A LONG MARCH

by George Weigel

On June 12, 1982, between 500,000 and a million Americans rallied in New York City's Central Park in support of a "nuclear freeze"—a ban on all further increases in nuclear weaponry. The *New York Times* editorialized the next day that "hundreds of thousands of demonstrators... can't be wrong." Conservative columnist Joseph Sobran saw the great "freeze" demonstration rather differently: "The rally was actually a broad coalition of people who hate the West and people who don't hate people who hate the West."

About a year later, America's Roman Catholic bishops adopted a pastoral letter on war and peace that was broadly sympathetic to the ideas that had generated one of the biggest political demonstrations in U.S. history.

Eighteen months after the bishops' letter, President Ronald Reagan, who had been vigorously denounced by the Central Park orators and whose defense policy had been sharply criticized by the bishops, was overwhelmingly reelected, carrying 49 states.

Has the peace movement since 1945 been a success, or a failure? It has, in fact, been both. How that can be is a complicated tale.

The years immediately after World War II were a time of great hope and energy in the American peace movement. These were the days when the United Nations (UN) was established at Lake Success, New York, with 51 member countries; when 17 state legislatures passed resolutions supporting world government; when many of the scientists who had created the atomic bomb organized to prevent its further use; when Emily Balch, of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) won Nobel Peace Prizes (in 1946 and 1947, respectively). The awesome fact of nuclear weaponry, and a widespread popular belief that the war's sacrifices ought to be redeemed by a more humane future, gave the postwar movement a special élan.

The bomb seemed both curse and blessing. The curse was clear from John Hersey's *Hiroshima* (1946), a vivid account of the Japanese experience. The blessing lay in the widely shared perception that atomic weapons meant "the end of world war," as Vannevar Bush put it. Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, called the bomb the "good news of damnation"; the threat of global destruction made a "world society" imperative. Dwight Macdonald, editor of the radical journal *Politics*, described Hiroshima as "Götterdämmerung without the gods." Norman Cousins, in a famous

Military observers at an atomic weapons test at Frenchman's Flats, Nevada (1951). U.S. armed services were becoming interested in low-yield "tactical" devices; pacifists' protests came later.

1945 *Saturday Review* essay, "Modern Man Is Obsolete," argued that the concept of national sovereignty was "preposterous now."

A 1946 Gallup poll indicated that 52 percent of the public supported national disarmament and an international police force responsible for keeping the peace, while only 24 percent were opposed and 22 percent undecided. Even Reinhold Niebuhr, better known for attacking sentimentalism in foreign policy, was caught up; he wrote veteran activist A. J. Muste that, while the "whole development culminating in the atomic bomb is terrible," its existence "may increase the fear of war sufficiently so that we can build a real world organization. Therein lies our hope."

The world-government movement was the child of prewar liberal internationalism, whose leaders, such as Clark Eichelberger, had first tried to build a legal framework to prevent war and then championed U.S. entry into the war against Hitler. Founded in 1947 as a merger of 16 preexisting world-government organizations, the flagship agency of the revitalized movement, the United World Federalists (UWF), espoused a minimalist approach: a "world government of limited powers, adequate to prevent war." The UWF was led by Cord Meyer, Jr., a highly decorated Marine veteran; among its vice-

presidents were Cousins, Grenville Clark, Thomas Finletter, and Carl Van Doren. By 1949 the UWF had 659 chapters and 40,000 adult dues-payers, who tended to be East Coast urban whites, liberal, Protestant, and affluent.

The UWF was neither radical nor pacifist; its leaders wanted to work in the political mainstream. Meyer, who proposed general and complete disarmament under the umbrella of a world federation, supported military deterrence as an interim step, and endorsed the Truman administration's Marshall Plan of aid to war-torn Western Europe (opposed on the American Left as the "Martial Plan" and by Senate Republican conservatives, notably Robert A. Taft of Ohio, as a "give-away" to foreigners).

Urgency and Opportunity

Although some traditional pacifists welcomed the world-government advocates, others were skeptical. Emily Balch of the WILPF voiced "a very considerable distrust of government as such," and could "see no reason to be sure that a world government would be run by men very different in capacity from those who govern national states." Many pacifists preferred a "functionalist" approach: building international community through people-to-people cooperation. The UN Security Council, according to them, was not an instrument of peace; the UN Economic and Social Council was. Pacifists and nonpacifists alike criticized many world-government schemes as too abstract; Muste and Niebuhr agreed, for example, that brotherhood and a sense of international community could not be willed into existence by a world constitutional convention.

The politicization of the atomic scientists was the second key to the peace movement's postwar resurgence. Physicists who had supported President Truman's decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki joined with those few who had opposed using the nuclear weapon to form the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists in 1946. The Committee meant to "arouse the American people to an understanding of the unprecedented crisis in national and international affairs precipitated by the atomic discoveries."

But the scientists' new activism was not just alarmist; they felt responsible for the peaceful use of the extraordinary power they had put into human hands. The famous "minutes-to-midnight" clock on the cover of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, launched in 1945

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by nuclear researchers in Chicago,* was not so much a symbol of fear as an emblem of urgency and opportunity: Something drastically new had entered the human condition, and it required new understandings and a new world politics, sooner rather than later.

The scientists enjoyed some immediate successes: Congress, for example, passed the 1946 McMahon Act providing for civilian control of U.S. atomic research. But the scientists' measured approach was not welcomed by everyone in the peace movement. Muste, for one, argued that global annihilation, not the Soviet Union, was the real enemy; he urged that U.S. scientists simply refuse to participate in weapons research. Albert Einstein agreed, but Hans Bethe said that a scientists' strike "would only antagonize the public of the United States who would rightly accuse us of trying to dictate the policies of the country." Edward Teller wrote that scientists have "two clear-cut duties: to work on atomic energy under our present administration and to work for a world government which alone can give us freedom and peace."

The scientists' movement fissured during the controversy over thermonuclear weapons that followed the first Soviet A-bomb test (1949). James B. Conant, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Bethe, and Enrico Fermi opposed a U.S. effort to develop the H-bomb; Teller supported the project. A political and moral impasse had been reached, and by the end of 1950 the Emergency Committee disbanded.

