviet affairs, and deal or maintain contact with the Soviet Union.

Helpful appendixes and indexes are included in the back of the Guide.

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The authors, Siegfried Breyer and Norman Polmar, are among the most renowned experts on the Soviet Navy living in the West. Each man has devoted years of study to the Soviet Navy. Their work has been published in most of the prominent maritime and defense journals in the United States and Europe, and they have produced more than a dozen books between them.

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GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND

BY JOSEPH TUSSMAN

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THE
WILSON
QUARTERLY

AUTUMN
1977

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One of the Quarterly's aims is to provide a second look by scholars at recent and not-so-recent events. In most scholarly disciplines, such "revisionism," reassessing old evidence and assimilating the new, is continuous.

In this spirit, our contributors examine several historic developments: Washington's changing nuclear strategy and its efforts to reach agreement with Moscow on nuclear arms control; the long evolution of Sweden's pioneer Welfare State; the dramatic shifts in American families' earning, spending, and standards of living as the U.S. "consumer economy" has grown since 1945.

In each case, as our essayists note, the answers to some important questions remain a matter of debate among scholars and politicians alike: What have been Moscow's intentions with respect to the arms race? Have the Swedes exhausted the possibilities of "industrial democracy"? If the United States is now close to eliminating absolute poverty (i.e., starvation), how will Americans define "minimum" well-being and "equitable" distribution of wealth in the future? Our contributors offer some tentative suggestions. We welcome others.

Scholars' reassessments are reported elsewhere in the Quarterly. Their more contemporary concerns include the voting behavior of American Catholics and cost pressures on health care (in the Periodicals section) and the power of multinational corporations (in Current Books). None of these revisionists, presumably, claims the last word on his subject, but all stir the mind.

For a longer perspective, we publish Carlos Fuentes' richly detailed appreciation of Don Quixote in the context of 16th-century Spain. Miguel de Cervantes, creator of the knight of La Mancha, and the West's first "modern" novelist, lived and wrote in harsh times; the Jews had been expelled from Spain, and the first stirrings of a more democratic spirit had been crushed. Cervantes himself was dogged by misfortune. Yet he gave us Quixote and, as Fuentes makes clear, a new way of looking at literature and at the world's realities.

Peter Braestrup

Delegates to the Second Continental Congress (1775–81) and the Confederation Congress (1781–83) complained bitterly about the many burdensome legislative duties. Indeed, writes historian Pavlovsky in a review of the delegates' correspondence, the laments of the early years are, for the most part, echoed in Congress's complaints today.

"I know now what has confounded us all day," wrote John Adams in 1775, provoked by long hours, longwindedness, and a maze of detail. Forced to scavenge for money while conducting a war, Congress, he added, had found itself caught "between hawk and buzzard." Other delegates grumbled frequently about the "unwieldy" committee system, absenteeism, corruption, "plagues" of lobbyists, and the high personal cost of holding office.

One of the main complaints concerned the paltry salaries provided by the 13 states. In 1782, a New York delegate reported that Philadelphia, then the capital, was one of the "most extravagant cities in the world." Mutton cost $15 a pound, and most delegates had to dip into their own pockets or lodge with friends in order to survive. Charles Carroll could not afford to send for a doctor when he fell ill; James Madison, William Ellery, and Roger Sherman could barely afford the stagecoach fare home when Congress adjourned.

Many delegates, however, avoided discomforts altogether by simply staying away. As a result, legislation was often stalled for lack of a quorum, and committee work fell to the few stoics who remained. In 1776, James Lovell of Massachusetts ran the Foreign Affairs Committee single-handedly for 16 weeks.
Black Votes in Mississippi

Mississippi has a higher proportion (36 percent) of blacks than any other state in the Union, but prior to 1965, black Mississippians who attempted to vote faced economic reprisals, complicated literacy tests, and sometimes violence.

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, renewed by Congress in 1975, guaranteed blacks the right to vote; federal examiners enforced that right. Joubert and Crouch, professors at the University of Southwest Louisiana and Texas A&M, respectively, report that within 30 days after the VRA was signed into law, registration of blacks in the state rose 120 percent, from 35,000 to 77,000. By the end of 1970, the percentage of registered Mississippi blacks was comparable to that of the white majority, with 71 percent—or 286,000—of the eligible blacks on the voting rolls (82 percent of the eligible whites were registered). A year later, 50 blacks were elected to public office in Mississippi, more than in any other Southern state.

These advances have brought renewed white opposition. Some counties, the authors note, have instituted re-registration laws, effectively purging much of the black electorate. Threats of violence and of economic sanctions are increasing. The black achievement in Mississippi may be substantial, contend Joubert and Crouch, but among many whites "no real change in attitude" has occurred since 1965.

Neo-Conservatives and Politics

The connections between the "power elite" and the "intelligentsia"—and ultimately, between both these groups and society as a whole—continue to engross American intellectuals.

But in recent years, argues historian Gillam, a "general reorientation" has jeopardized the independence of what Lionel Trilling once called the intellectual "adversary culture."

The "old muckraking style of thought," Gillam observes, has been replaced among growing numbers of political intellectuals by the ideology of "neo-conservatism." Power is perceived by them as "preordained," human society as impervious to all but the most insignificant tinkering, and radical agitation as an irrelevant exercise that is, in sociologist Daniel Bell’s words, "increasingly apocalyptic, hedonistic, and nihilistic."


"Intellectuals and Power" by Richard Gillam, in The Center Magazine (May-June 1977), Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif. 93103.
By rejecting the adversarial stance of the late 1930s and early 1940s, contends Gillam, such neo-conservatives (and former liberals) as Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Irving Kristol have tended to view the workings of political power as rigidly managerial, elitist, and virtually unchangeable. On the one hand, he writes, these intellectuals are no longer sure that the mind "can or should resist the imperious advance of power"; on the other, they are strongly aware of the "unanticipated and usually negative" consequences of many government efforts at social uplift. They now urge a strategy of "salutary" neglect vis-à-vis a wide range of social issues; "coping" is all that one ought to expect.

Gillam quotes George Orwell, who 30 years ago contended that embattled intellectuals would "rob reality of its terror by submitting to it." Gillam claims that the neo-conservatives are doing just that, by asserting the impotence of "reason" in the search for solutions to social problems.

Bargaining on Capitol Hill


Congress-watchers have recently noted a curious phenomenon: When House and Senate meet "in conference" to resolve differences over a piece of legislation, Senate proposals usually win.

The authors, political scientists at the University of Illinois, report that, since 1960, in House-Senate conferences on appropriations and taxes, Senate modifications were adopted in 55 to 65 percent of the cases. (The House figure is 25 to 30 percent, with the balance classified as a "draw.") This result is surprising because the House—with its members' greater specialization, tighter organization, better committee attendance, and "tougher" bargaining stance—would seem the favorite to win in such contests.

Some analysts contend that the Senate is stronger in conference because Senate conferees enjoy greater support from the "parent chamber" than do House conferees. Others suggest that the greater media "visibility" of U.S. senators provides a cushion of popular support from interest groups, lobbyists, and the public.

But in fact, the authors suggest, the primary cause of Senate predominance is structural: The House acts first on most bills (it initiated 61 percent of all legislation passed during the 92nd Congress) largely because of its constitutional responsibility for revenue and appropriations bills; conferees acting first, the authors argue, "have an incentive" to accept amendments made by the other body in order to preserve the original core of the legislation. The second body thus acquires bargaining leverage because of its implicit veto power.
Contesting the Catholic Vote

Right wing theorists (such as Kevin Phillips, who hopes to see Catholics join a "new conservative majority") and nonpartisan scholars (such as Norman Nie, who is skeptical of Catholic "party loyalty" after the massive Catholic defection to Nixon in 1972) have advanced the notion that Catholic voters, once staunch members of the Democratic coalition, have turned more conservative.

Greeley, director of the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center, disagrees. Even if Catholics seem more conservative on social issues, he writes, there is a greater separation between "social" and "economic" conservatism "than either conservatives or liberals are prepared to believe."

According to the "conventional wisdom" of "realignment politics," says Greeley, Catholic voters, at least 60 percent of whom always voted Democratic between 1932 and 1972, have begun to drift away as the party becomes more "liberal." In this view, Northern Catholic migration to the suburbs and the increased importance in politics of social issues (pornography, abortion, drugs) have driven Catholics to the right.

In rebuttal, Greeley provides data showing "little erosion" of Catholic support for the Democratic Party over the past two decades. Most Catholics also remain on the "liberal side" of the political spectrum—liberalism defined as "support for the New Deal 'bread and butter' stance." It is not a "pure" McGovern-style liberalism, Greeley concedes. Nevertheless, most Catholics surveyed in the late 1960s and early 1970s favored such liberal causes as U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, a guaranteed annual wage, the vote for 18-year-olds, racial integration, and cost of living increases for welfare recipients. A majority did not own guns, were concerned about pollution, and would vote for a black presidential candidate. In short, concludes Greeley, "the Catholic marriage with the Democratic Party has not come to an end."

War Between the States

During fiscal year 1976, the 16 older "Frostbelt" states in the Northeast and Great Lakes regions sent $29 billion more in taxes to Washington than they received in federal outlays.

According to the National Journal's second annual survey of inequalities in federal largesse (see map), the Southern and Western
Money spent in each state by the federal government for every dollar it takes out in revenue.

Adapted, with permission, from National Journal.

states of the "Sunbelt," on the other hand, enjoyed a $23 billion "balance of payments" surplus.

This pattern is not new; what is new, report the National Journal's Havemann and Stanfield, is the Frostbelt's increasingly powerful "self-preservation" coalition, comprising hundreds of local officials, congressmen, and governors. Organized loosely, but effectively, in both the House and Senate, and backed by a Carter administration cautiously sympathetic to the old Industrial Belt, the "well-oiled, bipartisan lobbying machine" already has several victories to its credit and "no major defeats." (Last May, for example, it altered federal funding formulas in the Community Development Act in favor of the Northeast.) The coalition's Capitol Hill spokesmen unabashedly call for increased military procurement and federal "risk-capital" programs in the region.

Sunbelt and Frostbelt partisans discount talk of an impending "war between the states." However, the Sunbelt states have been lobbying informally under the auspices of the Southern Growth Policies Board and the newly formed Western Policy Office. Time is on their side, the authors note; on the basis of U.S. population shifts, congressional reapportionment in 1980 should swing the majority in Congress to the South and West.
Recent surges in voting strength among Western European Communist parties pose disturbing questions for American foreign policymakers. (The Italian Communists got more than a third of the vote in 1976; the French party came within one percentage point of victory in 1974.) What alternatives are available to the West if France, Italy, Portugal, or Spain elects a Communist government?

Some analysts have dismissed the threat to NATO security by emphasizing the relative independence from Moscow of Western European Communist parties. The former U.S. Secretary of State, however, finds this "independence" questionable. While Italian party chief Enrico Berlinguer and his French counterpart, Georges Marchais, have both pledged devotion to "national independence" and "political pluralism," so too, notes Kissinger, did Hungarian party boss Erno Gero in 1944 and Polish party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1946.

Moreover, if the Western European Communists have in fact repudiated Moscow, it remains problematic whether the West can manipulate the division to its advantage. "No major Communist split," observes Kissinger, "has ever been generated or sustained by deliberate Western policy." The Soviet Union's disputes with China and Yugoslavia festered "for months, possibly years" before the West became aware of them. Washington's ability to bar elections of Communists is limited. U.S. diplomacy must tread a path of noninterference, says Kissinger, without leaving the impression that it considers Communist victories inevitable.

U.S. servicemen learned how to sort mail during a nationwide strike by 200,000 postal workers in 1970. They may also have learned that Washington is unwilling or unable to cope with strikes by federal employees. Pressure for a military union is growing; the American Federation of Government Employees has announced its...
intention to begin organizing on military bases; and defense officials are studying the possible effects of a military union on national security.

Cortright, an associate with the Center for National Security Studies, is not worried. Labor leaders, he notes, concede a military union's need for a strike ban during times of national crisis. Morale in the armed services is low; a union, he believes, would eliminate the "reservoir of discontent" among soldiers who have come to regard themselves simply as "employees." Grievance procedures would be institutionalized. Unions would also help assert civilian control over the military. Moreover, experience with unionized armed services in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden "shows no damage to military strength."

Not so, says Parnell, a navy commander now assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. In highly unionized Sweden, he writes, the government faced a walkout of army personnel in 1971 when troops balked at being used to break strikes. U.S. military unions, he adds, would foster the "sloppiness" and "unreliability" characteristic of the Dutch Army. The U.S. chain of command would be weakened, "professionalism" would decline, and hostility between enlisted men and their officers would be stimulated.

As for the issue of civilian control, says Parnell, the history of unions in the United States suggests that "our society appears to have better means at hand to control arbitrary military authority than it does to control arbitrary union actions."

The Pentagon's Industry Woes

"Let's Change the Way the Pentagon Does Business" by Jacques S. Gansler, in Harvard Business Review (May-June 1977), P.O. Box 9730, Greenwich, Conn. 06830.

The "defense industrial base"—the industry portion of the "military-industrial complex"—expands rapidly during periods of sustained world crisis and shrinks just as rapidly when the crisis subsides. While Pentagon planners anticipate this "fact of life," writes Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Gansler, management of the post-Vietnam turndown has caused "considerable concern."

Annual Pentagon procurement outlays, Gansler notes, have declined to the lowest point in constant dollars ($17 billion) since the early 1950s. (As a result, defense contractors rely increasingly on foreign arms sales, up to more than $10 billion annually from $1.6 billion in 1970.) Excess production capacity at "prime" U.S. aerospace contractors now averages 30 percent; in the aircraft industry, 45 percent. In some cases, key parts are now supplied by a single company, compromising U.S. capacity to increase output quickly. (When Congress approved a rapid tank build-up after the 1973 Mideast War, Chrysler, the prime contractor, was ready, but the
only company supplying turret and hull casings refused to set aside its commercial business to produce them."

Despite a shrinking military market, the Defense Department has not reduced the number of prime contractors. Subsidiary contractors are thus losing Pentagon business; some no longer deem it worthwhile. Profits are low, labor costs high: The cyclical nature of defense spending levels (see chart) makes such employment unattractive to workers, and up to 20 percent more expensive to employers.

Current Defense Department business practices, Gansler observes, embody the "worst of both worlds: neither an efficient free market system nor a well-planned 'controlled' economy." He recommends (among other things) that industry merge civilian and defense operations to keep costs low and help smooth the volatile hiring cycle. Most important, he writes, is a need to "institutionalize" the idea of the defense industrial base as a "natural resource" to be managed with as much care as timber, oil, education, or scientific research.

**Another Look at 'Containment'**

"Containment: A Reassessment" by John Lewis Gaddis, in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1977), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Thirty years ago this summer, Ambassador George F. Kennan, then director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, outlined in his famous "Mr. X" memorandum the American Cold War strategy of containment. In essence, containment was designed to frustrate Soviet expansion by "adroit and vigilant application" of "counterforce" at "constantly shifting geographical and political points."

This strategy, as adopted and modified by Washington, sparked a
controversy that persists to this day, writes Gaddis, an Ohio State University historian. Nevertheless, he contends, recently declassified government documents as well as the partially opened Kennan papers rebut both conventional liberal and conservative interpretations of Kennan's containment theory.

Those who define containment as purely responsive to Communist strategy have criticized Kennan for placing the initiative in Moscow's hands. Other analysts have faulted Kennan for allegedly urging an "all-out commitment" to bar Communist advances in any part of the globe. Still others have assailed containment for its lack of discrimination between "Communism" and "Soviet expansion," thus delaying U.S. rapprochement with China and other Communist states.

Gaddis concedes containment's "passivity" but sharply rejects other criticisms of Kennan as ill-informed. As early as 1948, he notes, Kennan advocated neutrality in the Chinese civil war and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Moreover, Kennan criticized rather than encouraged U.S. official tendencies to regard Communism as monolithic instead of "polycentric." His suggestion that Marshall Plan aid be offered to Eastern Europe reflected his belief in the intrinsic diversity among Communist-run nations. Gaddis's conclusion: Kennan's containment proposal involved a far more subtle, dynamic, and discriminating policy than most of its critics (and supporters) were able to comprehend.


Since World War II, U.S. nuclear analysts (among them, U.S. SALT negotiator Paul Warnke) have rejected the view of Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) that war is simply politics pursued by other means. But the Russians, says Harvard historian Pipes, have not dismissed Clausewitz so easily.

Characterizing Soviet strategy as "primitive" overlooks important differences between the two superpowers, Pipes contends. American strategy, fashioned by civilians rather than by the military, views a resort to violence as a failure of policy and nuclear war as madness because neither side can win. This view, reinforced by the "fiscal imperatives" introduced in the 1950s and '60s by John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State and Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense, has led American policymakers to conclude that the U.S. nuclear stance must be to avert, rather than win, a nuclear war. Thus was born the doctrine of "massive retaliation," whereby the United States hoped to deter a Russian "first strike" by threatening an instant, devastating U.S. "second strike."
The Kremlin, Pipes argues, views nuclear war not only as possible but also as possible to win. Twenty million dead in World War II alone (U.S. dead in all wars since 1775 are estimated at one million) and a political system based on struggle have inured Moscow to the threat of heavy losses. Russian strategy, keyed to the politically powerful Red Army and formulated by the military, grafts nuclear weaponry onto an overall offensive and defensive plan that avoids sole reliance on any "absolute weapon." A sophisticated civil defense program has been designed to safeguard political and military leaders, industrial managers, and skilled workers in the event of war.

"There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both," writes Pipes, "and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for himself." In the SALT negotiations, he warns, the key question is intent: The success of deterrence is possible only if the United States understands "Soviet war-winning strategy."

**Li Hung-Chang's Sleight of Hand**

The tour of Western Europe and the United States in 1896 by Li Hung-Chang, "stern-and-resolute Earl of the first rank" and the most senior Imperial Chinese official ever to visit the West, was interpreted by his hosts as a signal that Peking, stung by the recent Sino-Japanese War, was eager to make political and commercial deals to protect and modernize its faltering empire.

While Li’s visit differs significantly from recent U.S.-Chinese contacts, writes Eggert, a historian at Pennsylvania State University, it showed "how far fancy can be, and has been, divorced from reality in East-West contacts."

After representing his Emperor at Tsar Nicholas II’s coronation in St. Petersburg, Li undertook an extended trip through Europe and the United States. Despite a series of high-level receptions designed to win his favor, no deals were made. American historians have argued nonetheless that Li’s visit altered the Cleveland administration’s commercial policy toward China and kindled interest in the China trade.

Actually, Eggert writes, the significance of Li’s eight-month tour lies in the treaty he first concluded with the Russians, giving them right of way across Manchuria for the Trans-Siberian Railway in return for a mutual defense pact against Japan. Li’s subsequent tour of the West, Eggert speculates, was undertaken simply to maintain the diplomatic balance. Peking wished neither to alienate the Western powers (especially its old ally, England) nor to create an image of Chinese dependence on the Russians.

In 1974, Peru’s revolutionary Velasco government expropriated the local assets of the Utah-based Marcona Mining Company, a large iron ore shipping and sales concern. No compensation was offered; the company was vilified as the epitome of the “evil multinational”; and U.S.-Peruvian relations quickly sank to a new low.

Nevertheless, writes Gantz, a State Department lawyer, within two years a settlement acceptable to both Peru and Marcona was negotiated by the U.S. government. With both nations exhibiting imagination and restraint (Velasco had been ousted in 1975), the Marcona case may serve as precedent in future negotiations.

After nationalizing Marcona, Peru could no longer find foreign buyers for its ore. Prospective customers feared Marcona lawsuits. Moreover, the country faced a mandatory cutoff of U.S. aid. For its part, Marcona could not realistically demand “market value” compensation because of Peru’s poor economic situation. The country was losing $8 million a month on Marcona operations alone.

While Washington, says Gantz, is generally reluctant to mediate in expropriation negotiations, the Marcona case was seen as ripe for a new approach. And between the “cost” to Peru of expropriation and Marcona’s desire for a “continuing relationship” with Peru, the United States found a solution.

Instead of insisting on a $100 million “market value” compensation, U.S. negotiators accepted $37 million in “book value” remuneration from the money-short Peruvians. However, Marcona retained shipping rights to the iron ore, as well as an option to buy ore (for resale) at prevailing prices. The deal allowed Peru to resume foreign sales while retaining Marcona’s “expertise.” But it also gave Marcona the lucrative shipping and resale rights—the equivalent of full market value compensation.

This “book value plus continuing relationship” approach, writes Gantz, may offer the United States its best opportunity for obtaining the “prompt, adequate, and effective compensation” required in such cases by the 1961 Hickenlooper Amendment and the 1974 Trade Act. At the same time, it eases political pressures on economically shaky (and expropriation-prone) Third World nations, gives them continued access to sophisticated corporate techniques, and helps preserve incentives for overseas investment by U.S. firms.
"Are the LDCs In Over Their Heads?"
by Harold van B. Cleveland and W. H. Bruce Brittain, in Foreign Affairs (July 1977), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

To counter the recent recession's effects and the still rising costs of oil, less developed countries (LDCs) broke with precedent and turned to commercial banks in the United States and Europe for financial assistance. By the end of 1975, 71 Third World nations were $90.5 billion in debt, $25 billion of it owed to private banks. (Total debt is now closer to $160 billion.) The 21 U.S. banks that account for nearly all foreign lending have invested the equivalent of 10 percent of their assets in loans to these 71 countries.

In some financial circles, say Citibank officials Cleveland and Brittain, it is believed that many LDCs "will continue to borrow heavily until their massive debt burden reaches the point where they are unable to service it." This has created fears of a worldwide financial crisis, should the banks suffer large losses on such loans.

Although Citibank, the authors' employer, accounts for one-fifth of total foreign lending by U.S. banks, the authors are optimistic. The build-up of the LDC debt, they argue, was sudden but temporary. Even now, the flow of capital from the steadily recovering industrialized world has enabled developing nations to augment domestic savings and investments.

Most of the LDC debt, the authors add, is owed by larger, more advanced countries (such as Brazil and India, which each owe more than $12 billion) that are better able to handle their financial affairs. Loan defaults, if they do occur, are likely to involve only "temporary suspension" of debt-service payments until a rescheduling is arranged.


The state-run Soviet economy, largely insulated from the West's recession of the early 1970s, now faces "serious strains" of its own. According to the CIA, slackened growth in the urban labor force, slowdowns in productivity, lack of "hard" Western currency to pay for technological imports, and an uncertain agricultural base will combine with a "looming" energy crisis to create a sharp "fall-off" in Soviet economic growth within the next five years.

Energy aside, the labor shortage will be Moscow's most pressing problem. A decline in birthrates, evident in the 1960s, will become more acute by the mid-1980s when the working-age population will grow at a rate of less than one-half percent annually. All available
surplus rural labor has already been siphoned off into industry. Moreover, notes the CIA, it is "highly probable" that Soviet farm production will drop significantly during the next decade. Increased crop yields in most years since 1963 have been due to a "favorable climatic deviation," which may have ended with the crippling 1975 drought. Food shortages will "further complicate" the U.S.S.R.'s foreign trade picture by forcing the Russians to increase purchases of U.S. grain during a period of "hard-currency stringency." This in turn will "squeeze severely" Moscow's capacity to import industrial technology.

While Russian leaders are aware of the impending crisis, says the CIA, economic planning remains "unrealistic." Without immediate action on energy (no comprehensive energy plan seems to be forthcoming), annual Soviet GNP growth will decline from its present rate of 4 percent to between 2 and 2.5 percent.

The origins of the giant Great Plains cattle industry after the Civil War preoccupies few modern scholars. Long ago, historians documented the pervasive influence of Spanish ranchers west of the Mississippi. But even the patron saint of Western historians, Frederick Jackson Turner, acknowledged that the ranchers of Texas were "guided" by the "experience of the Carolina cowpens."

Spanish influence came later, suggests Guice, a historian at the University of Southern Mississippi. He writes that the cattle industry "advanced from the East"—from the "old Southwest" states of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and the Carolinas—until it "established itself" under the perfect conditions found in the open West. Guice criticizes Southern historians, "distracted" by the Civil War and slavery, for overlooking a fundamental aspect of ante-bellum farm life. One quarter of the slaves on large cotton plantations raised livestock; in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, cattle herds in the South increased rapidly in size and value. (When Alabama settlers sought federal reparations after devastating Indian raids in 1816, one-third of all claims were for lost cattle.) Large herds were reported on the eastern side of the Mississippi as early as 1724. Only the merger of Spanish herding techniques—and particularly longhorn geneology—with an already developed cattle industry, says Guice, can account for the "extravaganza" that later swept across the Great Plains.

In this light, Guice concludes, the surprise voiced in the late 1960s at the mention of black cowboys seems "ludicrous." Mounted slaves were common. Indeed one traveler in 1818 described Southern blacks as "among the best horsemen in the world."
ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Women Lead the Recovery


The U.S. job market has improved significantly, with an estimated 6.5 million persons joining the ranks of the employed since March 1975, when unemployment stood at 9 percent. Prospects for adult males and the young have improved considerably, with employment levels for both running 2 percent above the pre-recession level in early 1974. Re-employment of workers laid off during the recession has climbed sharply.

But the most startling phenomena, reports Federal Reserve aide Zickler, are the absolute and relative gains made by adult females, accelerating a long-term trend. While their representation in the total civilian population (about 42 percent) has actually declined, the number of women finding employment outside the home—particularly in service industries—continues to increase. Fully half of the net gain in the labor force since 1975 is accounted for by adult women; employment of women is now 8 percent above its 1974 pre-recession level.

Zickler speculates that this unexpectedly high employment rate reflects economic pressures on many American families. After declining between 1973 and 1975, real per capita income increased by only 8 percent between 1975 and 1977—an unusually small rise for a recovery. This lag in family purchasing power spurred many housewives to seek employment. Zickler notes that, even as the economy regains its health, the number of working women may continue to increase as families try to "restore," and then to "expand," their incomes.

Regulating the Cashless Society


Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) systems are rapidly becoming an "integral part" of the telecommunications and computer revolution that is changing the world of U.S. banking and finance.

On the consumer side, EFT systems allow payment for goods at retail stores with a card that automatically records debits on the purchaser's bank account. They enable bank customers to deposit or withdraw funds via a 24-hour machine, provide for automatic payment of utility and telephone bills, and permit employers to send paychecks directly to employees' bank accounts. Now that
computers have an up-front role in American banking, says Rutgers Journal editor Wolfson, legal steps must be taken to ensure consumer privacy, provide proof of payment, and assess liability for negligence.

Use of EFT systems is not yet widespread. Banks and other "depositary institutions" have installed some 200 "off-premise" systems (in supermarkets and department stores, for example), with a modest 10,000 terminals. However, "rapid expansion" is anticipated—particularly when the federal government clarifies regulations dealing with the nature and status of EFT. A report is due this autumn from Congress's National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfer Systems.

According to an early draft of the report, writes Wolfson, the Commission will recommend that EFT terminals not be classified as bank branches, thus bypassing geographic restrictions on branch offices. It will also recommend that financial institutions share facilities, allowing customers of different banks to use the same terminal at retail outlets. (In general, EFT will parallel check and credit card operations.) The Commission will recommend finally that Congress safeguard the privacy of EFT transactions from access by government or other third parties, such as credit agencies, without due process of law.

**Inflation vs. Democracy**


It has long been established that the great German inflation of 1919-23 helped destroy the Weimar Republic, which governed Germany between the dismemberment of the Kaiser's Empire (1918) and the rise of Hitler's Third Reich (1933). Analyzing the relationship between inflation and democratic attitudes in prewar Germany, the authors, economists at Texas Tech, conclude that inflation by its very nature remains the most serious structural threat to liberal self-government in the West.

German inflation progressed slowly during and immediately after World War I, but reached hyperinflation levels by late 1922. (Hyperinflation is defined as a price-increase rate of more than 50 percent a month for 12 months.) The German wholesale price index, with a base of 1 in 1913, increased to 36.7 in January 1922, 2,785 in January 1923, 74,787 six months later, and a staggering 750 billion by November. In December 1923, new currency, known as the rentenmark, was issued at an exchange rate of 1 trillion to 1.
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Inflation's bite is selective, the authors note. Hardest hit are workers and the middle class, historically the strongest proponents of democratic government. In 1923, a quarter of all union members in Germany were out of work; those who had jobs saw their real income decline to 65 percent of its 1913 level. Professionals, civil servants, rentiers, and the self-employed were largely ruined. Speculators, industrialists, and financiers, on the other hand, prospered. When the deprived and humiliated middle classes turned against Weimar, the way was clear for Hitler's National Socialism—long nourished with money and borrowed respectability from prominent industrialists.

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The Real Villain:
Health Insurance

"The High Cost of Hospitals—And What To Do About It" by Martin Feldstein, in The Public Interest (Summer 1977), National Affairs, 10 E. 53rd St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Most critiques of soaring hospital costs (they have risen 1,000 percent since 1950, compared to an overall consumer price index increase of 125 percent in the same period) cite both the burden of labor costs and an insufficiency of hospitals amid unprecedented demand for better health care. These factors are minor, writes Harvard economist Feldstein, who argues that the growth of health insurance has permitted patients and their doctors to demand more sophisticated and expensive treatment. Insurance now pays 70 percent of all hospital bills, up from 37 percent in 1950.

Higher labor costs, Feldstein says, account for only one-tenth of hospital cost inflation. An imbalance in hospital supply and patient demand is equally insignificant. Hospitals have simply responded to the "increased willingness to pay for sophisticated services by providing them, and costs have gone up accordingly."

Rather than imposing direct regulation on the health care industry or enacting a comprehensive plan to finance health care costs through higher taxes, Feldstein proposes major-risk insurance (MRI). Its main feature would be an "expense limit," perhaps 10 percent of annual income, for which each family is responsible. Once the limit is passed, insurance would cover the remainder. Since less than 1 family in 15 spends more than $3,000 per year for medical care, the cost to the government would be only $19 billion annually. The attractiveness of MRI, Feldstein says, is that it compels each patient to be aware of the cost of health care, thus helping to control demand for more.
When crews from Harvard, Brown, and the Massachusetts Agricultural College lined up for the first regatta of the Rowing Association of American Colleges in July 1871, nothing more seemed to be at stake than a trophy. But when the Massachusetts Aggies crossed the finish line 43 seconds ahead of Harvard, the victory sparked philosophical debate and changed the face of college sports.

The Aggie crew and their record time created a sensation far greater than a mere sporting event would ordinarily merit, writes Fidler. Widely discussed in the nation's press, the Aggies' victory seemed to refute the theories of Harvard professor Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. concerning the natural superiority of the "Brahmin caste of New England." Holmes had originally used the term to refer to an "untitled aristocracy...in which aptitude for learning...is congenital and hereditary," but it grew to mean the whole class of cultured city-dwellers, proud of their ancestry and disdainful of those with less socially prominent antecedents.

With American society changing from rural to urban, many in the 1870s resented cities and the values they represented and longed for the greater simplicity of country life. The triumph of the farm boys and their brawn over the city slickers and their brains seemed to prove the superiority of Jefferson and Franklin's aristocracy of talent over Holmes's aristocracy of genes.

A second Aggie win in 1872 and one by Amherst College in 1873 proved that small colleges could successfully challenge Harvard, until then dominant in the sport. So many schools began to put forward teams, both for the regatta and for track and field events accompanying it that the Intercollegiate Association of Amateur Athletics of America (better known as the IC4A) was established in 1876 to handle the arrangements.

Settlements of blacks in Southern cities followed a distinctly different pattern from those in the North, writes Kellogg, a graduate student at the University of Kentucky. Unlike inner city districts in the North, filled by massive black migration during World War I, black "urban clusters" sprang up in Southern cities immediately after the Civil War in rigidly determined neighborhoods. (Between 1860 and 1870, Southern cities of more than 4,000 saw their black
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populations rise 80 percent vs. a 13 percent increase in the white population.)

There are, Kellogg writes, four kinds of black settlements in the Southern city: the back-alley settlement (A on map), where a prestigious avenue with many whites was backed by a parallel row of servants' quarters; (B) other areas near the homes of the wealthy, inhabited by servants; (C) areas populated by financially independent blacks; and (D), usually the largest type of settlement, shantytowns built by profit-minded white entrepreneurs near the city limits in the most undesirable locations (poorly drained bottomlands, for example, or lands adjacent to the city dump or to a cemetery or railroad tracks). White residents preferred to live close by the central business district, making such areas too expensive for newly arrived rural blacks.

Kellogg cites Lexington, Kentucky, a thriving antebellum city, as a classic example of the urban cluster pattern. To provide land for the freed slaves flowing into Lexington (the city's black population grew from 3,000 to more than 7,000 in the 1860s, whereas the white population increased from 6,000 to only 7,500), landowners sold lots bordering railroad tracks or in unhealthy valley bottoms near the periphery of the city. Kellogg documents similar patterns in Atlanta, Richmond, and Durham. "In terms of black residential location," he concludes, "many towns in the South may be thought of as anachronisms—with the calendar stopped at 1880."

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Adapted, with permission, from The Geographical Review.
The Right to Choose

A July 1976 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court (Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth), in effect, struck down the right of a husband to an "abortion veto" by ruling that, when parents disagree over an abortion decision, the mother has the final say. Should the husband (or unwed father), thus isolated from the abortion decision, have the right to choose whether to support an unwanted child—a 20-year burden costing $125,000 in 1973 and much more today?

With its 1976 decision, writes Swan, a former assistant attorney general of Ohio, the Court has inadvertently backed itself into a corner. Combined with the right to abortion on demand (established in Abortion Cases, 1973) and the presumed duty of parental child support, the decision could create "excruciating logical dilemmas" by forcing child support on a helpless father.

The Court, says Swan, wishes to recognize three principles: a father's duty to support his child; abortion on demand (Abortion Cases); and a woman's exclusive right to choose whether to have an abortion (Planned Parenthood). But "the cold logic of causation" makes room only for abortion on demand coupled with a woman's exclusive right to choose, or abortion on demand coupled with a father's child-support duty. Attempts to square forced paternal support duty with a woman's exclusive right to choose, Swan argues, are "grotesque in the extreme."

Southern Blacks Are Catching Up

As a group, America's blacks have made significant economic and social progress. But these gains, contend Hogan and Featherman, researchers at the Universities of Chicago and Wisconsin, respectively, mask regional disparities that still exist among blacks.

Comparing data from 1962 and 1973 for black workers between the ages of 25 and 64, they find that "pronounced inequalities" in income exist not only between the black minority and the white majority, but also within the black minority itself.

Overall, the black population appears to have "moved in the
direction of economic integration" with the white population. By 1973, the difference in amount of completed schooling between blacks and whites that could be attributed to "racial" causes had dropped to about half a year. "Positive" factors that traditionally correlate with "success" for white males—such as socioeconomic background, education, and father's occupation—now influence occupational patterns among growing numbers of black men. (Put another way, the process of "perverse egalitarianism"—in which opportunity for black males is based on the liabilities but not the assets of their backgrounds—is slowly being reversed.)

But behind general progress lies a regional lag. In 1962 and 1973, native Northerners typically led native Southerners in socioeconomic background, education, occupational status, and earnings. (In most "status" categories, black migrants from South to North tend to fall between Northern and Southern levels.) In 1973, the economic "return" on each additional year of schooling was twice as high in the North as in the South; Northerners also completed, on average, two more years of schooling than Southerners. In fact, Hogan and Featherman note that the range of educational inequality is now greater among blacks than among whites. Annual earnings have risen for all blacks, but Northerners still lead Southerners by $3,000.

While the Southern lag may be attributed to the North's economic edge, the authors believe that North-South differences are steadily narrowing. (The current status of Southern blacks resembles that of Northern blacks a decade ago.) As the economies of North and South "converge," they speculate, so too will "regional variations" in social status between Northern and Southern blacks.

**The Biology of Salt Taboos**

Sodium from salt (sodium chloride) and from high-sodium foods is a basic requirement of the human diet. But sodium needs vary widely, especially during periods of exercise, emotional stress, menstruation, and pregnancy. Today, doctors can adjust a person's sodium intake to prevent dehydration or edema (swelling) during these periods. Neumann, a doctoral candidate at the University of Minnesota, believes that "salt taboos" performed an analogous function among Indian tribes of the Southeastern United States.

Neumann compares the biology of sodium needs with dietary customs among the Cherokee, Creek, Caddo, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes. During menstruation, pregnancy, and mourning, when the human body needs little sodium because of sodium and water retention, salt taboos provided the needed restriction. In Creek and
Cherokee preparations for war, on the other hand, salt taboos resulted in impaired judgment and a tendency to rash behavior—qualities that, when added to an adrenalin boost, would help create a "formidable warrior." Similarly, in initiation rites intended to weed out the weak, sodium deprivation could push endurance to the limit. Neumann recounts a report of Carolina Sioux boys' "hellish cries and howling" during one such rite.

"Consciously or not," Neumann concludes, salt taboos developed because of concrete "advantages for the population as a whole": preservation of health or creation of culturally desirable physical and emotional conditions.

**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

_Ozone and the Origins of Life_


What source of energy triggered the chemical reactions leading to the evolution of life on earth 3 billion years ago? Scientists frequently assume that the earth's primitive atmosphere, which contained as little as one-thousandth the current amount of oxygen (O_2), contained correspondingly little ozone (O_3), a gas that absorbs the sun's ultraviolet radiation. In the absence of such an ozone "screen" (which developed later), scientists believe that ultraviolet radiation could have penetrated the atmosphere with sufficient intensity to spark the synthesis of organic molecules.

But the authors, physicists at the University of Adelaide, Australia, contend that such calculations based on models of the earth's primitive atmosphere may be in error. Oxygen and ozone levels, while related, are not directly proportional. Photochemical reactions between water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and especially nitrogen also have a significant effect on ozone production. The authors conclude that even with an atmosphere containing only one-thousandth the current oxygen level, the earth would have had an effective ozone screen—thereby ruling out ultraviolet radiation on earth as the energy source responsible for organic synthesis.

The authors suggest two alternate explanations: (1) Electrical discharges within the atmosphere may have supplied the needed energy, or (2) chemical synthesis might have taken place outside the earth's environment. Modern radio astronomers have detected organic molecules in dark, nebular regions of space. Such complex molecules of extraterrestrial origin may have accumulated on the earth's surface as a result of intense meteor showers during the first ice age of the planet's history.
Pulses of sound passed through ocean currents are distorted by temperature, pressure, and other variables. The resulting "arrival structure" of a sound wave can thus be used to determine conditions along its path.

The Sinews of the Sea


The swirl of ocean waters over much of the earth’s surface can determine the weather in New England and the anchovy catch off Peru. But most techniques for tracing currents, eddies, and other ocean phenomena are either too expensive (survey ships) or too superficial (satellite photographs) to reveal the workings of a large tract of water over a long period of time.

With the help of acoustic probing, however, researchers can begin to grasp the dynamics of ocean behavior. Sound can travel great distances through water, writes Porter, an associate scientist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, but its speed will vary with such factors as temperature, pressure, depth, current, and salinity. (As an eddy crosses a transmission path, for example, the intensity of a sound wave can vary by a factor of 10.)

Acoustic probing can be conducted over vast areas—up to 100 km from small, untethered sound emitters suspended in the sea. Pulses can be tracked from widely scattered sites. In one experiment, each pulse of sound emitted from a projector arrived at the receiver in two pulse groups, one 30 milliseconds after the other, in defiance of basic ray acoustics (see figure above). The "arrival structure" resulting from the influence of "ocean variables"—which can disperse, retard, and otherwise distort sound waves—is an implicit record of conditions along the sound’s path.

If scientists can "sort out" the relationship between sound and ocean, it will be possible to measure temperature, speed, and countless other critical characteristics of, say, the Gulf Stream by simply passing a sound wave through it and analyzing the arrival structure.
Diverse Terrain on Earth’s ‘Twin’

Because of similarities in size, density, and position in the solar system, Venus is generally considered the earth’s “twin” planet. Interpreting high-resolution pictures made with radar telescopes—which can penetrate the opaque, intensely hot, Venusian atmosphere—two astronomers from the California Institute of Technology suggest that even Venus’s geographical features are comparable to those on earth.

Malin and Saunders find that Venus, like earth, has a mobile crust subject to the forces of tectonism (movement of crustal plates) and volcanoes. A “startling” trough system 1,400 km long, 150 km wide, and about 2 km deep bears a striking resemblance to the East African Rift system on Earth. It suggests modification of Venus’s crust by tectonic spreading and extension.

Evidence of volcanic activity is found in a large dome (300 km across, 1 km high, capped by a small, steeply sloped crater), reminiscent of similar features on Mars, and in clusters of smaller mountains resembling areas on earth associated with volcanic activity, such as Arizona’s San Francisco Peaks region.

The trough system and volcanic formations, the authors observe, suggest a “geologically active” planet, perhaps “rivaling the earth in the breadth of features portrayed on its surface.”

Acoustical Illusions

In 1843, Georg Simon Ohm (1787–1854), formulator of the law of electrical circuits that bears his name, conceived a revolutionary theory of physical acoustics. “Ohm’s law” stated that the ear, when exposed to complex musical waveforms, can separately analyze their distinct, component waves. The theory, writes Turner, a historian at the University of New Brunswick, was quickly discredited but later played a key role in studies of the relationship between the mind and the senses.

