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-Oliver Wendell Holmes

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Economics and business and taxation and energy were major issues in the last national election campaigns. The American people had to make political decisions based on their grasp of those issues—and the strength of that grasp depended in large measure on what they had been able to learn about those complex topics.

Take energy reporting, for example. Some of it is superb. But, as an oil company, we are occasionally astonished—and dismayed—to see or read a quick, shallow treatment in the news concerning energy matters of profound domestic or international significance.

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Editor's Comment

All too often, American foreign policy specialists—academics, government officials, newsmen—tend to take an ethnocentric view of the world. They see foreign countries largely in terms of their relationships, attitudes, and importance to Washington. Thus, Mexico is usually described not in terms of the chief preoccupations of its own people and politicians but as a neighboring source of illegal immigrants and natural gas. Saudi Arabia is a provider of oil and a demanding partner in the Persian Gulf region. Japan is a competitor to Detroit, a prime market for U.S. grain, and a stable friend in Northeast Asia. And West Germany is “our strongest NATO ally.”

Such appraisals are, of course, incomplete. They can also lead to unpleasant surprises, as in the case of the 1979 ouster of a “pro-American Shah” in “oil-rich Iran.” Ordinary Iranians, it now seems, placed a lower priority on Persian Gulf stability than did the Shah or officials in the West.

Thus, following both the advice of Wilson Center Fellows and our own inclinations, we endeavor in the Quarterly to go beyond ethnocentricity, to describe a little of what the world looks like to the inhabitants of any nation whose evolution our contributors seek to analyze. It is not always easy; our planet is not yet a Global Village, and even our closest allies do not necessarily look at the world—or themselves—the way we do.

This is certainly true of West Germany, as our writers in this issue make clear.

Peter Braestrup
The Myth of Voter Apathy


In the 1980 presidential election, voter turnout dropped to a 32-year low of 53.9 percent. Is democracy in trouble? Does "voter apathy" diminish Republican claims of a popular mandate? Plissner and Mitofsky, directors of CBS News's political and survey divisions, respectively, say no.

The 1980 turnout was only 0.5 points lower than in 1976, they note. The continuous decline since 1960 seems to be leveling off. Participation peaked that year at 63.1 percent of the electorate and dropped to 60.7 percent in 1968. In 1972 (when incumbent Richard Nixon routed Democratic challenger Senator George McGovern), turnout sank to 55.4 percent.

But such data are misleading. The "turnout rate" represents voters as a percentage of the total number of voting-age individuals—including aliens, prisoners, and mental patients, who are barred from participation. It does not include citizens who voted at the polls but who made no presidential choice or who accidentally cast invalid ballots. The 1980 turnout figure approaches 60 percent when both elements are factored in, the authors say.

Still, why is voter turnout so much below 100 percent? The oft-cited "political alienation" explanation does not hold up. CBS News/New York Times surveys found that in both 1976 and 1980, about one-fourth of voters and nonvoters alike expressed dissatisfaction with the candidates or with "the system." Two-thirds of the 1980 nonvoters even said they "cared a lot" about the election. Registration problems account...
for most nonvoting, the authors contend, notably among the one-fifth of Americans who move each year. Turnout in 1980 was 20 percent lower for movers than nonmovers.

Voter participation may soon be on the rise, the authors say. The post–World War II Baby-Boom generation, which has disproportionately shunned the ballot box, is nearing the peak voting ages of 30 to 60. Recent vigorous Democratic-Republican competition may boost turnout in the South. And rising gasoline prices and mortgage rates may keep more Americans from moving and bring them back to the polls.

Welfare and Inflation

In 1964, Moynihan, then a Labor Department policy-planner, made an astonishing discovery that inspired the first of many failed efforts to reform the U.S. welfare system. Since 1962, he reported, the number of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) had been growing even as unemployment shrank.

Moynihan’s conclusions—that his data reflected the breakdown of the black family and the emergence of a permanent “welfare class”—are still bitterly disputed. Critics of welfare claim that AFDC encourages fathers to leave families. Moynihan himself contends that the evidence for cause-and-effect is inconclusive. Now a Democratic Senator from New York, he writes that the issue of incentive has, in any event, been overshadowed by more pressing concerns: Inflation is eroding the value of AFDC benefits while the number of children who depend on them is skyrocketing.

Today, 13.5 percent of American children live in female-headed households; two-thirds of these families are on welfare. And the number of female-headed homes is growing. Moynihan predicts that fully one-half of the children born in America in 1979—including 75 percent of minority children—will live in a fatherless household at some point before their 18th birthday (up from 35 percent of 1960 babies). At least one-third of all children born in 1979 will live in female-headed families that receive AFDC payments (up from 22 percent).

Seven million children are now helped by welfare. But, unlike Social Security or federal pensions, AFDC benefits do not rise with inflation. Consumer price increases have eaten away 56 percent of the value of the average monthly welfare payment (now $272) since 1969.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children must keep pace with inflation to help children, Moynihan argues. That it incidentally helps parents “is beside the point.” To welfare’s critics, Moynihan declares: “AFDC is not a program to subsidize leisure; it is a program to enable a hard-pressed woman to keep a roof over the heads, clothes on the backs, and food in the mouths of her children.”
Slavery aside, no social issue divided pre-Civil War America more than temperance. Some scholars have portrayed prohibitionists as know-nothing bumpkins determined to harass sinful city slickers. Others argue that stolid middle-class community leaders soldiered the drive against Demon Rum. But Rorabaugh, a University of Washington historian, believes that support for temperance depended on where an individual thought he was headed in society, not on where he stood.

In 1846, Rorabaugh writes, the citizens of New York State went to the polls to decide whether local taverns and inns could continue to serve alcoholic beverages. (Hopelessly wet New York City was exempted.) The result: 80 percent of towns in the state rejected alcohol.

Support for curbing liquor sales was strongest in such booming communities as Albany, Troy, and Ithaca, and in towns harboring the state’s newer industries—textile mills and glass works, rather than flour or clover mills. Young voters flocked to the prohibition cause far more than did the elderly. New Englanders who had migrated to New York were more apt to vote dry than were natives.

Behind these cleavages, Rorabaugh contends, lay another: The temperance movement was a crusade of the ambitious.

Wet voters were concentrated in sleepy backwater towns that had changed little since Rip van Winkle’s day. Indifferent to political causes, they resented the “preachings of self-proclaimed experts who came from afar” to disrupt their lives and take away their whiskey.

Temperance supporters, by contrast, were go-getters—professionals
just out of college, new owners of mills and factories, skilled artisans, merchants, and even eager young farmers—who gravitated toward centers of economic opportunity. They viewed drinking as a danger to profits and progress. Temperance, Rorabaugh concludes, was the banner of progressive young men during the 1840s. The movement grew and prospered with them for the remainder of the century.

“Uncontrollable” is the word politicians have used to describe some 75 percent of federal expenditures. They cite interest on the national debt (which will eat up 11 percent of the fiscal 1981 budget) and especially “entitlement” programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Hemel, an economist formerly with the Reagan transition team, asserts that entitlements can be reined in any time Congress chooses.

Since 1967, entitlements’ share of the federal budget has grown from 36 to 59 percent, or $340 billion. In the main, the increase has stemmed not from annual congressional appropriations but from automatic upward adjustments keyed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and from a steady increase in the number of qualified applicants.

Social Security, which was created in 1935 as a bare-bones retirement program, now costs $140 billion a year (more than twice the Gross National Product in 1935). Demographic changes have contributed to its expansion: In 1935, men and women who reached age 65 were expected to live another 12 and 13.5 years, respectively; today, such individuals can look forward to 14.5 and 18.5 more years. A two-year hike in the age of eligibility would reduce Social Security costs by 15 percent, or $20 billion in 1981, Hemel estimates.

Indexing transfer payments to inflation has produced unforeseen inequities. Fully 42 percent of federal expenditures are so pegged, and another 12 percent—e.g., Medicare and Medicaid—increase automatically with service charges. By contrast, the after-tax income of the labor force has sunk 10 percent since 1977 in relation to inflation. Inconsistencies in the CPI add to the imbalance. The CPI, for instance, includes a home purchase price but not the tax benefits that come with a mortgage. It also reflects outmoded spending habits, such as a 1972 rate of gasoline purchase.

Should entitlement beneficiaries suffer less from inflation than taxpayers do? Hemel thinks not and proposes an alternative: Peg transfer payments to the Labor Department’s index of hourly earnings. Under this formula, last year’s Social Security increase of 14.3 percent would have been 8.5 percent. Such a shift is within Congress’s power. But whether legislators will risk angering millions of aid recipients, writes Hemel, remains to be seen.
The Giant with Feet of Clay


That the federal bureaucracy is too big and too powerful has become an article of faith in American politics. But Kaufman, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, maintains that the power of the civil servant is vastly exaggerated.

At first glance, fears of an omnipotent bureaucracy are understandable. How can 537 elected officials (the Congress, the President, and the Vice President) properly supervise the U.S. government's three million civilian and two million uniformed workers? Indeed, the dramatic extension of Washington's responsibilities has meant that politicians must frequently rely on the bureaucracy's corps of experts—many of whom outlast elected officials—for substantive guidance.

But critics tend to forget the constraints on bureaucratic power, writes Kaufman. A President determined to dictate an agency's course will eventually get his way, as when President Nixon ordered the Justice Department and the FBI to slow their investigations of the Watergate break-in. Congress, with its budgetary and investigatory powers, can strike terror into administrators' hearts. And, in recent years, the courts have usurped many bureaucratic prerogatives, often overseeing specific agency programs.

The biggest check on bureaucrats' power, however, may be other bureaucrats. Agencies such as the Commerce Department and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which serve different constituencies, clash continually. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation compete for new public works projects. And jurisdictional overlaps (such as that between the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission) sometimes keep bureaucrats busier protecting their turf than expanding it.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

An Incorrigible Adversary


Can the Soviet Union be induced to curb its expansionism and accept the international status quo? Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter believed so, as they negotiated arms control pacts and promoted trade with the USSR. But their policies were doomed because Soviet leaders perceive international stability as a threat in itself. So writes Odom, a
member of the National Security Council staff under President Carter.
The country the Bolsheviks wrested from the Romanovs in 1917 had "neither a tradition of rights of the nobility, nor of private property, which might have helped diffuse State powers," notes Odom. Ever since Peter the Great (who ruled from 1682 to 1725), Tsars had also been obsessed by fears of Western attack. Only a powerful military, they believed, could conquer neighboring lands as buffer states, keep their non-Russian populations in line, and make sure the peasants produced enough food to maintain an Army.

After the Revolution, Lenin's pledges of "peace, bread, and land"—and self-determination for nationalities—promised to change all that. But Lenin also believed that no worthy "proletarian" regime would actually move to secede from the new Soviet Union. When some did, the Bolsheviks substituted a Red Army for the Imperial force and crushed nationalism in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. Later, they placed the economy on a permanent wartime footing (starting with the First Five Year Plan of 1928) and forcibly collectivized agriculture.

In short, the central issues of the Russian Empire—how to support a strong Army, how to control the centrifugal tendencies of diverse nationalities, how to keep the needs of the state paramount—remain unresolved today. Ever-increasing Western trade concessions will not bring about liberalization within the USSR or abate international tensions, for either would reduce the power of the Soviet state and alter the domestic status quo.

The Soviet Union's imposing military strength makes a return to Cold War-style containment and U.S. nuclear superiority impossible. But East-West stability can be attained. Odom calls for a Western military build-up aimed at making the United States (with its allies) "pre-eminent" over the Soviets (and their allies) in nuclear and conventional fighting capabilities; a Western policy of denying the Soviets strategic goods and of linking all other commerce to diplomatic concessions; and active political, moral, and sometimes material support for those who resist Soviet designs—in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and inside the Soviet Union itself.

Beyond Cloak and Dagger

For centuries, spies were the backbone of government intelligence, ferreting out secrets and occasionally manipulating events. Then, during World War II, General William Donovan, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency), introduced a new approach, employing a corps of academic specialists to analyze information available publicly as well as data gathered by agents in the field. Today, writes Colby, who directed the CIA under President Ford, a third revolution is transforming intelligence-

The United States can not afford many more surprises like the Shah's ouster in 1979, writes former CIA Director William Colby.

gathering from a "secret service" into a "public function."

Failure to anticipate the Shah's fall in Iran, Colby observes, underscored the need for intelligence agencies capable of predicting the future—not simply compiling facts about the present. In recent years, American intelligence services have begun to experiment with war games, hold mock meetings of the Soviet Politburo, and invite outside specialists to challenge in-house forecasts. Colby applauds these efforts. He also urges the reintegrated of intelligence researchers and policymakers—long separated for fear that involvement in policy disputes would tarnish the objectivity of data collectors.

Maintaining national security today also requires that intelligence agencies expand their focus beyond politics and military might to pay more attention to energy, trade, social and cultural forces, and psychological factors. Intelligence officials should draw more on government expertise from outside the "spook" community—e.g., the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy. Grouping intelligence analysts from many disciplines into geographic teams should be a top CIA priority during the 1980s, Colby argues.

Even as the CIA and its sister agencies cast their nets more widely, they should distribute their catch to a broader audience. Colby wants the CIA to publish more of its data systematically (as the Bureau of Labor Statistics does, for example). In-depth assessments of foreign leaders or world trouble-spots—too sensitive for official release—could be distributed to "private intermediaries" such as journalists or academics who can bring their own expertise to bear on thorny problems. Intelligence gathering, Colby concludes, "has become too important to be left to the government."

The Army's readiness is hampered by policies that turn assignments in its senior echelons into a game of musical chairs, reports Sorley, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and chief of the CIA's audit staff.

The U.S. Army's General Staff, for example, consists of seven top generals, plus a Chief of Staff and a Vice Chief. Between 1960 and 1980, 86 different officers held these nine senior positions (average tenure: 27 months). The Army went through 12 deputy chiefs of staff, 11 vice chiefs, and 10 comptrollers. As a result, the top command worked together, on average, for only four months before someone departed.

But turnover affects all major commands. As of August 1980, the U.S. Army's nine four-star generals had served in their current billets an average of only 20 months. And over two decades, the Second Infantry Division in Korea had 19 different commanding generals. The attitude that evolves, as one general put it: "All errors are due to one's predecessor and each commander leaves before his own errors crop up."

Partly to blame are "statutory predispositions" to early retirement and the lure of civilian careers. But the primary cause, says Sorley, is a promotion policy that encourages plenty of "generalists," not enough specialists. This policy has deprived the Army of experienced field commanders at a time when growing Soviet military strength has made tactical skill the key to victory in a conventional NATO war. (Many of the leading Soviet generals have held their current jobs for more than 10 years.) The Army now has a generation of "amateur commanders," writes Sorley, with no strong commitments to their predecessors' programs, little incentive for long-range planning, and more concern for avoiding failure than for achieving success.

Sorley's recommendations: Reassign general officers only in cases of promotion or retirement. Tie any general's new job to his past experience. Allow commanders a needed respite "not by giving them staff assignments in unfamiliar fields, but by providing sabbaticals during which they...study, travel or teach."


The Reagan administration hopes to increase military spending by $184 billion over the next five years. But even if Congress approves this build-up, writes Gordon, a National Journal correspondent, the nation's defense industries may not be up to it.

Opinions vary. Some Carter administration alumni, notably William J. Perry, former Undersecretary of Defense, argue that industry has the
capacity for such a massive "surge," given the current decline in U.S. production of autos and commercial jetliners. However, recent studies by congressional committees, the Pentagon, and private researchers take a gloomier view. The "defense industrial base" employs perhaps one-fifth of U.S. scientists and engineers and one-tenth of industrial workers. But it labors under increasing difficulties.

First, the Vietnam War's $135 billion drain on the Pentagon budget combined with soaring military payroll costs (due partly to the shift to an all-volunteer force) necessitated drastic "stretch-outs" and deferrals of Pentagon spending for new military hardware. Procurement budgets fell from $42 billion in 1968 to $18.7 billion in 1976 (in 1978 dollars); the number of subcontractors supplying components to major aerospace corporations dropped from 6,000 to 4,000, reducing the pool of companies with specialized skills and manufacturing capacity.

Second, presidential policies and uncertainty over congressional weapons funding (done on a year-to-year basis) have discouraged manufacturers from making long-term investments in plant and raw materials. Jimmy Carter's sudden decision in 1977 to scrap the B-1 bomber project had a ripple effect. Manufacturers of titanium sponge, used in aircraft forgings, held back on adding new capacity. Lead times for these forgings jumped from 38 weeks in 1978 to 120 weeks in 1980, slowing F-15 fighter production.

Finally, the sheer complexity of "fewer and costlier" new weapons (e.g., the $2 billion Trident missile submarine) has affected production capacity. Contractors cannot use the new technology to make civilian goods and hence lack a "hedge" against a drop in military orders. So, they limit their defense production facilities.

Foreign arms sales ($6.7 billion in 1978) ease some industry difficulties. But Pentagon officials and outside analysts suggest reforms: congressional approval of multiyear weapons contracts; increasing industry competition by splitting up major contracts; paying some costs of plant expansion; even making cheaper, less complicated weapons.

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**ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**

**Layoffs and Services**


The growing role of services in America since the end of World War II has trimmed back the percentage of the labor force thrown out of work by recessions. So contends Bowers, a U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics economist.

Bowers analyzed changes in employment and unemployment from
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Business cycle peaks to troughs for the seven U.S. recessions since 1948. He found that the severest slump (1973-75) saw employment decline by only 1.6 percent. But during the earlier, milder 1957-58 recession, employment fell 2.1 percent. More service jobs made the difference. Service employment rose from 58.3 percent of total employment in 1948 to 70.2 percent in 1980, with government employment rising during each recession. In March 1975, a recession nadir, service jobs rose to 70.6 percent of total employment.

Male-female comparisons illustrate the importance of service jobs. Bowers found that employment losses among adult white males during economic troughs were disproportionately high in comparison with their percentage of the work force during peaks. This reflects the concentration of men in manufacturing jobs sensitive to business downturns. In fact, men accounted for 80 percent of the newly jobless during the recession that began in January 1980. Women, on the other hand, have traditionally held service jobs (e.g., as secretaries or teachers). During the 1980 slump, female employment actually rose.

Teen-age jobholders suffer most during recessions. Having comprised less than nine percent of the work force since 1948, they have accounted for between 14 and 38 percent of layoffs. The picture for blacks has been grim but may be improving. Just before the 1960 recession, they represented 10.6 percent of American workers but lost 35.3 percent of the jobs wiped out by April 1961. In 1980, however, they lost less than half their overall "share."

When manufacturing jobs are singled out for study, the image shifts. Blacks, women, and youths are increasingly bearing the brunt of recession-induced manufacturing job losses, confirming the adage "last hired, first fired." During the 1973-75 recession, for example, women made up 29.3 percent of the peak manufacturing work force but suffered 38.3 percent of the employment decline.

Did a great influx of female jobhunters trigger the sharp rise in the unemployment statistics during the mid-1970s, as some economists claim? No, says Bowers. More than 68 percent of women out of work were job losers, not frustrated first job-seekers.

"No Triumph for Big Government"

"Government Policy and Economic Development in Germany and Japan: A Skeptical Reevaluation" by Frank B. Tipton, in Journal of Economic History (March 1981), Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, P.O. Box 3630, Wilmington, Del. 19807.

Scholars have long assumed that far-sighted central leaderships masterminded the economic miracles that presaged Japan's and Germany's rises to power in the half century before World War II. But Tipton, a historian at the University of Sydney (Australia), disagrees.
Japan's first railroad, opened in 1872, was planned by government officials. But much economic growth occurred despite Meiji policies.

For an explanation of "miracles," he points to favorable world markets and trade strategies by native entrepreneurs that succeeded despite government policies.

By the time Prussia's Count Otto von Bismarck unified Germany in 1871, German heavy industries had been expanding steadily for almost a century. The crushing of the peasant and worker revolutions of 1848 by the German monarchs of central Europe and the Austrian Empire had brought sufficient political stability to the Germanic kingdoms to encourage private railroad magnates to link their markets and forge commercial ties. German steel and machinery producers outdid foreign competitors, while German farmers grabbed 60 percent of Britain's imported grain market after its tariff barriers were lowered in 1846.

In Japan, the story is similar. Technical advances in agriculture and an expanding urban work force sparked economic growth and created new domestic markets half a century before the Meiji emperor restored the monarchy in 1868. Meiji officials occasionally tried to accelerate the country's development by sponsoring mines and factories, but most such enterprises failed miserably. And during the 1880s, Japan's new national banks provided scarcely more credit than did the nation's pawnbrokers. Fearing that the spread of "soft living" would undercut efforts to build a modern army, Meiji leaders denounced the manufacture of imitations of Western consumer goods, which had helped Japan's trade balance by replacing imports.

Bismarck unified Germany just as the world plunged into a 20-year depression. His misguided efforts to ensure Germany's economic
strength by imposing protective tariffs and a gold-based currency (which hastened capital shortages) and by cracking down on political foes were carried on by his successors until Hitler's day. Bismarck also ordered the government to horde gold in anticipation of military emergencies, further restricting credit.

Meanwhile, Japan's military spending and, later, its war with China touched off persistent inflation. Rather than cut the military budget, Japanese leaders chose a government strategy similar to Bismarck's. Their policies plunged the country into stagnation during the 1920s and '30s and, finally, helped produce the desperate militarism that led to Pearl Harbor.

**Why Not the Very Best?**

"Why Health Care Costs Will Continue to Rise" by Kevin F. Hickey, in *Journal of Contemporary Business* (vol. 9, no. 4, 1980), Graduate School of Business Administration, Univ. of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195.

Only two things in life are inevitable, mused Benjamin Franklin—death and taxes. Americans can add escalating health-care costs to the list, says Hickey, who is special assistant to the president of the American Hospital Association. He blames the aging of the U.S. population and ever-rising patient demands for nothing short of the best.

Americans spent more than $212 billion on health care in 1979—a 12.5 percent increase over 1978. This was nine percent of the gross national product. The federal government picked up the tab for 43 percent of the total, with the rest split almost evenly between private insurers and individuals. Some economists expect the total figure for 1990 to top $750 billion, or $3,057 per American.

Hospital costs (at $85 billion, the biggest item on the health bill) have been soaring 13 to 14 percent annually. Payroll expenses accounted for nearly half of these increases between 1975 and 1979. And doctors' services cost Americans $40.6 billion in 1979, a 13.4 percent jump over 1978. Meanwhile, hospitals' supply bills have grown by half since 1976; only two-thirds of this spurt is due to inflation.

Demographic changes explain some of the increases. Senior citizens consume three times the amount of inpatient care, and remain in hospitals twice as long per visit, as do patients under 65. During the next 35 years, the elderly's share of hospital days will increase from 37 percent to more than 50 percent.

But, Hickey argues, most medical inflation stems from consumer pressures. With 90 percent of the average hospital bill covered by public or private medical plans, more and more Americans insist on the "best possible" health care. Even community hospitals, once the medical sector's "cottage industries," offer sophisticated services such as cardiac units. In Michigan, for instance, such facilities were once limited to the large University of Michigan hospital. Today, they are available at many locations in the state.
Most efforts to restrain health-care costs have focused on the “supply side” (such as former President Carter’s proposal to put a ceiling on medical costs). But health-care demand is finally starting to receive attention. Coalitions of doctors, patients, and insurers organized at Washington’s behest beginning in 1977 helped save an estimated $3.2 billion in 1978–79, mainly by convincing doctors and patients to pass up unnecessary treatment.

**All in the Family**

“Household and Kinship: Ryton in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries” by Miranda Chaytor, in *History Workshop* (Autumn 1980), P.O. Box 69, Oxford, OX2 7XA, United Kingdom.

Much of the historical evidence for the “naturalness” of the nuclear family comes from the unusually copious census and legal records kept in preindustrial England. Most scholars believe that, while hardship and death broke up many families and forced the formation of “extended” households (including relatives other than the husband, wife, and unmarried children), the extra kinfolk were treated as “second class citizens.” Chaytor, a British feminist, argues that family structure was far more complex.

The author studied families in late 16th- and early 17th-century Ryton, a parish southeast of the Scottish border. Though densely settled, Ryton’s farm land was poor, and many residents had to scrounge for a living digging coal and cutting timber. Worse, four successive crop failures, cattle sickness, and an outbreak of plague in the 1590s turned Ryton into a “society of widows, orphans, and step-children.” Nearly one-fifth of the parish’s families were “extended.”

Women sought providers, and men needed full-time servants. Together, they formed complex households containing foster children, stepchildren, their own offspring, and, frequently, married sons and daughters. These households regularly drew on the material and human resources of relatives—borrowing money, land, and nieces and nephews for domestic labor. Pressed by high mortality rates and poverty, Chaytor writes, “the distinction between conjugal unit and wider kinship was virtually eroded.”

The French household was a case in point. In 1587, widower Robert French, father of three, married Dorothy Foggett. By the time they died, in 1596, they had four children of their own, and Robert’s eldest son by his first wife had married and moved into the household with his bride (probably Dorothy’s sister). The married son advanced to household head, and his wife raised the surviving orphans. They all shared income with more distant relatives—as records of their debts and credits show.

Ryton’s misfortunes produced an unusually high number of extended...
In 16th-century England, poverty and high death rates forced the breakup of many peasant households and the creation of extended families.

households. But the parish does not represent the "exception which proves the rule" of nuclear families. Instead, maintains Chaytor, Ryton demonstrates that family structure is a function not only of biology but of economics as well.

Black Power's Uncertain Victory


Dashikis are out, Stokely Carmichael lives in self-imposed exile in Africa, and the Black Panthers are moribund. But Killian, a University of Massachusetts sociologist, argues that the demands of Black Power activists in the late 1960s form the basis of affirmative action's pre-eminence on the civil-rights agenda.

From its inception in the early 20th century, the civil-rights movement worked to assimilate blacks into the mainstream of white society. Preaching nonviolence and brotherhood, leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Roy Wilkins, and A. Phillip Randolph pressed for a "color-blind" democracy. But by the late 1960s, Carmichael and other frustrated militants urged black racial solidarity as the road to political power. More important, writes Killian, they spoke of blacks not as a category of individuals but as a separate community with group rights. Some, such as James Forman, called for "repairs" for past injustices under slavery.

These claims were dismissed not only by most whites but also by major civil-rights groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Killian, however, contends that when the broad task of achieving integration fell to the judiciary (in-
stead of more “compromise-prone” legislatures), even “moderate”
civil-rights activists eventually underwent a philosophical conversion.
Judges set quotas and numerical guidelines to measure progress. In
1974, the NAACP firmly endorsed reparations when it backed the Uni-
versity of Washington Law School’s admissions quota for blacks, say-
ing it served “remedial objectives.” Today, Killian observes, “race
thinking” pervades American life.

Affirmative action’s defenders deny charges of “racism” by pointing
to their benign intentions. But Killian contends that the policy has al-
ready produced angry rivalries over “group rights.” (Have Korean im-
migrants of the 1960s and ’70s, for instance, suffered more in America
than white ethnics not eligible for federal preferences?). Moreover, as
sociologist William J. Wilson has argued, affirmative action has mostly
helped those skilled black individuals who need it least. It has not
changed the lives of the black urban “underclass.”

The Long
Road North

“Chicanos in the United States: A History of Exploitation and Resistance” by Leo-
بدو F. Estrada et al., in Daedalus (Spring 1981), American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, 165 Allandale St., Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Mass. 02130.

Throughout America’s history, Mexican immigration has frequently
been encouraged—not only by labor-hungry U.S. businessmen and
farmers but by the federal government, as well. So note the authors, a
team of Mexican-American scholars.

Economic troubles in Mexico and the tremendous growth of agriculture in the
Southwest touched off the first great waves of Mexican immi-
gation to the United States. This occurred just when World War I
created both enormous European demand for American produce and a
labor shortage in the United States. All told, from 1900 to 1930, an esti-
mated 250,000 Mexicans sought their fortunes north of the Rio Grande.
Their labors were a boon to U.S. railroad tycoons, food processing mag-
nates, and farmers. And, since the overwhelming majority never left the
Southwest, their presence was not viewed as a threat by increasingly
nativist Midwesterners and Northerners. Thus, when Congress slapped
immigration curbs on foreign ethnic groups in 1924, Mexicans were not
included.

The Great Depression of the 1930s stirred popular resentment of
Mexican workers. From 1929 to 1934, more than 400,000 were deported
(including some 200,000 born here). But World War II brought another
about-face. In 1942, the United States and Mexico launched the bracero
program, through which Washington underwrote Mexican workers’
travel costs and guaranteed a minimum wage. In force through 1964,
the program brought nearly five million Mexicans north.

Today, 14.6 million Chicanos make up the second-largest U.S. minori-
ty group (behind blacks). Growing at between 2.2 and 3.5 percent an-
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nually, their numbers could double in 20 years—even as the American population's overall growth rate levels off. Fifty-eight percent of Chicanos still live in the Southwest, but ever since the 1920s, higher wages have drawn many to Kansas City, Chicago, Gary, Detroit, and other cities in the North.

Younger Chicanos seem to be making economic gains. The median education of the second generation is 11.1 years, compared with 5.8 years for their immigrant grandparents. But Chicanos, as yet, are not well-represented in the professional ranks; two-thirds work where job opportunities are shrinking (e.g., heavy industry). Chicanos are not likely to catch up with the Anglo majority in the workplace, the authors conclude, in the decades immediately ahead.

More Cops, Less Crime?


Can robberies and assaults be curbed simply by putting more policemen on the beat? Are high crime rates the inevitable result of overcrowding in central cities? Criminologists disagree. But three sociologists at California State College, San Bernardino, find that the answers depend on the offense.

The authors examined 1974 Justice Department statistics on police per capita, 1976 Census Bureau figures on population density, and 1974 criminal victimization rates supplied by U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration surveys for 26 large American cities.

They found that cities with the densest populations had the lowest rates of assault without theft—e.g., rape or aggravated assault. The same held true for property crimes without human contact, including household burglary. But property crimes with contact were highest in these cities.

Since the most crowded urban centers tend to have the largest law enforcement agencies, the authors sought to isolate the role of police in deterring crime. They discovered that cities with the most police per capita suffer slightly fewer nonviolent property crimes than do their less well protected counterparts. Added police manpower was somewhat more effective in preventing rape and other simple assaults, but it had virtually no impact on thefts with contact.

It appears that rape, other violent assaults, and household burglaries are most likely to occur in quiet neighborhoods that contain just enough victims and homes to attract criminals. Increased police patrols, the authors suggest, could help in such areas to reduce these crimes by increasing the likelihood that felons will be spotted "in the

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act." On the other hand, human crowding does seem to generate more crimes that combine thefts with bodily harm to the victim—perhaps only because undetected robbery becomes more difficult.

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"From 'Moderately Liberal' to 'Doctrine Libertarian'" by Lloyd Gray, and "When the Takeover Doesn't Take" by Peter Katel, *in The Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors* (Feb. 1981), Box 551, 1350 Sullivan Trail, Easton, Pa. 18042.

What happens when the local newspaper is swallowed up by a national publishing chain? As is suggested by two case studies by Gray and Katel, former correspondents for the *Delta Democrat-Times* of Greenville, Miss., and the *Santa Fe New Mexican*, respectively, the decline in community coverage can be striking.

Founded in 1936 by Hodding Carter, Jr., the DD-T soon won national renown, and a Pulitzer Prize—as well as censure from the Mississippi House of Representatives—for its outspoken civil-rights editorials and ambitious local reporting. But in 1979, the Carter family sold the paper for a reported $18 million (more than $1,000 per paid subscriber). The buyer was Freedom Newspapers of Ohio, a staunchly libertarian, anti-government chain of 29 publications in 11 states.

Change was swift. Freedom cut the space held open for day-of-publication news by an average of four columns—in a paper that was often only 12 pages. And advertising space increased. The staff that had once fanned out to six Delta counties was reduced from six correspondents to four. Reporters were asked to limit their investigations beyond Greenville's Washington County to phone checks with law enforcement officials. (As a result, several nearby communities no longer enjoy regular coverage by a daily newspaper.) Freedom also closed the DD-T's bureau in Jackson, the state capital.

Meanwhile, Freedom's blanket hostility to government, says Gray, means neglect of the community's special interests—e.g., in federal flood control. Too often, the paper's "local" editorials are simply reprints from Freedom publications elsewhere.

News has fared little better at the *New Mexican*, Santa Fe's only daily, since its takeover by the Gannett Company in 1976, according to Katel. Gannett, with 82 newspapers, is the nation's largest chain. Under the conglomerate's management, in 1978, the *New Mexican's* word count per issue for one week shrank by 5,064 compared with a week in 1975. Headlines ate up more than twice the space they had before. The newsroom remained well staffed and employees were better paid, but
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the number of daily stories dropped from 157 to 92.

Gannett has made some improvement in its new property, writes Katel. The New Mexican runs some excellent local features and gives good coverage of nearby Espanola. But, like Gray, Katel suggests that conglomerates may not be big enough to fill small newspapers' shoes.

_Milton as Censor_

"John Milton's Place in Journalism History: Champion or Turncoat" by Mark Fackler and Clifford G. Christians, in _Journalism Quarterly_ (Winter 1980), School of Journalism, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans. 66045.

John Milton (1608–74) has long puzzled historians of journalism. His impassioned 1642 essay, _Areopagitica_, is perhaps the most compelling defense of free speech ever penned in English. But to some scholars, Milton's later brief service as Oliver Cromwell's press licenser showed him to be lacking "the courage of his convictions."

Fackler and Christians, researchers in journalism at the University of Illinois, Urbana, defend the epic poet's reputation.

A long-time foe of the Stuart monarchy and England's Anglican state religion, Milton enthusiastically supported the Puritan Revolution of 1642. After Oliver Cromwell's victorious "Roundheads" executed Charles I in 1649, Milton joined the Puritan administration for one year as Secretary of Foreign Tongues. His prime responsibility was composing state correspondence elegant enough to allay the fears of continental monarchs wary of the Puritan regicides. He also oversaw _Mercurius Politicus_, an official newspaper, and licensed publications for printing.

How stiff a censor was he? A close reading of styles in _Mercurius Politicus_ suggests that the ailing Milton was an absentee adviser, who contributed occasional paragraphs but gave chief writer Marchmont Needham nearly free rein. Indeed, during Milton's tenure, there was less to Puritan censorship in general than the harsh-sounding laws of the Roundheads have led some historians to conclude. The Printing Act of 1649, for instance, which curbed the number of presses, the production of type, and printers' profits, was not enforced until 1651. And full-time Puritan censors were phased out soon after Cromwell's victory, not to re-emerge until 1662.

Milton apparently stretched the definition of "acceptable literature" in the Puritans' eyes. Soon after he left public service, the nearly blind bard was summoned to defend his licensing of a heretical catechism. His defense (allowed "just this once" by the Council of State): He had simply followed the principles expressed in _Areopagitica_.

Milton himself never perceived a conflict of interest between his belief in free speech and his "censor's" role. He held that free expression must advance justice and virtue. To him, in 17th-century revolutionary England, that meant "the good of my country and... the glorious cause in which we were engaged."
If you want to trace modern Americans' changing attitudes toward work, read the funnies, suggests Kasen, a sociologist at California State College, San Bernardino.

In her survey of comic strips run in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin from 1925 to 1975, Kasen found that "labor history" in the comics fell into three periods. During the age of the Self-Made Man (1925–45), 14 of the 18 strips with "occupational orientations" featured plucky entrepreneurs. Rudy Nebb of "The Nebbs" was typical. He inherited a "water-hole" from an aunt, turned it into a prosperous country resort and mineral-water bottling plant, and finally realized his dream of joining the snooty Ariston country club by threatening to build a stable next door. Lower-middle-class characters were the most common inhabitants of the funny pages (and continued to be through the 1970s). But they were hard workers during the 1920s and '30s. Most had their sights set on Swelldom Beach or Snob's Point. During the Great Depression, when some 15 million Americans were jobless, only one Evening Bulletin cartoon family (Winnie Winkle's) fell on hard times.

The widespread prosperity and growth of large corporate bureaucracies during the postwar era made the self-made man obsolete in the comics. And World War II destroyed the appeal of snobbism. A new-style hero emerged: the wise, public-spirited professional like Judge Parker and Rex Morgan, M.D. These characters were middle class, but they had eluded the corporate world and ran their own lives.

During the late 1960s, cartoonists turned to depicting rank-and-file employees (who comprised 59 percent of the "occupational" strips in 1968 and 69 percent in 1975). Worker discontent and popular malaise were their themes. The work ethic itself took a beating. Thus, in a 1975 "Lolly" strip, a secretary reports that her watch says, "two hours and twenty-seven minutes before five." Characters teetered on the edge of downward mobility. As one teacher in a 1975 "Like Now" cartoon groaned, "The garbage workers are complaining that teachers make al-
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most as much as they do.”

In more optimistic times, Kasen observes, comic strips helped perpetuate Americans’ belief in equality of opportunity. Today, they portray a “democracy of underdogs.”

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Darwin’s Faith


Charles Darwin (1809–82), whose theory of evolution shook the foundations of religious faith in the West, claimed to believe in God—at least from 1838 to 1859, when he was formulating the theory. But recent biographers dispute him, citing unpublished jottings by Darwin that characterize God as a creature of man’s imagination.

Ospovat, a University of Nebraska historian, argues that the naturalist’s public testament is true.

In 1838, two years after his globe-girdling research trip aboard the Beagle ended, Darwin believed that God worked through “secondary causes.” By this, he meant that the Creator had devised a set of natural laws designed to achieve certain ends, rather than styling and altering each species himself. This suggests to some scholars a view of God as a human construct. “May not the idea of God arise from our confused idea of ‘ought,’ joined with the necessary notion of ‘causation’?” Darwin wondered. But he was not implying that man invented God to explain the unfathomable, Ospovat contends. Instead, Darwin meant that God had produced a human brain organizationally capable of conceiving of the idea of him.

Darwin’s spiritual crisis was prompted late in 1838 by his theory of natural selection, which held that successful species develop initially by chance. How could this view dovetail with the notion of a plan of creation? Darwin resolved the dilemma by postulating that evolution’s laws guarantee general, not specific, results. The emergence of a particular organ, for example, is governed by chance. But natural selection will never support a structure harmful to an animal.

Not until the 1860s, writes Ospovat, did Darwin abandon his faith. Throughout the 19th century, anatomists studied related structures (such as the bird claw and the human hand) whose differences could not be explained by function alone. Why were tasks sometimes performed by different organs in different creatures (e.g., an elephant draws water with its trunk, but a giraffe laps it up with its tongue)? And why did some species’ changes lead to extinction? Darwin could find no answers consistent with the idea of an all-powerful, intelligent Creator. His conventional faith faded into agnosticism.
Rome's Dilemma: Are We Not Men?


After the coronation of Augustus in 27 B.C., rites of emperor worship surfaced in Rome’s eastern provinces. To many historians, they symbolized the “convulsions” of dying Hellenistic theology or the Greeks' craven efforts to curry favor with their new overlords. Yet Price, a Cambridge historian, argues that the imperial cults scattered throughout the Hellenistic communities of Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt revealed this culture’s surprising vitality.

The Greek city-states of the region had offered animal sacrifices to their kings ever since Alexander the Great established his monarchal rule in the fourth century B.C. Thinking of royal power in divine terms evidently eased the Greeks’ adjustment to this new political system. For 200 years before the Roman conquest, they dutifully honored their rulers.