Cold War Realities

Pacifists and radicals who had been the peace movement's mainstays before Pearl Harbor were also active in the war's aftermath. The New York–based War Resisters League got fresh leadership from conscientious objectors who had been radicalized by their experience in Civilian Public Service camps and federal prisons during the war. These men argued for nonviolent resistance and "direct action" tactics. Muste and David Dellinger launched the Committee for Non-Violent Revolution (1946) and the umbrella organization Peacemakers (1948); draft and tax resistance were key planks in the Peacemakers' program, which was partially inspired by Gandhi's campaigns in India.

The postwar detente between peace movement veterans (radicals, pacifists, and anarchists) and new recruits (the world-government and atomic scientists' groups) was short-lived. Cold War realities—the Soviet atomic bomb, the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan to internationalize nuclear materials, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin, and finally the 1950 Communist invasion of South Korea—eroded the movement's high hopes. Tensions among peace advocates were exacerbated by

*The *Bulletin* (circ. 27,000) remains an important voice for scientists today.

Labor Party "Ban the Bomb" rally in London's Trafalgar Square (1958). Nuclear pacifism (and anti-Americanism) has long been a theme of the Left, threatening NATO cohesion in Britain, West Germany, Holland.

former vice president Henry Wallace's Progressive Party presidential bid in 1948, and the controversy over Communist penetration of his campaign organization.*

Peace, it now appeared, required more than a great act of U.S. political will. The Berlin blockade was the last straw for Dwight Macdonald, who abandoned pacifist politics for cultural criticism. Cord Meyer left the UWF for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and by 1951, 16 states had repealed their resolutions in favor of world government. The Korean War led world constitutionalist G. S. Borgese to remark dourly that "ideas, too, have their Valley Forges." The atomic scientists were never able to heal their rift; like the World Federalists, they soon faded from a leadership position in the movement. The movement's postwar euphoria had been broken by the realities of foreign totalitarianism.

Movement historians often describe the first half of the 1950s—

*Wallace ran for president after breaking with Truman over the latter's anti-Communist foreign policy, which Wallace called a "bi-partisan reactionary war policy." He proposed sharing nuclear weapons technology with the Soviets. He won 1,157,140 votes, notably in New York City and Los Angeles. Among his supporters: South Dakota political science professor George S. McGovern. Among his sternest critics: Socialist candidate Norman Thomas.

the years of the Korean War, Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950–54 crusade against domestic Communism*, Eisenhower prosperity, and mass middle-class migration to the suburbs—as the "nadir" of the American public effort for peace.

The good feeling of the Eisenhower era seemed to muffle political activism. The costly Korean War ended in 1953, and if Americans had not triumphed, neither had they been defeated. Stalin died, and in 1955 Ike met Stalin's successors, Nikolay A. Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, at the first postwar summit. The subsequent "spirit of Geneva" led to hopes for progress in Soviet-American relations. The president took the initiative with "open skies," the most radical arms control verification proposal ever made: the United States and the USSR would exchange blueprints of their military facilities and allow unobstructed overflight of each other's territory to permit observers to check treaty compliance.

Climbing Fences

But the Soviets rejected Ike's proposal, the Cold War continued,† and eddies of anxiety over the bomb remained. They surfaced and the peace movement regained public visibility through the controversy over testing thermonuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

Two new organizations, reflecting the centrist-radical division in the peace movement, were born in the late 1950s.

The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), led by pacifist Clarence Pickett and liberal internationalist Norman Cousins, opened its campaign for a unilateral U.S. suspension of atmospheric nuclear testing with a full-page ad in the November 15, 1957 *New York Times* headlined "We Are Facing a Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed." SANE, whose name was suggested by psychologist Erich Fromm, capitalized on intense public concern over the health effects of nuclear tests in the atmosphere (would strontium 90 end up in the milk drunk by American children?). Demonstrating how nuclear anxieties could be focused through the single-issue prism of a test ban, SANE had 130 chapters and 25,000 members by mid-1958.

Cousins and Pickett still endorsed disarmament under an effective international legal system. But they also understood that the test ban was a more immediately achievable objective, one that could be grasped by their primary constituency, which resembled that of the

*McCarthy had the support of G.O.P. conservatives, e.g., Senator William Knowland (R.-Calif.), who combined hostility to the domestic left with neo-isolationist wariness of a U.S. role in Europe's defense against the Soviet threat. U.S. membership in NATO, for example, was opposed both by Senator Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio) and by the *Nation*, a revival of the old anti-interventionist coalition of the late 1930s.

†In 1956, Soviet tanks crushed the Hungarian uprising, and there was saber rattling over that year's Suez Crisis. Khrushchev visited America in 1959, but the 1960 U-2 incident involving the Soviet downing of a U.S. "spy plane" ruined Eisenhower's chances for a career-capping accord at the aborted Paris summit.

postwar world-government movement: urban professionals, liberal whites, typically Protestant or Jewish.

While SANE became a vehicle for liberals and centrists, the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA) was created by radical pacifists who declined to be bound by SANE's deliberately moderate education-and-lobbying approach. Founded in the autumn of 1958 by movement veterans including the ubiquitous A. J. Muste, CNVA conducted nonviolent "direct action" campaigns against nuclear weapons and testing. CNVA's protest ships *Golden Rule* and *Phoenix* sailed into U.S. nuclear-testing zones in the Pacific Ocean. CNVA activists also mounted campaigns against the ICBM base near Omaha (the 75-year-old Muste climbing over the base's fence to seek arrest) and the Polaris submarine yards at Groton, Connecticut (successfully "boarding" the missile submarines *George Washington*, *Patrick Henry*, and *Ethan Allen*). Those Northeast-based college students who joined the Groton civil disobedience campaign were a harbinger of the hurly-burly of the decade to come.

Antinuclear activism also began to attract prominent Protestant theologians, much as pacifism had been popular among them in the 1920s. By early 1959, the influential John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary was writing Muste that "for the first time I agree with you that, if the USA did take the initiative along your lines, this would probably be a better policy in terms of prudence as well as in terms of ethical sensitivity." The path to the 1960s was being charted on many fronts.

A Higher Loyalty

The peace movement of the late 1950s was also influenced by the successful nonviolent techniques of civil rights activists in the South. The demonstration, the sit-in, and other civil disobedience techniques developed by black leaders like Martin Luther King, Bayard Rustin (a World War II conscientious objector), and James Farmer were not only congruent with CNVA tactics, they also helped white clergymen make the transition from the politics of persuasion to the politics of nonviolent coercion. The civil rights movement thus became a kind of training exercise for Vietnam-era peace activists.