With the assistance of a new sound-producing device—the siren—Ohm determined that complex waves are decomposed by the ear, just as the ear “hears out” separate notes of a chord. August Seebeck countered by demonstrating that certain complex waves
combine to form distinct "combination" tones. Ohm's law disavowed such waves; but, argued Seebeck, the ear can hear them.

In 1856, Hermann von Helmholtz, German philosopher and physicist (1821-94), settled the dispute in Ohm's favor. Using more refined instruments to measure sound, Helmholtz discovered that Seebeck's "combination" tones were, in fact, Ohm's "component waves." Within the ear, he argued, these waves are "subjectively" distorted and not "heard out" as simple waves.

By separating mechanics from psychology, Helmholtz was able to apply his "theory of signs" to acoustics. He contended that the mind, when receiving information of little use, generalizes the existence of the information through "unconscious inference." Thus, the experienced human ear finds the complex tones of voices and instruments "sufficient" to establish the identity of the sound-producing body. Hearing the component tones adds no useful information. Helmholtz's interest in acoustics, Turner speculates, developed from his earlier optical discovery: that for precisely the same utilitarian reason, the human eye does not see the "blind spot" where the optic nerve enters the retina.

Is the Sun Predictable?


Sunspots—strong magnetic fields on the surface of the sun—have been thought to appear and disappear in 11-year cycles. Closely linked to the aurora borealis, or "northern lights," sunspots have for centuries been taken as evidence that the forces of the sun are constant and predictable. In 1893, however, E. Walter Maunder, Superintendent of the Royal Greenwich Observatory, made a curious and little-noted discovery. While perusing old astronomical records, he found that for a 70-year period ending in 1715, sunspots and other solar activity had virtually vanished from the sun.

Setting out to re-examine this "skeleton in the closet of solar physics," Eddy, an astronomer at the Harvard College and Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatories, confirms the accuracy of Maunder's original research. Between 1645 and 1715—a period which Eddy calls the "Maunder minimum"—there were few aurora sightings and not a single account of sunspot-induced streamers, which can be seen trailing from the sun's corona during an eclipse.

More intriguing evidence involves analysis of carbon 14 content—which correlates directly with solar activity—in the annual growth rings of the bristlecone pine. Plotting carbon 14 levels not only confirmed the Maunder minimum but revealed at least 12 other similar periods during the past 5,000 years, each lasting from 50 to 200 years and ushering in particularly cold eras in the history of the earth's climate. The Maunder minimum itself corresponds to the 17th century's so-called "little ice age."
The Ethics of Euthanasia

Among the Greeks and Romans, euthanasia enjoyed a degree of acceptance and was defended by Plato and Seneca. Christians subsequently rejected the idea of taking the life of a hopelessly ill person, even with his consent. They based their position on the Sixth Commandment, which forbids the "harmful" taking of human life. However, Wennberg, a professor of philosophy at Westmont College, argues that euthanasia, when grounded in mercy and compassion, can be compatible with Christian morality.

Opponents of euthanasia, Wennberg writes, are generally more critical of active euthanasia (or "mercy killing"—the administration of a lethal substance to a terminally ill patient at his request) than of passive euthanasia (or "mercy dying"—withholding treatment from that same patient). In fact, passive euthanasia can at times be compatible with orthodox Christian belief, as when "in the face of imminent death" a person refuses "extraordinary" treatment to prolong his life.

Wennberg contends that there is no moral distinction between passive and active euthanasia. "If it is in our power," he concludes, "to shorten an agonizing death by actively intervening and we do not do so, then we are responsible for the consequences of not doing so, as we would be should we choose to intervene."

Skepticism, East and West

Skepticism, as a method of philosophical inquiry, has been practiced at least since the fourth century B.C., when the Greek philosopher Pyrrho founded the School of Skeptics. Applied differently in the West and East, however, the skeptical approach has led philosophers to very different conclusions.
REYNARD, JOHN

A historian at Western Ontario University, writes that the epistemological crisis of the 17th century led some European thinkers to embrace outright skepticism. (The crisis had its roots in the Reformation debate over how man acquires religious knowledge: Through the Church? Reason? Scripture?) Beginning in France in the 1620s, some Jansenists held that there is “no rationally justifiable criterion of religious knowledge because there is none for knowledge of any sort.” They used this proposition to disguise their rejection of papal infallibility as well as to support their claim that Christians can at best “accept docilely” the mysteries of the faith. Antoine Arnauld, a leading Jansenist, also used skepticism to explain his movement’s view of grace as a divine (and arguably Calvinist) instrument that causes belief “without justifying it.”

By contrast, writes the University of Hawaii’s Cheng, in Eastern philosophies skepticism is practiced “positively.” Lao Tzu (fourth or sixth century B.C.) and Chuang Tzu (399–295 B.C.), for example, employ “positive skepticism”: to delineate the relative value of ordinary knowledge as a means of achieving the tao, the ultimate truth of reality. “Knowledge of things,” the author explains, “depends on recognition of existing relative distinctions.” Cheng claims that negative skepticism, which aims to attack some or all claims of knowledge and/or truth and is evident in Western philosophies, arose as a reaction to excessively stringent requirements for knowledge—requirements dismissed in Eastern thought.

The Roots of Fundamentalism

Religious Fundamentalism shared many traits with “mainstream” evangelical Protestantism, but it had its own distinctive doctrines: the “verbal inerrancy” of Scripture, belief in divine creation rather than biological evolution, and a view of history that assumed God’s continuing intervention. The Fundamentalist movement, writes Marsden, a historian at Calvin College, was “overwhelmingly American” and played a “conspicuous and pervasive” role in American religion, culture, and politics until the 1930s.

As an early reaction to “modernism,” he observes, Fundamentalism grew up first in England; but, he adds, it never became as divisive among British denominations as it did among those in the New World. Although considerable controversy erupted in England over the new theories of Bible criticism and Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), the furor soon abated. Marsden speculates that Darwinism and “higher” theological criticism were closely akin to ideas (naturalistic development, the continuity of history) that had been brewing in secular British thought for some time. As far as tolerance was concerned, 19th-century English evangelical religion...
RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

"was closer in style to Edmund Burke than Oliver Cromwell."

In America, however, there was no such tolerance. Expanding rapidly in the late 19th century, American Fundamentalism severed its transatlantic ties and pursued an "anti-liberal militancy" at home. (The British, Marsden notes, never quite understood the 1925 Scopes "monkey" trial.) The phenomenal growth of the movement, he suggests, was helped by several factors. Large parts of the United States were insulated from intellectual life; a tradition of "unopposed revivalism" had encouraged theological conservativism; and the rapid transition in the United States from Romanticism to the "Second Scientific Revolution" left many clergymen "not always thoroughly prepared" for emerging modes of religious thought.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Graphic Coverage

"The Development of Social Reportage in English Periodical Illustration During the 1840s and Early 1850s" by Celina Fox, in Past & Present (Feb. 1977), Corpus Christi College, Oxford OX1 4JF, England.

Illustrated journalism flourished in English periodicals after the invention of machine wood engraving in the 1830s. But unless one includes the "elevated, anodyne sentiment" of the Illustrated London News—the most successful periodical of the time—there were few precedents for graphic hard-hitting news reportage. It was left, says the Museum of London's Celina Fox, to the more enterprising partisan publications to show the possibilities of pictorial muckraking journalism.

Thus, when a furor arose in 1842 over the Report of the Children's Employment Commission, which contained illustrations of a child hauling a coal wagon (below), one Member of Parliament—and much of the public—insisted that the sketches be deleted. Instead, the pictures were released to the press. "True, the
sketches were often 'disgusting,'” explained the accompanying commentary in Douglas Jerrold's *Illuminated Magazine*, “but for that very reason the cause, not the sketches, should be removed.” *Punch* responded by printing a cartoon in which impoverished miners were surrounded by scenes of luxury. The *Illustrated London News*, however, maintained its “tasteful neutrality above the grubby, strife-torn world” and refused to print the pictures.

Although conditions in England merited solid social commentary, Fox writes, the rise of the illustrated periodical, then as later, did not necessarily bring serious reporting. Illustration was usually used to promote narrow religious or partisan causes; by appealing to the already converted, such magazines won only limited influence. Only the combination of a resourceful editor and a sizable readership enabled periodicals like *Punch* and Jerrold's *Illuminated Magazine* to take a serious look at the “condition of England.”

**Public Figures, Private Rights**

“*The Demise of the Public Figure Doctrine*” by John J. Watkins, in *Journal of Private Rights Communication* (Summer 1977), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

Since its celebrated 1964 decision in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, the U.S. Supreme Court has sought to reconcile First Amendment guarantees of freedom of the press with the individual's right to freedom from defamation. *New York Times* stated that “public officials” claiming to have been libeled in the press must prove “reckless disregard of truth” or “knowledge of falsity” on the part of the publisher to recover damages. The doctrine was extended to public figures in 1967, and in 1972 to the private individual in cases involving the public interest—the “involuntary public figure.”

But in recent years, writes Watkins, a 5th Circuit Court of Appeals law clerk, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the “public figure doctrine” by defining narrowly what is meant by “public figure.” In the landmark 1974 case, *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, the Court ruled that Elmer Gertz, civil-rights activist, prolific legal writer, and frequent subject of newspaper articles, was not a public figure. Two years later, it held that Mary Alice Firestone, former wife of the tire heir and a socialite who actively sought publicity, was also not a public figure. In four subsequent cases, courts have ruled on the “public” or “private” status of individuals, but in none of these cases have the courts established precisely what is meant by “public” or “private.”

Without guidelines to help editors and newsmen determine an individual's status, defining the term “public figure,” one judge noted, is like “trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.” The present system of libel law, Watkins contends, “savages” the First Amendment and could lead to “crippling press self-censorship.”

During televised Senate committee hearings on Vietnam in early 1966, CBS refused to pre-empt regular programming (and sacrifice major revenue) to carry "live" the testimony of Ambassador George F. Kennan. The decision prompted the resignation of CBS News President Fred Friendly. The network, Friendly claimed, had made a "mockery" of past CBS "crusades" to gain access to congressional debates. According to Rutkus, a Library of Congress analyst, the 1966 case illuminates the rigid journalistic and financial pressures that determine what will and will not be aired on television. And he concludes that, as a result, ABC, CBS, and NBC are not (really) anxious to expand coverage of Senate proceedings.

Business considerations, says Rutkus, argue strongly against increased "live" coverage; and time limits (i.e., the 22-minute news show) argue, in turn, against more Senate coverage on the regular evening news. Because pre-empting scheduled entertainment programming means a loss of advertising, and because congressional debates may "bore or alienate" viewers, commercial networks limit such coverage to events of "overriding importance"—customarily, dramatic clashes between congressional committees and the executive branch (see table). One exception is the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), which does not rely on advertising. Since its creation in 1970, PBS has broadcast more hours of congressional activity than any of the commercial networks.

**ANNUAL "LIVE" TV COVERAGE OF CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS**

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>9:23</td>
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RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

**Fossil Fuels and Climate**


The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the earth’s atmosphere has increased substantially since the Industrial Revolution (from 295 to 330 parts per million). One cause may be the 5 Gt (trillion metric tons) of carbon annually released into the atmosphere by man’s burning of fossil fuels. Can the carbon cycle, which maintains equilibrium among the 40,000 Gt of carbon in the atmosphere, on land, and in the sea, recycle this increase back to earth?

The question deserves urgent attention, suggest the authors, who are scientists at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Associated Universities. Plant and animal respiration, fires, and the decay of organic material naturally release CO₂ into the air (about 200 Gt a year), and dissolution of atmospheric carbon in the ocean returns roughly the same amount to earth. However, the authors explain, about half the CO₂ generated by burning fossil fuels appears to remain in the atmosphere. A century from now, it could contain 1.5 to 5 times the 1860 CO₂ concentration. The potential result: an accelerated atmospheric warm-up, conservatively estimated at 1.5–3°C per doubling of CO₂ concentration.

The effects of such rapid warming would fall unevenly around the globe. Increased evaporation would reduce water supplies; melting polar ice would raise sea levels, and plant and animal ecosystems would be altered. The authors predict that man, nevertheless, will continue to burn fossil fuels until the consequences become “clearly unacceptable.”

**Managing the Whales**

"The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment" by James E. Scarff, in *Ecology Law Quarterly* (vol. 6, nos. 2 and 3, 1977), Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

The struggle between conservationists and the whaling industry has become increasingly heated. While conservationists have succeeded in limiting “kill” quotas, the resolution of the conflict remains in doubt. In an exhaustive two-part review of the history, economics, and politics of whaling since the 14th century, ecologist Scarff concludes that, although some steps have been taken to ensure the
survival of some 78 species of whale, more knowledge is required to set sound, internationally backed herd management goals.

Even with the rising price of whale meat (85 percent of which is now consumed by humans) and the demand for baleen (whalebone) and whale oil, the $100 million international whaling industry is only a marginally profitable business. It faces declining catch quotas set by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), increases in shipbuilding costs, and the possibility of a lower-priced substitute for sperm oil (a high-grade machine lubricant). Norway, the United States, Great Britain, and others have abandoned whaling altogether. (Japan and the U.S.S.R. are now the most active.) The number of factory ships operating in the Antarctic has dropped to 3 from 18 in 1950, and the United States has recently prohibited whaling within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline.

Even so, the effects of years of unrestricted whaling have depleted the herds. The estimated 3.9 million whales existing before the 19th-century whaling boom number only 2.1 million today, with the mature, exploitable whale population dropping even more dramatically, from 2.4 to 1.2 million. Some environmentalists fear that the current slump in whaling will soon disappear as Third World nations, not bound by IWC quotas, step up their efforts. (Even now, 9 of the 17 nations hunting whales are not IWC members.)

Who Owns the Icebergs?

“Who Owns the Icebergs?” in *Natural Resources Journal* (Jan.-Feb. 1977), University of New Mexico School of Law, 1117 Stanford, N.E., Albuquerque, N.M. 87131.

Until recently, man’s water sources were limited to fresh water from streams, lakes, and underground aquifers. Artificial processes, such as desalinization, have already been able to increase slightly the world’s fresh water resources; it is now estimated that one-tenth of the water supply of Antarctica’s icebergs could yield enough water to irrigate 15 million acres of land in arid regions. The technical feasibility of “iceberg harvesting” has been demonstrated. What is less certain, writes Lundquist, a 1977 Harvard Law School graduate, is the legal status of glacia firma Antarctica.

The principal organization governing the Antarctic today is the 18-nation Antarctic Treaty Group (ATG). However, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty makes no provisions for resource exploitation, and the pact is in any case not binding on non-ATG nations. Without a wider consensus on the central issue of what constitutes “sovereignty,” Lundquist argues, the question of who is authorized to harvest icebergs will remain unresolved.

One solution would allow two or more nations to pool their territorial claims to create a “condominium” (joint territorial sovereignty) within a sector of Antarctica. (In effect this is what
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New Zealand and the United States have done on the Ross Ice Shelf. At its most extreme, this approach would allow the 18 ATG nations to form a monopoly over the entire continent.

Another solution, the so-called International Approach, would place the continent under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or the trusteeship of the United Nations. But any solution rests on resolution of the legal question: Is Antarctica res nullius, a "no man's land" subject to national appropriation, or res communis, "everyman's land" to be enjoyed by all?

ARTS & LETTERS

A. Pope on Grub Street?


Through 250 years of literary history, it has generally been assumed that English poet Alexander Pope (1688-1744) was either the founder or guiding spirit of the *Grub-street Journal*, the most notorious London newspaper of the 1730s. With its taste for scandal and controversy, the *Journal* in its eight-year life attacked many of the same men of letters Pope himself had ridiculed in the heroic couplets of the *Dunciad*. Accusations, current in the mid-1730s, that Pope had founded the newspaper to continue his crusade against the "Dunces" hardened into fact by the 19th century. Even Pope's recent editors have been slow to challenge the tradition.

There is little evidence to settle the issue conclusively, but Goldgar, professor of English at Lawrence University, disputes the conventional assumptions after taking a "fresh look" at historical records, the writings of Pope and his contemporaries, and the *Journal* itself. Recently discovered ledgers of the booksellers and printers who owned the *Journal*, for example, make no mention of Pope, and neither of the newspaper's two strong-willed editors, Richard Russel and John Martyn, can be connected with the poet. The *Journal* printed few of Pope's contributions, though his style was often imitated (after all, observes Goldgar, he was the dominant poet of his age). Pope's own letters and those of his contemporaries are silent on the matter.

Only in 1734-36, when the *Journal* was in decline, were accusations of Pope's editorial influence circulated—the result of an "eccentric" writer's mistaken charge that Pope had libeled him in the *Journal*. Pope's critics quickly picked up the theme, and from this "slender foundation," says Goldgar, a mighty legend grew.
New Light on Leonardo

"Drawings by Leonardo da Vinci at Windsor Newly Revealed by Ultraviolet Light" by Jane Roberts and Carlo Pedretti, in The Burlington Magazine (June 1977), Elm House, 10-16 Elm St., London WC1, England.

Of the drawings by Leonardo da Vinci in the vast Royal Collection at Windsor Castle, several have so deteriorated that they are no longer visible to the naked eye. Drawn with (presumably) a metal stylus on chalky paper, the sketches, which date from the 1480s, appear to have faded as early as 1517: Dürer's Dresden sketchbook of that date, into which the artist copied two of the Leonardo works in question, shows little more than what can be seen today. But with the aid of ultraviolet photography, report Roberts and Pedretti, portions of the Windsor drawings were recently brought to light.

The newly revealed sketches include dozens of anatomical drawings of skulls, spines, arms, and legs; architectural designs for towers and churches; experimental studies for major oil paintings; an assortment of doodles and puns; and even plans for a device to mix mortar—possibly invented during the rebuilding of the walls at Pavia in 1487. In addition, the ultraviolet photographs have further clarified Leonardo's studies for the Uffizi Adoration of the Magi, first discerned by A. E. Popham through ultraviolet study in 1952.

In an analysis accompanying publication of the 18 "restored" Windsor drawings, the authors explain that, while ultraviolet light

A drawing by Leonardo as it appears to the naked eye (above) and under ultraviolet light (below). The newly deciphered writing in the upper right-hand corner translates as: "In this manner originate the nerves of the whole person at each projection of the spine."

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is often used to examine manuscripts and works of art, results for many of the Leonardo drawings had so far been spotty. (Ultraviolet light excites the surface of paper, producing fluorescence; but dark lines—even invisible traces of lines—will not fluoresce, thus allowing faded markings to reappear.) The authors speculate that since earlier experiments involved chalk landscape drawings on paper coated with calcium, ultraviolet light could not distinguish the lines from the paper.

The drawings in the Roberts-Pedretti study, however, appear to have been made with a metallic instrument—probably an alloy of copper and lead—whose tracings inhibit fluorescence even though they are no longer visible to an unaided eye. Unfortunately, a precise chemical determination cannot be carried out without destroying a part, however minute, of the original drawing.

Settling Scores


Many musicologists have claimed that composer Franz Schubert (1797–1828) wrote his music rapidly, intuitively, almost impulsively, without the laborious reworking that marks the finished scores of Beethoven and other contemporaries. But in this careful analysis of Schubert's autograph scores, Griffel, professor of music at Hunter College, argues that the composer's creative process was in fact arduous and methodical.

Schubert followed his working procedure rigorously. First, the piano score was sketched, then the melody-carrying voices on the orchestral score, followed by the other parts. One shade of ink was used for the melodies, another for other voices, revisions, and corrections. Some drafts would become illegible because of the number of errors; they would therefore be recopied, yielding the clean pages that have misled specialists for so long. (In other words, observes Griffel, the faultless pages in a Schubert autograph score are the very pages that gave him the most trouble.) Once a manuscript was completed, dated, and signed, the composer would destroy all his preliminary sketches—unlike Beethoven, who left behind a record of trial and error.

Thus, the "Great" Symphony, says Griffel, was written and revised over a three-year period (1825–28), and its pencil corrections and different colored inks and paper reveal clearly the various stages of the work. Griffel also throws light on the mysterious "Unfinished" Symphony—the "cleanest" of Schubert's works—which boasts a signed and dated title page (den 30. Octob 1822. Wien) despite the fact that it was incomplete. Griffel speculates that the composer made a gift of it to the Styrian Music Society in Graz (which had elected him an honorary member) because he was too ill, and later too lazy, to compose something new.
Japan's Dilemma

Although a peaceful and economically healthy South Korea has been a major goal of Japanese foreign policy for the past 20 years, Japan has depended largely on the United States to achieve that end. Now, in the wake of apparently weakening U.S. commitment to Korean defense, Japan faces an array of disquieting choices.

Armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, writes Buck, a military affairs specialist at the University of Georgia, would expose Japan to unpleasant foreign policy alternatives and painful internal strains. If it sides with the United States in a Korean struggle, it will alienate China and the Soviet Union; if it refuses to aid the United States, it will damage the basis of its own defense under the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty. And reaching either decision in a country which lacks a popular consensus on Northeast Asia policy could well upset the fragile internal political balance. In realistic terms, only the status quo represents Japan's best interests.

Because of its own minimal military establishment—a 250,000-man non-nuclear force on which it spends less than 1 percent of its GNP—as well as the bilateral nature of U.S.-South Korean defense agreements, Japan lacks any significant ability to influence the situation. As Korea's major trading partner and source of investment capital, Japan has a vital stake in Korean stability. Nevertheless, says Buck, Japan has little choice save to remain "an interested, but essentially powerless bystander."

Nikita Who?

There has been considerable debate in recent years over trends in Soviet control of intellectual life under the government of Leonid Brezhnev. While some analysts believe that Soviet writings now reflect a greater range of opinion than during Khrushchev's rule, others view the Brezhnev regime as especially repressive.

Kerst, a retired State Department official and former Guest Scholar at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, suggests that, while there is still some room for innovative and imaginative thought in contemporary Russia, "it is equally obvious that some periodicals enjoy less freedom of discus-
PERIODICALS

OTHER NATIONS

sion than they did in the Khrushchev years.” Particularly glaring examples involve the histories of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), revised once by Khrushchev, and now being revised again.

Under Khrushchev, beginning with his “secret” speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and culminating in his 1962 attack on Stalin at the 22nd Party Congress, historiographers were confronted with a rare opportunity for candid analysis. Party historians laid the groundwork for a wholesale re-evaluation of the Stalin era. Work was intensified on the multivolume general history of the CPSU.

After Khrushchev’s removal in 1964, writes Kerst, the “new era” of permissiveness quickly disappeared. Historical studies completed during the Khrushchev years have been revised. Work has slowed on the History of the CPSU, and those volumes that have appeared reflect a new focus and contain startling omissions: gone is the standard reference to leading officials who perished in the Stalinist purges, for example, and there is no reference to the infamous Lavrenti Beria, the head of the secret police, who was assassinated in 1953. Khrushchev is all but ignored. The more recent party line has been to soft-pedal Stalin altogether; his worst atrocities are now being characterized as what dissident intellectual Roy Medvedev calls “lesser truths.”

Cuba’s Other Revolution

“Origins of Wealth and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba: 1750-1850” by Franklin W. Knight, in Hispanic American Historical Review (May 1977), Box 6697, College Station, Durham, N.C. 27708.

Between 1750 and 1850, colonial Cuba evolved from an island of small farmers (population 150,000) into a sprawling corporate plantation society with more than a million free men and slaves. The new plantation system gave rise to a “sugar revolution”—sugar mill production increased threefold during the period—as well as to a marked stratification of the island’s social classes. Until recently, many historians had assumed that this transformation was sparked by an influx of new men and new money from Spain, then the country's colonial master.

Knight, a historian at Johns Hopkins, argues instead that “the dynamic change came from among the oldest stock of Cubans,” whose distinguished ancestry could be traced to the earliest Spanish settlers. In a study of 450 prominent families, Knight finds that the old Cuban aristocracy, established before the wave of immigration, wielded considerable influence and could easily purchase public office on the town councils or cabildos. The councils, in turn, regulated commerce, commodity prices, and land tenure.

It was primarily these families, says Knight, and not newly arrived entrepreneurs, who consolidated the vast landholdings necessary for sugar cultivation. Receptive to technical innovations, they
took advantage of the 1762 British occupation of Havana to expand trade with non-Spanish ports. A high rate of intraclass marriage reinforced tendencies toward greater property accumulation. The Spanish Crown contributed directly to the evolution of plantation society by building the world's largest sugar mill complex on the island and by granting land transfers to loyal colonial subjects.

This effective monopolization of "exploitable sugar land" led to the growth of a large poor, landless class. The pursuit of wealth, Knight writes, largely obscured a "vicious process" of social disintegration, ethnic antagonism, and economic dependency.

Beyond the Fringe: Dissent in Israel


Israeli politics, long known for bitter controversy, have become considerably more volatile since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Factionalism, writes Schnall, coordinator of Judaic studies at Staten Island Community College, has erupted at the extremes of the political spectrum as a result of the Labor Government's failure to forge a lasting peace or define Israel's territorial claims.

On the right is the intransigent, intensely Zionist Gush Emunim ("Bloc of Believers"), which considers annexation of all Israeli-occupied land a religious obligation. Despite its Messianic ideology, the Gush has won wide secular support for a pioneering and spiritual movement to recover the territory of the Biblical kingdom of Israel. By emphasizing a return to a simpler piety and purity (discouraged by contemporary Israeli institutions), Gush Emunim has captured the public imagination in the nation's moments of greatest triumph and despair.

Most left-wing, anti-Zionist groups criticize Israeli life for its spiritual inertia, as does the Gush. But there comparisons end. One group, Haolam Hazeh ("This World"), reflects the ideologies of flamboyant journalist and former Knesset (or Parliament) member Uri Avnery, who remains one of the nation's most durable social gadflies. Among other things, Haolam Hazeh believes that as long as Israel remains an essentially Western state in an Oriental world, it can never be naturally integrated into the Middle East.

Far more militant is the Marxist Israel Socialist Organization, which refuses to appear on the Israeli ballot but has made its presence felt through violent demonstrations and alleged complicity with Arab intelligence agents. Rakah (an acronym for "New Communist List"), by speaking for the civil and political rights of
OTHER NATIONS

Israel's Arab minority, has the largest natural constituency of the three blocs and five seats in the 120-member Knesset. It follows Moscow's lead in interpreting and fighting for the "legitimate rights of Palestinians" and the repatriation of Arab refugees.

Traditional Zionism, Schnall notes, demands that radical dissent be voluntarily suppressed in the face of continual military, economic, and diplomatic pressures. But as both the defeat of the Labor Party in the May 1977 elections and the challenge from the fringes suggest, a political consensus in Israel is still far away.

A State of Disunity


For many young African nations, a federal system of government seemed an ideal solution to the intense regional rivalry among diverse tribal and ethnic groups under their jurisdiction. The experience of Nigeria, however, where the number of states has grown from 3 at independence (black lines on map) to 19 today (red) demonstrates that a federal structure is no stronger than the sense of "nation" that underlies it. Indeed, writes Rogge, a geographer at the University of Manitoba, the country's short but turbulent history—including attempted secession by the Ibo state of Biafra in 1967—is a case study of the inadequacy of federalism when it is forced to carry too great a burden.

Before Nigeria achieved independence in 1960—even before it came under British control after the Berlin Conference of 1885—continual conflict existed among the three dominant tribes (the Hausa-Fulani of the north, the Ibo of the east, the Yoruba of the west), as well as among countless smaller ones. Attempts to remedy the situation by increasing the number of states, Rogge contends, merely added to the friction by heightening tribal competition.

Symbolic of this internecine rivalry are the hot disputes over the national census whenever it is issued. The census is used to apportion political power and oil revenues among the states, and charges of over- and under-counting various groups helped topple the regime of General Yakubu Gowon in 1975. In all, the internal map of Nigeria has been redrawn three times since 1960. It is estimated that, if representation of all ethnic communities were achieved, some 200 states would be necessary. In Nigeria, says Rogge, "it remains highly questionable whether a desire for union ever overrode the preoccupations with regional self-interests."
"The State of Academic Science"
Based on a Study by the National Science Foundation, Change Magazine Press, NBW Tower, New Rochelle, N.Y. 10801. 250 pp. $5.95.
Authors: Bruce L. R. Smith and Joseph J. Karlesky.

Academic science retains the strength and vitality that have made such exceptional contributions to America's overall research and development (R&D) effort in the post-war era, report Columbia Professors Smith and Karlesky. But subtle indications of deterioration raise serious questions for the future.

Inflation, the economic slowdown, and a leveling off of federal support have eroded the financial base of even the wealthier private institutions. Less affluent research centers face more immediate obstacles: Facilities are becoming outdated or cannot be adequately maintained; less "discretionary" money is available to tide researchers over periods of uncertain funding. Deteriorating relations between universities and state and federal governments prompt some scientists to "play it safe" to keep their projects going, with a resulting trend toward less speculative research.

Graduate student enrollments are declining in several fields (physics, chemistry, mathematics), and some departments—as well as individual scientists—are losing decision-making power to the middle-level university bureaucracy that has emerged to manage interdisciplinary and group research projects. Moreover, the current controversy over recombinant DNA research illustrates an ever increasing involvement by federal, state, and local authorities, the media, and the public, in research decisions.

What kinds of research must be preserved, and where? What is the proper link between teaching and research activities? How and by whom should research decisions be made? For the short term future, the authors write, the $3.7 billion academic research system remains vigorous. But these complex questions must be addressed—now—to prevent a downward spiral in research capability that will be difficult and costly to arrest.

"The 1978 Budget: Setting National Priorities"
The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 443 pp. $11.95 (cloth); $4.95 (paper)
Editor: Joseph A. Pechman.

President Carter's revision of President Ford's 1978 budget reflects the sharply different economic philosophies of the two chief executives. While both hoped to stimulate the economy in the short run and balance the budget within three or four years, the eighth annual Brookings budget survey observes that Carter has changed Ford's emphasis by restoring cutbacks in federal spending for health and income security.
(although keeping a business and personal tax reduction proposal) and adding $22.6 billion in expenditures for employment programs—intended as the main stimulus to recovery. The total budget is now $462.6 billion, with a deficit of $57.9 billion.

Carter's stimulus package (including the ill-fated $50 tax rebate and the business tax credit proposals he later withdrew) increases outlays for employment and training assistance (up $10 billion) and public works programs (up $4 billion). These programs are designed to improve job prospects in the long run for the chronically unemployed, while at the same time relieving short-term inflationary pressures.

This mixture of long- and short-term objectives is a risky strategy, the authors suggest, particularly because public employment projects are notoriously slow in getting started; tax cuts and spending measures, the report goes on, might better provide an immediate stimulus.

The new administration's revisions in other policy areas generally hold down spending to avoid crowding out programs in the future. Defense spending, reduced by $2.8 billion from the proposed Ford level, is nevertheless up by about 3 percent.

The Carter energy program may slow consumer demand and increase alternative supplies but will do so at the expense of higher prices and delays caused by installation of environmental safeguards.

Projecting to 1981, the year Carter hopes to have a sufficient surplus to begin major new spending programs, the report's authors concede that changing circumstances at home and abroad may prove current assessments of future budgets unreliable. Nevertheless, they argue that the administration's inflation-fighting proposals—long-term policies of deregulation, antitrust enforcement, lower price supports, and greater competition from imported goods—will have had only a limited effect on inflation by the next election. Only if inflation drops to 5 percent annually, with unemployment dipping to 4.8 percent, as Carter hopes (Brookings is frankly "skeptical"), will there be leeway for further tax reductions and substantially increased social spending.

"War on Organized Crime Faltering—Federal Strike Forces Not Getting the Job Done"


The United States is little closer to controlling organized crime than it was 10 years ago, when President Lyndon Johnson instructed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to direct a coordinated campaign against the rackets.

Neither new organizations—such as the 18 interagency strike forces (these agencies include the Internal Revenue Service, the Postal Service, and the Secret Service) and the National Council on Organized Crime (NCOC)—nor the expenditure of $80 million a year on investigation and prosecution of key mob figures has denied organized crime a growing income, estimated at $50 billion annually from gambling alone. Other illegal activities, including narcotics and loan-sharking operations as well as infiltration of legitimate businesses, continue to flourish. So does corruption of public officials, the sine qua non of organized crime and its largest single expense.

In a review of six federal strike forces (in Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Brooklyn, and Manhattan), the report identifies a
Official and private forecasts have indicated "serious dislocations" in the 1980s as the demands of oil-importing nations approach the export capacity of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But one of the most critical variables in the energy equation remains a matter of speculation: Will Communist bloc nations, now facing a decline in the growth of Soviet oil production, be forced to join the competition for OPEC oil?

Not likely, concludes a Congressional Research Service study for three House and Senate committees. The Soviet Union is the world’s largest petroleum producer (over 10 million barrels a day), but as the "monster" Somolot-Tyumen oil field in West Siberia "peaks out" in the next year or two, the Soviets will probably be forced to turn to alternate energy sources (nuclear power, hydroelectric power, coal), conservation, and even "draconian" reductions in both energy and GNP growth rates. The reasons: Exploration under permafrost or in ice-locked offshore regions is a formidable task and largely beyond Soviet technology; and Soviet ability to maintain an international, hard currency balance of payments is already strained by imports of Western technology, equipment, grain. The U.S.S.R. cannot afford to enter the OPEC oil market, and in fact currently must export oil to the West.

A more pessimistic view comes from the CIA, which predicts that the U.S.S.R. will find itself unable to meet its own needs and those of Eastern Europe by the beginning of the next decade. According to the CIA report, the Soviet Union will turn to OPEC for imports totaling 3.5-4.5 million barrels a day (mb/d) by 1985. This would boost total world demand on OPEC supplies to 47-51 mb/d in 1985 (compared to the congressional estimate of 42.8 mb/d) and increase the demand on Saudi Arabia, the key OPEC producer, to 19 and possible 23 mb/d—"roughly double current capacity."

Senate and CIA reports agree on one crucial point: Soviet oil production will drop dramatically by the early 1980s and possibly as soon as next year.
variety of bureaucratic and conceptual problems hampering the federal effort. For one, officials and agencies cannot even agree on the nature of the enemy. Definitions of organized crime range from the 24 "families" of the Cosa Nostra to "any organized group involved in the commission of a crime." No clear lines of authority govern personnel of the 10 agencies participating in the strike force program, and NCOC, intended as the coordinating body, met for only one year and never developed a national strategy. The Justice Department has failed to provide criteria for evaluating the strike force program. Its computerized organized crime data system is of "limited use."

Inability to put organized crime leaders out of action long enough to damage criminal operations has also frustrated investigators. Of the nearly 3,000 indictments obtained between 1972 and 1975 by the six strike forces studied, only some 1,300 resulted in guilty pleas or convictions. Less than half of the guilty went to prison—and less than half of these for two years or more.

"The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?"
A Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, prepared by the Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 186 pp. $3.00 (Stock no. 052-070-04042-4)

In the past two decades, the Soviet Union has established an "impressive global presence," embracing much of the Third World—an area comprising two thirds of the world's 157 nations, half of its population, and 40 percent of its land mass. Increased Soviet influence constitutes a "challenge of the first magnitude" to the United States.

The Brezhnev regime, according to this analysis by the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service, has successfully pursued the seemingly contradictory goals of détente with the West and support for revolutionary activism in emerging nations. Soviet activity has moved beyond the Russian periphery and "national liberation zones" to focus on new targets of opportunity—exemplified by the Kremlin's carefully orchestrated support of one insurgent faction in Angola last year. Soviet ends have been advanced with such fervor that some observers termed the Brezhnev era a new, imperial phase in Russian history.

The foremost instruments of the Kremlin's influence have been economic aid ($11.4 billion since 1954), trade, and particularly military assistance ($12 billion since 1954). The Soviet Navy has also been used effectively as an arm of diplomacy.

An expanding Soviet presence among developing nations is of special concern to the West because of the critical importance of Third World resources (especially oil) and the proximity of Third World nations to major international shipping lanes. Even so, the report's authors observe, the United States can count on significant advantages in its dealings with the Third World. The United States is the cornerstone of the international monetary system and the fount of extensive amounts of foreign aid; it maintains unchallenged leadership in fields of science and technology desired by developing nations (the United States has been called the "graduate school" of the Third World); and its ideology of liberty and pluralism retains undiminished appeal. What is lacking, therefore, is not U.S. leverage, but a clear vision of where and how it ought to be applied.
"World Food and Nutrition Study: The Potential Contributions of Research"


In the poorest countries of Asia and Africa, where between 450 million and one billion people now suffer from hunger or malnutrition, food production must double by the end of the century.

But this comprehensive study by the National Research Council (NRC) takes an optimistic view of the future—providing "there is the political will in this country and abroad" to capitalize on several promising developments. Among them: the increasing ability of some developing nations (notably, Mexico, Libya, South Korea, Iran, and a score of others) to meet their agricultural needs, and the potential of scientific research to further improve crop yields. The report implicitly criticizes those who, like Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, in their book Food First: Beyond the Myth of Scarcity, contend that the "food problem" is essentially a "distribution problem."

The Council recommends a massive research and development effort to expand world food supply, reduce poverty, and curb soaring population growth, 80 percent of which, since 1950, occurred in the developing countries. The NRC recommends training native researchers to adapt new farming systems and technology to their own needs.

U.S.-based research, the NRC suggests, should emphasize four concerns: (1) nutrition and diet, which have greater impact on human health than comparable investments in medicine; (2) food production, particularly genetic manipulation, pest control, and management of tropical soils; (3) food marketing and waste reduction (in some areas, an estimated 50 percent of food supply is lost between harvest and consumption); and (4) mechanisms to promote better distribution.

Coordination of the U.S. food effort would best be accomplished by appointing an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Research; boosting agricultural research spending from $700 to $820 million (with 10 percent annual increases thereafter); and creating a federal matching-grants program to spur research and development in nonfederal institutions. With parallel commitments from other government agencies, the NRC concludes, "it should be possible to overcome the worst aspects of widespread hunger and malnutrition within one generation."
The United States bases its security on the Mutual Assured Destruction theory—each side holds the other’s cities hostage against nuclear attack.
Strategic Arms Control

Last spring, President Carter's surprise proposals for a deep cut in both U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces got a sharp rebuff from Moscow. However, the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), begun in 1969, have continued in Geneva, and once again Americans face the complexities inherent in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on curbing nuclear weapons. Here, historian Samuel Wells traces U.S. policy on strategic nuclear matters back to 1945; scholar-diplomat Raymond Garthoff discusses lessons learned during his SALT experience; political scientist Jack Snyder analyzes conflicting U.S. explanations of Soviet strategic moves; and theorist Colin Gray examines the basis of the "American" approach to arms control.

AMERICA AND THE "MAD" WORLD

by Samuel F. Wells, Jr.

Technology has infatuated the American people for at least a hundred years, but only in the 1970s have significant portions of society begun to raise questions about its costs in energy, about environmental damage, and unexplored alternatives. Nuclear weapons are surely the most deadly product of that love affair. Since the late 1940s, the United States has based its security overwhelmingly on atomic and hydrogen warheads. Could we have prevented a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union? Probably not—but American leaders could
have taken steps, despite the lack of Soviet cooperation, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and limit the opportunities for nuclear proliferation. Why this was never done makes a complex and tragic story.

The Era of Nuclear Monopoly, 1945-49

The United States initiated the atomic age on the premise that nuclear weapons required no special conditions or constraints in their use. Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the development of an atomic bomb in 1941, convinced that Nazi scientists were engaged in a similar effort. He continued the crash program even after it became clear that Germany had abandoned its research. When word of the first successful atomic explosion reached President Harry Truman at the Potsdam Conference, there was little debate about whether to use the awesome weapon against Japan. President Truman did not warn the Japanese or even inform all the Allied leaders about the new weapon. Then, on August 6, 1945, “Little Boy” exploded over Hiroshima, taking 70,000 lives. “Fat Man” fell on Nagasaki three days later, killing another 40,000 people.

Neither atomic attack killed more Japanese than the 84,000 who died in the firebombing of Tokyo the previous March 9, but they led the Emperor to intervene in the government debate and tip the scales in favor of immediate surrender. The American people and their leaders rejoiced at the end of the war in the Pacific and generally approved the use of the new weapon, but, as wartime attitudes dissipated, questions about the morality and usefulness of atomic weapons began to be heard.

Some critics, like radical author Dwight Macdonald, saw the bomb as further proof of the erosion of individual responsibility, the “decline to barbarism” provoked by the en-

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croachment of science into human affairs. Many scientists, guilty about their role in unleashing this new form of destruction and concerned about its future uses, worked to educate the public about the dangers inherent in the use and testing of nuclear weapons.

Armed and Navy leaders believed the A-bomb gave the United States a significant advantage, although they resisted incorporating it into their doctrine and strategic plans, in part because it accorded the primary role to the Air Force. Only a few senior officials, notably Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, hoped to use the nuclear monopoly to America's diplomatic advantage. Most political leaders, including President Truman, viewed the bomb as an ace in the hole, which they hoped would never have to be used again.

Arms Control Without Risk

By the end of 1945, there was widespread agreement among American government officials and opinion leaders on the need for international control of atomic energy. Washington assumed that the Soviet Union was developing nuclear weapons, and the search for a form of control that was both enforceable and acceptable to the Soviets quickly became the major issue. President Truman met in Washington in November 1945 with Prime Ministers Clement Attlee of Great Britain and Mackenzie King of Canada and agreed to work within the United Nations to ensure the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes and to outlaw nuclear weapons with appropriate safeguards.