These habits died so hard that the Greeks asked permission to honor their new Roman conquerors with offerings of bulls and burnt incense. But the Romans, who also invoked the emperor in their ceremonies, balked at deifying their rulers. They felt no pressing need to justify im-

Sacrifices to emperors made the Romans uneasy.

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Imperial authority. Roman governors sought to satisfy the Greeks by ingeniously blurring the distinction between man and God during the sacrifices. They saw to it that the rites were supervised not by true priests but by civic officials. The animals were offered "on behalf of" the emperor, rather than "to" him. And where the Greeks traditionally slaughtered white animals to worship gods and darker beasts to honor heroes and the dead, the imperial "priests" used speckled animals.

Price believes that a dispute over such rituals largely explains why the Romans singled out the early Christians for religious persecution. Until their revolt against Nero in A.D. 66, even the Jews willingly sacrificed animals "on behalf of" Roman rulers as they had always done for their own kings. Christians, however, would go no further than praying for them. They claimed that Christ's Crucifixion represented the ultimate sacrifice and ruled out all future blood rituals except for the symbolic Eucharist. Infuriated by this slight to their gods (and perceiving an insult to the emperor), Roman authorities drove the Christians underground until the Emperor Constantine's conversion in 313.

The Third Form of Love

When Christ implored man to love his neighbors and enemies, what did he mean? Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the great German philosopher, concluded that Christ spoke of "practical love" stemming from a sense of duty (surely he was not referring to "pathological love," or passion). Drengson, a philosopher at the University of Victoria, Canada, contends that Kant neglected a third form of love—compassion.

Kant was influenced by Plato and Aristotle, who held that right living is the product of reason and self-discipline. Both Greeks believed that individuals could bring their emotions and appetites into harmony with the just dictates of the intellect—thereby reaching an understanding of the "ways of nature, society, and self." But where his mentors emphasized a "balance of one's natural capacities," Kant argued that emotions could never be tamed by the mind. To him, the most moral actions were precisely those that conflicted with natural inclinations but were propelled by a commitment to ethics grounded in reason.

Kant's philosophy seems well-suited to a secular society, notes Drengson. There, "laws and rules become necessary substitutes for the large heart" of Christian charity, and actions become all-important. But religion demands a spiritual transformation. In his Sermon on the Mount, Christ asked his followers to suffer (empathize) with real people in their personal plights. Those who act out of duty alone, says Drengson, can only love abstractly. Worse, a sense of duty fashioned by the mind can lead one to cast judgments and value "consistency" without wisdom or mercy. Compassion summons up forgiveness and acceptance.
When Christ said that the poor in spirit would gain the kingdom of heaven, he meant those who are "empty of pretensions, free of compulsions and desires ... unfilled with accumulations of dogmas, theories, principles, and rules," writes Drengson. A Christian so transformed will focus his reason, emotions, and will on the task of helping particular people in particular situations.

**SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY**

**Newton's Apple**


Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), formulator of the landmark law of universal gravitation, also dabbled in "fiction." It was he who spread the tale about being inspired by a falling apple. Did his discovery (that all objects attract each other with a force that varies directly with the product of their masses and inversely with the square of their distance) spring from a sudden stroke of genius? Or did Newton pirate an insight of physicist Robert Hooke, with whom he corresponded? The two scientists' writings disprove both ideas, says Cohen, a Harvard historian.

It started with the mystery of orbiting bodies. In a 1679 letter, Hooke convinced Newton that the motion of an orbiting body results not from a centrifugal, or "center-fleeing," force but from two elements—an inertial force propelling the body in a straight line and a centripetal force drawing it toward the center. Hooke even proposed that the "attractive motion" between the sun and a planet varied inversely with the square of their separation. But at this point, Cohen writes, "Hooke was stuck." Hooke believed that centripetal force was a "one-way street" emanating solely from the center body. Why, then, were the planets' orbits elliptical, as the Dutch astronomer Johannes Kepler had observed 70 years earlier?

Hooke's way of subdividing curved motion set Newton on a new path of inquiry. Using Kepler's observation that a line stretching from a planet to the sun sweeps across equal areas in equal periods of time, Newton deduced that the forces Hooke described produced elliptical orbits (see Newton's geometric proof, next page). Therefore, he reasoned, the planets' movements around the sun must result from Hooke's forces.

Newton knew that the sun was not at the physical center of planetary orbit. He also knew that in the actual world (as opposed to the ideal world of mathematical constructs) "attractions customarily are directed toward bodies" and that, by his own law of action and reaction, the "actions of attracting and attracted bodies are always mutual and equal." Newton figured that the sun and planets must attract each other (he never claimed to know how) and that they all rotate around a
common center of mass. Again, he turned to astronomy for confirmation. Examining Jupiter and Saturn, he discovered perturbations in their orbits when they were closest together.

The apple anecdote that Newton circulated was a ploy to refute Hooke’s claim to a share of credit for the law of gravity, Cohen speculates. In fact, Newton displayed a combination of genius, thoroughness, and persistence that left his peers far behind. He repeatedly compared mathematical models to the observed physical world until theory explained reality.

Sir Isaac Newton showed, at left, that a body moving past a point (P) at constant speed describes equal-area triangles at equal intervals of time (e.g., at A₁ and A₂). In the middle diagram, he showed that a force pushing it toward the point creates yet another equal triangle. Repeating the process and making the centripetal impulse a constant reveals an ellipse.

Cancer Confusion

While routinely processing flasks supposedly containing live human cancer cells from Russia in 1973, Berkeley biologist Walter Nelson-Rees made an astonishing discovery: The cells actually came from Henrietta Lacks, a black woman from Baltimore who had been dead for 22 years. According to Gold, a *Science 81* staff writer, the accidental spread of Lacks’s cells has led many cancer researchers astray.

Before Lacks died of cancer at the Johns Hopkins clinic in 1951, doctors delivered part of a strange purple lesion from her cervix to colleagues who were trying to grow live tumor cells. Lacks’s culture turned out to contain the first human cancer cells vigorous enough to thrive and multiply in the lab. “HeLa” cultures became much in demand. Their ability to support human viruses, for example, helped scientists to develop polio vaccines.

But HeLa grew too easily. If only a few cells entered a different culture, they crowded out their host within days. Nonsterile equipment and sloppy lab procedures hastened their spread—a few stray cells on a
bottle lip or counter top were enough to seed contamination. HeLa, suspects Nelson-Rees, can travel inside tiny airborne droplets during common lab procedures such as pipetting. These cultures may have already distorted cancer research. During the 1960s and '70s, for example, scientists reported that human cells grown in a lab could spontaneously turn cancerous. This notion must now be discounted. Findings that all cancer cells shared common traits—ate the same food, flourished in the same environments, and contained abnormal chromosomes (the "mark of cancer")—were all the creation of HeLa. Lacks's cells have been studied as normal heart and liver cells and as intestinal, larynx, prostate, and breast cancer cells.

Nelson-Rees has become a scientific Philip Marlowe, writes Gold. He tracks down fugitive HeLa cells in all corners of the world and publishes "hit lists" naming contaminated cultures. (The cells are relatively easy to spot. All have four oddly shaped chromosomes and a rare digestive enzyme found only in blacks.) So far, Nelson-Rees has identified, as HeLa, 90 of the several hundred human cancer strains used today by researchers. He expects to find many more, any one of which may be warping cancer experiments even now.

Why QWERTY Lives On


In 1873, American inventor C. Latham Sholes sold a layout for a typewriter keyboard to the Remington Arms Company. One year later, the world's first mass-produced typewriters rolled off Remington's assembly line and soon cornered the market. Litterick, a British computer consultant, explains why a design that has strained the backs and fingers of countless secretaries, students, and journalists remains a standard in the computer age.

No one knows for sure why Sholes chose the "QWERTY" arrangement (named after its top row of letters). He may have wanted to avoid tangled type bars by separating the keys most often struck consecutively (e.g., t and h). But Sholes' prescience was limited; he designed QWERTY for two-finger typing. As a result, his layout overworks the weaker fingers of touch typists, impeding speed.

All efforts to topple QWERTY have been frustrated. During the 1930s, seeking to minimize movement and balance the typing load according to finger strength, August Dvorak lumped the vowels together on the left side. But QWERTY was so entrenched by then that few adopted his system. More recently, the British firm PCD devised MAL-TRON—a nearly vertical keyboard with left and right halves. The muscular thumbs operate the e and other workhorse keys. The system is no faster than QWERTY, but it is more comfortable, as typists reported.
after a small-scale 1979 experiment.

Another innovation may be just around the corner: the chord keyboard, on which various keys identify syllables, words, and even phrases. IBM may soon market a device measuring less than three inches by six inches with 10 keys capable of creating 4,407 chords at 80 words per minute (still slower than top QWERTY typists).

Further in the future are voice-activated word processors. Matsushita of Japan may introduce one such system with a small vocabulary (that could handle, say, numbers and a business's standard inventory) by 1983. But QWERTY will be here to gripe about, predicts Litterick—at least for a few more decades.

Science as Evolution

Henry Cavendish, James Watt, and Antoine Lavoisier independently hit upon the compound nature of water in the late 18th century. Austrian monk Gregor Mendel's long-ignored experiments in plant genetics in the 1860s were appreciated only after they were invented anew by three separate researchers in 1900. Why are simultaneous breakthroughs so common? Shrader, a graduate student in philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, answers by likening the development of scientific theory to the evolution of infectious parasites.

Shrader portrays scientists as organisms that can be broken down into species (such as biologists) and varieties (e.g., molecular biologists). Similarly, he describes theories as "parasites" that infect members of the scientific community. "Theory species" compete with one another (as the theory of evolution competes with creation theory) and among themselves (as two schools of evolutionary theory might).

Scientific progress comes as new theory-parasites join the competition for survival. As in evolution, variants often arise by chance or error. The accidental flash of an electrical spark in Luigi Galvani's laboratory caused a frog-leg specimen to twitch and led Galvani to discover electric current in 1791. Only the inadvertent contamination of a bacteria culture enabled Alexander Fleming to discover penicillin in 1928. Whatever the process, progress is slow. Just as a dramatically mutant parasite cannot reproduce or long survive inside its host organism, truly radical discoveries are—even when true—by definition unintelligible (if relativity theory had really sprung from Einstein's genius alone, no one would have understood it). This accounts for the frequency of multiple discoveries: Many scientists share common background knowledge and investigate the same problems.

Just as evolutionary pressures (such as climate) favor certain organisms and their parasites over others, financial and political pressures favor certain scientists and theory species. (Witness recent advances in particle physics aided by funding of costly cyclotrons.) The parasite
analogy, according to Shrader, suggests that "science fares best and the chances for progress are greatest" when society nurtures a broad range of research efforts and allows them to stand or fall on their merits.

**RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT**

*Energy Taxes at Cross Purposes*

"Nonneutral Features of Energy Taxation" by William E. Morgan and Dennis Olson, in *Natural Resources Journal* (Oct. 1980), School of Law, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M. 87131.

Washington and the states seem to be working at cross purposes on energy matters. The federal government gives oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium producers tax breaks that are the envy of other industries, in order to speed domestic energy production. But most states levy special charges for fuel extraction, report Morgan and Olson, economists at the University of Wyoming and Texas Tech, respectively.

Federal tax incentives to domestic energy firms vary. A percentage depletion allowance exempts from taxation a portion of the resource extracted. Though the major oil companies lost their percentage depletion break in 1976, the independent oil producers (with a 22 percent allowance limited to 1,200 barrels a day) and miners of coal (with 10 percent), shale oil (15 percent), and uranium (22 percent) still qualify. A second exemption, the cost depletion allowance, is available to all extractors and is based on the ratio of fuel withdrawn to retrievable reserves left. (Eligible companies may choose between percentage and cost depletion.) Other federal tax benefits in the energy field include the writing off of "intangible" oil and gas drilling costs (e.g., lease payments) and of hard mineral exploration and development costs.

But state governments heavily tax extraction at the wellhead and mine mouth, primarily to raise revenue. Fifteen states impose "severance" fees on coal, ranging from 2 cents per ton in Arkansas to 85 cents per ton in North Dakota. Montana demands a steep 30 percent of gross value. State coal taxes added up to $192 million, nationwide, in 1978. By contrast, the 25 states that tax oil and gas raked in $2 billion that year. Oil tax rates varied from a penny per barrel in Idaho to 45 cents per barrel in New Mexico. Louisiana takes the highest share of gross value—12.5 percent. State natural gas taxes range from 2 to 10 percent of gross value.

Washington is abandoning its "live and let live" posture. The federal government has successfully challenged Louisiana’s "first use" tax of 7 cents per thousand cubic feet on natural gas sold outside the state and is suing Montana, charging that its 30 percent coal tax represents unconstitutional interference in interstate commerce.
Safe Haven for Nuclear Waste?

In the United States, the nuclear industry and the federal government entomb sealed barrels of radioactive wastes in empty Western deserts. But smaller, more crowded European countries enjoy no similar option. In West Germany, however, researchers report that they have found a safe haven—underground salt formations.

Created by the evaporation of prehistoric oceans, Germany's underground salt formations (similar to many found around the world) are often more than 3,000 feet thick. According to the authors, all West German technicians, thousands of feet of rock overlie the salt, packing it so tightly that it has become plasticized, impregnable to ground water. (In most underground rock formations, circulating ground water can carry buried radioactive particles to the soil, lakes, and rivers above.) These salt formations appear to be chemically and physically stable—they have, after all, survived 200 million years of geologic upheaval. Moreover, large cavities can be carved in them without fear of collapse. Rock salt is thermally conductive and can dissipate the heat (as much as 900°F) generated by the purest "high level" radioactive wastes.

From 1967 until the late 1970s, the West German nuclear industry ran tests in the abandoned Asse salt mine, located near Braunschweig, in northern Germany. The mine contains 131 chambers with a total volume of more than 12 million cubic feet. Its 13 levels are located...
PERIODICALS

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roughly 1,600 to 2,500 feet below the surface. Some 141,000 drums holding 200 liters of low-level waste and 1,300 drums of intermediate-level waste were safely lodged there for more than 10 years.

Bonn views the construction of a national fuel disposal center in Lower Saxony as the next step in its waste management program. The system will consist of a reprocessing plant to produce fuel-grade uranium from spent nuclear fuel, located above a salt mine, which will be used for storage of unrecoverable wastes. But protests by West Germany's powerful antinuclear lobbies have forced Bonn to delay a final decision on the center until the mid-1980s.

LBJ as Conservationist


For adding 44 sites to the National Park Service and nearly five million acres to federal recreation areas, Lyndon Johnson has been called America's greatest conservation President. But late in his term, LBJ refused a chance to clinch the title, argues Crevelli, a historian at Santa Rosa (Calif.) Junior College.

LBJ felt duty-bound to leave future generations "a glimpse of the world as God really made it." But the man who drafted the conservation proposals of his administration was Interior Secretary Stewart Udall. In July 1968, four months after Johnson renounced a second term, Udall presented his most grandiose scheme: setting aside seven tracts of federal land totaling 7.6 million acres as new or enlarged "national monuments," using the Antiquities Act of 1906. The sites, which amounted to a 25 percent increase in national park land, included Mount McKinley, Alaska, and the Sonoran Desert in Arizona.

Citing more modest apportionments by past Chief Executives as precedent—e.g., Teddy Roosevelt's claim to the Grand Canyon—and stroking Johnson's ego ("if Herbert Hoover could put in four million acres, I think seven million is about right for Lyndon Johnson"), Udall got a tentative go-ahead on December 11. But LBJ worried about the legality. Little of the land had the scientific or historical value specified by the Antiquities Act. Much of it possibly contained oil or minerals. The amount made him hesitant, as did his policy of avoiding decisions that would bind the incoming Nixon administration. But Johnson's prime worry was Congress. He feared that a legislative rebuff as he left office would damage his reputation as a "doer" in domestic affairs.

At the last possible moment, on the morning of Inauguration Day, LBJ chose to declare only 300,000 acres as national monument lands. Johnson, Crevelli contends, realized that his neglect of tried and true methods of congressional consensus-building had led to political disaster over Vietnam, and he had grown gun-shy. Udall's seven million acres were just "too large even for a Lyndon Johnson to swallow."
When is a Thomas Wolfe novel not a Thomas Wolfe novel? When, like *The Web and the Rock* (1939) and *You Can't Go Home Again* (1940), it was published posthumously—and edited by Edward Aswell. So writes Halberstadt, a former English instructor at Northeastern University.

Wolfe (1900–38), a North Carolinian who won fame at age 29 for *Look Homeward, Angel*, was a man who could dash off handwritten letters 130 pages long. In a 1935 essay for *The Saturday Review of Literature*, he breezily admitted that Maxwell Perkins, his editor at Scribner’s, routinely lopped 40,000 words out of his manuscript chapters, whittling them down to 10,000. But shortly afterward, the temperamental prodigy confided to friends, “Every time [Perkins] took out a word it was as though he turned a knife in my heart.” About then, Wolfe began a mammoth new novel, an epic of American history revolving around his life and the saga of his pioneer ancestors. Stung by critic Bernard de Voto’s charge that he was a creation of the “assembly line at Scribner’s,” he switched publishers.

On New Year’s Eve, 1937, Edward Aswell of Harper and Brothers bought Wolfe’s upcoming novel “sight unseen” for $10,000 and a contract permitting “no changes” without Wolfe’s written consent. Five months later, Wolfe handed Aswell a million-plus-word amalgam of previously published and unpublished novellas, short stories, passages deleted from published works, and brand new chapters. Wolfe called it an “enormous skeleton” of a novel; Aswell called it a “mess.” In September, however, Wolfe died of tuberculosis contracted during a summer train trip through the American West. Eager to publish, Aswell soon found an “out” in Wolfe’s contract, which, he reasoned, barred “detailed editing” but permitted wholesale cutting.

Aswell set to work. He created *The Web and the Rock* by combining 50 chapters from the master manuscript with at least eight wholly new ones fashioned by chopping and pasting chapters, passages, and fragments that Wolfe had left behind. Aswell added his own transitions. In 1940, he grew even bolder. In addition to cutting and rearranging, Aswell created several new characters for *You Can't Go Home Again*. Tim Wagner, for example, the town sot turned real estate oracle, is a hybrid of Wolfe’s Tim Weaver (a millionaire turned town sot) and Rufus Mears (a cocaine addict turned real estate oracle).

Did Aswell “fundamentally” change the nature of Wolfe’s work? Even Wolfe scholars are confused, after praising and panning passages that simply are not Wolfe’s. Halberstadt recommends publishing Wolfe’s original manuscript, so that the public may distinguish “the vision of Wolfe from the editorial administration of Aswell.”
The fantastic imagery of Hieronymus Bosch’s three-panel painting, Garden of Earthly Delights (c. 1505–10), now hung in the Prado in Madrid, has long puzzled art historians. How and why did his 16th-century mind invent creatures that seem part animal, part vegetable, and part machine? Dixon, an art historian at Indianapolis’s Museum of Art, contends that Bosch’s exotica constituted, in effect, a code easily decipherable by many educated Europeans of his time. Garden portrays the medieval alchemists’ view of life.

Today, “alchemy” conjures up images of evil sorcerers obsessed with distilling gold from lead. Yet in Bosch’s time, alchemy was a comprehensive Christian philosophy. Its practitioners manufactured useful dyes, medicines, and cosmetics. But the most ambitious alchemists also strove to create a “second Eden” by restoring to humanity the emotional balance and physical purity that it enjoyed before the Fall.

Bosch (1450?–1516) lived in Leiden, Holland, a center of alchemical learning. His in-laws were pharmacists. In Garden, he depicts alchemy’s guiding allegory—likening the process of distillation to the world’s divine creation, destruction, and rebirth. The left panel shows Christ joining Adam and Eve: It represents the first phase of distillation—the “marriage of opposites.” The pair’s multiplication into mankind, shown in the center panel, corresponds to the “coagulation” of earth, air, fire, and water into a balanced whole substance. Similarly, Bosch’s bizarre flower/animal/humans represent alchemical experimentation—“marrying the elements indiscriminately one form to another,” as one early alchemist put it. Alchemists called the third stage of distillation “putrification”—blackening a mixture over a hot fire.

The “egg man” of Hieronymus Bosch’s Garden of Earthly Delights. Do the brittle, ovoid shells that populate this 16th-century masterpiece represent a vessel used by medieval alchemists for their experiments?
Bosch, like his contemporaries, compared this procedure to the agony of hell.

Bosch's wildest images incorporate alchemical devices. The beaker-shaped fountain of life in the central panel—whose neck culminates in a blooming pinnacle of buds and veined tissue—is one of many alchemical "marriage chambers" represented.

Bosch, writes Dixon, believed in a benevolent God, the ultimate Healer. He painted Garden to express his faith that the road to salvation was through science combined with Christian devotion.

The Literature of Nightmare

Gothic romances, set in "sinister Italy or wicked France" and drenched with madness and demonism, and science fiction such as Arthur C. Clarke's interplanetary 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) share more than just their perches on the fringes of "respectable" literature.

Both defy the primacy of reason that began during the Enlightenment in 18th-century Europe. And both portray reason carried to extreme to make their point. But they differ, says Brantlinger, professor of English at Indiana University, in the scale of the mayhem they depict.

Gothic writers focus on internal disaster and psychological disintegration. Employing unreliable narrators (such as the opium addict of Edgar Allen Poe's "Ligeia") and filling their stories with claustrophobic dungeons, secret passageways, and coffins, they chronicle the "inward journey" into madness and death—usually of a highly educated individual. In Mary Shelley's famous 1818 tale, for example, Dr. Frankenstein pushes science (reason) too far. Yet the chaos caused by his monster seems to affect only the good doctor, his family, and friends. In science fiction, the damage inflicted by technological progress pervades all of society and threatens to wipe out individualism itself. Witness the hi-tech dictatorship of George Orwell's 1984 and the treacherous computer "Hal," of 2001.

In Gothic tales, the message is that the irrational will conquer the rational. The villain-hero is often in league with the devil or endowed with supernatural powers. In science fiction, people are also dehumanized, but powerless—"sub-natural." The Gothic protagonist may be a vampire or necrophiliac; the super-technicians of later fiction sap people of life by subordinating them to machines. Invasions from outer space are simply demonic possessions of another kind.

"When Aristotle fails," the well-known science-fiction author Isaac Asimov has said, "try science fiction." But to demonstrate reason's pitfalls, science fiction, like the Gothic novels of old, extrapolates too far. As Asimov's colleague, Ursula K. Le Guin wrote in 1976, "Almost anything carried to its logical extreme becomes depressing." The true monsters, suggests Brantlinger, are the authors' imaginations.
Scholars in China are showing signs of "de-Maoization," reports Liu, a historian at the University of California, Davis. Just as the leaders of the People’s Republic are attacking Mao Zedong for his ruinous doctrine of “permanent revolution,” so China’s historians are now challenging Mao’s view of pre-20th century peasant rebels as proto-communist foes of feudalism.

Karl Marx called peasants "the ramparts of the old society"—isolated small-scale producers incapable of developing "class consciousness." But Mao owed his 1949 takeover to massive peasant support. To square this triumph with Marxist dogma, he credited peasants with revolutionary inclinations as strong as any urban proletariat’s. And, until shortly after his death (in 1976), most Chinese scholars dutifully followed suit.

Surprisingly, the first hint of dissent appeared in a 1963 novel by Yao Xueyin about a 17th-century peasant rebel, Li Zicheng. (It sold 2.3 million copies in China in 1977.) Yao noted that Li and his fellow agitators were "pointing with their spears in the great direction of class struggle." But, he added, limited by experience, they only envisioned replac-
ing one dynasty with another. Other scholars have recently taken up where Yao left off, arguing that throughout China’s history, most peasants revolted against individual oppressors, not against the imperial system or even against a ruling class.

The revisionists take a more “realistic” view of Chinese history than the Maoists, Liu contends. Conveniently, their studies also help legitimate the pragmatic economic policies of China’s current leader, Deng Xiaoping. For example, one historian has equated the failed “leveling” programs of 19th-century Taiping rebels with the disastrous “equalization” of Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Another has theorized that material progress was most marked under stable political conditions, feudal or otherwise—a backhanded slap at “permanent revolution.”

Yet, Liu writes, some Chinese revisionists have gone too far in denigrating the peasants of old China. More and more, Chinese scholars are now taking an easy way out—citing peasant origins and the “heavy baggage of history” to explain callousness and domineering “bureaucratism” among the New China’s cadres.

What Changed in Poland?

“Poland and the Soviet Imperium” by Seweryn Bialer, in Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1980), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

Polish workers have often rebelled (in 1956, 1970, and 1976), but their 1980 victory—gaining the right to form an independent trade union—is unprecedented. What changed? Mainly the Polish worker did, answers Bialer, a Columbia University political scientist.

During his decade in power, Communist Party leader Edward Gierek promised greater prosperity than he could deliver. Chosen to solve the 1970 labor crisis, Gierek tried to revive Poland’s economy by purchasing Western technology on credit and pouring investment into heavy industry. His strategy briefly boosted wages and output (nearly 7.2 percent and 11 percent, respectively, each year from 1971 to 1975). It also raised workers’ economic expectations.

Unanticipated high energy costs and recession in the West during the mid-1970s wrecked Gierek’s plans. With exports stagnating, and with most domestic investment tied up in heavy industry, shortages of consumer goods and accelerating inflation struck simultaneously. Poland’s heavy-handed state planning slowed the diffusion of Western technology and prevented the completion of many investment projects. From August 1979 to August 1980, industrial output nose-dived 17 percent. The housing industry fell far short of goals. And the 19-million-ton grain harvest in 1980 was officially described as being eight million tons below the country’s needs. Yet Gierek never told the Poles their country was in trouble. And the Communist “workers’” party lost most of its credibility.

The Polish proletariat no longer consists of former peasants grateful
for jobs in urban factories. Workers today are largely city-born, highly trained, and more self-assured than their predecessors were. Permitted to travel abroad, millions have seen the good life enjoyed by Westerners. And the workers have learned from past mistakes. In 1980, rather than confront the government in the streets, they occupied factories, putting the onus of violently ejecting them on the authorities. They eschewed the traditional hodgepodge of short-term economic demands and unrealistic political goals to focus on one aim—union recognition—designed to give them permanent leverage with party leaders.

Finally, the alliance between Poland’s dissident intellectuals and the working man (with the latter firmly at the helm) was unique. Unlike the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 or the Czech heresy of 1968, contends Bialer, Poland’s unrest cannot be quelled by imprisoning a few writers and academics.

Peace Dividend


Vietnam’s communist rulers won their wars against France and the United States, but they are losing the peace. Economic and diplomatic blundering has stirred discontent in the party and among the populace, reports Pike, a U.S. Foreign Service information officer.

Vietnamese living standards have plummets since the communists took Saigon in 1975. Food production has averaged between 15 and 20 percent below the country’s needs. The basic monthly rice ration for civilians has shrunk from 15 kilograms (during the Vietnam War) to 10 kilograms. Since 1975, consumer goods have become scarcer by half; even coffins are in short supply. Only an annual $900 million worth of Soviet economic aid keeps the economy afloat.

Pike blames the aging leadership in Hanoi for too hastily collectivizing the South’s agriculture, dismantling its capitalist commercial system, and making refugees of skilled ethnic Chinese and middle-class Vietnamese. The regime’s bellicose approach to foreign affairs (war with China, periodic threats to Thailand), he adds, has alienated potential Western aid donors. Vietnam’s economy has been hamstrung by military outlays. Hanoi’s $3.8 billion 1980 military budget represented 47 percent of government spending. The country maintains a 1.1-million-man Army (fourth largest in the world). Nearly 200,000 soldiers are bogged down fighting ragtag, tenacious Khmer Rouge forces in Kampuchea (Cambodia).

According to Pike, 1980 witnessed the first signs of major public unrest in communist Vietnam’s history. Antigovernment graffiti appeared on public buildings in Hanoi. Food demonstrations, strikes, rising crime, and other “counterrevolutionary activity” were discreetly reported by the state press. Meanwhile, the party replaced 20 Politburo-level officials last winter (mainly in economic, military, and police
posts), probably to mollify local leaders.

Filled with hubris after their victory over the United States, Vietnam's rulers will probably continue their belligerent policies abroad. The Vietnamese people themselves seem too accustomed to "submitting to history" (in the words of government propagandists) to revolt. But a "blowup" at the top is, for the first time, possible, says Pike. Either way, he concludes, for the ordinary Vietnamese, "more suffering seems inevitable."

**Labor Politics in Mexico**


Historians often depict Mexican President Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915) as brutally antilabor. But for most of his 35-year rule, writes Walker, a historian at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, Díaz was the workingman's hero.

Long before Díaz overthrew President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada in 1876, labor leaders had cultivated a symbiotic relationship with state and local politicians, delivering votes in exchange for donations to the unions. The new President moved quickly to destroy existing workers' organizations and replace them with groups loyal to himself. Soon, union chiefs such as Pedro Ordoñez and Carmen Huerta were echoing Díaz's dictum that "profits must be guaranteed to foreign capitalists in order to sustain national progress." In return, their organizations received government-financed night schools and printing presses, and access to such luxuries as running water for meeting halls. Díaz and his labor allies also promoted establishment of the mutualistas—blue-collar groups that sponsored medical care and pensions out of workers' dues, thereby avoiding claims on government or business.

Between 1877 and 1898, industrial wages in Mexico climbed 15 percent—due mainly to a spurt of foreign-financed railroad construction—while prices stabilized. As long as the economy remained robust, most workers appreciated Díaz's suppression of trouble-making dissidents. At the same time, prosperity allowed the President to tolerate sporadic labor unrest and even to mediate strikes to the workers' benefit. Then the economy soured. From 1901 to 1910, food prices jumped 100 percent and rents 500 percent, while wages stagnated. In 1907, pressured by foreign mill owners, Díaz imposed a strongly pro-business settlement of a nationwide textile dispute. After bloody clashes between federal troops and unarmed workers, his labor support vanished.

Mexican blue-collar workers overwhelmingly backed reformer Francisco Madero in his unsuccessful 1910 presidential campaign and joined his movement that toppled the Diaz regime in May 1911. But the strategy of paternalism and coercion that Díaz perfected, says Walker, has colored government-union relations in Mexico ever since.

From Marx to Castro, communists have been claiming that their system would wipe out racism and ethnic inequalities forever. Is their record any better than the West’s?

Echols, formerly a political scientist at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, compared black-white relations in the United States with the Russian-Central Asian minority cleavage. He examined inequalities between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia and between two other like-sized ethnic groups, Belgium’s Flems and Walloons. He also studied French-Anglo disparities in Canada and Czech-Slovak divisions in Czechoslovakia. In some respects—but not all, he found—capitalist countries are moving faster toward equality than are their rivals.

Both American blacks and Soviet Central Asians, for example, lag behind their countries’ majorities in income. But trends are diverging. In the United States, black family income as a percentage of white family income edged up from 52 to 62 percent between 1959 and 1975. Disposable income per capita in the predominantly Asian Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic fell from 63 percent of Soviet income per capita in 1940 to 51 percent in 1969.

In 1962, not one Central Asian sat on the Soviet Politburo or Central Committee, though Asians comprised 8 percent of the Soviet population. Similarly, all but a handful of U.S. Senators and Representatives were white, though 10 percent of Americans were black. By 1976, Central Asians still held less than half their “share” of seats in top Soviet ruling bodies. And blacks in the U.S. House and Senate remained scarce—3 percent and 1 percent, respectively.

By contrast, minority Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and French Canadians enjoy proportional representation. (Yet Slovaks and Québécois earn only 80 and 86 percent of Czech and Anglo incomes, respectively.) Belgium and Yugoslavia each have granted their major ethnic blocs local autonomy; income is distributed evenly among the Flemish and Walloons, Serbs and Croats. Yugoslavia’s smaller minorities (e.g., Macedonians, Montenegrins), however, are less prosperous.

No communist society has created a system of chattel slavery or apartheid of the sort marking ante-bellum America or modern South Africa. But, Echols concludes, most communist leaders today give far lower priority to redressing ethnic inequalities than to striving for a healthy overall economic growth rate.
"Energy and the Economy."

America's best hope of subduing the stagflation touched off by OPEC's 1973 oil price hikes is to become a net energy exporter by 1990. That may sound like wishful thinking, but a team of University of Texas scholars headed by geologist W. L. Fisher and economist Walt W. Rostow believes that it can be done.

The authors outline a plan to produce the equivalent of 48 million barrels per day of oil (mbd) in the form of natural gas, synthetic fuels, nuclear power, and, above all, coal. That would exceed projected U.S. energy consumption in 1990 by 2.7 mbd—giving the nation an exportable energy surplus for the first time since 1947. Among the potential results, the authors claim: a noninflationary annual U.S. growth rate of 3.5 percent, a drop in unemployment (to four percent), a rise in productivity (to a healthy 2.5 percent), and a U.S. trade balance running in the black.

But getting there will not be easy. Hard political decisions must be made, the authors state. Crude oil and natural gas must be free of price controls to ensure high energy conservation—and to enable energy companies to finance research and development.

The current windfall profits tax on oil must be changed to "plow back" oil company profits into exploration and drilling.

The federal government must provide private industry with such incentives as accelerated equipment depreciation schedules, low interest loans, and purchase agreements to encourage synthetic fuel production.

And many of the environmental laws that have hindered coal and oil production (e.g., the Clean Air Act and restrictions on offshore oil drilling) will have to be loosened.

Even if Congress enacts all of the necessary legislation, the logistical obstacles remain staggering. The authors do not provide a detailed financing blueprint. But they estimate that meeting the energy export goal by 1990 will cost $1.433 trillion—nearly 50 percent of the gross national product in 1980.

Expanding coal production alone (from the current 8.2 to the authors' proposed 20 mbd) could cost $500 billion over the next 20 years. A massive upgrading of railroad track and interior waterways would be required to transport Western coal to the East. The United States would need to build 10 new coal shipping ports, each capable of handling 25 to 30 million tons per year.

The authors urge the construction of 120 synthetic gas and shale-oil plants, each producing 50,000 mbd daily and employing technologies already available, such as the Fischer-Tropsch coal gasification process currently used in South Africa. Each of these factories—built and operated by private industry in remote Western regions—would take up at least one square mile of land and consume five gallons of water to make each gallon of fuel. Building them would absorb one-half of the capacity of the U.S. en-
HOW COAL-PRODUCING CAPACITY COULD EXPAND:
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED, 1977–2000 (million metric tons/year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>2000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
<td>373</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
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<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total world</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>6780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


gineering construction industry and require the skills of most of America's trained welders. Whole towns would have to be created to house these workers. Total estimated cost: another $500 billion, not to mention "a national mobilization on a scale never before attempted in this country or anywhere else."

To contain the inflationary explosion that a crash program would ignite will require a sustained wage-price control effort. Persistence, they say, is the key: President Nixon's wage-price controls of 1971–72 lasted too briefly to prevent "catch-up" inflation once they were lifted.

Making the United States an energy exporter will demand "a new sense of unity . . . among business, labor, government, and the community at large," the authors note. But the alternative is a future of sluggish growth punctuated by chronic recessions.

"Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?"

When the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations—a private research organization—and its British, West German, and French counterparts talk, Western governments often listen. Now, the directors of these four institutions have proposed a solution to a problem that has long divided the Atlantic alliance: how, collectively, to counter Soviet expansionism in the Third World, particularly in the oil-rich Middle East.

The inability of the Atlantic alliance to unite against Soviet thrusts in the
Third World—as evidenced by its mottled response to the invasion of Afghanistan—stems largely from differing experiences with détente.

Improved relations with Moscow brought concrete benefits to Western Europe. Trade with the Soviet bloc increased; families were reunited. The Soviets' achievement of nuclear parity with the United States is another justification for détente in the eyes of many Europeans.

For all of these reasons, leaders in Bonn, Paris, and even London are reluctant to echo U.S. threats to scuttle détente over such "peripheral" issues as a civil war in El Salvador.

For its part, the United States has gradually moved away from the Europe-centered foreign policy of the 1940s and '50s. U.S.-Soviet trade has been meager, and détente has benefited few Americans directly.

Further, the Vietnam War's disastrous conclusion contributed to a resurgence of pugnacious American nationalism—prompting many in Washington to forget that Western European nations have raised their share of the cost of maintaining NATO from 22.7 percent in 1969 to 41.6 percent in 1979, even as total U.S. military outlays fell in constant dollars.

The authors believe the time has come to restore a sense of common purpose. That purpose transcends the Atlantic basin: "Western security can no longer be limited to events and threats occurring in the NATO region alone." Their chief concern is that an extensive and prolonged interruption of oil supplies could unleash an unprecedented world economic crisis.

What is to be done? Since neither the United States nor its allies can check Soviet ambitions in the Middle East single-handedly, the Western democracies must pitch in and help protect the Persian Gulf—with money and manpower. The United States should be given chief responsibility for assembling a joint Western force. Western European—and Japanese—participation must be significant (to reflect their stake in energy security) and highly visible (to persuade a touchy American public that burdens are being shared).

The authors urge the West to support Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion with money and weapons. They agree that if Soviet thrusts outside the Persian Gulf (e.g., in Central America or in Africa) are often less dangerous than Washington alleges, they are sometimes more ominous than the Western Europeans acknowledge. Intra-NATO consultations should determine which crises require a joint response and which the West can safely disagree over.

Such measures, the authors believe, would transform NATO from an organization "characterized by U.S. dominance and European passivity" into a "real alliance" of equals.

"High School and Beyond."


Have young Americans today discarded the "counterculture" values of the late 1960s and early '70s? A survey of 58,000 high school sophomores and seniors conducted by the U.S. Department of Education suggests that a conservative swing has indeed occurred. Nine years ago, in a U.S. govern-
ment poll, 27 percent of high school seniors surveyed cited "correcting social and economic inequalities" as a "very important" goal in their life and work. Only 13 percent of seniors queried in 1980 felt the same way. Meanwhile, the proportion of students intent on "having lots of money" rose from 19 to 31 percent.

Shifts in career aims tell the same story. In 1972, "social science" ranked as the most popular choice of major among students headed for college (attracting 17 percent). Eight years later, its popularity had fallen by more than half; 22 percent of the college-bound by then were planning business majors (up from 13 percent).

Gender still seems to affect student career choices. Seventeen percent of the girls expected to hold clerical jobs, compared to only one percent of the boys. At the same time, 16 percent of the boys and only one percent of the girls were leaning toward careers as "craftsmen." But girls were almost as likely as boys to anticipate careers that required advanced degrees—12 versus 13 percent.

Some Class of '80 responses were fairly predictable. Asian Americans continued to show an unusually high interest in math and science: Their proportion taking calculus (22 percent) equaled the percentages of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians combined. Male students continued to take more math and science than did females.

But some surprises emerged. Blacks ranked slightly higher than whites in the percentage of students taking three years or more of math and in the numbers of students expecting four years or more of advanced education (48 compared to 46 percent).

Almost two-thirds of 1980 seniors held part-time jobs, averaging 21 hours per week at $3.18 per hour. White students were most likely to be working while in school (66 percent), and blacks were least likely (50 percent). Female students earned an average of 88 percent of their male peers' hourly wages.