By May 1960, SANE had developed sufficient political weight to stage a test ban rally in New York City's Madison Square Garden. Walter Reuther, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alfred M. Landon, and Norman Thomas spoke; telegrams from Hubert Humphrey, Adlai Stevenson, and Jacob Javits were read aloud. Three years later, Norman Cousins played a back-channel role in the test ban negotiations as a private emissary between President Kennedy and Soviet premier Khrushchev. Kennedy expressed his gratitude by presenting to Cousins one of the original signed copies of the Partial Test Ban Treaty,

PEACE, WAR, AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, 1945–1986

PEACE ACTIVITIES

- ▲ Federation of American Scientists
- ▲ Peacemakers
- ▲ Stockholm peace pledge
- ▲ Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists
- ▲ World Peace Congress
- United World Federalists ▲
- ▲ World Council of Churches
- ▲ Henry Wallace's presidential bid
- ▲ *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*
- Einstein-Russell Appeal ▲
- Schweitzer's "Declaration of Conscience" ▲
- Omaha Action ▲
- Council for a Livable World ▲
- Members of Congress for Peace through Law ▲
- SDS ▲
- Physicians for Social Responsibility ▲
- CNVA ▲
- SANE ▲
- Women Strike for Peace ▲
- Student Peace Union ▲
- Port Huron Statement ▲
- San Francisco-Moscow Peace Walk ▲
- First Pugwash Conference ▲
- Polaris Action ▲
- Amnesty International ▲
- *Golden Rule* A-bomb test protest ▲
- Vietnam Day ▲
- National Committee to End the War in Vietnam ▲
- JFK American U. "Peace" speech ▲
- Pentagon march ▲
- Resistance ▲
- SDS rally (D.C.) ▲
- VVAW ▲
- Vietnam Week ▲
- SANE March (D.C.) ▲
- "Dump Johnson" ▲
- Chicago riots ▲
- Weathermen ▲
- "New Mobe" ▲
- Moratorium ▲
- Friends of the Earth ▲
- Mobilization to End the Vietnam War ▲
- Chicago "Days of Rage" ▲
- Union of Concerned Scientists ▲
- McGovern-Hatfield amendment ▲
- Kent State ▲
- Greenpeace ▲
- McGovern "Peace" candidacy ▲
- March on Washington ▲
- Pentagon Papers ▲
- War Resisters League Vancouver–D.C. march ▲
- Mobilization for Survival march ▲
- Nuclear weapons protests ▲
- Peace Ribbon ▲
- Nuclear Freeze ▲
- "Nuclear Winter" ▲
- Catholic bishops' antinuclear letter ▲
- Great Peace March ▲
- U.S. Peace Institute ▲

U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPONS

- First A-bomb test
- B-29
- B-50
- B-36
- First H-bomb test
- B-47
- B-52
- Regulus
- Thor
- Snark
- Titan I
- Jupiter
- Atlas (first ICBM)
- B-58
- Minuteman Titan II
- Polaris
- Minuteman II
- FB-111
- MIRV capability
- Minuteman III
- Poseidon
- Trident I
- ALCM cruise missile
- Pershing II
- GLCM
- SLCM
- B-1B

U.S. LEADERS

TRUMAN | EISENHOWER | KENNEDY | JOHNSON | NIXON | FORD | CARTER | REAGAN

SUMMITS

- ○ YALTA
- ○ POTSDAM
- GENEVA ○
- GENEVA ○
- CAMP DAVID ○
- ○ PARIS (cancelled)
- ○ VIENNA
- ○ GLASSBORO
- MOSCOW ○
- WASHINGTON ○
- MOSCOW ○
- ○ VLADIVOSTOK
- ○ HELSINKI
- VIENNA ○
- REYKJAVIK ○
- GENEVA ○

ARMS CONTROL EVENTS

- △ U.S. Baruch Plan (International control of nuclear technology)
- U.S. "Atoms for Peace" proposal △
- International Atomic Energy Agency △
- U.S. "Open Skies" proposal △
- U.S.-Soviet testing moratorium
- Antarctic Treaty (no nuclear devices) △
- Limited Test Ban △
- U.S.-Soviet "Hot Line" △
- Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty △
- Non-Proliferation Treaty (128 nations) △
- Outer Space Treaty △ (no nuclear weapons)
- Sea Bed Treaty △
- SALT I Talks
- ABM Treaty △
- Biological and toxic weapons ban △
- SALT II Talks
- Vladivostok Accords △
- △ Helsinki Accords
- European Force Reduction Talks
- U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) △
- Soviet walkout △
- Soviet return △
- START and INF negotiations

SOVIET LEADERS

STALIN | MALENKOV / BULGANIN / KHRUSHCHEV | KHRUSHCHEV | KOSYGIN / BREZHNEV | BREZHNEV | ANDROPOV / CHERNENKO / GORBACHEV

SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS

- First A-bomb test
- First H-bomb test
- TU-16 Badger
- SS-2
- TU-95 Bear
- MYA-4 Bison
- SS-3 (First ICBM)
- SS-4
- Hotel
- Largest H-bomb test (50 megatons)
- SS-5
- SS-6
- TU-22 Blinder
- SS-7
- SS-8
- SS-12
- SS-9
- SS-11
- Yankee
- SS-13
- SS-14
- SS-18
- SS-N-8
- TU-22M Backfire
- Delta
- ▲ MIRV capability
- SS-17
- SS-19
- SS-16
- SS-20
- SS-N-17
- SS-N-20
- First cruise missile
- Typhoon
- SS-25

INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

- E. Europe: Communist takeover
- ▲ NATO
- Korean War
- Warsaw Pact ▲
- Dien Bien Phu
- French-Indochina War
- ▲ UN Charter
- ▲ Marshall Plan
- ▲ Berlin blockade
- ▲ Hiroshima, Nagasaki
- Palestine War
- Greek Civil War
- E. Berlin ▲ uprising
- British ▲ nuclear-capable
- ANZUS ▲
- Hungarian ▲ uprising
- W. German ▲ independence
- SEATO ▲
- Suez Crisis/ Sinai campaign
- Cuba: Castro ▲
- ▲ Sputnik
- Lebanon Civil War
- Quemoy-Matsu
- Bay of Pigs ▲
- Military Assistance Commission
- ▲ Berlin Wall
- French nuclear-capable
- Congo Civil War
- ▲ Cuban Missile Crisis
- Tonkin Gulf
- ▲ Sino-Soviet split
- Chinese nuclear-capable
- ▲ Dominican Republic: U.S. intervention
- Czech invasion ▲
- Vietnam War
- Mideast Six-Day War ▲
- Biafra War
- ▲ U.S. moon landing
- Cambodia "incursion"
- Ceasefire
- Saigon falls
- Chile: ▲ Allende's fall
- OPEC embargo
- Yom Kippur War
- Cyprus War
- ▲ Indian nuclear test
- ▲ Angola: Cuban troops
- ▲ Cambodia: Pol Pot
- Camp David ▲ talks
- Iranian hostage crisis
- Iran-Iraq War
- Afghanistan: Soviet invasion
- Zimbabwe ▲
- Falklands ▲ War
- Grenada ▲
- ▲ Spain, Portugal in NATO
- Libya: U.S. strike ▲
- Lebanon: Peacekeeping force

MILITARY SPENDING (percent of GNP)

15% · 10 · 5

U.S. · Soviet

Soviet data for 1986 & pre-1951 N.A.

1945 · 1950 · 1955 · 1960 · 1965 · 1970 · 1975 · 1980 · 1985 '86

following its Senate ratification in September 1963.

SANE—and the protests of Muste and the CNVA—could thus claim a considerable success. SANE's leadership had demonstrated an impressive ability to marshal significant public support behind a middle-of-the-road peace agenda. But something was missing. SANE's 1957 declaration—that the "challenge of the age is to develop the concept of a higher loyalty—loyalty by man to the human community"—was a noble and, in many respects, true statement. But could that "higher loyalty" be married to a peace politics that recognized totalitarianism's threat to peace and freedom? Would the peace movement take the relationship between peace and freedom as seriously as it took the relationship between peace and disarmament? As public attention turned from the test ban to Vietnam, events demanded answers to these questions.

The Rout of the Liberals

President John F. Kennedy is often remembered for telling an American University graduating class, in June 1963, that peace was the "necessary rational end of rational men," and for undertaking his peace initiative that helped gain Soviet agreement to the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

But the Kennedy administration, all in all, gave the peace movement of the day little satisfaction—a fact now largely forgotten. Kennedy entered the White House on a pledge to "get America moving again"—which meant, among other things, Pentagon budgets and ICBM deployments considerably larger than those of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Kennedy's presidency included the bungled CIA invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, confrontations with the Soviets over Berlin, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and the beginning of a U.S. military commitment in the Second Indochina War. And it was Vietnam—not nuclear weapons—that led to the enormous expansion of the radical wing of the peace movement, the eclipse of nuclear pacifism, and the rout of the movement's liberal centrists during the years after Kennedy's assassination.

Criticism of American intervention in Southeast Asia was not confined to the peace movement. Political realists like Hans Morgenthau and Niebuhr opposed U.S. policy on pragmatic grounds: Vietnam was the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place. Republicans and liberal Democrats attacked Lyndon Johnson for duplicity. Congressional hostility to the war during the late 1960s and early 1970s also reflected anxieties over constitutional questions of executive authority in foreign policy, and led to the constraints of the 1973 War Powers Act. Senior military leaders, obediently mute in public, had grave misgivings about President Johnson's refusal to settle on a coherent Vietnam strategy, or to mobilize the country in

THE ARMS CONTROL CONUNDRUM

"Defense is moral; offense is immoral!"

So said Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin, pounding the table at a June 1967 summit meeting with President Lyndon Johnson in Glassboro, New Jersey.

As Robert S. McNamara, LBJ's secretary of defense, writes in *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age* (1986), Kosygin was dismissing U.S. concern about a new ABM (antiballistic missile) system around Moscow. This Soviet innovation, said the Americans, would force a major increase in U.S. nuclear forces to ensure "deterrence" against attack.

Two results followed. First, Washington developed Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRVs, for each intercontinental ballistic missile—the "cheapest way," notes McNamara, to expand U.S. nuclear forces. Second, in 1969 Richard Nixon began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the centerpiece of an "era of negotiations" with Moscow.

Today, that history seems ironic. The latest summit, Ronald Reagan's October meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, broke up over a *U.S.* ABM plan, Reagan's antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars." And despite 17 years of SALT—or, as Reagan calls it, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks)—atomic weaponry has grown. From 1970 to 1985, the U.S. nuclear warhead total rose by 275 percent. The Soviet figure: 533 percent. The two nations' arsenals each now hold some 10,000 weapons.

On the U.S. side, the early arms control impetus grew out of the internationalism that shaped other postwar policies. E.g., during the 1940s, U.S. officials, hoping that wide prosperity would ensure peace, fostered the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But Josef Stalin refused to take part—just as he balked at the *first* U.S. nuclear arms control effort.

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That was the 1946 Baruch Plan. It called for full nuclear disarmament in stages, following a treaty setting up controls by an international agency and providing for United Nations–imposed sanctions on violators. But the Soviets, still developing their own atomic technology, demurred. They wanted America's nuclear weapons destroyed *before* controls were established.

After the 1957 Soviet launch of the first satellite (Sputnik I) and intercontinental missile, President Dwight Eisenhower asked Nikolay Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev to discuss ways to bar a "surprise attack" by either side. The talks, in Geneva, failed when the Soviets raised other issues.

An atmospheric testing moratorium begun in 1958 was ended (by the Soviets) in 1961. After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets—who then had 300 strategic nuclear weapons to America's 5,000—pressed a build-up. In 1963 President John F. Kennedy tried to end *all* atomic tests, but Moscow insisted on allowing underground blasts. By the late 1960s, the Soviets were approaching nuclear "parity," and were still working on an ABM system.

The 1972 ABM treaty negotiated by the Nixon administration placed sharp limits on antimissile defenses, to leave population centers on both sides open to attack. This was to sustain the logic of "mutually assured destruction" (MAD)—the basic concept urged on Lyndon Johnson by Robert McNamara

during the 1960s. MAD held that neither side would launch a "first strike" if its civilians were left vulnerable to a retaliatory attack. Still, Washington, and then the Soviets, proceeded with MIRVs, even as SALT continued. During 1975–80, the number of Soviet warheads more than doubled.

The SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) treaties did "cap" strategic *launchers* (missiles and bombers) at 2,400 on each side; and no more than 1,320 could carry MIRVs. Though SALT II, never ratified by the U.S. Senate, expired in 1985, and neither treaty put a lid on *warheads*, the U.S. and Soviet arsenals are now in the rough equilibrium that is favored by most "mainstream" arms control theorists. What is sought from arms control now?

Soviet leaders, observes Brookings specialist Raymond L. Garthoff, view nuclear weapons as just one of a range of "economic, military, political, diplomatic, and psychological elements" in their dealings with the West. They can press for curbs now as ardently as they once resisted them. Pessimists (e.g., Colin S. Gray) worry that the Soviets oppose Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative for the same reason they rejected Jimmy Carter's 1977 "Deep Cuts" offer: They seek a first-strike capability. SALT proponents (e.g., McNamara) say that the Soviets, observing U.S. ardor for both SDI and new missiles (MX, Trident II), conclude, mistakenly, that Washington seeks first-strike capability.

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On the U.S. side, the Reagan proposals, as they stood post-Reykjavik, were for a 50 percent cut in strategic missiles, sharp reductions in intermediate-range missiles (and their elimination in Europe), a phaseout of underground testing, and a promise not to pull out of the ABM treaty for 10 years. The proposals have not won unanimous praise, even from "doves" who have long sought big cuts. Some want warheads to be slashed by 90 percent. Other specialists ask, why cut at all? Reductions would save little (nuclear forces account for about one-fifth of U.S. military spending); they could force more spending for conventional forces—a political burden for many U.S. allies. Other doubters note that the smaller the strategic forces, the bigger the danger posed by cheating—and the more likely that one side will consider a preemptive first strike, if it thinks few of its missiles would survive an attack.

Some East-West talks yield unarguable benefits. In Stockholm last September, Warsaw Pact negotiators agreed to a NATO proposal to allow each side's observers to conduct "confidence-building" surveys of the other's military ground exercises in Europe—to reduce the chance of (Soviet) "maneuvers" becoming massive surprise assaults. But the plane on which SALT proceeds does not always seem quite so practical, at least where America is concerned.

One reason is that a key factor in White House SALT calculations—and in those of the Kremlin—has long been U.S. public opinion. Post-Reykjavik polls showed wide public support for Star Wars, even though Reagan's refusal to give up SDI prevented an instant deep-cuts deal and led to bitter Soviet complaints. But traditionally, notes Harvard's Joseph S. Nye, Jr., American public opinion "oscillates between twin fears of nuclear war and Soviet expansion." Since the 1960s, he argues, the "glue" that has reconciled these contradictory attitudes has been the hope—justified or not—that a safer world somehow could be gained via Soviet-American arms talks.

support of the war he sent Americans overseas to fight.*

But the impact of these criticisms paled in comparison to the sea change wrought in American political culture by the key teachings of the Vietnam-era peace movement, teachings that had little to do with realist calculations of the national interest, arguments over constitutional "checks and balances," or questions of military strategy.

Amid all the turmoil and upheaval, movement opposition to America's war in Vietnam evolved through three stages: Vietnam as policy error, as moral failure, and ultimately as a reflection of the illegitimacy of America.

De-Nazifying America

By 1967 at the latest, the movement's dominant message was not the horror of war but the corruption of the American experiment; as Father Philip Berrigan put it during the 1968 trial of the draft-file-burning Catonsville Nine, "we have lost confidence in the institutions of this country." America, not war, became the movement's primary target. And while pacifists, anarchists, and liberal internationalists contributed to this evolution in their distinctive ways, the principal influence on the ideological transformation of the Vietnam-era peace movement was the New Left.

The New Left should be carefully distinguished from the Old Left, which found its expression in the small American Communist Party and its allies. The New Left did not consider the Soviet Union the paradigm of a humane future. Nor, contrary to the suspicions of LBJ, was it a disciplined cadre deployed at the pleasure of a foreign power. New Left ideology began, in the 1962 Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as a kind of social-democratic humanism. Rejecting the "depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things," the Port Huron Statement was critical of, but basically optimistic about, American democracy. The job was to transform American society into one in which man's potential "for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity" could be fully realized.

But SDS's originally optimistic humanism would not last three years; by 1965, it had been displaced by a vulgarized Marxism. Lyndon Johnson, the peace candidate in 1964, had already sent the first U.S. combat troops to South Vietnam when SDS president Carl Oglesby took the microphone at a November 27, 1965, antiwar rally in Washington. His speech heralded a decisive shift in the ideology of the peace movement.

*After losing 58,000 men in Vietnam, U.S. military leaders, even as they seek bigger budgets, have become extremely reluctant to intervene overseas—the ill-fated deployment of Marines to Lebanon in 1982–83 was opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; there was great skepticism in the Pentagon over President Jimmy Carter's 1979 creation of a "Rapid Deployment Force" ready to go to the Persian Gulf.

During the Vietnam war, actress Jane Fonda sang "anti-imperialist" ballads to encourage anti-aircraft gunners near Hanoi (1972). Other visitors: New Leftist Tom Hayden, writers Mary McCarthy and Susan Sontag.

American liberalism, Oglesby charged, was hopelessly corrupt. The United States government had systematically lied about its post-war actions in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam because it was the tool of "the colossus of history, our American corporate system." This evil system had led America to resist the revolution of the Viet Cong, which was "as honest a revolution as you can find anywhere in history." The problem was "the system." Radical change was required if the movement were to "shake the future in the name of plain human hope." Oglesby and his followers were not impressed by LBJ's claims that "the Great Society" was at hand. There could be no "Great Society," much less a humane society, while the structure of power in American life remained the same.

These 1965 SDS themes would so dominate the leadership cadres of the Vietnam-era peace movement that it often became not so much an antiwar movement as an anti-America movement.

Leaders of the movement traditionally had taught that peace required change in international politics and economics; the Vietnam-era militants specified the primary obstacle to change as an America controlled by the "military-industrial complex." Noam Chomsky, the distinguished Massachusetts Institute of Technology linguistics

scholar, captured the essence of the radical critique in 1967 when he wrote: "The Vietnam War is the most obscene example of a frightening phenomenon of contemporary history—the attempt by our country to impose its particular concept of order and stability throughout much of the world. By any objective standard, the United States had become the most aggressive nation in the world, the greatest threat to peace, to national self-determination, and to international cooperation." What was needed, Chomsky concluded, was "a kind of denazification" of America.