Drawing on the work of a committee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal, Bernard Baruch presented the American program for international control to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946. Under the Baruch Plan, the United States proposed that all existing nuclear weapons be destroyed, that no further bombs be made, and that all information relating to the production and use of atomic energy be turned over to a proposed international agency. Steps toward nuclear disarmament would occur by stages after acceptance of a treaty that established a system of inspection and control, including sanctions that could be voted by a majority of the UN Security Council and were not subject to veto.

The Soviet Union, not surprisingly, rejected the Baruch Plan. The Russians were years away from development of their own atomic bomb and even further from a reliable
delivery system suitable for an attack against the United States. From Moscow's perspective, it was totally unacceptable to open their closed society to an inspection system and give up their veto in the Security Council before the United States had disposed of its weapons. The Soviet representatives responded with a proposal to destroy all atomic bombs first and then create a system of control, an arrangement that would have accorded them military predominance, especially in manpower, far superior to that of the demobilized West.

The United States refused to consider the Soviet proposal, thereby creating a deadlock in arms negotiations that would last until 1955. The sterile debate over whether disarmament or controls should come first continued; without a willingness on either side to make basic concessions, the discussions degenerated into a propaganda contest.

An Atomic Strategy

Washington moved toward greater reliance on atomic weapons for U.S. defense when confronted with both a Soviet threat of growing dimensions (Russia totally dominated its neighbors in Eastern Europe and occupied North Korea) and domestic pressures to reduce military manpower and balance the budget. During 1947, the administration advanced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as elements of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion by political and economic means.* Recurrent crises in Berlin and a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948 persuaded many American officials that a more forceful response to the Russians would soon be necessary.

In this atmosphere, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1948 approved the first emergency war plan of the postwar period. Codenamed Halfmoon, this plan postulated that the Soviet Union would initiate a war with concurrent offensives in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia and called for the United States to respond with a devastating A-bomb attack on more than 20 Russian cities within the first two months of the war.

Before the operational plans for Halfmoon could be completed, the Soviet blockade of the western zones of occupied Berlin in late June 1948 raised serious questions about Ameri-

*The Truman Doctrine, announced March 17, 1947, offered U.S. assistance in freeing peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The Marshall Plan, named for Secretary of State George C. Marshall and made public June 5, 1947, offered economic aid to all European countries willing to cooperate with others in helping themselves. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were included in the plan but spurned it.
can military capabilities. Several of the President's top civilian advisers wanted to adopt a tough stance, but the Joint Chiefs pointed out the inability of American conventional forces to break the blockade as well as the lack of effective atomic power. At that time, fewer than 40 B-29 bombers were able to carry the unwieldy nuclear weapons; the atomic stockpile contained only a slightly larger number of bombs, many of which were later discovered to be defective and unusable; and there were neither bombs nor delivery aircraft located outside the United States and within range of the Soviet Union.

The Berlin blockade highlighted the nation's weak and uncoordinated postwar defense posture; it convinced the President that the Pentagon would have to make better use of its resources. Even before his surprise re-election in November 1948, Truman took steps to ensure greater military preparedness and to end interservice squabbling over appropriations by proposing a tight defense budget with a $15 billion ceiling for the coming fiscal year.

**The Push of Technology**

The combination of budget pressures and the availability of new technology caused the United States to adopt an atomic strategy. The success of the 1948 atomic tests promised a large stockpile of new weapons, which were cheaper, smaller, had a wide range of destructive force, and used much less fissionable material than the original A-bombs. At the same time, new long-range B-36 and B-50 bombers became operational, and the Air Force perfected new techniques of inflight refueling. The military, unable to match the immense Soviet ground forces, concluded that an air-delivered atomic offensive was the only adequate means of defense within the economic limits imposed by the President. NATO also fitted into this strategic plan, with America's European allies providing the forward bases needed for strikes against the Soviet Union. By mid-1949, the United States was entrusting its basic security to nuclear weapons capable of being delivered from European bases by the bomber crews of the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

Just as this atomic strategy matured, the United States lost its nuclear monopoly. The first Soviet atomic test in August 1949 signaled a new phase of the Cold War. For the first time since becoming a great power in the 1890s, the United States was vulnerable to strategic bombardment.
In response to this new Soviet capability, the President called for a study on the advisability of building a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb. Senior officials rejected the arguments of scientists like J. Robert Oppenheimer and diplomats like George F. Kennan that a superbomb would not increase American security. Convinced by hostile Russian behavior that no reliable arms limitation agreement on nuclear weapons could be reached with the Soviets, Truman approved an accelerated research program to determine the scientific feasibility of a fusion bomb and, as a concession to critics of the H-bomb proposal, he ordered a broad review of basic U.S. national security policy in light of the new Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The review group, under Paul H. Nitze, then director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, reported to the National Security Council (NSC) in April 1950. In the study known as NSC 68, Nitze and his colleagues argued that the United States should strengthen its defenses and prepare for a time of "maximum danger" from the Soviet Union in the year 1954. Truman did not endorse the study immediately. While agreeing that Soviet-American relations were headed for difficult times, he was suspicious of a large military build-up and wanted to know how much the study's recommendations would cost. Before the agencies and departments could provide an answer, the outbreak of war in Korea made the question moot.

The Era of Massive Retaliation, 1950-59

The North Korean attack of June 25, 1950, destroyed the Truman administration's resistance to increased military spending and provoked a significant escalation of the Cold War. Assuming the North Korean offensive to be directed from Moscow (the Soviet Union had equipped the North Korean forces and approved an attack but had expected it to come later in the summer), American officials viewed the invasion as concrete evidence of Soviet aggressive intent and quickly decided to resist with force this probe of Western will. Truman ordered U.S. ground troops into South Korea, and spending for defense rose from $13 billion in Fiscal Year 1950 to a peak of $50 billion in Fiscal Year 1953. Outlays would decline as the war wound down, but defense spending would never again go below $40 billion a year.

In addition to financing military operations in Korea, this
infusion of new funds supported guarantees and increased aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan and the French in Indochina, the dispatch of four additional U.S. Army divisions to Europe, and the rearming of West Germany within an integrated NATO force. With regard to strategic arms, the Korean War years saw the development of a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, rapid expansion of the Air Force, and the construction of numerous air bases at home and overseas. Programs begun in this period increased SAC bomber strength from 520 aircraft in 1950 to 1,082 in 1954, and to a maximum of 1,854 in 1959.

The impact of the Korean War on U.S. diplomatic commitments and strategic programs is hard to overestimate. The war sounded an alarm bell in the demobilized West. The United States extended the policy of containment to Asia and placed overwhelming reliance on military means to restrict Communist expansion. In response to an attack by a Soviet client-state in an area the United States had previously declared outside its Asian defense perimeter, the Truman administration surrounded Russia with air bases, built an immense nuclear arsenal, and transformed NATO into a significant military alliance with conventional forces. So great became the opposition of the American public to the indecisive, limited war in Korea that national security planners confirmed their commitment to an atomic strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the future. By the summer of 1952, the Truman administration had developed plans to use tactical atomic weapons in any wars to come. The Democrats had thus taken the first step toward what came to be called the policy of Massive Retaliation.

The New Look

As he fulfilled his campaign pledge to end the war in Korea, President Eisenhower initiated a broad study of U.S. defenses that resulted in the New Look policy. The Republican administration's approach, approved in October 1953, rejected the concept of a predicted "year of maximum danger" and sought to avoid limited wars like that in Korea. Emphasizing the importance of a sound economy to a national strength, Eisenhower and his top advisers sought a military program that could be maintained over what the President called the long haul without bankrupting the country. Their plan called for increased emphasis on strategic offense and defense against air attack, and it further reduced ground forces while...
OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS: USA & USSR


Polaris A-2
Atlas F
Titan I
Jupiter
Polaris A-3
Minuteman II
Poseidon C-3
Minuteman III
Trident C-4
Trident D-5

Polaris A-1
Titan II
Minuteman

B-58
FB-111

Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter

Cuban Missile Crisis
Arab-Israeli War
Yom Kippur War
Vietnam War

Berlin Wall
Czech Invasion

ACDA Founded
Limited Test Ban Treaty
"Hot Line"

French Nuclear Capability
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Latin American Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

SS-6
SS-9
SS-13

SS-8
SS-11
SS-N-6

SS-7
SS-N-8

SS-12
SS-NX

TU-22 (Blinder)
TU-XX (Backfire)


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making them more mobile. Although Republican spokesmen stressed its novelty, Eisenhower's New Look closely resembled the pre-Korean War plans of the Truman era.

Eisenhower's views on nuclear weapons, however, represented a significant departure from those of the previous administration. He insisted that atomic weapons should be used on the first day of a general war and that any war with Russia would be a general war. He rejected distinctions between conventional and atomic munitions. With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, he told a press conference on March 16, 1955: "In any combat where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else."

In strategic terms, these views became the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which held that the United States should respond to any aggression, conventional or nuclear, with an all-out atomic attack. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained the policy to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, the administration had made "the basic decision . . . to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly by means and at places of our choosing." Although Dulles insisted that the administration did not intend "to turn every local war into a general war," strategists from the President on down clearly expected this policy of calculated ambiguity about the nature of an American response to deter Communist aggression of any sort.

Ike as Arms Controller

While relying on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, Eisenhower at the same time made great efforts to curb the arms race and lessen Soviet-American tension. Advances did not come easily. The detonation of a Soviet hydrogen bomb in August 1953 enhanced Moscow's power, and the triumvirate that assumed leadership after Stalin's death the preceding March (Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev) refused to negotiate any agreement that placed Russia in a position of permanent strategic inferiority to the United States.

Nevertheless, Eisenhower initiated many studies and proposals for the limitation of armaments. His December 1953 Atoms for Peace address, calling for the creation of an international agency to receive and utilize donations of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, led to the establishment, with Soviet participation, of the International Atomic Energy
Agency in Vienna in July 1957.

In order to reduce the dangers of surprise attack, the President at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 advanced the Open Skies proposal, which would have required the United States and Russia to exchange blueprints of their military establishments and to allow reciprocal aerial inspection of their territory. Although rejected by the Soviets at the time as a scheme for legalized espionage, the Open Skies concept, along with Ike's 1958 proposal for the peaceful exploration and development of outer space, formed the basis much later for verification of arms agreements by reconnaissance satellites, a necessary feature of the control mechanism in the SALT I Agreements.)*

In the spring of 1955, American officials headed by Harold Stassen began a series of comprehensive arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union covering conventional and nuclear arms, limits on testing, nuclear free zones, and restricted aerial inspection. Prospects for agreement faded when Soviet successes in rocket development in 1957 threatened to alter dramatically the strategic balance.

The Sputnik Shock

America's sense of technological superiority was rudely jolted when the Soviet Union launched the first successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957 and followed it in early October with the orbiting of the first earth satellite, Sputnik I. The Eisenhower administration belittled the Soviet achievement at first, but most Americans were greatly impressed. Policy studies urged the President to accelerate U.S. missile development, disperse SAC bombers, improve early warning systems, expand the civil defense effort, and increase funding for basic research and scientific education.

Responding to these recommendations and to the pressures generated by widespread discussion in Congress and the press of an impending "missile gap," Eisenhower increased the pace of missile development, won passage of the National Defense Education Act, and opened negotiations with the Russians in Geneva over ways to reduce the chances of surprise attack.

*The Soviet Union accepted the peaceful uses of space in principle in 1963, and the proposal became the basis for the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. In a less vital area, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 10 other nations signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, which opened Antarctica for scientific investigation but prohibited weapons testing there or the creation of military bases. This treaty, which became effective on June 23, 1961, was the first arms control agreement of the nuclear age.
The Geneva talks collapsed in December 1958 after six futile weeks because of a Soviet insistence on discussing broad issues, such as the removal of all nuclear and rocket-powered weapons from both parts of Germany, instead of the technical aspects of surprise attack (e.g., aerial reconnaissance) to which the Americans had limited the agenda. Meanwhile, the American missile build-up gained momentum; the first Atlas ICBMs became operational during 1959.

The United States overreacted to Sputnik, much as it had to the North Korean invasion of 1950. Eisenhower was correct in his basic feeling that America led in technology and was developing satellites and missiles of much greater sophistication than the Russians. We know today that the Sputnik accomplishment was largely bluff. Under immense pressure to provide propaganda victories for the Khrushchev regime, Soviet space scientists had grouped 20 inefficient rocket engines in a two-stage cluster and without adequate testing or safeguards had launched the first Sputnik into orbit. At Khrushchev’s insistence, Soviet scientists continued their efforts to beat the Americans at every stage of the space race, yet Soviet technology was never superior to that of the United States.*

The Era of American Missile Superiority, 1960-70

As John F. Kennedy quickly learned after entering the White House, the United States did not, in fact, lag behind the Soviet Union in strategic power. In addition to its superiority in long- and medium-range bombers, America held the lead in land- and sea-based missiles in terms of numbers deployed, reliability, accuracy, and production capacity (see chart on p. 69). Yet, for the first time, the United States was vulnerable to a devastating Soviet attack. Though lacking a long-range bomber force, the Soviets now had giant missiles that could hit cities in Western Europe and the continental United States. It no longer made sense for America to threaten nuclear war in response to localized aggression. Massive Retaliation, having become a two-way street, was no longer an adequate defense policy for the United States.

Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara drew on the research of systems analysts and so-called defense intellectuals to shape a new strategy of Flexible Response. With regard to strategic weapons, their objective was to

*See The Russian Space Bluff (London: Stacey, 1971), by Leonid Vladimirov, a Soviet space-science journalist, who defected to Great Britain.
create a secure second-strike retaliatory force that would serve as a deterrent to nuclear war. The relatively invulnerable Polaris fleet with its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) provided the solution to this problem.

To enhance strategic stability, the administration developed in 1963 the concept of the "triad," a balanced offensive force that included ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers. For limited non-nuclear conflicts, Kennedy and his advisers expanded the country's mobile ground forces and strengthened the Green Berets for nonconventional guerrilla warfare. Reversing Eisenhower's New Look, they rejected the use of tactical nuclear weapons except in cases of extreme danger. They advanced, and subsequent administrations have maintained, the theory of the "firebreak"—that the major threshold in escalation was the move from conventional to nuclear weapons and that the costs of taking that step ought to be raised so that it would never be taken.
Nikita Khrushchev's October 1962 gamble in secretly installing Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Cuba gave Kennedy the opportunity to apply the principles of Flexible Response and resulted in a reassessment of strategic policy on both sides. Backed by a recognized superiority in nuclear forces, the United States pursued a series of graduated conventional steps from a naval blockade to the threat of air strikes and invasion of the island, which forced Khrushchev to capitulate.

In the aftermath, McNamara worked to rationalize force structure and cut back projected missile strength to 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs, a plateau that would be reached in 1967. Believing that the Russians would develop an antiballistic missile (ABM), the Army increased its effort to create a similar defensive system.

The Cuban crisis had an unexpected effect on Soviet strategic policy. Since 1945, Russian military priorities had overwhelmingly stressed conventional offense and strategic defense forces. They had not built a long-range bomber fleet and were slow to produce and deploy ICBMs despite their early successes in this field. But the Cuban episode, coming after Khrushchev's failure to bluff Kennedy out of Berlin in 1961, proved sharply humiliating to the Russians. First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov spoke for many when he declared, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."* Thereafter, the Russians launched a massive ICBM building program that resulted in parity with American forces within a decade. With this surge in Soviet missile strength, a debate began in the United States over what the Russians were trying to achieve—parity or superiority in strategic power.

Mutual Assured Destruction

Although unaware of the magnitude of the projected Soviet ICBM force, American defense officials concluded in 1965 that it would be impossible to maintain a degree of superiority in strategic power that would prevent serious damage to the United States in a general war. McNamara convinced President Lyndon Johnson that the best policy for America was to hold the population centers of the Soviet Union hostage. Any hope of pursuing a "Damage Limitation Strategy" (combining civil defense efforts at home with an announced policy of targeting only enemy military forces and


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installations rather than civilian population centers) was abandoned in favor of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In February 1965, the Secretary of Defense announced to the House Armed Services Committee that, while he sought in the event of war "to limit damage to our population and industrial capacities," the primary objective of American defense policy was "to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker."

McNamara judged that the level of damage sufficient for deterrence was 25–30 percent of the Soviet population and about 70 percent of its industrial capacity. Subsequent strategic refinements have included the addition of "flexible options" to allow targeting of Soviet military installations in a limited war situation, but MAD has remained the basic American strategy.

**Arms Limits at the Margin**

While there is much disagreement among American experts over whether the Russians have accepted the underlying premise of MAD, it is clear that U.S. strategic policies and the size of both Soviet and American strategic forces as we know them today were fixed by 1965. New strategic weapons, given current technology, require 10 to 15 years for development, and the Russians, in particular, adhere to rigid five-year defense plans that restrict innovation.

The high hopes for arms control expressed by officials of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had meager results, producing only a series of limited agreements in areas where the superpowers did not deny themselves anything of value. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was founded in September 1961 as an independent organization to develop and advocate new approaches to arms control within the Washington bureaucracy. It was unable to make progress, however, until the Cuban missile crisis and its threat of nuclear war revived interest in stabilizing the arms competition. The Cuban confrontation led directly to the signing in June 1963 of the "Hot Line" Agreement, which provided for rapid Soviet-American teletype communication "in time of emergency."

The following August, building on the experience of the 1958–61 voluntary test ban, the two superpowers and Great Britain signed in Moscow the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which
prohibited nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

Among other agreements, the most important were the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. These last two accords did not affect the Soviet-American strategic balance, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty was accompanied by an announcement that the superpowers had agreed to enter discussions on strategic arms limitations.

The Era of Strategic Equivalence, 1971-

When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, the Soviet Union was building giant missiles at a rate that would produce general parity in the number of strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers) by 1971. In order to establish détente with Russia and stabilize the strategic arms race, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger added new programs and options to the established McNamara concepts and created the Strategy of Sufficiency. Concentrating less on the effects of each new weapon system on strategic stability than on negotiating technique, Kissinger relied heavily on "bargaining-chip" tactics. Weapon systems of marginal benefit or cost-effectiveness to the United States were developed; they could then be traded off for concessions by Moscow.

The antiballistic missile highlighted the difficulty of maintaining strategic stability under the 1965 MAD doctrine. Mutual Assured Destruction rests on the assumption that enemy cities will be undefended and therefore will become hostages against a first strike. This strategy cannot survive the introduction of damage-limiting innovations such as extensive civil defense, ABM defense of cities, or high-accuracy ICBMs designed to hit the hardened silos of the other side's retaliatory missile force.

Although an extensive ABM system proved very expensive and difficult to build, the Nixon administration pursued ABM development as a bargaining-chip. The United States had also produced the Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), a missile which separates into 3-14 separately targetable nuclear warheads. American officials knew the Soviets were several years behind in MIRV technology, but to counter the Russians' ABM and improve American striking power, Nixon directed the deployment of MIRVs starting in June 1970. While giving the United States a substantial lead
in total warheads deployed, the decision now poses grave problems for stability (the Russians are MIRVing too) because it is virtually impossible to verify whether a missile is MIRVed.

The United States and Russia began a long series of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in November 1969. Designed to be the Nixon administration’s centerpiece of détente, SALT has so far produced three agreements signed in Moscow in May 1972 and the Vladivostok Accord of November 1974. In Moscow, President Nixon and General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed a statement of Basic Principles of relations between their two countries. They agreed to an ABM treaty, which restricted each side to two ABM sites, with no more than 100 missiles at each location. Most important, they signed an interim agreement that limited the number of offensive missiles each side could possess. The agreement, which expired in October 1977, restricted the Soviet Union to 1,618 ICBMs and 950 SLBMs in 62 submarines, and the United States to 1,054 ICBMs and 710 SLBMs in 44 submarines; it put constraints on the number of large ICBMs and provided for replacing old ICBMs with additional SLBMs.

The follow-up Vladivostok Accord, signed by President Ford and Brezhnev in 1974, filled some of the gaps in the interim agreement. It limited each side to a total of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, including bombers, and allowed each to place MIRVs on no more than 1,320 of its missiles. There was no provision in the agreement for verification of the limits on MIRVs.

The SALT Process

The SALT I agreements are milestones in the history of arms control, and they have unquestionably benefited the United States by placing the first limits on offensive nuclear weapons and effectively terminating one weapon system, the ABM, which undermined Mutual Assured Destruction and the American theory of deterrence.

But SALT was designed as a continuing process in the expectation that limited initial agreements would lead to more substantial concessions and eventually to cuts in the number of weapons. Unanticipated events have, however, interrupted the process. Domestic political attacks on the agreements, the loopholes that have been exposed in the terms, and overselling by the Nixon administration have all produced disillusionment and suspicion among the American
people. The discussion of SALT in the 1976 election campaign, together with President Ford's rejection of the term détente, demonstrates the vulnerability of arms control diplomacy to political pressures generated in an election year.

The Carter administration's "Deep Cut" proposals* presented to an astonished Soviet leadership in Moscow in March, 1977, had the effect of offering a total ban on development of the U.S. long-range cruise missile in return for a freeze on development and deployment of new ICBMs and a reduction by half in the number of large Soviet ICBMs. The Soviets rejected the proposals outright, warning that the Carter proposals threatened the Vladivostok Accord, including Brezhnev's agreement to omit from the SALT equation U.S. forward base systems (e.g., intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed tactical aircraft capable of attacking the Soviet Union from overseas bases).

Despite this spring's rebuff in Moscow, the SALT negotiations have resumed. New initiatives came from Washington, but as autumn approached, there was little prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough. The SALT process remains vulnerable to new weapon systems, sudden political changes in Moscow and Washington, and events in the Middle East or Africa. The current status of technology in satellite reconnaissance, mobile ICBMs, and cruise missiles threatens many changes in strategic weapons within the next few years. It is imperative that new arms control agreements be concluded before technological developments or political changes make negotiation more difficult.

Lessons of the Nuclear Age

The history of American nuclear policy over the last 30 years provides some "lessons" in the form of sensitivity training. We have much to ponder, notably our past assumptions about the motives and capabilities of the other side. We underrated Soviet fears of our nuclear supremacy after World War II. We overreacted to both the Korean War and to

*The United States proposed: a reduction in strategic delivery vehicles for each side from the Vladivostok maximum of 2,400 to 1,800-2,000; a reduction in MIRVed missiles from 1,320 to 1,110-1,200; a limit on land-based multiple warhead ICBMs of 550 each; reduction of large, modern Soviet ICBMs from 308 to 150; a freeze on development and deployment of new ICBMs; a ban on the modification of existing ICBMs; a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBMs; arrangements to assure the United States that the Russian Backfire bomber was not to be deployed as a strategic weapon (e.g., limiting fuel capacity or gear for inflight refueling). In exchange for these limitations, which would bear harder on the Soviets than the Americans, the United States suggested a total ban on development of strategic cruise missiles with ranges over 2,500 miles.
Sputnik. We tended to confuse Soviet rhetoric with Soviet capabilities. But to blame the United States primarily for the failure to halt the momentum of the nuclear arms race is both naive and without foundation.

Although America has led in technological innovation each step of the way (with a few exceptions like Sputnik), we have also led in efforts for arms control. But our arms limitation proposals frequently included elements such as on-site inspection that undermined aspects of the Soviet domestic security system. And our current human rights policies are reviving Kremlin fears and complicating strategic arms negotiations, despite the Carter administration’s denial of any linkage between the two issues.

Moreover, we found that our early lead in atomic weaponry produced no guarantee of national security; the advent of the ICBM has made the continental United States vulnerable to surprise attack for the first time in history. Our own system of weapons procurement has given technology a momentum of its own—leading to deployment of weapons useful only as bargaining-chips. Such ventures can be costly, as President Carter discovered last spring in analyzing, then rejecting, the proposed B-1 bomber with its price tag of $102 million per airplane.

The best results in our negotiations with Moscow have come not when the United States enjoyed clear superiority, but when both sides possessed roughly equivalent power. The United States, which has traditionally approached arms control negotiations with “worst-case” assumptions, should now develop initiatives that take some risks for international control and limitation of nuclear arms. In a MAD world, the payoffs in terms of survival could be substantial.
NEGOTIATING SALT

by Raymond L. Garthoff

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been a familiar feature of United States–Soviet relations for almost eight years. They are, in fact, the broadest, most extensive U.S.–Soviet negotiations ever undertaken and therefore offer some useful clues on how, and how not, to negotiate with the Russians.

First proposed more than a decade ago (by the United States in December 1966), postponed because of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the SALT negotiations finally opened in Helsinki in November 1969. The U.S. and Russian negotiators shuttled between Helsinki and Vienna and in 1972 settled in Geneva, where their discussions have continued, punctuated by occasional summit meetings.

The U.S. delegation, including advisers, interpreters, administrative staff, and Marine guards, has numbered up to 100 people—the equivalent of a major embassy staff, but costing to date something less than the price of one modern jet fighter. The Soviet delegation has been roughly similar in size and composition.

A presidential appointee heads the American negotiating team: 1969–73, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1973–76, U. Alexis Johnson, a veteran State Department diplomat; 1977, Paul C. Warnke, lawyer, former Defense Department official, and present director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Also on hand are several senior delegates, representing important bureaucratic constituencies in the executive branch, including the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and sometimes the defense-scientific community. The Soviet delegation, which in eight years has exhibited far fewer changes in personnel, is basically similar in composition, except that there is greater military and military-industrial representation and no representation equivalent to that of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It has been headed for all eight years by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who came to the talks with considerable negotiating experience, although not specifically with the United States or in arms control.

Serving with Semenov have been at least two three-star generals and two senior scientific representatives, including initially Colonel General (now Marshal and First Deputy Minister of Defense) Nikolai Ogarkov; Academician Alexander Shchukin, a radar specialist and renowned scientist, then in his 70s; and Peter Pleshakov, deputy minister (later minister) of the Ministry of Radio Industry.

As in all negotiations, in SALT I, time spent in preparation vastly exceeded that devoted to formal negotiating. Senior delegates on the American side usually met together five days a week, for two or three sessions of several hours each, to discuss draft presentation, tactics, and strategy. The two delegations (usually with about 10 persons each) met for several hours twice a week for the first year or so; formal sessions were later held less often. They were held alternately in the American and Soviet Embassies. The host for the day would welcome his opposite number and invite him to make his presentation. The procedure was rigidly formal, with little time devoted to actual discussion. After each formal "plenary" meeting the delegations split into small groups to chat. These informal chats provided moderately useful opportunities for clarification and argumentation.

After each session in Helsinki or Vienna, the U.S. delegates would return to their offices in leased buildings, with secure, tap-proof conference rooms, Marine Guards, and secure communications, to talk over highlights of the plenary session and the informal meetings that followed. Cables to

*In the years leading to the 1972 SALT I Agreements, the first senior State Department delegate was the late Llewellyn Thompson, followed in 1970 by J. Graham Parsons, former U.S. ambassador to Laos and Sweden. The representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, an Air Force staff officer and former fighter pilot. Paul Nitze, onetime Secretary of the Navy and a man with broad experience in the Defense and State Departments, represented the Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown, now Secretary of Defense, then president of the California Institute of Technology and previously the Pentagon's director of Defense Research and Engineering and Secretary of the Air Force, represented the military-scientific establishment.
Washington were prepared and cleared, and informal talks were written up in MemCons (Memoranda of Conversation)—some 500 in the two and one-half years of SALT I.

Formal Soviet presentations, accounts of Ambassador Smith’s meetings, and highlights of other conversations were sent to Washington by cable. MemCons were sent by diplomatic pouch for background use by the Washington SALT community, which numbered 50 or so government professionals. All cables from the SALT delegation had very restricted circulation within the Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Formal meetings of the two delegations were an essential part of SALT I, but they were “on the record” and by themselves were not adequate for actual negotiating. The two delegations later experimented with smaller “mini-plenaries,” with only a few senior members present. These sessions were usually held to discuss treaty specifics, such as restrictions on the numbers and locations of radars allowed in an antiballistic missile (ABM) system. Discussions at these mini-plenaries were exploratory and seldom evoked an authoritative official response or change of position from either side.

But important informal probings and exchanges between Soviet and American negotiators often took place over long luncheons and dinners preceding private meetings of the delegation chiefs. They were useful in scouting out possibilities, in underlining particular proposals or rejections, and in shading degrees of advocacy or opposition without changing formal positions.

Eventually such meetings became a principal channel for negotiating many of the most difficult provisions of the SALT I Agreements. They resolved such matters as radar controls, ABM levels, the key provision in Article I of the treaty in which both sides agreed to limit their ABM systems, and corollary restrictions on other radar systems (e.g., early warn-
ing and air traffic control radars) that might be upgraded for ABM use.

Recourse to this informal mechanism proved highly useful in SALT I. Regrettably, it was not much used from 1973 through 1976 in SALT II—a reflection of Washington's view that the delegation should operate under a more limited negotiating mandate. I, personally, found these sessions the most fascinating part of the work. As the "point men," we entered first on new terrain or tried to find paths through well-known minefields. Minister Semenov called us "the wizards." Those Americans not participating sometimes used less flattering terms.

Two representatives from each side were usually present, both to ensure straight reporting and, in the case of the Americans at least, to protect the representatives from possible charges of exceeding their mandate. When I was alone, as was sometimes the case, or accompanied by a Russian-speaking colleague, we usually spoke Russian with the Soviets; otherwise we used English.

Partnerships of Interest

More formal working groups were set up in the summer of 1971 to work on ad hoc technical matters and, on a regular basis, to prepare joint drafts of the agreements—initially with many bracketed alternatives reflecting points of disagreement. These sessions were held alternately in the two embassies.

One of the peculiarities of prolonged international negotiations is that "transnational" or "transdelegation" partnerships of interest develop, whereas unanimity of views may be lacking within a delegation (or within the home offices of the delegation). For example, in the SALT negotiations, certain American and Russian negotiators wanted to ban "futuristic" types of ABM systems; others, on both sides, did not. Also, Paul Nitze felt strongly about controls on radar, while General Allison and the Joint Chiefs were less determined to press the issue. Nitze's exchanges with Soviet Academician Shchukin eventually led to Soviet acceptance of some significant restraints on radars. To my knowledge, there were no instances on either side of disloyalty to a delegation or its instructed position. But there were issues on which some delegates and advisers sought earnestly to persuade members of the other delegation, while their compatriots did not.

Back in Washington, a "Verification Panel" was established early in the negotiations to deal with the important
verification, or "policing," aspect of strategic arms control. Henry Kissinger, in his role as assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, rapidly converted the panel into the sole senior-level American group dealing with SALT, aside from the White House's National Security Council. (The Verification Panel held 12 to 15 meetings on SALT in 1971, in contrast to the Council's 2 or 3.) Its members included Kissinger, as chairman, the deputy secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the director of the CIA, and a few others, including, for no apparent reason, Attorney General John Mitchell.

**Secret "Back Channels"**

At the same time, unbeknownst to the U.S. SALT delegation abroad, President Nixon in January 1971 began a "back-channel" correspondence on arms control with Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, supplemented by secret meetings of Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington. These meetings and exchanges continued until mid-May of that year. Both sides agreed to seek a separate ABM treaty as well as certain, not clearly defined, interim measures to limit offensive strategic weapons, rather than continuing to try for a single comprehensive treaty. Ambassador Smith (and Secretary of State William Rogers) were informed of this negotiating effort on May 19, only one day before release of the official announcement, although the American SALT delegation had heard from members of the Soviet delegation earlier in May that some special talks were taking place.

The back-channel was again employed by Kissinger in the spring of 1972 (by then the Kremlin principal was General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev rather than Kosygin) and involved a secret trip to Moscow by Kissinger, accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin.* Minister Semenov was recalled to Moscow for the occasion, but the American SALT delegation and even the American ambassador in Moscow, Jacob Beam, were unaware of the meetings until after they had ended. These back-channel meetings produced high-level endorsement for an ABM agreement worked out by the SALT delegations in April, as well as an interim agreement on offensive arms to include SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles), but

*This Brezhnev-Kissinger "mini-summit" marked the beginning of Kissinger's practice of relying only on Soviet interpreters—a practice he favored to prevent possible leakage to other American officials, and one adopted by President Nixon at summit meetings dealing with SALT but later abandoned by President Ford.
a number of other issues were left for the Nixon-Brezhnev summit negotiations in June 1972.

Kissinger relished the process of personal involvement. In many cases he served brilliantly, but in others he failed to recognize the role that professional diplomacy and diplomats could play and even came to resent, and perhaps be jealous of, the professionals who were effective. He therefore curtailed the role of the professionals and in the process spread himself too thin.

From his early success in mastering issues that came before the Verification Panel, Kissinger developed a conviction that he did not need the government bureaucracy. A small personal staff, he felt, could skim the cream off the ponderous interagency staff studies that he ordered to keep the bureaucracy occupied. In this way, he thought, he could learn all he needed to know about a subject.

Unfortunately, this was not always the case. On some occasions, his penchant for going it alone prevented him from getting needed advice, and U.S. interests suffered as a consequence. This happened, for example, in 1971, when Kissinger agreed with the Russians that the interim agreements on strategic offensive weapons need not include submarine missile fleets, thus permitting both sides to strengthen their SLBM forces. The agreement was to be in effect for a five-year period, but the United States, unlike the Russians would not benefit. Why? Evidently Kissinger was unaware that a follow-on navy ballistic missile submarine design was not yet ready, and U.S. submarine-building facilities were committed to work on other types of submarines.

Differing Approaches

During SALT I, in marked contrast to earlier post-World War II negotiations with the Russians, there was a remarkable absence of extraneous ideologizing and propaganda or, indeed, of irrelevant political discussion. Each side, of course, presented and justified its position in terms of its own rationales, but the talks stuck to business. Agreement with the Soviets was readily reached on maintaining secrecy during the negotiations. On the whole, confidentiality was strictly observed by both delegations. There were, however, a number of leaks to reporters in Washington, including some by Kissinger that were perhaps intended to prepare for public acceptance of the final agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union took markedly
different approaches to SALT. As is often the case, the Russians sought “agreement in principle” prior to agreement on specifics, or even before disclosing their proposals. By contrast, the more pragmatic American approach was to offer a fairly complete, complex, and detailed package proposal. Arguments can be advanced for each technique, but the two are difficult to reconcile.

Essentially, the Russians' approach offered them greater flexibility; they would have the advantage when nailing down specifics after getting us committed to a general line. One principle they sought, unsuccessfully, to establish was the definition of a "strategic" weapon as one capable of striking the homeland of the other side. This would have meant that U.S. tactical aircraft in Europe were "strategic," but that Russian medium-range missiles and bombers aimed at Western Europe were not.*

Where the Russians wanted a general, "politically" significant accord, American negotiators favored specific measures that would add up to a "militarily" significant agreement. Such an accord would both enhance mutual deterrence and maintain "crisis stability" in the sense that promoting the invulnerability of strategic weapons (ICBMs, Polaris submarines) would discourage the precipitous launching of missiles by either side at the first sign of danger. At the same time, such measures would ease the fears of the American public about relative Soviet-U.S. strength by seeking equal overall limits on strategic delivery systems and limits on the numbers and size of Soviet intercontinental missiles.

Delegation Initiatives

American negotiators differed on whether it was advantageous to be first in advancing proposals. In practice, the United States did take the lead, not only because we were the initiating side but because of the complex of considerations noted above. I believe this was an advantage, because it is helpful to stake out the negotiating ground first and because, despite all our internal problems, we were generally more flexible and efficient in reaching an agreed negotiating position, whereas a proposal hammered out in Moscow might take months to revise.

*From the start, the Russians were suspicious of possible fishing expeditions by Americans seeking intelligence data—especially before they found the U.S. side rather forthcoming in presenting, and relying on, American intelligence information concerning Soviet military weapons and forces. Moreover, being in the weaker strategic military position (in their own eyes), the Soviets were reluctant to reveal their strategic worries by being the first to propose limitations on specific weaponry.
U.S.–SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: A CHRONOLOGY


1971 Sep Nuclear Accidents Agreement: To reduce risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Washington.


1973 May SALT ABM Protocol: Limiting the United States and the Soviet Union to one ABM deployment area each. Moscow.


Some elements of our position were endorsed more strongly by U.S. military planners, others by arms control representatives. As a rule, the military had the last word on proposals that would impinge on existing or planned Pentagon programs, whereas the arms control representatives had the greater influence on proposals that would most severely affect Soviet programs. The same rule probably applied on the Soviet side as well, although the nonmilitary Russian delegates were clearly less well informed about their own military programs than their U.S. counterparts and less able to override purely military, as opposed to basic political, arguments.

The U.S. delegation operated on the basis of presidentially endorsed NSDMs (National Security Decision Memoranda) specifying in some detail American objectives and positions. The delegation was responsible for decisions on tactics, arguments and presentations of positions, and development of agreed texts.

**Washington “Guidance”**

One example of effective “transnational negotiation” concerned Article I of the 1972 ABM treaty, which contained the rationale for the very limited ABM deployment permitted. On November 19, 1971, the Soviet delegation introduced a new draft of a proposed Article I, calling on each side “not to deploy ABM systems for defense of the territory of the [entire] country.” The American delegation, uninstructed on this point, reported the proposal to Washington and warned that the Soviet wording could be used by them to argue against specific limitations on radars and related ABM-system infrastructure. We did not request guidance.

Much negotiation over the next month led to Soviet agreement to continue working on other specific limitations and to go along with the revised language developed by American negotiators, which broadened and made more specific the agreement not to seek a basis for a territory-wide defense or to deploy ABM systems for defense of a particular region.

This language, which constitutes the final version of Article I, signed by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in May 1972, was worked out entirely by the American delegation with no guidance from Washington at any stage. It was submitted to Washington as part of a revised joint draft text, but in this instance there was not sufficient disagreement among agencies in Washington to bring the matter to the
attention of Kissinger’s Verification Panel or any other senior review group.

Since Article I is a basic provision, often cited by later commentators as fundamental, it is striking that at no time was guidance regarding it addressed to the delegation by Washington!

Perhaps the biggest problem for the American side in SALT has not been the Russians—tough negotiating partners that they are—but the absence of high-level consensus in Washington on American negotiating objectives and the burden of continually negotiating (and maneuvering) among various factions within the U.S. government.

Effective negotiation obviously suffers if decisions, once made, are regarded merely as tentative and reversible by important elements in our own government. Yet, this has frequently been the case with SALT. One man’s “bargaining-chip” becomes another’s vital interest; positions advanced for bargaining purposes with the other side become, instead, part of one’s own final position. Nowhere more clearly than in SALT have differences within the American government so shaped and reshaped negotiating approaches and goals in ways that undercut and complicated a sound and effective negotiating strategy.

The lesson in all this is that negotiating with the Russians requires firm leadership, direction, and support from the President on down. Objectives must be clear and consistent. The integrity of the principal negotiating channel—the two SALT delegations—must be preserved despite the powerful temptation to skip between secret back-channels and official forums. The attraction of summit deadlines and other artificial time pressures linked to domestic political concerns must be vigorously resisted; they simply give additional leverage to Moscow.

Today there is a greater Soviet readiness to look for possible agreements on a broad range of issues. Compromise is no longer a taboo for Soviet negotiators. In part, this reflects increased Soviet sophistication. It also reflects growing self-confidence. To this extent, the growth of Soviet strength to a level of near equality with the United States has produced not greater intransigence but a more businesslike approach. Agreements on mutually advantageous strategic arms limitations are not easy to reach—but they are attainable.
THE ENIGMA OF
SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY

by Jack Snyder

Analyzing Soviet strategic arms policy is something like taking a Rorschach test. The process reveals more about the predispositions and biases of the analyst than about Russian intentions.

Why is the interpretation of Soviet strategic arms policy so difficult? Can it be made less so? And if not, how should American policy function in light of U.S. uncertainty about Russian intentions?

Since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in 1969, a broad range of conflicting interpretations of Soviet policy has won a correspondingly wide spectrum of supporters in Congress, in academia, and among various factions in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. The disagreements do not concern nuances so much as the origins and fundamental nature of Soviet strategic thinking. By and large, it is conceded that, for the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders will not press their goals recklessly enough to risk major armed conflict with the West. But beyond this, almost all questions are open to debate. For example:

Does Soviet participation in SALT indicate a desire to achieve a long-term strategic modus vivendi with the United States? Or do Brezhnev and his colleagues see SALT as a temporary, tactical maneuver to lull the West and improve Russia’s strategic position?

Does Soviet deployment of new generations of heavy, MIRV*ed missiles represent a conscious attempt to achieve a one-sided capability to destroy hardened American ICBM silos? Or are these deployments merely Moscow’s prudent reactions to American advantages in warhead accuracy?

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*Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles. Each missile carries several warheads aimed at different targets. American MIRVs carry a smaller payload but are more accurate than their Soviet counterparts.
How does the Politburo evaluate the effect of inequalities in strategic forces on the outcome of East-West diplomatic contests?

The following four explanations of Soviet strategic policy illustrate the diversity of positions in the debate. Mutations of these ideas pop up in Senate speeches and Pentagon briefings, as well as in the pages of *Time, Commentary, The New Republic*, and the scholarly journals. Because evidence about Soviet intentions is ambiguous, each of these radically different interpretations is plausible enough to have won a considerable following among informed observers in government, journalism, and academia.