Is schoolwork as hard as it used to be? The survey indicated that "grade inflation" is no myth. Three-fourths of the 1980 seniors spent less than five hours per week on homework, up from 65 percent in 1972. But the proportion of seniors reporting grades of "about half A and half B" or higher rose—from 29 percent to 33 percent.

"United States National Interests in Africa."
Author: William J. Foltz

Africa, with its widespread poverty, racial strife, and chronic political turmoil, "presents a somber setting for the pursuit of American national interest," writes Foltz, a Yale political scientist, in a forthcoming Wilson Center report on "United States National Interests in the 1980s." The continent offers few opportunities for major U.S. political gains. Yet misguided policies could undermine the stability that Washington seeks to promote and endanger long-run access to important markets and minerals.

Africa's arms race is one of the world's best-kept and most dangerous secrets, says Foltz. Since 1963, military outlays by the African states have doubled every five years (after inflation). While the French and Americans
have recently trimmed weapons sales, the Soviets are filling the gap.

African states are rapidly dividing into two camps: emerging regional powers—e.g., Nigeria and Tanzania—and "basket cases" such as Uganda and Chad, which have been turned by political chaos into stages on which their more powerful neighbors' rivalries are fought out (e.g., Tanzania versus Kenya in Uganda).

Africa's instability is exacerbated in part by such conflicts and in part by continuing racial strife in South Africa and Namibia. White-ruled South Africa will remain the region's dominant power, Foltz believes, but the economic role of that country's black majority "is now too central and too complex to permit a return to the successful repression of the 1960s."

On the surface, America's economic stake in sub-Saharan Africa seems small. Since World War II's end, trade with the region has averaged about four percent of total U.S. foreign commerce, with South Africa accounting for one-fourth of that total. Yet Nigeria is America's second-largest supplier of oil (behind Saudi Arabia) and together with Libya and Algeria sold the United States more crude in the first half of 1980 than the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates did. Southern Africa, meanwhile, contains a mother-lode of chromium (in South Africa and Zimbabwe), cobalt (in Zaire and Zambia), and manganese (in South Africa and Gabon).

To maintain long-term access to these materials, the United States must establish at least "tolerable" relations with the governments in control. This means distinguishing between black nations with avowedly Marxist-Leninist governments (such as Angola, which the United States has refused to recognize, and Mozambique) and countries truly controlled by the Soviet Union (such as Ethiopia). The former, Foltz writes, "have never refused to sell any Western country any major commodity when offered market prices."

The United States must also seek "engagement and rapport" with all South African forces, groups, and shades of opinion, while pressing rhetorically for racial progress.

Finally, America must recognize that focusing its attention on the superpower competition and automatically opposing African "Marxism" is likely to enhance Moscow's influence —by pushing the United States into a quasi-alliance with South Africa and by inviting black states to turn to the Soviets for protection.

Prepared for a conference sponsored by the Notre Dame Law School and held at the Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. 25 pp.
Author: Edward McGlynn Gaffney

Many Americans reared on the notion of "rugged individualism" resent it when Washington wields its power to grant (or not to grant) federal funds in order to, say, promote school desegregation or encourage the installation of public facilities for the handicapped. Yet the federal government has been holding out economic "carrots" to secure the "general welfare" since the early 1800s. The practice is not without its dangers, writes Gaffney, a Notre Dame law professor.

Early federal aid had few strings
attached. During the ante-bellum decades, Congress funded such public works projects as the Erie Canal in western New York. Federal subsidies to private business began in earnest in 1850, when Congress awarded 3.75 million acres of land to railroads for the construction of a North-South railway from Chicago to Mobile, Ala. Legislators justified their largess by arguing that railroads were "affected with a public interest."

In 1913, the states set the stage for a vastly strengthened federal "spending power" when they ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, permitting the government to levy a tax on personal income. The Great Depression and the New Deal fostered overwhelming public support for spending to relieve social and economic ills. But politicians remained reluctant to attach social quid pro quos to federal grants, notably in the matter of race relations.

The first legislation blocking federal funds to racially segregated school districts was introduced in Congress in 1961. The Kennedy administration opposed it as a "precipitous action" and a potential precedent for abuses by future Presidents.

Only after local policemen viciously attacked peaceful civil-rights demonstrators in Birmingham, Ala., in May 1963 did the President change his mind—cautiously, writes Gaffney. Rather than claim sweeping discretionary powers to withhold funds from localities, he asked Congress for an omnibus civil-rights law making it clear "that the Federal Government is not required . . . to furnish any kind of financial assistance to any program or activity in which racial discrimination occurs."

Once this breakthrough legislation was signed (by Lyndon Johnson as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), similar measures barring "federally funded discrimination" against women (1972) and the handicapped (1973) followed.

Conditional grants that advance social or economic aims are now the norm, writes Gaffney. American sugar interests, for example, profit by qualifiers on U.S. foreign aid that prohibit competition with American producers. And Senator Paul Laxalt (R.-Nev.) has proposed shutting off all federal funds to "any State which prohibits voluntary prayer on the premises of any public building."

The courts have generally deferred to Congress and the President when the propriety of a specific funding condition has been challenged. Thus, notes Gaffney, it remains to the politicians to see that "foolish, fatuous . . . and futile" restrictions do not survive.
Bonn, by Rosemarie Landstedel-Eicken. The picturesque town on the Rhine was designated West Germany’s “provisional” capital in 1949. A vast federal complex arose on the outskirts, leaving the center city unscarred.
West Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany was born in 1949 from the rubble of Hamburg and Frankfurt and other parts of what was once the Deutsches Reich. Among scholars, West Germany's "economic miracle" has become a cliché. We focus here less on the country's industrial resurgence than on the society that produced it—and the new society that it made possible. Success creates its own problems. Below, historian Konrad Jarausch recalls the West's long love-hate relationship with the German people; journalist David Binder looks at the legacy of World War II and the evolution of the modern Federal Republic; and historian David Schoenbaum analyzes West Germany's peculiar international position. For the first time in the country's history, he writes, its people have a stake in the status quo.

PERCEPTIONS

by Konrad H. Jarausch

In 1944, historian A. J. P. Taylor was commissioned by British officials to write a chapter for a book about Germany that would "explain to the conquerors the sort of country they were conquering." When Taylor's essay was rejected as "too depressing," he penned an even more impassioned statement.

"The history of the Germans," Taylor began, "is a history of extremes. It contains everything except moderation, and in the course of a thousand years the Germans have experienced everything except normality. . . . They have produced the most transcendental philosophers, the most spiritual musicians, and the most ruthless and unscrupulous politicians. . . . Only the normal person, not particularly good, not particularly bad, healthy, sane. . . . has never set his stamp on German history."

One need not subscribe to this tendentious assessment to recognize that perceptions of Germany, among Anglo-Saxon peo-
ples generally (and particularly among the British, who for 150 years have claimed a special insight into the German soul) have likewise embraced incompatible extremes. An opinion survey taken in 1942, as the Battle of the Atlantic raged, found that Americans regarded the Germans as “warlike” (68 percent) but also “hard-working” (62 percent), “treacherous” (43 percent) but “intelligent” (41), “conceited” (33) yet “progressive” (31).

Ever since Coleridge and the romantics (and, later, Arnold) “discovered” German Kultur—the world of Goethe and Schiller, Mozart and Beethoven—and introduced it into polite drawing rooms, the pendulum of Anglo-American opinion on Germany has swung from worship through apologia to condemnation and back.

In the United States, another factor variously tempered or reinforced both popular and scholarly opinion. Unlike Britain, where the influx of Germanic peoples had largely ceased after the barbarian invasions, America opened its doors to millions of German immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries. Between 1820 and 1950, some seven million Germans came to the United States—more than any other group. While Thomas Carlyle in England could assert that his countrymen and the Germans still shared “the same old Saxon spirit,” only in the New World did anything like real affinity develop. There was also a certain ambivalence, associated less with personal impressions of the Germans as a people than with their behavior as a nation.

Germany did not become an integrated sovereign state until 1871, and it is difficult to say just when “German history” began. Various Germanic tribes had settled in central Europe before the time of Christ, and most of them lived free of the Roman yoke. It took some time for Christianity to penetrate the Teutonic hinterland, becoming, thanks to Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation, something else for the numerous German duchies, kingdoms, and principalities to fight about. For a thousand years, what is now Germany was under the transnational umbrella of the Holy Roman Empire, whose extent, composition, and cohesion varied over time. Only the rise of the kingdom of Prussia during the 17th and 18th centuries provided

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a stable nucleus around which the German state could eventually form.

From Queen Victoria to Napoleon III, through diplomacy or war, the rulers of neighboring lands were heavily involved in Germany’s evolution. But in the minds of most Americans, Germany remained half a world away. Three great waves of German immigrants, not concern for the balance of power, shaped initial public impressions of the German character.

The 13 Mennonite families who arrived on the Concord at Philadelphia in 1683 heralded a migration of Southwest German peasants to the New World seeking land and religious freedom. These were the “Pennsylvania Dutch” (for Deutsch), whose descendants still farm the Middle Atlantic states, from southern Maryland to New York. The newcomers seemed quiet and sturdy, if strongly sectarian and somewhat aloof. Among others, Benjamin Franklin admired them for their “habitual industry and thrift.”

In contrast to these drab “grays,” as they were called, came thousands of “greens,” political refugees of Germany’s failed 1848 revolution. Led by the dynamic Carl Schurz, later a U.S. Senator and Secretary of the Interior, the “greens” established German churches, colleges, and newspapers (in 1884, there were 84 German-language daily newspapers in the United States) and campaigned for the new Republican Party, congenial to their own liberalism.

The final wave, coming after the Civil War, was the biggest. Driven by poverty and industrialization, millions of rural and urban poor from northwest Germany streamed across the Atlantic and settled in the great Midwestern cities: Cincinnati, Cleve-
land, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis. They were hard-working and mechanically adept—think of Weyerhauser, Westinghouse, Chrysler, Steinway. This group also prospered, much to the resentment of the less-affluent Irish and the Italians. Their more puritanical neighbors may occasionally have been upset by brass bands parading down the street, yet according to a study by journalist Norbert Muhlen, the most frequent adjectives used in the English-speaking press to describe the German émigrés were “calm, moderate, hardy, staid, brave, kindly, quiet, domestic.”

Among educated Anglo-Americans, Germany had a more lofty connotation, at once romantic and scholarly. In 1815, Harvard theologian Edward Everett, Germanicist George Ticknor, and philologist George Bancroft all went to study at Göttingen, the first of a growing stream of American researchers (a total of 10,000 by 1900) attracted by the academic freedom, scientific achievement, and unfettered student life of German universities. “I think the Germans have an integrity of mind which sets their science above all others,” Ralph Waldo Emerson observed. The Americans were quick to bring German innovations back to the United States: The notion of graduate education, for example, was transplanted to Johns Hopkins in 1876.

From Bismarck to “Kaiser Bill”

Through much of the 19th century, most Americans tended to flavor their opinion of faraway Germany with their impressions of the Germans they knew. Diplomatic contacts—or contretemps—between the United States and the German Confederation were few. During the war against Denmark in 1864 and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, American sympathies, insofar as anyone could tell, were with Prussia, which held out the promise, according to the New York Tribune, of “progress and the possibility of freedom and national growth.” Similarly, during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Americans generally sided with Bismarck against Napoleon III, whose attempt to install his protégé, Maximilian I, as Emperor of Mexico in 1864–67 roused politicians’ ire north of the Rio Grande.

There was a palpable decline in admiration for the Germans after the Prussian victory over France at Sedan in 1870, the final unification of Germany, and the proclamation of a Kaiser (Wilhelm I). The new French Third Republic drew a groundswell of American support. In official Washington, there was concern as Germany moved, like the United States, to become a colonial latecomer in the Far East, daring to covet many of the same
prizes sought by American expansionists—Samoa and the Philippines, for example. Kaiser Wilhelm II, cursed by an erratic personality, embittered by the paralysis of his left arm, and utterly lacking in the diplomatic finesse of Bismarck (whom he dismissed as Chancellor in 1890), was ripe for caricature.

Rehabilitating the Underdog

Yet American academics still admired German scholarship (despite a slow turning of the intellectual tide against Germany in England), and ordinary folk in the United States continued to esteem their German-American compatriots. Not until the last prewar years did cautionary works such as Roland G. Usher's *Pan-Germanism* (1913) begin to appear in the United States. As the European war began, Americans regarded their German-American neighbors with sympathy rather than suspicion. There are few today who remember to what extraordinary lengths President Woodrow Wilson had to go to turn American sentiment against Germany. British propaganda was helpful. So were the blunders of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, and Turkey): their violation of Belgian neutrality; their clumsy espionage in the Western Hemisphere; and their dramatic sinkings of transatlantic liners such as the *Lusitania*, with many Americans lost at sea.

America's entry into World I temporarily shattered the century-old friendly stereotype of the German in the United States. Sauerkraut became "Victory cabbage," and German-town, New Jersey, was renamed Oldwick. Germans became "Huns"—an epithet ironically coined by Wilhelm II himself in 1900 when he exhorted a German expeditionary corps en route to China to be "as terrible as Attila the Hun." American intellectuals, even including such iconoclasts as Thorstein Veblen, volunteered for the propaganda effort; they produced earnest screeds whose scathing assessments of the German national character were buttressed by selective quotations from the works of such men as Prussian historian Heinrich von Treitschke and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. "It was popularly believed," historian J. G. Gazely later wrote, "that every Frenchman was naturally and inherently a hero, and every German instinctively and unalterably a baby killer."

What is surprising is not that Germany got a bad press from

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*The English, of course, were far more sensitive than the Americans to the implications of a united Germany for peace on the continent. Yet, even as war approached, British scholars retained their fascination with German history and their admiration for German scholarship. Both are evident, for example, in the 1910 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica.*
its Anglo-American adversaries during World War I but that its image was later so quickly rehabilitated, in both scholarly and popular circles. On both sides of the Atlantic, the Weimar Republic (1918–33) appeared as a promising new experiment in democracy. "In innocence," historian Henry Cord Meyer later recalled, "we evidently presumed that with militarism defeated and the Kaiser gone the Germans would build a good middle-class republic not unlike our own." The diffusion throughout the West of Weimar cultural modernism—Bauhaus architecture, for example, and the plays of Bertolt Brecht—restored Germany to the affections of America’s intellectuals.

The Muses Flee

A wave of revisionist scholarship during the 1920s (e.g., The Origins of the World War by S. B. Fay) also prompted second thoughts on where the blame lay for starting the Great War. Russian mobilization and French revanchism, as well as sheer British antagonism, now took their place alongside German bellicosity as the war’s "causes." French President Henri Poincaré’s sudden military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 made Germany now appear as the victimized underdog. An Anglo-American sympathy for "our German cousins" began to reassert itself.

Even as the worldwide Great Depression threw millions of Germans out of work, few observers anticipated the imminent disintegration of the Weimar Republic or the growing popular resentment against industrial barons (such as Hugo Stinnes) and Germany's rigid class structure. Despite the growing conflict between Left and Right, the increasing virulence of German anti-Semitism, and the country’s acute economic distress, Americans were unprepared for the triumph of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in 1933.

The Third Reich (1933–45) initially aroused more curiosity than condemnation in the United States. Impressed by the discipline and dynamism of the New Order as manifested in the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, many Americans (and Britons) believed that one could at least "do business" with Hitler, whatever his faults. Lloyd George and Charles Lindbergh positively admired the man. Though appalled by the enthusiasm for the Führer shown by the brown-shirted German-American Bund, U.S. newspapers were divided on the wisdom of "interfering" in Europe once again in the event of another war.

American attitudes were fundamentally confused. Isolationism was widespread on the American Right, while the Left loudly denounced both German fascism and any effort at U.S.
rearmament. The communists opposed nazism—until Stalin's 1939 pact with Hitler. American Jews watched with growing alarm as the 1935 Nürnberg racial laws were followed by the chilling Kristallnacht pogrom in 1938. The Northeastern "establishment," typified by President Franklin Roosevelt, was strongly Anglophilic and imbued with a congenital distrust of "Prussian militarism."

Yet, throughout the 1930s, U.S. opinion of the German people remained remarkably steady. A December 1939 Office of Public Opinion Research poll found that some 66 percent of the respondents regarded the Germans as "essentially peace-loving and kindly" while only 19 percent believed the Germans to have "an irrepressible fondness for brute force and conquest." Even the "Flight of the Muses" from Hitler's storm troopers—the exodus of thousands of Germany's most creative scientists, artists, and intellectuals to the New World—seemed, ironically, to have had largely a positive impact on American opinion of Germans generally: It was a tragedy that they had to flee in the face of anti-Semitism and totalitarianism, yet the very struggle of such men as Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann against the depredations of nazism testified to the existence of another, more civilized Germany. What animosity later developed toward the Germans was superimposed upon earlier, happier views.

Hitler's declaration of war against the United States in De-
cember 1941 marked the beginning of a strange golden age for students of Germany of every stripe. For a time, it seemed, the public appetite for books and pamphlets on the subject, ranging from the most obvious propaganda to solid scholarship, was insatiable.

While journalists poured out a stream of invective to strengthen American morale, numerous scholars explored the German character From Luther to Hitler (William M. McGovern), examined The Rise of Metapolitics from the Romantics to Hitler (Peter Viereck), and sought The Roots of National Socialism (Rohan Butler) in the legacies of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The chief flaw in such books was a shared assumption that the “German problem” could be explained only if one conceded that the Germans, as a people, had somehow been abnormal from the start. Not all historians or political scientists agreed; the war years also saw more sophisticated (and less faddish) reflections on the origins of nazism by such scholars as Konrad Heiden, Franz Neumann, William Langer, and Raymond Sonntag.

Germans as Americans

It was not until after V-E Day, with the revelations—and sickening pictures—of the nazi death camps, that a reflexive wave of revulsion passed over the United States and the rest of the world that would forever darken the German image. Allied leaders, including U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, seriously considered carving Germany into a handful of small states and, at the very least, “deindustrializing” the country—forcibly converting it into an agrarian nation.

Yet, in the immediate postwar period, Germany—more properly, West Germany—was gradually transformed from conquered enemy to valued ally. Prompted by Russian belligerence and the emergence of a Cold War, Washington shifted its emphasis from “collective guilt” to the economic and industrial reconstruction of Germany via the Marshall Plan (in which Moscow would not allow East Germany to participate). For the West, the psychological turning point came in 1948 when the “brave, freedom-loving Berliners,” with the help of a massive U.S. airlift, successfully resisted the Soviet blockade of the former capital.

In the three decades since the creation of the Federal Republic in 1949, American perceptions of West Germany have drifted toward a neutrality flavored by ambivalence. Germany is no longer a media favorite, even if many scholars would agree
with V. S. Pritchett that its destiny remains an enigma.

Superficially, the country is more familiar to more Americans than ever before. Millions of U.S. tourists have taken a Rhine cruise, hundreds of thousands of GIs have lived in military enclaves throughout West Germany, and tens of thousands of students and scholars, supported by the Fulbright Program and the German Academic Exchange Service, have studied at West German universities. Not a few Americans work for U.S. subsidiaries of such German firms as Siemens and Volkswagen. Americans are becoming aware of West Germany as a prosperous economic competitor and a strong, sometimes truculent ally.

All of this is new. Yet older fears and suspicions linger beneath official cheerfulness and cooperation. Stereotypes of the German abound, many of them once quite serviceable but most of them dating back to the Second World War or before. There is little appreciation in the United States of the extent to which German society is fundamentally different from what it was in 1925; of the degree to which the West Germans, uprooted by war, their political and cultural fabric utterly destroyed, set out to build something completely new; of the ironic tendency of this new society nevertheless to cherish the old traditions of "Germanness" for want of anything better, of postwar vintage, to put in their place.

Why is this so? To some extent, the passing of the émigré generation, marked symbolically by the death of Hannah Arendt in 1975, cut the living bond between America and Germany. West German prosperity has dried up the last trickle of transatlantic migration, notably the brief 1960s "brain drain." In a sense, too, Americans have come to see the prosperous Germans as Europe's "Americans"—and Americans are not terribly curious about Americans.

Whatever the cause, West Germany today summons up a kaleidoscope of vague images in American minds, some folksy, some still worrisome, but few of them bearing much relation to the reality of the Federal Republic in 1981—its diplomatic aims, its social tensions, its peculiar view of the world. In many ways, misperceptions are more dangerous than honest disagreements. And the consequences of a misunderstanding are always worst among friends.
Societies, like individuals, carry their birthmarks and their birth defects along with them as they grow. West Germany, conceived in 1949 out of the ashes and rubble of the last great war, bore the defect of being only part of the German whole, even though it claimed to represent the entire German nation.

True, the Federal Republic of Germany became a homeland for most of the 9 million Germans—East Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians, Sudetenlanders—driven westward after their expulsion from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and elsewhere in the wake of World War II. Similarly, until the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the new nation absorbed some 3 million Saxons, Thuringians, Mecklenburgers, and Brandenburgers from what had begun as the Soviet occupation zone. During the 1970s, West Germany took in hundreds of thousands of Volksdeutsche who had been kept behind, or had lingered, in the Soviet Union and Poland. To a considerable degree, then, West Germany's birth defect has been healed. The Federal Republic, with its 61 million people, is the acknowledged bourn of most that is German.

The chief effect of the great postwar treks and population shifts, especially in urban centers, was the broader Germanization of places that had previously been not un-German but primarily Hessian or Swabian or Bavarian in character.

A medium-sized provincial town like Giessen (pop. 75,500) may serve as an example. Located in Upper Hesse just beyond the old Roman limes, Giessen before the war had been the home of some heavy industry, a reputable little university, some socialists, some anti-Semites, and an overwhelming majority of Lutheran Protestants. After the war, it became a German melting pot, thanks mainly to a large refugee camp raised on its southern outskirts. Many of the new settlers were Roman Catholics from Silesia, far to the east; by the mid-1950s, Giessen was one-fifth Catholic. Its reputation as the heart of “Red Hesse” rapidly disappeared.

The newcomers, unfamiliar with local customs and values, did not mix well. First generation expellees were frequently made to feel unwelcome. In the early postwar years, there was an oft-told anecdote about a boastful German refugee from the east, in this case a dachshund. “I’m small now,” the little dog said, “but back home in the east I was a German shepherd.”
The story is long since obsolete. The majority of the new settlers, having lost even more in the war than those West German natives who had been bombed out of their homes, set to work with redoubled energy to build their lives anew. Former expellees and refugees, including the writer Günter Grass, the politician Willy Brandt, and the businessman Otto Friedrich, have climbed to the heights of West Germany society.

Still, the truncation of what had once been Germany has left a kind of residual trauma in many Germans, compounded by the split between West Germany and East Germany (the German Democratic Republic). While it would be extremely difficult to find a German willing to take up arms to recover the lands lost to the Russians, Poles, or Czechs, it would also be difficult to find a middle-aged German who would deny the historic "Germanness" of Breslau or Danzig or Königsberg.

This may explain the agony many West Germans underwent in 1972 when a package of treaties—to ratify the loss of the eastern territories and acknowledge the sovereignty of East Germany—came before West Germany’s parliament, the Bundestag. "Stop this gruesome game!" was the headline in one newspaper. Opposition was so strong that a no-confidence vote

Nürnberg, 1945. Germans who remember World War II are today a minority. Two-thirds of West Germany’s population was born after V-E Day.
in the Bundestag nearly toppled the government of Chancellor Willy Brandt. Yet a thin parliamentary majority ultimately accepted the "normalization" treaties with Warsaw and Moscow and, in the next (1972) popular election, Brandt received a resounding endorsement. In a larger sense, the West Germans sought thus to redefine what belonged to Germany.

The narrowness of this geographic definition is almost breathtaking when compared to the reach of German claims in recent and not so recent times—encompassing chunks of Alsace and Lorraine, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Austria, and Italy, not to mention the vast lands to the east. Today, Germans are content to vacation in these regions, not to invade them.

**Too Big and Too Small**

Nor does there seem to be even a hint of the revanche syndrome, so widespread in the Weimar era, on which Hitler flourished—even though Germany suffered much greater territorial losses in the Second World War than in the First and paid a blood tribute of 6.5 million lives, three times the German toll in the first global conflict. This can probably be attributed to the postwar East-West division of the surviving nation, which continues to be the main focus of German national interest.

In any event, the West Germans seem to have a better sense of proportion and perspective about their relative size and weight on the international scene than they did between 1900 and 1945, despite the fact that West Germany, during the early 1960s, became the dominant economic power in Europe. That sense of proportion was concisely defined in 1967 by Herbert Wehner, the great strategist of the Social Democratic Party. "Germany has a critical size," Wehner observed. "It is too big to play no role in the balance of powers and too small to keep the powers around it in balance."

Admittedly, the current Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, banking on West Germany's stability and strength, has been inclined to test the Wehner premise on occasion, notably by pursuing special bilateral relationships with France and Poland on the one hand and with the Soviet Union on the other. Yet few West Germans today seem willing or even able to consider Germany's situation in isolation from that of her neighbors, a tendency that

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is reinforced by the nation’s senior membership in the Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This willingness to view the present and future from an essentially European perspective is something new in German life. It has been nurtured by West Germans’ proclivity for foreign travel and by the country’s absorption of huge numbers of foreigners, some 4 million since the war, mostly from other European countries. Having begun life as a refuge for other Germans, the Federal Republic now finds itself becoming a haven for thousands of persecuted people from around the world: Turks, Pakistanis, Afghans, and, recently, Soviet Jews. In 1979, 51,000 people applied for political asylum in West Germany; in 1980, the figure was expected to be double that.

In addition to permanent residents, millions of others, mostly from the impoverished southern reaches of Europe, have spent time in West Germany as temporary workers, or Gastarbeiter, collecting garbage, cleaning streets, manning assembly lines, and generally performing tasks shunned by the Germans themselves. There are currently 1.7 million Gastarbeiter in West Germany, most of them Turks, Yugoslavs, Italians, and Greeks. (Their numbers declined from the 1973 peak of 2.4 million as a result of the economic belt-tightening occasioned by the rise of oil prices.) The Gastarbeiter also account for a share of West Germany’s “current accounts” deficit by sending billions of dollars out of the country to their families ($11 billion in 1979).

Contending with Garlic

German society has never been much of a melting pot—not, at least, since the barbarian invasions of the third through the fifth centuries. The recent influx of foreigners has, to some degree, helped to deepen understanding of alien cultures among a people that had been inculcated with radical xenophobia. But a certain backlash was inevitable in a crowded country where newcomers tend to congregate in ghetto-like isolation. Turks now make up one-third of the population of West Berlin’s Kreuzberg borough, clustered in the old working-class district’s southern section with its dark and crowded fin de siècle inner courtyards. There are 18 mosques in West Berlin.

As in England, and increasingly in the United States, the growing number of foreign workers has prompted demands for curbs on immigration. “It isn’t easy,” Chancellor Schmidt told a crowd in Ludwigshafen during last October’s election campaign, “for Germans who live in an apartment house and who don’t like the smell of garlic to have to put up with it and even to
have a lamb slaughtered in the hallway.” Such remarks are tempered by a recognition that Gastarbeiter, if not “here to stay,” are to some degree an economic necessity. Their presence, if only in a negative sense, may at least contribute to a clearer definition of what is “German.”

While it is customary to refer to East Germany as the country that put up the Wall, West Germany is a country of private walls, high fences, and double locks. The average West German carries as many keys as an American does credit cards. He keeps his fences mended, his hedges trimmed back from the sidewalk, lest a passer-by sue for a rip in his clothing, and his doorstep free of clutter, lest the postman trip and break a leg. An automobile (and 67 percent of West Germany’s households own one) is considered a mobile castle, and lie on the other motorist who even grazes its bumper.

West Germans cherish the security of their walled castles above most other qualities of their lives. This would seem to contradict the promise of an open society inherent in West Germany’s democratic 1949 constitution, but it undoubtedly represents a reaction to the chaos of the war and the uncertainty of the early postwar years, when black marketing, inflation, and political kidnapping were rife.

In the late 1960s and early ‘70s, the younger generation rebelled violently against this tradition of security-consciousness, forming thousands of communes (some of which still exist) in such places as Berlin, Hamburg, and Frankfurt. The Studentenrevolte was a harbinger of social and political change, including a shift away from the conservative rule of the long-dominant Christian Union Party coalition (led by Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, and Franz Josef Strauss) and toward the more innovative coalition of Social and Free Democrats (led by Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel). The Social Democrats even capitalized on the shift for a time with a slogan calling on Germans to “dare more democracy.”

However, the truly revolutionary urge remained confined to a small number of radicalized bourgeois youths, some of whom formed outright terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction led by Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader. Between 1970 and 1980, terrorists killed 56 people (including 14 policemen) and injured 161. Altogether, 25 terrorists were killed and 16 injured in confrontations involving 425 cases of arson or bombings and 60 robberies. *

*Terrorism is not confined to the Left. A neo-nazi group was apparently responsible for an explosion in a crowded Munich beer hall during the 1980 Oktoberfest. Twelve people were killed; 213 injured.
CAN PROSPERITY LAST?

Total industrial production in the truncated Federal Republic of Germany today is 50 percent greater than it was in all of Germany before World War II. The country's GNP per capita is considerably higher than America's. Fueled by the Korean War boom, West Germany ran up its first trade surplus in 1952; since then, writes economist Wolfgang Hager, "against all textbook wisdom, there has not been a single year with a trade deficit."

The West Germans achieved their Wirtschaftswunder thanks in part to good luck and U.S. aid (some $2 billion under the Marshall Plan alone). They also made a virtue of necessity and threw themselves into the export business. From Bismarck through Hitler, Germany's economic growth had been spurred primarily by domestic demand. But after the war, with domestic markets halved by territorial losses, and with millions of refugees seeking work, West Germany had no choice but to harness its reviving industrial potential to a world economy that was growing faster than its own.

A rough postwar consensus emerged after 1949 among business, labor, and Konrad Adenauer's new government. Bonn fostered a "structured" free-market environment (with tax incentives to promote reinvestment and exports). Labor and business leaders warily groped toward an uneasy concordat, eventually embodied in law, that guaranteed a role for unions in corporate decision-making ("codetermination") and thereby bought three decades of labor peace. The blue-collar rank-and-file worked harder than they "had to." Indeed, as historian Hans Gatzke has noted, "the most important element in Germany's economic recovery was the industry and self-discipline of its people, eager to slave and save in order to pull themselves out of the economic abyss."

All of this, combined with the chronic undervaluation of the mark (which made German goods especially attractive abroad), established the Federal Republic as a worldwide merchant.

West Germany, however, faces a new set of circumstances in the 1980s. Its economy, in a sense, has "matured." The mark has been steadily revalued upward, and there is greater competition from Japan, the United States, and Western Europe in foreign trade. Labor unions increasingly deplore the presence of foreign Gastarbeiter at a time of high unemployment, while some business executives now seek imaginative ways to by-pass the "codetermination" statutes. Bonn sees a need for "export substitution"—finding new domestic markets for German goods. The transition from heavy manufacturing to an American-style "service economy" still lies ahead. Energy costs, here as elsewhere, keep rising.

In short, the next thirty years of prosperity may not come as easily as the last thirty.
These repeated terrorist incidents revived fundamentally conservative instincts among the majority of West Germans, instincts reinforced by stiff legislation aimed at curbing "radicals." As with other national issues, such as reliance on nuclear energy, the West Germans were quick to cast the debate over terrorism in ideological terms of Left versus Right.

**Vying for "Germanness"**

Conceivably, Germany is the most ideological of all nations. It is no coincidence that the principal thinkers of 19th-century socialism—Marx, Lassalle, Engels, Bebel—were Germans. However, the roots of ideological contest, so alien to Anglo-Saxon tradition, go further back in German history—to the 16th-century Peasant Wars, Reformation, and Counter Reformation. The conflicts between German Catholics and German Protestants were so devastating that, in retrospect, one must ask whether it was bad luck that the Germans were ever converted to Christianity.

Even today, confessional lines are sharper in Germany than they are in any other country. This has led, for instance, to such grotesque excesses as the selection of television anchormen and commentators not by any criterion of merit but by their allegiance to Christian or socialist parties. Similarly, the schools of the ten Länder, or federal states, have curricula determined often by the party that controls the state government. A child schooled in Bayern (Bavaria) might thus find strangely different conditions upon moving to a school in Bremen.

The ideological contest is replayed on another scale in the rivalry between West and East Germany, each of which seeks to portray itself as the home of the free—the one under the banner of welfare-state market capitalism, the other under the banner of communism. (Here the Federal Republic has a distinct advantage, since some 75 percent of East Germany’s population of 17 million regularly watches West German television, posing problems for the communist leadership.) On a more mundane level, East and West Germany vie to outdo each other in preserving "Germanness," whether by erecting museums or by emphasizing traditional styles. There was a time not long ago when West Germans fancied going to dine in East Berlin, to get away from the Gasterbeiter waiters of the West. "If you want a real German meal served by a real German waiter in a dress coat, you have to go to East Berlin," a West German told me.

That urge to revive dormant German tradition has been especially strong in recent years among the middle-aged bourgeoi-
sies: in the refurbishing of old family portraits; the display of tin soldier collections; the acquisition of Biedermeier furniture; the popularity of folk festivals; the (abortive) attempt to restore the 18th-century Great Tattoo (*Grosse Zapfenstreich*) of military drum and fife in the West German Army.

It has also been reflected very widely in careful restoration and preservation of architectural treasures (and even of whole towns, such as Nördlingen and Rothenburg) dating as far back as the Middle Ages. Modern commercial concerns have begun designing their new establishments in a style that accommodates itself to Neoclassical or Renaissance buildings in their vicinity. Much of this has occurred in the context of regional pride, which tends to underscore the intensely provincial character of much West German life.

It was the express intention of the American, British, and French occupation powers to foster decentralization in postwar Germany. Thus, police administration and education were made the responsibility of the 10 *Länder* plus West Berlin. But it was the establishment of the federal capital in the small university city of Bonn (population then: about 100,000) and the denial of seat-of-government status to Berlin that effectively provincialized all of West Germany.

Henceforth, Frankfurt (an imperial German capital in medieval times), Munich, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Cologne, and Hanover would vie for national attention, but none had the strength to command allegiance as a successor capital. By the same token, the larger cities developed supraregional newspapers, such as *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Welt*, and *Zeit*, yet none has acquired a commanding lead as the main national daily or weekly. (West Germany does, however, have several national news magazines of wide circulation, such as *Stern* and *Der Spiegel*.)

**The Seventeenth Drop**

During the 1970s, provincialism was also evident in “voter initiatives” on both township and state ballots to address controversial local issues. Often local lobbying groups focused on environmental problems: a hazardous waste dump; a building developer’s bid for park or forest land; a proposed nuclear power station. The enthusiasm and commitment of some of these regional groups spawned an ecological movement on a national scale in the latter part of the decade. The Green Party, founded in 1980 as a coalition of environmentalists, opponents of nuclear energy, and people disturbed generally about the
The radicalism of the 1960s lingers on among West Germany's young. In this 1980 cartoon, middle-aged burghers are discussing imaginative ways of dealing with the "youth problem."

By Hans Sigg for Weltblicke, Schwei,.

encroachments of a highly industrialized society, polled 1.5 percent of the vote in the October 5, 1980, federal elections. (This was well below the 5 percent minimum required for entry into the Bundestag.)

The willingness of individual Germans to take matters into their own hands, to challenge authority, to stand up for rights that they feel are threatened represents a new phenomenon in German society. It reflects the penetration of the democratic spirit to the grassroots. To be sure, the impulse to preserve one's rights often takes the form of going to court. There is an especially strong litigious streak in the West Germans.

Frequently, West Germans file suits over the pettiest imagined infractions of the law: an insult muttered in a tavern; a gesture by a motorist such as tapping the brow to impute empty-headedness in another driver; a householder's failure to remove winter ice from his sidewalk. A certain righteousness accompanies this litigious spirit, rooted perhaps in the ideological contests that have long played a prominent role in the German consciousness. The urge to be right and to be proven right is still very strong.

Once, in a youth hostel, I sat opposite a German boy who was consuming a liter of Beaujolais by himself. When he had finished, I told him with a touch of malice that according to legend
there were still 16 drops left in the bottle. The boy proceeded to upend the bottle and to count. The first dozen drops came fairly swiftly and the sixteenth only after some minutes, but then he shook and twirled the bottle until a seventeenth drop fell from the rim. "You were wrong!" he exulted.

The great leveling effect of the last world war, literally and figuratively, has made itself felt throughout the social structure of West Germany. True, a remnant of the old class stratification lingers on, as does a remnant of the old wealth in industrial and banking circles. People named Flick and Thyssen and the heirs of Hohenzollerns and Bismarcks continue to enjoy a certain social prominence. Workers continue to drink beer, raise rabbits or pigeons, and go bowling. The bourgeoisie continues to drink wine, attend concerts, and take walks on Sunday. Students at the smaller universities have revived the customs of dueling (some 2,500 students out of a university population of 1 million belong to dueling fraternities) and drinking in unison.

Banking on the Future

Yet it would be impossible to characterize West Germany as a class-ridden society. The great majority of the citizenry shows no signs of cultivating a class consciousness. Rather, the sharpest social distinctions have tended to be between Germans with a higher education and Germans who completed their schooling at the secondary level. A German with only 10 or 12 years of schooling is likely to have his career in an enterprise or in the civil service strictly curtailed.

Still, the values of the lower-income groups remain fundamentally the same as those of the more affluent: security, property ownership, and a sense of personal prosperity. Elaborate programs of welfare benefits, unemployment compensation, health insurance, and pensions have all added to the sense of well-being and stability. At the same time, these social security programs, which in the main have enjoyed the support of all political parties, created a considerable hedge against inordinate German fears of inflation (which now runs at 5.5 percent a year, the highest since 1965).*

The memory of the economic and political ruin brought on by Germany's inflation during the 1920s is still strong. It helps explain why West Germans are willing to contribute, on the av-

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*Unemployment compensation, for instance, amounts to 68 percent of one's pay; social security payments range from $300 to $1,000 a month, depending on longevity in a job and wage rates. Health insurance usually covers 80 percent of treatment costs, hospital costs are almost fully covered, and a worker may receive up to 6 weeks pay while on sick leave.
AFTER THE ECONOMIC "MIRACLE," SOME PROBLEMS

THE GERMANS AS CONSUMERS: A 1977 COMPARISON

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In his native land, he has been praised and damned like few men in this century: as a "renegade" by communists; an "old Bolshevik" by right-wingers; a "primordial rock" by admirers. But, unlike Konrad Adenauer or Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, the 75-year-old parliamentary whip of West Germany's dominant Social Democratic Party (SPD), is virtually unknown in the English-speaking world. Yet Wehner has had an extraordinary impact on the evolution of German politics and society since 1945.

His career spans—and reflects—50 turbulent years of German history. During the 1920s and '30s, he was a member of the German Communist Party. Called to service in Moscow, he barely escaped Stalin's purges. He was arrested in Sweden in 1942 while organizing a secret mission to Berlin to revive the underground German Communist apparatus; while in jail, he converted from communism to socialism. In 1946, Wehner began his postwar political career as a protégé of socialist leader Kurt Schumacher. By 1957, he had attained the deputy chairmanship of the Social Democratic Party, a post he held until 1973.