This profound disaffection with America intersected with two other key movement themes: that American "interventionism" and anti-Communism were primary causes of the world's pain. A new isolationism emerged, and was married to a trendy anti–anti-Communism among many American intellectuals.

The movement's growing influence after 1965 was not simply a function of its oft-cited media access, although movement "guerrilla theater" tactics had a natural appeal for television, and the prestige press itself reinforced movement teachings in commentary on the 1970 Cambodia invasion and the 1972 "Christmas Bombing" of Hanoi. Lyndon Johnson's ambiguities and evasions left a vacuum that allowed the movement and its congressional allies to claim the moral high ground. But even more importantly, as the war went on, the primary themes of the Vietnam-era peace movement—isolationism, a moralistic approach to foreign policy, rejection of American institutions—matched old cultural currents in American life. The strategic achievement of the peace movement was its discovery of new audiences for these classic themes.

Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh

Isolationism, which had appealed to farmers and Midwest conservatives and progressives during the 1930s, now attracted literary and intellectual leaders running the gamut of disaffection from Mary McCarthy to Susan Sontag. Moralism, which Reinhold Niebuhr challenged among liberal Protestants before World War II, took new roots among Roman Catholic and other religious activists; Daniel Berrigan was not alone in teaching that "the times are inexpressibly evil." Anarchist dissatisfaction with American institutions had been one traditional element in the pre-Vietnam peace movement; now it flowered anew in the Vietnam-era counterculture.

Did the movement that taught these themes and recruited these new audiences have a significant impact on American public opinion?

Political scientist John Mueller suggests that, while the war in Vietnam was eventually more unpopular than the Korean War, it became so only after U.S. battle casualties "had substantially surpassed those of the earlier war." According to his analysis of opinion

polls, the movement did not *create* the evolving public opposition to America's effort in Southeast Asia, an opposition fed, rather, by White House ambiguity, the failure to win quickly, and years of growing casualty lists.

Mueller also argues that the movement's rhetoric and style had domestic political effects opposite to those intended by its leaders: "the Vietnam protest movement [in 1968] generated negative feelings among the American public to an all but unprecedented degree . . . Opposition to the war came to be associated with violent disruption, stink bombs, desecration of the flag, profanity, and contempt for American values."

The net result, according to Mueller, was that the movement played into the hands of the men it most despised: George Wallace drew 13 percent of the vote in 1968 and Richard Nixon captured the presidency twice. The movement's own paladin, George McGovern, was summarily crushed in Nixon's 1972 landslide. The "Silent Majority" to whom Nixon successfully appealed wanted the war to end but wanted little to do with Viet Cong banners on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Despite all the protests, Congress did not cut off funds for U.S. military activities in Indochina until after Nixon's 1973 "Peace with Honor," an ill-fated cease-fire accord with Hanoi.

From Carter to Reagan

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the antiwar cause's credibility was temporarily shaken by events: Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia, the deaths of thousands in Hanoi's "reeducation" camps, the ordeal of a half-million South Vietnamese boat people fleeing their "liberated" country. As Peter L. Berger, a distinguished sociologist and former member of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, put it in 1980: "Contrary to what most members (including myself) of the anti-war movement expected, the peoples of Indo-China have, since 1975, been subjected to suffering worse than anything that was inflicted upon them by the United States and its allies."

Yet the movement's successes at home during the Vietnam era cannot be denied. As the old liberal consensus on foreign policy crumbled, many of the movement's themes became respectable in crucial opinion-forming centers of American life: the elite universities, the mainline Protestant leadership, women's groups, New York and Boston publishing houses, commentators in the prestige press, and Hollywood.* From these cultural redoubts, movement teachings would continue to affect American political discourse.

*In 1974, for example, Peter Davis's antiwar film, *Hearts and Minds*, won an Academy Award; a congratulatory telegram from Hanoi was read aloud at the Hollywood ceremony. Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake* (1972) won the Bancroft Prize for history and a Pulitzer. Hanoi's "narrow flame of revolution," she predicted, would "cleanse" South Vietnam of the "corruption and disorder of the American war."

UTOPIANS AND ROMANTIC RADICALS?

In Rebels Against War *(1984), historian Lawrence S. Wittner, himself a peace activist, described the post-World War II American movement. Excerpts:*

Superficially, there may be no reason why an opponent of militarism cannot be an economic conservative, a racist, and a foe of civil liberties. And yet . . . any analysis of [American] peace activists finds them overwhelmingly on the liberal Left. This coincidence of outlook suggests a sharing of certain attitudes: a humanitarian commitment, a basic egalitarianism and a strong belief in individual freedom. They may also have a similar character structure—what some writers have called the "libertarian personality". . . .

[T]he charge of naiveté leveled against the peace movement cannot be totally dismissed, especially with regard to traditional pacifism. . . . Nor is this completely surprising, for, as a social cause based on a moral ideal, the peace movement [has] had an inherent weakness for other-worldliness. . . . Like other utopians and romantic radicals, pacifists could skillfully expose the inanities and injustices of the established order without always posing a relevant alternative.

[Yet] as the history of its two new action thrusts—non-violent resistance and nuclear pacifism—evidenced, [the peace movement] was indeed attempting, however clumsily, to deal with questions of power and its use. Were American policymakers during this period any more "realistic"?

Indeed, America's first elected post-Vietnam, post-Watergate president, Jimmy Carter, at first espoused policies that seemed to reflect Vietnam-era themes, and that illustrated the movement's impact on the thinking of the national Democratic Party, once the internationalist party of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy.

The former Georgia governor appeared keen on "anti-interventionism" (e.g., in Iran and Nicaragua). He seemed to view the Soviet Union's policies as essentially defensive, and criticized human rights violations by anti-Communist U.S. allies in the Third World. Carter pledged, during his 1976 campaign against Gerald Ford, to cut defense spending by $5–7 billion, and a few months after his inauguration warned the American people against an "inordinate fear of communism." He proposed the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea, tried to establish diplomatic relations with Havana and Hanoi, and in March 1977 tried (and failed) to reach a "deep cuts" nuclear arms reduction agreement with the USSR. Movement alumni gained highly visible administration jobs: Andrew Young as ambassador to the United Nations, Patt Derian as State Department coordinator for human rights, Samuel Brown as director of ACTION.