*Seeking superiority.* Some analysts contend that the Soviet Union is consciously seeking superiority in strategic arms both to improve the outcome of a war, should one occur, and to intimidate the United States in confrontations short of war. Two beliefs underlie this interpretation. First, the Soviet system, though mellowed since Stalin’s time by bureaucratization and ideological “middle age,” remains fundamentally expansionist. Second, it is claimed that, for various historical and organizational reasons, Soviet nuclear strategists have never viewed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD, based on the complete vulnerability of populations and the invulnerability of retaliatory forces) as either inexorable or desirable as a strategic concept. At best, the Soviets see MAD as a transitory phenomenon that must be accepted only until it can be nullified by civil defense measures to protect the Soviet population or by improvements in Soviet ICBM capabilities that would make possible the destruction of American land-based retaliatory forces in a surprise first strike.

If seeking superiority is the key to Soviet strategic policy, competition is inevitable, because the United States must take the necessary steps to counter persistent Soviet attempts to gain unilateral advantage. This view is closely associated with “Team B,” a group of nongovernmental strategic theorists assembled by the Ford administration in the summer of 1976 to provide an independent assessment of Soviet intentions, using classified data that had previously been analyzed by the CIA. Prominent members included George J. Keegan, Jr., retired chief of Air Force Intelligence and now executive vice president of the United States Strategic Institute, Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation, Richard Pipes of Harvard, and Leon Goure of the University of Miami.
Just trying to catch up. In this view, Soviet behavior can be explained by the Russian desire to catch up with the United States in ultra-advanced weapons technology and in the meantime to balance quantitative advantages against qualitative deficiencies. This interpretation is founded on two premises. First, Soviet political leaders—if not always the military—have consistently recognized and accepted the technological fact of absolute deterrence based on Mutual Assured Destruction. Moscow’s reluctance to enshrine this concept in official pronouncements has no operational significance; it is only a verbal concession to military esprit de corps and Leninist doctrinal sensibilities (explicitly embracing MAD seems only a half step away from endorsing “bourgeois pacifism”—a long-standing taboo in Soviet circles). Hence, U.S.–Soviet military competition is unnecessary, once a rough equivalence has been achieved. Expressions of this view can be found in the writings of Paul Warnke, currently director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jan Lodal, former staff member of the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger.*

Political compromise. This interpretation suggests that Soviet behavior results from logrolling among important political and bureaucratic personalities. Thus, it is not surprising that evidence about Soviet strategic arms policy points toward several seemingly contradictory interpretations, since the policy itself is a fusion of conflicting outlooks and preferences, not a coherent strategy. For example, Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev may personally view the continuing deployment of new Soviet heavy MIRVed missiles as a counterproductive provocation, and yet he may have had to authorize these programs to win approval of military and party skeptics for a new SALT agreement. According to this view, American


Jack Snyder, 26, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Columbia, wrote this paper while working at the Rand Corporation. Born in Allentown, Pennsylvania, he is a graduate of Harvard (1973). He worked for a year as policy analyst for the Wednesday Group—a group of Republican Congressmen—and for a summer on the foreign affairs staff of Senator Charles Percy. He is the author of Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Process in Failures of Deterrence (1976), and The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (forthcoming), both published by Rand.
policy influences Soviet policy by affecting the credibility of the arguments put forward by various Soviet factions. Presumably, American restraint in the deployment of new weapons would strengthen the hand of those Russian leaders who believe that an acceptable *modus vivendi* is possible and desirable.*

**Organizational processes.** Some feel that even the "political compromise" explanation assumes too much purposefulness in Soviet behavior. Analysts like Graham T. Allison, dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, suggest that Soviet strategic "choices" (e.g., whether to build more ICBMs or more long-range bombers) may be largely explained as the result of the routine, half-conscious behavior of the Soviet military-industrial establishment. Kremlin choices are so constrained by bureaucratically filtered information, options, and the sheer momentum of established programs that it would be wrong to try to infer any detailed, conscious strategy from observable behavior. As Allison explains it, top decision-makers—including Presidents and Premiers—can *change or disrupt* routinized bureaucratic behavior by conscious intervention, but only rarely can they *control* it sufficiently to obtain the precise outcome they desire.†

**Superiority or Just Catching Up?**

Faced with this proliferation of theories, how can we choose among them? *Prima-facie* cases are based on gross aspects of Soviet behavior that are alleged to "speak for themselves." Thus the going-for-superiority school considers the SS-18 heavy missile proof that the Soviets are consciously acquiring a one-sided capability to threaten U.S. missile silos, a development said to be obviously incompatible with a sincere concern for equitable security arrangements. Other

*See Raymond Garthoff's "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1975, and *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* by John Newhouse, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973. Of course, the reverse argument can be made that unilateral American restraint would bolster the belief in Moscow that uncompromising bargaining tactics had caused an American retreat. It is equally difficult to predict the effects of U.S. firmness. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is possible that American firmness convinced the Soviets of the foolishness of brinkmanship and led directly to a thaw in U.S.–Soviet relations. At the same time, it could be argued that Kennedy's firmness in Cuba helped to discredit Soviet leaders like Nikita Khrushchev who favored a minimum deterrent force and that it led to the great expansion of Soviet strategic forces in the late 1960s. Thus, even if we accept the "political compromise" view of Soviet policymaking, the implications of that view for American policy are uncertain.

schools of thought advance their own *prima-facie* cases. For example, the just-catching-up school claims that the ABM treaty obviously signifies Soviet acceptance of stable mutual deterrence. The trouble with all of these arguments is that several plausible explanations for any action, be it SS-18 deployment or the ABM agreement, can nearly always be advanced.

For this reason, any serious attempt to choose from among rival explanations must fall back on "creative reconstructions" of Soviet motivations, using as evidence speeches, press statements, indirect inferences about internal political struggles, and the like. These "creative" approaches generate their own difficulties, because of the unreliability of the data employed. For example, hawkish Soviet journal articles on strategic doctrine are often cited as proof that the Soviets reject the notion of a stable deterrent balance. But these articles are written in such abstruse and polemical language that they shed little or no light on how Soviet strategic forces would actually be used. Worse still, it is far from certain that their main concern is of operational concepts at all. On the contrary, it may be propaganda, exhortation of the troops, or simply ammunition for use in bureaucratic budget fights. Even the best "creative analysis" is necessarily based on the pyramiding of inferences from such questionable sources.

Attempts to interpret Soviet SALT policies demonstrate the shortcomings of both the *prima-facie* and creative analysis approaches. First, let us examine the *prima-facie* cases mentioned above—that the ABM ban and the SS-18 deployment "speak for themselves" as clear-cut evidence of the trend of Soviet policy. American observers who argue that the Soviets are seeking superiority point to Soviet insistence on deploying large numbers of heavy missiles. This, coupled with multiple warhead technology and inevitable improvements in accuracy, will give the Soviet ICBM force an effective, large-scale capability to knock out U.S. ICBMs in a surprise first strike—a capability that is difficult to reconcile with a sincere, enduring interest in arms control based on equality of security.

At the same time, those who make this argument deny that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement limiting deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABM) shows that the Soviets have renounced the quest for superiority or accepted the immutability and desirability of deterrence based on Mutually Assured Destruction. Instead, they argue that the ABM agreement merely shows that Soviet decision-makers believe that their own ABM would not work but that an American ABM might,
given the U.S. lead in ultrasophisticated technologies. The Soviet leadership, they contend, restricted "defensive" competition to passive measures like civil defense and dispersal of industry, areas in which an authoritarian society has an advantage.

By contrast, observers who argue the prima-facie case that the Soviets are seriously interested in long-term SALT accords point to the ABM treaty as marking the end of doctrines of "nuclear victory" in both the Soviet Union and the United States. With ballistic missile defense systems banned, cities will always remain hostages to invulnerable submarine-based missiles, making a meaningful war-winning posture impossible. SALT I marks a point of no return, they claim, and therefore Soviet insistence on heavy missile deployments should be seen as part of an awkward transition period from unrestrained competition to collaborative stability.

Easing Mutual Fears

During this transition period, it is held, the Soviets feel they need such quantitative advantages to provide a partial offset to the American edge in technology, which the Soviets see as the most ominous threat to the long-run strategic balance. Once the U.S. potential for a qualitative breakthrough is sufficiently circumscribed by SALT, the Soviets will be more willing to limit or ban heavy MIRVed missiles. Thus, U.S. reluctance to submit our cruise missile innovations to tight SALT controls touches on the Soviets' fear of our technological dynamism, just as Moscow's reluctance to limit heavy silo-busting missiles touches on our fear that Soviet strategists have not accepted the American goal of ensuring the mutual survivability of retaliatory forces. In this view, the main goal of SALT should be to find a formula that minimizes these residual and largely needless fears.

A third explanation tries to account for apparently self-contradictory Soviet behavior by presenting Soviet policy as the outcome of a political bargaining process. Thus, Soviet proponents of SALT may have had to mollify doubters in their own camp by promising not to consider proposals that would curtail the development of new generations of ICBMs.

Finally, a supplementary explanation seeks to remind us that bureaucratic momentum in itself may account for some Soviet moves. In this view, the deployment of advanced ICBMs requires little explanation. Since this is the Soviet bureaucracy's path of least resistance, it should be explained
not as a calculated decision but as the result of normal bureaucratic procedures. The ABM ban, by contrast, was a true “decision” that required the conscious contravention of a program’s momentum.

Each of these contrary explanations seems plausibly consistent with the coarsely sifted evidence. For this reason, of course, none succeeds in establishing a prima-facie case against the others. To pursue the question, it is necessary to resort to finer-grained analysis which, given the nature of Soviet data, means building a shaky pyramid of speculative inferences. This is a formidable task that should be undertaken with caution.

Take, for example, an attempt at fine-grained creative analysis to support the political compromise interpretation of Soviet SALT policy. First, the analyst might discuss the Kremlin policymaking process in historical perspective in order to show that intra-Politburo politics and bureaucratic infighting have greatly influenced policy outcomes in the past. He may succeed in showing these effects convincingly and in detail for a study of, say, agricultural policy, but he is less likely to generate much more than vague speculation about defense case histories, due to Soviet secrecy.

**Pitfalls of Fine-Grained Analysis**

Using Kremlinological techniques, it is difficult enough even to determine which Soviet actors (bureaucratic or individual) supported which policies, much less how greatly each influenced the outcome. American analysts, therefore, disagree fundamentally both about historical case interpretations and about the generalized picture of the Soviet policy process that emerges from them.

Secondly, the analyst would delve deeply into recent published Soviet material on SALT in order to glean evidence of a policy debate. Thomas W. Wolfe, of the Rand Corporation, for example, presents evidence of a debate on strategic issues between Soviet military and nonmilitary authors carried on in the pages of various Russian journals in the months leading up to the 1974 Vladivostok Accord.* However, the debate took place on the esoteric issue of whether nuclear war could be considered an instrument of politics. The underlying

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*The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking, Santa Monica: Rand, Sept. 1975 (R-1686-PR). The “muted argument,” Wolfe notes, pitted a group of writers identified with the Brezhnev détente line, many of whom were associated with G. A. Arbatov’s Institute of the USA in Moscow, against a number of military theorists who expressed skepticism about détente in the pages of Red Star and The Communists of the Armed Forces.
issues and positions are not explicit; they can only be imagined. Nor do we know whether the terms of the Vladivostok Accord, for example, represented a compromise or an outright victory for one faction over another.

Similar problems confront fine-grained attempts at creative analysis to support the other interpretations. As a result, the claim that fine-grained analysis can fill the gaps left by the coarser-grained approach remains largely unfulfilled.

How then can the United States choose a rational SALT policy in light of our ignorance of Soviet motives, intentions, and likely reactions to future American actions? One traditional "solution" is to distinguish between Soviet capabilities (i.e., present and projected Soviet ICBM forces) and Soviet intentions and claim that we must be prepared to counter the former, regardless of the latter.

This distinction falters on two grounds. First, since existing Soviet "capability" alone cannot provide a decisive military victory against the United States under present conditions, additional capability is useful only insofar as it affects the international climate for political coercion and bargaining. To deny that intentions govern attempts at political coercion is to refuse to deal with the significant questions. Second, focusing on Soviet capability is often a euphemism for accepting the worst possible assumptions about Soviet intentions. If the worst-case assumption is wrong—and Soviet intentions less hostile than anticipated—a hard-line U.S. policy might act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and provoke the very behavior we would like to discourage.

Another pitfall is overcommitment to a single estimate of Soviet intentions. Overcommitment to one interpretation is likely to desensitize us to new information on Soviet motives. Disastrous intelligence failures can often be traced to the premature adoption of an exclusive interpretation that locks out all but the most blatant disconfirming evidence.

The need for action under conditions of uncertainty is unavoidable in political life. What can be avoided, however, is the current harmful tendency among academics, politicians, and Washington "experts" alike to deny that our strategic analyses and policy rationales vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are highly tentative—and, frankly, unreliable.
ARMS CONTROL

"THE AMERICAN WAY"

by Colin S. Gray

The modern arms control community in the United States was born in the late 1950s. Its family tree exhibited two very dissimilar roots. On the one hand, there was the nuclear-scientific group that had designed the means for mass destruction and had begun to feel guilty about its technical triumphs; on the other, there was the small but rapidly growing group of "defense intellectuals" who did not feel personally or collectively guilty but who were convinced that, through both explicit and tacit cooperation, the superpowers could jointly manage their "balance of terror" so as to obtain a degree of mutual safety and economy that could not be attained through unalleviated competition.

These new arms control advocates were very different from earlier disarmament lobbyists, who argued from various combinations of religious, political-theoretical, and frankly emotional premises. The latter were against the means for making war, against the "merchants of death," against war itself. The new advocates of arms control tended not to be very interested in disarmament. The principal goal of control, they felt, was to stabilize strategic relationships and thus avoid a nuclear conflict. If reductions in armaments would advance that goal, well and good, but the goal was not the reduction of strategic force levels per se. Indeed, passionate advocacy of disarmament was unfashionable; sophisticated thinkers considered that reductions in force levels might even have a destabilizing effect.¹

¹Heretical though this may sound, major force-level reductions through SALT are not merely of little interest to negotiators but could be positively dangerous. The basis for the SALT negotiations is a healthy redundancy in the means for conducting strategic retaliation. The lower the strategic force levels, the more rigorous must be the rules for verification, the more important any major technical surprise, and the more obvious any differences in the structures and capabilities of the strategic forces of the superpowers—not to mention the encouragement that lower strategic force levels would give to another (nuclear-armed) power desirous of diminishing the strategic differential between the Big Two and itself.
To this day, American arms control theorists tend to believe that very substantial disarmament is both unattainable and undesirable. The undesirability of a major ICBM cutback by both sides, for example, lies in the premium it would put on cheating and the resulting delicacy of any strategic balance based on low numbers of opposing weapons. Technical breakthroughs, cheating, and the growing unreliability of some weapons systems are less severe as sources of concern if one has an arsenal of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles (land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and long-range bombers—the limit mentioned in the Vladivostok Accord) than if one has 250–300 (the number under discussion in the Carter administration as an eventual goal).

The body of ideas that still constitutes the lion’s share of U.S. working intellectual capital in the field of arms control, was produced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Arms control theory in its post-1945 form was largely the product of defense intellectuals—or academic strategists who became influential in the United States in the 1950s. They included such figures as Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, Henry Rowen, Paul Nitze, and Thomas Schelling.* As consultants or participants in government, these men sought to identify a survivable and plausibly usable military posture that would be relevant to U.S. foreign policy. They also explored ways in which potential nuclear-armed adversaries might, through cooperative endeavor, reduce the risks that appeared to be inherent in their strategic competition.†

The road that led eventually to SALT may be said to have begun in 1958 with the convening in Geneva of a Soviet-American conference of experts on problems of surprise attack.† Notwithstanding the many changes that the world has seen between 1958 and the mid 1970s, there is a really remarkable continuity in American premises and approaches.

*With the exception of Paul Nitze, all of these men had been connected with the Rand Corporation. Nitze was director of the State Department’s policy planning staff from 1950 to 1953 and later served as Secretary of the Navy and deputy secretary of Defense.
†In the 1955-57 period, the United States discovered arms control as opposed to disarmament. In 1958, largely as a result of lessons drawn from its 1941 Pearl Harbor experience, the United States was convinced that the deployment of strategic air power and—even more significantly—strategic missile power would encourage fears of surprise attack and hence would encourage precautionary alert procedures that should promote acute anxiety on the part of the adversary. The Americans understood that the Surprise Attack Conference in Geneva was intended to address predominantly technical issues bearing on decisions to commit or withhold strategic forces. The historical context should be recalled: A major study conducted for the U.S. government (the Gaither Report of November 7, 1957) forecast a vulnerable condition for American manned bombers that could become critical by 1959; in the meantime, following the first Soviet ICBM test in August 1957 and the first successful Sputnik launch in October of that year, fears concerning a missile gap were growing apace.
In Geneva in 1958, the Americans discovered that Soviet officials were relatively uninterested in narrow technical issues such as inspection procedures. Instead the Soviet delegation appeared to see arms control questions almost totally in a political light and to believe that arms control had an overarching political meaning. The way to eliminate the problem of surprise attack, the Russians argued, was to ban nuclear weapons and eliminate American bases overseas.

From Bible to Dogma

In 1960, in the wake of the Geneva conference, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences convened a Summer Study on Arms Control and published many of the papers prepared for that gathering in a special Fall 1960 issue of Daedalus. That publication, issued in revised form as a book in 1961 (Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security, edited by Donald Brennan), warranted its later reputation as the bible of American thought on arms control. Certain fairly distinctively American concepts surfaced in that publication, as they had during the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958, and as they did in many subsequent articles, books, and conferences. The authors of the 22 Daedalus papers were not issuing an arms control credo; they were offering some ideas that seemed interesting enough to warrant analysis and possible use in policy formulation. But what happened, essentially, in the 1960s, was that some of the more important and tentative 1959–60 ideas hardened into dogma despite the fact that empirical support for them was absent or, at best, very tenuous. The most significant of these American ideas—become-dogma are the following:

- Arms control is a means whereby technical end runs can be effected around the barriers of worldwide political and
ideological competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Through arms control we could foster a habit of limited explicit cooperation in narrow technical areas that might/should/will (expectations escalate) spill over beneficially into political matters.

Arms control really is about "stability." Because both superpowers would benefit from a strategic context wherein fears of surprise attack were greatly reduced, and acute anxiety was not promoted by developments in a qualitative/quantitative arms race, there must be a basis for agreement on technical arms issues that pose a common threat.

Soviet officials are backward in their understanding of arms control issues, hence "the American interest in raising the Russian learning curve."

By the late 1960s, the American arms control community generally endorsed the notion that strategic stability was achieved through the secure, reciprocated development of a military capability to impose unacceptable damage in retaliation upon an adversary in the event of war. Weapon systems like the ABM or the big, silo-threatening ICBM that threatened the capability for Mutual Assured Destruction were deemed to be destabilizing by their very nature.

Soviet officials have rejected these ideas very convincingly. They have provided no evidence to suggest that collectively they endorse the idea of finite deterrence based upon the ability to kill or destroy some "magic fraction" of American civilian assets. On the contrary, Soviet leaders appear to believe that a defense posture should serve to defend the country and that there is no identifiable level of sufficiency. The premises and assumptions upon which American arms control thinking is based are simply not shared by the Russians. President Carter is but the latest senior American to learn that Soviet leaders cannot be persuaded to agree to arms control plans that are not in the best Soviet competitive interest. In the SALT negotiations and in the talks on MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe), the United States and NATO have sought, at times, to negotiate with the Russians on the basis of a falsely presumed commonality of East-West interests.

Despite the evidence apparent in Soviet declarations and in the Soviet military build-up observed over the past decade, American theory and attempts to put it into practice in
the arms control field often show a heroic ignorance of—or disregard for—the world outside, particularly the world as seen by others. Americans are known as a people of boundless vision, impatient of obstacles, real or apparent. However, vision in arms control matters is at a severe discount. Impatience simply encourages an adversary to sit tight, talk tough, and wait for a better offer tomorrow.

American arms controllers, by and large, have yet to come to terms with the existence of an adversary who does not share their objectives and aspirations. Arms control theory in the United States was, with few exceptions, designed by tough-minded defense intellectuals who discerned pragmatic mutual advantages in a strategic relationship where competition was tempered with limited cooperation. Those tough-minded defense intellectuals did not understand adequately the heavily political Soviet view of armaments, nor did they credit the Soviet Union with a determination to prevail.

It may be impractical to ask that American politicians and officials model their arms control behavior on the Soviet example, but it is not unreasonable to require of American negotiators that they review the arms control record in detail—with a view to identifying what factors produced what outcomes—and ensure that the U.S. strategic posture and doctrine has internal and external consistency (that is, that the separate parts relate sensibly one to another and the whole speaks intelligently to the distinctive needs of American foreign policy) before SALT options are preferred to the Russians.

Understanding Arms Control

The body of ideas that merits description as American arms control or arms race theory should be criticized because it is inappropriate to the nature of the world in which we live—and not necessarily because it lacks abstract merit. The beginning of wisdom in the understanding of arms control matters is the recognition of the truth in the proposition that you cannot solve or alleviate, through arms control, problems that apparently you are unwilling to resolve unilaterally. Arms control negotiating outcomes are the products of contests between differing degrees of bargaining leverage (which is wielded by such elementary factors as “money up front” on weapon systems and political determination), not the clash of strategic ideas on the subject of stability.

The history of the arms control endeavor illustrates the
The merit of the paradox that arms control is worth achieving only between potential enemies, yet the mutually perceived fact of potential enmity limits very sharply what can be accomplished in cooperation through arms control.

4. This idea was expressed, with increasing inflexibility, in Robert McNamara's annual "Posture Statements" in the late 1960s. A very useful analysis of deterrence ideas is Richard Rosecrance, Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1975 (Adelphi Paper No. 116).
8. It should suffice were American officials to read and inwardly digest the wisdom to be found in Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper, 1964.
BACKGROUND BOOKS

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

Efforts to limit armies and armaments are a frayed but still unbroken thread of man’s history. Oddly, no single good survey on arms control from the earliest times to the Atomic Age has yet been written in English. And much of the published analysis of contemporary nuclear issues is strongly flavored with advocacy.

A brief run-down of early attempts to deal with the spread and use of weaponry appears in the first three chapters of INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: Issues and Agreements by the Stanford Arms Control Group, edited by John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler (Stanford, 1976, cloth & paper). Mention is made of Isaiah 2:4 (8th century B.C.), "They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks"; of a disarmament conference of 14 feudal states held in 546 b.c. in Honan, China, ending a 70-year series of wars; of pre-Renaissance “rules of warfare” (including the Mohammedan ban on poisoning wells); of Columbia University Professor Francis Lieber’s Civil War Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, which became the basis of the turn-of-the-century Hague Regulations on international warfare.

Multinational efforts to reduce the levels of armaments made prior to World War II get capsule coverage from the Stanford writers. Most of these attempts were failures—the exception being a temporary success in limiting the naval competition involving Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.

All this was pre-nuclear. But the Stanford book provides much more than a quick review of the distant past; it is principally a thorough introduction to arms control efforts since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has many companions. There are at least as many detailed, often controversial studies of the arms race since the Bomb as there are years since 1945. We present here a sampling of works on the creation and detonation of the first atomic bomb and on recent strategic arms and disarmament issues.

For background, there is Martin J. Sherwin’s A WORLD DESTROYED: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance (Knopf, 1975). Sherwin describes the development of the bomb and the diplomatic implications of the decision to use it against Japan. Additional detail (not as startling as the title implies) is provided by Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald in THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (Dial, 1977, cloth; Dell, 1977, paper). The authors present excerpts from the formerly classified history of the Manhattan Project, as well as the bulk of the Smyth Report, first published in 1945 just after World War II ended in the Pacific.

diplomats' zigzag trail from initial discussions in 1957 to the signing in Moscow of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Two useful books by Herbert F. York, a former weapons scientist turned arms controller, are THE ADVISORS: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (Freeman, 1975), and RACE TO OBLIVION: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (Simon & Schuster, 1970, cloth; 1971, paper). The original title of Race was Ultimate Absurdity.

One good general review of the entire post-Korea era is Jerome H. Kahan's SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Brookings, 1975, cloth & paper), a solid account of U.S. policy on strategic arms, 1953-74, and an analysis of the requirements for a condition of stable deterrence in the 1970s. Another is Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke's DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Theory and Practice (Columbia, 1974, cloth & paper); case studies, from the 1948 Berlin blockade through the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, lead into proposals for reformulating some of the theories on which U.S. policy has been based.

John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee's THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (Praeger, 1962) is an out-of-print, critical account of the "disarmament minuet." In THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (Pantheon, 1976), noted Swedish writer-diplomat Alva Myrdal analyzes the pressures that prevent the superpowers from taking major steps toward disarmament and offers her proposals for the "lesser states" to break the continuing deadlock between Russia and the United States.


Books focusing on the Soviet Union and arms control include some accounts published a decade ago but still useful reading on the early years of the missile race, before and after the Cuban crisis. In this category are Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklin Griffiths' KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (M.I.T., 1966); Roman Kol-kowicz et al., THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A Superpower Dilemma (Johns Hopkins, 1970, cloth & paper); and Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (Univ. of Chicago, 1966).

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in a solo effort, THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL: From Cold War to Interdependence (Lexington, 1973), takes the story to SALT I. Thomas W. Wolfe, a leading U.S. analyst of Soviet affairs, makes a careful assessment in THE SALT EXPERIENCE: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking (Rand, 1975). Finally, Colin S. Gray's THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS RACE (Lexington, 1976) is a provocative examination of the dynamics of the arms race. Gray says that "the United States has been profoundly ill equipped, intellectually and in terms of political institutions, to conduct protracted arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union."
Richly forested and sparsely populated (only 8 million in a country not much larger than California), Sweden now has a heavily "urban" economy with rural pockets of relative poverty, especially in the north.
Sweden

A year ago, American newspapers headlined the election defeat of the prime architects of Sweden's famed welfare state, the Social Democrats, who were suddenly out of power for the first time since 1932. The shift prompted new looks by scholars at the future of Sweden's controversial, oft-misunderstood experiments in social and economic welfare. Here, historian Steven Koblik assesses some long-popular stereotypes—"socialism, sin, and suicide"—of Sweden. M. Donald Hancock, a professor of government, reviews the Social Democrats' troubled efforts to combine economic growth, egalitarianism, and "compensatory" welfare. Political scientist Steven Kelman looks at the future. Our Background Books review-essay stresses studies of Sweden's earlier history and culture and its neglected literature.

SYMBOLISM AND REALITY

by Steven Koblik

"Will the new President seek to turn the nation into a Swedenized America?"

This sentence from a pre-inaugural Saturday Review article about Jimmy Carter illustrates the special image Sweden has acquired among Americans. Ever since columnist Marquis Childs published his best-selling Sweden: The Middle Way in 1936, both advocates and foes of increased government intervention in American society have variously acclaimed Sweden as a "prototype of modern society" or damned it as "a
warning for democracy." A rare symbol of peace, progress, and prosperity to one faction—and, to this day, of sin, suicide, and bureaucratic socialism to the other.

While both the positive and negative views reflect certain realities, neither explains the peculiar Swedish phenomenon. Alone among European maritime nations, Sweden has not fought a war since 1814. She has undertaken a remarkable array of social reforms, particularly since World War II: a comprehensive school system influenced by American models, a far-reaching national health plan, a reliable pension scheme, a massive day-care system, effective programs for urban planning and job retraining, improvements in the work environment, and increased equality in the workplace.

All this has been accomplished in a period of growing prosperity, during which Sweden has virtually eliminated its slums, maintained near full employment, provided a high degree of equality of service to both rural and urban citizens, attained the highest per capita GNP west of the Persian Gulf, and given economic aid to the Third World at a level equivalent to almost 1 percent of her GNP.*

Has the price of these efforts been social decay, the erosion of morality, and the destruction of private initiative?

Few Swedes attend church. Although all Swedes are nominally born into the Lutheran Church, attendance rates and the proportion of the population retaining a “belief in God” are the lowest in the Western world. In 1974, more than one-fourth of Swedish babies were born out of wedlock. Divorce rates and crime (mostly nonviolent) are on the rise. The suicide rate normally stands among the top seven worldwide (20.8 per 100,000 in 1973). Personal income taxes rank second only to those of Israel. Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin’s ruling coalition, the first “nonsocialist” government in 44 years, has just raised the value-added sales tax to almost 21 percent. Swedish executives complain about government control and economic intervention; recently concluded labor negotiations saw the employers’ federation take its toughest stand in years against current economic practices, particularly job security. And today Sweden faces its most serious economic crisis since World War II.

It is tempting—but extremely misleading—to link these “positive” and “negative” aspects in a cause-effect way. While

*The history of the Swedish welfare state can be traced in detail through the following books: Kurt Samuelsson’s From Great Power to Welfare State: 300 Years of Swedish Social Development (1968); Hugh Heclo’s Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance (1976); and Gunnar Myrdal’s 1960 book Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications.
there have been dramatic changes in Swedish lifestyles, many traditional features remain. For example, foreign accusations of "sinfulness" are hardly new. In an 11th-century chronicle, Adam of Bremen wrote of Swedish men that "only in their sexual relations with women do they know no bounds." A 19th-century English traveler, Samuel Laing, found that "the moral condition of Sweden is extremely low," ascribing "this diseased moral condition" to the country's poverty and rigid class structure. The suicide rate has been relatively high since the turn of the century. The Swedes' great break with the active, religious life occurred well before the advent of the postwar welfare state. Since the early 20th century, Swedish law has not differentiated between children born in or out of wedlock. In short, Swedish sexual customs and social values simply differ from many Anglo-American traditions; they are not fresh products of the welfare state. Next door, Norway, which has a welfare system almost identical to that of Sweden, does not display such "deviant behavior."

**Cultivating Capitalism**

In economic matters too, simplistic observations can be misleading. Sweden is not burdened (or benefited) by "socialism." More than 90 percent of its industrial production is privately owned. Most of the few public enterprises—in transportation, communications, and iron-ore mining—were established before World War II. Their managements operate much as do those of private firms; they must demonstrate both solvency and social responsibility to survive. The Swedish national railways, for example, were compelled by a parliamentary ruling to be self-supporting, and that decision has led to a severe and much-lamented contraction of rail service in rural areas.

Swedish industry is not only privately controlled, it is dominated by a few individuals or families. Swedes talk of the

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famous "17 families," none of them particularly flamboyant, which control a growing portion of Swedish business. The Wallenberg family is the best known and through its Stockholm Enskilda Bank has had an extraordinary influence over the economic life of the country. Fourteen years ago, the head of the clan, Dr. Marcus Wallenberg, sat on the boards of 63 of Sweden's major companies. His fellow Enskilda Bank directors held an additional 133 posts—a number that grew when the Wallenberg bank was merged with the Skandinaviska Bank, Sweden's largest, in the early 1970s. No American dynasty enjoys that degree of economic influence.

Moreover, the Social Democratic government long encouraged the trend toward mergers and concentration, perceiving it as rational and efficient. Sweden needs companies large enough to compete internationally, because export earnings are the lifeblood of the country. Sweden has the world's largest number of multinational corporations per capita. Big companies, it is believed, provide an improved workplace environment and better opportunities for improved labor productivity (average annual increase, 1965–70: 7.6 percent), and can muster the capital for research and development.

The tax system reinforces these tendencies. While personal income taxes quickly reach 60 to 80 percent on a graduated scale, Sweden's business taxes are lower than equivalent taxes in the United States. Tax incentives for new investment are generous and tend to aid large companies as well as small. Outright nationalization was not attractive to the Social Democrats. They chose to rely on indirect methods to achieve the same social goals.

**Harmony and Fulfillment**

Swedish industry is privately owned, but it is not untrammeled. Political decisions by Parliament have strongly shaped private management processes, the workplace environment, and criteria for investment. Labor relations are centrally controlled. Government planners, big business, and big unions work together, cozily for the most part, to push and mold Swedish economic development. The president of Volvo, Pehr Gyllenhammer, for example, has written, "Private companies do not solve their own problems alone. They are dependent upon cooperation with local and national governments and the programs of the public sector that are directed toward the creation of harmonious and fulfilled citizens."
What should be clear by now is that popular American perceptions about Sweden are not very accurate. For a better understanding, one must look at five historical factors that have been essential to the relatively smooth development of the Swedish welfare state:

- The consensus nature of Swedish society;
- The strength of conservative traditions;
- The importance of nongovernmental organizations;
- Popular acceptance of the notions of "rationalization" and "progress";
- Public deference to ruling elites.

Sweden is a homogeneous society whose historical experience has been largely isolated from the turmoil and conflict of the European continent across the Baltic. During the early 20th century, in particular, the Swedes developed a sense of community that obscures class differences and provides a near-universal sense of national identity. Unlike Americans, whose social identity is commonly rooted in church, neighborhood, or region, Swedes have an overwhelming sense of "Swedishness"; they share a broad range of social, cultural, and moral values. Levels of conflict, as measured in violent crimes or labor violence, are remarkably low. Even more important is the cultural value that rejects confrontation as a proper means for settling differences of opinion. From childhood on, Swedes are taught to compromise and to seek consensus. Open displays of real differences of opinion, although strong differences may exist, are not common either in business or in politics. The preferred procedure is to discuss a problem informally, examine all solutions, and then select one that can be accepted by a large majority.

When I once remarked, during an interview with former Prime Minister Olof Palme, that official minutes of Cabinet meetings gave little indication of interministerial conflict, he replied that discussion of government policy often takes place at informal luncheon meetings where no official record is kept.

All of Sweden's major social reforms were preceded by such a process of quiet, methodical dialogue among various factions. In the formal sense, the Social Democrats may have governed the nation between 1932 and 1976, but they alone did not create contemporary Sweden.

The tendency to reach a consensus is reinforced by a widespread desire not to upset traditional values. Swedes are
among the most "anti-urban" of the West's industrial citizenry, and the pastoral life has a strong hold on butcher and banker alike. The central place of the family, the work ethic, a commitment to traditional Judeo-Christian humanism, a desire to live harmoniously with nature, a fairly stiff code of interpersonal relations, a tradition of authoritarianism—all are Swedish characteristics that have historical roots. One key to the success of Sweden's social planners is that they have not challenged the people's basic values; rather they have argued that the old socioeconomic system did not permit all Swedes to find self-fulfillment.

Swedes are an organized people. Most Swedes belong to at least three organizations (e.g., labor union, cooperative, renters group). Over 90 percent of the labor force is unionized (compared with 21.7 percent in the United States). Employers are also organized. Most Swedes are members of cooperatives. Other special-interest organizations abound. Swedes are indirectly represented in the economic and political decision-making process through these organizations, whose leaders operate as lobbyists. They serve on parliamentary and bureaucratic commissions and are queried by political leaders about the attitudes of their members.

The "Elm Tree" Incident

This "organizational" leadership, mostly recruited from a small group of highly educated Swedes, has tremendous power. Rank and file cohesion is extremely strong. Wildcat strikes, splinter groups, and public airing of differences within organizations are frowned upon. A 1971 demonstration to save some elm trees on the site of a future subway station in central Stockholm, for example, was condemned by the city's Social Democratic mayor as a "fascist" attempt to thwart democracy.

With the exception of a few such grassroots incidents, the Swedish public defers to its trusted decision-makers. Swedes vote in astounding numbers (91 percent of everyone over the age of 18 in the last election), but their participation in the political process is more symbolic than real. Decisions are made behind closed doors by political leaders and the bureaucracy in touch with the leaders of interest groups and private industry. The public is informed rather than consulted. There is seldom any protest. Corruption is rare. Leaders and their grassroots followers share too much in common.

As Thomas J. Anton writes, "Although there is over-
SWEDEN: A CHRONOLOGY

1809 Swedish Constitution adopted; Finland ceded to Russia.
1814 Sweden's last war: Karl XIV Johan joins the alliance against Napoleon and forces Denmark to surrender Norway to Sweden.
1882 Emigration to the United States reaches peak (1,116,239 Swedes arrive in the United States, 1820–1920).
1889 Founding of the Social Democratic Party.
1905 Union with Norway dissolved.
1913 Sweden's first social insurance scheme: the compulsory Basic Public Pension System.
1920 First Labor administration elected.
1932 Worldwide economic depression hits Sweden; Per Albin Hansson forms a Social Democratic Cabinet.
1939 A coalition Cabinet made up of Sweden's democratic parties created under Hansson's leadership.
1945 Social Democrats take office as a single-party government.
1946 Per Albin Hansson dies; Tage Erlander becomes Sweden's new Prime Minister; Sweden joins the UN.
1952 Nordic Council established (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland).
1958 Parliament approves Supplementary Pension System.
1960 Sweden joins the European Free Trade Association.
1969 Olof Palme succeeds Tage Erlander as Prime Minister.
1973 King Gustav VI Adolf dies; his grandson, King Karl XVI Gustav, accedes to the throne.
1974 Parliament approves a constitutional amendment stripping the monarchy of its residual political powers; President Nixon appoints Robert Strausz-Hupe U.S. ambassador to Sweden, ending a 15-month diplomatic freeze over Palme's criticism of the 1972 American bombing of Hanoi.
1976 Parliament approves industrial democracy bill giving workers greater control over employers and management; Social Democrats defeated by a coalition of three non-Socialist parties, ending 44 years of rule; Thorbjörn Fälldin named Prime Minister.
whelming evidence to support the proposition that Swedish citizens are quite uninterested in the question of who governs or how, it is equally clear that they are very much interested in what comes out of the governmental box in the form of municipal services.”

Policies have been pragmatic and problem-oriented. There is frequent testing of alternative solutions before final decisions are made. Nearly all Swedes, whether of the “Left” or “Right,” share a taste for “rationality,” rather than symbolic politics or rhetoric, and politics are justified and judged in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. For example, Swedes believed (at least until recently) that they could achieve a better society through “progress,” but they did not try to redistribute existing wealth. Rather, they divided new wealth achieved through economic growth in such a way as to redress past imbalances.

The Sweden of today has been built on shared values, consensus building, rational decision-making, and a highly self-disciplined society. The country is no Utopia but neither is it a danger to democracy. Along with economic growth, Swedes have sought to establish a minimum standard of living and a real measure of equality for all its citizens. Opposition to the welfare state concept hardly exists. When there is debate, it arises over such questions as: How much can Sweden pay to achieve its social goals? Are some of these goals counterproductive? And must there be limits to economic growth?

THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE:
PROSPECTS
AND CONTRADICTIONS

by M. Donald Hancock

For decades the Swedish welfare state has simultaneously fascinated and troubled outsiders. After the rise of the Social Democrats to long-term political power in 1932 and their subsequent success in initiating a comprehensive program of social and educational reforms, sympathetic Western journalists and social scientists began to celebrate the Swedish system as a "middle way" between capitalism and socialism, a "model for the world," and the "world's most modern society."

Liberal-minded politicians in such countries as Norway, England, West Germany, New Zealand, and the United States have borrowed selectively from the Swedish experience to establish ombudsmen and introduce social reforms. During the 1960s, Willy Brandt, then Chancellor of West Germany, publicly praised Sweden's mixture of public-private economy and welfare services as a model for encouraging growth and minimizing class conflict in other industrial societies.

At the opposite extreme, social critics with diverse points of view have regarded the Swedish welfare state with ideological disdain. Conservative politicians in Western Europe and the United States have repeatedly criticized the Swedish system for allegedly frustrating individual initiative. In a more strident vein, the South African journalist Roland Huntford has attacked Swedish bureaucracy and the Social Democratic commitment to equality for comprising the basis for a "new totalitarianism." Similar views based on other premises have been voiced by the radical left within Sweden itself. Criticizing the "alliance" between business and Social Democracy as "the Swedish model of exploitation," Jan Myrdal, son of economist Gunnar Myrdal, and other "proletarian" writers have agreed with Huntford that Sweden is well on its
way to becoming a "union dictatorship."

Both uncritical praise and strident disapproval obscure more than they reveal. The Swedish welfare state is a success as well as a failure; moreover, it is far from a finished product. To understand Sweden's relevance for social change elsewhere we must examine her domestic reform efforts in their own political context.

What are the underlying objectives of the welfare state as conceived by the Social Democrats and implemented with varying degrees of nonsocialist endorsement from the early 1930s onward?

What has the evolution of the Swedish welfare state done for workers, women, and others—and at what financial and social cost?

What has the welfare state failed to achieve and what are its prospects for future transformation?

One of the most pervasive myths concerning the contemporary Swedish welfare state is the naive belief that the country's industrial growth has produced "generalized welfare" as a matter of course. In fact, the development of the Swedish welfare state has resulted from basic ideological choices by the Social Democrats and other domestic reformers during the crucial decades of Sweden's industrialization and political modernization since 1900. As the political spokesmen for Sweden's growing industrial proletariat, Social Democratic leaders decided as early as the party's founding congress in 1889 to work within the existing socioeconomic and legal system in pursuing social change. Accordingly, they joined with other progressive parties—the Liberals early in the century, the Agrarians (now the ruling Center Party) from the 1930s through the mid-1950s—in implementing reform efforts piecemeal.

These involved, first, the slow democratization of the Swedish political system in accordance with Western notions of parliamentarianism and individual civil liberties (1907–1921),* and, second, the expansion of the government's role as economic and social engineer.

From the outset, Social Democratic leaders and their

*Sweden shifted during this period from a system of limited suffrage, in which votes were weighted according to income, to a system of universal suffrage. Likewise, a parliamentary democracy was introduced, in which the ruling party was required to maintain the confidence and support of a parliamentary majority.
close allies, the officials of the national labor federation (Landsorganisation) renounced the Marxist concept of inexorable class conflict under capitalism. Once the Social Democrats acquired a stable parliamentary majority in the 1932 elections, they proceeded to act from this ideological perspective with New Deal style measures to help restore economic health in the face of the Great Depression—introducing public works, worker retraining programs, and government subsidies to farmers distributed through a network of agricultural cooperative associations.