A superb organizer and brilliant political strategist, Wehner is generally credited in Germany with three achievements. First, he provided the impetus for the Social Democratic Party's 1959 swing away from Marxist doctrine and toward acceptance of the Federal Republic as it was—allied to the West and committed to NATO. Second, he prepared the SPD for a short-lived coalition with its archrival, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), paving the way for the various coalition governments that have ruled West Germany since 1966.

Finally, Wehner, the godfather of West Germany's Ostpolitik, has kept up the pressure, publicly and privately, to keep alive the issue of Germany's continuing East-West partition—and to find ways to ameliorate the plight of separated families.

"For the Germans and probably for Europe too," he has said, "it would be best if the Germans lived in a united democratic state, and could organize their relations to the rest of the world. But that does not depend solely on our will, for the day when this unity comes will be determined by the [Great] Powers. Whether it comes and if it comes at all is something we alone can determine."

―D.B. "The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1981"
erage, more than 50 percent of their earnings to the payment of (progressive) income taxes and the maintenance of the various social security and medical insurance programs, as well as to set aside regular amounts for savings. Despite a growing indulgence in luxury goods and services, from expensive soaps to vacations in Thailand, the German tradition of thrift is still very powerful. Savings are encouraged by high interest rates for such basic investments as housing. West Germans have accumulated savings worth $4,000 per capita, almost 10 times the rate of Americans. (However, balance-of-payments deficits of nearly $15 billion began to chew up investment capital in 1980.)

While there are people who live poorly in West Germany (Gastarbeiter, for the most part), it would be difficult to find a German who is poorly housed. The barracks life of the early postwar years has practically vanished, but there is a shortage of new housing, created in part by real estate speculation in crowded metropolitan areas, in part by laggard public housing construction. Rents for small apartments in the big cities have risen to $600 a month and more. Young people have taken to "squatting" in vacant dwellings designated for destruction (and, eventually, replacement), causing violent clashes with the authorities in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.

Can Comity Last?

Still, it would appear that their general, new-found comfort makes the Germans easier to live with, less marked by the envy, fear, and hatred so prevalent in the interwar years. The sense of comity, or perhaps the desire for comity, has meant that blue-collar workers have frequently, though not always, heeded union calls not to strike; it has meant that entrepreneurs and bankers feel comfortable with the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. The idea of cooperation between social sectors was actually institutionalized in 1951 in the coal and steel industries in the practice of "codetermination"—appointing worker representatives to sit on the governing boards of the coal and steel industries—and, in the late 1960s, in the practice of concerted action, devised by Economics Minister Karl Schiller, which brought industry, trade union, and government economic leaders together periodically to create an acceptable range for nonbinding wage and price guidelines.

In Germany, the effect of such developments has been to eliminate, or at least modify, potential sources of acute social tension and, conversely, to create a sense of common social purpose. What is not entirely clear is the extent to which a "com-
mon purpose" depends on the Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle, West Germany’s three decades of steady economic growth. How firmly will this social consensus hold up during the 1980s if production continues to decline and unemployment and inflation continue to creep upward?

A Fatherland without Fathers

That could be a problem, but in my view, the real tensions in West German society lie elsewhere, in the realm of the psyche. To begin with, there was the failure in the early years of the Federal Republic to come fully to grips with the immediate nazi past, a failure that was practically ordained by the Western Allied occupation powers. The cause was the Cold War, commencing with brutal force in Germany less than three years after the end of World War II in the form of a Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948. The Western powers swiftly abandoned their plans and programs for "reeducation" of the Germans and virtually terminated their "de-nazification" efforts in favor of integrating West Germany into the common effort against the communists.

Annemarie Renger, a Social Democrat who later became President of the Bundestag, recalled those early postwar years: "Suddenly with the blockade, we saw we didn’t have to change and could stay the way we were. We pursued our own personal interests, with a bad conscience that we had gotten off so easily." In effect, the national memory was short-circuited.

From this act of mental amputation, West German novelists such as Heinrich Böll and film-makers, including Rainer Fassbinder, Volker Schlöndorff, and Alexander Kluge, derived much of their material. They sought to fill in the gaps opened by the sudden transformation of their countrymen from occupied enemies to prized allies. One should keep in mind, of course, that the nazi experience has not been totally sublimated, or buried, as the militarist era has been in Japan. Rather, there have been sporadic revivals of interest and attention—centered around a new French film about concentration camps, Joachim Fest’s biography of Hitler, or an American TV serial (Holocaust).

While writers and film-makers have attempted to recreate a kind of continuity in German life, and are often richly subsidized and rewarded by the federal government or private foundations, most of their work seems to have a remote or provincial quality. For instance, little of the political life of West Germany is reflected in literature except as caricature. This has not been a matter of deficient craftsmanship or lack of originality, but
rather an incapacity to create a major work on the order, say, of a Thomas Mann or a Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.

A second and related source of alienation and tension has been the diminution not only of a hierarchical social order but also of customs of authority and obedience. The concept of hierarchy was removed in a formal sense by the adoption of the Federal Basic Law in 1949, the third article of which declared all human beings to be equal before the law. But authority, principally in the form of rule by fathers and (male) teachers, had already been greatly undermined during six years of war when most of the fathers, and teachers, were at the front—many never to return, many to languish another five years in prison or in forced labor camps. In some respects, Germany in those years was a matriarchy, and the strength of the nation lay in its women rather than in its men. (In 1978, well over half of the

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**LANDS LOST BY GERMANY IN TWO WORLD WARS**

![Map of lands lost by Germany in two world wars](image)


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Federal Republic's 469,741 teachers were women.) It was, well into the 1950s, a fatherland without fathers, also because the German men in those years were preoccupied with rebuilding their economic lives.

The effort by the men to reassert traditional concepts of order and authority during the 1950s and '60s, the period the West Germans called the Restoration, contributed to the Student Revolt that began in 1967. That was, above all, a rebellion against outworn and potentially repressive concepts of conformity, against a sense of being watched or reprimanded for signs of disorderliness, and against a feeling of confinement in a country where the population density is 639 persons per square mile, 10 times the density in the United States.

Hothouse Democracy

Presumably, the same instincts lie behind the almost hectic urge to travel abroad by the millions (contributing to West Germany's balance-of-payments problem), and to emigrate at a rate of 50,000 a year, as if to offset the arrival of foreigners seeking political asylum in West Germany. In this respect alone, West Germany has become a very mobile society. Even its young drug addicts in outpatient rehabilitation programs can afford to visit the United States on their welfare funds.

One senses that the spirit of adventure remains strong among the Germans despite all the constraints, pleasures, and comforts West German society has created. Now and then, it bursts out: a mountain climber, Reinhold Messner, conquering hitherto unattainable peaks in the Himalayas; a wingwalker, Jaromír Wagner, crossing the Atlantic; a daring rescue of hostages in Somalia in 1977.

For the more sedentary burghers, there are thousands of "cliques," the groups of friends from the workplace, the vacation spot, or the profession, who meet with alarming regularity to celebrate their togetherness with wine or beer or schnapps. It is probably a replication of the old guild traditions or the almost moribund custom of the Stammtisch (regular table) in old taverns where fraternity brothers used to meet.

It is an axiom that the Germans have demonstrated the ability to make all political systems function, from feudalism to constitutional monarchy, from fascism to communism to the democracy of the Federal Republic. The German problem has been to flesh out these walking skeletons of theory and infuse them with the human spirit. The democracy of West Germany has tested and proven the fundamental strength of the 1949 consti-
tution. An official tendency merely to inform the public or to lecture it from on high has been replaced by the notion of democratic discussion. Even the West German press, though given to preaching on the one hand or denunciation on the other (following a habit of nihilism that goes back to the 1920s), has become more tolerant of opposing views. The idea of promoting discussion without declaring a winner or crushing a loser was introduced in 1952 by Werner Höfer, a radio-television journalist whose program, *Internationaler Frühschoppen*, is the longest running and most popular TV show in the country.

In a few years (1993), the Federal Republic will have surpassed the Germany of the Hohenzollern Kaisers in maintaining a German state and system of government in peace at home and abroad. The West Germans have made democracy work, and work well. One of the quaint experiences of recent times is for Americans or Britons to be lectured to by Germans on the theory and practice of democracy. Germans have always been eager students and even more eager schoolmasters.

Still—and here I take a deep breath—the lingering impression of West Germany is that of a hothouse, with a connection to the west, a connection to the east, and a dependency on a modicum of economic sunshine. There are NATO and the European Community on the one hand, Ostpolitik commitments and benefits on the other, and the pendulum effect of political and cultural trends between East and West Germany. Would this plant called democracy survive if it were dug up and replanted in the soil of a reunited Germany? Or will the West Germans, intensely preoccupied with themselves, and cross-pollinated socially and economically, subtly alter the breed before that time comes, if it ever does? I continue to hold my breath.
A PLACE IN THE SUN

by David Schoenbaum

Three decades after the contentious postwar reorganization of Central Europe, the largest fragment of a once-devastated nation—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)—is now a power in world affairs.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's debut at a Western summit meeting on Guadeloupe in early 1979 only confirmed the obvious. As the world's third-largest industrial economy, and a global trader second only to the United States, West Germany exports 23 percent of its GNP (versus 8 percent for the Americans). Its generous foreign-aid program, designed in part to keep its Third World customers happy, is the West's third biggest.

As suppliers (and consumers) of goods and services, the West Germans are ubiquitous. They build Volkswagens in Pennsylvania, airports in the Soviet Union, nuclear power complexes in Brazil, solar installations in Kuwait, medical research laboratories in Egypt, desalination facilities in Libya, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The Federal Republic's works adorn the planet and extend beyond it, with a sophisticated European Spacelab, mostly German-built, scheduled for launching aboard the U.S. Space Shuttle in 1983.

No German city today matches the "world city" standards of Imperial or Weimar Berlin. But the Deutsche Mark (DM), created by the American military government in 1948, has edged out the pound sterling as the old Reichsmark never did to become a world reserve currency second only to the dollar. Despite the rising price of OPEC oil, Bonn has managed to hold both inflation and unemployment below six percent.

Actually, the Federal Republic has been an economic giant since the late 1950s although, in Willy Brandt's phrase, it long remained a "political dwarf" in world affairs—partly by choice. But, during the past decade, West Germany has grown in international stature. Its representatives receive respectful attention in Moscow and Riyadh, in Tokyo, Tripoli, Beijing, and, lately, even in Washington, once accustomed to taking Bonn's compliance for granted.

Be it democracy's survival in postrevolutionary Portugal,
the financial bail-out of Turkey, the economic health of Israel or Poland, the effectiveness of last year's Olympic boycott, or the periodic support of the dollar, the success of a growing number of Western (and Eastern) initiatives now depends heavily on quiet decisions made in Bonn. "We have to live up to our growing responsibility," Chancellor Schmidt observed last November. "But we don't want our German role in the world to be written too large, . . . awakening expectations that can't be fulfilled."

On the face of it, West Germans enjoy the best of at least three worlds. The Federal Republic is the keystone of the NATO alliance and the European Economic Community; it is the bridge-builder, via Ostpolitik, to Eastern Europe; and it is the beneficiary-participant in numerous bilateral pacts with the United States, France, and the Soviet Union.

Bonn has managed, despite the recent Polish troubles, to maintain a tolerable relationship with its powerful East German sibling on the other side of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall. East-West German trade totaled nearly $5 billion in 1980,
up 34 percent over 1979. While Erich Honecker’s Communist regime last October doubled the amount of “hard” currency Western visitors must exchange daily after they enter its territory—from about $7 to $14—West Berliners and West Germans continue to visit their colleagues, friends, and relatives in the “other Germany” by the hundreds of thousands. Some 50,000 phone calls are made every day between the two nations.

West Germany’s postwar achievement is all the more remarkable for a nation whose earlier leaders asserted the primacy of an aggressive foreign policy and pursued that policy around the world. From Waterloo through World War II, successive generations of Germans lived and died with the same obsessions: Germany as the country in the middle, Germany with its nightmares over hostile European coalitions (and its capacity for bringing such coalitions into being), Germany in pursuit of markets and a place in the sun from Samoa to Togo to Baghdad.

Looking East

The traumatic outcome of World War II (and the subsequent partition of Germany) made these traditional concerns irrelevant. For a time, West Germany, like Japan, had neither the need nor the capacity for any foreign policy at all. Its territory dismembered, its economy in ruins, its cultural and social structures in disarray, its politics in suspension, post-Potsdam Germany became a passive object of international politics. Its leaders’ choices were effectively defined by the occupying powers; France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Defeated and demoralized, demobilized and displaced, millions of Germans wanted nothing more than to restore the freedom and security of their private lives.

Konrad Adenauer, the venerable Christian Democrat and the Federal Republic’s founding Chancellor (1949–63), was convinced that only cooperation with the Western allies, and especially with Washington, would ensure the Federal Republic’s future prosperity and safety. He led his nation, seriatim, into the European Coal and Steel Community, into rearmament, and into NATO, and he accepted the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles on German soil. As for the question of national reunifica-

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tion—the nation's major preoccupation—Adenauer counted on Western strength and cohesion. There would be no flirtations with the Soviet bloc in general and certainly no dalliances with the new communist regime to the east, the German Democratic Republic, which Adenauer, to the end of his life, continued to call the "Soviet Zone."

The West Germans enjoyed the fruits of Adenauer's Westpolitik. With hard work and Marshall Plan aid, protected by the U.S. security umbrella, the West German economy recovered rapidly. Exports flourished, and the new DM acquired the luster Germans once associated with the nation's military might.

Yet, by the time of Adenauer's reluctant retirement in 1963, his Christian Democratic Union's days in power were numbered. As the opposition Social Democrats untiringly pointed out, living in the West's shadow had not brought about German reunification or any improvement in the lives and liberties of 17 million East Germans. They argued that Germany's future was as a "senior partner" in Europe, not as the everlasting junior partner of the United States. Germans in and out of government believed that it was time to start easing Cold War tensions by acknowledging the postwar status quo in Eastern Europe. Besides, the communist nations to the east represented a potential new market (possibly the last new market) for West German goods and know-how.

Already Foreign Minister in an interim coalition with Adenauer's colleagues, Social Democrat Willy Brandt took his party's arguments to the voters on election Sunday, October 21, 1969; 24 hours later, he emerged as West Germany's Chancellor. The new leaders in Bonn moved quickly to negotiate treaties with their communist neighbors. Westpolitik was not scuttled—economically and strategically it remained essential—but it was joined by a complementary Ostpolitik, a rapprochement with the East. The goal, then as later, was "balance."

Today, the abstraction Ostpolitik includes such tangibles as a West German–built aluminum plant in Siberia, German-built pipelines to carry Soviet natural gas to Essen, German coal imports from Polish Silesia, and over $20 billion in overall trade with communist nations—regimes that the Bundesbank describes with studied neutrality as "centrally planned economies."" Ostpolitik also embraces continued repatriation of

There has been considerable concern in Washington over the European-Soviet natural gas deal. As it now stands, the Soviets, with West German financing and technology, intend to build a 3,600-mile natural gas pipeline from Siberia to the Federal Republic. The gas will be purchased by France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as West Germany. The FRG estimates that, if the project goes through, 30 percent of its natural gas needs will be supplied by the Soviet Union in 1990 (versus five percent in 1980).
WEST GERMANY'S FAR-FLUNG FOREIGN INTERESTS


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ethnic Germans—50,000 in 1980, half of them from Poland, another quarter from East Germany—as well as East-West German family reunions on Black Sea beaches, and some 20 million trips a year between West Berlin and West Germany on autobahns where the sudden tightening of Soviet restrictions on travel once served as a warning of impending Cold War crises.

Scrapping an Arms Deal

What neither Ostpolitik nor other successes have provided is an abiding sense of self-assurance in a people long more disposed than most to find the cloud in every silver lining. The Federal Republic survives thanks to a close relationship with both NATO and the Soviet Union and a formidable industrial machine that for 30 years has sustained social tranquility and political civility. Having come to appreciate the status quo, the Germans now must take pains to maintain it. It is not always easy.

The recent debate on arms sales is symptomatic of the fragility of Bonn's political equilibrium. The Germans decided after World War II that arms sales only meant trouble and resolved to restrict their business primarily to NATO countries and to sell no weapons to nations that might actually use them. West German leaders violated this prudent policy at their peril. The revelation in 1965 that the Federal Republic had for eight years secretly been shipping arms to Israel led to a diplomatic breach with Arab states and a triumphant reception in Cairo for East Germany's Walter Ulbricht.

But now there is a domestic angle. Arms sales mean export revenue at a time when West Germany's current-accounts balance is $15 billion in the red. They mean jobs at a time when unemployment in the Federal Republic is at a record high (some 230,000 West Germans are employed in the weapons industry) and the economy is in a slump.

Last year, Bonn tentatively agreed to sell 300 Leopard

More than most nations, West Germany lives by trade. Its exports last year topped $187 billion, not far behind total U.S. exports. Automobiles and heavy industrial equipment account for about one-quarter of the total. The biggest import item is oil. Often overlooked in the American press is West Germany's sizable foreign aid program. In 1979, the Federal Republic disbursed grants and loans of some $3 billion to about 100 nations, most of them in the Third World. (This compares with U.S. economic aid of $7.1 billion to 112 countries that same year.) Bonn plans to increase its foreign aid by 12.5 percent annually during the next three years.

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tanks, various armored vehicles, an unspecified number of Cheetah anti-aircraft missiles, and other weapons systems to Saudi Arabia. In return, West German businessmen hoped to secure some $9.2 billion annually in Saudi contracts. That would help pay West Germany's mounting oil bill. But many in Chancellor Schmidt's own party opposed the scheme, arguing that, whatever the short-term advantages of the weapons transfer, the Federal Republic's long-term interest was to keep its distance from international trouble spots. Last April, Bonn quietly called off the deal.

The Japanese Challenge

Many of those who oppose West Germany's weapons sales also oppose Bonn's decision to press forward with nuclear energy—the only way, the government contends, to reduce reliance on expensive OPEC oil in a country where the sun shines fitfully and coal is increasingly costly (and dangerous) to mine. Some 70,000 persons demonstrated last March against construction of a new nuclear power plant in Brokdorf, near Hamburg.

The issue goes beyond keeping German homes warm in the winter and illuminated at night. West Germany's economy, like those of other industrialized nations, depends on high-technology exports and on energy-intensive manufacturing. Excluded by design from postwar avionics and unable to keep up with the Japanese and Americans in microelectronics, the Germans fatefully invested a great deal of money and ingenuity in nuclear technology. One object was to supply 45 percent of West Germany's electricity needs by 1985—a goal that will not be met. (In 1980, nuclear energy accounted for less than 14 percent of the nation's electricity.)

Another aim was to generate income from sales of reactors abroad. Here Bonn ran into trouble in 1977 when the Carter administration sought to block West Germany's proposed sales of nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment plants to Brazil and Argentina. The White House called the German plans another step toward worldwide nuclear proliferation. West Germany went ahead with the sales anyway. In a nation where one out of four jobs depends on exports, the issue was as much an economic matter as a question of diplomacy. The deals with Brazil and Argentina are together worth $6 billion—as much as West Germany spent to import iron and steel in 1980.

Economists in Bonn shudder at the deficit in the Federal Republic's current account (which measures the value of trade,
services, and other international transactions). Oil is not the only culprit here, although it is West Germany’s biggest single import, and its price more than doubled between 1978 and 1980, to $36.16 per barrel. One out of every five dollars of export income flows out of West Germany to such countries as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, and Algeria. (Much of this money, however, is in turn recaptured by the German businessmen who quadrupled the Federal Republic’s exports to OPEC countries between 1973 and 1977.)

Other factors behind the current-accounts deficit include the millions of foreign workers in West Germany who send money out of the country. And German tourists spend twice as much overseas, all told, as tourists from any other country. (In 1979, foreign tourists brought $6.5 billion into the country, while German travelers took $20 billion out.) Only recently have the Germans noticed that they are also importing 28 percent of their cars, one-third of them (250,000) from Japan. Only the Federal Republic’s oil bill tops its imported auto bill, and German automakers, like their American counterparts, have suddenly discovered an interest in “protection.”

West Germany’s general economic health has been good for the Germans and good for the world. But the Federal Republic’s “locomotive” economy is but one reason for the nation’s impor-
tance on the international scene. The Germans remain where they have always been, at the center of a fractious and productive continent. Their country is crucial simply as a piece of real estate, facing 46 Warsaw Pact divisions across the Elbe. For the Federal Republic, the Cold War remains a fact of life.

Since World War II, the Germans have lived with two fears. One is that America won't defend them. The other is that it will. A chill in Soviet-American relations, be it the result of trouble in Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador, or anywhere else, inevitably makes West Germans feel a cold coming on. Frenchmen, confident that NATO forces stand between Paris and Moscow, sometimes kid themselves that they can always stay aloof, if they choose. Most West Germans, particularly those of the ruling generation, have no such delusions.

Like other NATO countries (except the United States, Britain, and Canada), West Germany continues to draft its youth—for 15-month tours. The country maintains a well-equipped, well-motivated Army of 500,000 with a mobilization potential of one million; a modern Air Force comprising 561 combat aircraft; and a serviceable little North Sea Navy. Defense spending ($20 billion in 1980) has regularly constituted about three percent of a growing GNP.

Guns or Butter?

With the largest armed force among the European NATO allies, the West Germans are willing to do their share. It is no secret, however, that Bonn was uneasy with the Reagan administration's postinaugural focus on El Salvador and its chilly fundamentalism on the subject of East-West relations. German leaders prefer quiet on their eastern front. They favor continued strategic arms talks between Washington and Moscow.

But the West Germans are also realists when it comes to the USSR. In 1977, Chancellor Schmidt was among the first to warn publicly of the threat of the Soviets' new SS-20 medium-range missiles aimed at Western Europe. His Social Democratic Party in 1979, despite its "dovish" nature, overwhelmingly endorsed the government's decision to allow the deployment of 108 countervailing U.S. Pershing II missiles on German soil.

And, stung by recent complaints from Washington, Bonn has grudgingly agreed to raise its defense budget. West German

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*In a 1980 poll conducted by the Hamburg weekly Stern, 77 percent of West German respondents agreed that the United States would go to war with the Soviet Union in the event of a Warsaw Pact move against the Federal Republic. Only 58 percent of Americans surveyed concurred.
leaders recognize the need to be prepared should many of the American troops in Central Europe be abruptly airlifted to the Middle East. They also want to pre-empt a new "Mansfield Amendment" mandating withdrawal of some or all of the 230,000 U.S. troops from German soil on the grounds that "rich Europeans" refuse to "pay their share" of the NATO burden. (Senator Mike Mansfield, D.-Mont., now U.S. Ambassador to Japan, proposed in 1971 that the United States unilaterally cut its troop levels in Western Europe by one-half. The Senate defeated the proposal, 61 to 36.)

The unanswered question is: How much more can West Germany actually afford to spend on defense? The country's military budget is penned in on three sides—by the rising rate of inflation (now 5.3 percent), the rising price of imported oil, and the rising price of American weapons and training programs. Defense Minister Hans Apel reported last year that he was running as fast as he could to stay in the same place. Soon he was falling behind. In March 1981, Apel announced that production or acquisition of several new weapons systems, including a new main battle tank and new combat aircraft, would be delayed or abandoned owing to the cost squeeze.

If Bonn is to spend more on defense, the money will have to come, as it does in other countries, from domestic civilian programs. As in the United States, that is a looming question for the legislature. The Bundestag deputies are loath to slash the social welfare portion of the budget—especially at a time of economic dislocations.

So all is not roses for the Federal Republic, as its citizens are generally the first to emphasize. But today, most nations of the world would regard themselves as fortunate to have West Germany's problems, instead of their own.
"Germany is Hamlet!" exclaimed the German poet Ferdinand Freiligrath in 1844.

Historian Gordon Craig, in Germany, 1866–1945 (Oxford, 1978, cloth; 1980, paper), chose Freiligrath's remark as an epigraph to his survey of the "tragic story" of German history from Prince Otto von Bismarck's triumph over Austria to the fall of the Third Reich.

As Craig suggests, the same "pale cast of thought" that prevented Hamlet from avenging his father's death—the indecisiveness and confusion, the incapacity for self-criticism, the paralysis of the will—dogged Germany as well. It hindered the pursuit of political freedom, and eventually it destroyed the country's unity and political culture.

In the view of many historians, Germany suffered because, unlike France, Britain, and the United States, her people dallied with but refused to embrace Western liberalism—the political legacy of the Enlightenment. In his densely written The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Univ. of Chicago, 1957, cloth; 1973, paper), Leonard Krieger probes the traditional German concept of the state. He finds that from the inception of the Holy Roman Empire, the loose confederation that made up "Germany" from the Middle Ages to 1806, the Germans considered political freedom a mere privilege that could be granted, or revoked, by the "prince."

Krieger notes that even as Englishman John Locke in the 17th century was defending individual rights against the usurpations of government, German political theorist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94) was insisting that "the supreme sovereign can rightfully force citizens to all things which he judges to be of any advantage to the public good."

Hajo Holborn, in A History of Modern Germany (Knopf, 1964), agrees with Krieger. The notion of the absolute authority of the state, he argues, came to full bloom in Prussia under Frederick the Great (1712–86), who built his kingdom into a formidable European power. Frederick's absolutism—he methodically subordinated the rights of his subjects to the needs of the Army, bureaucracy, and nobility—carried over into Bismarck's Empire (1871–1918) and became its major flaw.

Historians have found other flaws in Bismarck's Germany. In The Social Foundations of German Unification, 1858–1871, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1969, cloth & paper), Theodore Hamerow describes the class divisions of the Second Reich, where wealth and nobility remained the monopoly of a privileged caste. In Prussia, Bismarck retained the old constitution of 1849 with its system of "three-class suffrage" that gave more parliamentary representation to the moneyed minority than to the lower-class majority.

George O. Kent considers Bismarck himself, in Bismarck and His Times (Southern Ill. Univ., 1978, cloth & paper). The Chancellor's bold personality, his diplomatic genius, and even his ruthlessness—he warned his compatriots that only "iron and blood" would unify Ger-
many—served him well as he took on foreign and domestic foes and forged a German empire.

But, as Kent reminds us, the conservative Prince had "some noticeable blind spots." He never recognized the necessity of coming to terms with socialism, for example, whose adherents he oppressed, and whose cause he thereby furthered.

According to sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, in Society and Democracy in Germany (Doubleday, 1967, cloth; Norton, 1979, paper), Western-style liberalism remained out of Germany's reach until the "social basis of authoritarian government" was destroyed. This occurred, ironically, as a result of Adolf Hitler's revolution during the 1930s, which jacked the bulwarks of Bismarck's order—the Junkers entrenched in the Army, bureaucracy, and judiciary—and swept away many of the social vestiges of the old German Empire.

The problem in Germany had always been, as Fritz Stern comments in The Failure of Illiberalism (Knopf, 1971, cloth; Univ. of Chicago, 1976, paper), that "revolution came from above," as when, for example, Bismarck introduced unemployment insurance to forestall social unrest. Yet the stern munificence of Bismarck's "State Socialism," like political freedom, was subject to the ruler's caprice. "Reform" came from above in Nazi Germany as well, except that the changes brought on by mass mobilization and, eventually, total war were so devastating that most of the last class distinctions were virtually wiped out. In the end, Hitler unintentionally did more than any other German leader to break down the old authoritarianism—and so make post-war democracy possible.

What of the "other" Germany—the peace-loving and cosmopolitan Germany of poets and thinkers? Ironically, Ronald Gray, in The German Tradition in Literature, 1871-1945 (Cambridge, 1965), ascribes at least partial responsibility for the rise of nazism to German writers and philosophers.

Gray condemns the German intellectuals' obsessive idealism—and their aversion to everyday politics. He sees prototypes of the totalitarian mind-set in the poetry of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), and the will to power philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who once said that "a master race is either on top or it is destroyed."

Erich Heller disagrees. As he remarks in The Disinherited Mind (Harcourt, 1975, paper only), the works of many German poets, writers, and thinkers, from Goethe to Kafka, embody "distinctive symptoms of all modern literature," particularly "the consciousness of life's depreciation" amid the social dislocations of the Industrial Revolution.

The German expressionist painters at the beginning of the century, as Peter Selz notes in his engaging German Expressionist Painting (Univ. of Calif., 1957, cloth; 1974, paper), are a case in point. From Ernst Ludwig Kirchner's desolate landscapes of the modern industrial city to Franz Marc's pantheistic, wildly colorful portraits of foxes, horses, and cows, these artists evoked what they saw as the perceived spiritual emptiness of their time.

The continuation of this "modernist revolt" during the Weimar Republic (1919-33) is the subject of Peter Gay's Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (Harper, 1968, cloth; 1970, paper). As a result of the chaotic Revolution of 1918, the Weimar Republic succeeded the German
Empire. It was, Gay writes, a "creature of reason," a "creation of outsiders, propelled by history into the inside, for a short, dizzying, fragile moment."

Weimar culture accommodated a whirlwind of artistic achievement.

In film, there was that bizarre expressionist creation, *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (1920), with its distorted stage effects. The 1920s also saw Bertolt Brecht's *The Threepenny Opera* (1928) and the heyday of the Berlin political cabaret, with its mimes and raucous skits.

Gay's work is a good introduction to the history of Weimar culture, but there are faults. The underlying inspiration was not, as Gay believes, the Western Enlightenment but German romanticism. Even the Bauhaus—the most famous avant-garde school of "functional" architecture and "rational" design—cannot be understood outside the framework of a peculiar utopianism left over from the days of German expressionism.

Architects in the new German republic, like painters, playwrights, and filmmakers, tried to evoke a messianic sense of social renewal. Walter Gropius, the director of the Bauhaus, thought architecture should be a "crystal symbol of a new faith."

But when he and other artists thought of social change, they did not envision a bourgeois order of the kind found in England or the United States. Rather, as John Willet argues in *Art and Politics in the Weimar Period: The New Sobriety, 1917–1933* (Pantheon, 1979, cloth; 1980, paper), many creations of the Weimar period were "founded on a broadly socialist, and, in many cases, communist ideology and a generally sympathetic alertness to what was going on in Soviet Russia."

Karl Dietrich Bracher describes the dissolution of the Weimar Republic—and the suppression of its culture as well—in *The German Dictatorship* (Praeger, 1970, cloth; 1972, paper), the most thorough and balanced treatment of the rise and consolidation of nazism to date. Bracher, like fellow historians Holborn and Krieger, traces the origins of National Socialism back to Germany's rejection of the Enlightenment. The ultimate cause of nazism, he writes, "was the deep schism between German and Western political thought, and the emergence of a special German sense of destiny with anti-Western overtones."

Norman Rich's *Hitler's War Aims*, 2 vols. (Norton, vol. i, 1973, cloth; 1976, paper; vol. 2, 1974, cloth), is one of the most provocative studies of Hitler's foreign policy. Rich discusses the interaction between nazi ideology and military planning and concludes that Hitler was not a mere political opportunist, but a "fanatical ideologue" who consistently followed the racist-national principles laid down in *Mein Kampf* (1925).

One key to Hitler's foreign policy was the drive for *Lebensraum* (living space) in the East—an expansionist policy to subjugate "inferior" races and to make more room for German settlements in Eastern Europe and Russia. Rich contends that Hitler never deviated from the policies of *Lebensraum* and the Final Solution. Indeed, his determination to smite the Soviets and to pursue racist extermination policies, without regard to political or military consequences, may have been the "decisive factor in his defeat."


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BACKGROUND BOOKS: WEST GERMANY

ed., 1971, paper), still one of the most comprehensive and perceptive biographies of the Führer. Bullock portrays Hitler as a "political genius"—a master of oratory and a ruthless demagogue determined to destroy his enemies. On the day before his suicide on April 30, 1945, as exploding Russian artillery shells tore away at the protective masonry above the Führer’s bunker, Hitler issued his last will and testament: "Above all I charge the leaders of the nation . . . to merciless opposition to the universal poison of all peoples, international Jewry."

In German Foreign Policies, West and East (ABC-Clio, 1974, cloth & paper), Peter H. Merkl deals with the legacy of Hitler’s destruction—the aftermath of World War II and the division of Germany. Merkl is above all concerned with West Germany’s Ostpolitik (the policy of reconciliation with the East), détente, and the relationship of both East and West Germany to the rest of Europe. West Germany’s future, Merkl believes, depends on its ability to "merge" politically with the West and diplomatically with the East.

If West Germany’s diplomatic horizons have broadened considerably during the past decade, so have its contributions to the arts. John Sandford asserts, in The New German Cinema (Barnes & Noble, 1980), that German film reached a "historical turning point" in the 1970s, as directors such as Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Werner Herzog, and Volker Schlondorff discovered that they could combine aesthetic integrity and box-office success. In 1980, Schlondorff’s The Tin Drum won an Oscar for Best Foreign Film.

It is no accident that Günter Grass’s novel, The Tin Drum (Vintage, 1962, paper; Random, 1971, paper) became the basis for such a popular movie. This novel is the epic tale of Oskar Matzerath, an incorrigible and destructive child who, with piercing screams and fiery tantrums, defies the absurdity of life in the interwar period by refusing, physically, to grow up. It is a mythic commentary on what Grass calls the “Epoch of Infantilism” (the period between the First and Second World Wars), and the surrealist pageantry, moral decay, and senseless destruction it encompassed.

The unfathomable disasters in the years 1914–45 left German writers such as Grass with the conviction that irrationality—represented by Oskar’s infantilism—was not merely one of life’s unhappy elements but its basic character.

Today, with West Germany’s economy and prestige on the rise, the old tragic flaws of German history—national chauvinism, militarism, and authoritarian rule—seem at once vitiated and irrelevant. Whatever problems West Germany has today, they do not stem from the historical tradition that drove Germany into two world wars. That was laid to rest, along with the ghost of Hamlet, in the rubble of Berlin in 1945.

—Kim R. Holmes

EDITOR’S NOTE: Mr. Holmes is a doctoral candidate in history at Georgetown University.

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A LITIGATION SOCIETY?

"Doomsday Drawing Near with Thunder and Lightning for Lawyers," warned a 17th-century London pamphleteer. Today's Americans may still distrust lawyers, but they nevertheless have come to rely more and more upon courts and the law. Everything from disputes between parents and children to the future of nuclear power seems eventually to come before a judge. As A. E. Dick Howard, a specialist on constitutional law, suggests, we may be well on our way to becoming a "litigation society." The courts have often served as a useful "safety valve"—they led the way in ending de jure racial segregation. But, of late, they have tried to resolve an increasing number of social questions that are less susceptible to judicial remedy. The real difficulty, Howard says, may be the breakdown of the old sense of community and compromise that led Americans to settle political disputes out of court—in legislatures and party conventions.

by A. E. Dick Howard

Our colonial forebears would be struck dumb by the explosion of law and litigation in 20th-century America. When John Locke drafted the Carolina colony's constitution in 1669, he included the provision, "It shall be a base and vile thing to plead for money or reward." Yet today the cost of legal services accounts for two percent of America's gross national product, more than the entire steel industry.

There are now more than 574,000 lawyers in America, twice as many as there were just 20 years ago. Law school enrollments have gone up 187 percent in the same period. Already we have one lawyer for every 400 people (compared to one doctor for every 500), or three times as many lawyers per capita as England and 20 times as many as Japan.

"We may well be on our way to being overrun by hordes of
Critics today accuse the courts of "legislating" social reform from the bench. Ironically, the Supreme Court of the early 20th century was also attacked for its activism—as it consistently overturned child-labor laws and other social legislation.

Almost every week, someone seems to discover another creative way to turn a dispute into a lawsuit. Actor Lee Marvin could hardly have expected that in parting with his live-in girlfriend, he would also be parting with the $104,000 that a California court awarded her. Yet once the "palimony" precedent was set in April 1979, lawyers across the country began "Marvinizing" similar cases, and many more former roommates found themselves reunited—in court. In April 1981, a homosexual "palimony" suit was filed against Billie Jean King, the professional tennis star. Of late, the itch to litigate has approached the absurd: In 1977, a group of irate Washington Redskins' football fans filed suit in federal court to overturn a referee's call that had given a game to the St. Louis Cardinals. Trial magazine...
has run articles on “The Sports Spectator as Plaintiff” and “A Guide to Referees’ Rights.” Even clergymen have been advised to take out malpractice insurance.

We are witnessing the peculiar “legalization” of American life—the tendency to react to a problem by enacting a law or by bringing a lawsuit. To be sure, this preoccupation with the law is nothing new. Thomas Paine long ago declared that “in America the law is king.” We have always been among the most litigious people on earth. But during the past decade or two, the trend toward relying on law and litigation—especially toward going to court over even minor issues—seems to have taken on epidemic proportions. What forces are at work?

The sheer growth of government activity is one factor. The federal government is involved in more aspects of our lives than ever before. Regulation has grown at a record pace. Seven new watchdog agencies were created by Congress in the last decade alone.* From 1970 to 1980, the Federal Register, which publishes new regulations, grew from a hefty 10,000 pages annually to almost 80,000. To get some idea of what this means, consider the University of Colorado study that found that a hamburger, from its start as part of a steer on the hoof to its arrival at the frying pan, is in theory affected by nearly 41,000 state and federal regulations.

Increased regulation spawns increased litigation. The regulatory agencies have set up additional procedures to adjudicate disputed rulings; there are now more than 1,100 administrative judges who do nothing but hear arguments on everything from water pollution to Social Security benefits. (After this procedure, of course, the plaintiff can still appeal to the federal courts.) Not surprisingly, these increasingly byzantine proceed-

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ings have helped to make Washington, D.C., a boom town for lawyers. Since its establishment in 1972, Washington’s bar association has more than tripled in size and now boasts 35,000 members. That is equivalent to five percent of the capital’s total population (although many of the lawyers live in the suburbs).

No less significant is the rise of the public-interest law firm. There are now at least 125 of these—most were created during the early 1970s—but their impact is far greater than their number would indicate. Their main purpose is to litigate, to petition the courts to enforce and extend laws and regulations in far-reaching cases. As Ralph Nader put it: “Our institutions [are] serving special interest groups at the expense of voiceless citizens and consumers. A primary goal of our work is to build countervailing forces on behalf of citizens.”

**Righting Wrongs**

Public-interest firms have gone to court in a number of famous cases. Construction of the Alaska oil pipeline, for example, was delayed for four years while environmental issues were argued in the courts. When construction began in 1974, the pipeline had been significantly redesigned and rerouted to take into account many of the environmental factors that the public-interest firms had raised. In recent years, a new kind of public-interest firm has sprung up to pursue a “conservative” notion of the public interest. These firms (there are now 10 of them) go to court on a wide range of issues, from challenging environmental regulations to trying to extend corporations’ “free speech” rights. (James Watt, former president of one of these firms, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, is now secretary of the U.S. Department of Interior.)

Another aspect of the law’s increasing pervasiveness has been the growth of legal-aid organizations. The Supreme Court led the way for this development by ruling in *Gideon v. Wainwright* (1963) that in felony cases a criminal defendant must be provided with legal counsel if he cannot afford it himself. The Court’s decision (since extended to misdemeanor cases) soon led to the creation of legal-aid services funded by state and local governments, bar associations, and universities. For its part, the Johnson administration established the Legal Services Program (now called the Legal Services Corporation) to provide help to the poor in civil cases, involving landlords, welfare agencies, and the like. Today, with a budget of $321 million, 6,000 Legal Services lawyers provide representation to the poor in all 50 states plus Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Micro-
Corporations, by contrast, deducted $24 billion in legal expenses from their taxable income in 1977.