Despite his successes in gaining ratification of the Panama Canal treaties and in negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli accords at Camp David, President Carter's foreign policy soon changed under the impact

of events. The drawn-out Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created a widespread impression of American weakness and vacillation. The president sought and won congressional approval for a revival of draft registration (which provided peace advocates with their first opportunity to raise the spectre of "another Vietnam"), and eventually sought major increases in the Pentagon budget.*

Carter's overwhelming defeat by Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed, at first, to demonstrate the peace movement's collapse as a political force.

The former two-term California governor, leader of the conservative revival since the late 1960s, came to the White House proclaiming the nobility of American intentions in Vietnam, describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," and scoffing at the possibility of meaningful arms control with a Kremlin partner who would "lie, cheat, and steal" to serve his own interests. U.S. defense spending rose dramatically during Reagan's first term. American forces were deployed in Lebanon. The United States invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983, and ousted its Cuban-backed "revolutionary" regime. And the U.S. Navy challenged Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi to aerial dogfights over the Gulf of Sidra. Each of these actions drew strong protests from peace advocates and their allies in Congress.

What much of the movement found most offensive was Reagan's policy in Central America. White House support for the antiguerrilla struggle of Christian Democrat José Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador and U.S. pressure on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua directly challenged the post-Vietnam movement's anti-interventionism and anti–anti-Communism, and led to new forms of agitation. Dozens of Protestant and Catholic churches across the country offered "sanctuary" to Salvadoran and Guatemalan (but not Nicaraguan) refugees; the sanctuary movement was, by its own leaders' admission, a political effort to change U.S. policy south of the border.

'Stop Now'

Such opposition to Reagan policy, combined with the post-Vietnam anti-intervention sentiments of many Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives, persuaded Congress to interrupt U.S. military aid to the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels for two years, until it was restored in 1986. Polls indicated that it was the peace movement's description of Central American realities, not the president's, that most Americans believed, and political Washington paid heed.

But it was the nuclear freeze campaign that most dramatically

*Gallup polls between August 1969 and February 1980 showed that the percentage of Americans who believed Washington was spending too little on the military rose from eight percent to 49 percent.

illustrated the peace movement's ability to influence, however briefly, the terms of debate in Washington as it had once done during the Vietnam years.

The freeze effort began during the late Carter years. There had been little progress on arms control since the early 1970s. Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev had signed SALT II in Vienna in 1979. But the treaty's Senate ratification was unlikely; polls revealed public skepticism about the complex agreement, and Carter was committed to the new MX missile program even under SALT II. Nuclear anxieties were intensified by the Soviets' military build-up, by the Carter administration's 1979 "Presidential Directive 59," which shifted the United States toward a "counterforce" (i.e. war-fighting) strategy, and by the fears of domestic nuclear power that had been building among environmentalists and others long before the Three Mile Island drama of 1979.

Couldn't a simpler, more understandable arms control formula be found?

The basic freeze proposal, the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," was drafted in March 1980 by Randall Forsberg, a Boston activist and defense researcher who had once worked at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The freeze proposal

Dr. Helen Caldicott, holding baby aloft at an antinuclear rally on Boston Common, May 1982. "Somewhere in the last 38 years," she wrote in Missile Envy, *"the United States has lost its direction and its soul."*

paralleled the simplicity of the movement's basic message during Vietnam: Where the previous generation had reduced the war issue to "U.S., Out Now!", Forsberg and her allies crafted a similarly straightforward answer to the nuclear dilemma; "Stop Now." The superpowers should just stop where they were, ending the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Forsberg's "Call" became the centerpiece of a renascent peace movement that quickly attracted new recruits.

Congress Reacts

As the freeze campaign got under way in 1980–81, for example, such supporters as atomic scientist George Kistiakowsky helped resurrect Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), a long-moribund organization of doctors and other health care professionals who now found inspiration in the rhetoric of a Boston-based Australian pediatrician, Helen Caldicott. Caldicott, PSR, and a series of editorials in the stately *New England Journal of Medicine* claimed that most Americans were unaware of their nuclear peril, and had to be shaken out of their "psychic numbing" by slide shows and films emphasizing the horrors of nuclear war (PSR veterans often referred to these shock treatments as "bombing runs"). There were local rallies and protests, and leaflets. ABC-TV produced the nation's first prime-time nuclear war drama, "The Day After," in November 1983, just as the presidential election season was getting under way.

The Catholic bishops of the United States had already joined the physicians as recruits to the antinuclear cause. An explosion of episcopal criticism followed hard on the heels of Ronald Reagan's 1980 election. Archbishop John Quinn of San Francisco charged that the United States had "shifted to a first-strike . . . strategy." Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle called the Trident submarine base in his diocese "the Auschwitz of Puget Sound." Bishop Leroy Matthiesen urged his congregants to leave their jobs at the warhead-assembling Pantex plant in Amarillo.

The bishops' critique, which reflected the movement teaching that the arms race resulted from a failure of American morality and will, eventually led to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace."

The letter, which drew front-page attention in the *New York Times*, and a *Time* cover story, was much less a theology and politics of peace than a commentary on weapons and nuclear strategy. The bishops' final proposals were shaped by conventional arms control theory and aimed at political Washington. Here the Catholic prelates followed the pattern set by their Protestant colleagues during Vietnam: a church-as-lobbyist model took precedence over religious leaders' classic task of culture formation through moral education.

The nuclear freeze campaign, mostly an upper-middle-class phenomenon, was criticized as simplistic by some active disarmament advocates. Among them was Roger Molander, a White House staffer under presidents Ford and Carter and founder of Ground Zero. He thought the freeze was a good way for citizens to express their nuclear concerns, but worried that "there is a little too much of the feeling that the whole problem is in this country and that if we can just get our act together, the Russians will go along."

Almost a year after the Central Park rally, the campaign hit its political apogee in May 1983 when an amended freeze resolution passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 278 to 149. But 90 of the House Democrats who voted for the freeze voted less than a month later for MX appropriations; and the freeze resolution eventually died in the Republican-controlled Senate. Freeze pressure certainly contributed to President Reagan's appointment of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission on strategic forces; but the Commission's recommended development of a small, single-warhead missile ("Midgetman") did not fit the freeze's "Stop Now" position. White House worries over eroding public support, influenced by the freeze campaign, for the traditional U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence may well have been a factor in generating the Reagan administration's antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); but SDI, too, was opposed by virtually all freeze leaders.