In 1938, the national labor federation undertook a major step toward ensuring labor peace by concluding the historic "Saltsjöbaden agreement" with the Swedish Association of Employers. This pact, named after the Baltic resort town where it was signed, outlawed unauthorized strikes and set up grievance procedures to supplement the work of the Labor Court, established in 1928 to settle labor-management disputes over interpretations of wage contracts.

Simultaneously, the Social Democrats, with the support of the Agrarian Party, embarked on an ambitious effort to expand social services. Between 1934 and 1937, the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament, approved voluntary unemployment insurance, a national pension system, home construction subsidies for large families, maternity benefits, state grants to invalids and orphans, and state subsidies for school lunches.

The advance of the welfare state, which had been interrupted by World War II, was resumed under the Social Democrats after the war. The Riksdag endorsed a compulsory national pension program in 1946 and communal support for home construction in 1947. A national health program was also introduced in 1947, but because of a doctor shortage, it was not fully implemented until 1955. In addition, the Social Democrats sponsored a 1956 law on "social help," which further extended social services and narrowly won a protracted parliamentary struggle with the Conservative, Liberal,
and Center Parties in 1959 to launch a new compulsory pension scheme providing supplemental retirement benefits based on a citizen's best-income years.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Social Democrats initiated another set of reforms—this time with the formal support of the three nonsocialist parties. To promote greater class equality by reducing educational barriers to socioeconomic mobility, the traditional three-track public school system (vocational, intermediate, pre-university) was abolished in favor of a unified system modeled after that of the United States. "In the process," says Professor Arnold J. Heidenheimer of Washington University in St. Louis, the Swedes "greatly increased access, particularly of working-class children, by eliminating most standard examinations and other criteria of selection, even to the point of abolishing the exam given at the conclusion of gymnasium [advanced secondary school] study."1

Overall, the Social Democrats sought to "humanize" Sweden's existing capitalist industrial system while increasing its efficiency. Their reform strategy thus served two overlapping social objectives: to ameliorate individual deprivation caused by advancing age, disability, unemployment, and insufficient income; and, as a necessary means to that end, to accelerate Sweden's economic growth through active labor-market, monetary, and fiscal policies.

Both supporters and critics of the Swedish welfare state have described this strategy in terms of a "compensatory" theory of social justice. As the authors of a joint 1971 Social Democratic Party-National Federation of Trade Unions report, Equality, asserted, "We have the means to be generous toward those who aren't successful in our complicated society."2 In 1970, when he optimistically forecast 70 percent economic growth by the end of the decade, former Prime Minister Olof Palme asked rhetorically, "Is this desirable or not?" and answered:

A rate of progress of 60-70 percent is, of course, valuable. But if the price is that people are adversely affected, if they are thrown out of work without being given new opportunities to find employment, then the price would be too high. If the price is to exacerbate social cleavages in Swedish society, the price is also too high. But if an increase in productivity of 70 percent means that we can help people who are hurt and can reduce social cleavages in Sweden, it's worth the price.3
The dual purpose of the Swedish welfare state, then, is to promote material prosperity while compensating those individuals who, in the words of the *Equality* report, "for whatever reason wind up outside the boundaries recognized by a career society."

Radical critics are correct when they detect in this strategy some strong ideological limits to the structural transformation of Swedish society. While the emergence of the welfare state has undeniably enhanced social security and altered the distribution of political power in Sweden, it has neither abolished social stratification nor changed basic relations between the "haves" and the "have-nots."

**Prosperity and Labor Peace**

The success of the Swedish welfare state can best be measured in terms of economic performance and of the human consequences of social reforms.

Economically, Sweden has fully shared in the West's postwar growth of domestic productivity, national affluence, and international trade. Owing to the combined effects of increased demand for Swedish industrial and timber exports (chiefly in Scandinavia, the Common Market area, and North America) and efforts by the central government to facilitate investment and industrial rationalization, Sweden experienced an average annual growth rate of 4–5 percent from 1945 through 1970.

By 1973, Sweden's per capita gross national product reached $6,140 (second only to the United States and Switzerland among industrial nations). In that same year, private consumption per capita was $3,240 (compared to $3,840 in the United States, $3,000 in West Germany, and $1,190 in the United Kingdom). Between 1967 and 1974, real hourly earnings increased by 28 percent; in 1976 they averaged 23 Kr (kronor), or approximately $5.50, as compared with $4.87 in the United States.

As in other advanced Western countries, economic growth in Sweden has been uneven during the past decade and increasingly beset by "stagflation." Productivity declined during the mid-1960s and again after 1971 in response to international recessionary trends. But in both instances, indirect government intervention in the economy helped ease the effects of incipient economic crisis. A direct result of government economic activism was Sweden's strikingly low rate of unemployment; it rose from 1.5 percent in 1970 to a peak of
2.5 in 1973, declining thereafter to 2.0 in 1974 (compared to 5.6 percent in the United States in 1974 and 3.0 percent in West Germany).

Important to Sweden's postwar affluence has been an extraordinary record of labor peace. As a matter of deliberate policy, the national labor federation—which encompasses virtually all of the industrial hourly wage earners and roughly one-fourth of the lower-level salaried employees—has generally sought to avoid direct confrontation with the Swedish Association of Employers in negotiating national wage agreements. Moreover, between sessions, the trade union leadership has studiously acted in the spirit of the Saltsjöbaden agreement in enforcing contract terms and proscribing "illegal" strike activity.

As a result, Sweden claims an international record with respect to the infrequency of strikes and retaliatory lockouts. In contrast to a total of 3,095,000 working days lost in Sweden...
through strikes in 1932, an annual average of only 536,000 working days was lost during the entire 1956–66 decade and 141,000 per year between 1966 and 1973.

In turn, national affluence has enabled government agencies to extend and expand the social services launched between 1934 and 1960. Aggregate expenditures on social services rose from 544 million Kr in 1938 (approximately $104 million at the time) to 41,266 million Kr in 1972 (approximately $8,543 million).

The Ideal Society

Augmenting the redistributive effects of compensatory social services is the "democratization" of access to secondary and higher education in Sweden. In 1930, fully 91 percent of the adult population had only a primary school education and fewer than 1 percent had a university degree. The educational reforms of the 1950s and 1960s have significantly changed that picture. By 1974, 50.2 percent of the population 16 years and older had completed at least 8 years of school; 14.3 percent had completed at least 9 to 10 years; 27.1 percent had progressed to a gymnasium (an advanced secondary school, equivalent to a two-year American college); and 8.8 percent had obtained some form of higher education.*

There has been a sharp increase in the number of female students. At the turn of the century, only 8.9 percent of those completing secondary school were women. By the 1930s the percentage had increased to 29.8, and by 1966–70 it reached 45.8 percent. The percentage of women among those receiving university degrees had grown from 23.5 in the 1940s to 40.5 by 1966–70.

Whether material affluence, extensive welfare services, and more equal access to education have yielded the Swedes something close to an ideal society depends very much on one's point of view. Clearly, from the historical perspective of widespread rural poverty in the 19th century and mass urban unemployment in the 1930s, Sweden has made enormous progress. The government's dual commitment to material growth and full employment is the envy of union leaders in much of the industrialized West. Sweden's health care is second to none; it boasts the world's highest investment in medical services, the lowest infant mortality rate, and easy

*In 1974, 89.3 percent of the U.S. population had completed 8 years of schooling; 57.5 percent had completed high school; 18.7 percent had completed two years of college; and 10.9 percent had completed four years of college.
SWEDEN

SWEDEN’S SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMS

Universal Health Insurance
Financed by individual contributions, employer fees, and subsidies from both the central government and local authorities. Payments under the national health program cover outpatient services at hospitals and district medical offices, subject to a uniform fee of 15 Kr per visit (≈$3.06); all hospitalization expenses, including childbirth; 50 percent of dental expenses; and all prescription charges above 20 Kr (≈$4.05). In addition, health insurance provides a daily allowance amounting to 90 percent of a person’s lost income during sickness and pays up to seven months’ income compensation to whichever parent leaves work to care for a newborn infant.

Minimum Old-Age Pensions
Payable at 65 years of age—9,880 Kr (≈$2,010) per year for single persons, 16,120 Kr (≈$3,280) for married couples. Since July 1, 1976, basic benefits have been augmented by supplemental pensions (financed largely by employer contributions), which increase retirement income to two-thirds of the annual average of a person’s 15 highest-income years.

Children and Family Allowances
Paid mostly out of central government revenues. These include an annual payment of 1,200 Kr (≈$243) per child to all parents or guardians, regardless of need; rent subsidies for low-income access by citizens to doctors and dentists.

The sum of these achievements, as Harold Wilensky notes in The Welfare State and Equality is that Sweden “not only distributes medical care more aggressively and fairly, but also invests heavily in health-relevant programs of housing, nutrition, health education, and child care, and draws the income floor for everyone higher and more uniformly; in short, it assures the least privileged of its population a higher standard of living.”

But from the perspective of “utopian” social engineering, the Swedish welfare state is far from perfect. It is expensive, impersonal, and, in important respects, seriously flawed. In the eyes of its critics, basic reforms are long overdue.
families; payments for home-help services, day nurseries, and playschools; and miscellaneous services, such as vacations for children and housewives and school lunches. In 1972, more than 1,796,000 children under 16 years of age benefited from one or more of those services.

**Unemployment Insurance**

Supplements Labor Market Board activities by paying cash benefits to jobless persons who do not qualify for one of the "sheltered jobs" set aside for the handicapped or who are not immediately enrolled in a retraining program. The system of unemployment insurance remains voluntary, although it is likely soon to become compulsory and universal. Most Swedish workers are covered through membership in some 44 unemployment "benefit societies" organized by the trade unions. They are eligible for a maximum allowance of 130 Kr ($26) per day for up to 300 days. Persons not covered by a benefit society may apply to a local labor market office for state-financed allowances of 45 Kr ($9) a day.

**Industrial Accident Insurance**

Financed largely by employers, pays medical benefits, life annuities, and death benefits for accidents sustained at work and for occupational diseases. The number of industrial accidents increased from 129,298 in 1960 to 136,563 in 1968, but declined to 124,864 at the beginning of this decade. In 1971, industrial accident insurance paid compensation for 2,961,420 working days lost through injuries on the job.

An incipient crisis has been evident since the mid-1960s when nonsocialist critics and left-wing Social Democrats launched simultaneous ideological attacks on its perceived shortcomings. Although liberals and critical socialists disagree in their basic analysis of the causes of the crisis, they generally concur on its symptoms:

*The high cost of welfare.* Because 90 percent of the Swedish economy remains in private hands, the Swedish state is required to finance social services, national defense, and other government functions largely through taxation rather than through direct proceeds from nationalized industries and services, as in Eastern Europe.
To pay for the range of economic and social services administered by the various levels of government, the tax rate is correspondingly high. All Swedes and registered aliens earning more than 4,500 Kr ($914) a year are required to pay both a local income tax at an average rate of 27 percent, as well as a national income tax, with rates ranging from 26 percent on annual incomes of 40,000 Kr ($8,130) to 58 percent on incomes above 150,000 Kr ($30,500).

Corporations also pay a direct income tax as well as multiple indirect taxes in the form of contributions to the various national insurance programs on behalf of their employees. Capital gains are taxable as ordinary income, including the entire gain on the sale of real estate. The most important form of indirect taxation is the value-added tax, which was introduced in 1969 in place of a national sales tax. The value-added tax, levied on all goods and services except exports, has increased from 15 percent in 1969 to 17.65 percent in 1971, and 20.63 percent in June 1977.

The effects of Sweden's heavy tax burden on individual behavior are predictable. Swedes of all economic brackets and political persuasions complain bitterly and try, when possible, to augment family incomes. An increasing number of housewives have entered the job market; factory workers and craftsmen take on two or three jobs concurrently, sometimes collecting sickness compensation while they are absent from one job but working at another; and many of those with capital and the requisite knowledge either invest abroad or practice varying degrees of income tax fraud.

Bureaucratization. Accompanying the extension of social services during the past four decades has been an inevitable growth in the size of the Swedish government and the centralization of political power.

Empirical indices show an increase in government consumption as a percentage of GNP from 16 percent in 1960 to 23 percent in 1973; a steady growth in the number of state employees, which presently comprise approximately 14 percent of the labor force; a merger of 3,000 local government units into some 280 larger, more efficient, but undeniably more remote regional governments; and a common tendency within both government and private interest groups to impose detailed policy directives and controls from above. In these trends lies the source of the simultaneous rightist and leftist attacks on the alleged emergence of "corporatist authoritarian" tendencies in Sweden.
SOME COSTS OF SWEDEN'S "WELFARE STATE," 1938-72

Annual social expenditures in millions of kronor*

*The exchange rate has varied from an average of 5.16 kronor to a dollar through the 1960s to under 4 in 1977.

Persistent inequality. In the eyes of both radical and socialist critics, one of the most conspicuous shortcomings of the Swedish welfare state is its failure to achieve real social equality. A highly publicized study issued in 1970 on income distribution in Sweden clearly documented that a principal cause of inequality was periodic unemployment and variations in underemployment, suggesting that the government's official policy of full employment is less effective than the ostensibly low unemployment rate would indicate.

Another chronic source of complaints is social discrimination against women. Attitudes toward sex roles have changed significantly in recent decades. As Berit Gonenai and Birgitta Thorsell note in a recent article on "Economic Necessity and Women's Emancipation," the belief that women have the right to "demand employment again ... after a period in the home," has gained increased recognition from the 1940s onward. This is also an economic consequence of the shortage of workers in industry and service jobs. Since 1960, both the

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national labor federation and the national government have undertaken concrete steps to advance the emancipation of women. The federation abolished its earlier practice of setting separate wage scales for women and since 1969 has pursued a "solidaristic wage policy" providing equal pay for equal work to lower-income groups; the government introduced individual taxation for spouses in 1971 and provided compensation for either parent to take a leave-of-absence to care for a new infant.

 Nonetheless, women still suffer from economic and occupational inequality. According to Gønegai and Thorsell, women earned in 1975 an average income equivalent to 86.5 percent of men's wages, with 75 percent of all women employed in only 75 of 300 possible job categories—typically, lower-paid service occupations such as homecare assistants, nurses, telephone operators, cashiers, secretaries, and textile workers.

Worker alienation and criminality. A much more diffuse manifestation of social disorder in Sweden—one that is related more to advanced industrial society in general than to any shortcomings of the Swedish welfare state in particular—is an apparently widespread sense of powerlessness and personal frustration. Its causes are exceptionally complex, ranging from the psychological pressures of industry's demands for increased productivity to the decline of extended families and the loss of a personal sense of community caused by urbanization. Employee resentment of stress and inadequate control over local working conditions erupted into spontaneous wildcat strikes in 1969 and 1970 at the Volvo factory, at the docks in Göteborg, and at the state-owned iron mines in northern Sweden.

 To the extent that criminality can be interpreted as a sort of anomic response to modern society, Sweden shares in the industrial world's trend toward increased lawlessness. Reported crimes increased nearly fourfold between 1950 and 1973—from 172,999 to 622,060—with the largest category encompassing various types of theft. Although violence against persons also increased from 12,665 to 33,130 incidents during the same period, the number of murders actually declined from 81 to 66.

None of these trends is, of course, unique to Sweden. All advanced nations manifest degrees of burdensome taxation, bureaucratization, inequality, and alienation. What is distinc-
A comparison of total outlays (federal, state, and local) shows that the United States surpasses Sweden in the percentage of public spending devoted to education (18 vs. 14 percent), public welfare (25 vs. 20 percent), and defense (16 vs. 6 percent) but trails in health (8 vs. 16 percent) and housing (1.6 vs. 3.3 percent).


The policy response to the perceived imperfections of the welfare state and the implications of that response as a possible pattern for other nations.

Although employer groups and the three nonsocialist parties came to endorse the Social Democratic concept of the welfare state during the postwar period, the nonsocialist and socialist blocs differ in their prescriptions for easing its contemporary malaise. Private corporations such as Volvo and Saab have already undertaken a radical reform of the manufacturing process by abolishing the traditional assembly line at experimental sites in an attempt to lessen worker alienation and decrease absenteeism. (The initial results are being debated.) Politically, the nonsocialist parties now in power would seek to correct imperfections in the established system by slowing down the growth of bureaucracy and by increasing private incentives to invest in further industrial growth (primarily through a reduction in the rate of marginal taxation).

Since the late 1960s, the Social Democrats and the national labor federation have acknowledged leftist criticism
that the basic source of inequality and worker alienation is the concentration of socioeconomic power in private hands. Accordingly, the Social Democratic Cabinet, largely at the federation’s prodding, enacted a series of legislative measures between 1969 and 1976 establishing new sources of collective savings for investment in industry and home construction, enabling unions to appoint two representatives to the governing boards of all corporations employing 100 or more workers, and abolishing management’s unilateral right to hire, assign, and dismiss labor.

In June 1976, delegates to the national congress of the labor federation went beyond these reform measures by endorsing a long-term proposal authored by Rudolf Meidner, the federation’s chief economist, calling for the creation of a national system of collective capital formation through an annual transfer of company profits into a union-controlled fund. Under this proposal, the unions could utilize a portion of the employee fund to acquire, in time, controlling interest in Sweden’s leading industries—a radical change.

The public’s short-term electoral response to the contest between Social Democrats and nonsocialists over economic democracy versus liberal reform was to give a narrow parliamentary majority to the Center, Liberal, and Conservative Parties in the September 1976 election. Thus, for the first time in 44 years, a stable nonsocialist coalition displaced the Social Democrats from executive leadership. In part, the socialist setback can be blamed on the failure of the party leadership to endorse the Meidner proposal; Prime Minister Olof Palme had preferred to refer the complicated and highly controversial issue to a Royal Commission for expert evaluation. Thus, the leading Socialist newspaper Aftonbladet suggested after the election that a principal cause of defeat was lack of a party-union consensus on the question. In greater measure, however, the party’s loss can probably be attributed to serious public reservations about the Meidner plan.

Several worries voiced during the campaign by nonsocialist spokesmen were apparently shared by many rank and file workers. How, for example, would the fund be administered? What guarantees were there that it would not simply result, as Thorbjörn Fälldin,* the Center Party chair-

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*Thorbjörn Fälldin, 51, a farmer and politician, was born in Hogsjo in northern Sweden. A member of parliament since 1958, he became chairman of the Center Party in 1971. He heads a three-party coalition, which outnumbers the Social Democrats in parliament, 180 to 152, with 17 other seats held by the Communists. New elections are scheduled for 1979 unless Fälldin loses his majority earlier through a parliamentary vote of no confidence.
man and now Prime Minister, put it, “in the substitution of one concentration of power by another?” To what extent would control of capital and the eventual controlling interest by unions in corporations lessen individual powerlessness at the factory level, if there were no accompanying effort to strengthen democracy within the labor federation itself?

The Welfare “Society”

Despite the lack of clear answers to these basic questions, the introduction of some such fund seems sure to emerge as the next significant reform of the Swedish welfare state. A 1976 report issued by the Swedish Association of Employers advocates the creation of a voluntary program of collective savings based on contributions from individual wages rather than company profits. Encouraged by that report, Prime Minister Falldin predicted in April 1977 that a system of employee funds could be implemented on such a basis as early as 1980. For their part, the Social Democrats remain keenly interested in the issue. They have announced that they will conduct an extensive discussion on the merits of alternative collective-savings programs among the party’s rank and file before submitting a new report at their 1978 congress.

The introduction of employee funds, in whatever form, will by no means resolve the tension between national achievement and imperfection that now characterizes Swedish society. No immediate utopia is conceivable. Sweden—like other advanced nations—must as a matter of national survival maintain the complex economic and social structures that are a principal source of inequality and alienation. But within these existing constraints, the ideological competition between the Social Democrats, with their commitment to economic democracy, and the nonsocialists, with their emphasis on classical democratic liberties, may yield some margin of qualitative change.

As Harold Wilensky notes, such changes could transform the welfare state into a welfare society. The challenge, he writes, “is to humanize the welfare state and make it more effective at a time when costs are climbing, and simultaneously (to enable it to) cope with the universal issues of civilized survival.”

That both the Social Democrats and nonsocialist groups are committed to a continuing strategy of active social change is the real relevance of the “Swedish model” to other industrialized countries. What is instructive about the Swedish case
is not the particular blend of economic and social policies, which each nation must achieve in light of its own resources and requirements. What is striking is the historical willingness of Swedish leaders—in politics, business, and labor—to respond creatively to continuing public pressures for change. In my view, a significant test will come as the Swedes try to broaden their historically successful welfare state formula—material growth plus “compensatory” social services—to accommodate citizens’ demands for increased control over their own lives.


THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

by Steven Kelman

Few Americans, even those who know a bit about Sweden, have ever heard of the Swedish economist, Gösta Rehn. Nor have they heard of the so-called Rehn model named after him. But understanding the controversial Rehn model is crucial to understanding where Sweden has come from and where it may be going.

First, the Rehn model of the economy has embodied Sweden’s recipe for combining economic growth with increased wage equality—and full employment with controlled inflation. It has also illustrated the Swedish ability to develop programs which satisfy both trade unions and business.

Second, the breakdown of the consensus over the Rehn model in the late 1960s signaled the current era of uncertainty, in which the ability of Sweden’s political institutions to come up with new programs and reforms acceptable to a wide range of organized Swedish interests is being put to a severe test.

Rehn argued, as long ago as 1951, that Swedish unions ought to abandon opposition to technological change in industry, while not “going soft” in wage negotiations with low-wage, low-efficiency firms. Furthermore, Rehn believed that inefficient firms should not be allowed to ask the government for handouts in order to survive. They should either improve their efficiency or go bankrupt.

According to Rehn, the government was expected to carry out an “active labor market policy” by finding temporary work for the unemployed in public works projects, by retraining workers as necessary, and by providing grants to cover moving and relocation costs for the unemployed when they found jobs. There was something here for both labor and big business. Labor got full employment, increased wage equality, and the benefits of economic growth. Big business got assurance of continuing technological change and a supply of workers for expanding industries.

After its initial adoption in the mid-1950s, the Rehn model worked splendidly for a time. During the late 1960s,
some unexpected things happened. After small inefficient local firms in northern Sweden went bankrupt, their former employees duly landed in highly paid industrial jobs in the big cities. But many of these workers soon discovered that they preferred small-town life back home. Technological change at the factory level also created dissatisfactions. Work sometimes became more boring or faster paced, or both. Finally, it was discovered that the union policy of negotiating equal wage increases for workers in both weak and strong firms tended to hurt the weak, low-wage companies and provide excess profits for strong companies, which could afford even higher wages.

A "Green Wave"

These difficulties became apparent at a time when the Center Party, one of the three nonsocialist parties opposing the Social Democrats, was in the process of articulating the Swedish version of an environmentalist, antigrowth, "small-is-beautiful" critique of Sweden, that most modernistic of modern societies. The Green Wave, as it came to be called, featured demands that Sweden reverse the general trend towards industrial and population concentration by putting massive governmental resources into a movement to spread industry and social services evenly throughout the country, so that people could stay in small towns, close to nature, if they wanted to. The Green Wave's spokesmen also urged that Sweden reverse its "march into the nuclear society" by abandoning atomic power as a source of energy—this in a country where such sources now provide more electricity per capita than anywhere else in the world (twice as much as in the United States).

The reaction against the effects of technological change on workplace conditions occurred mainly within the union movement and the Social Democratic Party. It took the form of calls for "co-determination"—a demand for union involvement in everything from setting the pace of work to deciding when to set up new shifts or abandon production lines. In

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effect, this meant the end of the Rehn notion that unions should not attempt to block technological change.

This year, labor-management negotiations are underway concerning the content of co-determination agreements, and one of the most interesting changes worth watching in Sweden in the coming years will be the effect of co-determination on Swedish industry and working life.

Other issues growing out of reactions to the Rehn model remain as open sores in the Swedish political system. The Green Wave thrust the Center Party from a position as the smallest of the nonsocialist parties to that of the largest. Some parts of the Center program, such as increasing grants to industries willing to locate in depressed regions of Sweden, had already been introduced earlier by the Social Democrats. But the nuclear power issue still festers, plastered over by an almost comic compromise between the Center and its two coalition partners, who favor continued reliance on nuclear power. After pledging in the 1976 election campaign that he would never agree to the continued construction of nuclear power plants, the Center leader, Thorbjörn Fälldin, now Prime Minister, said that the plants should be built to save the jobs of construction workers—but should not be allowed to come into use.

**Buying Union Control**

In 1971, Rudolf Meidner, the senior researcher of the **Landorganisation** (the national labor federation) and an old associate of Gösta Rehn, was assigned the task of finding solutions to the "excess profits" problem caused by the uniform wage-increase negotiating strategy.

Meidner’s scheme for dealing with excess profits—the handing over of new issues of company stock to a union-controlled fund—would permit those unions to achieve eventual voting control of most Swedish companies. Clearly this plan would bring a fundamental transformation of the Swedish economic structure. It remains to be seen if the national labor federation and the Swedish political parties can reach a satisfactory compromise on this issue.

All these discussions about Sweden's future take place against a background of economic uncertainty, as in other Western countries. One should be skeptical about suggestions that Sweden's high tax burden, wage levels, and fringe benefits spell an end to the steady economic growth that has propelled Sweden near the top of the GNP-per capita league.
Such predictions have been voiced regularly by critics of the Social Democrats ever since the 1930s.

Nevertheless, serious questions remain. In 1975 and 1976, wage increases in Sweden far outstripped increases among Sweden's leading foreign competitors like West Germany, a difficult situation for a country as dependent on foreign trade as Sweden. Typical of Sweden's increasing difficulties overseas is the plunge of Volvo auto exports to America. In 1973, Volvo sold almost as many cars in America as in Sweden; now, a combination of a buoyant home market and weak U.S. market has transformed the ratio to nearly 2:1 in favor of domestic sales. U.S. Volvo sales slumped 27 percent in 1976. Even more ominous: Volvo lost about one-fourth of its American dealerships. In August 1977, partly to help export sales, Sweden devalued its currency by 10 percent.

Moreover, Sweden is moving away from the Rehn model policy of not subsidizing weak industries; there have been massive government subsidies to shipbuilding and steel. There is also a small but noticeable trend toward making up for lost markets in the industrialized world by essentially "political" sales to Third World countries like Algeria and Cuba; the foreign government is the purchaser, and the purchase often constitutes a gesture of appreciation for Swedish support. (Sweden, which backed the winning side in Angola with both public statements and money, negotiated a major sale of Volvo trucks to Angola last year.) One by-product of this is that it may reduce Sweden's freedom to adopt independent stands on issues of importance to Third World countries.

Yet overall, the visitor to Sweden in 1977 is struck not by the impression that a social experiment has broken down or run out of steam, but rather by a bubbling surfeit of new experimental beginnings. Most of the new areas of serious concern in Sweden also crop up in America—not only the small-is-beautiful and industrial democracy issues, but also, for example, the shifting roles of men and women.

Sweden approaches these new questions without the pristine certainties of days gone by, and with an economy that is just hobbling along. What the Swedes still have in their favor is a set of political institutions that appear better adapted than ours to produce wide agreement on new courses of action and a strong residual optimism, which reminds one of the hopeful innocence for which Americans were once famous.
BACKGROUND BOOKS

SWEDEN

From Viking times to the Volvo era, Sweden's story is one of a hardworking, self-absorbed people's successful effort to make the best of modest resources, a harsh climate, and the limits fixed by geographical and cultural isolation.

The long, earnest Swedish search for a workable society and a prudent relationship with the outside world is described in Franklin D. Scott's SWEDEN: The Nation's History (Univ. of Minn., 1977), a 654-page compilation of facts, figures, charts, maps, photographs, and narrative enlivened by vivid anecdotes.

One of Scott's recurring themes is Sweden's ability to alter its strategic position as changes occur in Europe's military balance. After the Napoleonic wars (in which Sweden lost Finland to Russia but emerged with a 100-year union with Norway that was peacefully dissolved in 1905), the Swedes worked toward a policy of neutrality. They maintained this policy throughout World War I and, despite Nazi occupation of Denmark and Norway, during World War II. Later, avoiding the Cold War, Sweden stayed out of NATO, stressed its neutrality (but cheered on Hanoi in the Vietnam conflict), and tended to its defenses, including an air force now said to be one of the world's strongest after those of the United States, Russia, and Britain.

Scott's single-volume treatment of the whole course of Swedish history, from icebound beginnings to the conformist, tax-burdened welfare state of the present day, is necessarily fragmented. A more unified approach to a shorter span of time is taken by Vilhelm Moberg in A HISTORY OF THE SWEDISH PEOPLE: From Odin to Gelbrecth, vols. 1 and 2 (Pantheon, 1972, 1974). Moberg's approach is imaginative and romanticized, as might be expected from Sweden's best-known writer of historical fiction. One of his novels, THE EMIGRANTS (Simon & Schuster, 1951, cloth; Popular Library, 1971, paper), was made into a powerful film familiar to U.S. audiences.

"Had I been born in another milieu or come from another social class, I should have written quite another history," writes Moberg, whose parents and relatives were peasants and servants. Theirs was a somber heritage. During the 19th century, despite heavy emigration (450,000 Swedes left home, mostly for America, between 1867 and 1886), Sweden's rural population doubled. In 1870, farmers who owned or rented their land numbered 1,396,000; the total number of crofters, servants, and landless laborers (who were required by law to take any job offered them) was 1,288,000.

The earlier, epic time in Scandinavian history—when the great Viking "dragon ships" set sail for the coasts of Iceland, Greenland, Britain, Ireland, and northern France and penetrated the Mediterranean—is vividly portrayed in Johannes Brondsted's illustrated THE VIKINGS (Penguin, rev. 1965, paper).

Brondsted discusses the main themes that have been elaborated to explain Viking expansionism (700-1200 A.D.). In his view, changing conditions in commerce were the crucial factor. Sweden's role in the Viking age was less dramatic than that of the Danes and Norwegians. The latter, the "West Vikings," roamed afar to plunder, explore, and eventually to colonize; the Swedes, or "East Vikings," were more active as

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middlemen in the lucrative trade between the Baltic and the Levant.

Sweden's democratic institutions go back before the Vikings to the village ting (or council), the forerunner of the modern Swedish Parliament. Joseph B. Board, in his excellent introductory study THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SWEDEN (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1970, paper only), gives due attention to this historical background in relation to today's political system. Board acknowledges that "the state is easily the most powerful single entity" but also points out that "Sweden, like America, is a pluralist society par excellence."

The Scandinavian nations today cooperate through the Nordic Council, but comparative analysis of Scandinavian politics dispels the myth of a single "Nordic" world-view. Nils Andersen analyzes contemporary elements of commonality and divergence in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964). Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are constitutional monarchies; Finland's parliamentary system includes a strong president whose function is to remain above the fray of party politics; all five parliamentary systems are based upon variants of proportional representation; the greatest similarity exists between Sweden and Norway.


"The predominant trend in Swedish politics has been a convergence toward the middle, not the provocation of extremist tendencies," he writes. The SAP, closely identified with bread-and-butter trade unionism, eventually chose the road of nonradical, non-Marxist reform. However, from the framing of the platform at the fourth Party Congress in 1897 to the first participation in a coalition government in 1917, the SAP's deliberations were characterized by intense, often vitriolic debates over both theory and tactics. In the end, the principles of democracy prevailed over the doctrines of orthodox socialism.

The "progressivism" of social reform in Sweden is rooted in a basically conservative approach to the political order, Dankwart A. Rustow argues in THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden (Greenwood, 1969, reprint). Rustow describes "that most fundamental yet elusive quality of Swedish politics—the harmonious interplay of rival forces, the tradition of government by discussion and compromise."

Some observers of the Swedish system have hailed it as near-utopian. One who has taken it as a nightmare warning to the West is Roland Huntford. In his THE NEW TOTALITARIANS (London: Penguin, 1971; New York: Stein & Day, 1972), the theme is Brave New World, the place Sweden, the time now. Where columnist Marquis Childs, in SWEDEN, THE MIDDLE WAY (Yale, 1936, 1961), saw fresh and innocent social democracy, Huntford finds a despotism made evil by unrestrained official megalomania. According to Huntford, the SAP, as the chief agent of social and economic security, strengthened its monolithic grip by appealing to the Swedes' fear of change: "Concerned only with economic security, the Swede is prepared to sacrifice most other things in life"; "Swedes like social control."

The country's economic growth through the second half of the 19th
BACKGROUND BOOKS: SWEDEN

century—when Sweden, long poverty-ridden, achieved her industrial breakthrough well after the United States and England—is treated in Eli F. Heckscher’s AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SWEDEN (Harvard, 1954). Martin Schnitzer provides a more contemporary overview in THE ECONOMY OF SWEDEN (Prager, 1970), out of print but available in most libraries. Schnitzer covers the tax system (less progressive than the British and offering strong incentives to private industry), resource allocation, the labor market, and the importance of the export trade for domestic prosperity.

Outside the realm of politics and economics, a sense of Sweden can be found in its sociology and literature. An easy place to begin is a short book by British Swedophile P. B. Austin, ON BEING SWEDISH: Reflections Towards a Better Understanding of the Swedish Character (Univ. of Miami, 1968). A typical Austin observation: “The last thing a Swede is prepared to dispense with is his själsliv (literally, soul-life). The very impossibility, indeed, of translating ... själ (soul/ mind/spirit/psyche) into any non-Scandinavian tongue suggests ... what chasms there are between being Swedish and being anything else.” Another instructive—and entertaining—book by Austin is THE LIFE AND SONGS OF CARL MICHAEL BELL-MAN: Genius of the Swedish Rococo (Malmo: Allhems, 1967). Two hundred years ago, the roistering poet Bellman (1740–95) wrote: Am I born, then I’ll be living / Well and truly on this wise / To my Eve like Adam cleaving / Here in paradise. /... By my bottle let me slumber; / By my girl will I awake: /When sad thoughts my brain encumber / Time an end will make.

Also illuminating are the popular short stories that comprise the Gösta Berling Saga, part of the work for which Selma Lagerlöf won a Nobel Prize (1909), and the books of Pär Lagerkvist, another Nobel Prize-winner (1951) and the grand old man of Swedish letters. A translation of Lagerlöf entitled THE STORY OF GÖSTA BERLING (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1951; Westport, Conn.: Hyperion, 1977, reprint, cloth & paper), is available, as are Lagerkvist’s BARABBAS (Random, 1955, cloth; Bantam, 1968, paper) and THE DWARF (Hill & Wang, 1945, cloth; 1958, paper).

Finally, there are the copious works of Johan August Strindberg (1849–1912), Sweden’s greatest dramatist, who touches upon most, if not all, of the major Swedish preoccupations, including the war between the sexes and the tensions of social class. Several good paperback selections of his plays are available.

The gloomy dramatist’s themes and characters are reflected in the world-famous films of Ingmar Bergman, who in his youth directed many productions of Strindberg. The first film written by Bergman to appear in the United States was Torment (1947). Scenes from a Marriage, a typical Bergman study of psychic conflicts and personal morality, captured a large U.S. television audience earlier this year.

Swedish films are everywhere. But not very much of the sizable recent Swedish literary output is available in English. Happily, this gap is being filled by the University of Minnesota Press, which plans to release anthologies of contemporary Swedish prose (edited by Gunnar Harding and Anselm Hallo) and poetry (edited by Karl-Erik Lagerlos) late in 1978.
THE UNCHANGING INCOME PYRAMID

The postwar years have seen little apparent shift in the overall distribution of income. In the pyramids, each colored band represents one-fifth of all U.S. families, with the richest quintile at the top. The size of each band reflects its relative share of total personal income. Dollar figures at the right show the lowest income in the top 5 percent and the highest income in each of the lower four quintiles.


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Money and The Pursuit of Plenty in America

As the United States recovers from its worst recession since the 1930s, economists and other scholars continue to seek new data on the changing patterns of family earning, spending, and "status" in America. Scholars have reached general agreement on at least one point: In 25 years, for all its defects, the growing U.S. "consumer economy" has brought most American adults (and even most American poor adults) a level of material well-being that would have astonished their grandparents.

As the pyramids in the chart on the opposite page indicate, total personal income has grown since 1950, and all segments of the population have gained. But, as the chart also makes clear, the top two-fifths of all American families still get the lion's share of the total. As in the rest of the industrialized West (and in the Soviet Union), some people get far more than others.

How freely can Americans scale the pyramid? Academic studies of the "social mobility" of racial, ethnic, and other groups abound. But scholars differ on the factors that enable individual Americans to do better than their fathers in terms of income (see our Background Books essay). In the essays that follow, historian Edward Pessen looks at social mobility prior to World War II; economist Robert Lampman analyzes American economic growth and income inequality since the war; and economist Helen Lamale examines the impact of postwar changes on consumer spending, living standards, and definitions of "luxuries" and "necessities."
America's current patterns of wealth, income distribution, and social mobility are the product of earlier trends as well as contemporary influences. Even a swift glance at the historical background will show how equality and opportunity have increased or diminished—or remained intact—over the course of time.

Pre-Civil War popular perceptions of America's distribution of worldly goods were shaped primarily by a small number of articulate commentators; by far the most influential was the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville. In the opening sentence of his universally acclaimed Democracy in America, the first part of which was published in 1835, Tocqueville reported that nothing struck him more forcibly than "the general equality of condition among the people"; this was "the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived."

Supplementing this general equality, which he believed to exclude only blacks, recently arrived Irish immigrants, and individuals who were lacking in industry and sobriety, was an equality of opportunity that awarded every manner of success to individuals on the basis of ability and diligence rather than inherited advantages. Scratch a rich American, said Tocqueville, and you will find a poor boy.

Henry Clay spoke for many of his countrymen when he observed that the wealthy businessmen of his acquaintance were self-made men. And because commoners in the New World supposedly had access to wealth and status not dreamed of by their European counterparts, they were said to wield a power over government and society similar (in Tocqueville's phrase) to "the power of the Deity over the universe."

Fortified later in the century by the inspirational novels of
Horatio Alger* and fed by national pride, the American success myth was widely accepted. Until recently most historians treated it as gospel. They had some reason to do so.

The foreign visitors and native American writers who propagated the image of an egalitarian American society did not create it out of whole cloth. They could all point to examples of well-fed, well-dressed working people, contented farmers, and successful businessmen who had risen from humble beginnings. But modern scholars, by immersing themselves in manuscript census schedules, probate inventories, tax assessment records, and genealogical materials have discovered that the reality was much grimmer than had been supposed. The revised version of our past is more authoritative than the old because it rests on comprehensive data rather than on examples selected haphazardly.

Rich and Poor in Brooklyn

In every geographical section and in every rural or urban social milieu, wealth in early 19th-century America was unevenly distributed and becoming more so with the passage of time. Brooklyn, New York, in 1810 was a village of fewer than 5,000 persons, engaged in a variety of agricultural and mercantile pursuits not unlike those in dozens of other American communities. Seven out of eight adults paid taxes on some property, but wealth—in the form of real estate, buildings, personal possessions, and money or liquid assets—was more unequally distributed than it had been a generation earlier at the close of the Revolution. Then the richest tenth of the adult population owned slightly more than 40 percent of urban wealth. By 1810, they controlled 60 percent, while more than half of all Brooklyn adults owned only 3 percent of the village’s property. Still more dramatic changes occurred a generation later.

By 1841, Brooklyn had a population of more than 40,000. It was the nation’s seventh most populous city and one of its wealthiest, but the wealth was more unequally distributed than ever. The wealthiest 1 percent of taxpayers owned more than 40 percent of the community’s wealth, the richest 10 percent owned about 80 percent, and the poorest two-thirds of the population—individuals worth less than $100 each—owned less than 1 percent. Studies by Gavin Wright, Stuart Blumin, Robert E. Gallman, Lee Soltow, this author, and

*Ragged Dick (1867), Luck and Pluck (1869), From Farm Boy to Senator (1882). The sustaining theme of these and other Alger books was that virtue and hard work were invariably rewarded with wealth and fame.
others show that patterns of wealth distribution in mid-19th
century communities in the cotton and urban South, the
Midwestern frontier, and the great cities of the Northeast
were much like those in ante-bellum Brooklyn.

The new evidence does not mean that propertyless indi-
viduals were necessarily down and out. The farmers, who
predominated, might have ample fare and serviceable (if less
than lavish) accommodations, even when they possessed no
real or personal estate worth assessing. The absence of cash
reserves has always meant less to farmers than to city-
dwellers, thanks to the availability of the food produced on
the farm. Moreover, then as now, urban residents were not
eager to disclose the true value of their property to tax
assessors. Having "no property" meant having no property
with any market value in an assessor's judgment. It did not, of
course, preclude owning clothing, furniture, household goods,
and utensils that were of immeasurable value to their posses-
sors for all their lack of commercial value. And yet most
evidence about workingmen and their lifestyles reveals a vast
gulf separating the mass of 19th-century Americans from the
possessors of status and wealth.