The sheer volume of new laws and litigation is only part of the story. There has also been a change in character. Litigation has become an outlet for political claims that in an earlier time would normally have been resolved by elections or by votes in legislatures. Tocqueville long ago noted that “there is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” The developments of the past two decades have given new meaning to his observation.

In 1963, the Warren Court declared that litigation by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was more than simply a technique for resolving private differences. It was “a form of political expression.” Under the conditions of modern government, the Court said, “litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.”

**Sweeping Remedies**

The success of blacks in seeking judicial remedies for racial discrimination quickly inspired imitation by virtually any group that failed to have its way through the normal political process. Spokesmen for voting blocs that claimed to be underrepresented, inmates of mental hospitals, and women have all dispatched lawyers to court to do battle. The United States is witnessing a “rights explosion,” as more and more litigants persuade the courts to view abuses or privations as constitutional issues.

In a traditional lawsuit, a judge settles a dispute between private individuals about private rights (e.g., a quarrel over the location of a boundary line between two neighbors). But now, the courts are more willing to consider issues as matters of public or constitutional law. Today, the dispute is likely to be between a broad class of people, such as prisoners claiming cruel and unusual punishment, and some public authority (a state prison administration). The typical vehicle is the class-action suit, filed, perhaps, by a public-interest law firm.

As critics of “judicial activism” point out, the courts have also been more willing than ever before to fashion sweeping

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*At this writing, the White House has asked Congress to dismantle the corporation. Apparently, the Reagan administration is unhappy with class-action lawsuits that have won court-mandated changes in state and federal policies affecting the poor, such as the level of Medicaid payments. Such suits constitute about two percent of the Legal Services case load. The administration wants to leave the provision of legal services to the states’ discretion, making funding available to them through a block-grant program.*
THE LAW

A SCARECROW OF A SUIT

Lawyers were less pervasive in the 19th century than they are today, but their activities attracted just as much concern. The law itself worked at least as slowly then as it does now, judging by this excerpt from Charles Dickens's 1863 novel, Bleak House.

Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarndyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the Court, perennially hopeless.

remedies. The examples are legion: court-ordered busing, reapportionment of voting districts, affirmative action, and many more. In a famous 1976 Alabama case, Pugh v. Locke, federal judge Frank Johnson ruled that, regardless of cost, the state must build new and better prisons and that it must provide 60 square feet of living space per prisoner, three "wholesome and nutritious" meals a day, and a variety of recreational and social services.

Indeed, judges (especially those on the federal bench) often wind up managing public institutions themselves in order to carry out the reforms they have mandated. In 1974, federal district court judge Arthur Garrity ordered Boston's schools desegregated and began to supervise the process. But he has become increasingly involved in the day-to-day affairs of the school system and now participates in making decisions on such matters as the hiring and firing of teachers.

The rationale for judicial intervention is sometimes less than precise. Judge David L. Bazelon of the Washington, D.C.,
federal appeals court has said that his test for intervening is: "Does it make you sick?" Other judges have sought to curb the judicial appetite. Referring to a lawsuit challenging a local school system's restriction on the length of boys' hair, Justice Hugo Black wrote in 1971 that he could not imagine that the Constitution "imposes on the United States courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that public school students should wear."

But the judiciary is expanding its reach into ever more aspects of our daily lives, forcing elected officials and state institutions to undertake reforms it thinks are necessary. Harvard's Nathan Glazer has warned against the emergence of an "imperial judiciary." How far the trend will go depends heavily on judges themselves. As Justice Harlan F. Stone once observed, "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."

Judicial activism is often associated with the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1953 to 1969. "In that time," wrote the New York Times's Anthony Lewis, "the Supreme Court ...brought about more social change than most Congresses and most Presidents." Many observers thought that the Burger Court—with four of its justices appointed by President Nixon—would veer away from such activism. The Burger Court has indeed taken a "hands-off" attitude toward some issues, such as school dress codes and "gay" rights.

**A History of Activism**

More striking, however, is the new ground that the Burger Court has occupied. It declared a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion in its *Roe* and *Doe* decisions (1973), invalidated all then-existing state capital punishment laws with *Furman v. Georgia* (1972), and opened the doors to a flood of sex discrimination cases. In other fields, it extended the Warren Court's principles. With regard to school busing, for example, the Burger Court approved the first big city busing plan and made it easier for plaintiffs to show *de jure* segregation. All in all, the Court is today more of a center for the resolution of social issues than it has ever been before.

Judicial activism is not an invention of the modern Supreme Court; judges in the early decades of this century used the due process clause to protect business from social and economic welfare legislation, overturning such measures as minimum
wage and child-labor laws and some New Deal legislation as well. In his famous dissent from the Court’s *Lochner* decision (1905), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. objected that in striking down New York State’s law limiting working hours for bakers, the Court was imposing its own social and economic views. "The Fourteenth Amendment," he wrote, "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics.*"

**New Ideas**

Traditionally, the courts considered all governmental actions valid unless proved otherwise. With its decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the Warren Court embarked on the development of a judicial rationale that allowed it to view certain kinds of governmental actions as presumptively suspicious. This meant that courts could overrule government actions much more easily. Far from repudiating this approach, the Burger Court has made generous use of it in carving out a zone of "personal autonomy" rights in abortion and contraception cases. Now, government has to prove a "compelling state interest" to avoid having its laws in these matters overturned by the courts.

Reinforcing the trend toward greater judicial intervention are changing ideas about the nature and function of law. In earlier times, law and morality were one. Law, it was believed, was rooted in a society’s common ethos—its religion, its customs, its folkways. Under a regime of "natural" law, judges did not "make" law, they "discovered" it. Thus, the creative role of judges was, at least in theory, significantly limited.

The insights of positivism and of legal realism—two powerful forces in American thinking about law—have shattered the old unity between law and morality. In positivist theory, law comes from deliberate human decisions, with certain ends in mind, and is not simply the reflection of society’s values. Between 1811 and 1817, Jeremy Bentham, the English philosopher and reformer, campaigned to have the United States adopt a unified code of laws and discard the common law, which had slowly evolved under the old English system. A single code drawn up by a purposeful legislature, he believed, would do more to reveal the intent and thrust of law. Legal realism, another influential movement, emphasizes the role of the judge in interpreting and extending the law.* The late Justice William O. Douglas, in his willingness to reinterpret constitutional law in

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*In the United States, several legal scholars were responsible for advancing legal realism. Jerome Frank’s *Law and the Modern Mind* (1930) and Karl Llewellyn’s *Bramble Bush* (1951) were particularly influential works.*
light of contemporary values, was strongly influenced by this movement. Both notions embody a view of the law as purposeful and result-oriented.

When the law is no longer viewed as the reflection of some immutable verity, the courtroom becomes a place to seek simple tactical advantage, not necessarily justice. One can go to court on the slightest pretext. If one has the resources—deep pockets and skilled counsel—delay may be as good as a final decision. More than one litigant has filed motion after motion, hoping simply to wear the other side down. Of such calculation is much litigation made.

The Decline of Community

The growing number of lawyers and lawsuits, the displays of judicial activism, and the “judicialization” of an ever widening variety of issues are trends that reflect, in turn, fundamental shifts in American attitudes toward authority and in our sense of community. Beginning in the 1960s, opinion polls have marked a continuing decline in public confidence in the leadership of virtually every major public and private institution. The Catholic Church’s teachings on birth control, for example, are ignored by the majority of American Catholics. College students today would scoff at the notion that their college should serve as a kind of substitute parent, as it did only 20 years ago. In every sphere of life—family, school, church, politics—there is more confrontation and less accommodation than ever before. Consensus on basic values seems, in the modern world, increasingly elusive.

The decline of a sense of community carries with it a more atomistic attitude toward public policy—more emphasis on legal formalities and procedure, less place for the informal, non-legal resolution of issues. In such a climate, adversarial relations replace trust, and the sense of community is further diminished. Yale’s former president, Kingman Brewster, once said that a university is “a community of goodwill and of loyalty more than it is a regime of laws.” Today, that phrase sounds more hopeful than descriptive. Few university activities—from admissions to student discipline, from faculty hiring to the operation of student newspapers—do not now give rise to legal issues. Caution, not collegiality, is the watchword on today’s university campus.

Our increasing reliance on law and litigation to resolve conflicts has far-reaching implications. The more we litigate and the more judges intervene in our affairs, the more our shared
values and elective political processes are undermined. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in warning of the "inherently oligarchical powers" of judicial review, "Such an assertion of judicial power deflects responsibility from those on whom in a democratic society it ultimately rests—the people."

Courts that make rules for universities, prisons, welfare agencies, or other bodies take on the functions of legislatures. But courts are afflicted with a kind of tunnel vision. A judge is not in a position—nor does he have the warrant—to balance competing political and economic interests as legislators are accustomed to doing. Yet he can order heavy expenditures of public funds to carry out his decisions, and that means either that taxpayers will pay more or that other public projects will get less.

Similarly, in our rush to regulate and litigate, we are eroding the informal processes and traditions of compromise so vital to the functioning of our society. We are both setting up rigid rules and inviting controversy on the smallest matters. An army unit that has to go "by the book" all the time soon becomes demoralized; so, eventually, will a society.

What steps can be taken to de-emphasize the role of law in America? In public policy, deregulation of some industries, such as trucking and airlines, is one avenue. In other areas, simpler and fewer regulations might get the job done as effectively with less need for litigation and confrontation. Some states have experimented with laws designed to cut down on the need for lawsuits. Massachusetts and New York, for instance, have enacted no-fault insurance statutes (which guarantee damage payments no matter who is at fault) in an attempt to reduce the number of automobile negligence cases.

The courts themselves can be improved; year after year, Chief Justice Burger has called for court reform. In a speech this year, he said that the growing burden of litigation could be met...
by more judges, the adoption of better office and support systems by the courts, improved procedures. “The most important single ingredient,” he said, is “the service of dedicated judges and supporting personnel in the courts.” Former Attorney General Griffin Bell has urged more vigorous enforcement of an existing rule that requires an attorney’s affidavit that there is “good ground” for any filing in a federal legal proceeding and that it is “not interposed for delay.”

The signs that we must get to work on these reforms are all around us. In California, desperate litigants have invoked a long-forgotten “rent-a-judge” law to by-pass the state’s clogged court system. The law provides that the parties to a suit can hire their own judge (usually a retired jurist, but the law doesn’t require a law degree).

Many suggested remedies require closer scrutiny. For example, some reformers have called for the creation of intermediate appellate courts to ease the congestion. But creating more courts is like building more highways: It simply encourages traffic. And other proposals may have little real prospect of success. For one thing, almost every move to “de-legalize” runs squarely into the opposition of a well-organized group that benefits from leaving things as they are. Opponents of no-fault insurance, led by lawyers loath to abolish jury trials in auto accident cases, say that they have a political constituency “that exceeds even that of the AFL-CIO.”

A Little Pruning

Much can, and should, be done by judges, lawyers, and politicians to slow the pace of the legalizing of America. At the same time, we should not be blind to the gains that have been made precisely because of increased recourse to the courts. It is hard to imagine that a nation dedicated to principles of justice would want to go back to the days when minorities were largely shut out of the legal system or when, because of poverty, a deserving citizen could not have his fair day in court. The courts can also serve as a useful “safety valve” if a minority’s fundamental rights are consistently ignored by the majority in the political process. It is unlikely that we would want to confer untrammeled discretionary power on police, prosecutors, and bureaucrats, and it is surely no abuse of the law to curb air and water pollution.

But it is clear that we have gone too far in many cases. Some selective pruning is in order. A little less than 200 years ago, Alexander Hamilton sought to reassure an America worried
about the powers given the federal government in the new Constitution. He wrote in *The Federalist* that the judiciary would be "the weakest of the three departments of power." The judiciary, he said, "has no influence over the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." We have come a long way from that concept of judicial power.

A judiciary that single-handedly undertakes the systematic reform of a democratic society exceeds its appointed task. In America, resolving problems informally through consensus or in the elective process ought still to be the ideal; judicial intervention ought to be the exception, not the norm. We cannot go back to a simpler time. But we can begin working to restore the primacy of compromise in building a better society—an undertaking that cannot succeed on the basis of laws and court judgments alone.
As this 1869 lithograph makes clear, the American farmer, after the Civil War, began to think of himself as of a group apart: Others profited from his honest labors. Indeed, not until well after World War II did a measure of economic equality, bolstered by federal crop subsidies and off-the-farm income, come to those who produced the nation's food and fiber.
Agriculture in America

As their spokesmen like to remind city folk, America's hard-working farmers have scored some prodigious successes: relatively cheap food for consumers at home, extra grain to help the famine-stricken overseas, and, last year, $41 billion in export revenues to help offset what the United States pays for OPEC oil and Toyotas. Productivity has grown five times faster in agriculture than in industry over the past five years. But the recent export push has exposed some long-term difficulties. Here economist Walter Ebeling explains the rise of U.S. agriculture; historian Tom Fulton and editor Peter Braestrup describe the new "farm issues"; and demographer Nick Eberstadt re-examines world hunger and America's role in alleviating it.

ROOTS

by Walter Ebeling

America's pre-eminence in world agriculture—its great amber waves of grain—does not stem only from nature's endowments. But nature has been generous. As an agricultural region, the heartland of America, more than one million square miles stretching from the Appalachians to the Rockies, is unsurpassed in size and quality elsewhere on this planet. The soil is so deep in many places that the plow seldom hits stone; thanks to the glaciers' movements over a million years, the ground is level enough for modern tillage; and there is plenty of rainfall except in the West, where irrigation is used.

There are superb patches of land elsewhere in America: California's Central Valley; Pennsylvania's Lancaster County (home of the Amish); the Georgia Piedmont; the Willamette Valley in Oregon. But the nation's greatest endowment lies between Denver, Colorado, and Columbus, Ohio, and its development has been to world agriculture what the exploitation of the Persian Gulf has been to world oil production.
No less important, from the beginning the land in America was not only fertile but also underpopulated. The few Indians who greeted the first English settlers of Jamestown in 1609 grew corn—and tobacco, which led the South to a commercial cash crop and to plantation agriculture, with indentured whites and, after 1690, large numbers of African slaves as labor.

Along the rivers and coasts of New England, however, there was a different pattern. The Pilgrims, and the Puritans who came ashore on Massachusetts Bay, found forests, natural meadows, and open patches that had been cleared by the Indians and then abandoned as European small pox ravaged the native tribes. The Puritans, too, learned to plant corn and raise pumpkins and beans. But New England was settled in villages. The first farmers in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island often shared cattle pastures and tilled scattered individual plots outside town. In New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, however, the English, Dutch, Germans, Swedes, and Scotch-Irish settled on isolated individual farmsteads. And in the southern colonies, even as the great plantations grew up on the Tidewater, the poorer Scotch-Irish latecomers settled in the Piedmont on their own homesteads.

Thus, for almost 300 years, America developed two agricultural land-use styles. In the South, plantations produced cash crops for export—tobacco, indigo, rice, and then King Cotton—dependent on slavery (and later, after the Civil War, on tenantry and sharecropping) and on large acreages. In 1770, Southern tobacco led the way in all exports from the colonies, with over $1 million worth of it going to London.

In the North, aside from the Dutch patroons' holdings along the Hudson River, great estates were few. Indentured servants, immigrants bound to their employers for a fixed time in return for transatlantic passage, could and did disappear to start their own farms. Outside the slave-owning South, there was always too much land and too little labor for any group of landowners to develop into a European-style aristocracy.

Moreover, the very abundance of land led to a focus on extensive rather than European-style intensive agriculture. Then as later, the farmer was less concerned with how much each acre could yield at harvest time than with how many acres he

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could clear and crop. The average farmer used crude wooden plows, pulled by oxen and horses; cut his meager grain crop with a sickle; threshed with a flail. When the soil wore out, he laboriously cleared a new patch nearby or moved West. He pastured his scrawny cattle on native grasses; he enlisted his wife and children as labor and, by trial and error, figured out which crops, which vegetables, which kinds of livestock brought in from Europe would make it in the New World. Sheep were, for a time, the mainstay of New England; in 1840, New York was the country’s leading wheat producer.

After the Revolution, the abundance of land, the shortage of manpower, and the fact that farmers, most of them freeholders, made up 90 percent of the white labor force gave the concept of the independent “family farm” a special power in American political thought that still endures. Thomas Jefferson expressed it in 1785:

We now have lands enough to employ an infinite number of people in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country, and wedded to its liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds.
The Continental Congress had offered land grants to soldiers for wartime service, and the post-Revolutionary ordinances of 1785 and 1787 provided for the sale of public land to farmers, opened up the northern Midwest to settlement, and there banned both slavery and any laws allowing the perpetuation of great estates. Other encouragements followed. The biggest one was the Homestead Act of 1862, signed by President Lincoln, which transferred 147 million acres in the Middle West and West to 1.6 million families. Each settler could get a 160-acre section (one-fourth of a square mile) for free if he lived on it for at least five years and made certain improvements. He could also buy the land after six months for $1.25 an acre. Inevitably, speculators profited, and many a new settler went broke or hungry; but the family farm was solidly established.

"Raise Less Corn, More Hell"

Indeed, the Homestead Act was only part of what Lincoln and his supporters created in the midst of the Civil War—a peaceful agrarian revolution. Congress voted to create the first federal department serving a special interest group, the U.S. Department of Agriculture. And the 1862 Morrill Act established the federally supported land-grant colleges, each with its own agricultural component. The Grange, the Farmers Alliance, and the Populists all worked for measures helpful to farmers. ("What you farmers need to do," said one Populist orator in 1892, "is to raise less corn and more Hell.") To the USDA and land-grant colleges were added agricultural experiment stations, the county extension agents, the Farm Credit Administration, and an array of other service agencies, all designed to promote the welfare and education of the independent farmer.

Thus, not only in Fourth-of-July rhetoric but also in law, the farmer remained something special.

Even when general social legislation was passed, most notably starting in the 1930s, farming kept its privileged status. Agriculture was exempted from Social Security, child-labor laws, minimum wages, collective bargaining rights, restraint-of-trade laws (to foster farm cooperatives), price controls, and, even in wartime, the military draft. Federal tax laws favored farmers, who also got preferred access to public lands and water. They received direct federal subsidies not given to auto makers or other manufacturers.

In short, in America, farmers gained a social status and a political power unknown to their counterparts in most other nations of the globe. Indeed, in much of today's Third World, par-
particularly in Latin America and Africa, the farmer is viewed with
disdain by the ruling elite who live in the cities. The new bu-
reaucrats prefer to think about steel mills, fancy cars, and an
up-to-date airport near the capital city. In most communist
countries, "collectivized" farmers are treated, more or less, like
factory hands and behave accordingly—leaving their shifts
promptly at 5:00 P.M., for example. Lester R. Brown, of World-
watch Institute, describing lackluster Soviet farming in Science
magazine, noted pointedly that "Marx was a city boy."

Mechanizing with Horses

Another factor has helped to shape U.S. agriculture—tech-
nological innovation, coupled with public education and quick
communication. During the new Republic’s first few decades,
there was little innovation on the average farm in the North. Eli
Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793, helping to make cotton
the South’s chief cash crop. But in the North, essentially, self-
sufficient farming continued until early in the 19th century.
Farm families filled their own needs for clothing, tools, soap,
and food. And life was not easy.

Agricultural innovation by and large came from the top
down. It was fashionable for the leaders of the new nation to
take an interest in agricultural promotion. George Washington
experimented with mule breeding, and Thomas Jefferson tested
a new moldboard plow. Improved strains of hay, including tim-
othy and alfalfa, were imported, mostly by well-to-do farmers,
who also formed the agricultural societies. The first farm jour-
nal, Agricultural Museum, came out in 1810. In 1819, U.S. con-
suls overseas were told by the Secretary of the Treasury to
collect seeds, plants, and agricultural inventions from abroad
and to send them home.

But the main thrust in innovation in America was to de-
velop technology for opening up more land with less labor.
Thus, in 1837, John Deere and Leonard Andress began manufac-
turing steel plows needed to open up the tough prairie sods of
the Midwest—reducing requirements for animal power by at
least one-third. Slowly the McCormick reaper, threshing ma-
chines, and mowers—all complicated, horse-powered mecha-
nical devices—came into use. Soon after the Civil War, the
average American farmer had stopped harvesting his crop by
hand. Horse power or mule power made possible the westward
push of the wheat belt. And by 1890, most of the potential for
horse-powered machinery had been established. The transition
to the gasoline tractor, first developed in 1892, took several dec-
Not until 1954 did the number of tractors on all farms in America exceed the numbers of mules and horses, with the South behind the rest of the country.

After the Civil War, the Department of Agriculture, the land-grant colleges, and the county extension agents led the way in developing and encouraging higher-yielding, disease-resistant grain crops, new irrigation techniques, meatier livestock. Under the New Deal, rural electrification and agricultural credit, in particular, helped to modernize the farm sector. Private industry helped develop labor-saving machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. The onset of World War II and Washington's demand for all-out production accelerated the growth of capital-intensive farming and higher productivity.

The results were dramatic. In 1930, it took 15 to 20 man-hours of labor to produce 100 bushels (on two and one-half acres) of corn. In 1975, it took 3½ man-hours to produce the same amount of corn—on one and one-eighth acres. The incentives for the farmer to borrow money and invest in the new technology were clear.

For most of America's history, there was an increasing demand in the growing cities and towns at home and in industrializing Europe for what the farmer could sell (if not always at prices that paid off his debts). Not until the 1890s did farm products drop below even 75 percent of all U.S. export sales. This agricultural surplus enabled the United States in its early days to buy the European factory machinery and the other finished goods that it needed to develop an industrial base.

Essential to this export growth was transportation. The Erie Canal (1825) brought wheat from the Ohio Valley and western New York State by barge to the Hudson River and then to the Atlantic coast. The federal encouragement through land grants to the railroad companies to open up the West after the Civil War—linking the West coast to the East in 1869 and adding 136,000 miles of track from 1860 to 1890—provided a major impetus to farming. Without this network, essentially farm-to-market transportation, the heartland would have been reduced to subsistence farming except along the major navigable rivers. Refrigerated freight cars, beginning with the "Tiffany" cars in 1888, enabled Westerners to ship produce to the East and ultimately allowed Florida orange growers to ship their fruit north. It made it possible to ship beef from Chicago to New York and apples from New York State to Florida.

But even as the domestic markets grew, fed by immigration and natural population increase, American farmers were increasingly at odds with the bankers, traders, middlemen, and
To attract German immigrants, the Des Moines Navigation Co. advertised "one million acres" of Iowa land between Keokuk and Des Moines, for sale in parcels on credit terms.

suppliers. Buying land and the new horse-drawn machinery led many of them into debt. They were at the mercy of market competition and of volatile changes in prices. After the Civil War, farmers began to support the Greenbackers and Populists—attacking "hard money," high freight rates, and monopolies of all kinds.

At the same time, farmers began to become a minority. By 1880, farm workers and farmers accounted for less than half the nation's labor force, even as a fresh influx of Scandinavian immigrants helped to thicken the settlement of the Great Plains. The farm population, all told, peaked at 32 million in 1910; the number of farms peaked at 6,454,000 ten years later. World War I brought a great boom in demand for food. When the war boom ended, the overextended farmers suffered from a slump that did not end for two decades. And a fresh exodus from the land to the cities began.

The Great Depression of the 1930s, which struck hard at all sectors of American society, was a turning point for American agriculture. Under Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the federal government stepped in to prop up farm income, save the family farm, and improve soil conservation and management practices.

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—particularly after the harsh experience of the Dust Bowl, when black dust clouds from the parched Great Plains blew east and hovered over Washington. Acreage and marketing quotas were imposed to curb production; surpluses were purchased by the federal government; price supports were begun. "The American farmer," FDR asserted, "living on his own land, remains our ideal of self-reliance and spiritual balance."

Feeding Hogs in Taiwan

Debates over the costs and benefits of such efforts went on for three decades. There was no question that federal intervention, however well intentioned, favored some farmers over others. Some got no subsidies, notably livestock farmers. Growers of cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and rice were paid ($709 million in 1939 alone) to keep marginal cropland out of production—and, naturally, bigger farmers with the most acreage benefited the most. After World War II, acreage controls failed to end surpluses; indeed, land couldn’t be taken out of production fast enough. New high-yielding strains of corn and wheat used in conjunction with fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides pushed output even higher. It seemed that U.S. agriculture was simply too productive for its own good. Indeed, in 1953, the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation acquired 486 million bushels of wheat—41 percent of that year’s crop, and a record.

During the 1960s, Washington began to distribute much of this surplus to the needy at home via food stamps (starting in 1964) and overseas via Public Law 480 “give-aways” to such countries as India, South Korea, Taiwan. In time, as many of these countries gained economically, their people began to demand beef and pork. Producers of cattle and hogs in West Germany or Japan or South Korea needed feed grains; the United States’s surpluses began to ebb.

During the ’70s, while price supports stayed in effect, federal production controls eased; there was enough demand around the world to buy up whatever feed grains the U.S. farmer could produce. In 1972, the United States found itself selling soybeans, corn, and wheat to the USSR—too much of it—and unsubsidized U.S. cattle and hog farmers found themselves paying higher feed bills as a result.

Even as the crop surpluses declined, the individual farmer, pressed by inflated costs of machinery, labor, and other materials, had to rent or buy more acreage just to stay even with the bank; the price of farm land went up as it always does in inflationary times. Many farmers found themselves, after a period of
expansion and relative cost-price stability, deeply in debt by 1975. Farm prices went up more slowly under the stagflation of the 1970s than did the cost of inputs. And while Washington now put a floor under the prices paid to some farmers and subsidized dairy farmers, beef and hog farmers and vegetable growers had no such relief. The bigger farms grew bigger and more mechanized; to survive, the smaller farmers or their wives worked off the farm. Indeed, this trend had accelerated since 1967 when, for the first time, off-farm income surpassed farm income for all people living on farms. Without that rising off-farm income, many more of America's small and medium-sized farm operators would have been forced to quit the land altogether.

Thanks to America's special history, we have a central government that has long served the farmer without seeking to "manage" him. Partly as a result of our great natural endowment, and of shifting economic forces, we have a very small, highly efficient farm sector. Four percent of the U.S. population provides food and fiber for the rest. The 510,000 largest farms, almost all of them family-operated, produce 64 percent of the total farm output. Overall, the one-billion-acre U.S. farm sector is gradually becoming more capital-intensive, more energy-intensive, more heavily in debt, and freer of surpluses (except in the dairy industry, where the average cow now produces about 12,000 pounds of milk a year—twice the level in 1954). Diversified farming, particularly combination livestock-and-grain farming, is on the wane.

Lastly, the political power of the farmer and the strength of the old congressional "farm bloc" has greatly declined. The "farm vote" is now simply too small to be decisive in most states. And, since the early 1970s, other players have gotten into the act: the nutrition lobby; exurban real estate developers; the hunger lobby; the environmentalists worried about pesticides, herbicides, and stream pollution; occupational safety inspectors; activists interested in minority rights; the State Department. No longer is Jefferson's "cultivator of the earth" considered the bulwark of the Republic, even as the recent back-to-the-country movement among city folks indicates his enduring mythic appeal.
AGRICULTURE IN AMERICA

THE NEW ISSUES:
LAND, WATER, ENERGY

by Tom Fulton and Peter Braestrup

The biggest single new fact about America’s agriculture is that U.S. farm exports are expected to reach a record 170 million tons this year—despite a world economic slowdown.

"At the rate exports are increasing," noted Lauren Soth, columnist and former editor of the Des Moines Register and Tribune, "the danger of over-exploitation of the land . . . is becoming imminent. Yet exports have been the lifeblood of American agriculture and are vital to farm prosperity."

Therein lies the dilemma.

The old surpluses are gone. One-third of the nation’s 400 million acres of prime crop land are devoted to export production. We now export 60 percent of our wheat, more than half of our soybeans, nearly one-third of our corn. "Expansion of exports," observed the new U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, himself an Illinois corn and soybean farmer, "is a key to a market-oriented agricultural policy."

For the Reagan administration, as for its predecessors, there is another reason to push farm exports: Their dollar value, some $41 billion last year, constituted a major offset to the $80 billion the United States paid out for imported oil.*

Such pressures have begun to stir debate within farm groups and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) bureaucracy, and among academic specialists. To most Americans, living in city or suburb, the discussion may seem remote; it rarely gets into the mass media; food is something that comes ready-packaged at the A&P and seems to cost more every time one reaches the check-out counter.

But new "farm issues," aside from the perennial congressional debates over subsidies to some types of farming, most notably dairy farming, are emerging. Some minor matters get lots of media attention—scattered foreign ownership of U.S. farm land, the loss of farms to "suburban sprawl," or the im-

*The net U.S. "farm trade surplus" in 1980 was $24 billion; the United States spent $17 billion for imported coffee, rubber, cocoa, bananas, tea, spices, and other farm products.
In 1979, protesting high production costs, hundreds of farmers staged a "tractorcade" past the Department of Agriculture building in Washington.

...
merely re-enforced the trend.

The results were dramatic.

After 40 years of federal effort and $30 billion in outlays nominally spent to promote conservation, the USDA estimated in 1977 that soil erosion was a major problem on over 20 percent of the nation's crop land. Annual erosion rates exceeded 10 tons of topsoil per acre, twice the "tolerable" level, on 32 percent of the land in crops such as soybeans in the Southeast, and on 19 percent of acreage in crops such as corn and wheat in the Midwest.

Even if economists question the reliability of such data—since they are not collected on a regular basis and are often subject to revision—the problem is clearly one that merits attention. In Iowa, the thickness of the rich black topsoil that the first settlers plowed during the mid-1800s, has diminished in some places from two feet to one. If such depletion continues unabated, according to federal estimates, the Midwest's yields of corn will probably decline by as much as 30 percent by the year 2030.

Why are so many U.S. farmers "mining" the soil? The farmer, it is important to remember, is in business to grow and sell a crop at the least possible short-term cost. Given the pressures of inflation and high land prices, as well as keen competition for the land, he has no incentive to do otherwise. It is easier, faster, and cheaper, on rolling land in Iowa, for example, to practice "straight row" cultivation of corn and soybeans than to follow the contours of the hillside, even though the resultant erosion is five times greater. Plowing fields in the fall eases the farmer's workload during the busy spring planting season, although it increases erosion by 10 percent.

Government price supports and the demand for U.S. corn and soybeans overseas now give the farmer every incentive to plant row crops on marginal (hilly) land, to rent more such land, and to maximize short-term benefits. In effect, the farmer has

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relied on fertilizer to compensate for the loss of topsoil; fertilizer use doubled in 1960–75, and yield per acre has increased.

To cut back, overall, on production of corn, soybeans, and wheat and to cultivate less intensively would raise farm prices since less food would be produced. A major attempt to curb soil erosion, and thus avert long-term penalties to society as a whole, implies either cost to the farmer or some added cost to the taxpayer or consumer. One proposed “massive” plan of conservation measures to “minimize the national sediment load” would eliminate 90 percent of crop-land erosion but would cost $13.4 billion.

Farming in Chicago

Other proposals are far more modest. But almost no plan suggested so far fails to inflict pain on someone. One new approach that is gaining favor among farmers is “no-till” or “minimum tillage” cultivation, where the ground is left unplowed and largely undisturbed, herbicides kill off weeds and grass, and the next crop is seeded into the trashy residue of the previous one. This technique reduces erosion by as much as 80 percent on hilly land; it requires fewer tractor trips (hence less tractor fuel), helps retain ground moisture, and takes less of the farmer’s time. But the expanded use of herbicides alarms environmentalists. The effective use of these chemical weed killers requires sophistication and care; the threat of run-off of herbicides in water supplies frightens many local citizens.

Other conservation techniques, such as crop rotation (corn, then oats, then clover, then corn again), interseeding alfalfa with corn, or strip cropping (sod and corn), are all well known. To mandate their use is to impose a short-term financial burden on the farmer, especially the small farmer. In effect, he must interrupt or curtail production of more remunerative crops (e.g., corn). Proposals have been made by some USDA administrators to link other benefits that the farmer gets from the government, such as crop allotments or low-cost loans, to his compliance with accepted conservation measures. This stern approach, known as “cross-compliance,” has not been greeted with huzzas by Congress or by export-minded farmers.

Other land issues are more popular in the media than they are important to agriculture. Suburban rowhouses eating up fertile cornfields make vivid, even distressing, television pictures. However, in its effects on U.S. food production—as opposed to aesthetics or land “stewardship”—the continuing loss of farm land to suburban development, highways, and even
strip mining remains small. The current loss of one million acres a year equals a loss of only 0.4 percent of U.S. prime crop land.\(^6\)

Around the major cities, particularly in areas like eastern Connecticut or New York City’s suburbs, farming may disappear entirely just as it is about to do within the city limits of Chicago and as it has long since done in the Bronx. Since 1970, in New York’s Long Island, Pennsylvania’s Lancaster County, and several areas of New Jersey, local conservationists and county officials have tried to preserve farm land by buying development rights, by giving farmers special property tax relief, or by zoning land exclusively for farming. None of these efforts seems to have stopped spreading suburbanization; only high home-mortgage interest rates and higher gasoline costs for commuters seem to slow down such growth.

**Draining the Ogallala**

*Water:* From the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas to the West Coast, it is water and not land that is the big issue. In the most arid regions, agricultural development has meant irrigation—in the beginning through private efforts and then through the 1902 Reclamation Act, which brought federal and state subsidies for cheap water projects to make the desert bloom.

All told, irrigated acreage has doubled (to 56 million acres) since 1950. It now accounts for more than one-fourth of the nation’s crops and nearly one-seventh of the nation’s total prime crop land. In the East, irrigation is used to permit double cropping—rice and soybeans, for example, in the Mississippi delta. But its big impact has been in the West where the thirst for water is enormous. Arizona’s citrus farmers and California’s celery and lettuce growers could simply not exist without subsidized irrigation.

Washington currently spends some $5 billion a year on management and planning of all kinds of water projects, mostly under the auspices of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Without federal subsidies, little irrigation would take place. Indeed, water projects have been pushed well beyond what pure economic feasibility would have permitted. The water subsidy for California’s Wetlands project, for example, runs to $1,540 per

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\(^6\)The widespread notion that foreigners, especially oil-rich Arabs, are buying up the best U.S. crop land is also exaggerated. According to the USDA, foreign investors, mostly British or Canadian, held an interest in 1979 in about 5.2 million acres of farm, forest, and pasture—less than 0.5 percent of the total. And almost half of this acreage was timber.
acre, roughly equal to the cost of the land itself.

Taxpayers have dug into their pockets twice for these irrigation projects: first, for the direct subsidy and second, for the crop price-support programs that were required, in part, because of the surpluses swelled by production on these subsidized lands. Consumers, on the other hand, have benefited, in the short run at least, from lower food prices.

Most of the more feasible water projects have been built—the exploitation of the Colorado, the Rio Grande, and other rivers is almost complete. Farmers have begun to tap ground water. In California, since 1953, ground water has provided 40 percent of total water used. In Arizona, since 1953, ground water has provided a little less than half. Under heavy pumping, the water level is falling, but the draw-down continues. Farmers are simply drilling deeper to get their water—at extra expense. Water itself remains cheap—priced below its true cost and utility.

However, a water shortage seems to be near. On the High...
ALTERNATIVE FARMING

Long before he left office, Bob Bergland, President Carter’s Secretary of Agriculture and himself a Minnesota farmer, worried aloud over the impact on conventional farming methods of “energy shortages, food safety, and environmental concerns.”

He noted that “many large-scale producers as well as small farmers and gardeners are showing interest in alternative farming systems,” with less reliance on petrochemicals, mechanization, and monoculture.

At Bergland’s orders, a USDA study team interviewed 69 successful “organic,” or “organic-conventional,” farmers in 23 states, surveyed agricultural schools and county extension offices, and did other research. In mid-1980, they reported their findings.

Most of the 69 farmers owned their farms outright, hence felt less financial pressure than did others with heavily mortgaged farms. Most were veterans of “chemical-intensive” farming; they had developed their own practical “organic” crop- and livestock-raising techniques, relying heavily on soil conservation, crop rotations, and the use of manure instead of nitrogen fertilizers. Their production costs were lower, but so were their incomes. Controlling weeds and insects without chemicals was a major problem, especially for organic fruit and vegetable producers.

Even so, as energy costs rise, the USDA team predicted, mixed livestock-crop farmers may find “organic farming just as economical or even more so than chemical-intensive farming.” Many “organic” methods, in fact, are already used by conventional farmers.

Yet, the team observed, any general shift by America’s big cash grain

Plains stretching from Nebraska to eastern New Mexico and from Colorado to the Texas Panhandle, irrigation has come from water in the eight-state Ogallala aquifer, an underground lake. In some places, its water is currently being drawn down an average of 14 times faster than it is being replaced. Net aquifer depletion in Texas runs from one to five feet per year. Given the rising costs of fuel for pumping, irrigation in some areas may prove uneconomical well before the water runs out. But the fact remains that the Ogallala aquifer is being drawn down at a rate considerably greater than it is being recharged.

All told, perhaps one-fourth of America’s irrigated crop lands utilize subsoil water faster than it is being renewed. Moving water by pipeline or canal from the Mississippi to northern Texas or New Mexico would cost over $400 per acre foot, over 10 times what farmers say they can now afford for irrigation water.
farmers to totally chemical-free farming would cause a sharp drop in U.S. food production.

To some degree, official interest in "organic" farming reflects the broader environmental crusades of the 1970s and a new back-to-the-land movement. Overall, from 1970 to 1980, the population of America's nonmetropolitan counties increased 15 percent, reversing a long exodus. Most of the rural newcomers were not farmers; but in some areas, notably New England and the upper Midwest, scores of abandoned small farms are now being reactivated by retired folk, young city couples, or "returnees," usually with outside incomes.

Coinciding with USDA studies, private groups have focused on alternatives to large-scale agriculture. They range from Control Data Corporation's Rural Venture project to Nebraska's Center for Rural Affairs, to Pennsylvania's Rodale Press, publisher of New Farm (circulation: 60,000). They variously urge easier credit and favorable tax policies for small farmers, especially beginners; more research on nonchemical farming methods; better marketing of crops.

As some of these groups see it, developing labor-intensive specialities—livestock, fruit, vegetables—rather than corn or soybeans may enable more small farmers to survive. For example, higher shipping costs have raised the supermarket prices of California's mass-produced vegetables in the East and Midwest; small vegetable farmers near the big cities have already begun to compete for California's old customers.

None of this is likely to change the face of American agriculture or halt the trend toward "bigness" in food processing and marketing. But energy prices—reflected in rising fertilizer, fuel, and pesticide costs—may lead both the USDA and private corporations to investigate how all farmers can produce more with less.

In Kansas and Nebraska, where the "mining" of water has become extensive, corn and other feed crops have been grown under irrigation since the 1950s to fatten beef cattle. As subsoil water supplies diminish, farmers here may shift back to dryland wheat farming, while the Corn Belt to the east, with its ample rainfall, resumes its old role of "finishing" beef for market.

Almost every region west of the Mississippi, according to the U.S. National Water Assessment, has insufficient water from all sources for future agricultural production based on present levels of use. The federal government estimates that Western farmers' demand for water will rise only six percent from 1975 to the year 2000. But the demand for water by all other users—industry, municipalities, miners—will increase by 81 percent. And the prospects for bringing in enough extra water to satisfy
the needs of developers of oil shale or the processors of Western strip-mined coal are dim.

In the past, Washington sought to solve the problem simply by supplying water to meet agricultural demand. Now, strong resistance by both the Reagan administration and Congress to high-cost projects, whose agricultural benefits can only be marginal, has set in. Some specialists argue that the over-expansion of irrigated agriculture, fostered by federal subsidies, has to be ended for the farmers' own good. In any case, a struggle in the West between farmers and nonfarm interest groups over dwindling water supplies seems inevitable.

**Rotation versus Corn-on-Corn**

*Energy*: As everybody knows, U.S. agriculture is energy-intensive; total tractor horsepower has more than doubled since 1951: More field work, the field-picking and shelling of corn, the use of bigger and bigger combines, and the general trend toward labor-saving mechanization have all required more fuel. Less obviously, U.S. farmers also use sizeable amounts of fuel for irrigation pumps, for drying corn and other harvested crops, for heating animal pens and breeding cages, and for transporting crops to market. Most important, petrochemicals are used in fertilizer and insecticides.

Thus, for corn, the energy outlay per acre in "gasoline-equivalents" is: fertilizer, mostly nitrogen, 40 gallons; natural gas for drying the corn, 20 gallons; tractor fuel for tillage and cultivation, 10 gallons; herbicides and insecticides, 5 gallons. In sum, it takes about 75 gallons of gasoline-equivalents to produce and harvest one acre of corn.*

One current research effort is devoted to reducing the use of chemical fertilizer, especially nitrogen. Legumes (clover, alfalfa, vetch) add nitrogen "organically" to the soil. A test using these legumes in a crop rotation produced as much protein and cost less in terms of chemical fertilizer than did the usual "corn-on-corn" monoculture many farmers currently practice. But for a cash grain farmer, the economics are poor. He cannot sell the legumes for as much money as he could get for the corn. The dwindling numbers of mixed livestock-grain farmers, on the other hand, can use clover and alfalfa in rotation and thereby save on chemical nitrogen—livestock can eat the legumes as hay or pasture and provide manure that is returned to the soil as fertilizer.

*Yet agricultural production uses only 2.6 percent of the nation's total energy.*

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HARVESTED CROPLAND AS A PERCENTAGE OF LAND AREA, BY COUNTY, 1974

The map highlights only the nation's prime crop land—the Southeast's soybean and tobacco country, Mississippi's cotton and rice fields, the Midwest's Corn Belt, Dakota wheatlands, irrigated acreage north of the Texas Panhandle, California's fertile valleys. Including woods, pasture, and range (not shown), all land in farms adds up to one billion acres. Little of it is owned by absentee corporations; most farm corporations, like most farm partnerships (below), are family affairs. But family farms can be big: In 1978, farms (or ranches) of at least 2,000 acres accounted for only three percent of all farms but almost half of all farm acreage.

FARMS AND FARMLAND, BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, 1974

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
The export push since 1971 has spurred higher U.S. grain production, but droughts have hurt output; the overall trend in livestock masks ups-and-downs in the cattle business. Below: The “spread” between what farmers get for their products and what consumers pay for food has steadily grown since 1973 as the middleman’s costs of labor and packaging have gone up faster than farm prices.

FARM SHARE OF RETAIL FOOD PRICES, 1979

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1981*
CAPITAL-INTENSIVE FARMING: INPUTS, 1967-80

About 6.2 million Americans lived on farms in 1979. Of 3.8 million "farm workers," only 1.2 million were hired hands; migrant harvest workers totaled 212,000. Four-fifths of all farms are owned by children of farmers.
WHERE U.S. FARM EXPORTS HAVE GONE (in billions of dollars)

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Even before Jimmy Carter's 1980 partial grain embargo, Japan was the No. 1 overseas customer of U.S. farmers. Washington's 1971 decision to "float" the dollar effectively cut the price of U.S. products and helped start the current export boom.

VALUE OF U.S. FARM EXPORTS, BY COMMODITY, 1972–79

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture.
For most farmers, nitrogen fertilizer will remain a major energy item. While fuel prices rose 207 percent from 1973 to 1980, the price of nitrogen-rich anhydrous ammonia fertilizer went up 161 percent. More efficient use of such fertilizer is likely as its cost keeps rising. But not to use any nitrogen fertilizers, as one study pointed out, would mean a significant drop in U.S. agricultural output.

As for fuel, farmers, like everyone else in America, will adjust. For some in the West, both reduced water supplies and the higher cost of fuel for pumping will cause a shift to production of more valuable crops on irrigated land, from alfalfa to corn, for example. To reduce fuel costs in the Midwest, there will be greater incentives to go to "minimum tillage" for corn or soybeans, reducing both tractor time and soil erosion. Still others will use solar heat to warm hog houses and milking parlors, or rely on windmills for part of their electricity. Livestock farmers may use bio-gas derived from hog or cow manure as practical production methods evolve.

Gasohol: Nourished by federal loan guarantees and tax breaks, the infant "gasohol" industry is designed to reduce U.S. dependence on OPEC oil. A mixture of 90 percent gasoline and 10 percent ethyl alcohol (ethanol), gasohol was pushed strongly by Jimmy Carter's administration. Last year, total output of ethanol increased 300 percent to 150 million gallons.

Various projections have been cited in Washington calling for a rapid build-up in production capacity to make enough alcohol—10 billion gallons—from all sources to "stretch" U.S. gasoline supplies by 10 percent by 1990.

Food for Fuel?

In the case of ethanol, one possible long-term problem lies in the fact that corn is now the cheapest, most practical feedstock. (Indeed, Carter's critics saw his 1980 promotion of gasohol largely as a sop to Midwest corn farmers angered by his partial embargo on U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union.) One bushel of corn makes 2.5 gallons of ethanol; at current production levels, the effect on overall demand for corn is insignificant.

A fast build-up, however, would have a major impact. According to Purdue economist Wallace Tyner, production of, say, four billion gallons of ethanol in 1984 might possibly lead to a 30 percent increase in corn prices. Many farmers would then switch to growing corn rather than soybeans and other lower-priced crops to supply the new "ethanol market." Higher U.S. corn prices might hurt exports of the grain. Incentives to culti-
vate additional erosion-prone marginal land might increase. So would the cost of feeding hogs, cattle, and chickens—and consumer meat prices.

However, neither Tyner nor specialists in Washington expect so dramatic a future. Rather, they foresee gradual change, well below the projections of gasohol's enthusiasts in Congress.

The Reagan administration did not repudiate the Carter gasohol plan, even as it lifted the Carter grain embargo last April. But the newcomers have ruled out further loan guarantees for ethanol plants: Federal help will go for research; ethanol production capacity will be left to private enterprise, albeit with the crucial retention of a four-cents-a-gallon federal retail tax exemption (plus similar state exemptions) for gasohol. As it is, gasohol now costs the motorist slightly more at the pump than does regular gasoline. Only a major rise in the price of regular gasoline is likely to make gasohol more competitive. And some critics claim that current methods of making ethanol (including growing and processing the corn) consume more total energy than they produce.

**Bigger May Not Be Better**

_The "Family Farm":_ There has been much rhetoric, particularly among environmentalists and Farm Belt politicians, about threats to the future of the "family farm." Merely defining the "family farm" or the "small farmer" has caused some difficulty. The decline in total farm numbers and the increase in the average farm's acreage usually start the discussion. But these numbers conceal as much as they reveal.

One can start at the top. A fifth (477,000 in 1974) of all farms are what the USDA calls "primary" farms: They earned more than $40,000 in 1974 in gross sales of what they grew. In 1974, they accounted for over 78 percent of all U.S. farm output. And their operators are overwhelmingly farmers and their kinfolk, not "agribusiness corporations." Almost half of these farms are crop farms (grain, cotton, sugar, tobacco). Within this "primary" group is an elite: the 64,000 farms with over $200,000 in sales; they account for 40 percent of farm output.

The primary farms are the big engines of U.S. production; their owners get over 75 percent of their revenue from crops and livestock; they own 70 percent of the farm land and rent much of the rest. They are in the best cash position to buy more. And their predominance is growing.

Four-fifths of all farms in America are in the under-$40,000 gross sales category. What now keeps most of these family farms
AGRICULTURE IN AMERICA

FEDERAL FARM PROGRAMS

The U.S. Department of Agriculture, with 91,232 employees and a $48 billion budget in 1981, is no longer simply the champion of the farmer. There aren't enough farmers and farmworkers left to sustain USDA's influence in Washington by themselves. Like his predecessor, Secretary of Agriculture John Block has been bequeathed a wide range of other responsibilities (and clienteles): "food assistance" to the needy overseas ($1.6 billion); "rural development," including loans for housing, utilities, and cable TV ($14 billion); food stamps and school lunches ($14.8 billion); food safety and quality ($356 million); the Forest Service and kindred operations ($2 billion).

Indeed, the "farm programs" category now accounts for only $9 billion, or less than a fifth of the department's program outlays.

Of this total, only $246 million goes to help farmers pay the costs of soil conservation. Roughly $5.4 billion is earmarked for commodity loans and payments—down from $6.6 billion in 1979. But the total federal commodity payout is unpredictable and may vary widely from year to year, depending on weather, export demand, free market prices, and the amount of crop land ordered "set aside" by the Secretary of Agriculture. Eligible for help are producers of corn and other feed grains, wheat, upland cotton, rice, soybeans, peanuts, tobacco, wool, sugar, and dairy products.

Through a complicated array of federal crop loans, direct payments, and commodity purchases (notably of milk), the USDA, in effect, guarantees each producer of these commodities a "minimum" price, if he cannot do better on the open market. The farmer, in return, accepts varying USDA curbs on his planted acreage ("set-asides") or actual production, as Washington seeks to keep supply in line with demand. With exports running high, no set-asides have been ordered for acreage devoted in 1981 to wheat, corn, and other feedgrains. Although nominal limits have been set since 1970 on the total annual amount any single farmer may receive, according to a 1981 USDA study, they "have never proved effective" due to various unpublicized exemptions. To get these programs through Congress, outnumbered Farm Belt legislators now have to make deals with urban lawmakers—endorsing food stamps for the poor in return for U.S. payments to farmers.

Notably unprotected are ranchers and livestock farmers, among others, who face steadily increasing costs but receive prices that may drop by 25 percent from one year to the next, even as consumers complain about high meat prices at the supermarket.
going is off-farm income—factory wages, salaries, dividends, retirement benefits. From 1960 to 1974, nonfarm income per farm increased on the average about seven percent per year. The trend has given farm families a financial security not found in agriculture, which is volatile in both yield and price, and thus has averted the further depopulation of the countryside.

Indeed, one-third of America's farms sell less than $2,500 worth of farm products a year, but in 1978, their owners' average family income slightly exceeded the national median of $17,640. These may be small farmers, but, contrary to the claims of subsidy-seeking farm lobbyists, no longer are small farmers necessarily needy, low-income folk.

How big is the most "efficient" farm? Long accepted was the notion that the capital-intensive new technology, particularly mechanized equipment, made "bigness" synonymous with efficiency, and thus lower consumer food prices. Every farm is different; raising wheat in Kansas is not the same as raising cotton in Texas. Yet with bigness, it was said, came lower production costs to the farmer per bushel of wheat, per bale of cotton, per pound of beef on the hoof.

But at some point, more "efficiency" and more acreage do not march together. A 1979 USDA technical study indicated that most—90 percent—of the "economies of scale" could be captured on family farms of relatively small acreage. But achieving the last 10 percent required that farms more than double in size.

For example, an Iowa corn and soybean farmer in 1979 could reach the 90 percent efficiency level with only 300 acres, selling $60,000 worth of crops. To attain 100 percent efficiency, the same farmer would have to work 640 acres; he would then sell $145,000 worth of crops. (As it happened, such primary farms in Iowa averaged 401 acres and $123,000 in gross sales.) The most powerful incentive to buying—or renting—more land may simply be the desire among farmers to increase family net income—not to become more "efficient."

Washington helps this along. Federal subsidies to producers of corn, wheat, and other commodities are based on the national average costs of producing each crop. The larger, more efficient farmers specializing in corn or wheat have lower-than-average costs, hence the subsidies tend to provide them with a windfall gain.† Since subsidies are paid on a per-bushel basis, these

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†In 1978, one percent of the farmers, those with large farms, got 29 percent of all the federal commodity program payments.
farmers, in turn, can put extra cash into buying more land. Thus, indirectly, federal crop payments have an unequal effect; like the tax laws, they tend to favor the bigger farmer and help him to acquire smaller, neighboring farms.

Land, water, energy—these elements shape the long-range problems facing American agriculture. But, like the long-range energy problems evident to specialists but ignored by politicians during the 1950s, they have received little serious attention in Congress, the media, or the White House. Any major remedies involve financial burdens on farmers, consumers, or taxpayers. Hence, they also promise political pain to elected officials. It is much easier to inveigh against high meat prices, or "corporate agribusiness," or "federal meddling."

Thus, few of the real issues crop up in the congressional debate over this year's farm bill, which will guide federal policy through 1985. In essence, the current Congress, like its recent predecessors, is simply tinkering with the farmer's "safety net"—the crop-subsidy legislation created during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Both Republicans and Democrats tend to view the new surge in exports as a boon—keeping up grain prices and reducing farmers' need for subsidies.

However, as Lauren Soth observes, America cannot possibly "feed the world," or continue to serve as a "ready reserve" granary (as it has for the Russians). Its best land is already under cultivation; the pressure to "mine" more land and Western water is already high. Fairly soon, the United States will have to decide whether to restrict exports and pay farmers to conserve land, or risk the long-range loss of the productivity of America's soil. U.S. agriculture, in effect, is experiencing a bonanza that, unexamined, could ruin us all.
The success of American agriculture is a crucial factor in supplying the world's food needs. The United States exports more grain than Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa together manage to produce, and it holds about half of the world's total grain reserves. Indeed, each year American farms account for roughly half the world's exports of grain and soybeans.

Opinion polls show that the American public consistently gives more support to "combating world hunger" than to most other U.S. foreign policy goals. Americans told the pollsters that they paid more attention to the 1974 World Food Conference than to the 1974 Ford-Brezhnev arms control meeting at Vladivostok. Since 1954, the United States has followed through on this commitment with over $30 billion in outright gifts of food or long-term loans for food purchases, besides increasing its regular food exports. And American citizens have organized or financed most of the world's efforts to reduce hunger in the poorer nations.

Yet, despite three decades of such efforts, many authorities tell us that the number of desperately hungry people in the world is increasing. Estimates by the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) suggest that about half a billion people in the less developed countries (excluding China) now suffer from malnutrition so acute that they would probably be hospitalized in Europe or the United States. The World Bank reckons that close to three-fifths of the families in the 90 poorest non-communist nations—which would be about 1½ billion people—do not get enough food. Based on a UN report, Robert McNamara, the bank's president until this summer, has claimed that "more than 30 million children under the age of five died of starvation" in 1978 alone.¹

Is world hunger really that severe? Probably not. The estimate of 30 million starvation deaths, for example, is flatly wrong. No credible estimate of the annual number of child deaths due to all causes is higher than 17 million, and 15 million is probably the most reasonable figure. Even if hunger were
completely eliminated, perhaps more than half of these tragic deaths would still occur as a result of accidents, disease, and other causes. The figure McNamara quoted, then, is about four times too high.*

The whole debate over world hunger—and how America can help to end it—is badly distorted by the lack of reliable statistics. In their zeal, many specialists on hunger have employed faulty data and shrill, headline-catching rhetoric. The problem is serious enough already; exaggeration serves only to make it seem less manageable and more hopeless than it is.

In a 1950 *Scientific American* article, for example, the FAO's director general, Lord Boyd-Orr, made a startling assertion: "A lifetime of malnutrition and actual hunger is the lot of at least two-thirds of mankind." Unfortunately, it later became apparent that Lord Boyd-Orr had made a mistake—he had reached his conclusion by looking at the wrong column of statistics. Although this was pointed out, it was never corrected or even officially acknowledged. During the more than three decades since that gaffe, the FAO has done little to improve its reputation for attention to accuracy. In 1974, for example, an unexplained change in methodology raised the FAO's estimate of the incidence of serious hunger from exactly 20 percent of the poor world's population to exactly 25 percent, just in time for the World Food Conference in Rome.

For its part, the World Bank measures the extent of hunger using a formula that compares individuals' caloric intakes against a fixed standard. That's how it reached its conclusion that three-fifths of the poor world lives under the shadow of "caloric deficits"—malnutrition. Upon closer inspection, however, the numbers this formula churns out prove useless. In Taiwan, for example, 48 percent of the population would seem to be malnourished; in Hong Kong, 46 percent.

This sounds grave indeed, until one learns that the average life expectancy in both places is over 72 years—about the same as in Finland or Austria. The World Bank overlooks the fact that human food needs vary widely; many people can live quite well on much less than the bank's standard.

*Without discounting the plight of the hungry, it must be said that many of the claims about the side effects of less-than-severe malnutrition are also false. Fertility, for example, is basically unaffected by nutrition unless women are beset by real starvation. As for the somewhat condescending claim that mental ability is impaired, it has been shown that every important experiment "proving" the connection between brain damage and mild or moderate malnutrition was significantly flawed. See Rose Frisch, "Does Malnutrition Cause Permanent Mental Retardation in Human Beings?" *Psychiatrico, Neurologia, Neurochirurgia*, no. 74, 1971. On fertility, see John Bongaarts, "Does Malnutrition Affect Fecundity? A Summary of Evidence," *Science*, May 9, 1980.

*The Wilson Quarterly/Summer 1981*
How can we get a meaningful impression of the dimensions of world hunger? We might start by looking at the results of eating patterns. Anthropometric tests, which compare weight to age or height, can tell us important things about the nutritional well-being of a population. Even this kind of data, unfortunately, can be easily misinterpreted if an American standard is used. One recent U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) study, for example, painted a sorry picture of Sri Lanka: By American height and weight standards, 42 percent of the nation's children were moderately or severely malnourished and less than 10 percent were "normal." If these researchers had bothered to measure life spans, however, they would have found that the average Sri Lankan can expect to live about 70 years.

Counting the Hungry

Another way to gauge hunger is to compare height and weight to death rates. Lincoln Chen, an American researcher at the Cholera Research Laboratory in Bangladesh, found that death rates for "normal," "mildly malnourished," and "moderately malnourished" children were all about the same. In fact, the rate for "normal" children was slightly higher than for their smaller and lighter playmates. But mortality rates were four to six times higher for "severely malnourished" children than for all other boys and girls. This certainly argues for concentrating our efforts first on the fraction of the world's population that is dangerously underfed.

How large is that fraction? According to a World Health Organization (WHO) survey a decade back, almost 10 million children under age five were "seriously malnourished" by anthropometric criteria. This number is far too low. It leaves out children over five and adults, which would double the total, and the hungry of mainland China, Indochina, and North Korea, possibly another 10 million people. The new number then has to be tripled at least: In many countries, of the total number of people who suffer from hunger in the course of a year, only

about one-third will be hungry at any single time. To correct for these factors and allow a margin for error, one would want to multiply the WHO estimate by a factor of about 10. This yields a current estimate of about 100 million desperately hungry people.\(^*\)

Attending to 100 million people spread across perhaps 90 or 100 countries would be an enormous but manageable undertaking. More than two-thirds of these people are concentrated in mainland China, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Zaire.

There are signs, too, that the situation is improving. The figure of 100 million constitutes slightly more than 2 percent of the world's population, probably the lowest percentage threatened by serious hunger in recorded history. Moreover, life expectancy in the less developed countries (excluding China) has risen by more than a third in the last 30 years. In the same nations, the death rate for children under five years old (those most vulnerable to malnutrition) has dropped by nearly half since 1960.\(^7\)

\(^*\) Using an entirely different method, researcher Thomas Poleman has put this number at slightly under 70 million. See *Quantifying the Nutrition Situation in Developing Countries*, Cornell Agricultural Staff Paper No. 7933, 1979.
Why, we might well ask, are there even 100 million starving people in the world today? Is it possible, as some have suggested, that through extravagant consumption in the developed world and high population growth in the poor world, we are close to exceeding the planet's natural "limits to growth"? This is the Malthusian viewpoint, embraced most recently by the Global 2000 Report to the President, published in Washington last year. This sort of argument leads to the conclusion that every problem we now have is unsolvable.

This is certainly not true in the case of food, at least. The world's current food-grain (wheat, corn, barley, oats, sorghum, and rye) production alone would be enough to feed the planet's entire population and a billion people more, if it were evenly distributed. Food availability has been on the rise for a generation, as the growth in life expectancy suggests, and the increase is continuing. Since 1950, worldwide food production per capita has grown by about 40 percent, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

In the poor regions of the world, FAO and USDA figures show that caloric intake per person has improved in each decade since 1950. Food imports and aid have helped to achieve this, but they do not explain it all. Domestic agriculture in the poor countries, though advancing at a slower pace than in the developed world, has still generated a 13 percent increase in grain production per capita (excluding China). Hunger in the Third World, then, is neither necessary nor inevitable.

"Ominous Food Deficits"?

Nor is there any measurable evidence that environmental limits will soon check the world's agricultural progress. If anything, agricultural resources are becoming less scarce. Soil erosion does indeed justify some concern. It is clear that poor farm management and overgrazing in Nepal, the Sahel, and elsewhere are degrading the soil. But as Rockefeller Foundation agronomists have shown, with improved cultivation and conservation practices, much badly abused land can be restored. Meanwhile, new land is always being opened up.

Between 1950 and 1980, the world's arable area grew by more than 20 percent, and at an even more rapid rate in the poor countries. In the decade ending in 1977, irrigated acreage around the world increased by more than 25 percent. Vast areas remain undeveloped. In South America, only 11 percent of the potentially arable land was being farmed; in Africa, only 22 percent, according to a 1967 UN study. If the tsetse fly, which
carries sleeping sickness, were to be controlled, an additional 1.7 billion acres in Africa could be devoted to agriculture, more than all the land now farmed in the United States.

Finally, the resources needed to exploit the land and increase productivity—fertilizer, pesticides, seed, and simple machinery—have all dropped in price (adjusted for inflation) over the past 30 years. Reckoning by supply and demand, then, these products seem more plentiful than ever.

Yet another school of critics worries not about scarcity but about abundance: Many development experts view the poor world's increasing reliance on foreign grain as a cause for alarm. Last year, the net grain imports of the less developed countries totaled nearly 70 million tons, up from about 20 million tons in 1960. In the otherwise sober study, To Feed This World, this is portrayed as a pattern of "ominous food deficits."*

**Putting Meat on the Table**

Such criticism seems to assume that if a nation imports food, it can no longer feed itself or has lost its race against population growth. But this confuses biological need with economic demand. The two have nothing to do with each other. Taiwan's 18 million people purchase more American food than do Africa's 400 million; this is not because they are hungrier. It's because they have the money to buy luxury foods and because they feed American grain to their pigs and poultry. Conversely, the fact that Burundi and India export modest amounts of food does not mean that these nations have eliminated malnutrition.

It would also be a mistake to assume that food imports cripple less developed countries financially. The so-called developing market economies—the poor world minus OPEC, China, and the smaller communist states—spent less than 4 percent of their export revenue to import grain last year. For the 37 poorest nations in this group, the food-grain burden was higher, but even they could pay for their purchases with less than 10 percent of their exports. By contrast, the oil bill for these poorest countries consumed 16 percent of their export revenue in 1977, up from 9 percent in 1960. To be sure, less developed countries face some serious financial problems, for a variety of reasons, and it would be a mistake to underestimate them. Nevertheless, it appears that the poor world, in general, could afford to finance even more "ominous" food deficits than it does now.

*Sterling Wortman and Ralph W. Cummings, Jr., To Feed This World: The Challenge and the Strategy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978.
hind demand? The answer has little to do with population growth, scarce resources, foreign exploitation, lack of native ability, or any of the factors usually cited by Western analysts. It can be explained in terms of a specific series of choices made by almost every regime in the poor world during the period of decolonization and national self-assertion after World War II.

**Frustrating the Farmers**

The nationalist leaders who came to power during this period differed remarkably in their ideologies. One need only compare Sukarno with Perón, Nehru, or Kwame Nkrumah to see this. On one point, however, they were united. They wanted to build powerful, "modern" state apparatus that would allow their nations, or at least their ruling classes, to deal on equal terms with Europeans and Americans. They would of course provide themselves with all the trappings of national power: airports, sports arenas, presidential palaces. But they would also rapidly build up an industrial base, even if that did not make economic sense.

That meant diverting scarce resources from the vast majority of the population that worked the land. Prices, taxes, investment, and credit were all skewed against the farmer to subsidize the build-up. These policies could be enormously influential. In India during the 1960s, for example, the government fixed the price of fertilizer so high that rice farmers had to produce four times as much rice as did their Japanese counterparts to buy a single kilogram. This was partly the result of New Delhi's decision to curb fertilizer imports, which were relatively inexpensive, and build up the domestic fertilizer industry. At the same time, many governments, India's included, imposed price ceilings on farm products to placate their city populations.

Predictably, the growth of agriculture in these countries was slowed. Overall economic growth was slowed too, as capital was diverted to less productive but more impressive uses in the industrial sector. Thus, there was less food—and less wealth with which to purchase food from other countries. The few developing nations that declined to follow city-oriented policies (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, Malawi, the Ivory Coast) are all now in better economic shape than are their neighbors.

When the rulers of the less successful developing countries did turn their attention to agriculture, their policies often compounded their problems. When Burma took "the Burmese path to socialism" in 1962, for instance, it expelled the Indian money-lenders who had provided most of the crop loans to farmers (ad-
Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) was the first “limits to growth” theorist. He feared that population would pass the “limits of subsistence.” But Malthus later altered his views, worrying that birth control would slow population growth too much.

mittedly, at usurious rates). “Socialist agriculture does not need private encroachment,” it was declared. Largely as a result, the supply of rice available for export, which had once totaled 3 million tons per year, dropped to only 1.6 million tons in 1963.

Unfortunately, most of the developing countries have opted for centralized bureaucratic control of agriculture. What matters here is not so much the size of the bureaucracy—Taiwan employs 70 agricultural researchers for every 100,000 farmers, India only one—but how it operates. Taiwan’s bureaucracy is relatively large, but it is decentralized and devoted to research and farmer education rather than to regulation or management.

As a result of their choices, it may now make more economic sense for some developing nations to import food and export manufactured goods. With its state-of-the-art factories and low wages, India can produce a ton of steel at less than two-thirds of Bethlehem Steel’s cost, while it costs 40 percent more to grow a ton of wheat in the Punjab than in Kansas.

Eliminating the artificial burdens under which farmers in most Third World countries must operate would do much to increase domestic food output and speed overall economic growth. But if they achieved these goals, many of these countries would undoubtedly run up even greater food deficits, as consumers used their increased income to buy more meat and other high-quality foods (which happened in Taiwan).
If we look beyond "ominous food deficits" to the issues that underlie them, we see that the United States is in a position to reduce hunger in the poor world in some important ways. We cannot solve the problem alone. But we can use our predominance in the world grain market to organize an international grain reserve that protects the hungry against sudden crop failures and price hikes. At the same time, we can stabilize our erratic food aid policies to permit better planning among the recipient countries.

Through AID and our influence with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, we ought to be able to encourage freer, less city-oriented economic development. Finally, easing access to the American market would help some poor countries increase their manufactured exports, generating the income needed to pay for food imports. These are good opportunities. But we will not seize them or others that may arise if we are possessed by an overriding fear of food deficits and a feeling of hopelessness about alleviating world hunger.

NOTES

"The glory of the farmer," wrote Ralph Waldo Emerson, "is that in the division of labors, it is his part to create. All trade rests at last on this primitive activity. He stands close to nature; he obtains from the earth the bread and the meat. The food which was not, he causes to be. The first farmer was the first man."

Raising and selling crops and livestock has become vastly more complicated since Emerson's day. With sympathy and precision, Mark Kramer describes the recent impact of technology, changing markets, and economic pressures on the operators of Three Farms (Little, Brown, 1979): a prosperous Massachusetts dairymen, an Iowa corn and hog farmer, and the corporate managers of California's long-troubled 21,000-acre Tejon Ranch.

What all had in common, Kramer found, "was their ability to apprehend a system that nowadays makes victims of its slacker participants and to operate with the canniiness and vigor needed to make do in hard times."

How U.S. farming has evolved into a big business since the Jamestown colonists first learned to plant corn from the Indians makes a good story, gripping in its human details. In The Fruited Plain (Univ. of Calif., 1980), Walter Ebeling illuminates an encyclopedic survey of advancing farm technology and complex economics with vivid vignettes—about the settlers' westward movement, the 1930s Dust Bowl tragedy, the slow mechanization of Southern agriculture that forced millions of sharecroppers (black and white) off the land and into the cities.


Perhaps the best sense of the past is found in contemporary documents: early colonists' letters on the harshness of the New World; George Washington's voluminous agricultural correspondence; official texts (e.g., the 1862 Morrill Act); admonitory essays from farm journals. All of this can be found in USDA historian Wayne D. Rasmussen's many-flavored four-volume Agriculture in the United States: A Documentary History (Random, 1975); it is available in the bigger libraries.

A detailed USDA overview of current trends, complete with charts, comes in Another Revolution in U.S. Farming? (USDA, 1979) by Lyle P. Schertz et al., with separate chapters on the Northeast, Southwest, and other regions. Providing the official numbers on everything from broccoli production to the school lunch program is the USDA's annual book of Agricultural Statistics (Government Printing Office, 1980).

With Washington subsidizing agriculture since the early New Deal, U.S. farm policy has stirred perennial debate. Some specialists see
postwar federal controls and subsidies as having created a stable economic climate for farmers that encouraged their rapid adoption of new technology, preserved "atomistic competition," and gave America "chronic food abundance." Economists Willard C. Cochrane and Mary E. Ryan make this argument in American Farm Policy, 1948–1973 (Univ. of Minn., 1976). Stronger federal intervention may be needed in the future, they suggest, as U.S. grain exports fluctuate in the world market.

Economist Don Paarlberg, a former Eisenhower White House aide, is more skeptical in Farm and Food Policy: Issues of the 1980s (Univ. of Nebr., 1980). Waste aside, he suggests that, while federal subsidies helped many big farmers, they indirectly hurt smaller ones and may also have hurt America's competitive position in world markets.

Paarlberg devotes most of his wry prose to an issue-by-issue analysis of what lies ahead. He predicts that, given farmers' political myopia and declining power, agriculture will get far less preference in Congress when it comes to Western water rights, preserving farm land, new subsidies for commodities, environmental rules, and labor rights. Paarlberg believes that some issues, such as the behavior of "agribusiness," "are worth more to activists and politicians if they are unsolved than if solutions are found."

As Paarlberg notes, Washington is infested with scores of farm lobbyists, ranging from the venerable American Farm Bureau Federation to the National Farmers Union and the National Cotton Council. These and many newer groups, including Ralph Nader's "consumerists," the "hunger lobby," and welfare rights organizations are described in Harold D. Guither's The Food Lobbyists: Behind the Scenes of Food and Agri-politics (Lexington, 1980); their battles over a variety of recent issues are recounted in The New Politics of Food (Heath, 1978), edited by Don F. Hadwiger and William P. Brown.

Covering a broad range of subjects from soil conservation to plant genetic diversity is a useful collection of essays on The Future of American Agriculture as a Strategic Resource, edited by Sandra S. Batie and Robert G. Healy (Conservation Foundation, 1980). By and large, the authors are not alarmists. But economist Vernon G. Ruttan asks whether growth in U.S. farm productivity can be sustained.

As he sees it, there is a delay in translating new technology into higher crop yields. The biggest U.S. gains in this century occurred in 1950–65, long after the development of hybrid corn. Annual productivity growth has slumped since 1965. Research now underway—into improved plant species, induced twinning (in beef cattle), more effective pesticides—may not boost U.S. farm productivity by much until after the year 2000.

The apparent end of the long depopulation of rural areas is described by 22 sociologists and economists in New Directions in Urban-Rural Migration: The Population Turnaround in Rural America (Academic Press, 1980), edited by David R. Brown and John M. Wardwell. One reason for the turnaround: the sudden availability of jobs in the countryside as factories locate there to take advantage of lower wage rates.

Radical Agriculture, edited by Richard Merrill (Harper, 1976), is a Left critique of rural economic in-
equalities, with technology and corporations as prime targets. It is also a plea for small-scale "self-sustaining agriculture" based on organic methods. Essayist Jim Hightower indicts federally supported land-grant college researchers as handmaidens of agribusiness. He singles out the University of Florida, where a thick-skinned "hard" tomato was developed for machine harvesting, thereby eliminating the jobs of thousands of local farmworkers.

Despite mechanization, strong backs and careful hands are still needed to harvest most of the fruits and vegetables that grace the American diet. In *Hired Hands: Seasonal Farm Workers in the United States* (Rand McNally, 1978), economist Stephen H. Sosnick focuses on California; most of the hired hands there, he notes, are neither blacks nor Mexicans but young whites who go to the fields as a last resort.

When it comes to international trade, journalist Dan Morgan’s *Merchants of Grain* (Viking, 1979) remains the best portrait of the secretive, but unsinister, big international corporations (e.g., Cargill, Continental) that buy, sell, and move grain round the world.

Guarded optimism flavors Keith O. Campbell’s *Food for the Future: How Agriculture Can Meet the Challenge* (Univ. of Nebr., 1979). The right application of science and technology, he contends, will increase world food production enough to feed the globe’s two billion additional people expected by the year 2000. But many Third World countries must change present policies, notably to give local farmers price incentives to produce more food.

An opposing view comes from Medard Gable, in *Ho-Ping: Food for Everyone* (Anchor/Doubleday, 1979), who blames local food problems on maldistribution, Western profit-mindedness, and lack of a worldwide food management system.

In *Agricultural Development: An International Perspective* (Johns Hopkins, 1971), Yuiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan analyze the differences among nations in farm productivity. They give good marks to the much-debated “Green Revolution” of the 1960s when improved seeds and technology increased crop yields even in India, one Third World country that now exports food.
THE SINKING OF THE TITANIC: A Poem
by Hans Magnus Enzensberger
Houghton, 1980
98 pp. $11.95

To many writers today, commitment means joining the ranks of capitalism or socialism. If a writer is smart, he knows, whatever his ideology, that he has simply picked a lesser evil. If he is dumb, he denies that his side admits any wrongs at all. West German poet Enzensberger is living proof that there is another choice. His book-length, beautiful, Dantesque poem, with 33 cantos and 16 separate poems interspersed like parentheses, has been translated from the German by the author himself. It centers around the Titanic's mid-ocean catastrophe on April 14, 1912. Enzensberger describes the songs the ship's orchestra played, the last dinner menu, the radio messages for help. Serious themes rub elbows with happy ones; the style changes from lyric to epic to elegiac to dramatic. The disaster is a metaphor for civilization, in danger, too. Politically, it is a poem about lost illusions. The poet remembers writing the first verses years ago in Havana. There, he thought: Tomorrow things will be better, and if not/ tomorrow, then the day after. O.K.—/ perhaps not much better really,/ but different, anyway . . . A marvelous feeling. Oh, I remember it. In reality, the party had ended even then. And all that was left was matter/ to be dealt with by the man from the World Bank/ and the comrade from State Security,/ exactly like back home in any other place. Despite the melancholy and bitterness of these lines, Enzensberger does not indulge in hopeless laments or cynicism. Who said that no good poem has a moral? This is a good poem, and it has a moral: If our ship is going to sink, we'd better learn to swim.

—Mario Vargas Llosa ('80)
BEYOND EQUALITY:  
Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862–1872  
by David Montgomery  
Univ. of Ill., 1981  
552 pp. $9.95 (paper only)

When this book was first published in 1967, historians who might have praised it were preoccupied. Many Reconstruction scholars were busy rescuing the Radical Republicans from attacks by Charles Beard and others of the Progressive school. (Beard had viewed the Radical's push for freedmen's rights as a "smoke screen" for Northeastern businessmen attempting to dominate the South.) Recently, studies of slavery, notably by Herbert Gutman and Eugene Genovese, have removed all occasion for surprise that most freedmen no more agreed with the Radicals than with their ex-masters on what their "freedom" should entail. Montgomery, a Yale historian, uncovers a different twist. He shows that the Radical politicians—men such as Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and William D. "Pig Iron" Kelley of Pennsylvania—also failed to see eye to eye with the Northern working class. Northeastern Republicans in Congress sincerely advocated "equality before the law" for Southern blacks. But although sympathetic, many, in the end, were unable to recognize the claims of white factory workers clamoring for better conditions, more pay, and an eight-hour day. The result was the collapse of the Radicals as a force in the North—as well as in the South. Montgomery unravels the party realignments that occurred as industrialization brought U.S. politics to maturity. He also writes with urbanity and humor. It is a pleasure to welcome Beyond Equality back into print.

—B. J. Fields ('80)

CHRIST: The Experience of Jesus as Lord  
by Edward Schillebeeckx  
Crossroad, 1980  
925 pp. $29.50

Following on his Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, Belgium's prolific Dominican, Schillebeeckx, continues his monumental (but still unfinished) study of Christ. He focuses on the Christian experience of grace and liberation. Schillebeeckx argues that it is impossible to accept the Christian revelation before one has learned to live it. Through an exhaustive analysis of New Testament texts, he shows how the first Christians, by recalling the career of Jesus and by following
him, experienced the joyful assurance of being called to share in his victory. Christianity, Schillebeeckx asserts, is unique among religions and philosophies in its capacity to inspire selfless service and to overcome evil. Yet, by insisting that Christianity is concerned with all that makes for man's freedom and happiness, Schillebeeckx aligns himself, somewhat, with secular and liberation theology. He warns, however, that salvation can never be reduced to anything achieved by man. "In the last resort," he concludes, "theology which loses itself in sociology, psychology, politics, or anything else that men may rightly think up for the benefit of others, is no longer theology. Theology which remains true to its task can only speak about the mystery of God as man's salvation."

—Avery Dulles, S.J. (77)

"My sweet wife," wrote John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay colony, in 1629, "thy love is such to me ... that I should neglect all others to hold correspondency of letters with thee." Drawing on such expressions of affection by Puritan husbands, and on the fact that most Puritan wives were educated enough to read them, some historians have held that 17th-century New England women enjoyed greater freedom than did their non-Calvinist English counterparts. Not so, says Koehler, a historian at the University of Cincinnati. Citing sermons, trial records, and religious tracts, he surmises that "anxiety ridden" Puritan men determinedly kept their women at home and in their place. A wife must give herself wholly to her husband "as her Owner, on whom God hath bestowed her," preached Thomas Gataker in A Good Wife Gods Gift (1623). Koehler sometimes errs when applying modern psychology to people who cannot speak up from the grave. But he is otherwise judicious in his uses of sociology, anthropology, semantics, and quantitative analysis. His extensive research does reveal an increased number of female innkeepers, teachers, lawyers—and criminals and prosti-

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EARLY VIEWS ON INDIA:
The Picturesque Journeys of
Thomas and William
Daniell, 1786-1794
by Mildred Archer
Thames & Hudson, 1980
240 pp. $37.50

In 1785, a little-known English landscape
painter named Thomas Daniell sailed with
his 15-year-old nephew, William, to Calcutta
to seek his fortune as an engraver. He was
lucky to get in. With at least five other artists
already in residence there, the East India
Company, not inclined to support "drop-
outs," scrutinized all incomers closely. The
Daniells' remarkably detailed hand-colored
prints of booming Calcutta and its inhabi-
tants proved immensely popular among
wealthy Britons living in India. Their sale
financed the Daniells' sorties up the Ganges
valley and, later, through southern India and
the Bombay area. These trips inspired several
hundred aquatints that conveyed to eager
Europeans back home their first impression
of India's Hindu and Muslim civilizations.
(Scotsman David Roberts would perform the
same service for Egypt and Palestine in the
late 1820s.) Throughout England, Victorian
pleasure domes were designed from the Dan-
iells' engravings of temples and mosques.
And even today, notes Oxford historian
Archer, the common perception of India re-
sembles the Daniells' Oriental Scenery, with
its cluttered street scenes and drawings of
overgrown countryside. The Daniells' prints
and sketches (258 of which are reproduced
here, 33 in color) preserve India's historic
treasures—the Taj Mahal, the Great Mosque
at Delhi, Ellora's rock-cut temples—as Brit-
ish sahibs first beheld them. The ugly con-
crete exurbs of New Delhi, Bombay, and
Calcutta came later.

—Henry Bradsher ('81)
CURRENT BOOKS

NEW TITLES

History

PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS
by Isaiah Berlin
Viking, 1981
210 pp. $13.95

An Oxford professor, former diplomat, and respected interpreter of Marx and sundry Enlightenment and Russian writers, Russian-born British philosopher Berlin has observed and conversed with many of this century’s Big Names. In 14 subdued essays, he deftly sketches the personalities of, among others, novelist Aldous Huxley, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Albert Einstein, Zionist Chaim Weizmann, poets Boris Pasternak and Anna Akhmatova, and a few of his eccentric fellow dons. Berlin recognizes that imperfections can be blessings in disguise. Winston Churchill used easily parodied archaic language, but, argues Berlin, his operatic style was just what was needed to convey the Battle of Britain’s high drama and spur his countrymen to victory. Berlin, who worked in the British embassy in Washington during the war, never met Franklin D. Roosevelt. But he recalls the President’s reputation for ruthlessness in dealing with the “adventurers, slick opportunists, and intriguers” who surrounded him, as well as his offhand, optimistic style. “He had all the character, energy and skill of the dictators,” Berlin concludes, “and he was on our side... every inch a democrat.”

LAND OF SAVAGERY,
LAND OF PROMISE:
The European Image of the American Frontier
by Ray Allen Billington
Norton, 1981
364 pp. $18.95

At the high point of Comanche courtship, a young brave plunges a knife into his horse’s neck, rips out its heart, and touches it to the forehead of his intended squaw. Or so Indian “custom” is portrayed in one 19th-century French novel. James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking tales (1823–41) introduced the hardy U.S. settler and his Indian foes to delighted audiences all over Europe. Soon, countless European authors were penning their own American adventure tales, with
such titles as *Pirates of the Prairies*. Even Goethe planned a novel about the West. The American pioneer portrayed by Germany’s Karl May, France’s Gustave Aimard, and others was violent and greedy. Throughout Europe, children learned to walk “Indian file” and, in games of cowboys-and-Indians, assumed that the redskins were the heroes. But other Europeans, poor people who had immigrated to the New World, wrote glowing “America Letters” to the folks back home. They praised the frontiersman’s fortitude, described with pride their newfound prosperity (“We eat meat three times a day” was a common boast), and touted America as a bountiful new Eden.

**JOHN MARSHALL:**
*Defender of the Constitution*
by Francis N. Stites
Little, Brown, 1981
181 pp. $11.95

**LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION**
by Melvin I. Urofsky
Little, Brown, 1981
183 pp. $11.95

When John Marshall, a 45-year-old rural Virginia lawyer, became the fourth U.S. Chief Justice in 1801, the Supreme Court was plagued by absenteeism and turnovers. The nation’s highest Court was neglected by the press, barely respected by the President and Congress, and virtually forgotten by the American people. Yet, by the time of his death 34 years later, Marshall had transformed the Court into a prestigious branch of government. Marshall “performed much as an Old Testament prophet—reminding his people of their social values and warning of the dangers likely to follow the abandonment of those principles,” writes Stites, a historian at San Diego State University. To strengthen the Court’s influence, he urged his Associates to turn in unanimous decisions. Marshall firmly believed that the Constitution was “the supreme law of the land”—a judgment he enunciated when the Court overturned a state law for the first time, in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803). But by the 1830s, Southern states were beginning to defy the Court; seeking to hold together both the Justices and the Union, Marshall began postponing controversial cases rather than risk the ire of Dixie’s States’ righters.

Like Marshall, Louis D. Brandeis (1856–
1941) made the Court his pulpit. Before Woodrow Wilson named him an Associate Justice in 1916, Brandeis had been an inveterate reformer, fighting insurance fraud in Boston in 1905–08 and negotiating settlement of New York's 1910 garment workers' strike. Brandeis saw the Constitution as a flexible tool to be used to meet society's changing needs, writes Urofsky, a historian at Virginia Commonwealth University. But his greatest contributions to constitutional scholarship, Urofsky contends, came in vigorous minority opinions that supported free speech and the right to privacy over government claims of the need for surveillance.

THE CONQUEST OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC
By G. J. Marcus
Oxford, 1981
224 pp. $25

It was perhaps as early as A.D. 795 when the Irish made their first leap westward, to Iceland. The feat was managed, says Marcus, a British maritime historian, thanks to the development of the curach, a sturdy, single-masted, hide-covered frame canoe. But the Gaels retreated, apparently because fierce Norse settlers arrived during the 9th century. Marcus recounts how the Vikings broke out of Scandinavia—venturing to Iceland, then to Greenland—because of overpopulation at home, because of Charlemagne's assaults on northern Germany and his threats to Denmark, and, perhaps the strongest reason of all, to assuage "some secret and powerful urge like that which inspired the Crusades." Based on evidence in medieval Iceland's "Granlendinga Saga," Marcus credits not Leif Ericson but Bjarni Herjólfsson (whose Viking father helped to settle Iceland) with discovering America in the late 12th century. But by 1370, the overextended Norsemen's exploratory voyages had ceased. Plague, involvement in Continental wars, and economic hardship inflicted by commercial competition from the German Hanse cities and the English heralded a period of rapid Scandinavian decline. The well-organized Hanseatic traders gained control of commerce in the North Sea and the Baltic, advancing as far as Iceland. The Brit-
ish, however, were the more enterprising voyagers. Bristol fishermen, Marcus suggests, were casting for cod in North American waters a decade or so before Genoa's favorite son set sail.

Contemporary Affairs

Within 20 years after the ruinous Korean War, President Park Chung Hee (1961-79) turned South Korea into a major exporter of ships, iron and steel products, textiles, and electrical machinery. Indeed, during the 1970s, his country's growth rate (9.6 percent) surpassed that of Japan in the thick of its pre-World War II build-up. How Park accomplished this rapid expansion is explored by nine specialists from the Harvard Institute for International Development and the Korea Development Institute. Park lifted tariffs on imported raw materials and cut corporate income taxes on exports. He welcomed foreign investment and, wielding the government's authority to deny loans from abroad, he pointed Korean businessmen toward industries he wanted developed. By 1977, manufactured exports comprised 25 percent of Korea, Inc.'s GNP. The United States, which pumped $6 billion in grants and loans into South Korea between 1945 and 1975, was a major contributor to the upswing. But U.S. efforts to promote democracy were not gratefully received; before his assassination, strong-man Park described democracy as "meaningless to people suffering from starvation and despair." During the 1974 oil crisis, however, he was able to quadruple gasoline prices overnight, an "obviously desirable measure" to force fuel conservation, say the authors, "that would have been difficult to carry out in a political democracy." The economic boom has benefited all Koreans, although, inevitably, some have prospered more than others. Korea, the authors conclude, is "a prime example of how growth can be achieved with equity."

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Ask a dozen political pundits to describe the senior Senator from New York and you will no doubt get a dozen conflicting impressions. These 14 articulate essays by the former Harvard political scientist and only man to serve in Cabinet or sub-Cabinet posts under four consecutive Presidents weave one argument: U.S. governmental institutions are resilient and can work well, if we rediscover the wisdom they embody. But Moynihan also comments on a panoply of abuses. He charges that political empire-builders obey the Iron Law of Emulation: In 1962, for example, the White House created the Office of Science and Technology; nothing would do but for Congress to get its own Office of Technology Assessment (in 1974). The result: duplication, rivalry, and stalemate. Moynihan’s most stinging barbs are reserved for Supreme Court Justices when they play at social science. His point: “Social science is basically concerned to predict future events, whereas the purpose of law is to order them.” Finally, Moynihan assesses SALT. With each new agreement, he notes, the nuclear forces on both sides have increased. He asks, “Need we sign treaties to legitimate an arms race that neither side might be willing shamelessly to go forward with unilaterally?”

With only one customer, there is no free market at work in America’s defense industries. Yet, since performance is ultimately more crucial than cost, fewer than 8 percent of military procurement contracts are decided “solely on the basis of price competition.” So argues Gansler, vice president of Washington’s Analytic Sciences Corporation. Supporting between one-fourth and one-third of all U.S. scientists and engineers, the Defense Department should be at the forefront of technological progress. But Pentagon planners have increasingly shifted research-and-development funding from small, inventor-led companies to large corporations that “emphasize risk minimization, and thus tend not
to push new ideas or applications.” A few “fixes” that Gansler feels would result in a cheaper and better war machine: Subdivide R&D and production assignments among separate businesses; require prime contractors to have many sources of parts; make cost compete with—but not necessarily over-ride—performance as the chief criterion for design decisions. Gansler estimates that “the last 5 percent of performance often results in a 50 percent cost increase.” Under the present system, he says, the United States fails to get enough bang for the buck.

First published as a special issue of The Public Interest, this collection of 12 essays surveys 400 years of economic theory. Sociologist Peter F. Drucker outlines the big movements—mercantilism, physiocratism, classical and neoclassical economics, the various shades of Keynesianism, and monetarism. He contends that economists need a new definition of “wealth”—not money or land or labor, as in the past, but productivity, “knowledge applied to resources through human work.” Economist James W. Dean discusses Keynesian “fine-tuning” by Paul Samuelson et al. and the revolt—to vigorous for the moment in Britain and America—against Keynes led by “supply side” economists such as Arthur Laffer. All agree that economic theory has so far failed to come to grips with runaway inflation and lagging capital formation. Co-editor Kristol accuses radical economists on both the Left and Right of formulating useless “rationalist-utopias.” He urges adherence to Adam Smith’s tenets: Men are “incorrigibly interested in improving their material progress”; when they are given free rein, economic growth occurs, and “in the long run,” everyone’s lot improves “however unequally.” But economist Paul Davidson recalls Keynes’s rejoinder that “in the long run, we are all dead.” And sociologist Daniel Bell observes that economists, ever striving to be “scientific,” often overlook the way people actually behave.
Before Evelyn Waugh achieved best-seller-dom with *Brideshead Revisited* (1945), he supported his novel-writing and his country estate by doing assignments for newspapers. Later, he could pick and choose his topics. Yet, whether hackwork or serious essays or polemics, his journalism, anthologized in *A Little Order*, was never dull, and it has yet to fade. He described British politics as the “co-caine of the people,” deplored the emerging “two-class state of officials and proletariat,” cheered the vigor of Catholicism in America, and regularly lamented aristocracy’s decline at home. “I was driven into writing,” he said, “because it was the only way a lazy and ill-educated man could make a decent living. I am not complaining about the wages. . . . What I mind so much is the work.”

Like his early novels, his *Letters* are far funnier than his *Diary* (1976). They provide a lively running portrait of English high life and of Waugh himself (in public, an outrageous Tory; in private, a loving husband and father); his unhappy war experiences; his bibulous “raids” on London; his travels (Ethiopia, Italy, Rhodesia); his spirited exchanges with Graham Greene, Anthony Powell, Nancy Mitford, Randolph Churchill; his devotion to work and to gossip. Waugh did not like the telephone. He prodded, lectured, and entertained his friends by mail until his death in 1966, and the letters survive to stir us as well.

Henry James “has a mind so fine that no idea could violate it,” quipped T. S. Eliot. McCarthy, the highly opinionated author of such novels as *The Company She Keeps* (1942) and *The Group* (1963), agrees. But James, nevertheless, set the trends of 20th-century fiction, she adds. James invented a refined, stately way of writing nearly devoid of “physical action, inventory, description of places and persons . . . and moral teaching.” Similarly,
many modern novelists have chosen a shapely literary style over a hard reckoning with the world around them. They work mainly at conveying their own sensibilities or their characters' psychology. McCarthy longs for books by the likes of Dickens, Balzac, Tolstoy, and Flaubert. These were authors, she says, who, because they dealt with subjects that affected their readers' lives, were 'looked up to as [spokesmen] on all sorts of matters: medicine, religion, capital punishment, the right relation between the sexes.' McCarthy does not rebuke her contemporaries by name. But she lauds John Updike's *The Coup* (1978) and the works of some American Jewish novelists—those few (Bellow, Malamud, Roth) probing questions of politics, class, or religion.

In May 1934, Mandelstam, a 43-year-old Russian poet, was arrested and exiled to the Urals. His offense was reciting to friends a poem, included in this anthology, about Stalin: *His fat fingers are shiny, like slugs, and his words are absolute, like grocers' weights.* But most of his early poems, written when Mandelstam was in his late teens and early 20s, are about cityscapes. St. Petersburg, made of stone, is the image by which he proclaims that the poet is not a creator but a builder: *Stone, become a web, lace fragility: Let your thin needle stab! The empty breast of sky.* St. Petersburg later became, for Mandelstam, a symbol of Western order and respect for people, virtues lacking in Stalin's tyrannical regime. Mandelstam died of "heart failure" in 1938. He was "rehabilitated" in 1956, but his poems were not allowed to appear in the Soviet Union until 1974, and then only in an edition intended primarily for sale abroad. He once compared a poem to an Egyptian funereal barge in which "everything needed for life is stored... and nothing is forgotten." Mandelstam's own "ship of death," as translator Robert Tracy notes, has already carried him "into many alien harbors; someday it will even reach a Russian port."
Science & Technology

FOX TALBOT AND THE INVENTION OF PHOTOGRAPHY
by Gail Buckland
Godine, 1980
216 pp. $50

FOX TALBOT: Photographer
by Robert Lassam
Kent State Univ., 1981
90 pp. $22.50 cloth, $9.95 paper

William Henry Fox Talbot (1800–77) was an accomplished scientist, mathematician, folklorist, etymologist, and Orientalist who also found time to serve in Britain's House of Commons. In 1833, Talbot got the idea that the camera obscura's "fleeting images" might be made to "imprint themselves durably." The following year, he treated plain writing paper with various salts and silver nitrate and came up with what he called a "photogenic drawing" (what we now call a "negative"). He next discovered that if transparent paper was used, the first picture could serve to produce a second on which light and shadow would be reversed, i.e., a "positive"; a single negative, he figured, could produce multiple positives. Still not satisfied, Talbot invented, among other things, primitive methods of photocopying and halftone reproduction. Talbot was so busy that he did not present his discoveries to London's Royal Institution until January 25, 1839—two weeks after Louis-Jacques-Mande Daguerre had announced his quite different process in Paris. Buckland, former curator of the Royal Photographic Society of Great Britain, recounts the whole story, with ample illustrations, and provides extensive excerpts from Talbot's writings. Lassam, curator of England's Fox Talbot Museum, has written a brief biographical introduction to some 65 full-page reproductions of the world's first photographs—Talbot's grainy still lifes, snapshots of early Victorians posed at work and play, and elegant close-ups of leaves and plants.

THE COMING OF THE AGE OF IRON
edited by Theodore A. Wertime and James D. Muhly
Yale, 1981
555 pp. $22.50

Iron was first used, for ornament, as early as 3000 B.C., probably in northern Turkey. But the Iron Age did not truly dawn until 2,000 years later, when the precious metal was discovered in abundance in the Middle East and began to replace bronze in weapons and tools, notes Wertime, a Smithsonian anthropologist. In these 14 often-technical essays,
historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, and metallurgists discuss facets of iron lore ranging from political events that hastened the switch from bronze to iron to the mechanics of smelting. Iron's introduction into daily life in Europe, Asia, and Africa "was far too complicated a process to have a direct influence on the known events of history," observes archaeologist Anthony M. Snodgrass. But the metal has played a supporting role in our own civilization. At the start of the Industrial Revolution, yearly world production of iron and steel was a half-million tons; by 1970, it exceeded a billion tons.

While observing the "power" of water falling from different heights, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) deduced and illustrated the principles of modern hydrodynamics that Daniel Bernoulli did not formally develop until 1738. In this brief survey of Leonardo's scientific notebooks, Zammattio, an engineer from Trieste, analyzes the artist's intricate designs (never executed) for such schemes as a navigable seaway linking Florence with the distant Mediterranean. Vincian scholar Augusto Marinoni traces the fate of the notebooks themselves—with their fully evolved treatises, haphazard jottings, and sketches—as they passed among owners in nine European countries and the United States. Marinoni also discusses a design—probably a student's copy of Leonardo's original drawing—for a chain-driven bicycle, an idea that went unrealized until the late 19th century. Anna Maria Brizio, an art historian at the University of Milan, supplies a collection of Leonardo's aphorisms on hydraulics, birds in flight, human anatomy, and other diversions. Leonardo studied nature, writes Marinoni, "like a pupil who wants to discover the secrets of the master."
CURRENT BOOKS

PAPERBOUNDS

THE RETURN OF EVA PERON, with The Killings in Trinidad. By V. S. Naipaul. Vintage reprint, 1981. 245 pp. $2.95

Much of the Third World is "doomed to remain half-made." Such is the estimate of V. S. Naipaul, whose novels and "obsessional" reports from underdeveloped nations have earned him a reputation as a successor to Joseph Conrad. This book of travel essays from the 1970s—on Trinidad, Zaire, and Argentina (with a side trip to Uruguay)—paints a mottled picture of delusions and decay. Argentines lack history, asserts Naipaul, himself a Trinidad-born Indian. Unable to face their own "artificial, fragmented colonial society," they claim "the achievements and authority of Europe." Meanwhile, in Uruguay, interest rates swell to 60 percent, and employees of the state oil company rush to work early because there are not enough chairs to go around. In Zaire, Joseph Mobutu honors the 19th-century despotism of Belgium's King Leopold II by imitating it. Writes Naipaul: "The chief threatens; the people are cowed; the chief relents; the people praise his magnanimity." Finally, Naipaul dissects a fraudulent black-power commune in Trinidad. It was financed, he says, by chic British do-gooders who "keep up with revolution as with theatre" and visit trouble spots "with return air tickets." Somber reading.


Most Americans do not particularly care what economic policies are implemented, just so long as they work. In this widely praised study, Tufte, a Yale political scientist, quantifies the voters' influence on economic planning—and the impact of prosperity (or the lack of it) on elections. He calculates that an average 1 percent increase in real disposable income nationwide leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the vote for an incumbent President (Democrat or Republican). Moreover, from 1946 to 1976, the median rate of growth in real disposable income per capita was 3.3 percent in years when incumbent Presidents sought re-election, compared to 1.7 percent otherwise. (During campaigns, Presidents typically boosted veterans' and social security benefits and federal aid to states and cities; taxes to help cover these costs were raised later.) Tufte strongly favors the "competitive rigors of the political arena" over the alternatives. But he also notes the inevitable by-product: "a lurching, stop-and-go economy."

THE MAKING OF ELIZABETHAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1558–1603. By R. B. Wernham. Univ. of Calif., 1981. 109 pp. $3.95 (cloth, $15.50)

During the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), England was but "a bone between two dogs," writes Wernham, an Oxford historian. Yet, by artful military moves and deft diplomacy, Elizabeth managed to keep both Henry IV of France and Philip II of Spain from swallowing up her weaker, less populous nation. To make sure that neither French nor Dutch ports would be used to launch an invasion, Elizabeth first harassed the Spanish occupiers of the Netherlands (allowing British volunteers to fight alongside Dutch dissidents), while she distracted France (by sending troops to bolster the Huguenots in France's first War of Religion).
But during the 1580s, Philip conquered Portugal. As a riposte, Elizabeth, in 1585, dispatched 7,000 soldiers to the Low Countries to battle the Spaniards. The fighting between Spain and England would persist for the rest of her life. The burden of the long war on Parliament, which had little say in the foreign policy it financed, and on heavily taxed Englishmen turned Britain from a monarch-worshipping into a monarch-criticizing nation. Yet it also broadened the horizons of British merchants. Wartime privateers, observes Wernham, took their ships across the Atlantic, to the West Indies, and to the Pacific.


In 1462, Albert Pfister of Germany invented a way of printing pictures and text together “at one economical squeeze of the press.” Soon all kinds of illustrations adorned the printed word—and enhanced its power. Picture books, Mayor suggests, “enticed the average German to read” and created “a literate public for [Martin] Luther to rouse with his writings.” As Europeans got in the habit of referring to books, they began to demand greater accuracy in their illustrations. Aggressive Renaissance publishers commissioned teams of scientists and artists to produce detailed botanical sketches and human drawings that were anatomically correct. Mayor, a former curator at New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, surveys prints ranging from Chinese woodcuts 3,000 years old to Jasper Johns’s lithographs of the 1960s. Ever since the Middle Ages, he suggests, most innovative print makers have made their reputations not as etchers or engravers but principally as artists in other media. Painters Daumier and Degas discovered new possibilities in sculpture because they were not cowed by the sculptor’s “rules”; similarly, painters and sculptors such as Renoir, Cézanne, and Rodin introduced fresh styles in print making. “Kneading clay and chiseling marble,” Mayor writes, “strengthened Rodin’s hand to pull a dry-point needle through copper as flowingly as another hand might move a pencil over paper.” Accompanying Mayor’s solid text are 752 well-placed illustrations.


Robert Penn Warren won a Pulitzer Prize for his most famous fiction, All the King’s Men (1946). Since then, he has won two more (in 1958 and 1979) for his poetry. Warren infuses his verse with novelistic detail and striking metaphor: Gold like a half-slice of orange/Fished from a stiff Old-Fashioned, the moon/Lolls on the sky that goes deeper blue/By the tick of the watch. Or/Lolls like a real brass button half-buttoned/On the blue flannel sleeve/Of an expensive seagoing blue blazer. In these 50 short, graceful poems, Warren, now 75, takes stock—of spacious American landscapes he has come to love, and of old age.

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Toward a Native Art

The great flowering of American modern art since 1945 has origins that go back much earlier—to the years after World War I, when writers, critics, and artists argued over the cultural health of the nation. Europe beckoned, and many, including Ernest Hemingway, fled to Paris. But others remained in Manhattan to do battle in little magazines such as *Soil* and *Broom*. Was America in the 1920s a sinkhole of crass “commercialism,” or were the new industrial machines, consumer gadgets, and advertising signs themselves a living native art? Historian Wanda Corn tells how this debate, now largely forgotten, helped lead to the vigorous original American art that we see today.

by Wanda M. Corn

Art historians have long regarded the 1940s and '50s as the period when New York City became the world’s art center. Spurred on by European artists such as Piet Mondrian and André Breton, who took refuge in Manhattan during World War II, American painters developed their own native avant-garde. The large, vigorous abstractions of New York School artists such as Jackson Pollock, Adolph Gottlieb, and Willem de Kooning were hailed internationally as America's first major contributions to art. New York City has been on top ever since—it's schools, studios, museums, and galleries a magnet to painters, as Paris was earlier.

But what happened in postwar New York had its beginnings much earlier. Although largely forgotten today, a cultural battle raged on American soil during the 1920s. Silently with palette and brush, or vocally in a bevy of short-lived “little” magazines, American intellectuals debated how to create an original art.

One problem, some maintained, was that America’s best artists chose to work overseas. Many U.S. writers and painters—F. Scott Fitzgerald, T. S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, John Marin, Marsden Hartley, Alfred Maurer—sought abroad what they could not find at home: a lively international cultural scene and a public receptive to new forms of expression. "Paris was our mistress," mused one American literary expatriate. In the city’s cafes, they “drank black coffee by choice, believing that Paris itself was sufficient alcohol,” critic Mal-
colm Cowley recalls.

One young writer of the day, Waldo Frank, studied his compatriots as they frequented these cafes and complained about America's materialism and insensitivity to the arts. He was struck by the irony of the situation. Here were some of America's finest "conveyers of truth, creators of beauty," he wrote. "They sneered, they jeered, they swore they were done with the barbaric land that had given them birth." But how would America's cultural life ever improve, he wondered, if its creative talents refused to "endow America with what they accused America of lacking?" Yet Frank understood their dilemma.

The years surrounding World War I in the United States had witnessed the speedy acquisition of cars, movies, and radios; ragtime, jazz, and the tango; hot-dog stands, dime stores, gas stations; packaged cigarettes, alarm clocks, safety razors; skyscrapers, grain elevators, and assembly lines; billboards, national brand-name consumer products, and tabloids. Was it possible to create art from this?

Two quite different groups of American painters, writers, and critics attempted to provide an answer.

Spiritual Refuge

The first group was led by Frank and his fellow writers for Seven Arts magazine—Van Wyck Brooks and Paul Rosenfeld.* It included the circle of painters associated with noted photographer Alfred Stieglitz, most notably Marin, Hartley, Georgia O'Keeffe, and Arthur Dove.

The son of a well-to-do merchant, Stieglitz (1864–1946) devoted himself, during the early years of this century, to gaining recognition for photography as a fine art. He pioneered in taking art photographs with a small, hand-held camera. As an entrepreneur, he promoted the medium through his magazine, Camera Work, and in his gallery at 291 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan.

Stieglitz also championed modern painting and sculpture. Five years before the famous 1913 New York Armory Show, which introduced modern European art to the American public, he exhibited works by Matisse and Rodin at "291."

Stieglitz believed that American art should be elegant and expressive; it should provide spiritual refuge from the crassness of the everyday world. Thus, his taste ran to the highly charged abstract and semi-

*The first issue of Seven Arts appeared in New York in 1916. The magazine folded the following year when its backers objected to the pacifist position on World War I taken by some of its editors and contributors.
abstract still lifes and landscapes of Marin, Dove, Hartley, and O'Keeffe—painters who were working with modern colors and forms and consciously striving to arrive at a uniquely American expression.

No Ordinary Folk

Stieglitz and the writers in Seven Arts despaired of American life. They found it repressed, materialist, and—to use one of their favorite words—vulgar. Stieglitz criticized automobile designs "for their lack of quality and feeling." Even the debonair songs of George Gershwin did not escape attack. Paul Rosenfeld claimed that Gershwin could "never long transcend the plain of things that please a public incapable of discrimination."

Naively, but not surprisingly, these critics, who grew up during the optimistic Progressive era, believed that artists could help reform society. If their art was sufficiently spiritual and emotional, they argued, it would give Americans the satisfaction of having an "inner life" and their own culture free of European influences.

To achieve this, the artist must sink roots into American soil and rise above gross commercialism. Members of Stieglitz's circle saw themselves as a class apart. They centered their lives around creative and intellectual activities; they consciously kept to themselves and close to nature, rarely socializing with ordinary folk.

Another group rose to defend America. Its members eagerly embraced just those qualities of U.S. culture that Stieglitz, O'Keeffe, and their friends disdained.

In 1916, as Seven Arts was calling for a new spirit in American art, another small magazine, the Soil, was loudly proclaiming that America already had a genuine culture. Intellectuals simply didn't know where to look for it: in comics and dime-store novels; in vaudeville; in the design of bridges and skyscrapers.

Robert Coady (1876-1921) was a sometime painter, writer, art dealer, and publisher, and the guiding spirit of the Soil's short run of five issues in 1916-17. We know little else about him. But he was perhaps the first to argue that America's lively mass culture embodied lessons for the high priests and priestesses of the fine arts.

Coady had Walt Whitman's reverence for street life. He often wrote with the bard's gusto, adding his own brand of fervent evangelism. Art, he declared, "comes from a feeling of human being. It is an extension of life and travels the earth and goes on to eternity."

No Gentlemanly Airs

Trained at New York's Art Students' League, Coady began his career abroad, among the American expatriates and European modernists. He was, someone once remarked, a "pugnacious red-headed Irishman." He had none of the gen-

tlemannly airs of the Seven Arts crowd.

It is not known how long Coady lived in Paris before World War I. He was probably doing some painting there when he became a close friend of a young American sculptor, Michael Brennan. In 1914, Coady returned stateside and, with Brennan as his European agent, started the Washington Square Gallery in New York’s Greenwich Village.¹

His exhibits were highly eclectic—at first glance. He showed the European avant-garde painters (Picasso, Juan Gris, André Derain, Matisse). He displayed African and South Sea Island sculpture and art by children. As far as is known, he did not exhibit or sell works by modern American artists.

Coady had a theory about art and culture. He never entirely articulated it, but he hinted at it in the Soil. He championed art that was intuitive and freely expressive, and despaired of art that was overly intellectual or theoretical, that depended on artistic conventions, or that was removed from life. Genuine art, for him, was unencumbered by the interference of teachers. Art, he wrote, should grow from the soil, "naturally, healthfully, beautifully."

So he illustrated Soil with reproductions of work he considered genuine and expressive: archaic Greek statues; Egyptian paintings; works by Toulouse-Lautrec, Cézanne, and Henri Rousseau; photographs of American machines, prize fighters, rodeo riders, and entertainers.

Such appreciation of the primitive and spontaneous did not originate with Coady. He acquired it in Paris, where, before World War I, it had become a vogue among Europeans. His friend in Paris, the American painter Max Weber, had been studying African art. And Coady had gotten to know the naïve painter Rousseau, of whom Weber was an early admirer.

But Coady’s penchant for everyday Americana, from machines and skyscrapers to baseball and jazz, was something new to the New York art world.

"Who Will Paint?"

To Coady, the fine arts in America were neither original nor authentic. They were, he wrote, "our academic imitations of the French academy," or "our technical imitations of the Franco-Spanish school." What was "young, robust, energetic, naive, immature, daring, and big spirited" in American culture were industry, commerce, the cities, and, especially, the great swirl of ethnic groups. Here, he wrote, "traditions are being merged, blood is being mixed." The result was a brand new culture. Coady became its cataloguer.

In the Soil’s first issue, he sang a Whitmanesque hymn to the American scene:

The Panama Canal, the Skyscraper and Colonial Architecture. The East River, the Battery and the “Fish Theatre.” The Tug Boat and the Steamshovel . . . The Steel Plants and the Electrical Shops. The Bridges, the Docks, the Viaducts . . . Indian Beadwork, Sculptures, Decorations, Music and Dances . . . Ragtime . . . The Cigar-store Indians . . . The Shoemakers, the Haberdashers and Clothiers . . .

Coady went on like this for almost two full pages.

The Soil ran articles on the American language, on industrial machines, and on the Woolworth Building in New York. It reported on

¹ Three years later, he relocated to 489 Fifth Avenue and named his new establishment the Coady Gallery.
dresmaking and serialized a dime novel by Nick Carter. Photographs of celebrities such as comedian Bert Williams and the circus clown "Toto," of sports figures including prizefighter Jack Johnson and swimmer Annette Kellerman, were interspersed among reproductions of European cubist and abstract paintings.

As for America's modern artists, Coady accused them of blindly following the "isms" of Europe and missing what was around them. "Who will paint New York! Who?" he asked. A mock advertisement in the Soil announced an exhibition of Freedom of Movement in Light and Space—at the Aquarium, Battery Park, New York City. Another "ad" offered art lessons in Henri Rousseau's Paris studio. (Rousseau had been dead for seven years.)

Trying to make sense of these harangues, taunts, and jibes, at least one historian has compared Coady's distaste for fine art to the Dadaists' anti-art rhetoric. But this ignores Coady's intent. Coady did have a sense of play like the Dadaists, and he was iconoclastic. But he was also an earnest cultural nationalist. Like Waldo Frank, Coady believed in the possibility of a new American art as original as that of Europe. ("With art in abundance and our arteries young, why should we nibble on a dead end of Europe?"

\*The Dadaists were a group of western European writers and artists that included poet Tristan Tzara and painter-sculptor Marcel Duchamp. During the 1910s and early '20s, they embraced chance and irrationality. A typical piece of Dada art is Duchamp's "ready-made" Bicycle Wheel (1913), which is just that—an ordinary bicycle wheel, mounted on a kitchen stool.
At left is John Marin's Deep-Sea Trawlers, Maine, No. 1, (1932). At right, My Egypt (1925) by Charles Demuth. During the 1920s, Demuth began to depict the landscape—steel mills, derricks, water tanks, smokestacks, grain elevators—near his home in Lancaster, Pa. He also drew experimental abstractions based on the rhythms of jazz.

he asked.) He just offered a very different strategy for cultivating it.

Coady prescribed a mixture of social and cultural reforms: "Free music, dancing, vaudeville and movies should be in all parks and public schools." Saturdays should be holidays "in honor of our masters in art, science, and industry." Cities should offer free public exhibitions of both the arts and the sciences. And artists should respond to America's popular culture.

But for all Coady's enthusiasm and unorthodox charm, he seems to have had little direct influence on the artists of his time.

Then, in 1921, Coady's mission was taken up by a new magazine called Broom (1921–24). Among its first editors was Harold A. Loeb, who had just graduated from Princeton. Loeb backed the magazine with his inherited wealth and kept it solvent partly by taking advantage of the international dollar exchange and publishing out of Rome, Berlin, and New York.

Broom began by soliciting essays, poetry, and art works from Europeans as well as Americans. The first few issues, Loeb later recalled, were not very distinctive. If early numbers of Broom had a point of view, it was simply to support art that was modern and that reflected a "higher consciousness." The magazine published many of the same writers who had appeared in the now-defunct Seven Arts—James Oppenheim, Sherwood Anderson, and Waldo Frank.

What the magazine lacked, Loeb complained, was direction. Its art reproductions were diverse: Joseph Stella's cubist Brooklyn Bridge; Juan
Gris's cubist still lifes; Picasso's drawing of Igor Stravinsky; sculptor Jacques Lipshitz's bust of Jean Cocteau; a painting of a vase with flowers and a drawing of a nude by Matisse; Rockwell Kent's gloomy Newfoundland Dirge.

The French Connection

Then, in May 1922, Loeb, who was living abroad, wrote an article entitled "Foreign Exchange." The essay was about the French influence on American literary expatriates. Two things struck him. First, Americans such as T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound were displaying a new concern with form and a fastidiousness about their language. And, second, expatriates—this flabbergasted Loeb—were beginning to re-evaluate their own country, taking a cue from their European friends. It was not, Loeb wrote, intellectual America that interested the Europeans but "that other America of the skyscrapers, of the movies, of the streets."

French writers and artists such as Jean Cocteau and Marcel Duchamp were scrutinizing contemporary America, hoping to capture "the crudeness of the amazing contrasts of the age and the speed of its mechanism." These Europeans had no patience with Yankees who praised French culture while demeaning their own. It was precisely America's gracelessness that the French loved.

Loeb's perceptions are echoed in Malcolm Cowley's Exile's Return (1934), Waldo Frank's In the American Jungle (1937), Alfred Kreymborg's Troubadour (1925), and Ernest Hemingway's A Moveable Feast (1964). From about 1915 on, and increasingly during the 1920s, the European avant-garde provided a kind of therapy for American literati who, like Loeb, had been brought up to think of their country as a puritanical wasteland.

Most of these Europeans had never been to America and knew it only through film, magazines, and recordings. But they were captivated. Philippe Soupault tried to write in what he called the "American tempo," picked up from U.S. movies. Fernand Léger did cubist drawings of Charlie Chaplin (which Broom published). Darius Milhaud wrote orchestral music derived from American jazz and ragtime rhythms. And architect Le Corbusier exulted over the "classic" design of American grain elevators, factories, and skyscrapers.

Capitalist Beauty

Loeb's own conversion was swift, and his new enthusiasm for American culture gave Broom the editorial direction it needed. In "The Mysticism of Money" (Broom, September 1922), he dressed down those U.S. writers such as Van Wyck Brooks, Waldo Frank, and Paul Rosenfeld who "hammer the country for its emptiness of beauty."

Opening the essay as if it were an anthropological treatise, Loeb declared that every nation's art history had three phases: The archaic or creative period, when art forms are invented in response to the culture's dominant religion; the classic period, when those forms are perfected; and the decadent period, when traditional forms become exhausted.

The art of Europe, Loeb claimed, was in the decadent period and declining. American culture, on the other hand, was in the archaic period. Anonymous workmen were creating exciting new forms, inspired by the country's own "religion" of capitalism. Great machines, advertising, skyscrapers, bridges, and factories—such was America's
“archaic” art.

If this sounds like Robert Coady, it is because Loeb had discovered Soil. Earlier, when he wrote "Foreign Exchange," Loeb credited only the Europeans for their grasp of American popular culture. Now he acknowledged Coady's early efforts on the home front.

An American Original

"The Mysticism of Money" was, in fact, a careful digest of Coady's ideas. But Loeb was less impulsive than Coady; he came across as a serious critic of American civilization, not as a fiery preacher. And because he seemed so serious and analytical, he offered a much more convincing challenge to American intellectuals and artists than Coady ever had. It had been easy in 1916 to ignore Coady. In 1922, Loeb emerged as a scholar of popular culture, offering a genuine alternative to the critics' prevailing pessimism about the state of American art.

Meanwhile, the French avant-garde continued to influence a handful of American painters. Most U.S. artists in Paris were still content to work within the modern cubist and abstract styles of Europe's guiding lights. But at least one American artist of the 1920s—Gerald Murphy (1888-1964)—was to prove something of an original.

Murphy was the wealthy, adventurous, and stylish son of the owner of New York's chic leather-goods store, Mark Cross & Co. After taking his B.A. at Yale and a two-year graduate course at the Harvard School of Landscape Architecture, Murphy, with his wife and young children, sailed for Europe in 1921—to escape from family pressures, to study European gardening, and to live the "good life." In Paris and Antibes, where he and his wife, Sara, established homes, they became friends of Picasso, Fernand Léger, Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and John Dos Passos.

The French and American avant-garde liked Murphy instantly—partly because of his unabashed Americanness, expressed in his penchant for jazz and country-and-western music. The Murphys called their Riviera home Villa America and posted an abstract design of the U.S. flag near its gateway. Here they often served home-grown sweet corn and tomatoes to their guests. And they threw extravagant but beautifully planned parties.

We can glimpse something of their elegant life in the first half of Fitz-
In pursuit of an original American art, Georgia O'Keeffe painted semi-abstractions of America's natural landscapes. At left is her Jack-in-the-Pulpit, No. 2 (1930). In Paris, Gerald Murphy celebrated a new age of American gadgetry with Razor (1924), at right.

Collection of the artist. Photo by Malcolm Varon.

gerald's Tender Is the Night (1934), where the character Dick Diver is modeled on Murphy. Keeping up with Gerald and Sara, recalled Dos Passos, was like "trying to live in heaven."

Murphy was not trained as a painter. But when he saw the work of Georges Braque, Picasso, and Juan Gris in the window of a Paris gallery, he was hooked. "If that's painting," he wrote, "it's what I want to do." He and Sara immediately signed up to take lessons from Natalia Goncharova, a Russian abstract artist living in Paris. But Murphy quickly developed a style and imagery of his own, one that combined cubism with American subject matter.

His Boatdeck (1922, now lost) was an 18-foot-high vertical canvas of smokestacks and ventilators as seen from the deck of an ocean liner. It recalled Murphy's own experience crossing the Atlantic and, in its clean, crisp forms, his fondness for things mechanical. For his still life Razor (1924), Murphy shunned the glasses, bottles, and guitars that were the familiar subjects of European cubist paintings. Instead, he chose new American gadgets—a safety razor, a fountain pen, and a box of matches.

In Cocktail (1927), he painted a corkscrew, martini glasses, cigars, and a cocktail shaker. Murphy had fled the business world of his father only to paint on a heroic scale the very objects for sale in his father's store.

The Europeans loved Murphy's work. Picasso praised his paintings as "simple and direct and . . . Amuriken, certainly not European." Léger said he was "the only American painter in Paris."

Although never reproduced in Broom's pages, Murphy's art fit neatly into the magazine's aesthetic.
His paintings, which received remarkably little attention in the U.S. press, would have complemented the American poems there by Carl Sandburg, Wallace Stevens, E. E. Cummings, and William Carlos Williams. By 1923, America had taken center stage in Broom. Italian futurist Enrico Prampolini wrote on the esthetic of the machine. American poet Amy Lowell submitted verse about New England lilacs. Industrial machinery, rendered in cubist and futurist compositions, graced Broom's covers.

The magazine also added two new young boosters of popular culture to its staff—Matthew Josephson (1899–1978) and Malcolm Cowley (b. 1898). After graduating from Columbia in 1920 and working briefly as acting editor of the Newark Morning Ledger, Josephson had set out for Europe. In 1922, he started a small magazine, Secession, in Vienna; later that year, he joined forces with Harold Loeb. Cowley, a graduate of Harvard (1920) and France's University of Montpellier (1922), signed up with the Broom about the same time.

In Europe, both men had made friends among the avant-garde, particularly the Dadaists. The anti-art rhetoric of the latter spurred their youthful rebellion against the high-toned view, championed by Waldo Frank and Paul Rosenfeld, that art was a refined, spiritual experience.

Cowley and Josephson were drawn to Loeb's view of America's cultural assets like bees to honey. They wrote a series of colorful essays promoting Loeb's doctrine, fully aware that they would infuriate the reigning American literary lights. Among the best essays, if not the most outrageous, was Josephson's "The Great American Billposter," in the November 1922 Broom.

Josephson argued that advertising was one of America's finest native
arts, reflecting "the national temper-
ament with great clairvoyance." Ad-
vertisements were "the most daring
and indigenous literature of the
age." They were, he claimed, "far
more arresting and provocative than
99 percent of the stuff that passes for
poetry in our specialized maga-
zines."

Josephson found a line by Keats
("The beaded bubbles winking at the
brim") no more poetic than one by
an anonymous ad man ("Meaty Mar-
rowy Oxtail Joints"). Applauding the
typography and layout of ads, as well
as their quick cheery rhythms, he
urged young writers to "become
more sensitive to the particular qual-
ities in their material environment."

In the same issue, Cowley pub-
lished "Valuta," an expatriate's bal-
lad to America, "my land of cowboys
of businessmen of peddlers peddling
machinery."* The poem incorpo-
rated lines from songs of the day and
swung with the rhythms of popular
music.

Within the next few years, some
of America's best-known writers
seemed to respond to Josephson's
toast to ad men. E. E. Cummings
wrote short, snappy poems that
sounded like advertising jingles.
John Dos Passos interrupted the nar-
rative of his U.S.A. trilogy (1930-36)
with cinematic "newsbreaks." And
in The Great Gatsby (1925), F. Scott
Fitzgerald erected a prominent road-
side billboard featuring a gigantic
pair of eyes to haunt his characters
with the commercialism of the age.

In the December 1922 issue of
Broom, Cowley and Josephson added
a dash of kerosene to the fires of the
now-escalating culture debate. Cow-
ley wrote a thinly veiled satire of Van
Wyck Brooks, while Josephson lamb-
basted Waldo Frank's latest novel,
City Block. Clearly enjoying himself,
Cowley pointed out the absurdity of
Brooks seated at "a typewriter which
is the most finished product of a me-
chanical civilization," while thun-
dering against American grossness,
puritanism, and "the commercial ugliness of cities."

**And Now Warhol**

Josephson attacked Frank for his
psychoanalytic prose and "vague
and flaccid vocabulary"; he urged
writers to seek a greater "articulate-
ness and precision of expression,"
exactly those qualities that he had
earlier found and praised in adver-
tisements.

Clearly, two schools of thought
about American art had developed:
Cowley and Josephson's belief that
American mass culture was a vital
resource, and Waldo Frank's position
that U.S. culture was inimical to the
fine arts.

Waldo Frank was willing to con-
cede that jazz, Gershwin, and the
New York Daily News were folk art-
that is, art of the people. But he re-
mained convinced that these were
not fonts of "high art." Realizing the
limitations of pop culture, he be-
lieved, provided "one of the incen-
tives for the production of great art."

Another former writer with Seven
Arts, Paul Rosenfeld, roundly re-
buked European intellectuals for
their fantasies about American popu-
lar culture. All the Europeans' talk
about jazz and Charlie Chaplin
would be harmless, he concluded in
an essay in Dial, except for the fact
that it is providing our "embryonic
artists with cheap formulae, keeping
them from working from their sensi-
tibilities."

For Rosenfeld and Frank, a great

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*Valuta is a French term meaning a currency's foreign-exchange value.*
American art was dawning—not in the gadgets and mechanical cubism of Gerald Murphy but in the transcendental nature studies and stately cityscapes of the Stieglitz circle. Such works, Rosenfeld wrote in *Port of New York* (1924), proved "we have taken root. No longer do we yearn to quit New York" for the cultural offerings of Europe.

Rosenfeld believed an American modernism was possible. But unlike Josephson and Cowley, he foresaw an art of refinement and beauty, not one built upon the popular idioms of advertising, jazz, and industry.

The arguments between the two camps continued throughout the 1920s but were quickly forgotten in the Depression years when social issues became the critics' central concern. During the 1940s and '50s, when young artists such as Jackson Pollock, Franz Kline, and Mark Rothko chose not to go abroad for training, they seemed confident that they could develop their styles just as well in New York. Their self-reliance grew, in part, out of the ebullience of that earlier generation of artists and writers who believed that "American art" was not necessarily a contradiction in terms.

The discussion of whether American modernism should assimilate the materials of everyday life, or transcend them, did not die. During the late 1950s and '60s, when the pop artists—Andy Warhol, Claes Oldenburg, Roy Lichtenstein—challenged the lofty transcendentalism of the New York School, they replayed themes from the 1920s.

Indeed, there was something *déjà vu* about their enthusiasm for mass advertising and popular culture and their determined attacks on the works of Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko. The large, colorful abstractions of Pollock, Rothko, and the New York School, they claimed, were too remote, turgid, and detached from life.

For the pop artists—as for Cowley, Josephson, and Murphy much earlier—modern American painting had to be built upon the nitty-gritty of American life, upon ads, national brands, comic strips, and gadgets. The artists of the New York School and their critics fought back, of course, claiming that theirs was a homegrown, deeply expressive art rising out of personal exploration and a commitment to locale—precisely what *Seven Arts* had called for several decades before.

Thus, though rarely acknowledged, the cultural battles of the 1920s smoothed the way for the great flowering of modern art in New York City after World War II that continues to influence painters across America to this day.
Africa’s Lost Generations

What kind of a place was West Africa when the slave trade began? Some written records exist in Islamic regions, but for other areas, scholars have little documentary evidence to go on. The slaves themselves were usually illiterate. Yet, beginning in the 18th century, a handful of slaves and ex-slaves, educated for the most part in America and Britain, unlocked their memories and penned their recollections. In many cases, these are the earliest written descriptions of West African societies—religious beliefs, politics, commercial activities, amusements, marriage customs. Nigeria’s noted literary scholar, Emmanuel Obiechina, analyzed these memoirs during his stay at the Wilson Center. We present excerpts from his book in progress.

by Emmanuel Obiechina

Between the year 1734, when Ayuba Suleiman, a Maryland slave, published his Memoirs,1 and 1854, when Ali Eisa mi’s Narrative2 appeared, a score of Africa’s children, dispersed by the slave trade, many of them laboring in servitude, overcame the cruel constraints of their condition to give the world a retrospective portrait of the West African civilization that slavery had destroyed.

Their accounts, written in simple, almost biblical prose, remain fresh and powerful to this day.

Some of these authors, such as Samuel Crowther, returned to their native lands, but others never saw their homes again. Some of them eventually “won” their freedom, or bought it, like Olaudah Equiano (for £40). Others remained slaves until death. Three were rescued from slave ships by British frigates (the slave trade was abolished in the British Empire in 1807) and resettled in Sierra Leone. A few of the writers were learned Muslims, the intellectual match of any contemporary Oxford don; some were poor farmers, animists, “primitives” from the rain forest further to the south.

They had in common two things only. All of them, though at different ages, had been wrenched violently from their homelands and brought to what Ottobah Cugoano (b. 1757) called “those inhospitable regions of misery.” And, in all of them, Africa
Olaudah Equiano, an Ibo tribesman, was sold into slavery in 1757. He educated himself, bought his freedom, married an Englishwoman, and, in 1789, published his autobiography. By 1827, his book had gone through 17 editions.
remained a vibrant reality, a source of acute sensations in which memory was mixed indistinguishably with regret.

What is extraordinary about these books, which have been little read nor long remembered, is their similarity, although they were written over a period of 120 years by men and women who, in most cases, did not know one another. The authors came from different lands in Africa; they lived in forced exile in different places, from Kent Island, Maryland, to Greenwich, England.

But their shared muse was Africa. They were impelled to write by the remembrance of things past. In so doing, they unintentionally became the most accomplished anthropologists of 18th- and early 19th-century West Africa.

Kidnapped

There are few if any historical parallels to the destruction of West African civilization by the slave trade—abetted by blacks and exploited by Europeans—that began in the mid-15th century. In the course of four centuries, perhaps 15 million black Africans were sold to white masters in Charleston and Rio, Kingston and London, Port-au-Prince and Havana. Not surprisingly, for all of the narrators, sudden capture by fearsome strangers on a day that promised to be ordinary was a traumatic turning point. Olaudah Equiano devoted almost the entire second chapter of his autobiography to his kidnapping by neighboring blacks in 1757.

The attack was unexpected: "One day, when all our people were gone out to their works as usual, and only I and my sister were left to mind the house, two men and a woman got over our walls, and in a moment seized us both, and, without giving us time to cry out, or make resistance, they stopped our mouths and ran with us to the nearest wood."

Africa’s Dark Age

So began an odyssey that would take Equiano from the dense rain forest of Igboland down to the slave port of Bonny in the Niger delta, to the West Indies and America, then as a freedman to Europe, and, later, even to the Arctic Circle on an unsuccessful British expedition to reach the North Pole.

Ayuba Suleiman, a nobleman of Bondu, in what is now Senegal, was, like some of the others, the victim of an ambush. He was with an attendant on a business trip to the Gambia when he was grabbed in 1830.

He had laid aside his gold-hilted sword, a gold knife, and his elegant quiver and arrows (a gift from King Samba of Futa Toro) and was proceeding to take sustenance with his companion at a wayside inn when a company of Mandingoes, who live upon plunder, passing by at the time, and observing him unarmed, rushed in, to the number of seven or eight, at a back door, and pinioned Job [Ayuba’s slave name], before he could get to his arms, together with his interpreter, who is slave in Maryland still." (Ayuba’s narrative was dic--
The slave trade fanned the tribal wars and political turmoil that nearly destroyed West African culture between the 16th and 19th centuries. The authors of slavery narratives were born in cities and villages scattered throughout a territory more than twice the size of Alaska. Their homelands are located in what are now the nations of Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Niger, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Ayuba was freed from slavery in 1733, thanks to the efforts of James Oglethorpe, a founder of the Georgia colony, who had been impressed by his erudition. Wined and dined as a great scholar in England (where he wrote out three copies of the Koran in Arabic from memory), he returned home to Bondu in 1734.

The era of the slave trade, which coincided with periodic Muslim jihads (holy wars) and political instability throughout West Africa, was the continent's Dark Age. The light of African civilization went out, whole societies were decimated, and the creative impulse in the people wilted away under the recurrent violence of armed roving bands and ambitious adventurers, white and black. The Ijebu tribe that captured and sold Joseph Wright to the Portuguese spent the 1820s tearing down neighboring Egba cities and enslaving the inhabitants.

Some of West Africa's cultural traits survived the Atlantic crossing, notably the art of storytelling. In their homelands, all the writers had sat around the fireside in the villages, listening to raconteurs, ballad-eers, epic narrators—and committing the tales to memory. The expatriates

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reached back to that tradition in their own stories.

In a sense, their first concern as writers was to restore their own personal identities. While the kidnapping itself was terrifying, the most disabling psychological blow fell when the individual was immersed in the wide impersonal world of strangers. There he was anonymous. In despair, many slaves took their own lives.

"I Was Named Olaudah"

Loss of identity began with the loss of one’s original name. The African was capriciously tagged with appellations picked up from here and there by his master. Olaudah Equiano was named Gustavus Vassa after the founder of Sweden’s hereditary monarchy. Ottobah Cugoano became John Stewart. Ayuba Suleiman became Job Solomon.

As if to reassert their individuality, all of the writers dwelt on their original African names. "I was named Olaudah," Equiano wrote, "which, in our language, signified vicissitude, or fortune also; one favoured, and having a loud voice, and well spoken."

The new slave, of course, did not lose only his freedom and his name. He was also stripped of paternity, fraternity, kinship ties, and the presumption of humanity. Inevitably, the narrators tried to restore these links to the human race.

Equiano wrote in endearing detail about his family: his six brothers and sisters; his closeness to his mother; his father’s high status in the community. "My father was one of those elders or chiefs I have spoken of, and was styled Embrenche," he wrote proudly, "a term, as I remember, importing the highest distinction, and signifying in our language a mark of grandeur."

Ayuba Suleiman’s “blue-blooded” family and social background in Bondu were given an impressive build-up in the account he dictated to Thomas Bluett: "About fifty years ago Hibrahim, the grandfather of Job, founded the town of Boonda, in the reign of Bubaker, the King of Futa, and was, by his permission, sole Lord Proprietor and Governor of it, and at the same time High Priest, or Alpha; so that he had a power to make what laws and regulations he thought proper for the increase and good government of his new city." Ayuba was himself an assistant imam, or priest.

The most detailed portrait of the 18th-century African homeland is contained in Equiano’s Life. Equiano was born in 1745 and sold into slavery in the West Indies 12 years later. Eventually, he was purchased by a Virginia trader. He became a skilled seaman and made enough money from private trading ventures to purchase his freedom, whereupon he settled in England and became, with Cugoano, a leader of the large black community in London.

A Nation of Dancers

In his autobiography, published in London in 1789, he began by describing his tiny village of Essaka, which he then carefully located inside the Benin empire (in present-day Nigeria), which in turn he set within the whole African continent.

He described the culture with enthusiasm and pride, and always with honesty. On the significance of music and dance among his people, he wrote: "We are almost a nation of dancers, musicians and poets. Thus every event, such as a triumphant return from battle, or other cause of public rejoicing, is celebrated in public dances, which are accompa-
nied with songs and music suited to the occasion." Among the musical instruments Equiano remembered were drums, guitars, and "another much like a stickado," a kind of xylophone reserved for the use of betrothed virgins.

Clean Cookery

The dress of both sexes was nearly the same, he said, and it "generally consists of a long piece of calico, or muslin, wrapped loosely round the body, somewhat the form of a Highland plaid. This is usually dyed blue, which is our favourite colour."

Equiano's picture is comprehensive, taking in the marketplace, agriculture, the making of cloth, and jewelry. "As we live in a country where nature is prodigal of her favours," he wrote, "our wants are few and easily supplied... In such a state, money is of little use... Agricultura is our chief employment; and everyone, even the children and women, are engaged in it... Everyone contributes something to the common stock; and, so we are unacquainted with idleness, we have no beggars."

The diet of his people, he said, consisted largely of yams and goats, plantains and poultry, all washed down with palm wine. "As yet," Equiano wrote, "the natives are unacquainted with those refinements in cookery which debauch the taste." It was a polygamous society, and Equiano conceded that the menfolk "do not preserve the same constancy to their wives, which they expect from them."

Equiano plainly loved his homeland, but he portrayed its darker side faithfully. He acknowledged that his people were warlike and that even the women were adept with the javelin and bow. Fallen enemies were dismembered for trophies—an arm or leg, say—to be hung in the marketplace. The chief spoils of war were slaves, for personal use or for sale to the white men on the coast.

As for religion, Equiano said, "the natives believe that there is one Creator of all things and that he lives in the sun... As for the doctrine of eternity, I do not remember to have ever heard of it."

One of the most memorable passages in Equiano's book describes a visit he made with his mother to his grandmother's grave, "which was a kind of small solitary thatched house... There she made her libations, and spent most of the night in cries and lamentations... The loneliness of the place, the darkness of the night, and the ceremony of libation, naturally awful and gloomy, were heightened by my mother's lamentations; and these concurring
with the doleful cries of birds, by which these places were frequented, gave an inexpressible terror to the scene."

**Tying the Knot**

I have quoted Equiano at length with good reason: His book provides the most comprehensive view known to scholars of a West African society in the 18th century. But every one of the other writers included something of his African heritage. In their portraits, tinged with nostalgia, Africa became a human habitation, not the dense, dark jungle of the European imagination.

Ayuba Suleiman’s Bondu lay on the banks of the River Senegal. Suleiman stressed its Islamic foundations (Islam first swept below the Sahara during the 11th century) and approvingly cited the ordinance that "no person who flies thither for protection shall be made a slave." Unhappily, this provision was extended only "to all in general, that can read and know God," in other words, to orthodox Muslims. Suleiman was actually on his way "to sell two Negroes" to the British for purchase of paper and other necessaries when he himself became a captive."

Through the pen of Thomas Bluett, Ayuba described the harvesting of peanuts, the hunting of lions, and the ivory trade. There was a brief discourse on a potent poison made from cassava, an aside on the perils of idolatry, and a long description of marriage customs:

"When a man has a mind to marry off his son and has found a suitable match for him, he goes to the girl’s father, proposes the matter to him and agrees for the price he is to pay for her. . . . All things concluded on, the two fathers and the young man go to the priest, and declare their agreement. . . .

"But now comes the great difficulty, viz., how the young man shall get his wife home; for the women, cousins, and relations, take on mightily, and guard the door of the house to prevent her being carried away; but at last the young man’s presents and generosity to them, makes them abate their grief.

"He then provides a friend, well mounted, to carry her off; but as soon as [she] is up on horseback, the women renew their lamentations.


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*By all accounts, including those of historians and those of our narrators, the enslavement of Africans by Africans was considerably more humane than was slavery in the New World. "So far as I can remember," wrote Cugoano, "some of the Africans in my country keep slaves, which they take in war, or for debt, but those which they keep are well-fed and good care taken of them and treated well."
and rush in to dismount her. However, the man is generally successful, and rides off with his prize." Ayuba had gone through this ritual twice.

Salih Bilali’s Kiannah was a little town on the Niger River. The Niger, with its tributaries, served as the artery of commerce linking populous cities such as Djenne, Segou, and Timbuktu with one another—and with the faraway Arab traders, who descended in “large boats covered with awnings” and laden with salt, blankets, pistols, beads, and cowries. There was a division of labor: “The men work in the fields, fish, herd cattle and weave.” Salih Bilali wrote. “The women spin, and attend to household duties, but never work in the field.”

The Gold Mines

Abū Bakr al-Siddiq, born in Timbuktu around 1790, was educated in Djenne and Bouna, cities then esteemed as centers of Islamic learning and commerce. Abū Bakr’s father was, intermittently, a gold miner in the rich fields around Bouna.

“They have to break the stones,” Abū Bakr explained, “and grind them, and reduce them to dust. This is then put into vessels and washed with water till the gold is all collected under the water in the vessels and the dust lies above it. They then pour out this mud on the ground, and the gold remains in the vessels.” The French and the British established outposts on the Senegal and Gambia rivers to exploit the gold traffic in the interior.

There was a strong religious emphasis in Abū Bakr’s account. "The faith of our families is the faith of Islam," he wrote. "They circumcise the foreskin, say the five prayers; fast every year in the month of Ramadan; give alms as ordained in the law; marry four women... They fight for the faith of God; perform the pilgrimage to Mecca."

We do not know if Abū Bakr himself ever made it to Mecca. After working in the West Indies as a stonemason and clerk (he kept his accounts in Arabic), he was set free by his master, published two autobiographical fragments, and then returned to Timbuktu in 1836, never to be heard from again.

Enlightened Whites

The writers among Africa’s lost children were remarkable people. They had to be. The leap from slavery (and the mentality imposed by that condition) to the liberating act of creating literature was a long and difficult one that only very few could make. Even those few could not have attempted, much less achieved, that feat without an education.

All of the writers had received some kind of schooling before they left Africa, be it of a “traditional” tribal sort—learning the customs and stories and rituals of the community—or of a Koranic variety, peculiar to the Islamic societies in West Africa. Scholars in the academies at Timbuktu, Djenne, and Katsina were known throughout the Muslim world.

For a slave, formal Western education was more difficult to acquire. In America, many states had laws forbidding Africans to learn to read. Overt sanctions were virtually absent in England, but racial prejudice was not. On both sides of the Atlantic, Africans depended for their educations on the efforts of enlightened whites. Most prominent among these were England’s indefatigable Duke of Montague and his benevolent wife, who helped Ayuba Suleiman and several other slaves.
Every writer talked about his education. Equiano first described his early training in Igboland prior to his journey into slavery.

"The manners and customs of my country," he wrote, "had been implanted in me with great care, and made an impression on my mind, which time could not erase, and which all the adversity and variety of fortune I have since experienced, served only to rivet and record."

From Slave to Priest

Later, Equiano learned to read through the kindnesses of many people: David, his young American companion on several sea voyages; the wife of a shipmate on Guernsey; the Captain's clerk aboard the Etna; and a Daniel Queen, "about forty years of age, a man very well educated."

Ottobah Cugoano managed to obtain a few years of formal schooling. "After coming to England," he wrote, "and seeing others write and read, I had a strong desire, and getting what assistance I could, I applied myself to learn reading and writing, which soon became my recreation, pleasure and delight; and when my master perceived that I could write some, he sent me to a proper school for that purpose to learn."

The "master" was Richard Cosway, official portrait painter to the Prince of Wales, whom Cugoano served from the time he was brought to England, at the age of 12, to sometime during the 1780s when he secured his freedom and went off to write and work among the London poor.

Two of the repatriates, Samuel Crowther and Joseph Wright, gained the most formal type of education. British Royal Navy antislavery squadrons had intercepted Portuguese slavers carrying Crowther and Wright to Brazil, and each was put ashore at the British colony of Sierra Leone—Crowther in 1822, Wright in 1827. As wards of Christian missionaries there, they received primary and secondary instruction in mission schools and then went to Britain to study theology. Both men were ordained (Wright was a Methodist, Crowther an Anglican) and returned as missionaries to West Africa. Crowther eventually became the first African bishop of the Church Missionary Society's Diocese on the Niger and died, something of a celebrity, at the age of 85. He is regarded as one of the fathers of modern Nigeria.

Finding a Voice

By contrast, the Muslim narrators—born in what is now Senegal, Mali, Niger, and northern Nigeria—described the rigorous Islamic training they received at home.

The Islamic system was laborious, often requiring decades, and encompassing, in its higher reaches, the study of logic, mathematics, rhetoric, and Koranic exegesis.

"I sought knowledge," Omar ibn Said recalled, "under the instruction of a Sheikh called Mohammed Said, my own brother, and Sheikh Soleiman Kembeh, and Sheikh Gabriel Abdal. I continued my studies twenty-five years, and then returned to my home where I remained six years."

As a slave in North Carolina, Omar treasured a copy of the Koran in English that a friend of his master presented to him.

Education enabled all of the writers to recover lost confidence and emerge from ignoble silence. With the shock of captivity and expatriation, the heart of the enslaved African was numbed with grief and his
soul was filled with despondency. The human voice froze within him, unable to speak to a world suddenly turned malevolent.

Gradually, the effects of the shock began to settle and clarity to appear. The submerged resources of the African's mind surged forward into his active consciousness. His spirit, at least, was free.

The spirit of freedom that survived in the African, precarious as it may have been, was built upon the memory of the past. The urge to re-enact that past—to narrate it, to share it, or, in defiance, to shout it to the uncaring world—became irrepressible. Like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, a few dispersed children of Africa poured their tales into the ears of their audiences and eased the pressure upon their own hearts.

NOTES


Some of the works mentioned in this essay are excerpted in Philip D. Curtin, ed., Africa Remembered: Narratives by West Africans from the Era of the Slave Trade (Univ. of Wis., 1967).
COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editors' requests for comment.

Hard Facts for the 1980s


No decontrol of oil prices, no crash programs for synthetic fuels or nuclear power, no dismantling of the Department of Energy, no Palestinian solution, no oil from Mexico, China, or Canada will permit us to end our dangerous dependence on imported Middle East oil by 1985 or even 1990.

A series of hard facts has not been fully assimilated by our public or our political leadership. These include the following: (a) Despite decontrol, American domestic oil production will actually decline between now and 1990. (b) In the short-run, strategies of demand-reduction (via energy conservation and efficiency—as well as through price mechanisms) are more effective than efforts aimed at major boosts in domestic energy supply. (c) The choice in oil and energy policy is not mainly one of free market versus planning. Extensive planning is a fact of life. The relevant question is by whom it will be done: OPEC, individual oil-producing countries, oil companies, or various governmental bodies in some way—however imperfectly—accountable to the American public. (d) The Arab-Israeli problem, though important and even dangerous, is not at the heart of the oil problem. It is at times a catalyst; it is not a cause. (e) U.S. and allied oil import dependence will continue at substantial levels throughout the decade. (Some recent reductions in oil imports have occurred, but they are not sufficient.) The risk of one or more serious crises or "crunches" remains enormous.

Things may well get worse before they get better. The problem is particularly dangerous in the short-run. Anyone who traveled last winter through Boston's Logan Airport terminal or shopped in Washington's L'Enfant Plaza experienced the uncomfortably high heating temperatures that accompany indifference to energy waste. Add the erosion of auto speed limits, the inadequacy of emergency preparedness, and delays in filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and the prospects of coping with a crisis diminish still further.

Robert J. Lieber
Wilson Center Fellow

Untangling America's Energy Problem

Karl Marx once said that if Napoleon had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent him. Our national energy situation is so confused, so incredibly tangled, that I sometimes think that if it did not exist, it would have been impossible to invent it.

The great value of "Energy: 1945–1980" is that it unravels our current energy crisis by tracing it back to its origins immediately after World War II. As I read them, the authors find two separate answers to the question, "How did the U.S. get into our energy mess?"

First answer: it was ever thus.

Second answer: It got steadily worse.

The irresistible temptation to avoid hard choices, the supremacy of political over economic considerations, the fragmentation of the problem by competing interests—these have characterized America's energy situation from the beginning.

During the Truman administration, the question was posed "whether the United States should encourage conservation of finite gas reserves through relatively high prices or stimulate widespread use of gas through politically popular low prices."

But the question was neglected in what
the authors call "Washington's peacetime preoccupation with short-term political costs and benefits," with the result that a policy emerged mainly by default. It was a policy with a measure of political popularity and no foresight. By 1973, consumption of regulated, low-priced gas was running at twice the rate of new discoveries.

The Paley Commission on energy policy put it this way in 1952: "As a nation, we have always been more interested in sawmills than in seedlings." It got worse as our dependency increased, our domestic reserves depleted, and the formation of OPEC drove oil prices to excruciating levels.

The authors make clear that the one option never seriously tried throughout this despondent history is the option of letting the market operate unfettered.

It's a little surprising that this option is not more forcefully urged in the summary and conclusion.

William E. Moffett
Vice President of Public Affairs
Gulf Oil Corporation

A New Agenda

Price controls encouraged Americans to use more oil and gas and discouraged production of oil and natural gas in this country. Environmental restrictions made it harder to produce and use coal. Unresolved issues and other delays slowed the growth of nuclear power. And millions of acres of public lands were closed off from energy development. As a result, our nation became increasingly dependent on oil imports, primarily from unreliable sources.

This history need not be repeated.

Recent developments offer hope that the trends of the 1970s can be changed. As a nation, we are beginning to move generally in the right direction. Oil imports dropped dramatically in 1980, when higher prices led Americans to conserve. In anticipation of crude oil decontrol, the year-to-year decline in oil production in the lower 48 states began to level off last year: Producers drilled more wells than ever before, produced more previously uneconomical oil, and undertook more enhanced recovery projects.

These are encouraging signs. What we as a nation can do—and should decide to do—is open up and develop more energy from public lands, achieve a balance between continued environmental progress and more productive development of U.S. energy resources, formulate consistent and timely government policies on nuclear energy, and continue to allow market forces to provide effective incentives for producing and saving energy.

If Americans decide to support these steps, the U.S. could be producing 90 percent of our energy here at home by 1990. This level—along with continued conservation—could reduce our nation's dependence on oil imports by 50 percent by the end of this decade.

C. J. DiBona
American Petroleum Institute
Washington, D.C.

Over a Barrel

"Energy: 1945-1980" contains a footnote on page 57 that is rather sloppy in its accuracy.

A barrel of oil does contain 42 gallons, but its origin is not associated with the relatively modern 52-gallon steel drum. Capacity of a barrel is more likely to be traced to a "tierce," which is one-third of a pipe or butt, which is equal to two hogsheads. Since a hogshead holds about 63 gallons, a pipe or a butt contains 126 gallons, one-third of which is 42 gallons.

More precisely, the barrels most readily available for shipping oil from the early Pennsylvania oil fields held 42 gallons, and it was there that the accepted measure for crude oil became established.

Brewster P. Carter
Vienna, Va.

Robert E. Hardwicke devoted an entire book, The Oilman's Barrel (Univ. of Okla., 1958), to the question raised by Mr. Carter. Whence the 42-gallon barrel as the unit of measurement for crude oil? Hardwicke concluded
that no one really knows. Many possibilities have been suggested, including Mr. Carter's and the one described in our footnote. A 42-gallon barrel was used for fish (but not wine) during the reign of Edward IV (1461–83); the first Pennsylvania oil drillers used whiskey barrels, which also held 42 gallons. The U.S. “Council of [oil] Producers” in 1866 adopted a 42-gallon standard barrel, but buyers paid for only 40 gallons, the extra two being an allowance for leakage. On the whole, we concede that Mr. Carter may have a stronger case than we do. However, the modern steel drum contains 55 gallons, not 52 as he states.—Ed.

Coping on a Crowded Island

WQ’s excellent articles on “Indonesia” [Spring 1981] illustrate that the country is a prime example of the “hunker-down” theory. What do I mean?

In 1968, my husband and I calculated that each man, woman, and child in Java had, as total living space, about 15 feet by 20 feet (including rice paddies and volcano tops). That approximates an American living-dining room and equalled our Jakarta front yard.

At the 1965 rate of population growth, that space would have halved in 17 years. While the rate has slowed markedly, the absolute numbers of people are formidable and increasing.

Accommodating this proximity while maintaining social harmony is a highly developed Indonesian skill. The more important the discussion, the quieter the voice. Life is ordered not so much by time sequence as by appropriate human relationships. Consensus (mufakat) is paramount. Gotong royong (mutual self-help) is the axle grease of village life.

The ideal Javanese male has been Arjuna, the slight, highly refined, courageous hero of the wayang stories everyone knows by heart. Sumatran children are reared on tales of Kuntjil, the mouse deer, who, like Brer Rabbit, carries the day by wit rather than confrontation.

At the same time, amok is an indigen-}

ous word. The external calm that community mores dictate shields subsurface tensions. The depth of these cultural tensions, triggered by complex politics, may explain the enormity of the 1965–66 bloodbath. There were many village grudges to settle.

The present significance of that experience, however, seems to be that Indonesians do not want it to happen again. Thus, they hunker-down. As Indonesia copes with escalating economic and social pressures, its people’s capacity to adapt the new while preserving the old, which James Peacock (“The Impact of Islam”) superbly illuminates, should serve them in good stead.

Margaret W. Sullivan
The Asia Society
Washington, D.C.

Where the Molds Fail

We all tend to think in categories. Nations are big or small; Hindu, Islamic, or perhaps communist; supporters of free markets or planned economies; xenophobic or tolerant and open.

Frustration, confusion, and bafflement occur when our boxes clearly don’t fit reality. If there is a thread of continuity running through Western understanding of Indonesia and WQ’s three articles on it, it is this difficulty in finding a focus.

Indonesia is supposed to be run by a self-seeking, neocolonial, military-technocratic elite, with some of the worst corruption of any functioning country. Yet there has been massive investment in education, health, and food production.

Indonesia has been described as a friend of the United States for the last 15 years. But it refuses to have military bases, supports many Third World initiatives, and extracts trade concessions with more vigor than most “radical” nations.

The awful truth may be that our ways of thinking about Indonesia may not capture the essence. The elites may well be self-seeking, but they are also nationalist in a way that the Shah was not.

Poverty, corruption, and repression are likely to be part of the immediate future.

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of Indonesia. I do not know if the reaction to them will be xenophobic, fanatic, or simply more of the same. To understand that, we need to understand what different groups expect of the rulers and what they can do if they are very disappointed.

David O. Dopice
Associate Professor of Economics
Tufts University

Why Send the Dying to the Hospital?

In “Invisible Death” by Philippe Aries [WQ, Winter 1981], you mention that “As soon as an illness seems serious, the doctor usually sends his patient to the hospital,” where the majority of deaths take place. In Florida, there is another reason for doing this. If a person dies at home, the police department is required to make an investigation to be sure that the death resulted from natural causes, unless a doctor was present at the actual time of death. This can be quite traumatic for the surviving spouse or other family members. For that reason, also, doctors send ill patients to hospitals.

Clinton B. Conway
Clearwater, Fla.

Managing a “Time Bomb” in the Soviet Union


Irrespective of whose energy forecasts one accepts, it is clear that the 1980s will be a time of severe troubles for the Soviet Union. The inevitable drastic reduction in labor force growth, coupled with dim prospects for improving productivity, will generate low rates of economic growth. Fluctuating sharply with the harvest, the growth of GNP can hardly average more than two to three percent annually.

The United Kingdom, however, has muddled along with such rates for 30 years. Soviet consumers will not be happy with such prospects, but what can they realistically do? They have no place to go, and, besides, they can alleviate their pain by resorting to the “second economy.” The military establishment will continue to fare well, for it alone makes the Soviet Union a superpower. (In quality of life, the nation is strictly fifth rate.) The Soviets will be able to endure the troubled times of the 1980s because they will perceive that less arduous times are ahead. Both labor force growth and energy supplies will be more favorable in the ’90s.

Murray Feshbach (“A Different Crisis”) perceives a demographic time bomb for the Russians. To my mind, the nationality issue is the least of the leadership’s problems. True, the peoples of the Sun Belt republics will be far more numerous, relatively, and may demand more freedom of cultural and artistic expression. But this will not threaten the stability of the USSR.

Even with only 48 percent of the population in the year 2000, the ethnic Russians—now firmly entrenched in the power positions in the military, police, and party—can surely manage their Muslim constituencies, who are better off economically than their non-Soviet neighbors. The imperative is to permit them more elbow room for decision-making in social and cultural matters, so long as none threatens to abandon either socialism or the USSR.

Gertrude E. Schroeder
Professor of Economics
University of Virginia

Hungary’s Lesson to the USSR

Blair Ruble (“Muddling Through,” WQ, Winter 1981) doubts that the Soviets will introduce a liberal economic reform because there is no real precedent for it in Soviet history. He is correct with respect to the kind of liberal reform introduced in Hungary, for example, that involves the virtual replacement of central planning by a system of market relationships among state-owned enterprises.

However, the Hungarians have introduced another type of reform for which
there is abundant precedent throughout Soviet history. The same issue of WQ contains a report by Chris Cvic [Periodicals: "Hungary's Market Socialism"] describing the flourishing state of small-scale private enterprise in Hungary. This includes part-time private farming, moonlighting by professionals and artisans, private housing construction by individual carpenters, and so forth. Similar activity has long existed in the USSR, but, unlike the Hungarian government, which gives its active support, the Soviet government treats this "second economy" with reluctant toleration at best; much of it is illegal.

Without "marketizing" the state-owned economy as the Hungarians have done, the Soviets could adopt the Hungarian policy of legalizing and actively encouraging the expansion of small-scale private entrepreneurship in a great variety of fields—from the growing of strawberries to private restaurants to high-technology consulting services. The task of regulating a small-scale private sector and coordinating it with the dominating state sector should be well within the competence of the Soviet leadership.

Tune in to the Brighter Side

All four of your essays on "Television in America" [WQ, Winter 1981] end on a note of quiet despair about the future. Is television that bad? Is the future that unchangeable?

I agree that television, precisely because it is so pervasive, has had a significant impact on attitudes and behavior, especially in children. I also agree that television, especially commercial television, falls far short of its positive potential. But rather than curse the darkness, we should be lighting a few candles.

It is important that social scientists continue to examine how television influences viewers in positive as well as negative ways. What are television's long-term effects? How does it affect special populations, such as patients in mental institutions? Recent research suggests that these patients' television viewing—properly structured—may even have some therapeutic benefits.

In the pursuit of new findings, the industry itself should be a willing partner.

Joseph S. Berliner
Wilson Center Fellow
Eli A. Rubinstein
Adjunct Research Professor of Psychology
University of North Carolina

Hobart Taylor, Jr., 60, a member of the Center's advisory Wilson Council, died after long illness on April 2, 1981. Born in Texarkana, Texas, son of a lawyer-businessman, Taylor graduated from Prairie View State College (Texas) and earned a J.D. (1943) from the University of Michigan, where he was editor of the law review. He came to Washington, D.C., in 1961 to serve as special counsel on President Kennedy's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. As White House Associate Counsel under Lyndon Johnson, he played a major role in implementing the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act and was appointed a director of the Export-Import Bank. In 1968, he entered private law practice in Washington and served on the boards of major corporations (e.g., Westinghouse, Aetna). He was a tireless supporter of the Wilson Center and of the Quarterly. We shall miss him.
CURRENT FELLOWS

WILLI PAUL ADAMS, Professor of North American History, Free University of Berlin
DOUGLAS BENNETT, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Temple University
CHARLES W. BERQUIST, Director, Comparative Area Studies Program, Duke University
DONALD BERGUS, former U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan
JOSEPH S. BERLINER, Professor of Economics, Brandeis University
CYRIL BIRCH, Professor of Chinese and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley
JOHN CAMPBELL, Assistant Professor of Political Science. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
JOHN A. COLEMAN, S.J., Assistant Professor of Religion and Society, Jesuit School of Theology and the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, former Director, Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of Energy
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