Seven out of eight Democratic presidential hopefuls endorsed variants of the freeze during the 1984 primaries; but former vice president Walter Mondale, a freeze supporter and the eventual Democratic nominee, did not make the freeze a central issue in his campaign. In any event, Mondale's crushing defeat by President Reagan seemed to suggest that the American people wanted both arms control *and* military strength.

Hamburger Money

Helen Caldicott, pleading exhaustion, announced her retirement from the antinuclear fray, and in late 1985 Randall Forsberg all but threw up her hands: "The shock of what happened in the 1984 elections [has] left us reeling. It's not that support has gone away. It's just that we've tried everything."

Yet the freeze campaign was an important exercise that, like the Vietnam-era protests, had a pronounced impact on the teaching centers of American life.

The Catholic bishops continued their criticism of the Reagan administration's nuclear policy after the 1983 pastoral letter. The Methodist bishops flatly condemned deterrence in 1986, while the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. issued a study paper entitled "Are We Now Called to Resistance?", which suggested that only massive civil

Mario Cuomo, then lieutenant governor of New York, holds torch of peace at the United Nations building in Manhattan (1982); massive anti-Reagan "nuclear freeze" rally attracted leading Democratic politicians.

disobedience could avert nuclear catastrophe. The Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City was declared a "nuclear weapons free zone." Evangelical Protestants formed "Evangelicals for Social Action," and produced a monthly, *Sojourners*, that carried freeze themes to the country's fastest-growing denominations.

The freeze campaign also stirred up interest in other aspects of disarmament and peace-keeping. Major foundations and individual donors poured millions of dollars into studies of arms control and U.S.–Soviet relations.* Many of them were sober academic exercises. But some were not. For example, Joan Kroc, widow of the founder of McDonald's, distributed thousands of free copies of Helen Caldicott's

*According to the Forum Institute (Washington, D.C.), annual private foundation grants in this area, broadly defined, rose from $16.5 million to $52 million in 1982–84. The big 1984 givers (to Harvard, Brookings, M.I.T., et al.): MacArthur ($18.5 million), Carnegie Corporation, Ford, Rockefeller. Meanwhile, Ploughshares, North Star, and smaller foundations funded scores of advocacy groups, peace lobbyists, and leftish think tanks—e.g., the Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for Defense Information, the American Friends Service Committee, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Peace Development Fund, SANE, Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament, and the freeze campaign itself. By one estimate, there were at least 5,700 local "peace" groups of various persuasions across the nation in 1985. In 1984, for its part, Congress established the grant-making U.S. Institute of Peace, with a modest $4 million budget.

Missile Envy (endorsed by no less a figure than Walter Cronkite), and gave $6 million to establish a peace studies institute at the University of Notre Dame. (The institute's advisory board included Evgenii Velikhov, a Soviet scientist and candidate member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.)

Indeed, freeze teachings—that the arms race was an action-reaction cycle; that reversing the arms race was a matter of American will; that the U.S. "military-industrial complex" was the main obstacle to that reversal; that a sort of psychological dysfunction, not real-world differences in values and interests, caused U.S.–Soviet conflict; that the United States and the Soviet Union were morally equivalent culprits in the nuclear dilemma—flavored new "peace studies" programs in high school and college classrooms and a children's best seller by Dr. Seuss, *The Butter Battle Book*.

Stalemates or Breakthroughs?

In the freeze campaign, then, as during Vietnam, the peace movement both won and lost: It lost the 1984 election and the public policy battle—narrowly defined—and may have prompted a backlash, but it made gains elsewhere. The ultimate impact of the freeze campaign remains to be seen.

The post-Vietnam peace movement's importance in American public life has often been masked by its diversity, volatility, and lack of discipline, by Ronald Reagan's victories, by the rise of the New Right, by congressional reaction to the shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Foreign policy realists of both Democratic and Republican persuasion in Washington, D.C., may think of the peace movement as a marginal factor. Peace movement leaders may feel only frustration because Pentagon budgets grow, U.S. aid again reaches Central American anti-Communists, and arms control is stalled. Both groups are wrong. They fail to measure the changes in the nation's political and cultural environment since 1965.

Indeed, Vietnam Moratorium veteran Sam Brown's appraisal of the movement of his day—"We seem to have had little lasting influence on the nature either of American society or its approach to the world"—rings oddly to anyone familiar with foreign policy positions taken in recent years by the United Methodist Church, the National Education Association, several *New York Times* columnists, the Machinists' union, the United States Catholic Conference, the League of Women Voters, and broadcast executive Ted Turner—and by younger Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees.

Drubbings in presidential elections aside, the peace movement, probably by accident, seems to have hit on a strategy: what 1960s

German radical Rudy Deutschke once called "the long march through the institutions." As we have noted, American religion, higher education, prestige journalism, and popular entertainment were deeply influenced by various movement themes during and after Vietnam. The initial impact has already registered in American politics: in the national Democratic Party, and in the constraints felt by even so popular a president as Ronald Reagan.

Yet, despite such gains, public support of the movement has never reached a point of critical mass. Why? For one thing, judging by the polls, its spokesmen have consistently failed to develop a response to the problem of totalitarianism in general, or the behavior of the Soviet Union in particular, that is satisfactory to the general public. Most Americans favor peace and arms control but remain convinced anti-Communists.

The movement's deeper failure lies elsewhere. Even radical movement leaders no longer spell their country's name "Amerika." But the impulse that lay beneath that Vietnam-era grotesquerie—the sense that there is an evil at the heart of an American darkness—seems to remain strong among many peace militants today. They see America as the problem. Most Americans do not. And there lies the basic point of disjunction, in my view, between the movement and the overwhelming majority of the American people.

The peace movement, since Vietnam, has been able occasionally to muster enough domestic pressure to help hobble U.S. policies—in arms control, in Central America, in U.S.–Soviet relations. But its ultimate effect on international politics, like that of its counterparts in Western Europe, has usually been to foster incoherence and stalemate, not breakthroughs. The peace movement's failure to challenge Soviet policy is the reverse of its apparent disaffection with the American experiment. Both sides of that coin have to be addressed, if the peace movement is to gain and hold widespread public support—and if it is to help make the United States a leader in progress toward a world that is peaceful, secure, and free.