Most people eked out a marginal existence, marked by
minimal consumption, low wages, and irregular employment.
They had little or nothing to fall back on during hard times.
The New York Times in 1869 estimated that fully 75 percent of
urban households earned a "meager subsistence wage or less."
In contrast, the top mercantile, landowning, and professional
elites lived in material splendor rivaling that of Europe's most
fabled accumulators of wealth. Magnificent mansions, luxuri-
ous furnishings, platoons of servants, splendid fetes and balls
were familiar features in the lives of the American rich a
generation before J. P. Morgan and Commodore Vanderbilt
flaunted their millions.

Equality of opportunity was no more prevalent then than than
equality of man's material condition. A recent investigation of

Edward Pessen, 56, professor of history at Baruch College and the
Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York, is
studying the extent and significance of social mobility in American
history under a grant from the Guggenheim Foundation. Born in New
York City, he received his B.A. (1947), M.A. (1948), and Ph.D. (1954)
from Columbia. His books include Most Uncommon Jacksonians
(1967), Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics (1969),
Riches, Class, and Power Before the Civil War (1973), and Three
Centuries of Social Mobility in America (1974).
the backgrounds of the 2,000 wealthiest individuals in the urban Northeast before the Civil War establishes that they had been neither the poor boys nor the self-made men that Tocqueville, Clay, and James Fenimore Cooper claimed they were. With few exceptions, they were born to families that combined great social prestige with wealth, usually dating back to Colonial times. Perhaps 2 percent were born of poor farm and working-class families. A less comprehensive study of rural Michigan in pre-Civil War days discloses similar backgrounds for rich men there.

It Takes Money to Make Money

We know far less about the mid-19th-century social movement of persons born to humble circumstances, although the information we do have suggests that it was not dramatic. In the fishing port of Stonington, Connecticut, before and after the Civil War the sons of local propertyless workers did not rise above their fathers. In Philadelphia, few persons found jobs or moved into neighborhoods that were more prestigious than the occupations or residences of their fathers in the years between 1820 and 1860. The expanding legal profession in that city contained a far higher proportion of young men of middle-class backgrounds (sons of clerks, shopkeepers, teachers, and civil servants) in 1860 than in 1800, but the new plebeians made few inroads in the lucrative practice that continued to be dominated by members of the Meredith, Wharton, Rawle, Wain, and Gilpin families and their ilk.

It is hard to disagree with Robert Gallman's generalization that "there were forces at work in the American economy during the 19th century that tended to produce greater inequality in the distribution of wealth over time." Great fortunes were to be made as booms in transportation, cotton production and manufacture, shipbuilding, insurance and finance, and international commerce moved the country toward the mature industrialism of the post-Civil War years. These fortunes were made not by upstarts but by men whose parents and grandparents had already accumulated sizable estates. Only such men were able to survive the recurrent financial panics of the 19th century. They alone possessed the capital necessary to participate in the great entrepreneurial ventures that beckoned.

In short, winning the race for material success depended less on the possession of innate ability than on inherited wealth and standing. The available evidence bears out Robert
A. Dahl’s comment on mid-19th-century New Haven, Connecticut, that the era was marked by a “cumulative inequality: when an individual was much better off than another in one resource, such as wealth, he was usually better off in almost every other resource.”

America’s pre-Civil War patterns of wealth and social mobility appear to have persisted to a remarkable extent during the 75 years that followed the war, but, because of the lack of data, one can only guess at the distribution of income during the 19th century. Local tax assessors and censustakers estimated wealth, not income. (An exception occurred during the Civil War years when the levy of a tax on incomes disclosed that in New York City the top-salaried 1 percent received about one-third of all the income dollars.) After 1870, censustakers no longer asked individuals for estimates of the value of their real or personal estate. Local tax assessors asked only for taxpayers’ own estimates of the worth of their real property.

Admittedly incomplete and imprecise scholarly studies suggest that the richest 1 percent increased slightly their share of the nation’s wealth to more than 50 percent by the last decade of the 19th century. If the proportion they owned diminished over the next 30 years to between 30 and 35 percent, depending on whether individuals or families are studied, it may have been due, at least in part, to the decision by the greatest wealth-holders to divide their large holdings “among a larger number of heirs, donees, and beneficiaries,” thus moderating the degree of inequality—among individuals, if less so among families.

With historians joining sociologists in the increasingly popular pursuit of research in social mobility, studies of the 1865–1940 period have proliferated. Evidence is now available on the progress of diverse American communities, ethnic and racial groups, and persons of differing religious affiliations and social backgrounds, not to mention various states of emotional imbalance and levels of aspiration.

The late 19th century has been described as an Age of Big Business, characterized by the emergence of huge industrial corporations, finance capital, a national labor movement, continuing urbanization, and the influx of a horde of “new immigrants” from southern and eastern Europe, who provided

*This is why scholarly estimates of 20th-century distributions usually focus on income rather than wealth. Income disparities, no matter how dramatic, are not nearly so dramatic as the changes that have taken place in the distribution of wealth over the past several generations. From the disparate data, the unwary may conclude that wealth is distributed much more equally in this century than in the 19th.
cheap and usually docile labor for factories and urban sweatshops. These developments did occur, but it is useful to remember that most Americans in 1900 lived in rural communities and small towns rather than in great cities. Small business was more common than big; Paterson, New Jersey, Newburyport, Massachusetts, and San Antonio, Texas, were more typical of U.S. cities than New York and Philadelphia. Rates of vertical mobility varied, in part because of differences in the sizes of communities, their local economic structures, and the overall social context.

Like Father, Like Son

In the late 19th century, Paterson's leading iron manufacturers were, with few exceptions, men who had worked their way up from the ranks. Sons of Newburyport workingmen continued to wear blue collars, as did their fathers, but they were far more likely than their fathers to own a house. In San Antonio during the last three decades of the 19th century, native whites improved their lot more often than did new European immigrants, but both groups enjoyed far greater success than Mexican-Americans and (in particular) Negroes. For that matter, Stephan Thernstrom's recent massive study of social mobility in Boston since 1880 discloses that, prior to World War II, blacks in that city rarely moved out of the most menial work, regardless of their geographical origins or how long they had lived in Boston.

In other cities, too, race or color correlated significantly with the degree of success achieved, as did religion. But the pattern has always been complex. Protestants have by and large risen more regularly than Catholics, and Jews more rapidly than either. Yet, even as they prospered in the professions and as individual entrepreneurs, wealthy Jews have continued to be underrepresented among the nation's top corporate directors. National business and financial elites, regardless of ethnic background or period, come from poor or working-class families as rarely as did the urban rich before the Civil War. Yet, if plebeians continue to move into the most coveted entrepreneurial niches at a glacial pace, much upward movement onto less exalted plateaus has indeed occurred in fields ranging from small business and the professions to entertainment.* In brief, the social mobility picture in

*While this important conclusion rests on admittedly impressionistic data (see Christopher Jencks, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America, New York: Basic Books, 1972), studies are underway that are expected to provide authoritative evidence of this sort of upward mobility.
early 20th-century America is a complicated one.

Despite structural changes in a growing economy that increased "opportunity" by replacing manual labor and low-prestige agricultural jobs with more highly regarded white-collar work, social mobility rates remained remarkably consistent until World War II. Dozens of mobility studies note the persistence of earlier patterns. For the most part, sons of successful fathers continued to be the nation's most successful men. Individuals made many changes in occupations, yet typically they were to occupations of similar standing: Men starting out, say, as manual workers, in the words of the most authoritative recent study, "ended up as adults, in the aggregate, [in occupations] little different from their fathers."

What is the significance of the maldistributions of wealth and the often static social mobility patterns that prevailed during the century and a half following the adoption of the federal Constitution? For one thing, they indicate that present-day inequality, whether of condition or opportunity, represents not a lapse from an earlier state of social grace but a continuation of ancient inequities. The gulf in wage differentials between the societies of the New World and the Old has been found to be less wide than first believed—although the precise extent of the shrinkage can be known only after more research. Clearly, political reforms, including the increasing democratization of American government, appear to have had a negligible effect on the conditions of life, the status, and the opportunities of most Americans during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th.

GROWTH, PROSPERITY, AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1947

by Robert J. Lampman

People worried thirty years ago, even as they do today, about the future of the American economy. During World War II, the great surge in production had shown that the decade of the Great Depression had done no permanent damage, but after the reconversion of plant and labor force from war production, and after a brief response to pent-up demands for civilian goods, many feared the economy would again turn sluggish.

Memories of the breadlines of the 1930s and fears of postwar economic stagnation cast a pall over the hopes of many Americans for a better life for themselves and their children.

Few economists or politicians foresaw the prosperity and economic growth that the nation has experienced since 1947. President Harry Truman warned in January 1946: "Whether we fall into a period of great deflation because of unemployment and reduced wages and purchasing power, or whether we embark upon a period of great inflation with reduced production and spiraling prices—the results will be equally disastrous." *

As it turned out, with the exception of a few minor recessions and a serious jolt in 1974–75, the American record is one of continuing increase in production and rise in living standards. In 1977, the total output of goods and services, as measured by the gross national product, stood at $1,900 billion, more than two and a half times the 1947 level in constant purchasing power dollars when adjusted for inflation. This increase reflects a compound growth rate of 3.5 percent per year, which compares favorably with that for any other 30-year period since the Civil War. The record, however, does not seem so remarkable when measured against that of other countries. Most West European countries, except Brit-

*Radio report to the American people on the status of the reconversion program, Jan. 3, 1946.
ain, have increased production at an annual rate of 5 or 6 percent, and Japan’s growth rate has averaged 9 percent.

During this same 30-year period, U.S. population increased by half. Nevertheless, GNP per capita increased at a substantial rate (2.1 percent per year) and is now 81 percent higher, in constant dollars, than it was in 1947. The current per capita level of GNP—about $9,000—is among the highest in the world, but we no longer rank first. A few nations, including Sweden, Switzerland, and oil-rich Kuwait, have recently surpassed the United States, but our per capita production is still about twice as high as that of the United Kingdom and Japan, perhaps four times that of the Soviet Union, six times that of Mexico, and 20 or more times that of China, India, and the other less-developed countries, which hold half the world’s population.

U.S. national income* has increased along with production. The share of income going to labor—employee compensation plus an arbitrarily selected one-half of proprietors’ income (e.g., that earned by farmers or sole proprietors in business or the professions)—has risen from 75 to 80 percent of the total. And the share of property income—profits, rent, and interest—has fallen from 25 to 20 percent since World War II. One form of individual income, though not counted as national income, is transfer payments, such as Social Security benefits, which have risen from 5 to 10 percent of all personal income after deducting payroll taxes paid by workers. Yet another form of personal “income,” but one not ordinarily accounted for, consists of transfers-in-kind, including such noncash benefits as education, health care, public housing, and food stamps. These publicly provided noncash benefits have increased from 4 to no less than 10 percent of national income. The impact of this change on poverty in America will be discussed later.

Total money income received by families and unrelated individuals,† which excludes undistributed corporate profits and takes no account of individual income tax liabilities, has risen faster than national income. In fact, the median total money income of families has almost doubled since 1947 (it was $13,719 in 1975), as did the comparable median for unrelated individuals (it stood at $4,882 in 1975).

Some would argue that Americans’ well-being gained from the increase in income is best shown by the 78 percent

*Consisting of wages or other employee compensation, rent, profits, and interest. By definition, national income equals production (the sum of goods and services produced).
†“Family” is defined as a group of people related by blood, marriage, or adoption who live together; an “unrelated individual” is a single person, not a member of any family.
## POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AMERICA

Selected data on U.S. production, income, and consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP (billions of current dollars)</td>
<td>$233</td>
<td>$1,692</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP (billions of 1972 dollars)</td>
<td>$468</td>
<td>$1,265</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita (1972 dollars)</td>
<td>$3,250</td>
<td>$5,884</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in millions)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median total money income of families (1975 dollars)</td>
<td>$7,303</td>
<td>$13,719*</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median total money income of unrelated individuals (1975 dollars)</td>
<td>$2,362</td>
<td>$4,882</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal consumption per capita (1972 dollars)</td>
<td>$2,124</td>
<td>$3,779</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All government nondefense purchases per capita (1972 dollars)</td>
<td>$347</td>
<td>$935</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal consumption and government nondefense purchases per capita combined (1972 dollars)</td>
<td>$2,471</td>
<td>$4,714</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*For the year 1975.

The rise in consumption per capita that occurred in the 1947–77 period. Others would say that at least some of the increase in government purchases of goods and services for nondefense purposes, such as aid to education, should be added to the increase in personal consumption to indicate the full gain to consumers. When this amount is included, the gain in per capita consumption is 91 percent.

Economic growth is not an automatic or painless process. It comes about through increases in expenditures for plant

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and equipment, through technological change, more education and training, more skilled effort by workers, improved management, and economies of scale. In the abstract, growth can simply mean an increase in the capacity to produce an unchanging bundle of goods and services. But what has happened in America since 1947 is a drastic change in the composition of output, with more of some goods, less of others, and many altogether new products.
Consumption of food has gone up relatively little, of housing more, of health care still more. The share of the consumer dollar allocated to food declined from 34 to 21 percent. The share spent for clothing had a similar decline, but that for medical care went up from 4 to 8 percent. Interestingly, the share of income saved rose and fell over the years with no clear trend or pattern.

Production of services has grown faster than production of goods; more than half of all American workers now produce services by engaging in activities related to education, health care, recreation, transportation, and the like. There has also been a phenomenal increase in state and local government employment, most of which is devoted to services, and while the number of people so employed has risen to 3.4 times the 1947 level, the number employed in agriculture has been halved.

As the American economy grew, workers have had to shift both jobs and locations. The most dramatic instance of this change has been the move out of agriculture caused by a relatively insignificant rise in demand for food and the technical revolution on the farm, which includes the development of new varieties of plants and animals, as well as new agricultural techniques and labor-saving machines. Today, only 3 percent of the labor force is needed to feed the entire U.S. population. Millions of people who would otherwise have been farmers are now city-dwellers working in factories, hospitals, and schools.

In this process, the population has become less self-employed and more urbanized; it has shifted from the South to the North and West, and there has been a relative growth in technical, professional, managerial and other high-skill jobs. The labor force has grown faster than the population as a whole as more women work outside the home. The typical American family is now smaller. More families are headed by women, and a larger share of adults now live as unrelated individuals.

All of these changes must be kept in mind when attempting to analyze the 81 percent rise in per capita GNP since 1947 in terms of American living standards. Even though this phenomenal growth has been accompanied by improved levels of educational attainment, better health, and greater leisure, it is not at all clear that Americans are happier or more satisfied with their lives today than they were in 1947. Some scholars believe that happiness stems from a sense of relative economic status rather than from the attainment of some
absolute level of income. In other words, happiness is earning more than your neighbor; keeping up with the Joneses is fine, but keeping slightly ahead of them is even better.

Disparities in Income and Wealth

The past three decades of progress and change were not marked by any increase in inequality in the overall distribution of income or wealth. While some individuals' fortunes rose and some fell, economic progress was widely shared. Interregional and some "intergroup" (e.g., black and white) differentials in family incomes narrowed. That part of the population living in what is now defined as poverty fell from almost a third in 1947 to 12 percent in 1975 when, as noted above, the median family money income was $13,719. In 1975, 60 percent of families were clustered in the narrow range between $6,914 and $22,037. The fifth of families below this range received only 5.4 percent of total incomes, while the fifth above it received 41 percent of the total. The top 5 percent, whose incomes started at $34,144 had 15.5 percent of all family income in America. The pattern for unrelated individuals—mostly the young and the old, of whom there were 20.2 million in 1975—is slightly more unequal than that for families, and turns around a median income less than half as great.

There appears to have been only a slight change in the degree of income inequality in the postwar period in spite of the rising levels of income and the changing composition of the population. However, inequality in the U.S. per capita distribution of income may have dropped more sharply. Family size declined more for the lowest fifth of families than for other families, and unrelated individuals increased as a proportion of the population. This decline in the size of poorer families was due to older people and young adults leaving the family unit to live alone.

Another development that contributes to greater equality is the increasing use of noncash benefits, such as food stamps, Medicare, Medicaid, and public housing, all of which tend to go to lower-income people, but whether there has been a "real" decline in inequality—after considering family size, noncash benefits, reporting errors, leisure, private fringe benefits, capital gains, taxes, and so on—is vigorously debated by scholars in the field.

The nature of existing income inequality is revealed when we analyze the most fortunate and the least fortunate
Americans—those at the top and bottom fifth of the income scale. The top fifth, with incomes starting at $22,038 per year, is disproportionately made up of families headed by white working males in their prime earning years (35–64), families with more than one earner, families in Northern urban areas, and families headed by highly educated persons in managerial, professional, and technical occupations. Not surprisingly, this group gets more than its per capita share of both wages and property income. This top fifth of families has 20 percent of all the children and 27 percent of the wage and salary earners.

The bottom fifth, with incomes no higher than $6,914, is disproportionately made up of families headed by the aged, nonwhites, and females, of southern and nonurban residents, and of persons with limited education and relatively unskilled occupations. Heavily represented are “unrelated individuals,” a group dominated by the young and the old, many of whom are not fully in the labor force. About half of the income of this “lowest fifth” consists of transfer payments—welfare, Social Security, unemployment insurance, workmen’s compensation, and the like.

While property income appears to have declined from 25

### The American Income "Ladder"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Rank of Families</th>
<th>Income Limit (current $)</th>
<th>Percent of Total U.S. Personal Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper limit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest fifth</td>
<td>$1,661</td>
<td>$6,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>11,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>5,355</td>
<td>22,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower limit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest 5%</td>
<td>8,666</td>
<td>34,144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


$1.00 in 1950=$2.14 in 1975.
to 20 percent of total American personal income, inequality in the distribution of wealth (real and personal property, such as land, structures, stocks, bonds, and other financial assets) has changed very little. The top 1 percent of persons ranked by wealth held 27.5 percent of net worth (e.g., savings, real estate, stocks and bonds) in 1953 and 26.6 percent in 1972. However, this group’s share of one important type of asset—corporate stock—fell sharply from 86 to 57 percent. (Wealth, of course, is much more highly concentrated than income.)

Almost half of all adults have virtually zero net worth. Only 12 million adults, as of 1972, had as much as $60,000; 485,000 had $500,000 or more; and 184,000 were millionaires.

**Intergroup Inequalities**

When we compare households in the highest and lowest fifths of the income scale, overall inequality of wealth and income does not seem to have changed very much, but other ways of thinking about the matter suggest that inequality has changed. For example, the black-white income difference has narrowed substantially. Black family median income used to be 51 percent of white family income; now it is 62 percent. Similarly, farm residents’ income used to average 50 percent of nonfarm residents’; now it is 80 percent. The North-South per capita income spread, formerly 25 percentage points, is now only 15. And, although there are no definitive studies to prove it, the rising level of government benefits under social insurance and public assistance has probably narrowed the income gap between those who are not at work (including the retired) and those who are working.

On the other hand, income differences by age are relatively unchanged. The peak earning years are ages 45 to 54, and Americans in that age group have twice the income of those under 25 or those over 65.

In spite of a considerable increase in average years of schooling and a moderate equalizing of differences in years of school attendance, variations in earnings by levels of education have not changed much in the past 30 years (although this may recently have started to change). There has been, in fact, a “slight but persistent” trend toward more inequality of men’s earnings in the 1958–70 period. This may reflect a shift of greater numbers of men into higher-paid occupations, including perhaps those fields, like medicine, where profes-

FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY EDUCATION AND RACE OF
FAMILY HEAD, 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Completed</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>under $3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over $25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>under $3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over $25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>under $3,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>over $25,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The black-white income difference narrows substantially at upper income levels for the college-educated. But the black family head with only an elementary school education is more likely than his white counterpart to be earning less than $3,000.


...ionals receive salaries rather than proprietor's income. The most startling increase in intergroup inequality is probably in women's earnings. White women working full-time the year round earned incomes amounting to 65 percent of those of men in 1955. The figure had fallen to 57 percent by 1974, although even more women were entering the labor force.

In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson set the poverty line for a family of four at $3,000 and declared "War on Poverty." Official poverty levels, of course, vary by family size and shift with changes in the consumer price level. In 1975, the poverty line for a family of four was $5,500; for an unrelated individual it was $2,724; and for a family of seven or more it

*President Johnson first used the expression "poverty line" in his 1964 State of the Union Message. Contrary to popular belief, there is no single poverty line, rather a set of poverty thresholds that vary according to family characteristics such as size, number of related children, and farm or nonfarm residence. Based on studies of family budgets, which revealed that about one-third of cash income, after taxes, went for food, the poverty thresholds were originally established at three times the "economy" food budget, a minimally adequate food budget for the very poor.

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was $9,022. In 1947, 30 percent of all Americans were below these "absolute" poverty lines; 21 percent were below those lines in 1962. By 1975, only 12 percent of the population, or 25.9 million persons (one out of every eight Americans), was considered poor. The percentage has remained virtually unchanged since 1968.

The Changing Profile of the Poor

The "income deficit" of the poor—the amount by which total actual income of all persons in this category falls short of the poverty line—was about $15 billion in 1975. This is less than 1 percent of our GNP, suggesting that with a slight additional rise in GNP and higher transfer payments to the poor, we could eliminate poverty entirely. GNP has been rising, of course, along with transfer payments, but many of these (e.g., Social Security) do not go entirely to the poor.

The poverty population in 1975 differed from the rest of the population in a number of ways. Forty-four percent were in the South, and another 44 percent concentrated in designated "poverty areas." The poor were less educated (32 percent of family heads had no more than eight years of schooling). They were largely nonwhite (31 percent), and half of all the poor were single women or members of families headed by women. One-fifth were unrelated individuals. Half the poor families were headed by a person not in the labor force.

For the following groups the frequency of poverty was two or more times as high as the overall average of 12 percent: unrelated individuals, female heads of families, Negroes, persons of Spanish and Mexican origin, families with five or more children, farmers and farm laborers, and, not unexpectedly, families where the head did not work during the year. Interestingly, for families headed by a person 65 years of age or older, the frequency of poverty was near the national average, and for families in which the head was unemployed, it was only slightly above average (16 percent).

The composition of the poverty population has changed significantly since 1965. It includes fewer aged, more unrelated individuals, and more female heads of families. The last two groups have increased relative to the total population, but the aged have been taken out of poverty in substantial numbers by cash transfers. The poor are now more heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas; the poor population in such areas rose from 47 to 59 percent of the total poverty group.

Between 1965 and 1972, there was almost no decline in
the number of persons in "pre-transfer" poverty (i.e., those persons whose incomes, aside from cash transfer payments, were below poverty levels). Presumably, the failure of this number to decline was due to the slowdown of the economy.

Noncash transfers in the form of food, housing, and health care, a large part of which goes to the poor, increased from a value of $7 billion in 1965 to $30 billion in 1972. If we count these benefits as money, then we can realistically say that income poverty has been virtually eliminated in America. However, if poverty is to be viewed as "relative deprivation," the poor are still poor, and there has been little progress.

**Where Do We Go from Here?**

The foregoing description of the level and distribution of income may suggest that "nothing changes but everything is different." Production per capita increases at an average rate of about 2 percent per year. Consumption moves with income in quite predictable ways. The fortunate top fifth of families get about eight times as much money income as the unfortunate bottom fifth. The distribution of wealth remains highly unequal. The income advantage of being male, white, well-educated, and middle-aged persists.

On the other hand, the dynamics of economic growth can be highly disruptive to certain industries, occupations, skills, and locales. Changes in consumer preferences and new production techniques, even shifts in government policy (e.g., affirmative action programs in behalf of women and minorities), can create new opportunities for some at the same time that they reduce economic chances for others.

The narrowing of income differences by region and race only hints at the impact of some radical changes taking place. Altered family patterns and longer life after retirement have a major influence on income distribution. Thirty years ago, far more old people and young adults remained within the family than joined the ranks of the poor as unrelated individuals attempting to subsist on their own. On the other hand, the expansion of federally funded education and health care programs profoundly influences opportunity and social well-being.

Classical economists—led by David Ricardo—and Karl Marx and his followers argued that the most interesting questions about income distribution involve the division of income between laborers and owners of land and capital. Ricardo feared that the landowner's share of income would
rise relentlessly over time, leaving less for the factory owner. Marx believed that profit was not only an unjustifiable return on the labor of others but one that made capitalism inherently unstable and doomed it to total collapse. Various schools of income distribution theory have since explored other issues.

Vilfredo Pareto concluded 70 years ago that income inequality existed in all societies because of fundamental differences among people and because of society’s need for competent, responsible leadership. Others, like John Stuart Mill, argued that inequality is a manmade phenomenon and subject to change. This notion leads some scholars to the belief that income inequality arises out of restraints (such as those imposed by labor unions and monopolies) on free and open competition among self-interested buyers and sellers in the labor, capital, and consumer markets.

Other scholars seek explanations in deeply rooted patterns of discrimination with regard to race, age, sex, and family and educational background. In an effort to overcome unequal opportunity, some would limit the head start some individuals receive through the inheritance of capital from a parent or grandparent. (Senator George McGovern suggested imposing limits on inherited wealth when he campaigned for President in 1972, but there was a strong adverse reaction from blue-collar workers as well as from the wealthy.)

The Price of Equality

Part of the current, confusing argument about income inequality has to do with distinctions between inequality of condition or result and inequality of opportunity. Most of the income inequality cited in this essay has to do with inequality of result. Many Great Society initiatives proposed by the Johnson administration were aimed, in part, at correcting imbalances in opportunity (e.g., the 1964 Civil Rights Act). It is clear, however, that this sort of inequality is very difficult to measure.

Another phase of the argument pertains to the consequences of changes in the degree of income inequality. Some argue that income inequality can only be alleviated at the price of reduced efficiency and slower economic growth. Others emphasize a tradeoff between lessened inequality and restrictions on personal liberties. Still others warn that failure to reduce economic inequality endangers the prospects for political and social equality, widely seen as a prerequisite for a genuine and viable democracy. Some would reduce this
issue to the question: Would the United States be a better place if it were more like Sweden? But social and economic inequality exists in Sweden too [see p. 121].

Current research by economists in this complex field includes "social accounting," which seeks to explain the "real" nature of income inequality by determining how much of measured inequality depends upon arbitrary definitions of "income," "income receiving unit," and "income accounting period." In particular, one school of thought emphasizes that inequality of "lifetime incomes" is much less than that of annual incomes. Associated with this is the notion that a substantial amount of labor income is really a deferred return on "investment in human capital" (i.e., the individual pays for advanced education and training and much later receives the benefits in terms of higher salary).

Other economists suspect that low lifetime earnings are due to the existence of secondary or peripheral labor markets in which employers offer essentially no training or experience of value (e.g., migrant farm labor and low-level restaurant jobs). Are there reforms of the labor market, perhaps through a higher minimum wage, that will alter the process whereby some workers always wind up in the secondary as opposed to the primary labor market?

In recent years much effort has been concentrated on determining the desirability and effectiveness of the negative income tax as a means of reducing income poverty. Related research involves assessing the undesirable side effects of current social insurance programs.

While research proceeds in academia, lively controversies periodically well up in Congress and the media. The "income distribution" issue intrudes in the growing debates about unemployment, inflation, taxation, education, health insurance, welfare reform, and even environment and energy policy.

The fact remains that, while many deplore inequality of opportunity, no American President has ever made it his declared intention to reduce inequality of income in the United States. As a people, we are concerned about inequities, but there seems to be no consensus for a commitment to any particular change in the overall pattern of income inequality.
During the depths of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Harvard sociologist Carle Zimmerman took a close look at the "American standard of living" and made some startling predictions for the future. In regard to the increased urbanization, commercialization, and social mobility of that time, Zimmerman wrote:

If a standard of living consists of values to be found entirely in the goods which the individual consumes, we shall probably continue our present sensational type of life as long as goods can be made available to the individual. . . .

However . . . I have reached the opinion that a system of living includes absolute values to be found in the social organization as well as the goods of life.

Consequently, it is my present belief that we have gone so far toward an over-emphasis of sensationalism, individualism, and conspicuous consumption that we will be forced sometime in the twentieth century to emphasize many anti-sensational (i.e., non-material) characteristics of life which are not popular now.*

Public officials and economists of the Depression era were more optimistic and less philosophical in their appraisals of American lifestyles. They conducted the first nationwide survey of consumer incomes, expenditures, and savings to cover all groups in the population and used the resulting data to develop the household sector of "The National Income and Product Accounts," by which the Commerce Department has measured trends in personal income, taxes, consumption expenditures, and saving from the 1930s to the present. With this tool they were able to trace the economic welfare of the

American consumer in relation to the economic health of the nation.

In the 1930s, both economists and public officials agreed on the urgent need to find ways of releasing the country's "potential productive power and of using it fully and continuously to further the well-being of the American people." In brief, they recognized the obvious: The nation's capacity for mass production had to be matched by a capacity for mass consumption.

There is no doubt that America became a rich mass consumption society in the 30 years that followed World War II. Aggregate personal income increased from $78 billion in 1940 to $801 billion in 1970 and passed the $1 trillion mark in 1972.\footnote{Personal income is the income received by individuals, nonprofit institutions, private noninsured welfare funds, and private trust funds from all sources—from participation in production, from transfer payments from government and business, and from government interest, which is treated like a transfer payment.} Income and other personal taxes increased even more—from about 3 percent of personal income in 1940 to about 14 percent in 1970.

Despite these tax increases, disposable personal income...
(income available to Americans for spending or saving) increased almost tenfold over the three decades—from $75 billion to $686 billion. In addition to “real” increases in income, these figures, of course, reflect the rapid population growth and sharply rising prices of the postwar period. Between 1940 and 1970, population increased by 55 percent, from 132 to 205 million. Prices of consumer goods and services in 1970 were, on the average, more than three times higher than in 1940.

The “real” increases in per capita income and expenditures from 1940 to 1970 were 96 and 87 percent, respectively. “Real” per capita saving more than tripled.

After adjustment for population growth and price increases, expenditures for durable goods in 1970 were more than two and a half times those in 1940, a reflection of the greatly increased buying of automobiles and household equipment. On the other hand, “real” expenditures per capita for nondurables such as food and clothing were only 52 percent higher.

In 1940, expenditures for nondurable goods accounted for 52 percent of consumption expenditures, while expenditures for services (housing, public transportation, health and other personal services, insurance, etc.) represented 38 percent and expenditures for durable goods, primarily automobiles, 10 percent.

By 1967, the situation was reversed. For the first time, per capita consumption of services exceeded that of nondurable goods—services accounting for 44 percent, nondurables, 43 percent, and durable goods, 13 percent. We were now a mass consumption “service economy.” In 1970, per capita consumption expenditures for services plus those for durable goods accounted for 58 percent of total spending.

The level and pattern of average family* spending over approximately three decades was reported in three nationwide surveys of consumer expenditures, income, and saving in

*As used here, the term “family” includes persons living alone as well as families of two or more persons.

Helen Humes Lamale, 65, retired in July 1972 after 30 years as an economist in the Office of Prices and Living Conditions of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, where she was chief of the Division of Living Conditions Studies, responsible for studies of consumer expenditure and family budgeting. Born in Pennsylvania, she received her B.A. from the College of Wooster (1934) and her M.A. from the University of Pittsburgh (1941). Numerous articles by Mrs. Lamale have appeared in Monthly Labor Review and other publications.
U.S. FAMILY SPENDING PATTERNS, 1941 AND 1972/73

1941
total $1,677
annual average

Food 30.1%
Transportation 12.2%
Recreation 9.4%
Clothing 12.2%
Housing 27.9%
Medical 5.0%

1972/73
total $8,282
annual average

Food 20.1%
Transportation 21.4%
Recreation 9.4%
Clothing 7.8%
Housing 31.4%
Medical 6.4%

The average American family now spends less for food than for either housing or transportation. Over the past three decades, the percentage of expenditures devoted to recreation and personal care have remained virtually unchanged, while spending for clothing has dropped and that for medical care has risen slightly.


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The table shows the sharp rise in money income in current dollars for the average family, together with heavier outlays for personal insurance and an upward trend in home ownership and private auto use.


*Data in this column are weighted averages of 1972 and 1973 information from quarterly interview survey, shown separately in BLS Report 455-3.

**Net change in assets and liabilities.

1941, 1960/61, and 1972/73. Family spending for current living in 1972/73 averaged almost five times the amount spent in 1941, having increased from $1,677 then to $5,054 in 1960/61, and $8,282 in 1972/73. Such expenditures accounted for about 85 percent of gross income in 1941, about 80 percent in 1960/61, and about 75 percent in 1972/73. The decreasing share of income spent for current consumption goods and services reflects the much larger share of income going for personal insurance, principally employee contributions to Social Security, and for federal, state, and local income taxes.

Despite sharply rising consumer prices and the smaller share of gross income available for current consumption, the average American family greatly increased its consumption of goods and services over these three decades. “Real” expenditures for current living increased 68 percent, or over 2 percent a year, and 1970 patterns of spending and saving are vastly different from those prevailing in 1941.
Traditionally, in a low-level, developing economy, food, shelter (including heat and utilities), and clothing have been considered necessities, or basics, and spending for these categories has been referred to by statisticians as "nondiscretionary." Other current consumption expenditures were considered luxuries, and spending for luxuries was referred to as "discretionary." No such simple distinction can be used to characterize the consumption spending of modern American families, and many of the problems in legislating, financing, and administering present-day welfare programs stem from a failure to recognize this fact. For example, is an automobile a luxury if no public transportation is available? Is a TV set a luxury for an elderly shut-in? A comparison of the change in the slice of total spending devoted to the basics in the chart and the change in the slice of spending going for other categories of goods and services graphically illustrates the progress from austerity to relative affluence achieved by most American consumers during the years since World War II.

The "Good Life"

Total housing and transportation expenditures, which were 40 percent of current living expenses in 1941, were 52 percent in 1972/73. For the first time in a Bureau of Labor Statistics expenditure survey, the average family reported spending more for transportation than for food. One cannot understand these housing and transportation expenditures without reference to the greatly increased home ownership and suburban living, which, for many families, have linked these two expenditures.*

The proportion of home-owning families is not available from the 1941 study, but home ownership increased from 57 percent in 1960/61 to 62 percent in 1972/73. Auto ownership increased from 58 to 80 percent, and about two families in five owned two or more cars. In the 1972/73 survey, 3 percent of families reported expenses for owned vacation homes and 62 percent reported taking vacation pleasure trips.

For renters as well as home owners, dwellings were furnished with an array of labor-saving household appliances—washers and dryers, refrigerators and freezers, dishwashers and disposals, air conditioners and the like. Perhaps

*Of major importance to home ownership was the 1944 Veterans Home Loan Program (VA-insured mortgages), which enabled veterans to purchase homes without down payments at lower interest rates, and sooner than they could have under conventional financing.
the best illustration of the affluence of American consumers is the tremendous increase in the number of television sets, radios, phonographs, and hi-fi units purchased by American families.*

Credit and Insurance

Since World War II, American families have greatly expanded their use of credit, primarily to finance purchase of homes, through fixed-payment mortgages, and automobiles and household durable goods, through short-term loans, but also to improve their homes, to finance their children's education, and to meet other large or unexpected expenses. By the 1970s, the credit card had become a way of life for many consumers in paying for almost anything from a meal in a restaurant to a trip abroad.

Through this widespread use of credit, families have acquired financial resources with which to supplement current income and to build up an equity for the future. Home ownership has provided a hedge against inflation for many families, and use of credit has enabled them to acquire not only homes but consumer items, particularly household durables, far sooner than would be possible with only current income. They have also been able to spread their costs over a longer period of time.

The responsible use of credit has had a stabilizing effect on consumer demand and hence on the nation's overall level of economic activity. Expanded use of credit is not without its perils, however, and the number of Americans filing for bankruptcy under federal statutes rose from 10,000 in 1946 to 255,000 in 1975.

Government measures designed to protect workers and their families from the financial risks of unemployment, illness, old age, and premature death have immeasurably affected family spending and saving patterns. Despite these buffers, Americans have not looked exclusively to government for protection but have increased purchases of private insurance of all types: insurance on homes, automobiles, and other personal property; health insurance and prepaid medical plans; life insurance and annuities; personal liability insurance; and disability income insurance.

*In 1952, almost 47 percent of American homes had black and white TV sets; in 1971, the figure was 89.9 percent, and 67 percent had a color set as well. Other indications of rising standards of living can be seen in the following data: In 1950, almost 37 percent of American dwelling units were rated substandard (lacking hot and cold water, a shower or tub, and a flush toilet); in 1970, the figure was 9.5 percent. In 1950, 62 percent of American homes had a telephone; in 1973, the figure was 94 percent.
In addition, most workers and their families, particularly those in metropolitan areas, are covered by health insurance, life insurance, and pension plans paid for wholly or in part by employers. More than 9 out of 10 workers in metropolitan areas are employed in establishments providing life, hospital, surgical, and medical insurance plans, and about 4 in 5 have retirement pension plans as well. In the 1972/73 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey, 97 percent of all urban and rural families in the United States reported expenditures for health care that averaged about $475 annually and included expenses for both private insurance premiums and employee contributions to group plans.

A Chance for Retirees

Between 1940 and 1973, the number of Americans receiving Social Security increased from less than 250,000 to almost 30 million. Approximately half these beneficiaries in any one year were retired workers, whose average monthly benefit rose from about $23 in 1940 to $166 in 1973. These benefits are now escalated annually by the Consumer Price Index, and for an increasing number of retirees Social Security payments are supplemented by private pensions.

In 1967, the Bureau of Labor Statistics prepared three budgets for an urban retired couple, based on the cost of three standards of living—lower, moderate, and higher. The cost of the lower budget in 1967 was $2,671 for the 35 percent of retired couples with incomes below that amount. By 1972, only 22 percent of retired couples had incomes below the lower budget cost, which by then had been raised to $3,442 to reflect inflation. The annual costs of the three standards of living for a retired couple as of spring 1967 and autumn 1975 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RETIRED COUPLE'S BUDGET LEVEL</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1967</td>
<td>$2,691</td>
<td>$3,857</td>
<td>$6,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 1975</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>6,465</td>
<td>9,598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After World War II, general affluence and government subsidies distributed through the G.I. Bill opened up opportunities for higher education and specialized training to thousands of Americans. In the early 1940s, fewer than 25 percent of persons aged 25 and over had finished high school. By 1975, more than 62 percent were high school graduates. In 1950, 35 percent of adult women had at least graduated from high school, compared to 62 percent in 1975. Although there were appreciable gains between 1950 and 1975 in women receiving college training, such gains were much greater for men, but the effect on earning power and living standard, at least for some women, was profound.

Improved access to higher education has also played a role in the dramatic increase in employment of women outside the home since World War II. Between 1950 and 1975, the proportion of women 16 years and older in the labor force increased from 34 to over 46 percent.

American women have always made substantial contributions to the family’s money income, but prior to World War II this was money earned within the home, frequently from taking in roomers and boarders. Since the war, thanks to the employment of married women outside the home, wives have assumed an entirely new role in the family.

Working Women

Although much has been said of the advantages and disadvantages of such employment and its effect upon family life, working wives have contributed appreciably to the rise in “real” income of families. Their employment has meant higher living standards, including home ownership and a better education for children than would otherwise have been possible. By 1969, the proportion of families with incomes below the lower budget level was reduced by half (from 16 to 8 percent) by earnings of family members—mostly wives—other than the head. The proportion of families with incomes above the higher budget level was increased from 26 to 43 percent by such earnings. The long-run contribution of working wives may be enhanced if their employment entitles them and their families to participate in health and life insurance and retirement plans, and their earnings could provide a needed cushion in case the husband is unemployed.

“Real” personal income, consumption expenditures, and savings are still increasing, albeit at a slower rate than in the 1960s. The material standard of living achieved by most
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Americans has few parallels in the world. Yet, with double-digit inflation and high unemployment, economists and consumers alike have lost faith in the power of a dynamic, expanding economy and an ever increasing GNP to provide the good life.

Sterling E. Soderlind, writing in the Wall Street Journal on March 28, 1972, described the reactions of economists at that time: "Clearly, we consumers cannot be counted on to do our thing—consume—in a fashion that will make for tidy economic forecasting. . . . Once belittled for 'conspicuous consumption' . . . we're now suspected of inconspicuous disconsumption." By the end of 1974, the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's "Index of Consumer Sentiment" had fallen so low that the Center's analysts concluded: "The ordinary citizen is far more likely to feel that life in the United States is getting worse than he is to feel it is getting better."

The unprecedented growth of the typical American family's resources since World War II has provided greater freedom of choice in work, in consumption of goods and services, in manner of living, and use of time. On the other hand, "Affluence has not lifted American society to utopian levels of social harmony and personal fulfillment." * Similar appraisals are being made in other highly industrialized nations. Three decades of preoccupation with maintaining economic growth and accommodating the ever rising demands of consumers have left little time for concern with the nonmaterial elements that often determine the quality of life. Affluence has been accompanied by:

1. Increasing strain on the family, as evidenced by escalating living costs, the expense of raising and educating children, rising divorce rates, alterations in the traditional roles of wives, husbands, and children, and sharply declining birth rates.

2. Increasing strain on the environment, on natural resources, on financial resources, and on our governmental and social organizations, as reflected in the pollution and energy crises, bankruptcies, crime, and drug abuse.

Relief from these strains will necessitate shifting our resources and efforts from the enhancement of economic

well-being toward the restoration of our social and psychological well-being. But it is almost axiomatic that American families strongly resist any reduction in living standards, once achieved. Spending and saving patterns are not quickly or easily changed.

The have-nots—that shifting group of Americans who live in or near poverty—are certainly not likely to abandon their quest for a larger share of material things. Success in their efforts is dependent on continued economic prosperity and equitable solutions to our economic and social problems.

One can only wonder whether Carle Zimmerman's prediction of 41 years ago is ready to be fulfilled, and whether the time has at last come when we will be compelled "to emphasize many anti-sensational (i.e., non-material) characteristics of life which are not popular now."
Future scholars, using computers to sort the masses of data now being gathered, may, for the first time, be able to write the full story of the factors that determine success or failure in the pursuit of material well-being in America. Such a synthesis would be an invaluable addition to existing accounts, some of which are described below, of how Americans earn and spend and change their economic status.

Most professional journals and textbooks on economics give more attention to growth, full employment, and balance of payments than to matters of distribution. Yet, the radical economists are quick to argue, inequality is what economics should be all about.

Distribution theory has enjoyed cycles of popularity in the past. More recently, war, depression, and John Maynard Keynes have combined to encourage a preoccupation among U.S. economists with economic growth and the creation of wealth, rather than with its distribution. Defying this tide, A. B. Atkinson, economist at the University of Essex, has produced the first college text on the differences in income among individuals (as opposed to the division of income between Labor and Capital). In THE ECONOMICS OF INEQUALITY (Oxford, 1975, cloth & paper), he examines the available evidence on post-World War II distribution trends in Britain and the United States, and, while finding a decline in the share of wealth owned by the rich, he concludes that the relative poverty of the poorest third of society "is unlikely to pass rapidly away, and that it cannot be regarded as simply a problem of exceptional circumstances or minority groups."

Annual statistics published by the U.S. Census Bureau show a marked stability in the distribution of income in America since World War II. In recent years, however, these figures—the major source of data on personal income—have come under heavy criticism. Some economists have asserted that inequality has declined substantially over the past three decades but that Census Bureau figures fail to reflect the income-equalizing impact of such important factors as education and nonmonetary transfers (e.g., food stamps and health care). A report prepared by Michael K. Taussig of Rutgers and Sheldon Danziger of the University of Wisconsin, CONFERENCE ON THE TREND IN INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. (Institute for Research on Poverty, Madison, 1976), finds a consensus among conference participants; although the Census Bureau data may be flawed, these hidden benefits for the poor have little impact on overall income distribution trends.

Indicative of the sharp disagreements that arise among specialists in income distribution theory, Jacob Mincer's SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS (National Bureau of Economic Research/Columbia, 1974) concludes that variations in educational background and job experience "accounted for close to two-thirds of the inequality of earnings of adult white urban men in the U.S. in 1959." This hypothesis is in marked contrast to recent arguments in which the role of "human capital investment" (e.g., in schooling and job training) is relegated to a less prominent position.
One of the elemental premises asserted by Wesleyan University's Stanley Lebergott in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: Income, Wealth, and Want (Princeton, 1975) is that a distinction must be drawn between absolute and relative poverty. The absolute poverty endemic in many developing countries has never existed in the United States—where, with an economy "that bursts with productivity, that produces so fantastic a volume and variety of goods, poverty comes to be defined as relative to what the typical American enjoys." Government policies designed to foster economic growth and more equitable income distribution may have in fact exacerbated social tensions by creating unfulfilled expectations among the poor.

Few books give an overall picture of American consumption patterns and living standards. The most comprehensive data, of course, come from the federal government: the aggregate personal consumption expenditures and savings series of the Department of Commerce, and the periodic cross-section surveys of expenditures, incomes, and savings of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Department of Agriculture.

For an understanding of consumer spending, saving, and living standards at different times and in different societies and of the psychological, social, and economic concepts and theories of consumption, Carle C. Zimmerman's CONSUMPTION AND STANDARDS OF LIVING (Van Nostrand, 1936; Arno, 1976, reprint) remains a classic. This first comprehensive interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of family budgets was the product of 16 years of in-depth research by Zimmerman, a professor of sociology at Harvard. The facets of his research range from the so-called laws of consumption and the roles of various categories of consumption—food, housing, etc.—to the then novel and popular idea of "spending for prosperity" and an appraisal of the prevailing American standard of living.

This attention to consumer purchasing power received new impetus with the publication of CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES by Hildegard Kneeland and the staff of the National Resources Committee in Washington (Government Printing Office, 1939), the first nationwide survey of consumer income, expenditures, and savings to cover all groups in the population.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics' HOW AMERICAN BUYING HABITS CHANGE (Government Printing Office, 1959; Greenwood, 1969, reprint) is written in popular style and traces changes in the consumption and living conditions of American workers over the first half of the 20th century. Concentrating on the broad middle group of mass-market consumers, this Department of Labor publication follows the ever rising expectations of urban families—from the immigrant tenement-dweller's modest dream of a flat with a private entrance and plenty of light (Chapter I, "The Bell and the Bay Window") to the 1950 VA-mortgaged home in the suburbs (Chapter III, "From the Slums to Suburbia").

George Katona, one of the founders of Michigan's Survey Research Center and a pioneer in the development of psychological or behavioral economics, argues in THE MASS CONSUMPTION SOCIETY (McGraw-Hill, 1964) that American consumers are unique and impose new requirements on economic thought and economic policy. Our mass consumption society, he says, is marked by: affluence (the majority of families now have discretionary purchasing power and constantly replace and enlarge their stock of consumer goods); consumer power (cyclical fluctuations,
inflation or deflation, and the rate of growth of the economy—all now depend to a large extent on the consumer; and consumer psychology (discretionary demand is a function of both ability to buy and willingness to buy, which, in turn, is a reflection of consumer motives, attitudes, and expectations).

A how-to-do-it approach to wise spending is found in Arch W. Troelstrup and Jack R. Critchfield's *THE CONSUMER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: Personal and Family Finance* (McGraw-Hill, 1974). This is the fifth edition of a text on consumer education for American undergraduates and graduate students of family economics that approaches the life of the consumer as a whole rather than in its separate parts.

In democratic societies, where equality of opportunity is an important ideal, however imperfectly realized, the question of the extent to which class and ethnic origin determines career chances has a special significance. *THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE* by Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan (Wiley, 1967) summarizes the first systematic effort to collect data on U.S. socioeconomic mobility and opportunity by surveying a large national cross section of the population. The value of the 1962 survey data is now mostly historic, but given the high degree of "permeability" of American society—the weak ties between social background and achievement—which the plainly stated conclusions document, the authors call into question the notion, popular in the mid-1960s, of a "culture of poverty," in which the disadvantaged were compelled to remain disadvantaged.

There are as many descriptions of what produces inequality of opportunity in America as there are prescriptions for its remedy. *SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (Basic Books, 1976) offers the view of "radical economists" of social stratification and mobility in contemporary America. While the analysis is controversial, it does provide a provocative assessment of the role of schools in preserving the socioeconomic hierarchy between generations.

Lester Thurow's *GENERATING INEQUALITY: Mechanisms of Distribution in the U.S. Economy* (Basic Books, 1975, cloth & paper) advances a theory that challenges the neoclassical micro-economic theorists in regard to such "exceptional" phenomena as: the persistence of economic inequality in the face of declining educational differences among workers; simultaneous rising unemployment and rising earnings; earnings differentials among persons working full-time all year in the same occupation. Thurow contends, for example, that increasing the formal training of the unskilled is not an effective way to equalize incomes.

Like Thurow, Christopher Jencks finds little hope that economic inequality can be overcome through education. *INEQUALITY: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (Basic Books, 1972, cloth; Harper, 1973, paper), which Jencks coauthored with seven others, argues that, at the individual level, schooling accounts for few of the income differences among Americans, although formal education has a greater effect than parents' social status on an individual's income.
The debate on world food policy has centered on lagging production and protein deficiencies. In this important little book, two World Bank economists shift the focus to malnutrition among low-income people in poor countries. Noting that simple country-wide averages of calorie intake conceal the impact of highly uneven income distribution, they say that about two-thirds of the people in these countries do not have enough money to purchase adequate food for themselves and their families. The authors agree with other researchers that world food production should be stepped up. But they argue that neither bigger crops nor an increase in per capita incomes at present economic growth rates in developing countries will quickly solve food calorie deficits. They describe ways to measure the cost effectiveness of alternative programs (government food shops, special food supplements for infants) to help poor people achieve minimum standards of nutrition. Their views should stimulate other economists to move beyond looking at nutrition and health simply as welfare problems and examine the interrelationships among food, consumption, income distribution, nutrition, health, and family planning.

—Carl K. Eicher

State-supported museums blossomed in Britain during the last century, but Parliament did not give financial aid to other cultural institutions and activities. Janet Minihan, a historian at American University, notes that, as recently as the 1920s, Britain had no real national opera company, ballet, or theater. The documentary film movement got some government financial backing in the 30s, but the performing arts did not obtain public
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subsidies until after World War II, when major government support began. This careful study of the British experience with tax-supported culture shows that, even when London developed a clear sense of the needs and desires of the country at large, the arts bureaucracy failed to communicate its vision to local authorities for fear of seeming to impose an Art Officiel. Minihan never quite comes to grips with another touchy issue, which today bedevils U.S. officials: Should the State underwrite "mass" (popular) culture or only the "high" (traditional) arts?

—David Culbert

The 1967-68 Czechoslovak reform movement ("a revolt without theory," one observer termed it) burgeoned as a reaction against stifling bureaucratic rule and economic decline. Once in power, the reformers never agreed among themselves on means of improving the situation or on exactly what their ultimate goal was. "Socialism with a human face," Alexander Dubcek called it. But he did not use that celebrated phrase until July 1968, fully six months after he had become first secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and only a month before the Soviet military intervention. Professor Skilling of the University of Toronto, a long-time specialist on Czechoslovak politics, traces the gradual accumulation of frustrations during 20 years of communist rule up to the ultimate explosion of the "Prague spring." His sympathies are pro-Czech and pro-reform. He hopes that the revolution is not dead, only "interrupted." What might it have become—if anything? The Soviet troops have robbed us of the answer. The Czechs' internecine debates about "democratic socialism" and a "planned market economy," described in detail by Skilling, do not give us a clear picture of what might have happened. And the ability of a ruling communist party to abide by democratic traditions in a pluralistic society has yet to be demonstrated in historical experience.

—F. Gregory Campbell '77

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S INTERRUPTED REVOLUTION
by H. Gordon Skilling
Princeton, 1976, 924 pp. $45 cloth, $15 paper
ISBN 0-691-05234-4
ISBN 0-691-10040-3 pbk

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Are multinational corporations always as powerful in Latin America as their critics allege? Not according to Moran's study. Before 1945, Chile had little control over U.S.-owned copper companies. Initially, the Chileans needed the capital and modern technology that the multinationals could provide. Once the investment was made, however, and the Chileans began to acquire expertise and confidence, the relationship between the partners changed, and the Chileans were able to obtain ever larger benefits from the companies. Increased bargaining power, combined with growing resentment of exploitation by foreigners, ultimately led to the Allende government's nationalization of the copper companies (1971).

Goodsell's analysis centers on the 12 biggest U.S. companies (mining, oil drilling and refining, manufacturing, retailing, agriculture, communications) operating in Peru. He provides many specifics about the multinationals and, like Moran, concludes that in Peru, as in Chile, the American companies have become considerably less powerful over time. Unlike Moran, who offers a close look at the companies, the Chilean political system, and the interaction between them, Goodsell focuses almost exclusively on the companies. In so doing, he fails to convey a sense of what Peruvian politics is all about. This shortcoming weakens the impact of his otherwise useful book.

—Susan Kaufman Purcell


In the United States, the end of slavery came only with a devastating civil war. In Russia, the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 produced no such violence. Why the difference? Field, a Syracuse historian, shows us how Russia's shrewd imperial bureaucrats and acquiescent nobles bargained to avoid disaster, negotiating realistic terms for ending an inertial social system that had endured for centuries. He demonstrates in great detail the "naive monarchism" (faith in the benevolent will of the Tsar) that prevented most of the nobles from opposing Alexander
II, once he had decided, after eliciting their opinions, to end serfdom. This book, with its sharp cross-examination of Soviet archives and published sources, is a must for Russian historians and everyone interested in agrarian reform. It is not for the casual reader.

—Robert C. Williams

Everyone knows that Lewis Carroll wrote Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. Many people also know that he was the author of an “elementary” textbook of symbolic logic, published in 1896. When he died in 1898, he was finishing a second, advanced part of the Logic. The manuscript vanished. Over the past 18 years, Bartley has found most of the parts, widely dispersed; he has now published them, together with the fifth edition of Elementary Logic. The editing is superb. But the book is not just for friends of Alice or of Carroll. Nor indeed only for those interested in the history of logic—even though this was, as Philosophy Professor Bartley observes, “the first attempt to popularize algebraic logic.” (Such logic, also known as Boolean, is basically concerned with how many possible valid answers can be found from a set of given propositions.) As the reader moves from one of Carroll’s relatively simple situations involving the possibility that chickens understand French to his far more important, wildly imaginative problems, such as Pigs and Balloons or Grocers on Bicycles, the excellence and the mind-stretching quality of this book become increasingly apparent. A dry subject? Let Oxford professor Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) answer: “As to Symbolic Logic being dry, I can only say, try it! I have amused myself with various scientific pursuits for some forty years, and have found none to rival it for sustained and entrancing attractiveness.”

—Joaquin Romero-Maura
COLUMBIA historian Fritz Stern, using new archival material, including the recently uncovered papers of the wealthy Jewish banker Gerson Bleichröder, argues that political, more than economic, forces controlled and shaped imperial 19th-century Germany. By focusing on the exceptionally close collaboration between Bismarck and Bleichröder for over 30 years, Stern reveals what other historians have ignored or minimized—that Bismarck understood the political uses of money and consciously employed economics as an instrument of policy. He shows how the banker acted as the chancellor's political and financial adviser, helped him to amass a large personal fortune, and served him as diplomatic agent and financier of his wars against Denmark (1864) and Austria (1866). Portraying Bleichröder as a striver for social acceptance, Stern, in passing, demonstrates how Prussian anti-Semitism barred this conservative nouveau riche financier from assimilation into the aristocracy.

The modern tendency, writes Commager, is to view the American Revolution “against the foreground of our own time.” Conscious of its limitations, we neglect its greatest accomplishment: If the Old World imagined the Enlightenment, only the New World achieved it. The Revolution’s debt to such men as Montesquieu and Locke has long been acknowledged. But in this sweeping rummage through the 18th century, Commager shifts perspective to examine Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, and others as philosophes—but also as men of affairs, who could create a rational system of government unthinkable in the old societies across the sea.

A romantic in the grand historical tradition,
Commager is above all a stylist. His lavish citations of Enlightenment thinkers (Manasseh Cutler of Ipswich, von Haller at Göttingen, Linnaeus at Uppsala, "the intrepid Van der Kamp" at Leyden) lend a tone of animated omniscience to this volume.

**YOUNG MAN THOREAU**

by Richard Lebeaux
Univ. of Mass., 1977
262 pp. $12.50
L of C 76-4451

At a time in his own life and in American history when other young men and women were following the lure of the Western frontier, David Henry Thoreau (as he was christened) was discovering his inability to stray far from his native Concord and the hearth of his domineering mother. In this psychobiography, Lebeaux, assistant professor of American Thought and Language at Michigan State, cites Thoreau's early journals to show how the young man gradually came to see his fixation on the familiar as an opportunity for unique artistic and spiritual growth. The book covers the period from Thoreau's Harvard graduation (1837) at the age of 20 to his decision to take up residence at Walden Pond eight years later. Had it not been for neighbor Ralph Waldo Emerson's friendship and transcendentalism's liberating rationale for an outwardly sedentary life, Lebeaux suggests, Thoreau's talents as a writer and naturalist might never have matured. Although he lapses too often into the jargon of psychology, Lebeaux brings into human focus the "traveller in Concord" who inspired Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. and became a cult figure in the United States during the 1960s.

**THE BOSTON MONEY TREE**

by Russell B. Adams, Jr.
Crowell, 1977, 320 pp. $11.95
L of C 76-2738
ISBN 0-690-01209-8

How Boston money has been made, invested, and preserved. Journalist Russell B. Adams, Jr. begins with the early 17th century and progresses through the years dominated by the great names—Faneuil, Cabot, Boylston, Lowell, Lee, Hancock. In the 1960s, the "New Boston" of urban developer Edward L. Logue and technology's "Golden Semicircle" (Route 128) spawned its only New York-style "go-go" financier: Shanghai-born Gerald Tsai, Jr.,
a 1949 economics graduate of Boston University. Tsai became a stock market superstar, but he was an atypical exotic in a city whose conservative modern bankers favor a safe return. It was not always so. Adventure, risk, and profit all ran high in the days of the slavers and the China trade, before Boston’s old Yankee blood cooled and turned blue.

World War II had scarcely ended when the story of German resistance to Hitler began to come to light. Each successive memoir and monograph brought the intricate picture more sharply into focus. But since the resistance was, during its most critical phases, organized in closed compartments, and since those persons most knowledgeable about the whole were executed by Hitler, the task of historical reconstruction has been difficult. Hoffman’s absorbing account, first published in German eight years ago, spans the period from the 1938 Sudeten crisis to the final abortive attempt by Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg on Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944. It makes sense of the tangle of evidence that has come down to us. Is it the last word on the techniques of conspiracy and the complex personalities of the men and women who overcame their own hesitations and took up arms against the Führer? Very few key survivors have not been heard from. Unless new diaries or reminiscences come to light, as seems unlikely, this will become the classic work on a heroic failure.

Until the independence of India in 1947, British policy in the Persian Gulf was tied to London’s need to maintain the entire Arabian Sea area as a secure link between England and its most important overseas possession. For many years, reliance upon sea power was accompanied by a hands-off attitude toward tribal rivalries in the Arabian Peninsula. But when, in 1902, ‘Abd al ‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abd al Rhaman Ibn Sa’ud captured Riyadh, the ancestral capital of the House of Sa’ud, from the ruling Ibn
Rashid, the modern Saudi state was born. Thereafter, the desert kingdom became a matter of steadily growing interest to British strategists. In this informative (but, considering its emphasis, mistitled) book, Troeller makes extensive use of unpublished British documents to examine the period from 1910, when King Ibn Sa'ud first met with a British agent, through World War I, when he aligned himself with Britain, to 1926, when his conquest of the Hedjaz (including Mecca) unified the peninsula. All this was pre-petroleum. A "Postscript" takes the story to the Anglo-American discovery of large quantities of oil in Bahrain (1932) and the granting of the first concession to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (1933).

Contemporary Affairs

Les Floralies, a retirement residence for 150 men and women connected with the construction trades, is a 14-story glass and concrete residence in an old suburb of Paris. The neighborhood embraces low-rent apartments, a modern shopping center, industrial and commercial buildings. "The change of scene for new arrivals," writes Swarthmore anthropologist Jennie-Keith Ross, "is both social and physical, total and abrupt." She knows, having lived there herself for a year to observe how the aging create and maintain a "context for community." The young American's jargon-free report is a heartening contribution to the (frequently depressing) literature on the subject. She describes health and personality problems, daily routines, parties, the significance of seating arrangements in the dining room, political rivalries, and love affairs at Les Floralies. (Six couples met in the residence and are recognized as couples "only in the eyes of other residents." A legal marriage is seen as undesirable—"What would the children think?") Les Floralies works. But, says Ross, "'So what?' should be the most frequently asked question in social science." Her case study, she concludes, has two messages:

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"In such a residence, social interaction is greater [than in isolated private quarters] because of increased contact with age-mates, and morale is higher."

**Arts & Letters**

**ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG**
edited by Carroll S. Clark and Kathleen A. Preciado
National Collection of Fine Arts & Smithsonian
$25 cloth, $15.50 paper
L of C 76-58522
ISBN 0-87474-171-8 pbk

Avant-garde artist Robert Rauschenberg's new book can be judged by its cover. He designed it. The appealing "construction/painting/collage" reproduced on the dust jacket of the cloth edition is also used as the cover of the paperbound. It caricatures Rauschenberg's approach to the materials of his art (here, torn scraps of fabric, tape, and book-mailing wrappers superimposed on a summer sky). An annotated catalog of the 1976 retrospective organized by the National Collection of Fine Arts, this handsome book also contains a lively evaluation of Rauschenberg's development by British critic Lawrence Alloway, a detailed chronology with personal comments by the artist himself, photographs of him at work, and a complete bibliography. The 19 color reproductions are too few in number (black-and-white occasionally distorts his imagery); they include *Canyon* (1959), with its stuffed eagle protruding from the canvas, below which a small pillow dangles on a cord, and *Bed* (1955), a real quilt smeared with paint.

**BOTTICELLI**
by L. D. and Helen S. Ettlinger
$10.95 cloth, $6.50 paper
L of C 76-26747
ISBN 0-19-519907-3 pbk

"Il Botticello" (the Little Barrel) was the nickname given to Sandro Filipepi when he was born in Florence about 1444. He was buried on May 17, 1510, in the Ognissanti Churchyard. Of the intervening years, too little is known. His grave has disappeared, but his powerful *St. Augustine* still hangs in the church. Twentieth-century admiration for the great Renaissance artist follows a long period of oblivion and, far worse, destruction of many of his works and of evidence of his life. Scholarly curiosity has led to much unwarranted interpretation. The Ettlingers take us back to what really survives in the evidence,
adding only what can prudently be deduced about Botticelli, the man Leonardo called "vain" because he did not study the painting of landscape for landscape's sake. He emerges from the Ettlingers' sympathetic clarifications more alive than before. The two art historians treat the religious paintings, allegories, portraits, and drawings according to the genre to which each belongs. Illustrated with 138 good reproductions, 18 in color (including the *Augustine*).

The town of Zapotlán El Grande sleeps "at the edge of its rounded valley like a fairy tale village of adobes, bricks and roof tiles." Beneath it lies a "colossal geological fault . . . an eggshell." In his first novel, Mexican satirist Arreola bares the controversies, history, and daily hubbub of Zapotlán as the town prepares for its profitable annual fair in honor of St. Joseph. A timeless feud festeres between landowners and aggrieved Indians. Characters emerge and gradually become distinct through their own voices: the musings of a weary priest; the daily log of a cobbler turned farmer (the farm fails, but he invents a new shoe for field hands); the confessions of an inquisitive boy; the scoldings of housewives. An old Indian foreman's gentle admonition echoes like a refrain: "Don't shoot the crows, Layo. They are human beings like us, and they don't do the corn any harm. . . . Poor creatures, they can't be blamed for giving in to temptation." This notable short work is illustrated with woodcuts and accompanied by the translator's lively notes.

The Himalayas (literally "abode of snows") reach into parts of eight countries. This book's geographical coverage is limited to the Nepal, Punjab, and Sikkim ranges, and the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan). But awesome and austere shots of Everest, Annapurna, and lesser-known peaks make Yoshikazu Shirakawa's book of photographs a great visual prize. And, with 71 full-page color plates, at one-fifth the
price of the original 1971 folio edition, quite a bargain. The quality of reproduction complements Shirakawa's technical virtuosity (though f-stop minded readers may be disappointed by the scanty technical information). His colors lend the entire volume a special sort of otherworldliness, abetted by the immensity of the mountains themselves. A few paragraphs each by Arnold Toynbee and Edmund Hillary and a short essay on the geology of "the roof of the world" by Kyuya Fukada supplement the photographer's brief personal narrative. Shirakawa experienced severe trans-Asian cultural shock. His travail was political (four years of seeking permission in India and Pakistan to enter or even approach certain areas bordering Tibet and China) and culinary ("In time I became used to mountain goat meat, at first unbearably pungent").

Highly bellicose, the "Formalist" movement in literary criticism exploded in early 20th-century Russia. Stressing the urgency of separating the artistic from the simply "communicative" in analyzing literature, the Formalists soon generated new, first-class scholarship that led to modern linguistic "structuralism" (the analysis of language and literary phenomena in their dynamic parts and as a whole). Unlike some of their more modern descendants, the founding theoreticians of structuralism wrote in plain words for all readers. One of them, the Russian Roman Jakobson, in 1920 founded the Prague Linguistic Circle. Its foremost member, Czech Jan Mukarovsky (1892-1975), made precise, imaginative contributions to the new scholarship. Perhaps only Jakobson himself went further. This timely translation of Mukarovsky's main articles (on poetic language, on dialogue, on the influence that a poet's life and work have on one another) makes a readable companion to last year's comprehensive (but difficult) study, Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism, by Elmar Holenstein.
The core of sentimentality nestling within much American popular culture is persuasively traced to ladies and parsons in this thoughtful argument by Columbia Professor Ann Douglas. Concentrating on the early and mid-19th century, she shows how the writing of high-minded novels, stories, and poetry became the preserve of two disestablished groups: women lately turned from being proud, productive partners in the Revolution and on the frontier into dependent consumers, and Protestant clergymen relegated to the company of womenfolk by the rising male business class. The alliance of these two elements and their use of literary outpourings as weapons in a struggle to dignify their enforced passivity is examined through the works of Catharine Maria Sedgwick, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Lydia Huntley Sigourney, and many others. Douglas argues that the dichotomy between "culture" and "serious pursuits" established in this period led straight to today's TV soap operas and to the "plots" implicit in modern advertising. Two essays serve to contrast the era's sentimentalists with its most phenomenal literary deviants, Romans Margaret Fuller and Herman Melville.

Many Americans remain unaware of the riches of modern Greek literature. The work of Constantine Cavafy (1863–1933), an obscure employee of the irrigation service in Alexandria (Egypt) and poet second only (some would say equal) to Greece's Nobel Prize-winning George Seferis (1900–71), is not well known in the United States. Even readers of Lawrence Durrell's four novels, The Alexandria Quartet, in which Cavafy figures as the "old poet of the city," may be unaware of his achievements. Colgate English Professor Jane Pinchin's book of essays, on the "old poet," on Durrell, and on E. M. Forster (who did much to make Cavafy's work known in England) comes on the heels of Robert Liddell's full, old-fashioned life, Cavafy: A Biography, and the fine textual analysis, Cavafy's Alexandria: Study of a Myth in Progress, by the poet's...
translator Edmund Keeley, both published in 1976. Pinchin explores the real and imagined affinities of three men strongly linked to the home city of "We the Alexandrians . . . / with our far-flung supremacy, our flexible policy of judicious integration, / and our Common Greek Language / which we carried as far as Bactria, / as far as the Indians." ("Come, O King of the Lacedaimonians," 1929, Cavafy, Collected Poems 1924–1955.)

Science & Technology


There is a tradition of good writing about astrophysics and cosmology by men who have themselves been in the forefront of these fields. This brief, lucid book by Harvard Professor Steven Weinberg, a leading theoretician in the field of elementary particle physics, is perhaps the most important and readable such exposition since Fred Hoyle's The Nature of the Universe (1951) and George Gamow's The Creation of the Universe (1952). But Weinberg's discussion begins where the speculations of earlier generations of cosmologists left off; he leads us into the study of elementary particles, from which stems much of the concrete understanding of the universe's course after those first three minutes to today. He describes the "big bang" theory ("In the beginning there was an explosion") as the now generally accepted "standard model"—displacing previous formulations based on the assumption that the universe has always been just about the same as it is now. He reviews the many linking discoveries in astrophysics that have quietly revolutionized the scientific view of the nature of the universe during the last decade. Among these are microwave radiation measurements that show a relatively uniform temperature in space of about 3.5 degrees above absolute zero; this "blackbody" radiation is apparently left over from a time when the universe was approximately 1,000 times smaller and hotter than at present. Weinberg's presentation of the new theories is non-mathematical.
but non-trivial ("I picture the reader as a smart old attorney," he says, "who expects . . . some convincing arguments before he makes up his mind").

**THE DRAGONS OF EDEN:**
Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence
by Carl Sagan
Random, 1977, 264 pp. $8.95
L of C 76-53472

Having explored the possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence in *The Cosmic Connection*, Sagan, a witty and elegant astronomer, examines the infinite mysteries of the human brain. Natural selection, he assures us, has served as a kind of "intellectual sieve," producing intelligence increasingly competent to deal with the laws of nature. It has been a slow process. In this captivating history of cerebral development, Sagan reminds us that it was only a few hundred million years ago that an organism with more information in its brain than in its genes appeared. We still share with our less well-endowed fellow primates three inborn fears—of falling, of snakes, of the dark. But thanks to the neocortex, which grew up around our more primitive brain structures some 30 million years ago, we have a culture that includes language, logic, intuition, and myths. The human brain, Sagan predicts, will continue to evolve—with the help of its talented competitor, the computer.

**SNAKES—A NATURAL HISTORY**
by H. W. Parker, revised by A. G. C. Grandison
Cornell & British Museum (Natural History), 1977, 124 pp.
$8.95 cloth, $3.95 paper
L of C 76-54625
ISBN 0-8014-1095-9
ISBN 0-8014-9164-9 pbk

The 11 families of snakes in a blend of scientific data and sympathy. This short book, newly revised from the 1965 edition, with enlarged full-color plates, is authoritative enough for professional herpetologists but will not overwhelm well-read modern youngsters who make pets of garter snakes. Necessarily sprinkled with such technical terms as "keratin"—one of the three layers of a snake's skin—the text's sometimes pedantic authenticity is relieved by striking images ("a livery of warning colours") and British matter-of-factness (Typhlopidae, or "blind" snakes, "essentially subterranean creatures," feed on "small invertebrates, especially ants").
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS


Not so long ago, our forefathers believed that there was nothing much worth noticing in the ancient world except Greece and Rome. Later, when Western scholars started studying Egypt, Mesopotamia, Babylon, and other civilizations, the prevailing conviction for some time was that these cultures were emotion-ridden, irrational, illogical. This work, now republished with an updated bibliography, first appeared in 1946. It has become a landmark in the interpretation of ancient cultures. Steering clear of the old snobberies, the authors also avoid ascribing modern beliefs to the ancients. They present an excellent introduction, especially to "mythopoetic" thought—the product of minds that concentrated on ordering perceptions and on explanation but could not view cause and effect in the impersonal, secular way to which we are accustomed.

CHINA POLICY: Old Problems and New Challenges. By A. Doak Barnett. Brookings, 1977. 131 pp. $2.95 (cloth, $8.95)

In U.S.-China relations, the rapprochement of the early 1970s has slowed to a standstill; political uncertainties on both sides of the Pacific raise new obstacles to progress toward full "normalization" of relations. Barnett surveys the issues on the Peking-Washington agenda—trade, cultural exchange, military-security relations, arms control. He outlines the probable impact of Washington's future China policy choices on Russia, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and participants in the "North-South dialogue," then sets forth this controversial proposal: The United States should withdraw all its servicemen (now 17,500) from Taiwan, adopt the "Japanese formula" of unofficial diplomatic representation in Taipei, and issue a "strong, unilateral, public statement" of the long-range U.S. commitment to Taiwan in lieu of the current defense treaty. Such a statement, he assumes, would receive the "tacit" acceptance and respect of Peking.


This evocation of a 1920s boyhood spent in the small towns and on the tidal rivers of Maryland's Eastern Shore has been reissued in the wake of new literary interest in the Chesapeake sparked by William Warner's Pulitzer Prize-winning Beautiful Swimmers (WQ, Autumn 1976). The Lord's Oysters, first published in 1957, is as fresh as an April breeze off the Bay. The reader follows a young boy, Noah Marlin, through the slow rituals of a mischievous boyhood, reminiscent of the novels of Twain and Tarkington. Byron's prose is relaxed. Here the observant Noah sets off with his father for a day of crabbing: "We walked along the oyster-shell path, listening to the birds waking in the trees. . . . When we reached the cover an old heron flew out of the marshy fringe with a loud squawk, just like he might have been clearing the mist from his throat."

Avenge the patriotic gore
That flecked the streets of Baltimore
—Confederate song

Hailed when it appeared in 1962 as one of the most original, informative books to come out of the Civil War Centennial, Patriotic Gore was at the same time heartily condemned for its introduction. In it, Wilson equated Lincoln with Bismarck and Lenin and argued that the Civil War had nothing to do with slavery. The introduction still makes astringent reading, but it has little to do with the 800 pages on 30 writers that follow. Here are Mary Chestnut’s superb diary, the war’s romantic fictional after-glow in George W. Cable, a single reference to Gone With the Wind that dismisses it as a “curious counterbalance” to Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Wilson spent 15 years poring over the literature. Readers with 15 hours to spend will relish this long overdue reprint.


First published in 1918, The American Language preceded Mencken’s reputation and now largely upholds it. Twice revised, and later enriched with two supplements, its evolution mirrors diverging U.S. and British fortunes. Where once Mencken believed that America’s English and the King’s were following separate paths, he later held that English was rapidly becoming a dialect of American. Not a scholar, Mencken saw himself as a bird dog leading experts to the prey—even if many of the objects of their pursuit had “now gone to word heaven.” Starting with the first widely deplored “Americanism” (bluff, as in riverbank, but also in poker), he sifts through curious loan words (hoosegow, from the Spanish jusgado) and murky matters of grammar, spelling, and syntax. Like Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755), The American Language is enlivened by the author’s acerbic asides (“It has become a platitude that one may go almost anywhere with no other linguistic equipment [than English] and get along almost as well as in large areas of New York City”).


Each of these three beautiful books, available in paper for the first time since they were originally published by Skira (Geneva) in the early 1960s, stands on its own as an expert presentation of its subject. The excellent color plates (100 Chinese, 84 Persian, 81 Arab) reveal many similarities among the paintings of the three civilizations. All, at separate times, came under the influence of the Mongols. It shows—especially in the rendering of horses. The Chinese use of line is far more restrained, however, as are the soft earth colors that characterize even the earliest Chinese paintings on silk and paper. Lapis lazuli, turquoise, red, and gold tones shine from the pages illustrating the exuberant religious art of early Islam and the Persian manuscript and miniature paintings of battle, court life, and courtship.
REFLECTIONS

Don Quixote
or the Critique of Reading

Pencil sketch by Pelegrin Clavé, 1840, for an oil painting entitled El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote.
Don Quixote is to Spaniards what Shakespeare’s plays are to the English-speaking world. As it happened, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra published his rich comic tale of the Knight of La Mancha in 1605, the year that Macbeth and King Lear first appeared in England. Cervantes’ grasp of the complexity and tragedy of Spain helped to make him the first modern novelist in any language. Here a distinguished Mexican writer, Carlos Fuentes, a former Wilson Center Fellow, describes Cervantes’ Spain and suggests that Cervantes’ genius offers us “what amounts to a new way of reading in the world” and a new way of looking at the multiple faces of reality.

by Carlos Fuentes

There is a common saying in Spain that Cervantes and Columbus resemble each other in that both died without clearly perceiving the importance of their discoveries. Columbus thought he had reached the Far East by traveling a westward course; Cervantes believed he had merely written a satire on the epics of chivalry. Neither ever realized that they had landed on the new continents of space (America) and fiction (the modern novel).

This extreme view of a naive Cervantes finds its mirror image in the equally extreme view that, in fact, the author of Don Quixote was a consummate hypocrite, constantly disguising his barbs against the Church and the established order under the folly of the hidalgo’s* acts, while all the time professing public allegiance to the faith and its institutions. According to this school of thought, Cervantes was no less a hypocrite than all the other authors and thinkers caught in the reactionary swell of the Counter Reformation: Campanella, Montaigne, Tasso, and Descartes, not to mention the most dramatic example of them all, Galileo.

There is a grain of truth in both assertions. Most great novels are not written on perfectly developed blueprints. Whatever the a priori of the novelist, they tend to be drowned as the work itself achieves its own autonomy and takes off on its own flight. This is equally true of Cervantes, Stendhal, or Dostoyevsky. One could also contend that the declared satirical intentions in Don Quixote are ironical in nature, only a facet of the multiple game of mirrors the author promptly establishes when, after Don Quixote’s first outing, Cervantes casts a dubious light on the whole problem of the authorship of the book. Is it conceivable that Cervantes, after writing the first few chapters of the book, suddenly came on what was to be its essence—the critique of reading—without including (or excluding) the satire of the epic of chivalry in his

* A hidalgo is a member of the minor Spanish nobility.
broader intentions, and let it subsist as the naive principle that would guide the whole novel?

Certainly, too, Cervantes was a man of his age, not a thinker or scholar but, mostly, a self-taught, voracious reader who was quite aware, at the late stage of his life when he wrote his masterpiece, and after a peculiarly sad and intense existence, of the realities of his times. The failed physician's son, from childhood a wanderer of the Spanish land in his family's wake, certainly the fleeting disciple of the Spanish Erasmist Juan López de Hoyos; uncertainly, a student at the hallowed halls of Salamanca; the youthful composer of courtly verse that brought him to the attention of the court of Philip II and then to Rome in the retinue of the Cardinal Acquaviva; the cardinal's valet turned soldier at the "glorious hour" of Lepanto, where he lost the use of a hand in the decisive naval combat against the Turkish fleet; the captive of the Moors in Algiers during five long years; the harassed commissioner of provisions for the invincible Armada, who demanded too much from the Andalusian clerics and was excommunicated for his troubles; the incompetent tax collector who landed twice in jail because of his jumbled numbers; the old, poor, and unhappy author of an immensely popular novel conceived behind bars and on whose meager royalties he was hardly able to pay his debts—surely, this man was aware of the historical and cultural context of late 16th- and early 17th-century Europe, and particularly so of the realities of Spain as the prime bastion of the Counter Reformation. Irony, more than naiveté; awareness, more than hypocrisy. But beyond all these categories (and perhaps containing all of them), there is the writer of Don Quixote, the founder of the modern European novel; and there is the existence of Don Quixote as an aesthetic fact that profoundly altered the traditions of reading in relation to the culture that preceded Cervantes, the culture he lived in, and the culture that followed him.

Armor and Rags

In the Exemplary Novels, Cervantes was an early writer of picaresque tales and, of course, a reader of the novels of chivalry that were then all the craze. Caught between the shining armor of Amadís de Gaúla and the rags and ruses of Lazarillo de Tormes, Cervantes introduced them to each other. The epic hero is Don Quixote, the founder of the modern European novel; and there is the existence of Don Quixote as an aesthetic fact that profoundly altered the traditions of reading in relation to the culture that preceded Cervantes, the culture he lived in, and the culture that followed him.

Carlos Fuentes, 48, is one of Latin America's best-known and most widely translated writers. He was born in Panama City. The well-traveled son of a Mexican diplomat, he went into government service after study at universities in Mexico City and Geneva. In 1959, he began to devote himself full-time to writing. His fifth novel, A Change of Skin, was awarded the Biblioteca Breve Prize (1967) in Barcelona but was subsequently banned in Spain; his latest novel, Terra Nostra (1976), won the $40,000 Rómulo Gallegos Prize in Caracas last August. He was named Mexico's ambassador to France in 1975; he resigned last spring and plans to teach in the United States. His essay is drawn from a lecture written at the Wilson Center and published by the Institute of Latin American Studies, the University of Texas at Austin.
Quixote, the earthy *picaro* is Sancho Panza. Don Quixote lives in a remote past, his brain addled by the reading of too many chivalric novels; Sancho Panza lives in the immediate present, his only worries those of day-to-day survival: What will we eat? Where will we sleep? Thanks to this meeting of genius, Cervantes was able to go beyond the consecration of the past and the consecration of the present to grapple with the problem of the fusion of past and present. In his hands, the novel became a critical operation. The past (Don Quixote’s illusion of himself as a knight errant of old) illuminates the present (the concrete world of inns and roads, muleteers and scullery maids); and the present (the harsh life of men and women struggling to survive in a cruel, unjust, and shabby world) illuminates the past (Don Quixote’s ideals of justice, freedom, and a golden age of abundance and equality).

**No Illusions**

Cervantes’ genius is that he translates these opposites into literary terms, surpassing and suffusing the extremes of the epic of chivalry and the chronicle of realism with a particularly acute conflict of verbal gestation. He has, in this sense, no illusions. What he is doing is doing with words and words alone. But he realizes that words, in his world, are the only possible place where worlds can meet. Thus, the gestation of language becomes a central reality of the novel. The tense struggle between the past and the present, between renovation and the tribute due to the preceding form, is squarely faced by Cervantes in *Don Quixote*. And he solves this conflict and rises above its contradictions because he is the first novelist to root the critique of creation within the pages of his own creation, *Don Quixote*. And this critique of creation is, as we shall see, a critique of the very act of reading.

**A Man Divided**

It is a thrilling experience to read this book with the knowledge that it was written during the childhood of the printing press, in an age when a reading public was rising in Europe, and the unique reading of unique volumes, laboriously handwritten by monks and destined for the eyes of a privileged few, was becoming an anachronism defeated by the triumphant coincidence of critical thought, capitalist expansion, and religious reform. It is a thrilling experience to read it today, when the very act of reading has been condemned to the dust heap of history by the gloomy prophets of the electronic millennium, with a goodly assist from the writers of the unreadable, the nonlanguage of the adman, the acronymic beeps of the bureaucrat, and the unquestioning clichés of the sensational best seller.

Cervantes, in truth, did not suffer from a situation comparable to that of our own time, but neither did he benefit from the winds of renovation that created modern Europe. He was supremely aware both of the energy, the flux, and the contradictions of the Renaissance and of the inertia, rigidity, and false security of the Counter Reformation. It was his lot to be born in the Spain of Philip II, the very bastion of orthodoxy, but perhaps only a Spaniard of his age could have written *Don Quixote*.

In *Don Quixote*, Cervantes is immersed in an extraordinary cultural struggle—an unparalleled critical operation to save the best of Spain.
from the worst of Spain, the living features of the medieval order from the features Cervantes considers worthy only of decent burial, the promises of the Renaissance from its pitfalls.

I will go further into these matters, of great importance for the understanding of Don Quixote. Permit me, at this stage, to say only that the outcome of Cervantes’ mighty struggle was a book of infinite levels of interpretation, the first novel that can be read from multiple points of view because it does not refuse its own contradictions but makes them the stuff of the intensity of its writing. Victim and executioner of his own book, a man divided between the moribund and a nascent order, educated in the culture of the Counter Reformation and thus the child of a culture eccentric to the mainstream of 16th-century Europe, yet very much aware of it, but also a child of the Renaissance and thus, in many ways, alien to the official culture of Hapsburg Spain, Cervantes is in more than one aspect similar to James Joyce. Cervantes, in the early morning of the modern age, invents a new way of reading; Joyce, at its hour of dusk, invents a new way of writing. Both draw support for their monumental works from epics of the past. And both, the author who opens and the author who closes the adventure of the modern European novel—Cervantes Alpha and Joyce Omega—are highly charged with the fruitful doubts and contradictions of their eccentric societies.

Ferdinand and Isabella

The year 1492 is the watershed of Spanish history. After nine centuries of confrontation, coexistence, and integration of the Christian and Muslim cultures, the last Arab stronghold in Spain, Granada, fell to the first unified Spanish monarchy, Catholic Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile.* Ferdinand and Isabella had decided to sever the Arab heritage from the culture that they saw only in the light of their own political necessity, which was unity—a unity that superseded all considerations. It was a fragile unity since it went against the grain of the extreme fractiousness of the medieval kingdoms and the extreme regionalism (upheld to this very day) of Catalanons, Basques, Asturians, Galicians, Castilians, and Aragonese.

The Cost of Unity

To Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic religion and the purity of blood were the absolute measures of unity. The Catholic Queen admitted that she had been the cause “of great calamities and much havoc in towns, provinces, and kingdoms” but “only out of love for Christ and His Holy Mother.” The “Faith” came to excuse all acts of political expediency. And the law came to define true Spaniards as “the old Christians, clean of all evil race or stain.” This immediately shed suspicion, not only on the Arab heritage but on the Jewish culture of Spain and led to the expulsion of the Jews, also in 1492. In 1475, out of a total population of 7 million, there were in Spain but half a million Jews and conversos.† Yet more than one-third of the urban population was of Jewish stock. The result was that one year after the edict of expulsion of the Jews, the municipal rents in Seville dropped by one-third, and Barcelona, deprived of her

*The final expulsion of the Moors would be decreed by Philip III in 1609.
†Jews converted to Christianity.
The combined expulsion of Jews and Muslims meant that Spain, in effect, deprived itself of the talents and services it would later sorely need to maintain its imperial stature. The Jews were the doctors and surgeons of Spain, to a degree that Charles V, in the 1530s, congratulated a student of the University of Alcalá on being "the first hidalgo of Castile to become a medical man." The Jews were the only tax collectors and the principal taxpayers of the realm. They were the bankers, the merchants, the moneylenders, and the spearhead of the nascent capitalist class in Spain. They had been, throughout the Middle Ages, the intermediaries between the Christian and Moorish kingdoms, the almojarifes, or finance administrators, for the sundry kings who incessantly repeated that, without their Jewish bureaucracy, the royal finances would crumble. They served as ambassadors, public servants, and administrators of the royal patrimony. In fact, they took upon themselves what the Spanish nobility would not deign to accomplish, considering it beneath their dignity as hidalgos.

**Cultural Trauma**

The mutilation imposed on Spain by the Catholic kings and sustained by their successors was not only an economic catastrophe. It also sired a historical and cultural trauma from which Spain has never wholly re-
The singularity of Spain derives from the fact that she is the only nation in the West where three distinct faiths and cultures, the Christian, the Jewish, and the Muslim, cross-fertilized themselves for over nine centuries.

**Rising Expectations**

It is thanks to the Jewish intellectuals that the Spanish language itself became fixed and achieved literary dignity. Both aspects come together, as is well known, in the vast scholarly undertaking patronized by King Alfonso X, the Wise, in the 13th century. The purpose was to set down the knowledge of the times; its sum total would be an encyclopedia *avant la lettre*. But the extraordinary fact is that the Castilian king had to rely on Jewish scholars to do the job. It was of equal significance that this Jewish brain trust insisted that the work be written in Spanish and not, as was then the scholarly custom, in Latin. Why? Because Latin was the language of Christendom. The Spanish Jews wanted knowledge to be diffused in the language common to all Spaniards—Christians, Jews, and *conversos* alike. From their work at the court of Alfonso came the future prose of Spain. Two centuries after Alfonso, it was still the Jews who were using the vulgar tongue in commenting on the Bible, in writing philosophy, and in the study of astronomy. It can be said that the Jews fixed and made current the use of Spanish in Spain.

At the same time, within the Christian realms of Spain, a particular phenomenon was taking place. Feudalism was comparatively weak in Spain because the constant shifting of frontiers during the protracted wars of the Reconquista made it difficult for the nobility to stake a permanent claim to the land. Also, medieval Spain had too many twilight zones and buffer kingdoms where the Christian nobility was under the protection of the Moors, or vice versa. These weaknesses and the lack of any unified central authority made it possible for civil power and local institutions to develop through charters of local autonomy granted to cities and villages, freedoms consecrated within many urban communities, independent judiciary authorities, and a continuing revolution of rising expectations spearheaded by the commercial and cultural centers of Christian Spain, notably Barcelona with its overwhelmingly Jewish bourgeoisie. There was social porosity. The serf could slowly but surely ascend to the status of the burgher.

**A Modern Revolution**

As long as the Catholic kings did not interrupt this political process, the cities went along with their unitarian purposes. But when the Hapsburg prince, Charles I of Spain (better known by his title as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V), acceded to power in 1517 as the heir of the mad Queen Juana and her deceased husband Philip the Fair, the urban communities saw their freedoms menaced in several ways. There was an element of xenophobia. Charles was a Fleming who could not even speak Spanish, but what the comunidades* rightly saw was that Charles's policy was to further centralization without respect to the civil rights of the cities and the local institutions. The citizens' drive towards constitutionalism was pitted against Charles's conception of absolutism as reproduction, and

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*Urban communities functioning under medieval charters.*
extension, of the medieval imperium.

The civil war that ensued has justly been called by José Maravall "the first modern revolution in Spain and probably in Europe," in fact, the forerunner of the English and French Revolutions. The human composition of the revolt speaks for itself: a few urban noblemen; a greater number of mayors, aldermen, and judges; quite a few lesser clergymen (canons, abbots, archdeacons, deans); a sprinkling of university teachers (most of them of Erasmian persuasion); a great number of doctors, physicists, lawyers, and bachelors of arts; an even greater number of merchants, moneychangers, public notaries, and pharmacists; and an overwhelming majority of storeowners, innkeepers, silversmiths, jewelers, ironmongers, butchers, hatmakers, cobblers, tailors, barbers, and carpenters.

The Rebels' Demands

If this reads like the cast of Don Quixote, a conclusion can quickly be drawn. Cervantes deals with the very men who defied the absolutism of the Hapsburgs and fought for the development of civil rights. But what is, in Cervantes, a silent majority was, in 1520, a very outspoken and defiantly active one, for what the people of Spain could no longer express in 1605 they had fought for in 1520. The demands of the comuneros* were for a democratic order. I do not hesitate in using the word. It appears constantly in the written demands of the rebels. It is inherent in what they fought for: the suppression of political and administrative posts held in perpetuity; the control of the responsibilities of public functionaries; a stop to the harassment of converted Jews; no taxation without representation; a refusal to pay extraordinary tributes. The defeat of the comunero forces at Villalar in 1521 dealt a further, crushing blow to the forces working for a modern, democratic, humane Spain. It is against this historical complexity—the mutilation of the Arab and Jewish cultures, the defeat of local democratic forces, the royal absolutism of the Hapsburgs, the power of the Inquisition, the impoverishment of middle-Spain, the rigidity of Counter Reformation dogma, and the growing swell of post-Renaissance contradictions, doubts, and affirmations—that we must place the life of Miguel de Cervantes and the gestation of his masterpiece, Don Quixote.

Faith and Reason

Caught between the flood tide of the Renaissance and the ebb tide of the Counter Reformation, Cervantes clings to the one plank that can keep him afloat: Erasmus of Rotterdam. The vast influence of Erasmus in Spain is hardly fortuitous. He was correctly seen to be the Renaissance man struggling to conciliate the verities of faith and reason, and the reasons of the old and the new.

The influence of Erasmian thought on Cervantes can be clearly perceived in three themes common to the philosopher and the novelist: the duality of truth, the illusion of appearances, and the praise of folly. Erasmus reflects the Renaissance dualism: understanding may be different from believing. But reason must be wary of judging from external appearances: "All things human have two aspects, much as the Silenes of Alcibiades, who had two utterly opposed faces; and thus,
what at first sight looked like death, when closely observed was life" (*In Praise of Folly*). And he goes on to say: "The reality of things ... depends solely on opinion. Everything in life is so diverse, so opposed, so obscure, that we cannot be assured of any truth."

Erasmus promptly gives his reasoning a comic inflection, when he smilingly points out that Jupiter must disguise himself as a "poor little man" in order to procreate little Jupiters. Comic debunking thus serves the unorthodox vision of the double truth, and it is evident that Cervantes opts for this Aesopian short cut in creating the figures of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, for the former speaks the language of universals and the latter that of particulars; the knight believes, the squire doubts, and each man's appearance is diversified, obscured, and opposed by the other's reality. If Sancho is the real man, then he is, nevertheless, a participant in Don Quixote's world of pure illusion; but if Don Quixote is the illusory man, then he is, nevertheless, a participant in Sancho's world of pure reality.

"Words, Words, Words"

How do the spiritual realities reflected on by Erasmus translate into the realm of literature? Perhaps Hamlet is the first character to stop in his tracks and mutter three minuscule and infinite words that suddenly open a void between the certain truths of the Middle Ages and the uncertain reason of the brave new world of modernity.

Etching, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza by George Cruikshank, 1885.
These words are simply "Words, words, words . . ." and they both shake and spear us because they are the words of a fictional character reflecting on the very substance of his being. Hamlet knows he is written and represented on a stage, whereas old Polonius comes and goes in agitation, intrigues, counsels, and deports himself as if the world of the theater truly were the real world. Words become acts, the verb becomes a sword, and Polonius is pierced by Hamlet's sword: the sword of literature. Words, words, words, mutters Hamlet, and he does not say it pejoratively. He is simply indicating, without too many illusions, the existence of a thing called literature—a new literature that has ceased to be a transparent reading of the divine Verb or the established social order but is yet unable to become a sign reflecting a new human order as coherent or indubitable as the religious and social orders of the past.

**Knight of the Faith**

All is possible. All is in doubt. Only an old hidalgo from the barren plain of La Mancha in the central plateau of Castile continues to adhere to the codes of certainty. For him, nothing is in doubt and all is possible. In the new world of criticism, Don Quixote is a knight of the faith. This faith comes from his reading, and his reading is a madness. (The Spanish words for reading and madness convey this association much more strongly. Reading is lectura; madness is locura.)

Like the necrophilic monarch secluded at El Escorial, Don Quixote both pawns and pledges his life to the restoration of the world of unified certainty. He pawns and pledges himself, both physically and symbolically, to the univocal reading of the texts and attempts to translate this reading into a reality that has become multiple, equivocal, ambiguous. But because he possesses his reading, Don Quixote possesses his identity: that of the knight errant, that of the ancient epic hero.

**The Shelter of Books**

So, at the immediate level of reading, Don Quixote is the master of the previous readings that withered his brain. But at a second level of reading, he becomes the master of the words contained in the verbal universe of the book titled *Don Quixote*. He ceases to be a reader of the novels of chivalry and becomes the actor of his own epic adventures. As there was no rupture between his reading of the books and his faith in what they said, so now there is no divorce between the acts and the words of his adventures. Because we read it but do not see it, we shall never know what it is that the goodly gentleman puts on his head: the fabled helm of Mambrino or a vulgar barber's basin. The first doubt assails us. Is Quixote right? Has he discovered the legendary helmet, while everyone else, blind and ignorant, sees only the basin?

Within this verbal sphere, Don Quixote is at first invincible. Sancho's empiricism, from this verbal point of view, is useless, because Don Quixote, each time he fails, immediately re-establishes his literary discourse, undiscouraged—the words always identical to the reality, the reality but a prolongation of the words he has read before and now enacts. He explains away his disasters with the words of his previous, epic readings and resumes his career within the world of the words that belong to him.
We know that only reality confronts the mad readings of Don Quixote. But he does not know it, and this ignorance (or this faith) establishes a third level of reading in the novel. "Look your mercy," Sancho constantly says, "Look you that what we see there are not giants, but only windmills." But Don Quixote does not see. Don Quixote reads and his reading says that those are giants.

Don Quixote, each time he fails, finds refuge in his readings. And sheltered by his books, he will go on seeing armies where there are only sheep without losing the reason of his readings. He will be faithful unto them, because he does not conceive any other licit way of reading. The synonymity of reading, madness, truth, and life in Don Quixote becomes strikingly apparent when he demands of the merchants he meets on the road that they confess the beauty of Dulcinea without ever having seen her, for "the important thing is that without having seen her you should believe, confess, swear and defend it." This is an act of faith. Don Quixote's fabulous adventures are ignited by an overwhelming purpose: What is read and what is lived must coincide anew, without the doubts and oscillations between faith and reason introduced by the Renaissance.

"They Mention Me!"

But the very next level of reading in the novel Don Quixote starts to undermine this illusion. In his third outing, Don Quixote finds out, through news that the bachelor Sanzon Carrasco has transmitted to Sancho, that there exists a book called The Most Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha. "They mention me," Sancho says in marvelment, "along with our lady Dulcinea del Toboso, and many other things that happened to us alone, so that I crossed myself in fright trying to imagine how the historian who wrote them came to know them." Things that happened to us alone. Before, only God could know them. Now, any reader who can pay the cover price for a copy of Don Quixote can also find out. The reader thus becomes akin to God. Now, the dukes can prepare their cruel farces because they have read the first part of the novel Don Quixote. Now, Don Quixote, the reader, is read.

Reality Vanquished

On entering the second part of the novel, Don Quixote also finds out that he has been the subject of an apocryphal novel written by one Avellaneda to cash in on the popularity of Cervantes' book. The signs of Don Quixote's singular identity suddenly seem to multiply. Don Quixote criticizes Avellaneda's version. But the existence of another book about himself makes him change his route and go to Barcelona so as to "bring out into the public light the lies of this modern historian so that people will see that I am not the Don Quixote he says I am."

This is surely the first time in literature that a character knows that he is being written about at the same time that he lives his fictional adventures. This new level of reading is crucial to determine those that follow. Don Quixote ceases to support himself on previous epics and starts to support himself on his own epic. But his epic is no epic, and it is at this point that Cervantes invents the modern novel. Don Quixote, the reader, knows he is read, something that Achilles surely
never knew. And he knows that the destiny of Don Quixote the man has becomes inseparable from the destiny of Don Quixote the book, something that Ulysses never knew in relation to The Odyssey. His integrity as a hero of old, safely niched in his previous, univocal, and denotative epic reading, is shattered, not by the galley slaves or scullery maids who laugh at him, not by the sticks and stones he must weather in the inns he takes to be castles or the grazing fields he takes to be battlegrounds. His faith in his epical readings enables him to bear all the batterings of reality. But now his integrity is annulled by the readings he is submitted to.

It is these readings that transform Don Quixote, the caricature of the ancient hero, into the first modern hero, observed from multiple angles, scrutinized by multiple eyes that do not share his faith in the codes of chivalry, assimilated by the very readers who read him, and, like them, forced to recreate "Don Quixote" in his own imagination. A double victim of the act of reading, Don Quixote loses his senses twice. First, when he reads. Then, when he is read. Because now, instead of having to prove the existence of the heroes of old, he is up against a much, much tougher challenge: He must prove his own existence.

And this leads us to a further level of reading. A voracious, insomniac reader of epics that he obsessively wants to carry over to reality, Don Quixote fails miserably in this, his original purpose. But as soon as he becomes an object of reading, he begins to vanquish reality, to contaminate it with his mad reading—not the reading of the novels of chivalry, but the actual reading of the novel Don Quixote. And this new reading transforms the world, for the world, more and more, begins to resemble the world contained in the pages of

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Drawing, Don Quixote by Salvador Dali, 1946.
the novel *Don Quixote*.

So Cervantes need not write a political manifesto to denounce the evils of his age and of all ages; he need not resort to Aesopian language; he need not radically break with the strictures of the traditional epic in order to surpass it. He dialectically merges the epic thesis and the realistic antithesis to achieve, within the very life and logic and necessity of his own book, the novelistic synthesis.

As the world comes to resemble him more and more, *Don Quixote*, more and more, loses the illusion of his own being. He has been the cipher of the act of reading: a black-ink question mark, much as Picasso was to draw him. By the time he reaches the castle of the dukes, *Don Quixote* sees that the castle is actually a castle, whereas, before, he could imagine he saw a castle in the humblest inn of the Castilian wayside.

**The Saddest Book**

Thrust into history, *Don Quixote* is deprived of all opportunity for imaginative action. He meets one Roque Guinart, an authentic robber, alive in the time of Cervantes. This Guinart, totally inscribed in history, was a thief and contrabandist of silver cargoes from the Indies and a secret agent of the French Huguenots at the time of the St. Bartholomew's Night massacre. Next to him and his tangible historicity, as when he sees (but does not partake in) a naval battle off Barcelona, *Don Quixote* has become a simple witness to real events and real characters. Cervantes gives these chapters a strange aura of sadness and disillusionment. The old hidalgue, forever deprived of his epic reading of the world, must face his final option: to be in the sadness of reality or to be in the reality of literature—this literature, the one Cervantes has invented, not the old literature of univocal coincidence that *Don Quixote* sprang from.

Dostoyevsky calls Cervantes' novel "the saddest book of them all"; in it, the Russian novelist found the inspiration for the figure of the "good man," the idiot Prince Mushkin. As the novel ends, the knight of the faith has truly earned his sorrowful countenance. For, Dostoyevsky adds, *Don Quixote* suffers from a disease, "the nostalgia of realism."

**Another Life**

This phrase must give us pause. What realism are we talking about? The realism of impossible adventures with magicians, chivalrous knights errant, and frightful giants? Exactly so. Before, everything that was written was true, even if it were a fantasy. "For Aristotle," explains Ortega y Gasset, "the centaur is a possibility; not so for us, since biology will not tolerate it."

And this is what *Don Quixote* feels such intense nostalgia for: this realism without inner contradictions. What shatters the monolith of the old realism *Don Quixote* yearns for are the plural readings, the illicit readings to which he is subjected. *Don Quixote* recovers his reason. And this, for a man of his ilk, is the supreme folly. It is suicide. When he accepts conventional "reality," *Don Quixote*, like Hamlet, is condemned to death. But *Don Quixote*, thanks to the critical reading invented by Cervantes in the act of founding the modern novel, will go on living another life. He is left with no resource but to prove his own existence, not in the univocal reading that gave him his original being, but in the
multiple readings that deprived him of it. Don Quixote loses the life of his nostalgic, coincidental reality but goes on living, forever, in his book and only in his book.

Truth in Art

This is why Don Quixote is the most Spanish of all novels. Its very essence is defined by loss, impossibility, a burning quest for identity, a sad awareness of all that could have been and never was, and, in reaction to this deprivation, an assertion of total existence in a realm of the imagination, where all that in reality cannot be, finds, precisely because of this factual negation, the most intense level of truth. Because the history of Spain has been what it has been, its art has been what history has denied Spain. Art brings truth to the lies of history.

This is what Dostoyevsky meant when he called Don Quixote a novel where truth is saved by a lie. The Russian author's profound observation goes well beyond the relationship of a nation's art to its history. Dostoyevsky is speaking of the broader relationship between reality and imagination. There is a fascinating moment in Don Quixote when the Knight of the Sorrowful Countenance arrives in Barcelona and forever breaks the bindings of the illusion of reality. He does what Achilles, Aeneas, or Sir Lancelot could never do: He visits a printing shop. He enters the very place where his adventures become an object, a tangible product. Don Quixote is thus sent by Cervantes to his only reality: the reality of fiction.

The act of reading, in this manner, is both the starting point and the last stop on Don Quixote's route. Neither the reality of what he read nor the reality of what he lived were such, but merely paper ghosts. Only when freed from his readings—but captured by the readings that multiply the levels of the novel on an infinite scale—only alone in the very center of his authentic, fictional reality can Don Quixote exclaim:

Believe in me! My feats are true, the windmills are giants, the herds of sheep are armies, the inns are castles, and there is in the world no lady more beautiful than the Empress of La Mancha, the unrivaled Dulcinea del Toboso! Believe in me!

Reality may laugh or weep on hearing such words. But reality is invaded by them, loses its own defined frontiers, feels itself displaced, transfigured by another reality made of words and paper. Where are the limits between Dunsinane Castle and Birnham Wood? Where the frontiers that bind the moor where Lear and his fool live on that cold night of madness? Where, in fact, does Don Quixote's fantastic Cave of Montesinos end and reality begin?

The Knight's Lady

The power of Don Quixote's image as a madman who constantly confuses reality with imagination has made many a reader and commentator forget what I consider an essential passage of the book. In Chapter XXV of the first part of the novel, Don Quixote decides to do penance, dressed only in his nightshirt, in the craggy cliffs of the Sierra Morena. He asks Sancho to go off to the village of El Toboso and inform the knight's lady Dulcinea of the great deeds and sufferings with which he honors her. Since Sancho knows of no highly placed lady called Dulcinea in the miserable hamlet of El Toboso he inquires further. Don Quixote, at this extraordi-
Lithograph, Don Quixote and Sancho Panza by Pablo Picasso, 1955.
nary moment, reveals that he knows the truth. Dulcinea, he says, is no other than the peasant girl Aldonza Lorenzo; it is she Sancho must look for. This provokes gales of laughter in the roguish squire; he knows Aldonza well. She is common, strong as a bull, dirty, can bellow to the peasants from the church tower and be heard a league away; she's a good one at exchanging pleasannities and, in fact, is a bit of a whore.

Don Quixote's response is one of the most moving declarations of love ever written. He knows who and what Dulcinea really is; yet he loves her, and, because he loves her, she is worth as much as "the most noble princess in all the world." He admits that his imagination has transformed the peasant girl Aldonza into the noble lady Dulcinea. But is not this the essence of love, to transform the loved one into something incomparable, unique, set above all considerations of wealth or poverty, distinction or commonness? "Thus, it is enough that I think and believe that Aldonza Lorenzo is beautiful and honest; the question of class is of no consequence. . . . I paint her in my imagination as I desire her . . . And let the world think what it wants."

Bridge Between Worlds

In Don Quixote, the values of the age of chivalry acquire, through love, a democratic resonance; and the values of the democratic life acquire the resonance of nobility. Don Quixote refuses both the cruel power of the mighty and the herd instinct of the lowly. His vision of humanity is not based on the lowest common denominator but on the highest achievement possible. His conception of love and justice saves both the oppressors and the oppressed from an oppression that perverts both.

It is through this ethical stance that Cervantes struggles to bridge the old and new worlds. If his critique of reading is a negation of the rigid and oppressive features of the Middle Ages, it is also an affirmation of ancient values that must be lost in the transition to the modern world. But if Don Quixote is also an affirmation of the modern values of the pluralistic point of view, Cervantes does not surrender to modernity either. It is at this junction that his moral and literary vision fuses into a whole. For if reality has become plurivocal, literature will reflect it only to the extent that it forces reality to submit itself to plural readings and to multiple visions from variable perspectives. Precisely in the name of the polyvalence of the real, literature creates reality, adds to reality, ceases to be a verbal correspondence to verities immovable, or anterior to reality. Literature, this new printed reality, speaks of the things of the world; but literature, in itself, is a new thing in the world.

Through his paper character Don Quixote, who integrates the values of the past with those of the present, Cervantes translates the great themes of the centerless universe and of individualism triumphant, yet awed and orphaned, to the plane of literature, where they become the axis of a new reality. There will be no more tragedy and no more epic, because there is no longer a restorable ancestral order or a universe univocal in its normativeness. There will be multiple layers of reality.

It so happens that the rogue, convicted galley slave, and false puppeteer Ginés de Pasamonte, alias Ginesillo de Parapilla, alias Master
Pedro, is writing a book about his own life. "Is the book finished?" asks Don Quixote. And Ginés answers, "How can it be, if my life isn't over yet?"

Who writes books and who reads them? Cervantes asks. Who is the author of Don Quixote? Is it a certain Cervantes, more versed in grief than in verse, whose Galatea has been read by the priest who scrutinizes Don Quixote's library, burns the books he dislikes in an immediate auto-da-fé, and then seals off the hidalgo's library with brick and mortar, making him believe it is the work of magicians? Or is it a certain de Saavedra, mentioned with admiration because of the acts he accomplished, "and all of them for the purpose of achieving freedom"?

Mallarmé will one day say, "A book neither begins nor ends; at the most, it feigns to. . . ."

Cervantes wrote the first open novel as if he had read Mallarmé. He proposes, through the critique of reading that seems to start with the hidalgo's reading of the epics of chivalry and seems to end with the reader's realization that all reality is multileveled, the critique of creation within creation. Don Quixote's timeless and, at the same time, immediate quality derives from the nature of its internal poetics. It is a split poem that converts its own genesis into an act of fiction. It is the poetry of poetry (or the fiction of fiction), singing the birth of the poem, and narrating the origin of the very fiction we are reading.

Engraving, from the 1865 Gaspary y Roig edition of Don Quixote.
LETTERS

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication.

TV News and Politics: Confusion Among 'Experts'?

I don't know which group I am more despairing of, the academics or the TV journalists. In the case of your academics' essays and the dialogue involving both groups [WQ, Spring 1977], I'd have to say the academics win the prize for Donald Duckery.

As I see the paradigm—good Faculty Club word—for research, the typical communications-school scholar gets some graduate students to watch Cronkite or Chancellor between September 1 and November 4. The researchers generally conclude:

1. The network evening news gives only a few minutes to each candidate. (Stop the presses, big news!!!)

2. These reports tend to show film or tape of the candidates' activities, usually media events or other hoopla. (Another searing expose!!!)

3. Frequently, TV tells its audience who is ahead in the campaign. (What a terrible pandering to the lowest-common-denominator audience!!!)

I could go on. The communications "experts" should not confuse what is easy to study (the network news), with all the sources of news and (informal) information flowing to the citizenry. We are not at the mercy of Walter Cronkite for our information about politics. In fact, he may be the last person to go to.

The way to address media wrongs is to try to understand them. That cannot be done by putting a stopwatch to the network news or even by attending Wilson Center "evening dialogues." To understand the forms of the news, academics have to go out in the streets with newsmen when they are harvesting the daily news crop, and be in the newsrooms when "product" is being processed. That's what we do here at M.I.T.

Edwin Diamond, Director, News Study Group, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Author of The Tin Kazoo: Television Politics, and the News (1975)

Questions for TV News

"TV News and Politics" [WQ, Spring 1977] evokes strong reactions from a person who earns much of his living from the television business but in the past earned it from academic political science. Discussions of television's political coverage argue issues of political detail that have already been conceded in principle; they overlook more profound issues of American government.

On the one hand: Yes, American television news avowedly seeks mass audiences, is intensely competitive, operates under tight budgetary and deadline constraints, is dominated in substance and style by the three commercial networks, and often communicates through a visual, rather than a verbal, logic. Yes, these factors influence news coverage. Operators have evolved an efficient strategy to survive under these conditions. It encapsulates brief segments of dramatic film into simple, self-contained "stories" that contain pictorial elements tied together by a rudimentary moral theme ("A" is good, "B" is bad) and state, or imply, a moral conclusion. This strategy produces news coverage that is timely, compelling, episodic, sometimes incomplete, often emotional, and that seldom exceeds the attention span of mass audiences and seems to be roughly con-

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gruent with the beliefs of mass audiences.

On the other hand: No, commercial television news is not, and cannot by, its nature become, a method of formal education. While it is licensed to serve the public interest, it cannot be organized to provide an educator's presentation of information that, according to some academic conception, would be "complete" or "correct." TV news cannot become formal education partly because of its commercial basis and because it is so fiercely competitive.

More importantly (as a glance at European television will show), most people do not want to be educated by television. If alternative, entertaining programming is available, they will select it. And, whether broadcast newsmen work for commercial stations or for governments, they will tend to edit news so as to maximize audiences, because audience size is the best way to keep score in the professional game.

If, instead of debating them, we accept the foregoing thoughts as premises, we can move to more difficult questions.

Where do TV's moral themes come from?

Are they merely responses to a "market"?

Do they more than mirror the society?

What, if any, general consequences do they have?

Once in a while, TV newsmen develop stories that communicate moral themes in which the mass public had no previous interest. How are the stories that deviate from popular morality selected? Are they random? Do they result from guesses (predictions) about matters that mass audiences will become conscious of in the future? Do they result from the newsmen's personal moral convictions about matters that mass audiences should become conscious of? Is it not true that some logically possible moral themes are almost never conveyed through commercial television news? Are they ignored because of mass unpopularity? Or for nonmarket reasons?

Commercial, competitive television depends for its existence upon the existing legal, economic, political, and social order. In the last analysis, it depends upon national security broadly defined. National security and the preservation of the essentials of the existing order require effective popular education. Yet, commercial television does not function as an educational medium.

Should not the most powerful communication medium—in its own self-interest—reflect upon this possible paradox? On occasion, should it not examine the somber problems of national security, unity, governmental legitimacy, and justice, in their own terms? Should not television news derive at least some of its moral themes from the classical problems of government and the real concerns of statesmen?

Peter B. Clark, President
The Evening News Association
Detroit, Mich.

Japan: Still a Very Different Approach to Life and Work


On the basis of these three articles, Japan might be seen as approaching a condition where its household, economic, and political institutions are suffused with the familiar values of Western individualism.

The roots of this new view of Japan are not hard to find.

On the one hand, the large coterie of American social scientists now working on Japan have beaten back the purveyors of Japanese exotica by arguing that self-proclaimed transcultural categories and theories can be used to convincingly interpret the Japanese experience.

Moreover, given the international economic controversies of the last 10
years, the Japanese government and liberal trading policy advocates in this country have had a very strong complementary interest in emphasizing the similarities in how Japanese and Americans operate. Together, these sources have provided the context that has allowed the "Japanese are like us" imagery to begin to gain wide approval.

Yet, one can fully reject the crudities of earlier views of Japan and accept Japan as an advanced society without embracing the view that Japan is going down a path long familiar to us. One example will suffice. It is remarkably facile to suggest, as Koya Azumi does, that lifetime employment practices will wither away under Japan's mature economic conditions. They might; they might not.

Lifetime employment (most commonly this means until age 55) is certainly inconvenient in time of economic downturn. And seniority-based wage systems are a problem when, with slower economic and population growth, the average age of the labor force rises.

Nonetheless, lifetime commitment to employers is not primarily a cultural hangover from Japan's feudal era. Nor can its existence be primarily explained by union pressure, though this certainly has been a factor. Rather, there are economic rationales for lifetime commitment to employees quite independent of the undoubted truth that, until recently, there was for some time very little need to lay off workers.

As in all complex economies, firms in Japan need trained labor. In Japan, to an extent well beyond what is characteristic in the United States, this training takes place in large firms, and the expense of this training is borne by the firm. The firm's large implicit and explicit training outlays can be recouped because its employees remain with it permanently—not so much out of loyalty as because wages and technology are so structured that the typical employee, should he actually leave, would suffer major economic loss.

In the years ahead, as the Japanese economy absorbs, creates, and adjusts to still more sophisticated technology, these features of lifetime commitment will probably seem even more attractive than they have in the past.

What is true of lifetime commitment might be generalized. There are many features of older Japanese practices that are highly appropriate for the last quarter of the 20th century. No one looks to Japan of the 1970s as a model for less developed countries. Rather, Japan is viewed as having experiences from which other advanced industrial societies can benefit.

Today in Washington, as new legislation on mandatory retirement is being prepared, the Treasury and the Council of Economic Advisers want to know about Japanese practices. Again, as the debate on the U.S. "capital shortage" moves into its third year, these same agencies and the Labor Department want to know about the saving/investment behavior of the Japanese.

Among advanced industrial countries, it is the United States that least resembles Japan (witness West European employment practices). As the '70s turn into the '80s, perhaps we will be learning as much from Japan as they have learned (and will be learning) from us!

Gary Saxonhouse, Department of Economics, University of Michigan

Japan: The Importance of the 1920s Experience

The recent opening of American and Japanese archives dealing with World War II and the immediate postwar years has helped deepen scholars' understanding of what was involved in the crisis, war, and occupation that shaped U.S.-Japanese relations during the 1930s and the 1940s. To discuss Japan today, one must begin by contrasting conditions with the situation 30 and 40 years ago.

However, as implied by Mr. Rieischauer, perhaps the most crucial point of departure was the 1920s.

Many of the postwar Japanese leaders
in government, business, journalism, and academia were prominent during the '20s but were eclipsed by the militaristic regimes after 1931. They knew it was a hopeless proposition to wage war against the United States, and they harbored a vision of a postwar era of peace and economic interdependence between the two countries. This vision was essentially a product of their collective memories of the 1920s, to which they wanted their country to return. By coincidence, this was also what the American planners for Japan's defeat and occupation visualized. They too were looking back to a decade they fondly remembered as a time of peace and cooperation.

This was a happy coincidence. There was something solid about postwar collaboration between the two countries because their leaders shared the same perception of the 1920s.

Such a model served Japan and the cause of U.S.-Japanese relations well until the 1970s. Today, however, it may no longer suffice to share a remembered past. That past (as it seemed then) was a period of unlimited resources development, unrestricted trade and shipping, and expanding food production. The world no longer takes these things for granted; it is far more divided by conflicting nationalisms; and it faces a threat of nuclear proliferation even as it seeks alternative sources of energy. The best minds of Japan and the United States should attempt to grapple with these rising questions, questions to which their attitudes toward life and work, as described in the informative articles by Messrs. Thayer and Azumi, must ultimately be related.

Akira Iriye
Professor of American Diplomatic History
University of Chicago

Sociobiology: A Comment from One of Its Founders

Re your essayists' debate on sociobiology [WQ, Summer 1977]: To search for the biological foundations of human social behavior is not to postulate that all or even most behavior traits are genetically determined in a strict, Mendelian fashion. Rather, it recognizes the promise held for the social sciences by the simple observation that mankind is a mammalian species.

If chains of causal explanation are ever to lead from the social sciences to the construction of the human brain, they must be sought in closer applications of the disciplines of neurobiology and sociobiology.

In my opinion, the evidence for genetic constraints on human social behavior is decisive. Human social systems are not infinitely flexible; they form only a tiny subset in the space of realized systems displayed by the tens of thousands of other social species, from ants and wasps to hunting dogs, baboons, and chimpanzees.

Of still greater significance, the most general traits of human social behavior recorded by anthropologists and sociologists place our species close to the remainder of the Mammalia.

Within that group we are nearest of all to the great apes and other Old World primates, which, on the basis of anatomical and biochemical evidence, are our closest phylogenetic relatives. Language and high intelligence have created cultural evolution, accounting for almost all variation in social behavior within the human species. But we have retained distinctive traits that reveal our recent origins from far more simply organized Old World primates.

Furthermore, the broad features of cultural evolution contain remarkable amounts of convergence across agricultural societies in widely separated parts of the world, a feature described quite well in the new books by Marvin Harris (Cannibals and Kings, Random, 1977) and John E. Pfeiffer (The Emergence of Society, McGraw-Hill, 1977).

It is tempting to think that much of this pattern might eventually be explained more precisely as an interaction of man's idiosyncratic genetic structure, evolved during the Pleistocene Age and earlier, with novel environmental cir-
circumstances created by cultural evolution and increased population density.

Man's genetic predispositions are coupled to his cultural evolution, in the sense that the critical directions of cultural evolution were set by genes, while the limits of cultural evolution will ultimately be prescribed by the same predispositions.

Even so, the social sciences will not be reduced by deeper biological investigation of human nature along the lines suggested by sociobiology, nor should anyone's sense of humanity suffer. Both stand to be enriched. (A more detailed discussion of these subjects can be found in my article, "Biology and the Social Sciences" (Daedalus, Fall 1977).

Edward O. Wilson, Harvard University
Author of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975)

Sociobiological 'Vectors'?

Could I, a layperson, suggest a useful addition to the vocabulary of discourse among the professionals in sociobiological studies?

I propose that they use the phrase "sociobiological vector" to describe the end result of interplay between genetic and environmental influences. This would permit argument on a reasoned basis about the mix.

Harold Kennedy, Fort Collins, Colo.

Environment: Other Points of View

In the Background Books section of your "Environment" essays (WQ, Summer 1977), you have given the reader a one-sided selection. It would be only fair to mention such critical books as The Doomsday Syndrome, by John Maddox (McGraw-Hill, 1972) and Energy Crises In Perspective, by John Fisher (Wiley, 1974).

Donald J. Ey
University of Tennessee at Nashville

For Background Books, the Quarterly's editors and their scholar-advisers try hard to find the best available work on both sides of any question. Professor Ey's added nominations are welcome.

James Fenimore Cooper: A Writer of the Revolution

It was with surprise that I read in The Wilson Quarterly (Spring 1977, p. 28) the review of an article by Sacvan Bercovitch, "How the Puritans Won the American Revolution." In that review, I find that "James Fenimore Cooper's Natty Bumppo is a pre-Revolutionary rifleman, other Cooper heroes belong to later [post-Revolutionary] times."

I must protest. It was Cooper's second novel, The Spy (1821), which launched his career both at home and abroad; its hero is Harvey Birch who, at great risk, served the Revolutionary cause as a secret agent known only to George Washington (Mr. Harper, in the novel). Cooper followed this with The Pilot (1823), a patriotic and stirring account of a thinly disguised John Paul Jones. Two years later, in Lionel Lincoln (1825), among other incidents, Lionel is seriously wounded at Bunker Hill. One could add that Wyandotte (1843) deals with the outbreak of the Revolution in New York.

Come now. Leave us give Cooper his place in the patriotic literature recording our "struggle for national independence."

James S. Diemer, Department of English
Napa College, Calif.

Mistaken Identity

Your "Letters" section (WQ, Summer 1977) incorrectly identified us [the writer and Daniel G. Matthews] with the Washington Office on Africa. While that group has lobbied on Capitol Hill since 1972, our African Bibliographic Center, founded in 1963, is a comprehensive information and documentation service.

Francis A. Komegay, Jr., Associate Editor
African Bibliographic Center, Washington, D.C.
Conquest and Political Science: One Practitioner's View

Congratulations on publishing "Some Notes on Political 'Science'" by Robert Conquest [WQ, Spring 1977]. Yet, while Conquest admirably states a general caveat against trusting rigorous "scientific" explanations of politics, there are matters of emphasis which, I think, could be better put in the current context of political science.

The specialty's main difficulty today lies in an excessive empiricism accompanied by some combination of special vocabulary ("new concepts"), direct (i.e., nonhistorical) data gathering, and mathematical description of data—all presented in a manner that sounds very much like that used in the presentation of an advanced science.

Generalizations [about political behavior] then arise either out of the ordinary wishful thinking of the educated public (which new concepts obviously facilitate) or from statistical descriptions, arrived at mathematically, of the accumulated bodies of data. In either case, if unchallenged, these generalizations may be treated as real explanations. When challenged, however, the generalizations fade away, since a careful reading shows that they were not really offered as explanatory hypotheses. Thus, one can continue investigation along congenial paths indefinitely without risk of refutation.

It would be better to follow much more closely the real methodology of the exact sciences with investigations aimed at the validation of definite theoretical explanations. If such theorizing sought fully determinate explanations along the lines of Newtonian physics, it would, as Conquest indicates, be rather promptly and conclusively invalidated. On the other hand, more modest exclusionary explanations of political behavior "in the light of history to date" could very likely be tentatively established.

Such generalization from human experience would be highly useful in tempering the tendency to naive Utopianism of the many generous-spirited offspring of affluence.

G. Lowell Field, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut

Conquest and Political Science: Knee-Jerk Reactions?

My primary reaction to Robert Conquest's musings is that they were a case of overgeneralization and exaggeration on the part of someone who should know better.

Mr. Conquest has conveniently created his own straw man to demolish. In so doing, he has unfairly condemned the majority of dedicated and competent political scientists for the excesses of only a few.

If Mr. Conquest is so certain that a "science" of politics is absurd and/or dangerous, we must ask whether he is arguing for a complete abandonment of the study of politics, or for some new approach to this study.

It may be that Mr. Conquest, himself a journalist, is making a subtle plea for reportage as the only appropriate means for studying politics. If this is the case, we will all do well to remember that journalism itself suffers from some weaknesses that might render it as inappropriate and as dangerous as any "scientific" approach to the study of politics.

Political science has had its share of troubles, but generally they will not be solved by abandoning the advantages offered by the approaches we recognize as "scientific."

Critics of this approach should be more cognizant of the scope of the work that is being done in the field before they engage in knee-jerk reactions to the occasional piece that emphasizes quantification or the more esoteric variety of theory-building.

John P. Plumlee, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University
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In 1968 the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation’s official “living memorial” to the 28th President, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.”

The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 200 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian “castle” on the Mall in the nation’s capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation.