
THE
WILSON
QUARTERLY
WINTER
1980
A NATIONAL REVIEW
OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Smithsonian Institution Building Washington D.C.
$4.00

THE WILSON QUARTERLY

Published in January, April, July, and October by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. *Subscriptions: one year, $14; two years, $24; three years, $35. Foreign subscriptions: one year, $16; two years, $28; three years, $41. Foreign subscriptions air mail: one year, $26; two years, $48; three years, $71. Lifetime subscription (domestic only): $150. Single copies and back issues mailed upon request: $4.50 including postage and handling; outside U.S. and possessions, $6.50. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Editorial offices: Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. All unsolicited manuscripts should be accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence with* Wilson Quarterly *mailing label to Subscriber Service,* The Wilson Quarterly, *P.O. Box 2956, Boulder, Co. 80322.*

Advertising Representative: National Mediarep Corp., 111 John Street, Room 2406, New York, N.Y. 10038. Contact: Harvey Oshinsky.
Bookstore and Newsstand Distribution: Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 188 High Street, Nutley, N.J. 07110.

USPS 346-670 **VOL. IV NO. 1**

Who's the public in "public interest" politics?

Labels have become so influential in American social and political affairs that it is long past time for an examination of the "public interest" label blithely attached by many groups to their own activities. What exactly is meant when the media report that a lawsuit has been commenced or a demonstration mounted by an organization described as a "public interest" lobby or "public interest" group? Most such groups don't represent any broader interest than that of their own members—and most of them don't have all that many members. Some have no members at all, merely a board of directors and a source of funds. They grind a private ax—and claim that it really belongs to all of us.

Consider, for instance, the four-year delay in construction of the Alaska oil pipeline as the result of litigation brought by so-called "public interest" and environmental groups. We wondered, at the time, why the media had granted the public interest label to the litigants. There was then, and is, little evidence that the American public supported the lengthy delay. The majority of citizens in Alaska were anxious to have the pipeline and its attendant economic benefits; their elected representatives were doing everything possible to hasten, not hinder, the pipeline. The public in the lower 48 states was interested in seeing Alaska's oil developed and made available to increase domestic supply; its elected representatives—the incumbent administration—favored rapid construction of the pipeline. Labor interests looked forward to jobs, both ashore and in the maritime trades; consumer interests favored an expanded supply of crude oil and natural gas. Those who succeeded in blocking construction of the pipeline for four years were hardly representative, in their suit, of the public interest—if by that is meant the broad interests of the majority of the American people. They represented an extremely selective special interest, principally college-educated, middle-class advocates of untouched, untouchable wilderness. While they have every right to such advocacy, they have not the slightest right to the "public interest" label for it.

It is usually these "public interest" groups who decry the influence of "special interests" in American politics. By that they mean labor, with all its millions of members; they mean the oil companies, with their tens of millions of shareholders; they mean the automobile industry, probably the primary force in the American economy; they mean American business in general and as a whole, even though it generally speaks for a far larger constituency than any that might be demonstrated by a "public interest" lobby.

We are delighted that the media seem to be growing more aware that the interests advanced by many of the public interest lobbies are actually "special" interests—limited interests, often held by extremely small groups who are in obvious disagreement with the American majority. Some are "no-growth" or even negative growth advocates, repelled by the American lifestyle; many dislike the market economy, and the unruly freedom it entails; others want to bring business firmly under government's thumb. While most Americans are committed to improving the environment, it has not been our observation they are committed to doing so regardless of the costs in inflation, loss of jobs and productivity, growing bureaucracies, and a decline in living standards. Unlike the extremists among America's environmentalists, most people recognize the need for a reasonable balance between environmental and economic goals. After all, if the country should not develop nuclear power, and if coal is too dirty, and if offshore oil development is too dangerous, and synthetic fuel development too hard on the environment, what shall we use to power the nation's economy? Red tape?

We welcome this new skepticism about the "public interest" label, and about who is really entitled to it. We think the media should be especially careful about granting it to small groups who are—on the record—anti-growth, anti-business, anti-energy, and dedicated to an elitist, big-government view of America. That's a very small, very special interest, a long way removed from the goals and ideals of the American people.

Mobil

If you love great classical recordings, here's an offer that's music to your ears.

Now! A classical record club with no obligation to buy.

Now, The International Preview Society invites you to enjoy Brahms' Four Symphonies in your home for 10 days free. If you decide not to keep this set, return it to cancel your membership. Or keep it for only **$2.98** plus postage & handling (save $36.94 off list price) with no-obligation membership. As a member you receive, approximately every 7 weeks, preview privileges of the finest Philips and Deutsche Grammophon "silent-surfaced" recordings. You may choose to have the preview Selection come automatically. If you wish an alternate or no recording at all, return the Notification Card by the date specified. You'll always have ample time to decide. Your savings add up — only $19.99 (3 LPs) or $25.99 (4 LPs) — up to 35% off list price! (Postage & handling added to each shipment.) No obligation to buy — and you may cancel at any time.

- **Bonus Plan!** For every Selection you keep, choose Bonus Recordings at half the members' already-low price!
- **Free Bonus Recording!** Brahms' Violin Concerto, a $9.98 value, yours to keep just for trying this offer!
- **Send No Money!** Mail coupon at once for 10-day free audition of Brahms' Four Symphonies plus free Bonus Recording — glorious music as your introduction to The International Preview Society.
- **Records or Cassettes.** Choose your division.

Brahms
Four Symphonies
List $39.92
$2.98 if you join.

The International Preview Society
175 Community Drive, Great Neck, N.Y. 11025

Please accept my application for membership and send me, for 10-day free audition, the Brahms 4 Symphonies set. I agree to the membership plan described in this ad. The Free Bonus Recording is mine to keep in any case.

Send my recordings on ☐ LPs or ☐ Cassettes.

Name _____

Address _____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Only new members eligible. Offer good in connecting 48 states. Applications subject to review; limit one per household.

29017

The Subtle Revolution

WOMEN AT WORK

RALPH E. SMITH
EDITOR

THE URBAN INSTITUTE
2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

"This is likely to become the major reference work. Interesting and lively."

Lee Rainwater,
Professor of Sociology,
Harvard University

"It will be a very useful contribution on a subject whose economic and human importance could hardly be overestimated. It addresses major issues with cogency and with an admirably rounded and impartial point of view."

Barbara R. Bergmann,
Professor of Economics,
University of Maryland

"Its completeness, readability and policy orientation make it useful both as a text and as a reference work."

Myra H. Strober,
Assistant Professor of Economics,
Stanford University

"A clear, complete, up-to-date look at women at work—this is a valuable source of information difficult to find in one place."

Kirkus Reviews
(July 15, 1979)

"Important . . . this resource guide provides a clear picture of today's working woman . . . Forecasts . . . add to the value of this comprehensive study."

Publishers Weekly
(August 6, 1979)

CONTENTS

255 pages, bibliography, index
Paperback: $7.50 Hardcover: $15.00

Speak German like a Diplomat!

What sort of people need to learn a foreign language as quickly and effectively as possible? *Foreign Service personnel,* that's who. Members of the America's diplomatic corps are assigned to embassies abroad, where they must be able to converse fluently in every situation.

Now, you can learn to speak German just as these diplomatic personnel do, and with the same materials—the Foreign Service Institute's Programmed Introduction to German.

The U.S. Department of State has spent tens of thousands of dollars developing this course. It's by far the most effective way to learn German immediately.

The Programmed German Course consists of a series of tape cassettes and an accompanying textbook. You simply follow the spoken and written instructions, listening and repeating. By the end of the course you'll find yourself learning and speaking entirely in German!

This course turns your cassette player into a "teaching machine." With its unique "programmed" learning method, you set your own pace—testing yourself, correcting errors, reinforcing accurate responses.

The FSI's Programmed German Course comes in two volumes. You may order one or both courses.



- **Volume I, Basic.** 9 cassettes, 13 hours and a 647-page text, $115.
- **Volume II, Basic (Continued).** 8 cassettes, 8½ hours and a 333-page text, $98.

(New York State residents add appropriate sales tax.)

Your cassettes are shipped to you in handsome library binders.

TO ORDER, JUST CLIP THIS AD and mail with your name and address, and a check or money order. Or, charge to your credit card (American Express, VISA, Master Charge, Diners Club) by enclosing card number, expiration date, and your signature.

The Foreign Service Institute's German course is unconditionally guaranteed. Try it for three weeks. If you're not convinced it's the fastest, easiest, most painless way to learn German, return it and we'll refund every penny you paid! Order today!

Many other FSI language courses also available. Write us.

Audio Forum Dept. 317
145 East 49th St. New York, N.Y. 10017

audio-forum®

145 E. 49th St., Dept. 317, New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 753-1783

Ja! I want to speak German like a diplomat. Rush me the course volumes I've checked below.

☐ Volume I, Basic, $115
☐ Volume II, Advanced, $98

I understand that if I'm not completely satisfied, I may return the course materials within three weeks and receive a full refund.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

☐ Enclosed is my check or money order for $_____

☐ Or, charge my:
☐ VISA ☐ Master Charge
☐ American Express ☐ Diners Club

Card number_____

Expiration date_____

Signature_____



"My fundamental thesis is that there are six basic American perceptions of the Soviet intentions and capabilities . . . . Together these perspectives explain the following phenomena in Soviet-American relations: (a) American policy has been inconsistent and unpredictable; (b) Soviet policy has been reactive as well as initiatory; and (c) American and Soviet policies have been prey to misinterpretation and confusion by the other side."

With these words, Robert Pranger, director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, sets the theme of the latest issue of **AEI's Foreign Policy and Defense Review.**

These perspectives, which Pranger fully analyzes, are:

- Revisionism
- Polycentrism and Interdependence
- Ambiguity and Detente
- Ambiguity and Conflict
- Mutual Suspicion
- Containment of Expansionism

Essential background for all concerned with the direction of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, this issue of the expanded **AEI Defense Review** is the most recent in a series of issues which have covered such topics as **Options to U.S. Policy Toward Africa, American Policy Options in Iran and the Persian Gulf, Priorities in U.S. Defense Policy,** and the **FY 1980-1984 Defense Program.**

Coming issues will explore the **Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Latin American Views of U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy,** and **U.S. Policy Options in Northeast Asia.**

Send $18.00 today for a year's subscription (or $25.00 for two years) and for information about other AEI publications to:

American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research
Department 170
1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
202/862-6441

What your home could have in common with the Met, the Tate, and the Louvre.



Wilbur Streech's *The Path,* original serigraph. Signed limited edition of 250.

In your own home, you can exhibit original work by artists who are represented in the world's great museums and galleries.

Artists like Calder. Chagall. Dali. Miró. Picasso. Vasarely.

At the Original Print Collectors Group, we offer moderately priced limited edition prints by these and other well-known artists.

Our offerings include signed original etchings, engravings, lithographs, woodcuts, and silkscreen prints.

Each print we offer is signed and numbered by the artist. Custom-framed. Accompanied by a certificate of authenticity and a full money-back guarantee.

And each print has been chosen not only for its beauty but for its investment value.

(Works by the artists we offer tend to appreciate, sometimes as much as 30% in a single year. Perhaps that's why *The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Money,* AP, *Barron's* and UPI have quoted us as an authority on investing in art.)

For more information, send in the coupon. There's no obligation.

You'll find out about the special pleasure of owning original art, instead of just visiting it.

Yves Ganne's *Jeune Fille Entre les Peupliers,* original lithograph. Signed limited edition of 100.

Original print collectors group, Ltd.

120 East 56th Street, Dept. WQ-9, New York, N.Y. 10022

☐ PLEASE SEND ME YOUR FREE COLOR CATALOG, LATEST NEWSLETTER AND OTHER INFORMATION.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

THE
WILSON
QUARTERLY

WINTER
1980

ISSN-0363-3276

VOLUME IV NUMBER 1

Editor's Comment

As we move into the 1980s, scholars and government researchers are hard at work analyzing what has happened in America during the '70s—already widely described as a decade of domestic "reaction" and "stagnation" following the turbulence of the '60s. In fact, social and economic change accelerated during the '70s, as our specialists on "Jobs in America" make clear in this issue of *WQ*. Newspaper columnists rightly deplore double-digit inflation, yet they forget that real personal income rose 28 percent during the '70s, only two points less than during the booming low-inflation '60s. Politicians worry (rightly) about the unemployed but tend to overlook the fact that *employment* grew by 25 percent during the '70s, versus 19 percent in the '60s. The most striking change in the '70s was the large influx of married women into the labor force, creating more "two-paycheck families" and cushioning the blows of inflation and recession on individual households. As our essayists note, the full impact of this "subtle revolution" on America's economy, politics, and everyday life has yet to be measured or understood, even as it continues.

We also focus on Nigeria, black Africa's richest, most populous state, now the United States' second largest foreign supplier of oil, and, contrary to most expectations, the scene since October of a revived experiment in political democracy, American-style. As our "Nigeria" essays indicate, it is worthwhile to examine recent African experience beyond the dramas of the Rhodesian crisis, apartheid, Cubans in Angola, and the depravities of Uganda's Idi Amin.

As we look at the '70s, many scholars feel compelled to predict what is going to happen in the '80s. Here we are not above a bit of satire. We happily publish Sybil Schwartz's essay on deciphering the "inner rhythms" of history via what she describes as the new science of Decalogy. She insists that, true to form, the '80s will be a decade of relative tranquility.

Peter Braestrup

PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Sagebrush Rebellion

"There's More Rhetoric than Reality in the West's 'Sagebrush Rebellion'" by Dick Kirschten, in *National Journal* (Nov. 17, 1979), 1730 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

In a move designed to provoke a court test, the Nevada legislature last July laid claim to 49 million acres of rich and scenic federal land—about 87 percent of the state's territory. Politicians in California, Utah, Idaho, and other Western states threaten to follow suit as they rail against "greenhorn bureaucrats" who are "riding roughshod" over their rights.

The rhetoric of this "sagebrush rebellion," writes Kirschten, a *National Journal* staff correspondent, "is straight out of Zane Grey." But like Easterner Grey's stories, it may lack basis in fact. What is painted as war between East and West, Kirschten contends, is really a struggle between the urban "New West" and rural "Old West."

The U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) oversees 400 million acres of land in 12 Western states. Until recently, the federal landlord favored "traditional users": miners, loggers, ranchers. (The BLM was wryly called the Bureau of Livestock and Mining.) But the West has grown rapidly since World War II. California today is the nation's "most urban" state, with 90.9 percent of its residents living in cities or towns. Nevada's population is 80.9 percent urbanized, Utah's 80.4 percent. Hemmed-in cities now compete with farmers for land and water, while creating pressure for natural gas development. Townsfolk also want access to the BLM's "wide open spaces" for recreation.

Since reorganization of the BLM in 1976, Washington has been trying to perform a "magical balancing act": protecting parcels of wilderness, encouraging a little gas exploration, restricting some over-grazed

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

rangeland. It is a thankless task. Eventually, Kirschten concludes, local politicians may decide that this is one responsibility they do not want. That way, at least, "they will still have the feds to kick around."

Ike as Activist

"Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence" by Fred I. Greenstein, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1979/80), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025.

The conventional portrait of Dwight Eisenhower as a President "more attentive to golf than to government" is pure fiction, says Greenstein, a political scientist at Princeton. Newly released documents at the Eisenhower Library show the wide scope of Eisenhower's "hidden hand leadership."

Eisenhower's critics often accuse him of abdicating too much policymaking power to his staff, notably to presidential assistant Sherman Adams and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. But copies of Eisenhower's frequent memos to them make clear that it was he who set policy. The President, in fact, preferred that his staff have the limelight: The public perceptions of the two men—Adams, the "abominable no man," and Dulles, the "grim cold warrior," Greenstein contends, "preserved Eisenhower's ability to appear as a benevolent national and international leader."

"Don't get hysterical—I'm watching all the time," read the caption of this 1958 cartoon by Herblock. The conventional view of Eisenhower's Presidency is being challenged as more White House papers become available to historians.

From Herblock's Special for Today. *Simon and Schuster, 1958.*

Transcripts of Eisenhower's conversations show that he often feigned ignorance of important issues before the press. For example, during the 1955 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, he sought to skirt the question of using U.S. forces to protect the islands. ("Don't worry, Jim," he told his press secretary before a news conference, "if that question comes up, I'll just confuse them."). And if the President's daily schedule seemed relaxed, it was because at the time the administration did not consider it appropriate to make his full list of meetings public.

Eisenhower once wrote that he viewed the federal government as "too big, too complex, and too pervasive" to be guided by one individual. He preferred to conserve his "public prestige" by appearing to remain above the political fray (unlike Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says Greenstein, who "sought to enhance their professional reputations as political operators"). The advantage of Eisenhower's low-key approach may be that it avoided "raising expectations about what the President as an individual can ever accomplish."

The Future of Revenue Sharing

"An S.O.S. For Revenue Sharing" by Richard P. Nathan, in *Commonsense* (Summer 1979), Republican National Committee, 310 First St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

Congress should think twice before cutting off the states from federal revenue sharing in the name of "budgetary austerity," warns Nathan, professor of public affairs at Princeton.

First adopted in 1972, the general revenue sharing program—centerpiece of the Nixon administration's "New Federalism"—distributes $7 billion a year in general purpose grants to state and local governments. In 1979, congressional conservatives failed in an attempt to cut the states' portion ($2.3 billion; local governments receive the remainder) from the 1980 budget. The program comes up for renewal this year, and Washington policymakers may again be tempted to sacrifice the states' share in order to cut the 1980 federal budget deficit, projected at $28.4 billion.

Proponents of the cut point to the big budget surpluses of some (though not all) states. Yet those surpluses, Nathan contends, consist almost entirely of funds set aside to cover future retirement benefits for state and local government workers. Moreover, stopping federal grants to states would hurt local governments; in a Brookings Institution study headed by Nathan, seven of eight states monitored were found to be using their federal revenue to help city and county governments, mostly to pay the costs of public education.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of ending state participation in revenue sharing is the harm that could be done to the American constitutional system. Already, more than half of all federal grants to states and localities (excluding welfare), or roughly $30 billion, go di-

rectly to local governments. The power of the states "as the governments which determine and control the functions, finances, and boundaries of local units" is weakening. Americans, Nathan concludes, should avoid "further reductions in the role of state governments in national domestic policies."

The Real Non-Voter

"Why is Turnout Down" by Howard L. Reiter, in *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall 1979), Elsevier North Holland, 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

There has been a steady decline in the proportion of eligible voters who cast their ballots in U.S. presidential elections—down from 62.8 percent of the electorate in 1960 to 54.4 percent in 1976. Alienation due to the Vietnam War, the recent enfranchisement of 18-to-20-year-olds, and the growing numbers of eligible voters 70 years of age and older have all been blamed by political commentators for the downturn—unjustly, says Reiter, a political scientist at the University of Connecticut.

Reiter analyzed data on voter turnout from the 1960, 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1976 elections. He found the decline in voting to be centered among *white* voters of all ages, not just among the "traditional" low-turnout groups (e.g., the young and the old). The percentage of blacks who voted actually increased. Those least likely to cast ballots were poor whites with little education—these people, he writes, "have been dropping out of the electorate at greater rates than wealthy and highly educated whites."

Contrary to a widely held assumption, most white nonvoters listed themselves as independents, not Democrats. But those who did give a party preference, writes Reiter, were "considerably more likely to be Democrats than Republicans." Nonetheless, an analysis of the presidential preference of nonvoters shows their choices to be erratic—e.g., in 1960, nonvoters were more likely than voters to favor Nixon; in 1968, they preferred Wallace over Nixon.

The drop in voting among poor whites may cause elected officials to be less responsive to their needs. It is a vicious circle, Reiter observes. The less attention paid to the concerns of poor whites, the more they will believe they have no reason to vote.

The Religious Factor

"Religion and Presidential Politics, 1980" by Albert J. Menendez, in *Worldview* (Nov. 1979), Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 349, Fort Lee, N.J. 07024.

Religion is "the silent issue in U.S. politics," suggests Menendez, a free-lance writer. Yet ever since American Catholics deserted the Democratic Party of fundamentalist William Jennings Bryan, giving the

Democrat Al Smith cornered the Catholic vote in his unsuccessful bid for the Presidency in 1928. Catholic support of his Party has since been strong. In 1980, Baptist Jimmy Carter's success at wooing Protestants away from the Republican Party may decide the election.

Wide World

Presidency in 1896 to Republican William McKinley, voters' religious affiliations have had a strong impact on Election Day.

Nowhere has this been more evident than in presidential races in which the religion of the candidates themselves attracted attention. In the 1928 presidential race, for example, the French Catholic wards of Holyoke, Mass., broke their traditionally Republican pattern to give Catholic Democrat Al Smith over 90 percent of their vote. "The bigotry and nativism of that at once horrible and colorful campaign," writes Menendez, "drove large numbers of Catholics (and Jews) permanently away from the GOP."

Jimmy Carter, more than any other Protestant presidential candidate in recent history, has called attention to his religious beliefs. In 1976, this emphasis won the born-again Baptist valuable support among traditionally Republican Protestants—more than enough to compensate for the wary Catholics and Jews who defected to Gerald Ford, notes Menendez. Carter did better among Protestants (at 46 percent) than any other Democrat (except Lyndon Johnson) since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, and even topped FDR's showing for 1940 and 1944. Indeed, as President, Carter on the whole has received higher rates of approval from white Protestants than from Catholics or Jews, a phenomenon "unheard of for a Democratic President."

The Protestant turnout for Carter, Menendez asserts, was the "decisive factor" of the 1976 election, and "the way America's religious groups vote in 1980 will very likely decide who sits in the Oval Office come January, 1981."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Case for Blitzkriegs

"On War, Time, and the Principle of Substitution" by Herman L. Gilster, in *Air University Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1979), Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Sending bombers against Germany in World War II and North Vietnam in 1965–68, U.S. strategists failed to reckon with a disciplined foe's ability to keep his economy going despite major damage. In each case, writes Herman L. Gilster, a Boeing analyst, the defenders had the time and resources to adjust.

When heavy allied bombing began in 1943, Hitler's Germany had yet to fully mobilize; its economy "contained considerable slack." The British bombing of German cities, ironically, eliminated nonessential businesses and forced people into war work. Overall, Nazi weapons production *peaked* in mid-1944, despite the bombardment. Not until later did a new U.S. bombing offensive—against synthetic oil plants—hasten the collapse of the German war effort, already hardpressed by allied advances on the ground.

Unlike Germany, North Vietnam was an agricultural nation—little affected by U.S. strikes against bridges, factories, power plants. To support its low-intensity war in the South, Hanoi needed only to transport small amounts of war materiel from China and Russia; local manpower was available to repair bomb-damaged roads. Most important, the Johnson administration's cautious, step-by-step escalation gave Hanoi ample time to react. Only in 1972, when the North Vietnamese Army was heavily committed to its "Easter Offensive" in the South, and U.S. mining of Haiphong harbor curbed needed imports, did renewed U.S. bombing have a major effect.

In short, says Gilster, "time becomes the essential factor that dilutes the effect" of strategic bombing. What works best is a brief, intense combined air-ground campaign, like Hitler's 1940 *blitzkrieg* against France or Israel's Six-Day War against the Arabs in 1967. The Soviets seem to be organized for such a "short war" against NATO. The United States must be able not only to launch *blitzkriegs* but also to repel them.

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

"American Foreign Policy: The Changing Political Universe" by Samuel P. Huntington, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1979), Transaction Periodical Consortium, P.O. Box 1262, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

Even as there has been a recent political swing to the Right, unpredictable five years ago, on American domestic issues, so U.S. public opinion has grown more hawkish on foreign policy, writes Samuel P. Hun-

tington, head of Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

However, he notes, the polls show a cleavage between *mass* public opinion, which now favors a stronger U.S. stand against Moscow, and the "more ambivalent" views of leaders in government, business, journalism, and academia. This cleavage makes it unlikely that a "harder foreign policy line" will be quick to emerge in Washington, although both the Carter administration and its Republican critics are moving in that direction.

At the same time, popular views of presidential power have shifted since Watergate. During the 1960s and early '70s, government activity vastly expanded, while government authority (the "imperial Presidency") was widely challenged. Now the public seems to urge the opposite: Jimmy Carter should cut back on Big Government while providing "decisive" presidential leadership. Yet the decline of the political parties, the fragmentation-by-reform of Congress, and the rise of single-issue groups has made it hard for any President to govern effectively. Hence, it was easier for President Carter to get an Arab-Israeli accord at Camp David than to get Congress to agree on energy legislation.

To exercise "leadership," Huntington concludes, a President in 1980 is almost driven to look abroad—which may mean a more assertive foreign policy, "taking greater risks of confrontation with other states."

A School for Commuters?

"Women Can't Fight" by James Webb in *The Washingtonian* (Nov. 1979), Subscription Service, P.O. Box 936, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

In the name of "sexual equality," Congress voted in 1975 to admit women to West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy. According to Webb, a Naval Academy graduate (1968) and Vietnam Marine veteran who taught English at his alma mater last year, the influx of women has hurt the military without helping the women.

Annapolis' traditional purpose, at the cost of $100,000 per graduate, has been to train, condition, and select young men to lead their fellow Americans in the "organized mayhem" of battle. While Harvard and Yale produce scholars, lawyers, and managers, 9 out of 10 Naval Academy graduates serve in combat jobs. Hence Annapolis' old emphasis on "stress"—harassment, stern discipline, aggressive training.

Adding 300 women to the 4,000 men at Annapolis, says Webb, has brought "refinements"—an emphasis on classroom work and "management" at the expense of stress, preparation for combat, and male morale. Due to official fears of sexism, midshipmen no longer rate their classmates in "peer evaluations," once valued as a reliable measure of leadership ability. (So measured, a black midshipman became student brigade commander in 1970.) Rather, a double standard now exists for men and women. "Fraternization," however normal, between the sexes hurts discipline. Many women are isolated and lonely. Most male mid-

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE



shipmen resent their presence, despite official disclaimers.

What to do? Webb suggests that if the taxpayers want only a "brain with military training," Congress should expand ROTC and close down the costly service academies, since the present co-ed system does not prepare anyone for combat leadership. Or a separate academy could be created solely to train women for noncombat military careers.

"Equal does not mean 'the same,'" Webb concludes. In their zeal to experiment with the military academies, Washington politicians seem "to regard service in the combat arms as [no more demanding than] a commute to the Pentagon."

George Marshall's China Tangle

"A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria" by Steven I. Levine, in *Diplomatic History* (Fall 1979), Scholarly Resources, Inc., 104 Greenhill Ave., Wilmington, Del. 19805.

Many historians have described as "naive," or worse, the unsuccessful efforts of General George C. Marshall to bring China's rival Nationalists and Communists into a coalition government after World War II. However, says Levine, an American University historian, the famed Marshall mission was not a total fiasco.

When he sent Marshall to Chungking in late 1945, President Truman

was worried less about civil war in China, *per se,* than about the chances of Soviet intervention on Mao Zedong's side. Soviet occupation troops had yet to withdraw from the northeastern province of Manchuria; Truman wanted no confrontation in China with the Kremlin, whose designs on Western Europe already preoccupied Washington.

Hence, Marshall gave only conditional support to Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, even as he hoped to avoid a Communist takeover. Marshall, "the reluctant statesman," had few illusions about either side, but at one point, writes Levine, he thought (naively) that a coalition could be formed by nonextremists in both parties. He actually obtained a temporary cease-fire and a tentative agreement on a coalition regime before fierce fighting broke out in Manchuria in late 1946 as both sides tried to exploit the Russians' departure.

Thus, the 13-month Marshall mission failed to avert civil war and Mao's triumph in 1949. But, in Levine's view, the United States and the Soviets behaved circumspectly with regard to China. It did not become an issue between them. And Marshall's diplomatic apprenticeship served him well as Secretary of State (1947–50); he rebuffed suggestions that sending in U.S. forces could save Chiang's regime.

Yom Kippur Crisis

"The Yom Kippur Alert" by Scott D. Sagan, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1979), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

"In a play of mystery and hazard," writes Sagan, a Harvard teaching fellow, President Nixon on October 24, 1973, approved a worldwide U.S. military alert in the middle of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states. Why?

The machinery of Soviet-American détente diplomacy had broken down. Essentially, says Sagan, the U.S. alert was a response to uncertainty over Soviet intentions. Moscow, like Washington, wanted the war to end quickly in a stalemate and a cease-fire. But Egypt's President Anwar Sadat panicked as the advancing Israelis cut off his Third Army: He called for Soviet and American forces to enforce a cease-fire. On October 23, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev echoed this proposal in a message to Nixon, hinting that if Nixon held back, the Soviets might intervene on their own.

With hindsight, Sagan writes, it seems that Moscow only wanted to send a "harsh signal" to Washington to halt the Israeli advance. But at the time, the Americans could not be sure; and "raising the crisis to precarious heights was seen as the most effective way of deterring Moscow." Next day, a mutually face-saving solution was achieved as the Soviet Union accepted a UN resolution to send a non-superpower force to supervise a Mideast cease-fire.

The crisis showed that the two superpowers' ability to control events in the Mideast was limited; Egypt and Israel were less concerned with a global confrontation than with their own immediate needs. The lesson: Moscow and Washington must cooperate better in the future.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

The Brighter Side of Unions

"The Two Faces of Unionism" by Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, in *The Public Interest* (Fall 1979), P.O. Box 542, Old Chelsea, New York, N.Y. 10011.

Organized labor has come in for increasing criticism in the United States—even as the percentage of workers in private industry who are unionized declines. The attacks, particularly from management worried about declining productivity and from minority groups calling for "affirmative action," are not entirely justified, according to Freeman and Medoff, who are Harvard economists.

Executives complain that high union wage scales necessitate hiring fewer workers, thereby restricting a company's output. In fact, although a union member earns only 10 to 15 percent more than a nonunion counterpart, his productivity, in manufacturing industries, is likely to be 25 percent greater. "Union workers spend more time on formal breaks, [but] they spend *less* time on informal ones," the authors report. And employee turnover is 45 percent less among unionized workers.

Even strikes "do not seem to cost society a substantial amount of goods and services," Freeman and Medoff suggest, though the effect on a single company can be devastating. For the economy as a whole, the number of man-days lost to strikes during the past two decades equals 0.2 percent of all man-days worked.

As for charges that union seniority rules slow minority advancement, the authors point out that, in 1975, blacks' hourly wages were 9 percent less than whites' within the unions but 15 percent less outside the unions. A higher proportion of blacks than whites join unions. And in 1976, they held 9.4 percent of union apprenticeships. Although they may conflict with federal antibias efforts, seniority rules, if maintained, will benefit the black worker.

Economists, Past and Present

"Modern Economics as a Chapter in the History of Economic Thought" by Robert L. Heilbroner, in *History of Political Economy* (Summer 1979), Duke University Press, 6697 College Station, Durham, N.C. 27708.

Does modern economics represent the apogee of economic thought? No, says Heilbroner, an economist at the New School for Social Research. He find the achievements of the last 50 years "shallow and poor" compared to those of previous eras.

The forerunners of today's economists explored the "hidden prob-

lems" that underlay contemporary means of producing and distributing goods throughout society. Medieval economists, for example, were "largely preoccupied with the question of whether the pursuit of market objectives . . . would bring men into spiritual danger." The mercantilists explored the relationship "between the pursuit of private gain through foreign trade and the national security." And classical economists (e.g., Adam Smith, David Ricardo) pondered the effect that overall economic growth has on the fortunes of various classes in society. In short, says Heilbroner, economics "relies on introspection . . . heroic abstractions . . . the illumination of gestalt-like 'visions.'"

But modern economics has resulted in few new visions. The achievements, claims Heilbroner, have been mainly technical (e.g., the rise of heavily statistical "econometrics"). "The prestige accorded to mathematics in economics has given it rigor, but, alas, also mortis." Modern economists have analyzed the effect of higher wages on prices, but few have explored the relationship, say, between economics and politics.

Today's paltry achievements, Heilbroner theorizes, may stem from "living in an age of transition, when the hidden problems of the market system are giving way to those of . . . [the] planning system."

Fashionable Democracy

"The Democratization of Fashion: The Emergence of the Women's Dress Pattern Industry" by Margaret Walsh, in *The Journal of American History* (Sept. 1979), 112 North Bryan St., Bloomington, Ind. 47401.

Until the middle of the 19th century, wearing the latest fashions was a prerogative of the wealthy. But the mass production of inexpensive dress patterns in the 1850s and '60s, the availability of the sewing machine, and some aggressive entrepreneurs soon made *haute couture* accessible to all American women.

An early popularizer was Ebenezer Butterick, writes Walsh, who teaches economic history at the University of Birmingham. A Massachusetts tailor, Butterick designed a pattern for men's shirts that could be adjusted according to size. After local success with shirts, Butterick moved to New York City during the early 1860s to produce dress patterns that were cut in thin tissue paper, sold for 10 cents, and packaged with instructions and illustrations. Butterick peddled his patterns in a Manhattan showroom, but he also reached out to the large post–Civil War market of housewives across the United States.

Butterick hawked his wares in his own fashion-oriented *Metropolitan Monthly* and advertised heavily in other publications; he engaged dressmakers, merchants, and sewing machine salesmen in small towns as his agents and published a popular mail order catalogue. By 1871, E. Butterick & Co. was selling over 6 million dress patterns a year through 1,100 outlets in the United States and Canada.

In 1874, Butterick established a London branch office. Meanwhile,

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Ebenezer Butterick's inexpensive dress patterns put high-fashion apparel within the reach of most American women.

From The Metropolitan. *E. Butterick & Co., 1871.*

competitors entered the field and the industry grew. Within two decades, Walsh concludes, "a new industry had brought a mass-produced version of fashion within the reach" of American women, and "another facet of American culture had been successfully democratized." Still later would come the mass manufacture and sale of dresses by size.

SOCIETY

B.A.s Aren't Enough

"Through the Academic Gateway" by Bernard C. Watson, in *Change* (Oct. 1979), NBW Tower, New Rochelle, N.Y. 10807.

In 1976, 1 million black Americans were enrolled in colleges and universities—more than double the number enrolled in 1970. But such gains, argues Watson, a Temple University vice president, are overrated as signs of black progress toward equality with whites.

For one thing, blacks are still vastly "underrepresented" in certain academic fields. Although blacks make up 11.5 percent of the U.S. population, they comprise only 5.9 percent of American medical students, 4.5 percent of law students, 5 percent of engineering students.

Half of all black four-year college students, he adds, are in predominantly black schools. And professional training is still heavily segregated; in North Carolina, for example, 71 percent of the state's black law graduates come from North Carolina Central, a black institution.

Noting that blacks still suffer disproportionately from poverty, low-wage employment, and joblessness, Watson attacks Chicago sociologist William Wilson's assertion that problems of class, not race, should now preoccupy black leaders. Racism, Watson contends, still blocks black progress, as does generalized U.S. inequality of incomes. "Education alone," he says, "cannot ameliorate [black] socioeconomic status."

Family Matters

"Family Roles in a Twenty Year Perspective" by Elizabeth Douvan, Joseph Veroff, and Richard Kulka, in *Economic Outlook USA* (Summer 1979), Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106.

Americans' attitudes toward marriage, parenthood, and work have changed considerably over the last 20 years but not nearly so much as alarmists fear. So concludes a University of Michigan research team that surveyed 2,400 American adults in 1976 and compared its findings with those of an identical survey conducted in 1957.

In the 1957 study (*Americans View Their Mental Health*), four out of five respondents viewed a decision not to marry as selfish, immoral, or neurotic; by 1976, only one out of four felt that way. In 1957, 43 percent of those surveyed believed that getting married "makes a person more mature," "gives a person a goal in life." Twenty years later, however, the number of men and women who so regarded marriage dropped by 13 percentage points. The most striking shift was among single women whose "positive evaluation of the married state . . . dropped more drastically than any other group's."

Asked what they valued most in life, regardless of marital status, women in 1976 still chose love and "warm human relationships," while men in 1976 as in 1957 were more apt to choose hedonism and "self-actualization" on the job. But, *married* men and women of the 1970s, like those of the 1950s, said by a margin of 3-to-1 that they considered their family lives to be more important—and more satisfying—than their professional lives.

Sex and Geography

"Geographic Constraints on Women's Careers in Academia" by Gerald Marwell, Rachel Rosenfeld, and Seymour Spilerman, in *Science* (Sept. 21, 1979), American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1515 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 requires that colleges receiving federal aid avoid bias against women in hiring and promotion. But small-town colleges may have difficulty complying because married women professors discriminate against *them.*

SOCIETY

Marwell and Spilerman, sociologists at the University of Wisconsin and Columbia University, respectively, and Rosenfeld, senior study director at the National Opinion Research Center, surveyed the "residence patterns" of married male and female professors at U.S. colleges. The women, they found, were almost twice as likely as the men to live in cities of over 1 million population. The reason: Women academics are more apt to marry "professionals" (63 percent, according to one study) than are men (8.3 percent). A large city like Los Angeles or New York offers both husband and wife a better chance of employment than does a one-university town like Ann Arbor, Mich.

Women academics change jobs as often as men do, the authors note, but they are likely to stay in the same city when they do so. And those women who move to a new part of the country are not necessarily motivated by career opportunities. "Forty percent of the men who moved between urban areas attained a higher academic rank in the process; the comparable figure for women was 23.3 percent." Once again, marriage is a determining factor—in 1973, 75 percent of single women academics held the rank of associate professor or above; only 52 percent of the married women surveyed did.

PERCENT OF FACULTY MEMBERS BY SIZE OF CITY

	Less than 100,000	100,000–250,000	250,000–1 million	1 million–2 million	More than 2 million
Married					
Men	41.6%	18.0%	15.0%	3.5%	21.8%
Women	30.7	12.1	12.3	6.6	38.4
Unmarried					
Men	31.2	14.5	16.2	5.4	32.8
Women	34.6	16.6	17.5	5.2	26.2

The growing number of working wives has had ironic consequences. Today, the gravitation of married women academics to larger cities makes it hard for small-town colleges to meet federal "affirmative action" demands.

The advantage men have in mobility may soon wane, say the authors. As more wives undertake careers, more male professors will discover they can no longer "change geographic location with impunity." Meanwhile, the federal government continues to use the gross number of doctoral degrees issued to men and women nationwide as a basis for measuring sexism in academia—placing "an unfair burden on some institutions while letting the [truly] discriminatory practices of others go unpunished."

SOCIETY

Wasted Money

"The Perverse Effects of SBA Loans to Minority Wholesalers" by Timothy Bates and Alfred E. Osborne, Jr., in *Urban Affairs Quarterly* (Sept. 1979), 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

The "relaxed eligibility criteria" used by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to award loans and loan guarantees to minority businessmen may actually discriminate against the black entrepreneurs who have the best chances of success, argue Bates, an economist at the University of Vermont, and Osborne, professor of management at UCLA.

To promote inner-city business development, the SBA is willing to assume a greater risk on loans to blacks than to whites; i.e., a black firm with small net worth is eligible for a larger SBA loan than a comparable white business. However, in an analysis of SBA loans awarded to white and black wholesalers in 1968–70, the authors found that the agency relied on very different factors to gauge the individual business's ability to repay. A healthy cash flow, say the authors, was the primary basis for determining the amount of money lent to a white wholesaler. "Perhaps expecting failure," the SBA evaluated black wholesalers' ability to repay, however, by the amount of collateral put up; a strong cash flow was a secondary consideration.

The result, say the authors, is that a weak, poorly capitalized black wholesaler may receive preferential treatment from the SBA; a stronger and potentially more profitable black wholesaler with a healthy cash flow but not much collateral receives a smaller loan than his white counterpart. Ironically, this well-intentioned lending philosophy may be "simultaneously decreasing the availability of loan funds for viable, expanding [black] firms" in the inner city and "increasing the overall incidence of default on loans of black business borrowers."

Teachers Get Low Marks

"In Search of Quality: The Need for Talent in Teaching" by W. Timothy Weaver, in *Phi Delta Kappan* (Sept. 1979), Phi Delta Kappan, Inc., Eighth and Union, Box 789, Bloomington, Ind. 47402.

A declining U.S. birth rate and a tight job market for teachers have forced schools of education to lower admissions standards to stay in business. As a result, less-talented students are being trained as teachers, while brighter ones enter fields with more promising employment prospects (e.g., business and engineering).

Among graduating college seniors in 1976, education majors had scored 46 points below average on the verbal portion of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (taken before entering college) and 52 points below average on the math. Weaver, an associate professor of education at Boston University, also reports that the mean 1976 grade point average for seniors majoring in education was 2.72; the average for all majors was

SOCIETY

2.97. Teachers' scores on the Graduate Record Examinations (required for entrance to most graduate schools) have fallen faster than the national average since 1970.

To attract more qualified students, Weaver says, schools of education, aided by the federal government, must create "new career options in education" outside the traditional public school. To this end, he proposes training programs in basic academic skills for the handicapped, minorities, members of the armed forces, and women entering the labor force for the first time; vocational training in industry; and education programs in prisons, mental institutions, and old-age homes.

PRESS & TELEVISION

Congress' TV Problems

"Network News Coverage of Congress" by Michael J. Robinson and Kevin J. Appel, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1979), 2852 Broadway, New York N.Y. 10025.

Pollsters, journalists, social scientists—and not a few politicians—have long held that TV coverage has led to declining respect for the U.S. Congress. While supporting that conclusion, two Washington, D.C., researchers caution that Congress is also "uniquely suited for bad press."

Robinson, a politics professor at Catholic University, and Appel, a lawyer, analyzed network coverage of Congress during January and February 1976—a period that encompassed the beginning of the presidential primary season and the leak of the House Select Intelligence Committee report on CIA activities. The authors found that 86 percent of the coverage was "neutral." Most of the remainder, however, portrayed Congress negatively (primarily in footage of White House officials and even Congressmen criticizing the legislative branch, but also through network commentary and reports on congressional scandals). There was virtually no "positive" news.

Fifteen percent of total network news time is focused on Capitol Hill, with the Senate preferred to the House as a source of news by a ratio of about 5 to 3. Because the Senate has fewer members, the authors believe, it attracts a medium that "likes to deal in—and to create—familiar political faces." House or Senate committee stories (particularly investigative hearings) account for 44 percent of all legislative coverage (excluding campaign stories). Why? Committee action "represents the heart of the congressional process" and is easily adaptable to TV coverage—unlike floor debate, which may not be filmed by commercial networks and does not follow a prescribed schedule and format.

But why pick on Congress? Its diversity and size, Robinson and Appel observe, make it easier to criticize than other government branches.

Congressional hearings — with their predictable schedules and potential for newsworthy confrontations–make for good television.

Wide World

The Supreme Court bars network coverage of any of its proceedings; the President "is covered too personally, too directly, to be maligned by the networks day to day." Indeed, the authors conclude, the "networks need the President, and *generally* they cultivate him."

Time Marches On

"*Time* Magazine Revisited: Presidential Stereotypes Persist" by Fred Fedler, Mike Meeske, and Joe Hall, in *Journalism Quarterly* (Summer 1979), 431 Murphy Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455.

Does America's No. 1 news magazine give the facts—and nothing but the facts? Fedler, Meeske, and Hall, who teach journalism at the University of Central Florida, sampled *Time* magazine's coverage of Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter for 10 consecutive issues each. In their view *"Time* has never claimed to be objective. It is still not."

With a circulation of 4.5 million, *Time* leads *Newsweek* (3 million) and *U.S. News and World Report* (2 million) as the nation's most popular weekly news magazine. In a 1976 survey, American journalists ranked it sixth on a list of dependable sources—ahead of all three television networks and several newspapers, including the *Los Angeles Times.*

Most *Time* presidential stories, the authors say, begin on a "neutral note" but end with *Time's* conclusions. Often, the magazine (like its rivals) purports to tell readers what the nation thinks—for example, on the Watergate scandal, "For most Americans, it is a matter of profound disappointment." The magazine's headlines (e.g., "Carter's Dog Day Afternoons"), adjectives (Ford's "realistic way of curing the nation's ills"; Carter's "unsuitable, missionary foreign policy style"), and emphasis on the personality of the President all contribute to the creation of stereotypes, say the authors. Thus Lyndon Johnson was depicted as a

"demanding, often difficult" President; Nixon (pre-Watergate) was "dedicated, clearly serious"; Ford came across as a "square salt of the earth" man; while Carter "has a penchant for reading hope into almost everything."

Time's acknowledged pre-1965 Republican sympathies have only slightly abated, the authors contend. In their samplings, Johnson was the subject of 46 positive and 41 negative mentions; Nixon (before Watergate) of 42 positive and 16 negative; Ford of 53 positive and 34 negative; and Carter of 24 positive and 63 negative.

In only one aspect did the authors see *Time* relatively free of bias: Of all the political cartoons reprinted in the magazine during the periods studied, none was favorable toward *any* president.

The Morality of Soap Operas

"The Angst of the Upper Class" by Philip Wander, in *Journal of Communication* (Autumn 1979), P.O. Box 13358, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.

Despite their scriptwriters' focus on personal problems, television daytime soap operas make "modern life appear coherent and relatively secure," says Wander, professor of speech communication at San Jose State University.

The world of the soap opera is governed by a strict moral code: "Playboys are untrustworthy"; "adultery is invariably punished"; "divorce always tears apart the children." "Two people may love each other," Wander writes, but "where there is no marriage there is no hope for the future." Unsavory characters (e.g., Ty, the pimp in the ABC series "All My Children") provide for a natural selection of sorts. The weak who succumb to their charms are branded—usually forever—as "unfit for family life"; they tend, moreover, to be infertile.

The chief setting in today's soap operas has shifted from the home to the office. "Village life," Wander observes, "with friends and relatives living nearby, gossiping, helping, dropping by for a chat, is born again in the hospital, the law office, the corporation." The series' authors generally ignore social problems, such as "diseases resulting from smog or bad working conditions, a sudden increase in the work load, unemployment, or the insane pace of social change." Most difficulties faced by the predominantly upper-class characters can be remedied by readily available professional help—"a few hours of surgery, a visit to a psychiatrist or a lawyer." Dilemmas are rooted in individuals. For example, in "Days of Our Lives" (NBC), Brooke, the illegitimate daughter of Bob Anderson, president of a company that depends on military contracts, becomes an industrial spy against her father—not on political grounds but to get even for his desertion of her and her mother.

Soap operas, Wander concludes, present a view of society akin to that of the 19th-century romantic novel, filled with "characters struggling to keep things the way they were."

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

Gnostic Christians

"The Discovery of the Gnostic Gospels," "The Threat of the Gnostics," "The Suppressed Gnostic Feminism," and "The Defeat of the Gnostics" by Elaine Pagels in *The New York Review of Books* (Oct. 25, Nov. 8, Nov. 22, and Dec. 6, 1979), Subscription Service Department, P.O. Box 940, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

In 1945, an Arab peasant discovered some 52 papyrus texts buried in the upper Egyptian desert. Among them were 4th-century Coptic translations of early, previously unknown Christian gospels—the *Gospel of Truth,* the *Gospel of Thomas,* the *Gospel of Phillip*—as well as poems, treatises, and secret writings attributed to Jesus and his disciples. Some had been composed before A.D. 120 (by contrast, the New Testament gospels are known to have been set down c. 60–110).

Roughly 100 years after Christ's death, a broad schism developed among Christians between the orthodox (literally, "straight thinking")

In his five-volume Destruction and Overthrow of Falsely So-Called Knowledge, *St. Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyon, led the Christian Church's 2nd-century fight against the gnostic cult, branded "an abyss of madness and blasphemy."*

Reprinted by permission of B. Arthaud, publisher.

RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

and the gnostics ("those who know"). Whereas orthodox Christians believed that "God became accessible to humanity through the church," the gnostics accepted the possibility of "inner vision." "Abandon the search for God," wrote the gnostic teacher Monoimus. "Look for him by taking yourself as the starting point."

Some gnostics argued that God the Creator of both good and evil served a greater Divine, the "Depth." Others celebrated an Almighty who was both feminine and masculine ("She became the Mother of everything, for she existed before them all, the mother-father"). Still others argued that Christ's Crucifixion and Resurrection should be taken symbolically, not as historical events.

Orthodox leaders viewed gnostic teachings as falsehoods; they also perceived them as a threat to the development of a "unified hierarchy of church offices," writes Pagels, a professor of religion at Barnard.

Thus, Irenaeus (c. 180), bishop of Lyon, railed against gnostics who chose their priests by lot. And the inclusion of women in gnostic ceremonies was a source of much consternation. ("These heretical women—how audacious they are!") Yet, Pagels notes, the Christian movement had initially shown a "remarkable openness toward women." This was due partly to the religion's start among the lower classes, where everyone's labor was needed. Only "as increasing numbers of Christians were recruited from the middle classes," she observes, were women relegated to a silent, subordinate role.

To the orthodox, the gnostic denial of Apostle Peter's version of the Resurrection was heretical. But particularly galling was the gnostics' figurative reading of Christ's Crucifixion. During a period of brutal Roman persecution, the orthodox derived comfort and pride in the notion that their suffering mirrored the Lord's.

With Emperor Constantine's conversion to Christianity in the 4th century, Christian bishops, once persecuted, became the inquisitors. Possession of gnostic books was made a criminal offense; those works not destroyed remained hidden for nearly 2,000 years. As the new-found texts show, remarks Pagels, "contemporary Christianity, diverse and complex as we find it, actually may display more unanimity than the Christian churches of the first and second centuries."

French Censors

"Censorship and the Defenders of the Cartesian Faith in Mid-Seventeenth Century France" by Trevor McClaughlin, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* (Oct.-Dec. 1979), Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa. 19122.

Censorship, or the threat of it, was an overriding fact of life for French scholars in the second half of the 17th century. The "stifling orthodoxy" demanded by Catholic state and Church officials discouraged philosophic and scientific inquiry just as the Enlightenment dawned.

Beginning in the 16th century, numerous French laws dealt with the

"products and distribution of the printing press," writes McClaughlin, a history professor at Macquarie University, Australia. Printers were licensed in limited numbers. Officially, authority to ban publications rested with the king and his courts, but universities, religious orders, and the Church had their own machinery for suppressing heresy.

Among those whose writings were condemned were philosopher-mathematician René Descartes (1596–1650) and his followers. Orthodox theologians opposed Descartes' definition of matter as "extended substance." By the dogma of the Eucharist, they believed, "the accidents of the bread and wine [must be] distinct from their substance." King Louis XIV, who selected Church officials within France, feared a split in the French Church—and Vatican intervention.

But attacks against Cartesians were not limited to censorship of philosophers and theologians. Descartes' concepts served as the foundation for the explanations of matter and motion put forth by physicist Jacques Rohault (1620–75). To his regret, Rohault, like other Cartesians, gradually found himself embroiled in time-consuming defenses of his mentor. He had to curtail his own researches, choosing compromise at the expense of scientific rigor.

Constrained by censorship, McClaughlin concludes, other French thinkers also "withdrew from the centre of the European intellectual stage, giving way to . . . Locke and Newton, Leibniz, and others."

Celibacy Defended

"A Married Layman on Celibacy" by John Garvey, in *Commonweal* (Oct. 26, 1979), 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Celibacy for Catholic priests has come under increasing attack in recent years. One reason for this, says *Commonweal* writer Garvey, is that Western culture, with its emphasis on the individual, has come to view vows as "less than central to the business of being a human."

"There is nothing obviously good or healthy about celibacy," Garvey admits. He dismisses the traditional arguments in favor of clerical celibacy—that it makes priests more available for service, more free to love everyone, more able to exhibit both "masculine" and "feminine" attributes. He is concerned not with "celibacy as a *sine qua non* for the priesthood but with the vow itself."

The importance of vows, he avers, lies in their symbolism. Vows, he says, are "beyond reason but not irrational"; their consequences cannot be fully anticipated. A religious vow signifies profound trust, a willingness to "step into a larger life than the life [that the believer can] control and manipulate."

Celibacy is a kind of fast; like voluntary poverty or abstinence from food or drink, it makes no worldly sense in a culture that preaches self-gratification. But, Garvey concludes, taking the vow of celibacy serves as testimony that God's love is all the love needed for a fulfilling (albeit occasionally lonely) life.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

Washington's War on Cancer

"The Politics of Cancer" by Elizabeth Whelan, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1979), The Heritage Foundation, 513 C St. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

Most measures by federal regulators to protect workers and consumers from cancer-causing chemicals overlook obvious facts about cancer. So contends Whelan, a researcher at the Harvard School of Public Health.

The Food and Drug Administration bans any food additive that induces cancer in any animal species at any dose level. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has even broader criteria. OSHA considers a chemical a "confirmed carcinogen" if it increases the incidence of tumors or shortens "latency periods between exposure and onset of tumors"—*malignant or benign*—in either humans or two species of test mammals; one species if the test can be duplicated.

These criteria err on three counts, avers Whelan.

First, they target manmade chemicals only; substances such as egg yolk, egg white, caffeine, and Vitamin A—known carcinogens in at least one mammalian species—are ignored. Second, they depend on the rather unscientific notion that "mice are little men." Not all animal carcinogens (i.e., sodium penicillin) cause cancer in humans. And third, the regulators wrongly assume that most cancers are caused by pollutants in our food and environment. The International Agency for Research on Cancer puts the percentage of cancer contracted in the workplace at only 1 to 5 percent. And since the use of certain food additives has increased, the stomach cancer rate has actually declined. Some 30 to 35 percent of all cancer deaths are "directly attributable to cigarette smoking," asserts Whelan. Another 30 to 35 percent may be due to high caloric and fat diets.

There may well be "health-related and aesthetic" reasons for cleaning up the environment and the workplace and for purifying our food, she concludes, "but the risk of cancer is not one of them."

Molecular Detectives

"False Start of the Human Parade" by Adrienne L. Zihlman and Jerome M. Lowenstein, in *Natural History* (Aug.-Sept. 1979), P.O. Box 6000, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

"Give me a tooth and I'll reconstruct the animal," boasted early 19th-century French zoologist Georges Cuvier. In tracing human and animal evolution, most anthropologists today are more cautious.

The pelvis is "probably the most diagnostic bone in the human line,"

write Zihlman, an anthropologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Lowenstein, associate clinical professor of medicine at the University of California, San Francisco. It can tell researchers if a suspected human ancestor walked upright or on all fours. A tooth, on the other hand, can be deceiving; the teeth of the prehistoric chalicothere, for instance, led anthropologists to believe it was an ancestor of the horse until they discovered that it had claws instead of hoofs. But a controversy now rages over whether molecular, rather than bone, structure provides the clearest clues to human evolution.

Molecular anthropologists, notably Vincent Sarich and Allan Wilson of the University of California, Berkeley, compare the combinations of amino acids in proteins of living species to deduce how long ago the species diverged from a common ancestor. Amino acid arrangements in humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas are almost 99 percent identical—making all three as closely related as the grizzly bear and the polar bear. Based on the few differences in protein structure, molecular anthropologists have concluded that "humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas diverged from a common ancestor between 4 and 6 million years ago"—not 10 or 12 million years ago, as previously thought.

Molecular analysis, say the authors, destroys the once-accepted hominid credentials of *Ramapithecus,* a small creature (4 feet tall) that walked upright about 10 millions years ago. *Ramapithecus* had been reconstructed on the basis of teeth and jaw fragments (aligned much like those of modern-day *Homo sapiens)* discovered in India in 1932. Now, the authors conclude, nothing remains of him "but his smile."

Metals with 'Memories'

"Shape-Memory Alloys" by L. McDonald Schetky, in *Scientific American* (Nov. 1979), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

There is a "new family" of alloys that can be fixed to assume shapes on temperature command. Practical applications will likely range from artificial joints in human limbs to hinges on greenhouse windows that automatically open to admit fresh air in hot weather.

A so-called shape-memory alloy is one whose atoms undergo a specific shift from one crystal arrangement to another with a change in temperature. For example, a wire made of one of these alloys may be bent into cloverleaf shape and then heated until its atoms assume a "high temperature configuration" (the "parent" phase). Rapid cooling rearranges the atoms of the wire (without altering its clover shape) into the crystal pattern "martensite." Once cooled, the wire may be crushed into a wad, but when reheated to "parent" temperature, the cloverleaf will reappear.

Though first demonstrated with brass (a mixture of copper and zinc) in 1938, the "shape-memory effect" did not lend itself to useful application until the 1960s, when Nitinol—a costly nickel-titanium alloy—was developed by U.S. Navy scientists. Nitinol has since been used to trig-

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY



Heated, this antenna regains its shape.

ger instruments on spacecraft and to seal hydraulic lines on jet fighters. In laboratory dogs, surgeons have obtained encouraging results with a blood-clot filter constructed of a single strand of shape-memory wire. The mesh filter is straightened into wire form (at levels well below body temperature) and inserted through a catheter into a large vein leading to the heart. Warmed by body heat, it gradually reverts to screen shape and prevents blood clots from reaching the heart.

Shape-memory alloys may even help solve future energy shortages, says Schetky, a metallurgist at the International Copper Research Association. In tropical oceans and large reservoirs behind hydroelectric dams, alloy rods could be alternately lowered to cold deep waters and raised to warmer surface waters. The resulting metal contractions, he suggests, could be harnessed to drive a power wheel.

Sovereignty in Space

"The Geostationary Orbit: Issues of Law and Policy" by Stephen Gorove, in *American Journal of International Law* (July 1979), 2223 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

The geostationary orbit is roughly 22,300 miles above the Earth, parallel to the equator. In it, a satellite travels in the direction of the Earth's spin at such a speed as to remain fixed over a single point below. For the last five years, the right to control this orbit has been claimed by equatorial nations of the Third World.

There were approximately 100 satellites in geostationary orbit in 1977; it is estimated that there will be 239 by 1990. So far, the orbit has been used for telecommunications and broadcast satellites, but it is also considered the most likely location for transmitters of solar energy to Earth. The geostationary orbit has room for 1,800 satellites at most, depending on their sizes, stability, and tolerances for electromagnetic interference.

In 1976, eight nations—Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire—declared sovereignty over the sections of the orbit above their respective territories. Although they invoked U.N. resolutions giving a nation control over its limited resources, they

broke with international legal precedent, contends Gorove, a law professor at the University of Mississippi. Traditionally, the United States and other industrial nations have observed a "first come, first served" rule, adopted in the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty. The treaty specifically bans sovereign claims to any portion of space and makes no mention of natural resources. (Though none has tried, any country with the means may exploit the resources of the moon and other celestial bodies.)

A detailed legal and technical code is needed to ensure peaceful and efficient use of the geostationary orbit, suggests Gorove. Rather than opposing all efforts to create one, the United States should take the initiative in formulating "appropriate principles."

The Red Ocean?

"The Red Sea: A New Ocean" by David A. Ross, in *Oceanus* (Fall 1979), 1172 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02134.

The Red Sea, only 25 million years old, is spreading. For scientists, that means a great opportunity to study sea floor activity and the formation of continental "margins" in their early stages.

The floor of the Red Sea is widening along a central rift that has been seismologically "active" for the last 3 to 4 million years. It is forcing Africa and the Arabian peninsula apart at a rate of about 1 centimeter a year, reports Ross, a scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Insti-



A rift in the floor of the Red Sea is forcing the African and Arabian plates apart. By compressing the Persian Gulf against the Asian Continent, it has formed oil fields in the Gulf and the Zagros Mountains in Iran.

Used by permission of David Ross.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

tution. Within 25 million years, the Persian Gulf will disappear as a widening "Red Ocean" pushes Saudi Arabia into Iran.

Scientists disagree over how the Red Sea, now about 190 miles across at its widest point, was formed. Some argue that, because the facing coastlines fit together nicely, the Asian and African continents, once united, broke apart abruptly. Others say that the African and Arabian tectonic plates separated gradually, their edges stretching and thinning to become part of the sea floor. The issue will remain unresolved, Ross says, until future seismic readings and deep drillings reveal whether the rock below the sea's crust is "continental" or "oceanic." Data from such tests may also help explain the early development of the other, older oceans (e.g., the Atlantic, 175 million years older than the Red Sea).

The geology of the Red Sea floor is of more than academic interest, says Ross. Billions of dollars' worth of copper, zinc, lead, and silver lie in its sediment, almost equidistant between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. The two nations have agreed to share the deposits, which may be the first heavy metals mined for profit from deep seas. If the Red Sea were older, and thus wide enough to include international waters, Ross suggests, other countries would be able to share the wealth.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

The Trouble with 'Gasohol'

"Gasoholics Agronomous" by Stephen Chapman, in *The New Republic* (June 30, 1979), Subscription Service Department, P.O. Box 705, Whitinsville, Mass. 01588.

"Gasohol"—a mixture of 10 percent alcohol and 90 percent gasoline that can power automobile engines—has been widely touted as a new source of energy. Chapman, staff writer for the *New Republic,* says such claims are excessive.

Gasohol's advocates claim that its development will reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, improve cars' mileage, decrease auto exhaust emissions, and aid American farmers (who grow the corn from which the alcohol is made). Not so, Chapman writes. The alcohol in the gasohol now sold at some 800 filling stations in the United States costs about $1.59 a gallon (or more than $60 a barrel) to produce, one-third more than a gallon of most unleaded gasolines. Only exemptions from state and federal gas taxes enable gasohol retailers to price their fuel at even this competitive level.

No less important, current methods of making alcohol (including growing and processing the corn) consume about one-third more energy than they produce. Chapman adds that the U.S. Department of

Energy has determined that cars using gasohol do not get appreciably higher mileage; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has found that gasohol exhaust emissions do not contain significantly less pollution than those of unleaded gasoline.

Chapman concludes that tax exemptions for gasohol and federal outlays for experimental gasohol projects constitute a form of subsidy for the nation's farmers, "a lucrative welfare program for one of the nation's more powerful interest groups." If Washington wants to increase domestic fuel supplies, he says, its money would be better spent subsidizing the production of synthetic fuels from tar sands and shale, sources that can provide oil at $25 to $30 per barrel, prices not much above current world levels.

Acid Rain

"Acid Rain" by Gene E. Likens, Richard F. Wright, James N. Galloway, and Thomas J. Butler, in *Scientific American* (Oct. 1979), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

In parts of the Eastern United States and Western Europe, rain and snow now fall as dilute solutions of sulfuric and nitric acids. A by-product of the burning of fossil fuels in power plants, the problem of "acid rain" is expected to worsen as industrialized countries become more dependent on coal, say ecologists Likens, Wright, Galloway, and Butler.

Burning coal and oil produces sulfur and nitrogen oxides, which mix with water vapor in the atmosphere to form acids. They fall to earth when it rains. Already, some fresh water lakes in Nova Scotia, northern New England, the Adirondacks, and Florida have pH readings below 5. (The pH scale ranges from 0 to 14, with the value 7 representing a neutral solution. Values below 7 indicate greater acidity; those above 7, greater alkalinity.) As a result, many of their fish and plankton populations have been wiped out or severely reduced. Because bacteria are generally hampered by acid environments, the rate of organic decomposition has also slowed.

Ironically, the recent strategy of building taller smokestacks to alleviate local air pollution has worsened the acid rain problem—taller stacks disperse emissions over larger areas and allow more time for the oxides to convert to strong acids in the atmosphere before falling to earth. About 1 percent of the world's annual sulfur emissions originate from one copper and nickel smelter complex in Sudbury, Ontario, with a stack over 400 meters tall.

In the United States, the largest single source of sulfur dioxide emissions is public utilities. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. utility emissions will increase from 18.6 million metric tons in 1975 to 23.8 million in 1995. Although the EPA has ruled that from 70 to 90 percent of sulfur emissions must be eliminated from all new coal-fueled power plants, those plants already in operation are, the authors say, largely uncontrolled.

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

Saving Energy on the Stove

"Energy, Food, and the Consumer" by Mary Rawitscher and Jean Mayer, in *Technology Review* (Aug.-Sept. 1979), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

Three to 5 percent of total U.S. energy output (e.g., equivalent to the energy produced by the nation's hydroelectric plants) is consumed preparing food at home. Much of that energy could be saved if Americans changed their cooking and eating habits, write nutritionists Rawitscher and Mayer.

Certain culinary techniques waste more energy than others—an hour's baking time in a conventional oven, the authors say, uses eight times more energy than simmering for an hour on top of the stove. If every American reduced his use of electric ovens by one hour of baking at 350 degrees only once a month, the energy conserved would equal 7.6 million barrels of oil per year (current daily U.S. energy consumption equals about 36 million barrels of oil).

Consumers can also make energy-conscious decisions at the market. Not surprisingly, frozen foods, which must be stored in a freezer, waste electrical energy. Packaging, too, plays a role in the energy cost of food; the authors claim that if consumers used one less disposable aluminum tray (for TV dinners and frozen pies) each month, the nation would annually conserve the equivalent of 2.8 million barrels of oil.

One food that consumes little energy in packaging and refrigeration is fresh meat. But beef is one of the most energy-intensive foods, say the authors, due to the fuel and petroleum-based fertilizers needed to produce feed grains for cattle. Substituting a pound of fish once a month for a pound of beef would save 100 million barrels of oil annually. Consumers, the authors conclude, should replace red meat on their menus with vegetable protein or fish (unfrozen) to save energy; their health would benefit as well.

Growing Oil

"Petroleum Plantations for Fuel and Materials" by Melvin Calvin, in *BioScience* (Sept. 1979), 1401 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Va. 22209.

The United States can reduce its dependence on imported oil by cultivating plants that produce hydrocarbons, says Calvin, director of the Laboratory of Chemical Biodynamics at the University of California, Berkeley.

The genus *Euphorbia*, a relative of the *Hevea* rubber tree, grows wild in semi-arid regions throughout the world, including Africa, Japan, Israel, and the United States; it has been successfully cultivated in California, Texas, Arizona, and Florida. *Euphorbia* produces an oil that can be used to manufacture plastics and synthetic fibers. It can also be processed into fuel.

Experimental plantings of various species of *Euphorbia* have produced, on average, 10 barrels of oil a year per acre. (Genetic manipulation and selection of the most productive plants, Calvin predicts, could raise the annual per acre yield to as much as 50 barrels of oil.) The scheme demands "hundreds of millions of acres" to be effective, and, Calvin admits, cost is a problem. Oil flowing from a 1,000-barrels-a-day growing-and-processing facility would cost $60 per barrel. But if the processing plant's daily capacity were expanded to 100,000 barrels (the United States currently consumes about 19 million), and the trees' yield were boosted to even 20 to 30 barrels of oil per acre, the price of *Euphorbia* oil would drop to $15 per barrel, or about $10 below the average 1979 petroleum price on the world market.



The Euphorbia *tree contains an oil that can be processed into petrochemicals.*

Managing the Forests

"Implications of Economic Forest Management" by William F. Hyde, in *Policy Analysis* (Summer 1979), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Inefficient forest management has spurred government predictions of a "timber famine" by the year 2000 in the Pacific Northwest, source of one-fourth of the annual U.S. timber harvest.

No such famine need occur, argues Hyde, a research associate at Resources for the Future. Annual harvests in the Northwest range from 24 million to 26 million "cunits" (one cunit equals 100 cubic feet). According to Hyde, more sophisticated management would yield a potential harvest of 42 million cunits.

Efficient timber production depends on several variables, including the quality of soil, intensity of cultivation (e.g., using fertilizers and genetic breeding to boost tree growth), and access to the land (rough terrain and distance from the saw mill increase costs).

Current forest management techniques ignore such variables, says Hyde. Attuned to specific biological and geographical factors, he suggests, foresters could achieve a far larger yield from the most productive acreage. Marginal land now being used for timber could then be allotted to recreation, tripling wilderness and park areas. (Hyde esti-

RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT

mates that there are now 3.2 million acres of such marginal land in the Northwest.)

Conflicts between foresters and environmentalists are more apparent than real, contends Hyde. By and large, scenic vistas—rocky outcrops, steep slopes, alpine meadows—rarely include rich timber country. Moreover, soil erosion caused by tree-felling, hauling logs, and road-building is more likely in these areas; there is far less damage where the terrain is flatter—and lumbering is most profitable.

Hyde concedes that environmentalists object to some of the foresting methods he endorses—clearcutting (the most efficient form of tree-harvesting) and shorter intervals between harvests (30 to 50 years instead of as long as 120 years). And some logging communities in marginal territory might have to be relocated. But such costs, he argues, would be offset by higher timber yields and the increase in land devoted to recreational use.

ARTS & LETTERS

Abolitionist Fiction

"Far From 'Gambia's Golden Shore': The Black in Late Eighteenth Century American Imaginative Literature" by Mukhtar Ali Isani, in *William and Mary Quarterly* (July 1979), Box 220, Williamsburg, Va. 23185.

Antislavery fiction and poetry first appeared in American magazines during the late 1770s. Much of it was composed by "now forgotten authors . . . who hid their identity behind initials and pseudonyms." Their prose reflected the maudlin tones of the Age of Sentiment—and influenced later abolitionists such as Harriet Beecher Stowe.

Phillis Wheatley, the ex-slave whose verse gained public acclaim in late 18th-century Boston.

From Letters and Poems of Phillis Wheatley. *Printed in 1915.*

The focus was on the physical abuse and emotional suffering of slaves, writes Isani, an English professor at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The reader was seldom made witness to the harsh details of whippings and killings but was asked "in a vein of quiet melancholy" to dwell on the aftereffects—"the weeping child, the broken man, and the dead body of the suicide."

Epistolary fiction was the vogue. Often the abolitionist author invented a slave character—Corymbo, for instance, in "The African's Complaint" (1797)—to recount his tale of woe. These fictional narrators (frequently of "royal descent") wove scenes of New World misery and hardship with reminiscences of an "idyllic and pastoral" life in Africa. "My labors then were sweet," moaned one. "Strong and cheerful, I hailed the breeze of the morning." But writers made little effort to describe the African environment, mainly, Isani suggests, because few knew much about it. Instead, they gave unusual names to their characters and made passing reference to distant places (notably the Gold Coast) to provide an air of authenticity.

Several authors of early abolitionist fiction remain famous today for other accomplishments. Timothy Dwight, eighth president of Yale, tried his hand at antislavery verse; Benjamin Franklin created a fictional African, Sidi Mehemet Ibrahim. Yet "the voice of the black [was] seldom heard directly," notes Isani. One remarkable exception: ex-slave Phillis Wheatley, whose lyric verse was published in Boston magazines in the 1770s.

Fast Fadeout

"The Color Film Crisis" by Paul C. Spehr, in *American Film* (Nov. 1979), Subscription Service, P.O. Box 966, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

During the 1950s, Hollywood switched from Technicolor to Eastman Color (still in use today). The result has been new films that fade within a few years to an ugly purple and negatives that will be worthless within a lifetime.

Many of the films—e.g., *The Wizard of Oz* (1939), *An American in Paris* (1951)—printed by the old Technicolor method retain their bright colors, notes Spehr, assistant chief of the motion picture division of the Library of Congress. But shooting in Technicolor, which records each of three primary colors—cyan, yellow, and magenta—on a separate roll of film, was time consuming. It required a bulky camera and special lighting, costumes, and sets. Moreover, the Technicolor Company kept details of the process secret; it wielded unwelcome power over the studios, sometimes demanding control of movie negatives. Eastman Color, on the other hand, records all colors on a single film roll, is less expensive, and is franchised by Kodak to the major studios. Its dyes, however, are less stable.

Film archivists currently depend on two methods to preserve a gen-

eration of Eastman Color films. In one process, the primary colors are recorded on three separate rolls of color-keyed black-and-white film (which does not fade), an expensive undertaking—$30,000 a movie—akin to original Technicolor. At least three Hollywood companies now routinely make such black-and-white separations, although putting the three rolls back in sync for showing remains, to some extent, a matter of hit-or-miss.

Cold storage is also being tried, but, says Spehr, repeated thawing and refreezing may damage films; videodiscs, by contrast, are durable but as yet can only be shown on television screens. One preservation technique under study involves the use of laser-beam holograms (recordings of the patterns of light waves).

Many great films of the last 25 years will likely fade into oblivion before the means to save them are perfected, Spehr concludes—all because movie makers failed to reckon on the future profits to be made from the public's abiding interest in their creations.

Monet's Spontaneity

"Method and Meaning in Monet" by Robert Herbert, in *Art in America* (Sept. 1979), 542 Pacific Ave., Marion, Ohio 43302.

Conservative art historians dismiss the vibrant, multicolored landscapes and cathedral paintings of French Impressionist Claude Monet (1840–1926) as "hasty fantasy" or "melting ice-creams." Yet an analysis of the artist's brushwork by Herbert, a Yale art historian, reveals the painstaking methods Monet developed to create the illusion of spontaneity.

Monet rejected the traditional chiaroscuro approach of Delacroix and other pre-Impressionists—the formal arranging of light and dark elements in a careful synthesis of subject matter and imagination. He pursued instead a new method using pure color. So intent was he on achieving an instinctive response to a moment of "color-light" on a bridge or landscape, legend has it, that he entrusted nothing to memory; he abandoned a painting when the weather or the sun's angle changed, returning to it only under identical conditions. But this portrait of the artist is only half the truth, argues Herbert. Monet's repeated visits to his subjects were regulated by the drying times between applications of several layers of paint.

Beneath the play of surface colors in Monet's paintings lie layers of light-hued texture strokes. These vary in length, thickness, and direction. In *Stone Pine at Antibes* (1888), for instance, the artist laid down lateral strokes in areas of water and "diagonal, blossom-shaped" strokes to represent foliage. The foreground has "smaller twisting strokes—made by short, rotating stabs of the brush"; broader strokes underlie mountain and sky. Not only did Monet establish a "sense of near and far in the very texture," Herbert remarks, he also recreated different "real" substances. Atop this texture, Monet performed his ex-

periments with color, sometimes applying as many as five different hues to a single dried stroke.

Monet spent long sessions in his studio, away from his scenes; he returned to a single painting as often as 60 times. "The further I go," wrote the artist in 1890, "the more I see that it takes a lot of work to succeed in rendering what I am looking for: 'instantaneity.' "

OTHER NATIONS

Separatism and Economics

"The Re-emergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth" by Peter Alexis Gourevitch, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (July 1979), Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Ethnic consciousness has been on the rise in the West—for example, among France's Bretons and Canada's Quebeqois. But separatist movements have not always cropped up as a result. Gourevitch, a McGill University political scientist, surveyed eight countries to find out why.

When both political leadership and key industries are centralized in the same region of the country—as in Italy's northern Piedmont and, to a lesser degree, in France's central Ile de France (which includes Paris)—nationalist movements in other regions tend to be weak, says Gourevitch. Only when power and wealth are fixed in separate ethnic regions—as in Spain and Yugoslavia—is unity likely to be threatened.

Ever since the marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella in 1469, the bureaucratic center of Spain has been in the agricultural, land-locked region of Castille. Yet Spain's coal, iron ore, water power, and transportation links to the rest of the world lie in the east and the north. Catalans and Basques, who have long paid taxes to Madrid, question "the advantages of membership in the whole."

In Britain, new separatist movements have developed during the last 20 years. Welsh miners and Scottish shipbuilders prospered from the industrialization of the United Kingdom until the 20th century. Then, as England's economy slowed, they were hit particularly hard by unemployment. When Britain's Labour Party, which they supported in 1964, proved unable to stop the steady economic deterioration, it seemed clear to many that "the union . . . was no longer a good bargain." North Sea oil, adds Gourevitch, "makes this argument especially pungent in Scotland." Ireland is another story. There, nationalism rose much earlier, in part because an agricultural economy freed the Irish from heavy dependence on England's industrial well-being.

OTHER NATIONS

Where Were The Russians?

"Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union" by Joseph L. Nogee and John W. Sloan, in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Aug. 1979), Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

Seeing the Soviet Union's massive economic support for Castro's Cuba, Salvador Allende, head of Chile's short-lived Marxist government, expected Moscow to underwrite *his* socialist program. He was disappointed; the Russians did not provide the needed cash. The Kremlin's desire to preserve détente with the United States was only one of the reasons why.

Elected President in 1970, Allende formulated two broad goals for his administration: redistribution of wealth without alienating the middle class (one-third of Chile's 9 million people), and reduction of Chile's economic dependence on the United States. He launched government programs to nationalize the copper industry, to raise wages and increase employment, and to buy controlling interests in the nation's banks. Soon Allende had depleted Chile's foreign exchange reserves. Allende needed "massive amounts" of foreign aid, say Nogee and Sloan, political scientists at the University of Houston, to bankroll production



By David Levine. Reprinted by permission of the New York Review of Books. © 1971 NYREV, Inc.

Salvador Allende cut back Chile's economic dependence on the United States in 1970. But the move left his Marxist regime stranded without a net. He was overthrown in 1973, in part because he could not convince the Soviets to provide massive financial assistance.

and buy spare parts for industrial equipment manufactured in the United States. (By 1972, for example, 33 percent of all state-owned buses were out of service due to parts shortages.) Anticipated revenue from the nationalized copper industry was down $500 million in 1971–72 because the worldwide price of copper dropped from 64¢ a pound in 1970 to 48¢ a pound in 1972. Yet assistance from the presumably sympathetic Soviets amounted to no more than $340 million from 1971 to 1973.

Why did Moscow fail to bail out Allende? The Soviets do not have unlimited means, say the authors; they tend to make "mutually beneficial" economic arrangements. The Kremlin is happy to extend credit, provided it is repaid by exports to the USSR or used to buy Soviet goods (which Chile did not need). Moreover, Latin America (aside from strategically located Cuba) has never been a critical region for Moscow—from 1954 to 1975, 80 percent of Soviet aid went to "a narrow band of nations extending from the Mediterranean to China's southwestern border."

And Kremlin leaders realized that Chile, with its history of orderly "bourgeois democratic politics," its anti-Marxist military, its healthy middle class, was not ready for a full-scale "socialist revolution." Almost inevitably, Allende was ousted by the Army in 1973.

Voting in Japan

"Social Participation and Voting Turnout: The Case of Japan" by Anson D. Shupe, in *Comparative Political Studies* (July 1979), Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

In the United States and other Western democracies, citizens who belong to voluntary nonpolitical organizations such as men's and women's clubs are more apt to vote in elections than those who do not. This is not true in parts of Japan, finds Shupe, a University of Texas sociologist. There, native nondemocratic traditions continue to exert an influence.

In a survey of rural Japanese townspeople (one-fourth of Japan's population lives in rural areas), Shupe discovered that members of agricultural cooperatives, hobby clubs, and women's associations were more likely than nonmembers to engage in political discussions, serve on public committees, and have contact with public officials. But they were not more likely to vote.

By contrast, those Japanese who frequently attended seasonal and shrine festivals—without formal organizational ties—were clearly regular voters. Shupe theorizes that, in the eyes of some Japanese, voting fulfills an "apolitical obligation" to the community. Ballots are cast in the belief that "communities that cannot turn out high voting rates lose prestige or 'face.' "

At the same time, Japanese who voted, Shupe learned, were more likely to view politicians with skepticism than those who did not—just

OTHER NATIONS

the opposite reaction of U.S. voters. The reason: Many select their candidates out of old-style allegiances to "relationships grounded in kinship or geographic proximity," rather than on the basis of political stands. Their cynical evaluations, Shupe concludes, derive from "having two competing culturally distinct sets of expectations": one being Western and individualistic, the other descended from the "cultural politics" of prewar Japanese society.

Turkey's Troubles

"Turkey's Travails" by Dankwart A. Rustow, in *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1979), P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, Colo. 80322.

Since becoming a parliamentary democracy in 1945, Turkey has suffered from frequent political deadlocks, military coups, and a severe economic decline. Yet there is very little chance of this Muslim country becoming "another Iran," says Rustow, a political scientist at the City University of New York.

A large foreign debt is Turkey's most pressing problem. Aided by U.S. technology, the country's agricultural exports boomed during the 1950s. By the mid-1960s, Turkish migrant workers were taking over low-skilled jobs in Western Europe. In 1974, there were 800,000 of these "guest workers" abroad. They sent home $1.5 billion in earnings—bringing in, notes Rustow, "as much foreign exchange as did all of Turkey's merchandise exports." Then came the 1973–74 oil crisis and worldwide recession. Demand dropped for Turkey's exports, there were fewer jobs in Europe—yet the level of consumption at home remained high. By 1979, Turkey's severe balance-of-payments crisis spurred the Paris-based Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation to pledge nearly $2 billion in emergency aid.

As for Turkey's political ills, they arise from an "excess of expression," not from repression. Of the eight governments in power in Ankara since 1973, so far only four have held a majority in the National Assembly (the current government, voted in last October, is attempting to form a coalition with rival political factions). Proportional representation of each of the four major parties according to its share of votes ties up government response to economic problems. The military sits poised to intervene, as it did in 1971 when the Cabinet seemed unable to contain a wave of urban terrorism, but it remains committed to democracy.

Muslim Turkey's strongest links have long been with Europe rather than with the Middle East, Rustow observes. And the "dormant [but] not diminished" Russian threat to the north reinforces the country's 28-year commitment to NATO. The prospect of full Turkish membership in the Common Market, though distant, "provides a further guarantee against authoritarian upheavals—for the [European] Community in its dealings with Spain, Portugal, and Greece has left no doubt that none but democracies need apply."

Balancing Act in Indonesia

"Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia" by Howard Crouch, in *World Politics* (July 1979), Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

In precolonial Java (now Indonesia), sultans protected their rule by parceling out favors among competing factions. Since 1959, Indonesia's Presidents have tried the same "patrimonial" tactic, without the sultans' success.

President Sukarno, whose "Guided Democracy" replaced Indonesia's fledgling parliamentary system in 1959, maintained control by balancing off the armed forces and the well-organized Communist Party (PKI). He neglected needed economic development, suggests Crouch, a political scientist at the National University of Malaysia, in favor of "prestige projects"—e.g., costly military harassment of the Dutch in West Irian and expropriation of foreign enterprises. He awarded jurisdiction over nationalized businesses to military and civilian leaders, who managed them as personal fiefdoms. As a result, inflation rose rapidly; foreign and domestic investment dried up. An attempted PKI coup in 1965 gave Indonesia's restive generals an excuse to take over.

Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" lasted from 1959 to 1967.

Sukarno's strategy failed, says Crouch, on two counts: It offered only financial gain to ideologically opposed groups, and it was designed to win political points throughout the country by lining the pockets of the elite in Jakarta.

Sukarno's successor, General Suharto, solved the problem of competing ideologies by killing off 500,000 PKI supporters and by placing friends at the head of Indonesia's remaining political parties. He dispensed favors to military leaders and, to ensure domestic peace, committed the country to quick economic growth.

Now, the Suharto regime faces a split within its own ranks. A new generation of Western-educated officers and "technocrats" is pressing for a regulated, professional bureaucracy to aid modernization and deter growing social unrest (antigovernment rioting broke out in Bandung in 1973 and Jakarta in 1974). Older officers, however, are thus far reluctant to surrender the perquisites of their government jobs. Crouch's prediction: Suharto's regime "will turn more to direct repression—not only to deal with mass discontent, but also in response to increasing conflict within the elite."

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76."

United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 66027. 58 pp. $1.00
Author: Major Robert A. Doughty, U.S. Army

The tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army changed several times during the period 1946–76 in response to various developments—improved conventional weapons, nuclear "hardware," guerrilla wars—but Army leaders and Pentagon policymakers consistently returned to a central theme: the defense of Western Europe.

After World War II, Army doctrine emphasized tactics based on recent battlefield experience, including the use of armor teamed with infantry and offensive campaigns to break the enemy's will to fight. This approach was augmented by attempts to improve coordination between ground troops and fighter-bombers ("air support") and to increase the number and firepower of tanks. The postwar threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe kept the Pentagon concerned with that continent.

Such doctrine did not help ill-equipped U.S. troops sent to fight in Korea in 1950. North Korean and Chinese infiltration tactics, the rugged terrain, and subzero weather hampered troops trained to fight on the plains of Western Europe. The Army soon responded with a mobile defense (quickly moving back to new positions when the Chinese sent waves of attackers against U.S. forces), effectively buttressed by massed artillery fire.

Although the artillery barrages depleted ammunition supplies, General Matthew B. Ridgeway asserted that "steel is cheaper than lives and much easier to obtain."

U.S. development of nuclear battlefield weapons—the first was an "atomic howitzer" unveiled in 1953—forced the Army to rethink its role. Although most military men thought an atomic war was unlikely, the Army in 1956 reorganized its combat units into "pentomic" divisions consisting of five semi-autonomous battle groups that could operate in "checkerboard" fashion on an atomic battlefield. Being able to concentrate or disperse quickly was seen as the key to success and survival.

The pentomic concept was dropped in the early 1960s, when the Army and the Kennedy administration agreed that the problem of nuclear conflict was separate from all other types of war. Another reorganization ensued. Each 15,000-man division had a "common division base to which a varying number of basic [900-man] combat maneuver battalions could be attached." The new divisions were expected to be capable of fighting a nuclear war, but the emphasis was on conventional battle.

Again, troops were trained to take the offensive (as in World War II), backed up now by new technology—e.g., mobile personnel carriers, helicopters, fighter-bombers, improved communications. But the offense, says Doughty, "was no longer considered the primary means of destroying the effectiveness of the enemy forces"; field manuals stressed that defensive actions could also effectively destroy the enemy.

The movement of the 1950s toward "dispersion" proved beneficial during the semiconventional Vietnam War.

So did the helicopter. Small U.S. units, deployed rapidly aboard "choppers," could "fix" the enemy—when he could be found. The final destruction of dug-in enemy forces was generally accomplished not by infantry assault but by lavish airstrikes and artillery fire. As in Korea, the Army's maxim in Vietnam was "Save lives, not ammunition."

Since 1972, the Army has again emphasized conventional combat against the Soviets in Western Europe. However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War made it clear that modern weaponry—in this case, notably antitank rockets, antiaircraft missiles—can quickly inflict extremely high losses in materiel and men.

More than ever before, the Army has rejected the notion of a "ceaseless offensive spirit, untrammeled and unaffected by the realities of the new lethal weaponry." The 1976 Army manual pointed out that the attacker now needed a "combat power" ratio of 6 to 1 to defeat enemy defenders. The manual revived the idea of a Korea-style "active defense" with U.S. maneuvers to force a numerically superior foe (the Soviets) to mass his tanks and troops, making them vulnerable to counterattack, air strikes, and artillery bombardment.

However, Doughty warns as he concludes his survey, even the most sophisticated new doctrine cannot substitute for the "imagination, the inventive genius, and the will to fight of the American soldier."

"Stratospheric Ozone Depletion by Halocarbons: Chemistry and Transport."

National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418. 27 pp.

Scientists learned a decade ago that "trace amounts" of certain widely used industrial chemicals were depleting the earth's ozone screen, a gaseous shield against the sun's biologically harmful ultraviolet rays.

It now appears that this enveloping ozone blanket is being destroyed twice as fast as previously thought. That is the conclusion of a highly technical computer analysis conducted by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences.

Ozone is depleted by high-flying aircraft, nuclear weapons testing, nitrogen fertilizers, and the release of chemicals known as halocarbons into the atmosphere. The latter pose "the greatest and most immediate threat," the Council believes. Halocarbons are commonly employed as a coolant in household refrigerators and a propellant in aerosol sprays. They are a key ingredient in industrial solvents.

As these chemicals accumulate in the stratosphere, 6 to 30 miles above the earth, they react with sunlight and release chlorine compounds that break down ozone. Reduced ozone in turn means more ultraviolet rays striking the planet's surface. Scientists fear this could spur a sharp rise in the incidence of skin cancer. Climatic patterns might be fundamentally altered.

In its first report four years ago, the NRC predicted that, at 1973 production rates, halocarbons would cut existing ozone levels by as much as 7.5

percent before the atmosphere reached "steady-state." Half of this eventual decrease would occur within 50 years.

Now, using more sensitive instruments and improved mathematical models, the Council has revised the figure upward—to 16.5 percent. The ozone loss will amount to 8 percent within 30 years.

That assumes 1977 "release rates." But the use of halocarbons is growing. Though banned from aerosols in the United States in 1979, they are still a mainstay of foreign manufacturers. Moreover, the Council warns, the use of halocarbon F-22 in refrigeration has increased 25 percent worldwide in the past two years. Production of the solvent methyl chloroform is doubling every five years.

The NRC recommends development of an "early warning system" to monitor changes in the ozone layer. Satellites could be parked in the stratosphere to detect minute fluctuations in chemical concentrations—something ground stations now in use cannot do.

And the sooner the better. There is a time lag, the Council points out, between halocarbon release and ozone destruction. Even if halocarbon production stopped tomorrow, it would still be 15 years before the ozone shield began to recover.

"Key Crude Oil and Products Pipelines Are Vulnerable to Disruptions."

Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. 20548. 79 pp.

The 230,000-mile U.S. oil pipeline network pumps 7 billion barrels of gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, and kerosene throughout the country each year. Most of these pipes could probably withstand a moderate earthquake. But investigators for the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) charge that "no similar attention has been given to protecting pipelines from sabotage."

Pipelines carry 75 percent of all crude oil to domestic refineries and about one-third of the refined products to local communities. Damage to a small spur line can quickly be repaired or its contents rerouted. But disruption of one of three major arteries—the Colonial (linking Texas and New Jersey), the Capline (between Louisiana and Illinois), and the Trans-Alaska (Prudhoe Bay to Port Valdez)—could bring on an energy shortage "exceeding the 1973 Arab oil embargo."

These arteries move 4.5 million barrels of oil per day, eight times the volume the United States used to import from Iran. The Colonial alone provides 50 percent or more of the refined petroleum used in Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

Mainline systems like Colonial or Capline, the GAO contends, are "attractive targets" to saboteurs. Extensive damage—to pump houses, key intersections, river crossings, or the sophisticated computers controlling the oil flow—could take at least six months to repair. And in the meantime, there would be "no adequate al-

ternatives" for moving the oil around. Barges, trucks, tankers, and railroads could not fill the gap.

Yet pipeline security is almost nonexistent. Gates are left unlocked, visitors' identification goes unchecked. Many installations are left unguarded for much of the day. Inexplicably, some standby equipment has been installed side-by-side with the machinery it would have to replace.

Why the lack of interest? One reason, the GAO suggests, is that pipelines are owned jointly by as many as 10 oil companies; the owner who tends to lose the most "usually determines the level of security." The fledgling Department of Energy, unsure of its responsibilities, has stayed away from the problem.

Historically, pipeline sabotage has been infrequent. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline is something of an exception. To curb "malevolent damage," its operator, the Alyeska Pipeline Co., spent $8 million on security measures in 1979, including armed guards, daily aerial surveillance, and closed-circuit TV.

The pipeline has been bombed twice in the last two years.

"Social Security Revisited."

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 17th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 37 pp. $2.75
Author: J. W. Van Gorkom

The Social Security system, begun in 1935, was designed to provide a minimum income for those no longer able to work, paid for by mandatory contributions from employers and employees. Over the years, writes Van Gorkom, chairman of the board of Trans Union Corporation, it has become a kind of welfare program with several inequities. It should revert to its former role.

The present system covering 110 million workers (90 percent of the labor force) favors low-income earners. It enables them to receive higher retirement benefits in proportion to their wages (and thus the amounts they paid into the system) than those who earn considerably higher salaries.

The result: Benefits received by low-paid workers "can no longer be viewed as earned and consequently received as a matter of right." And workers not covered by Social Security (e.g., federal employees) can qualify for the minimum benefit—$122 per month—by working at a second job as little as one day a month for seven years.

The present system also discriminates against working spouses; a nonworking wife, for example, receives 50 percent of her husband's benefits after his retirement, 100 percent after his death. A working wife receives an equal share of her husband's benefits but nothing of the payroll taxes she paid during her employment. Social Security benefits are augmented today by private pension plans (about 45 percent of all workers are covered), and government programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for those over 65 and the blind or disabled, food stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

Another problem with the present system is its effect on capital formation. If there were no Social Security

taxes, Van Gorkom says, the $45 billion collected from workers each year could be saved or invested in stocks, bonds, and insurance.

The Social Security system should be scaled down and incorporated into a three-part "overall income replacement system."

The first component would be voluntary savings, including private pension plans, to encourage capital formation.

The second would be Social Security, reduced in scope to provide a minimum income to retirees who have worked and paid Social Security taxes full-time for a substantial period. (Van Gorkom suggests 35 years.)

For those who earn too little to put aside some savings or who are not covered by private pension plans, supplemental benefits are available through SSI, AFDC, and food stamps.

Specifically, he suggests that the $122 monthly minimum benefit be discarded because other federal programs already provide minimum incomes for those ineligible for Social Security. Elimination of the spouses' benefits and consideration of married couples as a single unit whose earned benefits are split 50-50 would remove the bias against working wives.

And the system should pay retirees only a basic minimum income; in this way, low-paid workers would bear a fairer share of the cost (but still make out somewhat better than highly paid workers) and pay lower Social Security taxes, thus strengthening "the concept that benefits . . . are received as a matter of right."

"Soviet Economy in a Time of Change. A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States."

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 1,532 pp. $7.50

The Soviet Union's "guns, butter, and growth" economic strategy is in deep trouble. Productivity is low, labor scarce, and inflation high. Military spending (a whopping 11 to 13 percent of GNP) combined with heavy investment in the lackluster agricultural sector precludes much variety in consumer goods. Shortfalls are the rule in the USSR's centrally planned economy. An economic crisis by the mid-1980s may be the only target date the Soviet Union meets on schedule.

That is the conclusion of a massive, two-volume report to the congressional Joint Economic Committee compiled by 79 scholars from the United States, Britain, Canada, Israel, and Austria. Their findings are detailed in 58 densely documented chapters dealing with everything from raw materials and computers to livestock feed, machine tools, and the merchant fleet.

Soviet planners face a painful choice, the authors believe: maintain the status quo and invite disaster; or begin changing the way the country does its business—with no guarantee of success.

Whatever the decision, the authors say, the lot of the average Russian will change little during the 1980s. Despite the "rhetoric laced with promises" of the Brezhnev regime, the average citizen's standard of living—diet, income, clothing, appliances, housing—will improve at a slower pace than it did

even during the sluggish 1970s.

Soviet citizens currently suffer from the poorest housing accommodations of any industrialized nation. Average per capita floor space today is only about 6′ by 12′ (versus 30′ by 40′ in the United States).

Rapid urbanization is one culprit. In 1926, only 19 percent of the Soviet population lived in cities or towns; the figure today is 62 percent, as millions of rural Russians have flocked to urban factories.

Factories are going up faster than public housing. Since 1964, private home construction has been illegal in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. The waiting period for a new apartment may be 10 years.

As a result, 30 percent of all urban Soviets live communally (in groups of singles; with unrelated families) or in crowded factory dormitories. Most newlyweds live with their parents. Although the divorce rate in the USSR has tripled over the past 20 years, many divorced couples must continue living together for sheer lack of alternatives. According to the report's estimate, 123 households compete for every 100 "housing units."

Soviet automakers cannot cope with rising demand either, despite completion in 1970 of the vast, Fiat-designed Volga Motor Vehicle Plant. Only one Russian in 46 owns a car, compared to one out of two Americans (yet, inexplicably, the annual number of highway fatalities—45,000—exceeds the U.S. death toll). The "official" waiting period for delivery is 18 to 24 months, which actually means 5 to 7 years.

And prices are high. In 1977, the cost of a Moskvich (roughly $8,600) was equivalent to 20 months' earnings for an average family with *two* income earners.

Private drivers are limited to 5.5 gallons of gasoline per week, an inconvenience mitigated by a lack of paved highways. The USSR, with a land area more than double that of the United States, has only 7 percent as many roads surfaced with cement or asphalt.

Ordinary citizens are extraordinarily adept at cutting red tape and circumventing delays and shortages. The report offers new insights into the USSR's burgeoning "illegal economy." In Moscow in 1971, for example, one out of every five gas-station attendants was arrested for black-market dealings. About one out of three private motorists drove, in part, with state-owned gasoline in his tank.

Theft of "socialist property"—from factories, clubs, farms, offices—is rife; most of the culprits go uncaught. Pilfered goods are a mainstay of outdoor flea markets.

Among the most sought-after commodities: information. One Muscovite, the congressional study reports, visited the Odessa fair and found a man offering to sell "one sentence for a ruble." When the hawker had been paid, he whispered: "Imported pantyhose will be sold at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow on the second floor of the Central Department Store."



Reproduced by Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum.

Ivory mask (16th century), Kingdom of Benin, Nigeria

Nigeria

Nigeria is black Africa's richest nation, the United States' second largest foreign oil supplier, and, currently, the world's fourth largest democracy. Last October, an elected civilian government took office after 13 years of topsy-turvy military rule. The new regime's prospects are uncertain. A decade after the cruel Biafran war, strong tribal differences persist. As in Iran and Mexico, petrodollars have created as many social problems as they have solved. But oil has brought Nigeria's views of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Angola increased attention in London and Washington. As the nation's new President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, observes, "Nigeria's interest does not stop at our borders." Here, economist Sayre Schatz surveys the current scene; Africanist Pauline Baker traces the country's troubled history from colonial days; and novelist Charles Larson provides a sampling of Nigeria's world-class literature.

MOVING UP

by Sayre P. Schatz

Few visitors to the seaside city of Lagos ever forget it.

With boundless vitality, it has grown since 1965 from a city of 300,000 souls to a sprawling metropolis of 3.5 million. Already the city has spilled over from its original islet, one-tenth the size of Manhattan, to the adjacent islands and the mainland. New communities take root at the fringes every year. In all of "greater Lagos," there are perhaps 10 million people.

The city boasts a modern university, a sports arena, a theater complex, a national museum. Downtown, rising from the bustling marketplaces, pastel-tinted skyscrapers with surfaces of glass hold up a mirror to the great natural harbor dotted with

freighters, low in the water, waiting for a berth. Lagos is a port, a commercial hub, a rail center, a national capital.

It is also choked with automobiles. The new "ring roads" and superhighways, coupled with on-the-spot police whippings of traffic offenders ("Operation Ease-the-Traffic") have neither appreciably eased the congestion nor shortened the casualty lists. (The monthly news magazine *Africa* has estimated that 300 people are killed in Lagos in auto-related accidents every month.) Undeterred, passengers squeeze into exhaust-belching, rickety old buses; others jauntily finesse the notorious "go-slows" and "hold-ups" by riding bicycles.

Dazzling Prospects

All about, people flow among stalled cars like a torrent around boulders: tailors carrying sewing machines; clothing merchants with their entire inventory on a pole; street hawkers selling fried *akara,* paper twists of peanuts, copies of the new 104-page constitution. Outside the air-conditioned department stores, lepers and beggars keep vigil, expectantly.

Lagos is, in short, a place to make a fast buck—to turn a *naira* (1 ₦ = $1.75). Today, the country's oil-powered economic boom beckons unending streams of Nigerian villagers to the city's squalid alleyways and satellite shantytowns. "For the next five years," one Nigerian intellectual commented recently in the *New York Times,* "even the most exploited wretch can still con himself into thinking he can make a million."

Foreigners are not far behind. The clipped lawns at the Ikoyi Club and the Lagos Yacht Club (whose membership criteria were suitably amended in the 1950s to embrace the black elite) are speckled with gin-sipping "expatriates" of every stripe: American salesmen, German builders, Indian demographers, British bankers. Unlike Algeria or South Africa, Nigeria has never had a large, resident European minority controlling the details of its internal affairs. Now there are strangers aplenty.

Lagos is unlike the rest of the country but somehow

Sayre P. Schatz, 57, is professor of economics at Temple University. Born in Philadelphia, he received a B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania (1946) and a Ph.D. in economics from the New School for Social Research (1955). He has lived and worked in Nigeria as a Ford Foundation Fellow (1959–60, 1961–62), as Senior Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (1962–65), and as an adviser to the Nigerian government on the Third National Development Plan (1974–75). His books include Nigerian Capitalism *(1977), and he is the editor of* South of the Sahara *(1973).*

Reprinted by permission of Alan Hutchinson.

Downtown Lagos

epitomizes it. It is the focal point of the nation's development, a microcosm of its failures. The decisions made here will determine the future of Nigeria in two key respects: whether it can forestall another military coup, and whether its enormous economic potential can be put to good use.

Nigeria's big money is oil money—very new money—and in six short years it has opened up dazzling new prospects for this country of some 90 million, the most populous nation in Africa.* With net government petroleum revenues topping $16 billion in 1979, and climbing, Nigeria's federal government is bankrolling an ambitious development effort aimed at providing more infrastructure, more schools, more industry, more exports—and more participation by Nigerians in the economy. Nigeria has also begun work on a spanking new capital city, "Abuja," in the country's geographic center, a kind of West African Brasilia. When the basic outline of the new city was worked out in 1977, unpublished official estimates put the cost at $30 billion, then twice the size of the nation's entire Gross Domestic Product.

As the world's sixth largest petroleum exporter, Nigeria has also become, almost *ex officio,* a key actor in world affairs, thereby putting some substance into its leaders' old avowal that

*No one knows exactly how many people live in Nigeria. Census-taking is a divisive political issue, because census results determine political apportionment and, more important, allocation of state oil revenues. A completed 1973 census was scrapped after charges of under- and over-counting eroded its credibility.

"Africa is Nigeria's natural sphere of influence." At home, a new civilian government peaceably assumed power last October after 13 years of relatively benign military rule.

More than 30 daily and weekly newspapers keep the country informed; they range from tribal-oriented papers like *The Sketch* to the national (state-owned) *Daily Times*. Political debate is lively and largely unfettered, though newspapers are required to support the new constitution. Each of Nigeria's 19 states now has a state-run radio station; most have a TV station as well. Television offerings include the usual U.S. imports (children's cartoons, "Mission: Impossible"), as well as some unremarkable domestic programming.

A Slow Start

Nigerians are proud of their recent accomplishments at home; proud, too, of their new prominence in the world scene. But the pervasive problems of underdevelopment cannot easily be swept away. And so far, Nigeria's leaders have shown neither the wisdom nor the will to spend the oil billions effectively.

Nigeria was not prepared for affluence. Before the 1967–70 Biafran civil war, agriculture was the backbone of Nigeria's economy. Farmers made up about 80 percent of the labor force; without mechanical aid or even, in most cases, animal power, they worked their land with short-handled hoes or "matchets."

But Nigeria was able to grow 95 percent of its own food. Cocoa, palm products, cotton, peanuts, and rubber accounted for 75 percent of all export earnings, and for a comparable share of the scant attention the outside world paid to Nigeria.

Native businessmen, meanwhile, sought a niche in the economy. Nigeria's basic economic goals—initially formulated by the British colonial government in 1949 in response to nationalist pressures—have been twofold: "develop" the country, and increase the degree of Nigerian management and ownership in the largely foreign-dominated "modern" sector. Nigeria's economy is unabashedly capitalist, but the government's role is significant. It nurtures private enterprise with a variety of incentives, as well as through careful attention to roads, communications, and so on. It is also the country's biggest employer and spender.

Progress was slow in the pre–civil war years; the new native enterprises rudimentary. A shoe "factory," for example, might have consisted of eight employees, four of them unpaid apprentices, working in a poorly lit hovel. Even the largest Nigerian-owned companies—textile mills, tire-retreading

plants, construction companies—were relatively small, costly to run, and often of necessity protected by a high tariff wall. Large foreign firms such as the United Africa Company and Michelin continued to dominate the upper reaches of the economy. The most profitable smaller enterprises tended to be run by Lebanese, Greeks, Indians, and other foreigners—a situation found in many Third World countries.

During these years, as many as half of all Nigeria's children died before the age of five. Most of the population was illiterate, and schooling was so scarce that parents in Lagos lined up overnight to enroll their children in what amounted to a first-come first-served school system. Annual growth in Nigeria's real per capita income—$83 in 1963—lagged behind that of the Third World as a whole.*

After exploration began in 1937, however, British geologists reckoned that there was oil somewhere in Nigeria. They finally found it in the mid-1950s beneath the steamy Niger delta. (By Saudi Arabian standards, Nigeria's proven reserves—about 20 billion barrels—are small, but the oil is of choice quality, and tankers can almost pull right up to the wells.) The first Nigerian crude shipment embarked for Rotterdam refineries in 1958.

Nigeria First

But oil hardly dominated the economy; the industry was a lucrative enclave that depended on foreign capital, foreign know-how, and foreign technicians. In 1964, Shell/BP (the only producer at the time) had only 2,800 employees in Nigeria and exported some $90 million worth of petroleum. In contrast, peanut production brought in about the same amount in export receipts and gave work to millions of Nigerians. When the Biafra secession grew into civil war in 1967, the federal government in Lagos relied more on the cocoa bean and peanut than it did on the contested oil fields to pay its bills.

Nigeria emerged from civil war in 1970 with an economy in surprisingly good condition. There was also a new self-confidence, an urge to get back to business. In keeping with the established policy of bringing more Nigerians into the modern sector, the military government in 1972 issued its famous "indigenization decree," which, with subsequent extensions, reserved certain commercial activities to Nigerians and otherwise re-

*Of course, comparisons of real income figures for developed and underdeveloped countries generally exaggerate the difference; they should be viewed skeptically and treated gingerly. This is particularly so in the case of Nigeria, where neither the GDP nor the population statistics are reliable.



Nigeria's 356,000-square-mile territory is more than twice the size of California. About half the country's arable land is under cultivation, and most of its people are farmers who work scattered plots averaging three acres.

quired foreign firms to sell off sometimes 40, sometimes 60 percent of their equity to local citizens. (Today, 60 to 80 percent of the equity of foreign oil companies' local operations is Nigerian-owned.) IBM and Citibank fled the country, but most firms gradually complied, in the process creating a class of affluent Nigerians known as the "Mr. Forty-Percenters." For most people, however, life changed little.

The 1973 OPEC price hikes transformed Nigeria. As the price per barrel rose from $3.01 to $11.20 between October 1973 and April 1974, oil's share of Nigeria's export earnings soared to over 90 percent. Combined with a boost in production, petroleum receipts quintupled. The military government launched a raft of new development projects.

Like Saudi Arabia and Mexico, Nigeria has been spending most of its new oil wealth on "infrastructure"—hospitals, schools, railroads, waterworks, harbors, pipelines, the foundations on which private enterprise is supposed to build. Six regional airports are being upgraded to international standards. Under 207 separate contracts totaling $6 billion, European, American, and Nigerian engineering companies are building 9,000 miles of new highway.

Corn Flakes and Caviar

Some striking industrial projects are also underway: steel mills, oil refineries, a petrochemical complex, a liquefied natural gas plant. Volkswagen and Peugeot have opened automobile assembly plants; British Leyland, Fiat, Daimler-Benz, and Datsun are on the way.

Thanks to massive government spending, Nigeria's gross domestic product grew by an average of more than 13 percent a year between 1973 and 1978, a fast clip, far outdistancing South Africa and even oil-rich Algeria. Needless to say, the immediate beneficiaries have not been the mass of Nigerians but rather those with political power, businessmen with "pull," and the lucky few who have landed jobs with foreign companies or in the swelling (1 million strong) government bureaucracy.

Nigeria, in short, has come a long way. Even the average citizen is without a doubt better off today than he was a decade ago. But feverish activity and conspicuous wealth create the illusion of greater progress than has in fact been the case. There have been headaches aplenty, some of them avoidable, some of them inevitable. To quote President Shehu Shagari's 1979 election manifesto, "too many things do not work as they should."

Ironically, government "planning" in recent years has been

SWEET CRUDE

In 1970, Americans got by without one drop of Nigerian oil. Today, the United States is Nigeria's No. 1 customer, and Nigeria accounts for 17 percent of total U.S. petroleum imports, second only to Saudi Arabia. The United States paid $6 billion for 350 million barrels of Nigeria's "bonny light" crude in 1978.

Since 1958, Nigeria has been producing low-sulfur ("sweet") crude—ideal for gasoline and hence in great demand. In 1978, Nigeria ranked sixth among the world's oil producers. With proven reserves of 20 billion barrels, Nigeria can maintain its present rate of production (more than 2 million barrels a day) for at least two decades. Currently, oil provides more than 90 percent of the country's export earnings, well ahead of cocoa.

But oil has not produced a simple success story. Corruption and incompetence within the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) run high; in a scandal that is still bubbling to the surface, government audits have revealed that, during the 1970s, some *$5 billion* in revenues was somehow left off the books. Tactical miscalculations have also taken their toll. In 1977, an "adventurous" (i.e., high) pricing policy cost Nigeria $1.5 billion when North Sea and Alaska oil suddenly glutted world markets. Prices dropped temporarily, and Nigeria wound up on a "pricing limb."

Since then, the picture has brightened. The NNPC plans new oil exploration and hopes to exploit vast natural gas reserves. The oil glut has evaporated, owing in part to the upheavals in Iran. Last November, Nigeria ignored the OPEC benchmark by upping the posted price of its oil from $23.47 to $26.17 a barrel, which should mean record revenues in 1980.

part of the problem. Drawn up in 1974 at the peak of oil-triggered euphoria, the Third National Development Plan (1975–80) called for capital investment of $50 billion, far beyond Nigeria's capability. It was an oversize grab bag. Because government agencies could not hope to meet their targets, worried civil servants concentrated on the easiest and often the costliest projects, not necessarily those of most importance, in order to boost their departments' "plan fulfillment ratios." Government monitoring of costs and performance was relaxed, and contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars were awarded without time-consuming competitive bidding.

Bottlenecks became more of a problem than ever. The most publicized example occurred during 1975, when Nigeria placed orders for 20 million tons of cement, although the annual ce-

Nigeria has used oil to back up its diplomacy. Last spring, for example, Lagos warned of an "appropriate response" if the Carter administration lifted economic sanctions against the new biracial government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. (The sanctions remained in place.) In July, Nigeria abruptly took over British Petroleum's equity shares in Shell/BP in retaliation for Britain's tentative overtures to the regime in Salisbury as well as for its oil exports to white-ruled South Africa. The other foreign oil companies in the country—Gulf, Mobil, and ENI-Phillips—were warned to "respect the policies of Nigeria."

Nigeria's latest move: a bid for more generous U.S. economic help to Africa. Nigerians cite an aid "imbalance"—Nigeria, for example, with 90 million people, will receive only $3 million in U.S. aid this year; Israel, with 3 million people, will get $785 million in economic assistance alone. Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari has explicitly tied future oil exports to stepped up aid for Africa from Washington. If an increase is forthcoming, he has said, "then, of course, it is our objective to reciprocate."

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1979
U.S. imports of Nigerian oil (thousands of barrels per day)	243	713	1,024	904	1,045
posted price per barrel	$3.18*	14.69*	13.80†	13.54†	23.47*

*posted price
†landed cost

Source: U.S. Department of Energy; *Platt's Oil Price Handbook.*

ment unloading capacity of Nigerian ports was less than 2 million tons. As a result of these and other exuberant purchases, a flotilla of 400 merchant ships soon gathered off Lagos. For months, they waited their turns to unload, all the while charging costly demurrage fees.

Even the most promising of plans have encountered some temporary obstacles. In September 1976, the government introduced universal, free primary education (UPE), at a projected cost of ₦17 million a year by 1982. Demand proved unexpectedly high, however, as perhaps 3 million new students suddenly flocked to the schools. Half of all the new students, ranging in age from 6 to 13, were in the first grade. By the time the 1978 school year rolled around, UPE was already absorbing ₦78 million annually—about one-third of the Nigerian government's

noncapital budget.*

For all its undoubted ultimate benefits, public education, at least in the short run, will probably exacerbate one of Nigeria's chronic problems: the unplanned, uncontrollable influx of countryfolk to the cities. Historically, rural Nigerians with even a primary school certificate have disdained village life and set out for the relative affluence of Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, and Port Harcourt. Partly as a result, Nigeria's once thriving, if only moderately lucrative, agricultural sector is in serious trouble. Gains in domestic food production lag behind population (which is climbing by 2.5 percent annually). In 1978, Nigeria imported $1.5 billion worth of food, most of it staples but much of it luxuries, ranging from corn flakes to caviar.

Rapid urbanization is a fact of life in Nigeria, as it is in other Third World nations. While two-thirds of Nigeria's people still live in rural areas, farm income is low, and the work is hard. Most of the countryside lacks paved roads, electricity, running water, and medical care. For younger members of a family, the rural "push" factors are considerable. (A senior son, at least, stands to take over the property.) The chief urban "pull" factor is the prospect, generally illusory, of real prosperity in the cities—a stroke of business luck, a well-paying job.

And so the hopefuls come, often leaving their wives behind. Younger brothers, sisters, and cousins arrive to live with those who have "made it"—often in crowded and expensive slum settlements, pervaded by the stench of sewage in open trenches.

Cleaning Out of Dead Woods

Urban unemployment is high in Nigeria, but given the lack of accurate data, no one knows how high. (Some estimates put the figure at 35 percent.) Fear of worsening the situation is one reason why the federal government has slowed demobilization of the armed services.† The specter of armed, disgruntled, and recently cashiered soldiers roaming the countryside appeals to no one.

By and large, the most prosperous people in the country

*Free *secondary* education has also been decreed, which will mean substantially more expenditures if it comes to pass. With some 35,000 students, the 13 universities in Nigeria are all public; there is talk of doubling the number. Tens of thousands of Nigerians study at colleges abroad, including 12,000 in the United States and 6,000 in Great Britain.

†After the civil war, the regime planned to discharge some 130,000 men from the 230,000-strong armed forces. To date, however, only about 50,000 soldiers have returned to civilian life. Nigeria has virtually no Navy and only 24 combat aircraft, all of them aging MIG fighters. There are no threatening neighbors to bother the British-equipped Army, but a battalion of Nigerian troops is serving with UN peace-keeping forces in Lebanon.

From Nigeria: The Land, Its Art and Its People. *Reprinted by permission of Felix Gluck Press Ltd.*

Niger River scene, 1833

have not been those who arrived at impoverished urban settlements imbued with the work ethic. Ever since the British began transferring power to a venal Nigerian political class in the mid-1950s, corrupt use of state power—to land a contract, start a business—has been the most certain means of personal enrichment. After a 1975 coup ousted General Yakubu Gowon and installed General Murtala Muhammed as head of state, the military government conducted an extensive purge—"cleaning out of dead woods," as Nigeria's newspapers enthusiastically put it. Some 10,000 public employees, from full colonels to messenger boys, were fired or induced to resign. Ten of the 12 military governors were summarily dismissed.

No one believes that corruption has actually been rooted out. Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who succeeded Muhammed upon the latter's assassination six months after assuming power, lamented in 1977 that "ours is still a place where people are prepared to destroy anything, to cover up any crime, if doing so promotes their economic interest or might." That same year, Nigeria lost about $1.5 billion in foreign-exchange through currency scams. And everyone is aware that "dash" is often needed to get a job, secure a permit, get a seat on an overbooked Nigerian Airways flight, or "quench police troubles."

Venal manipulation of an oil-engorged state—by busi-

nessmen, politicians, bureaucrats—is a prime cause of the startling income inequality in Nigeria, made all the more conspicuous by a strong local tendency to flaunt one's wealth. Most Nigerians can barely afford ancillary school expenses—books, for example—and shoes are a luxury for many. But the elite send their children to chic European academies and dress themselves in the latest fashions. They live in modern, air-conditioned homes in districts like Ikoyi—once the exclusive foreign colony in Lagos—with their imported appliances, their china, their lace. Although millions are undernourished, and meat is a rarity in the average person's diet, Nigeria was, until recently, the world's biggest importer of French champagne. (Both champagne and lace have now been banned.)

The acquisitive frenzy in Nigeria today is obvious on all levels. Nigerians have always been willing to work long hours to improve their economic status; they have energy, resourcefulness, persistence, and a yen for education and self-improvement. But today, the quest for any way of turning a naira proceeds with an intensity far beyond that of the past. Self-help correspondence courses have proliferated—for bookkeeping, law, high-school equivalency, and much else.

Everyone, it seems, is scrounging around for someone with influence—someone with "long-legs"—to be his sponsor, his benefactor, his golden entrée to a rosy future. "The dog likes to run behind the well fed," one Ibo politician explained.

Cutting Back

But most Nigerians have been grievously disappointed. Inevitably, some turn to crime. Robbery is common, and Lagos has become one of the most violent cities in the world, quite apart from the carnage on its roads. The public executions of murderers and armed robbers are attended by thousands; they seem to be as much spectacle as deterrent, a shock to foreign businessmen staying at the Lagos Holiday Inn. (The hotel overlooks Victoria Beach, within earshot of the Army firing squads.)

It is only within the last year or so that the Nigerian government, first under the Obasanjo regime, then (after the return to civilian rule) under President Shagari, has moved to put the brakes on the country's frenetic, over-extended economy. Simply put, the aim is to get Nigeria to start living within its means again, and to put the development effort on a firmer, if less extravagant, footing. In material terms, this means restraint on imports, more careful government spending. In psychological terms, it means lowered expectations.

Imports have hurt. Despite its oil billions, Nigeria has been running in the red for four years. Its balance-of-payments deficit surpassed $2 billion in 1978, most of it due to the sheer expense of rapid development, some of it traceable to costly luxuries imported from abroad.

Drastic import curbs imposed that year resulted in widespread shortages and helped bring on a recession that has, in turn, helped bring down the inflation rate, which hovered above 30 percent in the mid-1970s, to a more manageable 9 percent. (At one point, yams, a staple in the Nigerian diet, were selling for more than $2 apiece.) At the same time, the government backed off from several huge capital projects and scrapped others already begun.

The three OPEC price hikes last year helped ease Nigeria out of its balance-of-payments crunch. Imports are being monitored closely, and money may be redirected to agriculture and light manufacturing, to reduce reliance on foreign goods. Outside consultants have helped rationalize the government's graft-prone import practices. A $16.6 billion "austerity budget" is in place for fiscal year 1980. With luck, Nigeria's development can now proceed with more logic, less waste.

There is much discontent, poverty, and anger in Nigeria today. Expectations, fanned by media images, conspicuous wealth, and politicians' promises, are still high. Nigeria's national income, though high by 1966 standards, is spread very thin among 90 million people. And while the bottom of the country's economy is home to millions of budding capitalists, established Nigerian businessmen often tend to wait for foreign investors to do the big-time pioneering, then hop on board as partners, as specified by the indigenization laws. Nigeria's "nurture capitalism" orientation has not been effective.

In sum, Nigeria faces many unknowns, perhaps too many of them, over the next 10 years. If the oil revenues are used well—as well as one can reasonably expect, anyway—the country might just be able to proceed peaceably on course. Unfortunately, even performing reasonably well may not be good enough. Nigeria's record does not inspire confidence.

LURCHING TOWARD UNITY

by Pauline H. Baker

"Mammy-wagon" slogans—the West African equivalent of bumper stickers—are painted on the ramshackle wooden trucks, owned mostly by women, that provide Nigeria's chief means of mass transportation. One of the favorites: "No condition is permanent," a suitable motto for a people that has experienced the heights of optimism and the depths of despair over two turbulent decades.

When sub-Sahara Africa's richest and most populous state achieved its independence from Great Britain on October 1, 1960, it was widely hailed as a "showcase of democracy" with a bright economic future. *The Times* of London waxed euphoric:

> Rarely, if ever, can the relationship of master and servant have been transformed into partnership with so much understanding, sincerity, and humility; rarely, in the evanescent world of politics and diplomacy, has one felt so profound an emotion as at those moments when, at midnight on Friday, the Union Jack fell from the masthead at Lagos race course to be replaced for the first time by the green and white flag of Nigeria.

The applause died down with the collapse of the first civilian government in 1966. For the next decade and a half, Nigerians staggered from one political nightmare to another: coup d'états, assassinations, tribal pogroms, secession, and civil war.

Yet, the nation described by one of its architects, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, as "a mere geographical expression," has somehow held together. With the return to civilian rule in October 1979, Nigeria seems once again ready to try to fulfill its early promise. The outgoing head of state, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, whose ambition, unusual among his peers, was to relinquish the Army's monopoly on power to a democratically elected government, told his people last summer: "Let our past experience enrich and enlighten our future. We cannot afford to disappoint Nigeria, Africa, and the world."

Nigeria represents the classic African political dilemma writ large: how to create unity out of a mosaic of conflicting cultural legacies. The country's 80 million people speak some 250 languages or dialects; it is the most linguistically diverse state on the continent. There are divisive religious heritages—Islam and Christianity, as well as various African faiths—and competing traditions of government (emirates, monarchies, and village councils), with representative democracy a latecomer.

The origins of most of Nigeria's peoples remain obscure. The Nok agricultural society flourished 2,000 years ago near the present-day city of Jos; its striking terra cotta sculpture represents the earliest contribution to Nigeria's rich artistic heritage.

During the 7th and 8th centuries A.D., scholars believe, in the first of several invasions by Arab nomads, rugged Berber tribesmen from North Africa swept into the semi-desert and savanna regions of northern Nigeria. (The ancestors of Nigeria's Muslim Hausa tribe, the largest in the country, probably migrated from what is now Chad.) The caravan trade with Tripoli and Egypt was brisk, and Nigerian Muslims exchanged local cloth and skins for European textiles, metals, and glass. Government in the north was based on Koranic law, and the region's numerous emirates from time to time coalesced into empires. The last of these was the great 19th-century Fulani domain, centered around the powerful Sultan of Sokoto in northwest Nigeria.

The Slave Coast

The history of the non-Muslim peoples of the southern rain forest and coastal swamps is also murky. The Yoruba states of Ife and Oyo and the Kingdom of Benin were once the most powerful societies in the area, but there were many other tribes, including the Ibo, Ibibio, Efik, Ijaw, and Tiv. These self-sufficient communities of farmers and hunters were variously led by chiefs with limited authority or councils of elders.

For more than a millennium, then, what is now Nigeria has been like a divided cell, its peoples grouped into two broad cultural clusters, Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab and Negro, with the clusters themselves divided and subdivided. This is the central fact in the country's political history.

The first white men arrived in Nigeria during the winter of 1472–73, when Portuguese seafarers, from bases in Senegal and Sierra Leone, ventured into the Bight of Benin. Initially, the Portuguese sought gold and peppers, but by 1500, they were interested in a single resource: human beings. Feuding tribes were happy to oblige. The Kingdom of Benin, wrote Portuguese

explorer Duarte Pacheco Pereira at the end of the 15th century, "is usually at war with its neighbors, and takes many captives, whom we buy at 12 or 15 brass bracelets each."

For 350 years, trade in Nigeria meant slave trade, and by the 18th century, some 20,000 Nigerians were being shipped each year to plantation owners in Brazil, the West Indies, and North America. The area around Lagos became known as the "Slave Coast," to distinguish it from the "Gold Coast" (Ghana) and the "Ivory Coast" (which has retained its name).

Europe's Christian powers contended bitterly for control of this appallingly lucrative traffic. Bit by bit, Dutch, French, and British entrepreneurs chipped away at the Portuguese monopoly. By the early 1700s, France and Britain had cornered the market; Liverpool and Bristol grew fat on the proceeds. In 1807, however, in the face of mounting abolitionist pressures and changing economic conditions, Britain declared the slave trade illegal. By the mid-1840s, "legitimate" trade in ivory, gold, kola nuts, and palm oil (a lubricant widely used in England's new factories) had replaced human cargo.

Indirect Rule

When the Berlin Conference of 1885 divided Africa into German, French, and British "spheres of influence," a London-backed firm, the Royal Niger Company, was effectively granted exclusive trading rights in the Niger basin. The company set up its own military force, exercised judicial authority, collected taxes, and stamped out pockets of slave trading. In short, it exercised virtually all the powers of an independent state.

Meanwhile, an assortment of plucky Methodist, Baptist, Anglican, and Catholic missionaries penetrated deep into the interior. They braved a torrid climate and deadly malaria to promote "the Bible and the plough" in an area of the tropics reputed to be a "white man's grave." Their efforts opened up the hinterland. "It certainly is an inspiration," wrote Henry Dobinson, Archdeacon of the Niger, in 1894, "in this rather forlorn and

---

Pauline H. Baker, 38, is a staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with principal responsibility for Africa. Born in Jersey City, N.J., she received her B.A. from Douglass College (1962) and a Ph.D. in political science from UCLA (1970). She lived in Nigeria for 11 years, lecturing at the University of Lagos, and is the author of Urbanization and Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 1917–1967 *(1974). The views expressed in this essay do not necessarily reflect those of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.*

Sir Frederick Lugard, Britain's High Commissioner of Nigeria (1900–06), Governor General of Northern and Southern Nigeria (1912–14), Governor General of Nigeria (1914–18)

The Mansell Collection

desolate land, to see in every river and settlement the brave old Union Jack floating in the breeze. Our countrymen are wonderfully energetic and pushing."

The British Government formally took over the Royal Niger Company's territory in 1900, then rushed to claim, by gun and treaty, as much additional ground as possible before the French (to the north and west) and Germans (to the east) could take it. In their Whitehall offices, the British drew frontiers that ignored natural barriers and tribal boundaries, and installed Sir Frederick Lugard as the first High Commissioner of "Nigeria."*

Lugard was the archetypal colonial administrator. He was quick to assure local tribes, particularly in the north, that British rule would bring little noticeable change in their way of life. Thus, in 1903, he pledged to the Sokoto Council of Notables that he would be guided by "the usual laws of succession. . . . Emirs and chiefs . . . will rule over the people as of old time."

Lugard, in effect, was making a virtue out of a necessity. Rebellion was never a serious threat; as Hillaire Belloc once wrote, "Whatever happens we have got/The Maxim gun and they have not." But daily administration—tax collecting, maintaining courts, and the petty details involved in governing 15

*The name "Nigeria" was suggested by Lugard's wife, Flora Shaw, colonial editor of *The Times*, in a letter to that newspaper in 1897. It won out over "Niger Sudan," "Negretia," and "Goldesia," the latter in honor of Sir George Taubman Goldie, who secured the Niger Basin for Britain during the European "scramble for Africa."

million people spread over 360,000 square miles—was another story. Hence the policy of "indirect rule," similar to the system the British adopted in India and elsewhere in Africa.

On balance, Lugard's approach worked smoothly in the north, where the populace was accustomed to obeying authoritarian emirs. Lugard used the Muslim administrative system (and the Muslim administrators) for official purposes. Tactfully, he decided not to interfere with Islam and discouraged Christian missionaries from proselytizing in Muslim strongholds. While it eased the pain of conquest, the ultimate effect of this policy was to isolate the north from European education for half a century.

Peace and Profit

In the south and other non-Muslim areas, indirect rule was a disaster. Wrongly assuming that the Muslim administrative system had its parallels in the rest of Nigeria, the British equated local chiefs with emirs and used them as tax collectors, often in areas whose inhabitants had never paid taxes—to anyone—before. In the southeast, where there were no chiefs, the British appointed local notables as "warrant chiefs." The system was unpopular. Anti-tax riots were commonplace. In the long run, Lugard's policy catalyzed anti-colonial sentiment in the south, sowing the seeds of nationalist fervor that would eventually lead to an independent Nigeria.

What exactly were Great Britain's interests in Nigeria? Whitehall's injunctions to its colonial governors—in Asia, Africa, the Middle East—were generally two: Keep the peace, and turn a profit. Nigeria, the richest of Britain's African possessions, responded handsomely. By 1920, London's total import-export trade with the colony reached $43 million; revenues to the Crown topped $13 million. Colonialism was not a charitable exercise.

Yet, there were positive side-effects, as far as the Nigerian people were concerned. Commerce required good transportation; highways and railroads began to link major towns. Because the colonial administrators needed teachers, doctors, clerks, and lawyers, thousands of Nigerians, particularly southerners, received proper British educations. English became the official language; for the first time, Nigerians had a common means of discourse.

A sophisticated native elite developed. Men like Nnamdi Azikiwe ("Zik"), the American-educated Ibo journalist who became independent Nigeria's first President, and Obafemi

Awolowo, a British-trained Yoruba lawyer, returned from abroad with radical ideas and visions of freedom from colonial rule. Such people were hardly representative of the great mass of rural Nigerians. But as Awolowo put it: "It must be realized, for now and for all time, that the articulate minority are destined to run the country."

Self-government came to Nigeria in stages. During the early 1920s, to accommodate the first stirrings of nationalist sentiment, the British began allowing a few members of the black elite to serve on local governing bodies. The election in 1922 of three Africans to the Nigerian Legislative Council, for example, provided the first voice in government to the inhabitants of Lagos (males with an annual income of $240 or more were entitled to vote). Such advances were mostly symbolic. By and large, the early history of Nigerian nationalism is the story of a black urban elite pressing for limited reforms through short-lived native political parties and firebrand newspapers.

World War II changed all that. Within the British government attitudes toward colonialism softened. Indeed, as most hard-headed politicians in London realized, the Empire's post-war days were numbered, if not for reasons of justice, then for sheer expediency as anti-colonialism accelerated.

The "Jews of Africa"

Beginning in 1945, the British experimented with various constitutional formulas to pave the way for self-government. Decolonization was not strictly a British affair. Indeed, in retrospect, probably too much weight was given to competing Nigerian leaders seeking narrow political ends, not enough to building real foundations for national unity.

By the end of colonial rule, there were three distinct administrative regions—the North, West, and East. Each had a separate bureaucracy and a separate budget. Each gave rise to a major political party dominated by a single tribe.* Led by ardent nationalists like Awolowo and "Zik" in the West and East, and by the conservative religious leader, Sir Ahmadu Bello, in the North, these parties struggled for regional prerogatives. The tug-of-war produced, in essence, a tripartite federal system, ratified in 1954 by the last of the colonial constitutions. But "balance" proved elusive. Because parliamentary districts were drawn on the basis of population, the huge Northern Region had

*The Northern Peoples' Congress (Hausa-Fulani) in the North; the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Ibo) in the East; and the Action Group (Yoruba) in the West.

twice as many seats in the central legislature as the other two regions combined.

Thus, when Nigeria was granted independence in 1960, its internal power structure was skewed in favor of the least developed and most insular part of the country. A Muslim northerner, Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, became the country's first Prime Minister. And for the first six years after independence, the North maintained an iron grip on Nigeria's political life.

Educationally and economically, however, by 1960 the Ibos of the east—geographically mobile, receptive to change—had pushed ahead of the other groups. Whereas 50 years earlier, owing to their fragmented, village-based society, they hardly considered themselves a coherent "people," great economic strides had reinforced their tribal identity. As the Ibo elder statesman, Nnamdi Azikiwe, put it years before: "It would appear that the God of Africa has created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages."

All over Nigeria, Ibos filled urban jobs at every level far out of proportion to their numbers, as laborers and domestic servants, as bureaucrats, corporate managers, and technicians. Two-thirds of the senior jobs in the Nigerian Railway Corporation were held by Ibos. Three-quarters of Nigeria's diplomats came from the Eastern Region. So did almost half of the 4,500 students graduating from Nigerian universities in 1966. The Ibos became known as the "Jews of Africa," despised—and envied—for their achievements and acquisitiveness. Inevitably, ethnic tensions mounted. Competition for political offices and job promotions routinely degenerated into tribal rivalry. Nigeria was smoldering.

Mutiny

On January 15, 1966, following controversies over rigged national and regional elections, a military coup toppled Prime Minister Balewa's civilian government. Balewa, his finance minister, and the premiers of the Northern and Western regions were killed. The mutiny, led by five Ibo officers, was quickly suppressed by federal troops, but a military government was formed by Major General J.T.U. Ironsi, the head of the Nigerian Army—and an Ibo. Ironsi, well respected though sometimes maladroit at fitting actions to his good intentions, swiftly suspended the constitution, consolidated the regions, and attempted to impose unity by decree.

The Ibo junta insisted that there was no ethnic basis to the regime. But the military takeover was predictably seen by most

Nigerians, especially northern Muslims, as an Ibo *putsch*. In a country that thrived on rumor, horror stories abounded. According to one, the Ibos were flaunting photographs of the coup leaders proudly displaying the corpse of Sir Ahmadu Bello, murdered premier of the Northern Region; atop each picture (so the rumor went) was a crowing rooster, symbol of the Ibo political party. Riots rocked northern cities. Around the country, armed thugs hunted down local Ibo residents. Thousands of innocent people were massacred, and over 1 million Ibos were believed to have fled back to their homes in the east.

No Victors, No Vanquished

In the middle of all this, a detachment of Muslim soldiers heard unconfirmed reports that General Ironsi had drawn up a "hit list" of northern officers. The Muslims decided to strike first. In the early morning hours of July 29, 1966, they found Ironsi at the home of the military governor in Ibadan, the capital of the Western Region. The two men were taken to a remote forest outside of the city, stripped, "interrogated," and shot.

As the next Supreme Commander, the Army chose 31-year-old Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a compromise candidate. Gowon, then the Army chief of staff, was a Sandhurst alumnus, a Christian, and a northerner, though from a minority (i.e., non-Hausa-Fulani) tribe. He kept his job for nine years.

Gowon immediately faced civil war. The military governor of the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, refused to back the new regime, demanded "autonomy" for his territory, and finally called for outright secession. Arrogant, intelligent, and wealthy, Ojukwu had once told Oxford classmates that he would be "King of Nigeria"; he proclaimed the Republic of Biafra in May 1967.

The Ibos were euphoric. With one-quarter of the country's population and one-twelfth of its territory, Biafra was the richest and most developed region in Nigeria, crisscrossed by railroads and serviced by three large airports. Within its boundaries: the bustling oil rigs near Port Harcourt in the mangrove swamps of the Niger delta. Moreover, Ojukwu had about half of the Nigerian Army on his side, and most of the junior officers. He scored some impressive early victories, at one point even threatening Lagos.

With only 5,000 men, no tanks, no warships, and no combat aircraft, Gowon started at a disadvantage. Then came transfusions of arms and ammunition from Great Britain, artillery and MIG fighters (reportedly with Egyptian and East German pilots)

ETHNIC FEDERALISM: NIGERIA'S TRIBES AND STATES



As Nigeria's many tribes have sought greater political representation, so the number of its states has grown. Out of the original three regions (North, West, and East), a fourth (Mid-West) was created in 1963. The Gowon regime then carved the whole into 12 states (1966). In 1975, the Muhammed government increased the total to the present 19.

from the Soviet Union. The Army mushroomed to 250,000. Time was on the federal side.

The bloody war dragged on for two-and-one-half years, owing in part to massive Western shipments of food and medical supplies (as well as arms and ammunition, which the secessionists demanded be sent on the same planes) to the beleaguered Biafrans. International public opinion generally sided with Biafra, although France was the sole nation openly to provide military assistance.* The suffering of the Ibos was plain, their public relations effort first rate. (Novelist Cyprian Ekwensi was Biafra's Minister of Information.) And, too, the Nigerians whom most Westerners knew were the well-educated Ibos.

*Only five states—Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Haiti—recognized the rebel government.

The United States remained officially aloof, though public opinion was decidedly pro-Biafra. After a 1967 visit to Washington to explain the position of the Nigerian government, Chief Anthony Enaharo, Gowon's emissary, observed that there was "diminishing comprehension of the Nigerian crisis the higher up the hierarchy one went. . . . [The State Department] tended to gauge us by a double standard: What was right for the American federation in 1860 did not hold for the Nigerian federation." The frustration of Nigeria's rulers turned to anger when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk baldly suggested that the Nigerian crisis was a "British responsibility," implying that, in American eyes, the country was still a colony.

Surrounded, starving, and broke, the Biafrans surrendered on January 15, 1970. Ojukwu fled into exile in the Ivory Coast. With Abraham Lincoln as his avowed model, Gowon adopted a policy of "no victors, no vanquished." Ibos were quickly reintegrated into Nigerian life. Officials of the rebel government were given new posts in the federal bureaucracy; most Ibo officers kept their ranks. "In the history of warfare," wrote John de St. Jorre, who covered the war for the London *Observer*, "there can rarely have been such a bloodless end and such a merciful aftermath."

Nigeria's troubles were not over. Although the country's oil revenues doubled and doubled again after the 1973 OPEC price hikes, for most of Nigeria's people life had not much improved. The great influx of money into the economy also brought massive inflation. Corruption was rampant, and some of Gowon's military governors milked their districts as if they were private estates. In 1975, after reneging on his promise to return the country to civilian rule, Gowon was overthrown. (He retired to private life, enrolling as a freshman political science student at the University of Warwick in Britain.)

The new head of state was Brig. Gen. Murtala Muhammed, a no-nonsense northern Muslim who started to get Nigeria back on its feet. Muhammed dismissed the hated military governors, fixed a date for return to civilian rule, and began firing venal bureaucrats. He also made plans to move Nigeria's capital out of traffic-clogged Lagos. Six months after taking office, however, he was assassinated by disgruntled Army officers while his car was stalled in a Lagos traffic jam. He was succeeded by the next in command, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, a devout Baptist, a Yoruba, and a career Army man.

Carrying forward Muhammed's program, Obasanjo deftly shepherded the country through an unprecedented three-year-long exercise in grassroots democracy, which included the elec-

tion of hundreds of local governments, public debate on a new, American-style constitution, registration of 47 million voters (most of whom were voting for the first time in their lives), and the overseeing of five elections to fill state and national offices. "Never in the history of Africa," commented the magazine *West Africa* when it was all over, "have so many people been consulted so thoroughly about how they wished to be governed."

A casual observer might be tempted to conclude that Nigeria is merely back where it started in 1960. The new President, Hausa-Fulani nobleman Alhaji Shehu Shagari, is a northerner, as was Nigeria's first Prime Minister, Abubakar Balewa, whom he resembles. The election breakdowns show that tribal loyalties remain a powerful, even decisive, political force.

Yet Nigeria's political prospects may be brighter than would appear on the surface. The new 19-state federal system better reflects the country's cultural pluralism and effectively carves up the old Hausa-Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba strongholds. Moreover, the new constitution seeks to ensure that elections are truly "national" in character; to be elected President, a candidate must receive not only one-third of the popular vote but also at least one-quarter of the vote in two-thirds of the states. (In the 1979 elections, for example, Shagari needed critical support in the east, beyond his central base in the north.) Finally, the new constitution provides for effective checks and balances. Shagari's party holds only 38 seats in the 95-member Senate and 168 seats in the 449-member House. It is therefore obliged to wheel and deal.

Political reforms alone, of course, cannot guarantee national cohesion. In a country where leaders are as important as institutions, the real test is whether Shagari and his successors can actually govern this complex society—enriched by oil, afflicted by inflation, corruption, and poverty, and fractured by special interests.

Most Nigerians, publicly proud, privately pessimistic, seem determined to make the democratic experiment work. As the most populous state south of the Sahara, Nigeria is one of black Africa's natural leaders, a maverick member of OPEC, a commanding voice in the Organization of African Unity. What happens inside the country, therefore, has a certain importance to the outside world. Brave steps have been taken by the Nigerians; grave risks remain.

NEW WRITERS, NEW READERS

By Charles R. Larson

Looking back at the past 25 or 30 years, it is clear that the writing of fiction in sub-Sahara Africa has been dominated by Nigerians.

Why? The Nigerians' most obvious asset has been their perseverance despite such severe national upheavals as repeated coups and the 1967–70 Biafran war. Even in formerly French Africa, the most talented authors either have been silenced by government censorship or have slackened their efforts.

Numerous factors combined to give Nigeria its preeminence.* Nigeria's large population (35 million in 1959, just before independence) with its increasing literacy (6.1 percent in 1952, 25 percent in 1975) provided a literary marketplace. The development, in the eastern city of Onitsha, of a "pop" literature for the masses also helped. Perhaps the most important stimulus was the emergence of a group of young Nigerian intellectuals who spearheaded a national literary movement.

The literary output of these writers gave strength to Nigeria's post-independence drive for "Africanization" during the early 1960s. As a teacher at a boy's secondary school in eastern Nigeria, I at first followed a syllabus (set by the new government in Lagos) devoted only to England's great men of letters: Shakespeare, Hardy, Milton, Bunyan—all the obvious authors. This soon changed. British literature that described a world few Nigerian youths had ever seen or imagined was replaced by the works, in English, of native-born writers.

Most modern African fiction has been written in the "colonial" languages (English, French, Portuguese); Nigeria's has been no exception. Fifteen years ago, African writers hotly debated the problem of writing in European languages. Some younger writers argued that by using the colonial language they were denying their African heritage. Yet many African languages, although rich in narrative tradition, still lack a written literature. And the question of "authenticity" soon faded when it

*Of 215 books in the prestigious Heinemann Educational Books' African Writers Series, 52 are by Nigerian authors. South Africa is second with 23 books.

became clear that works in indigenous languages would have few readers outside Africa and that (in those days, anyway) the African writer's readers and publishers were mostly in Europe.

Today, the publishing situation is changing as a second generation of Nigerian writers and readers emerges. But the Nigerian who writes in his tribal language still discovers that he has considerably reduced his potential domestic audience. Nigeria has nearly 250 languages and dialects, so (as in most of sub-Sahara Africa) a European language—a second language—has become the language of literature, and of officialdom. After the second grade, instruction in Nigerian schools is in English.

"So Sweet and Sexy"

Nigerian literature began its emergence shortly after World War II with the development of publishing in the Ibo city of Onitsha. The literacy rate, particularly in the urban centers, had begun to grow. During the war, many Nigerian males had fought with the British armies in Europe and the Middle East—an eye-opening experience. In the cities, Nigerians came together from different tribal groups. And Western movies and lifestyles became popular as the booming oil-and-cocoa economy put money in Nigerian pockets that had been empty.

"Onitsha Market Literature"—the Nigerian equivalent of the American dime novel—developed as a response to an expanding audience. Newly, often barely, literate Nigerians devoured these sensational stories. The Onitsha writers' works, using a vocabulary of several hundred English words, were often replete with grammatical and typographical errors. The readers didn't mind.

Some of the early titles accurately indicate the works themselves: *The Sorrows of Love, Veronica My Daughter, Life in the Prison Yard*—melodramatic accounts of life, designed to serve as moral examples for their readers.

Mabel the Sweet Honey has always been my favorite. The author's description of his book, taken from the cover, reads as

---

Charles R. Larson, 41, is professor of literature at The American University. Born in Sioux City, Iowa, he received a B.A. from the University of Colorado, Boulder (1959), and a Ph.D. from Indiana University (1970). He is the author of The Emergence of African Fiction *(1972),* American Indian Fiction (1978), and The Insect Colony *(1978), a novel set in West Africa during the Biafran war; and has edited* African Short Stories: A Collection of Contemporary African Writing *(1970) and* Opaque Shadows and Other Stories from Contemporary Africa *(1975).*

By Speedy Eric. Distributed by Membership Bookshop.

By S. Eze. Printed by Providence Printing Press, Nigeria. Copyright reserved.

During the civil war, Onitsha market books were stamped "Printed in the Republic of Biafra." Rarely more than 64 pages long, they frequently picture stiffly posed, sweater-clad Caucasians on their covers. The reason: To keep costs down, printers go to press with whatever art is available; one major publisher uses a supply of plates from a European sweater catalog.

follows: "Her Skin would make your blood flow in the wrong direction. She was so sweet and sexy, knew how to romance. She married at sixteen. But she wanted more fun. Yet it ended at seventeen, and what an-end? SO THRILLING."

Other Onitsha pamphlets are self-help books: *Money Hard to Get But Easy to Spend; How to Speak to Girls and Win Their Love; How to Avoid Misatkes* [sic] *and Live a Good Life—A Moral Instructions on Don'ts in Public Meetings, Social Gatherings and Functions for Boys & Girls, Workers and Traders.*

One of Nigeria's most famous writers, Cyprian Ekwensi, now 58, began his publishing career in Onitsha in 1947 with *When Love Whispers,* a "pop" novelette about a young woman who meets and marries another man while her fiancé is going to school in England. Ekwensi, an Ibo who has worked as a pharmacist, forester, and Nigeria's Director of Information Services, later found British publishers for his work. His most popular novel is *Jagua Nana* (1961), the melodramatic tale of an aging prostitute.

The first Nigerian writer to gain an international reputation was Amos Tutuola. Born in 1920, Tutuola astounded the London literary scene in 1952 with his rough-hewn *The Palm-Wine Drink-*

ard. The novel, best described as an oral epic set down in broken English (Tutuola's formal education was limited to primary schools), caused immediate controversy. Europeans and Americans concluded that subsequent African literature would be written in Tutuola's style; the author's fellow Nigerians were embarrassed that their semi-literate countryman had dishonored them. Neither reaction was justified. Amos Tutuola was and is one of the foremost African story tellers, Nigeria's counterpart to Aesop or the Brothers Grimm.

If Amos Tutuola represents homespun narrative, Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka represent formal writing in the Western tradition. Achebe, 49, is an Ibo from eastern Nigeria; Soyinka, 44, is a Yoruba from his country's western region. Both began publishing shortly before Nigeria's independence in 1960 and are also, it seems to me, the two most talented Anglophone writers on the continent. Frequently nominated for the Nobel Prize, they are probably the only writers in tropical Africa who could live on their royalties, although both teach—Achebe at the University of Nigeria in Nsukka, Soyinka at the University of Ife.

Focusing on Immorality

Achebe's masterpiece, *Things Fall Apart* (1958), was the first novel by an African writer included in the required syllabus for secondary-school students throughout English-speaking Africa. It chronicles the coming of the white man to a small Ibo village in the 1890s. The main character, Okonkwo, is the archetypal Iboman (masculine and warlike); he dies tragically by taking his own life, a symbolic act representing the death of the traditional culture.

Though the book was praised when it first appeared, only years later did Achebe achieve international fame. By that time, he had published a sequel, *No Longer at Ease* (1960); *Arrow of God* (1964); and *A Man of the People* (1966), a satire which predicted Nigeria's era of political instability. As an Ibo, Achebe spoke eloquently for the Biafran cause during the war, but since that time, he has largely been silent on politics in his writing, limiting himself to poetry and short stories.

Wole Soyinka, on the other hand, has become not only Africa's most famous playwright but also Nigeria's most prolific writer and social critic. At last count, he had published more than 20 volumes of drama (including *A Dance of the Forests,* 1960; *The Lion and the Jewel,* 1963), poetry, fiction, and literary criticism.

Soyinka's finest work is *The Man Died* (1972), a journal of

the two years he spent in prison in Lagos during the civil war. Held by the Nigerian government without specific charges and denied writing materials by prison authorities, Soyinka kept his mind active during his years of solitary confinement by surreptitiously writing a number of subsequently published works, including his journal, between the lines of books that were somehow smuggled into his cell.

Ekwensi, Tutuola, Achebe, and Soyinka are beyond doubt the leading figures on Nigeria's colorful literary scene; their literary reputations are assured. But there are at least a handful of other important writers. Several of these—John Pepper Clark, Gabriel Okara, Christopher Okigbo (who was killed in the Biafran war), T. M. Aluko, John Munomye, Elechi Amadi—began their writing careers at roughly the same time as Achebe and Soyinka. A number of younger writers (T. Obinkaram Echewa, Flora Nwapa, Nkem Nwankwo) have shown great promise.

As Nigerian society has changed during the last few decades, most of these writers have shifted their social focus from the impact of colonialism to the behavior of Nigeria's new, native elite. Current literature places more emphasis on the individual than on the system, as writers examine present-day African problems, especially corruption and immorality among political and social leaders.

Nigerian writers have been successful by world standards. To illustrate the richness of Nigeria's literature, several excerpts follow, drawn from an Onitsha pamphlet, two novels, a poem, and a play:

The Nigerian Bachelor's Guide

by A. O. Ude

Onitsha market pamphlets usually have modest sales of 3,000 to 4,000 copies, but the more popular have been reissued several times. The Nigerian Bachelor's Guide, *for example, has sold 40,000 copies. In this excerpt, its author gives "Advice to Young Men on Marriage."*

Q. When you are ready for marriage what will be your target for selecting a wife?

A. The target should be

(*a*) A girl from a good family. For a family to be good, the parents of the girl must have lived successfully as husband and

wife. The father should not be too poor and his wife should be a dutiful, strong, intelligent, faithful wife. She and her husband should have a fair report of people.

(*b*) The girl should not be very beautiful, for beautiful women are dangerous. She should not be ugly. Ugly women make their husbands unhappy and uncontented.

(*c*) The girl should have good manners and be of good conduct.

Q. Why do you say that beautiful women are dangerous?

A. This is so because many of them are generally loose. They suffer too much from the trials of men and so become too kind to men. This often leads them to evil. Women of moderate beauty are therefore better for housewives.

Q. Is it good to go against the advice of your parents in choosing a wife?

A. It is not good. Our parents are our God's representatives and in all matters relating to marriage, their voice should be heard. In the real sense of the word, they are not against our marriage, but at times, after examining the girl and family, our parents may have good objections to our marrying the girl we love. Love is strong, but we should try to suppress it, and look for another girl. Failure in marriage is generally due to the neglect of our parents' advice while selecting a wife.

Q. Is it good to pay £100 for a girl?

A. No. This is buying the girl. Human beings should not be regarded as articles for sale. A sensible wise man will not receive a farthing for his daughter.

No Longer at Ease

by Chinua Achebe

Although Chinua Achebe did not leave home to study at a foreign university, many other Nigerian writers and teachers (including Wole Soyinka and T. Obinkaram Echewa) have studied overseas. In this excerpt from Achebe's second novel, No Longer at Ease, *the central character, 25-year-old Obi Okonkwo, has just returned to Lagos after studying English literature in London. His childhood visions of Lagos aren't quite the same as the city he sees on his return to his homeland.*

Obi was away in England for a little under four years. He sometimes found it difficult to believe that it was as short as that. It seemed more like a decade than four years, what with the miseries of winter when his longing to return home took on the

sharpness of physical pain. It was in England that Nigeria first became more than just a name to him. That was the first great thing that England did for him.

But the Nigeria he returned to was in many ways different from the picture he had carried in his mind during those four years. There were many things he could no longer recognize, and others—like the slums of Lagos—which he was seeing for the first time.

As a boy in the village of Umuofia he had heard his first stories about Lagos from a soldier home on leave from the war.

. . . "There is no darkness there," [the soldier] told his admiring listeners, "because at night the electric shines like the sun, and people are always walking about, that is, those who want to walk. If you don't want to walk you only have to wave your hand and a pleasure car stops for you." His audience made sounds of wonderment. Then by way of digression he said: "If you see a white man, take off your hat for him. The only thing he cannot do is mold a human being."

For many years afterwards, Lagos was always associated with electric lights and motorcars in Obi's mind. Even after he had at last visited the city and spent a few days there before flying to the United Kingdom his views did not change very much.

Some years later as Obi, newly returned from England, stood beside his car at night in one of the less formidable of Lagos slum areas . . . his mind went over his earlier impressions

Early Lagos

From Visitors Guide to Lagos, *1975.*

of the city. He had not thought places like this stood side by side with the cars, electric lights, and brightly dressed girls.

His car was parked close to a wide-open storm drain from which came a very strong smell of rotting flesh. It was the remains of a dog which had no doubt been run over by a taxi. Obi used to wonder why so many dogs were killed by cars in Lagos, until one day the driver he had engaged to teach him driving went out of his way to run over one. In shocked amazement Obi asked why he had done it. "Na good luck," said the man. "Dog bring good luck for new car. But duck be different. If you kill duck you go get accident or kill man."

Beyond the storm drain there was a meat stall. It was quite empty of meat or meat-sellers. But a man was working a little machine on one of the tables. It looked like a sewing machine except that it ground maize. A woman stood by watching the man turn the machine to grind her maize.

On the other side of the road a little boy wrapped in a cloth was selling bean cakes or *akara* under a lamppost. His bowl of *akara* was lying in the dust and he seemed half asleep. But he really wasn't, for as soon as the nightsoilman passed swinging his broom and hurricane lamp and trailing clouds of putrefaction the boy quickly sprang to his feet and began calling him names. The man made for him with his broom but the boy was already in flight, his bowl of *akara* on his head. The man grinding maize burst into laughter, and the woman joined in. The nightsoilman smiled and went his way, having said something very rude about the boy's mother.

Here was Lagos, thought Obi, the real Lagos he hadn't imagined existed until now. During his first winter in England he had written a callow, nostalgic poem about Nigeria. It wasn't about Lagos in particular, but Lagos was part of the Nigeria he had in mind.

> "How sweet it is to lie beneath a tree
> At eventime and share the ecstasy
> Of jocund birds and flimsy butterflies;
> How sweet to leave our earthbound body in its mud,
> And rise towards the music of the spheres,
> Descending softly with the wind,
> And the tender glow of the fading sun."

He recalled this poem and then turned and looked at the rotting dog in the storm drain and smiled. "I have tasted putrid flesh in the spoon," he said through clenched teeth. "Far more apt."

Telephone Conversation

by Wole Soyinka

After attending Ibadan University, Wole Soyinka moved to England in 1954 to study at the University of Leeds. Upon receiving a degree in English literature, he worked at London's Royal Court Theatre until his return home in 1960. This humorous poem, one of Soyinka's best known, drew on his experiences in England.

The price seemed reasonable, location
Indifferent. The landlady swore she lived
Off premises. Nothing remained
But self-confession. "Madam," I warned,
"I hate a wasted journey—I am African."
Silence. Silenced transmission of
Pressurized good-breeding. Voice, when it came,
Lipstick coated, long gold-rolled
Cigarette-holder pipped. Caught I was, foully. "HOW DARK?" . . .
I had not misheard. . . . "ARE YOU LIGHT
OR VERY DARK?" Button B. Button A. Stench
Of rancid breath of public hide-and-speak.
Red booth. Red pillar-box. Red double-tiered
Omnibus squelching tar. It *was* real! Shamed
By ill-mannered silence, surrender
Pushed dumbfoundment to beg simplification.
Considerate she was, varying the emphasis—
"ARE YOU DARK? OR VERY LIGHT?" Revelation came.
"You mean—like plain or milk chocolate?"
Her assent was clinical, crushing in its light
Impersonality. Rapidly, wave length adjusted,
I chose. "West African sepia"—and as afterthought,
"Down in my passport." Silence for spectroscopic
Flight of fancy, till truthfulness clanged her accent
Hard on the mouthpiece. "WHAT'S THAT?" conceding
"DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT IS." "Like brunette."
"THAT'S DARK, ISN'T IT?" "Not altogether.
Facially, I am brunette, but madam, you should see
The rest of me. Palm of my hand, soles of my feet
Are a peroxide blonde. Friction, caused—
Foolishly madam—by sitting down, has turned
My bottom raven black—One moment madam!"—sensing
Her receiver rearing on the thunderclap
About my ears—"Madam," I pleaded, "wouldn't you rather
See for yourself?"

The Lion and The Jewel

by Wole Soyinka

The Lion and the Jewel, *Wole Soyinka's satire of the clash between tradition and modernity in Africa, is often described as the finest play written by an African dramatist. Set in the western Nigerian Yoruba village of Ilujinle, its central characters are Baroka, the 62-year-old* Bale *or village chief, who has a reputation for opposing progress; 22-year-old Lakunle, the village teacher, who wants to modernize the village but whose ideas of progress are superficial ("High-heeled shoes for the lady, red paint/On her lips."); and Sidi, the beautiful but mischievous village belle who is sought in marriage by both men. In this excerpt, Baroka has just tried to woo Sidi by promising to put her picture on the village's first postage stamp.*

BAROKA:

I hope you will not think it too great
A burden, to carry the country's mail
All on your comeliness. . . .
For a long time now,
The town-dwellers have made up tales
Of the backwardness of Ilujinle
Until it hurts Baroka, who holds
The welfare of his people deep at heart.
Now, if we do this thing, it will prove more
Than any single town has done! . . .
I do not hate progress, only its nature
Which makes all roofs and faces look the same.
And the wish of one old man is
That here and there,
[*Goes progressively towards Sidi, until he bends over her, then sits beside her on the bed.*]
Among the bridges and the murderous roads,
Below the humming birds which
Smoke the face of Sango, dispenser of
The snake-tongue lightning; between this moment
And the reckless broom that will be wielded
In these years to come, we must leave
Virgin plots of lives, rich decay
And the tang of vapour rising from
Forgotten heaps of compost, lying
Undisturbed. . . .
Your school teacher and I are much alike.
The proof of wisdom is the wish to learn
Even from children. And the haste of youth

Must learn its temper from the gloss
Of ancient leather, from a strength
Knit close along the grain. The school teacher
And I, must learn one from the other.
Is this not right? . . .
[*Sidi nods, tearfully.*]
The old must flow into the new, Sidi,
Not blind itself or stand foolishly
Apart. A girl like you must inherit
Miracles which age alone reveals.
Is this not so?

SIDI:

Everything you say, Bale,
Seems wise to me.

BAROKA:

Yesterday's wine alone is strong and blooded, child,
And though the Christians' holy book denies
The truth of this, old wine thrives best
Within a new bottle. The coarseness
Is mellowed down, and the rugged wine
Acquires a full and rounded body . . .
Is this not so—my child?

The Land's Lord

by T. Obinkaram Echewa

T. Obinkaram Echewa was born in an Ibo village and educated in the United States at Notre Dame, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. His novel, The Land's Lord *(1976), tells the story of Philip, an unpaid Ibo servant for Father Higler, the white village missionary. Philip is a recent convert to Catholicism, but his fear of* jujus *(spirits) remains strong. Finding Christianity, with its promise of heavenly salvation, no more able than his tribe's idolatry to grant him earthly happiness, he has sought revenge by sinning against the gods of both religions. In this excerpt from the book's final chapter, Philip is on trial before the village elders after "crossing legs" with his mentally retarded foster daughter.*

"You know," one man was now saying, "before the White Man came, it was wrong for a man in this village to go in with a woman in the day time. Now the young men do it. The White Man did not ask them to do it, but they do it because of his coming. Our nights have been turned into days and our days

Published by Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport, Connecticut.

into nights. It seems we are confused. Our old certainties seem no longer to be certified. Strangers argue with our truths, and we stand and stare about like foreigners in our own land—as if we have to ask permission to be who we are and think what we have always thought, and act as our fathers acted before us. . . . What are we waiting for? Has the sun not already set twice since this act? Do we want the anger of the Land on our heads before we act, the anger of the concord of jujus assembled here? Do we want the ground to shake? Or the hills to vomit fire first? . . . I take my seat!" . . .

"Do you not know what we must do to you?"

Philip: "Yes. And I am ready. I have no fear in my heart. But for whose sake must you do it?"

"All. For the sake of all. You. The Gods. The Land. All these jujus. Ourselves and our customs and traditions, the whole communion of our group, both living and dead, born and unborn. We have all been tainted by you. The Land must be propitiated with your blood because you have tainted it. It must be cleansed and renewed."

Philip: "But why? Because you fear punishment? Then it is you who are afraid. It is you whose hearts shake and tremble. But me, I am not afraid of how you judge me or what you do to me. I have hit my one blow. I have my revenge against everything!" . . .

"Whence your new courage?"

Philip: "Did I choose to be born? I was born a slave to duty. I had no choice and no voice. My pains and sufferings, my sweats and tears did not justify me. So I have given myself one choice."

"And *this* was it? This heinous act! I say enough!"

The interrogator leaped forward and grabbed a machete.

"If he does not stop talking I will behead him here in front of all of you!"

The dramatic gesture brought the interview to a halt.

When the questioning stopped, Father Higler pleaded with the elders to save Philip's life, but they would not listen. The priest lunged forward and cut the ropes binding Philip. Instead of fleeing, Philip grabbed a machete and stabbed himself saying:

"I must die my own death. But if my life has been useless, then my death too. It must be without use. . . . Yes, I will die, but I will not die at your hands, like a goat in sacrifice, so that your hearts can stop their trembling and your minds can have peace."

BACKGROUND BOOKS

NIGERIA

Without sentimentality, Olaudah Equiano, a freed Ibo slave, described his people as "almost a nation of dancers, musicians, and poets ... [whose] manners are simple, [whose] luxuries are few."

Kidnapped during a 1756 slave raid, Equiano was taken to Virginia, then to England. He purchased his freedom in 1766, served as a sailor on merchant ships until 1777, then settled in Britain and took an active role in the antislavery movement of the day.

His memoir, **The Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African**, 2 vols. (1789; London: Dawsons reprint, 1969), edited by Paul Edwards, provides a vivid portrait of Ibo village life during the mid-1700s. Marriages were arranged, recalls Equiano, and most men took no more than two wives. When neighboring tribes raided Ibo villages for slaves, Ibo women fought alongside their men. Equiano remarks that the prisoners taken by his tribe and kept as slaves fared better than those sold to Europeans; some of the Ibos' slaves had slaves of their own.

Equiano's autobiography stands alone among authentic early Nigerian documents, according to British historian Thomas Hodgkin. Most written native chronicles of West Africa dating back to the 17th century, he notes, are in Arabic and provide "no clear dividing-line between fact and legend." Their authors are preoccupied with ruling dynasties and wars.

In **Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology** (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1975, cloth & paper), Hodgkin extracts short descriptive passages from more than 140 Arabic, West African, Portuguese, Dutch, and British sources from the 9th through the 19th centuries. He includes Sir Richard Burton's account of the 1861 British takeover of Lagos and its dependencies—"a pleasantly vague frontier." When asked to sign over his kingdom, the king, writes Burton, "consented and refused, as the Negro will, in the same breath. . . . Without awaiting, however, the ceremony of signature, possession, nine-tenths of the law, was at once entered upon."

British writer-travelers from the 16th through the 19th centuries shaped European and American perceptions of West Africa. Only a few of them—notably Mary Kingsley and German-born Heinrich Barth—went beyond condescension to serious study of the natives.

A classical scholar, linguist, and Arabist, Barth (1821–65) had traveled widely in North Africa and Asia Minor before he visited black Africa in 1850–55. Unlike most contemporary voyagers, Barth had a sense of the past; to his vivid travelogues he added essays on the history of the regions he traversed. His *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (1857) runs to five volumes. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene has extracted the portions pertaining to Nigeria and added a brief Barth biography in **Barth's Travels in Nigeria** (Oxford, 1962).

Mary Kingsley (1862–1900) went "skylarking" through West Africa between 1893 and 1895. Devoted to explaining local religions, superstitions, and ceremonies, she was West

Africa's first anthropologist. She was also still very much a Victorian. She noted that Africans did not have lunatic asylums, prisons, or hospitals, but the "institutions [of] slavery, the lash, death." R. Glynn Grylls has gathered up a sampling of her observations in **Travels in West Africa** (1897; London: Charles Knight reprint, 1972).

More rigorous scholarship developed after World War II. Two of the most dependable surveys of West African history are British historian J. D. Fage's succinct **A History of West Africa: An Introductory Survey** (Cambridge, 1955; 4th ed., 1969, cloth & paper) and a two-volume collection of essays by 27 African, British, and American scholars, **History of West Africa** (Columbia, Vol. 1, 1972, 2nd ed., 1976; Vol. 2, 1974; all eds. cloth & paper), edited by J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder. Crowder's **The Story of Nigeria** (London: Faber & Faber, 1963; 4th ed., 1978, cloth & paper) remains the best one-volume history of Nigeria proper; it contains a useful basic bibliography.

Other histories focus exclusively on the colonial period.

Britain and Germany in Africa and **France and Britain in Africa** (Yale, 1967 & 1971), jointly edited by Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, provide a Big Picture of European rivalries at work in Africa, including Nigeria, and of their varied impact on the Africans.

Two complementary studies are John D. Hargreaves' **Prelude to the Partition of West Africa** (St. Martin's, 1963) and J. C. Anene's **The International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885–1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation** (London: Longman, 1970).

Anene, a Nigerian historian, tells the African side of the story. He examines the instability of Nigeria's warring native kingdoms and the complexities of British, French, and German diplomatic relations. He concludes that the dominant West African ethnic groups were *not* destroyed or seriously fragmented by the arbitrary colonial boundaries set by the Europeans.

Two of the prime movers in Britain's colonization of Nigeria were Sir George Goldie (1846–1925) and Sir Frederick Lugard (1858–1945).

By 1879, the ambitious Goldie, "the founder of modern Nigeria," had joined all the major trading companies along the Niger river into the United African Company. A persuasive negotiator, he thus ensured local British hegemony. The ups and downs of his life are told by John E. Flint in **Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria** (Oxford, 1960).

Lugard was the dashing, paternalistic colonial administrator who amalgamated the British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Mary Perham's detailed two-volume biography, **Lugard** (1956; Archon reprint, 1968), captures both the man and the country he ruled on behalf of the Crown.

Missionaries from Europe had a profound effect on Nigeria's development. In **Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841–1891: The Making of a New Elite** (Northwestern, 1965), Nigerian historian J. F. Ade Ajayi suggests that their most important contribution was the introduction of Western education. Christian schoolboy-converts became the middle-class professionals who led the first movements for self-government after World War I.

Western-educated Nigerians often looked to American black leaders for political guidance between the

World Wars. In **Nigeria: Background to Nationalism** (Univ. of Calif., 1958; reprint, 1971), historian James S. Coleman notes that most educated Nigerians favored W.E.B. DuBois' emphasis on the advancement of the "talented tenth" of the black race over Booker T. Washington's vocational training for the masses. During the 1920s, observes Coleman, Nigerians—including Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was to become his country's President (1963)—were deeply impressed by Marcus Garvey's cultural nationalism and his call for a free Africa.

Independence achieved, civil strife was not long in coming. The best narrative history of the cruel Biafran war is John J. Stremlau's balanced **The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970** (Princeton, 1977, cloth & paper). More detail is available in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene's two-volume **Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1969** (Oxford, 1971).

Unfortunately, there are no major studies that compare the Nigerian experience with those of other new African nations. But some good microanalyses of Nigeria do exist.

In **Urbanization and Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 1917–1967** (Univ. of Calif., 1975), Pauline H. Baker notes that Lagos grew from a colonial town of about 100,000 people to a metropolis of more than a million by the late 1960s. Interestingly, Baker finds that, as the city grew, local political control shifted away from national groups and foreign interests to resident factions, with their own ideas about municipal uplift.

One durable anthropological study describes the people of the basin formed by the Niger and Kaduna rivers. In **A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria** (Oxford, 1942; Gordon Press reprint, 1976), S. F. Nadel, of the University of Vienna, provides a meticulous account of kinship, village life and politics, and the strong position of women in Nupe society. He also discusses local farming (cotton, rice, cassava), industry (crafts), and trade.

Growing self-confidence and the discovery of oil have led Nigeria out into the wider world. Seven papers by Nigerian scholars comprise **Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy** (Oxford, 1979). Editor A. Bolaji Akinyemi notes that although Nigeria's foreign policy remained essentially pro-Western from 1960 through the mid-1970s, the strains of the Biafran war led to increased contacts with the Soviet bloc. During the 1975 Angolan civil war, Nigeria broke with the neutral policy of the Organization of African Unity to support Angola's victorious Soviet-backed MPLA faction, thus directly opposing U. S. goals.

Seemingly, many Nigerian leaders share the belief of several of the book's contributors that they should use their country's size and new wealth to take the lead in deciding economic and political questions that affect the entire continent.

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Titles mentioned in this essay were suggested by Aaron Segal, program analyst at the National Science Foundation, and by Wilson Center Fellow Emmanuel N. Obiechina, chairman of the Department of English, University of Nigeria.*

Politics:

DOES FOREIGN POLICY REALLY MATTER?

Do a candidate's thoughts on foreign policy really matter to voters in U.S. presidential campaigns? Can SALT, NATO, and GATT ever upstage domestic bread-and-butter issues? Opinions vary. France's philosopher Jean-François Revel views Americans as fundamentally indifferent to most events abroad; when foreign policy is an issue, he has written, Americans find that "wishful thinking is easier and lasts longer." In the wake of U.S. difficulties in Iran, William Bundy, editor of *Foreign Affairs,* sees the 1980 campaign shaping up as a donnybrook over "Who Lost Patagonia?" Here, political scientist Stephen Hess briskly surveys the last few presidential campaigns; he suggests that foreign policy, often for rather odd reasons, *has* become important on Election Day.

by Stephen Hess

"You can say all you want about foreign affairs, but what is really important is the price of hogs in Chicago and St. Louis," said the Governor of Illinois, William G. Stratton.

The setting for the Governor's remark was a post-midnight meeting in Vice President Richard Nixon's suite at the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel in Chicago. Only hours before, the delegates to the 1960 Republican National Convention had unanimously chosen Nixon as their presidential nominee, and the candidate had now summoned 36 party elders to advise him on choosing a running mate.

Ultimately Nixon rejected Stratton's advice and picked Henry Cabot Lodge, whose face was known to millions of American television viewers as their country's chief spokesman at the United Nations for nearly eight years. Later, explaining his decision, Nixon said: "If you ever let them [the Democrats] cam-

CRISES ABROAD AS CAMPAIGN ISSUES, 1952–76

Foreign policy crises influenced five of the last seven presidential races. "As we come down to the wire," Richard Nixon told volunteers in the last minutes of the 1968 campaign, "I think the issue you should emphasize in your final telephone calls is the issue of peace."

paign only on domestic issues, they'll beat us—our hope is to keep it on foreign policy."

In 1960, Stratton was right, Nixon was wrong, but the evidence strongly suggests that—contrary to the belief of many observers—foreign policy has played a dominant role in five of the last seven presidential campaigns, and that it is likely to do so again in 1980. One need mention only Israel, the Middle East, and imported oil for the gas pumps of all America.

The claim for foreign policy as a cutting-edge issue in American electoral politics, however, must be tempered by three observations:

(*a*) We have not witnessed serious, responsible debate on foreign policy during the presidential campaigns;

(*b*) The American voter is not particularly knowledgeable about foreign policy issues;

(*c*) The electorate's interest in foreign policy generally does not go beyond a basic desire for peace.*

*Remember the Democrats' prime re-election slogan for President Woodrow Wilson in 1916: "He kept us out of war." A month after his inauguration, of course, Wilson asked for a declaration of war against the Kaiser's Germany, and America entered World War I.

Within this framework, a look at the last seven presidential campaigns is instructive:

1952: The victorious Republicans, with Dwight Eisenhower as their candidate, ran a sort of three "C's" campaign—"Korea, Communism, and Corruption"—against the Democrats, with communism proving to be the least potent. Poll data for that election year showed the Korean war looming as the nation's No. 1 problem for an increasing proportion of Americans—growing from one-fourth of those polled (January) to one-third (September) to over one-half (late October). On October 24 in Detroit, Eisenhower delivered his "I shall go to Korea" speech—the most politically skillful foreign policy pronouncement in recent U.S. history.

1956: In the rematch between Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, the Republicans changed their alliteration to "Peace, Prosperity, and Progress." If Eisenhower's most important statement of 1952 had been "I shall go to Korea," four years later it was "Ladies and gentlemen, I feel fine." Besides the question of the 66-year-old President's health, the issue causing sharpest disagreement was nuclear testing (to be discussed below). The campaign was complicated by the Hungarian uprising and the Israeli-French-English invasion of Egypt in late October, at which time Vice President Nixon stated the case for his ticket: "This is not the moment to replace the greatest Commander in Chief America has ever had. . . ."

1960: Although questions of foreign relations were much discussed—Cuba, Taiwan, missile gaps, U.S. prestige abroad—essentially the campaign revolved around "a Catholic in the White House?" and a general mood. "I have premised my campaign for the Presidency," said John F. Kennedy, "on the simple assumption that the American people are uneasy at the present drift in our national course . . . and that they have the will and the strength to start the United States moving again." Nixon, on the other hand, "pointed with pride to an eight-year record of

Stephen Hess, 46, is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Born in New York City, he was graduated from Johns Hopkins University (1953), where he taught political science before joining the staff of the Eisenhower White House (1959–61). He has served as deputy assistant for urban affairs under President Nixon (1969) and as U.S. Representative to the United Nations (1976). His books include America's Political Dynasties *(1966),* The Republican Establishment *(1968, with David S. Broder),* The Presidential Campaign *(1974, 1978), and* Organizing the Presidency *(1976). For this essay, Mr. Hess draws on his earlier analysis in* Foreign Policy *(Fall 1972) of "Foreign Policy and Presidential Campaigns."*

unparalleled national growth . . . But at the same time . . . warned against smugness or complacency." In sum, thought Theodore H. White, "specifics and issues had all but ceased to matter; only 'style' was important."

1964: The tone of the campaign was set by a Democratic television commercial, aired only once, in which a little girl plucked daisy petals while a doomsday voice began a countdown, followed by a mushroom cloud and the voice of President Lyndon B. Johnson reminding listeners that "these are the stakes. . . ." The world-view of GOP candidate Barry Goldwater had been expressed in *The Conscience of a Conservative* (1960):"The Communist's aim is to conquer the world. . . . Unless you contemplate treason—your objective, like his, will be victory. Not 'peace,' but victory." As election day approached, Johnson rephrased the question that was on voters' minds: "Who do you want to be sittin' beside that hot line when the telephone goes ting-a-ling and the voice on the other end says 'Moscow calling'?"

"Peace With Honor"

1968: Vietnam dominated the election year. The Communists' surprise Tet offensive increased the incentive for Johnson to withdraw as a candidate. On the day of LBJ's withdrawal, March 31, Nixon was scheduled to go on radio with *his* Vietnam plan. (It called for pressure on Moscow: "Without Soviet military assistance, the North Vietnamese war machine would grind to a halt. . . .") The speech was never delivered. Instead Nixon backed off from specifics, declaring that once a presidential candidate "makes a statement indicating what he would settle for, he pulls the rug out from under the negotiators."

After a bitter split over Vietnam policy at their convention, the Democrats chose Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Some of his advisers recommended an open break with the Johnson policy on Vietnam. But in his Salt Lake City speech of September 30, the Vice President would only go as far as to announce his willingness "to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as an acceptable risk for peace. . . ." The President declared a bombing halt on October 31; however, the immediate refusal of the South Vietnamese to join peace talks left the American people confused and succeeded in neutralizing any potential advantage to the Democrats. Despite the Republicans' rhetorical drumbeat on "law-and-order," the polls showed Vietnam as the number one concern of the electorate.

Issues of war and peace can be decisive in presidential campaigns. In 1952 (above), Dwight D. Eisenhower's pledge to "go to Korea" helped boost him to victory. In 1964 (below), Barry Goldwater's "hawkish" attitude toward the Vietnam conflict frightened off many voters.



by John Fischetti. © 1969 Field Newspaper Syndicate.

1972: For a time, this came as close to a single-issue campaign as there has ever been, guaranteed by the nomination of Sen. George McGovern (D.-S.D.), whose rise from obscurity was entirely based on his passionate opposition to the Vietnam War. In contrast, seeking "peace with honor," President Nixon had mined Haiphong's harbor, bombed Hanoi, and invaded Cambodia.

Yet Nixon also had gone to China, held SALT talks with the Soviet Union, made progress in the Middle East, and withdrawn over 400,000 troops from Vietnam. Spurred perhaps by McGovern's fumbles in selecting a vice-presidential candidate, the voters' verdict was overwhelmingly to approve Nixon's handling of foreign affairs.

Italy, Ireland, Israel

1976: The campaign was centered around controversies, not issues. However, one of the controversies did concern foreign relations: Gerald Ford's statement in the second televised Carter-Ford debate, "I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union." Among the other controversies were Jimmy Carter's language in a *Playboy* interview and a vulgar remark by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz. The burden of Watergate proved too great for Ford, an appointed President, and the voters narrowly chose a Democrat whose principal campaign theme was that he didn't have any Washington experience.

Clearly, in most of these elections foreign policy as an issue boiled down to who was most apt to get or keep us out of war: Highly technical questions, such as international finance, or even explosive situations that were unlikely to involve American troops were not the stuff on which electoral mandates were constructed.

Given, however, that the electorate has less interest in and less knowledge of foreign relations than of domestic affairs, it is clear that on those international issues that the voters do care about, they care very deeply indeed. As the classic American government textbook by Burns and Peltason* puts it: "Foreign policy issues . . . in contrast with domestic issues have less extensity and more intensity." Foreign policy becomes a dominant campaign issue only when it has reached the raw nerve of the electorate and is thus "domesticated."

*James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, *Government by the People*, 8th edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, p. 442.

THE LAW OF THE WORST

How enlightening are discussions of issues during presidential campaigns? Stephen Hess considers that question in this excerpt drawn from his 1972 Foreign Policy *article,* "Foreign Policy and Presidential Campaigns":

It is Daniel P. Moynihan's widely shared opinion that "elections are rarely our finest hour." As an iron rule, issues in a political campaign are oversimplified, overdramatized, and overcatastrophized. Reasonable discussion, as Theodore White has written, may be "the dream of unblooded political scientists," but in practice there should be no expectation that presidential campaigns will be appropriate vehicles for objective, thorough, balanced review of public policy. While this applies to both domestic and international issues, the latter are made even more inscrutable by their complexities, secrecy restrictions, and the limited knowledge of most voters.

Thus it can be stated as a general law of campaigning: *All issues are badly handled; foreign policy issues are handled worst.*

The issue-ignorance of the electorate probably is the most thoroughly documented finding in research on voter behavior. University of Michigan scholars in 1964 found that 28 percent of those

American actions on issues of great importance, such as helping Indochina's boat people or fixing the world monetary situation, may affect almost no votes at all. They have not reached that raw nerve. On the other hand, U.S. policy vis-a-vis some countries has become so domesticated that both parties must play special themes on them at all times. The "three-I circuit"—Italy, Ireland, Israel—was long a standard itinerary for American politicians; and Israel, in particular, gets special attention in any presidential candidate's campaign rhetoric.

Candidates' appeals in the international realm are basic, even primitive: "I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars" (Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940). "If there must be a war there in Korea, let it be Asians against Asians . . ." (Dwight Eisenhower, 1952). "We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing to protect themselves" (Lyndon Johnson, 1964). Given two factors that have worked powerfully to keep foreign policy discussions out of election year debate, the quantity, if not the quality, of these debates has been noteworthy.

interviewed did not know there was a Communist regime in China. A majority (three out of five) of those who voted for Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 New Hampshire Democratic primary probably did not know that the Minnesota Senator was a "dove" since they viewed the Johnson administration as not hardline enough in Vietnam.

Still, as political scientist V. O. Key has pointed out, "voters are not fools." For example, in 1960, Nixon received 59 percent of the Negro vote in Atlanta; in 1964, Goldwater received less than 1 percent of that vote. Many of these voters may not have known the substance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or that Goldwater voted against it. But their massive vote shift suggests that they had a firm notion of which candidate would be most sympathetic to their interests and thus had used their ballots "rationally."

A rough estimate would be that a third of the voters make up their minds before the conventions, a third during the conventions, and a third during the campaign. Many U.S. presidential elections are close enough for the time between Labor Day and Election Day to make a difference in the outcome. During this period, the only voting determinants that the candidates can manipulate are "the issues" —what they choose to stand for or ignore. And it is here that the candidates have accented foreign policy.

First, there has been the underlying American belief that "politics stops at the water's edge," the pervasive notion that extreme partisanship is not only out of place in foreign affairs but also somehow almost un-American. Massive disillusionment with the 1965–73 Vietnam involvement has eroded this feeling, but most candidates still find it necessary to pay lip service to this lingering sentiment.

Second, issues tend to surface in American politics because of strong prompting from pressure groups, which traditionally are organized along occupational lines. Labor unions, the American Medical Association, and farm groups, for instance, may have positions on international relations, but these positions are not generally central to their purposes.

Ethnic groups, of course, often feel very strongly about U.S. policies abroad. Irish-Americans and German-Americans lobbied to prevent U.S. intervention in both World Wars. Predictable pressure has come from East European (anti-Soviet) and Jewish (pro-Israeli) groups and, more recently, from Greek (anti-Turk) and black (anti–South African) spokesmen. Yet on the scale of forces that weigh most heavily in the making of

presidential election issues, these are modest, although not inconsequential.

Strangely, perhaps, an important reason for the prominence of foreign policy in recent presidential politics is that it has most engaged those who by some mysterious process become labeled in the press as "potential presidential nominees." More of this breed have served on the Foreign Relations Committee, for example, than on any other single Senate committee.*

Eisenhower, of course, came from the military, but with assignments that heavily involved international diplomacy. Nixon's foreign relations experience went back to membership on the Herter Committee in the House of Representatives. McGovern had been Food for Peace director; his ultimate running mate, Sargent Shriver, had been Peace Corps director and U.S. Ambassador to France. Even many of the governors whose names have been in that magic circle of potential Presidents have had some foreign policy experience—Stevenson, Harriman, Rockefeller, and Scranton. And those governors without a background in foreign affairs usually have tried to simulate this experience through overseas trade missions and membership on such bodies as the Trilateral Commission, as did Jimmy Carter.

Adlai's Lost Cause

Moreover, foreign policy has occasionally become an issue in presidential campaigns because the candidates have wished it to be, because it was the area in which they were most interested. Take the case of Adlai Stevenson in 1956.

Well before the convention, Stevenson's advisers reached the conclusion, based on a detailed study of voter attitudes and public opinion polls, that the Democratic campaign should be waged on domestic policy. "Concentrating on domestic issues," wrote two members of the candidate's braintrust, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Seymour Harris, "would renew the image of the Democratic party as the people's party, leading the nation out of depression and poverty."

The Stevenson offensive was to be called "The New America"—a phrase he used in accepting the nomination—and would emphasize such matters as education, medical care, civil rights, civil liberties, and the problems of children and the aged.

As the campaign progressed the candidate became increas-

*Howard Baker, Alben Barkley, Frank Church, Hubert Humphrey, John Kennedy, William Knowland, Eugene McCarthy, Edmund Muskie, and Stuart Symington. Henry Jackson, Lyndon Johnson, and Barry Goldwater were members of the Armed Services Committee.

by John Fischetti. © 1968 Field Newspaper Syndicate.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey was plagued in the 1968 campaign (above) by his association with President Johnson's Vietnam policy; with a "secret plan" to end the war, Richard Nixon narrowly won election. But as election day approached four years later (below), the war still raged on.

From MacNelly: The Pulitzer Prize Winning Cartoonist *by Jeffrey MacNelly. © 1972 by J. MacNelly. Used by permission of Crown Publishers, Inc.*

ingly restless with this strategy. By late October, he was telling audiences, "I want to talk with you about the most serious failure of the Republican administration. I mean its failure in conducting our foreign policy." And so "The New America" fell into disuse as Stevenson fought his lost cause over terrain on which he knew himself to be at a decided disadvantage but to which he seemed to be almost magnetically attracted.

The primary issue on which Stevenson challenged the President was the suspension of hydrogen bomb testing. The discussion was largely free of acrimony and innuendo; rarely has an American election produced two candidates so intolerant of demagoguery and political overkill. It is instructive as an example of how badly issues of such complexity are handled under the best of circumstances.

Stevenson changed his position in mid-passage. On April 21, he had said, "We should give prompt and earnest consideration to stopping further tests of the hydrogen bomb. . . ." By October 29, he was contending, "I have never proposed the prohibition of tests of other than large H-bombs." (Between the two statements was a distinction of some significance.) Eisenhower issued a 10-point statement on "the government's policies and actions with respect to the development and testing of nuclear weapons." Stevenson responded selectively to only half the points; Eisenhower responded not at all to some of Stevenson's arguments.

What Missile Gap?

In a narrow sense, the point at issue boiled down to Stevenson's contention that the United States should unilaterally stop the testing of large H-bombs and Eisenhower's contention that the United States should not. But more broadly, the contenders were off on different tracks. Stevenson's concern was with what his opponent called "the lesser matter of the testing of our nuclear weapons"; Eisenhower's concern was with the general question of disarmament: "The critical issue is not a matter of testing nuclear weapons," he said, "but of preventing their use in nuclear war."

The issue, the most important substantive one of the campaign, was simply never joined.

Questions of nuclear policy, as ventilated by Stevenson and Eisenhower in 1956, by Barry Goldwater in 1964, and by George Wallace's running mate, Curtis LeMay, in 1968, show how ill-suited are matters of high complexity and technical content for discussion in a presidential campaign. Two other questions,

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF A BLOOPER

"I don't believe that the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union." So spoke President Gerald R. Ford on October 6, 1976, 25 minutes into his second debate with Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter. The seemingly trivial "blooper" became the most publicized foreign policy issue of the 1976 campaign. Interestingly, writes Frederick Steeper of the Detroit-based Market Research Corporation, "the general public did *not* know that Ford had made an error until they were told [so] by the media the next day."

Commissioned by the President Ford Committee, Market Research conducted a national survey of some 500 viewers beginning that night, with fresh soundings taken at various times the next day. Some 44 percent of viewers interviewed right after the debate thought Ford had done a "better job" than Carter (35 percent). By the next morning, however, Ford's 18 point lead became a 13 point disadvantage—probably the result of emphasis on the blooper in morning newspapers and TV news. The gap widened to 26 percent during the afternoon. The October 7 evening interviewing, which extended beyond the evening news, showed the largest change: 61 percent of those interviewed now thought Carter had "won" the debate.

Ford's blunder had a big impact on his campaign. The Republican nominee was put on the defensive, Steeper concludes, and "the two-month trend toward Ford . . . in the public polls came to a halt."



raised in 1960—the "missile gap" and Cuba—illustrate the problems of debating issues that are shrouded in official secrecy.

Following the successful Soviet missile tests of 1957, the matter of the relative missile production of the two superpowers moved in glacieresque fashion from Pentagon to Congress to campaign, gathering momentum year by year, while losing those rough edges of doubt, detail, and perspective that would have slowed its descent into political rhetoric.

By 1959, the issue had been expropriated from the generals by Senator Stuart Symington, a former Air Force Secretary, and, more important at the time, a potential Democratic candi-

date for President. The Senator charged that Soviet capabilities would shortly give them a three-to-one lead over the United States in ICBMs and that "the intelligence books had been juggled so that the budget books may be balanced." Eisenhower's Defense Secretary Thomas Gates responded that "there is no deterrent gap."

During the fall campaign against Nixon, Kennedy did not stress the "missile gap," although it was a part of his stump vocabulary: "The Republican party, the same party which gave us the missile gap . . ." (Minneapolis, October 1); "I have confidence in our ability to close the missile gap . . ." (St. Louis, October 2).

Less than a month after Kennedy's inauguration, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, now privy to the appropriate classified documents, announced to a press conference that there was no missile gap, although his remarks were officially "not for attribution." By Thanksgiving, word was out that Kennedy too had formally buried the issue.

Playing Statesman

This explanation must have been cold comfort for Richard Nixon. In an analysis of 1956–60 voters who switched from one party to the other, Brookings' political scientist James Sundquist concluded that the second most helpful issue for the Democrats was the "missile gap" (after "unemployment").

The Cuban issue was raised by John Kennedy in a surprisingly militant statement on October 20, 1960:

> We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our government.

What Kennedy had proposed, in effect, was the covert CIA operation then in preparation, which would ultimately be transformed into the Bay of Pigs invasion. Nixon, who had been the project's advocate within high administration councils, thought that Kennedy had been briefed on the plans and, as he wrote later, was privately furious at his opponent for "jeopardizing the security of a United States foreign policy operation."

The day after Kennedy's statement the two candidates met for their final TV debate. When the question of the Cuba proposal was raised, Nixon attacked:

". . . If we were to follow that recommendation . . . we would lose all of our friends in Latin America, we would probably be condemned in the United Nations, and we would not accomplish our objective. . . . It would be an open invitation for Mr. Khrushchev . . . to come into Latin America and to engage us in what would be a civil war and possibly even worse than that."

Nixon was to explain later that this tack was the "only thing I could do. The covert operation had to be protected at all costs. I must not even suggest by implication that the United States was rendering aid to rebel forces in and out of Cuba. In fact, I must go to the other extreme: I must attack the Kennedy proposal to provide such aid as wrong and irresponsible because it would violate our treaty commitments."

Whether this was the "only thing" that Nixon could have done is a moot question. The point is that a responsible candidate will engage in what politicians call "honest lying" to maintain national security secrecy. But for voters who are prayerfully trying to weigh the merits of each issue, they must somehow factor in the possibility that what they are being told is not true.

Nixon's "dilemma" over Cuba suggests the liabilities of incumbency. Yet, on balance, the advantages of incumbency in dealing with foreign policy in a presidential campaign are substantially greater. At its most elemental, how does one measure

BOOKS: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The origins of America's quadrennial presidential contests are traced by James S. Chase in **Emergence of the Presidential Nominating Convention, 1789–1832.** One of the best documentary studies is the four-volume **History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968,** edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Individual campaigns have also inspired some good books. The drama of Abraham Lincoln's 1860 victory, which hastened the onset of the Civil War, is recorded by Reinhard H. Luthin in **The First Lincoln Campaign.** The biggest recent upset, Harry S Truman's 1948 win over Thomas E. Dewey, is chronicled by Irwin Ross in **The Loneliest Campaign**. Theodore H. White provides popular 1960–72 accounts of **The Making of the President.** Two excellent recent scholarly analyses are Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky's **Presidential Elections** and James W. Ceaser's **Presidential Selection**. Ceaser notes that, recently, each candidate has striven to attract a personal mass constituency; this "cult of the personality" and the increasing number of presidential primaries (at least 36 are scheduled for 1980) have severely weakened the link between President and party.

Oliphant, © 1979, Washington Star. Reprinted with permission of Los Angeles Times Syndicate.

"Well, I expected some kind of reaction from Carter, but I didn't know he had this *sort of influence," was the caption on this Oliphant cartoon, which appeared at the height of the furor last year over a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba. Castro's Cuba is a hardy perennial in U.S. politics.*

the worth to President Franklin Roosevelt, the wartime Commander in Chief, of opening his 1944 campaign for re-election from the deck of a Navy destroyer, its guns as background, as thousands of shipyard workers lined the docks of Bremerton, Washington, and millions more listened over nationwide radio? Or what better exit line can one imagine than President Lyndon Johnson, after Khrushchev was ousted in the midst of the 1964 campaign, saying to reporters, "I'm sorry I can't stay around and talk with you—[Soviet] Ambassador Dobrynin is coming over to see me . . ."!*

To run against a President is to live in constant terror of being upstaged: Will unexpected world events, such as Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964, give the incumbent an opportunity to play "statesman" while all around him are merely "office-seekers"?

While the President has less than total control over the world situation, his opponent has none. Johnson's request for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August of 1964 boosted his rating on "handling Vietnam" in the Harris Poll from 42 percent to 72

*Of course, the timing of foreign crises is a matter of some importance. The Communist Tet offensive in Vietnam, coming in January of 1968, probably knocked Johnson out of the race. Would it have elected him if it had come in October? The existence of a volatile international situation during the fall campaign works to the advantage of the in-power party, as with the Suez and Hungary crises in 1956; a period of relative calm does not (1960).

percent. After meeting with visiting Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in 1967, Johnson's popularity jumped 11 points, although a majority of those interviewed did not feel that the Glassboro (New Jersey) Summit "brought peace closer" and only 19 percent thought the meetings would help settle the Vietnam War. In the collective public mind, the President was aided by an action that was largely perceived as useless—at least he had done *something*.

There are no changes in the geography or the geometry of American politics to suggest that foreign policy issues are less likely to be raised in this year's presidential race—or that they will be handled more responsibly than in the past.

On the contrary. One development suggests that all issues —domestic and international—will be handled with more heat and less light. Political parties traditionally have represented so many different interests that each group has had to make compromises in order to remain within the party. The parties, in other words, long tended to mute intensity on any given issue. Thus, the steady decline of the parties has serious consequences. The current disarray of the Democratic Party, for instance, removes some of the pressure for consensus that has long held in balance the basic interests of organized labor, blacks, and Jews. Each group now has less incentive to act in tandem, as shown by the recent, unprecedented black-Jewish debate over the proper role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Mideast peace efforts. The repercussions on foreign policy debate in 1980 could be considerable.

The irony, of course, is that the foreign policy promises the candidates make in 1980 will probably have little to do with the foreign policy crises that a President will actually confront in 1981–85. Judging from recent history, voters would be better served if candidates addressed such questions as: What would you do if the Soviet Union put offensive missiles in Cuba? How would you react if North Korea invaded South Korea? What would be your response if the East Germans built a new wall between East and West Berlin?

Unfortunately, contenders for the Presidency do not answer hypothetical questions. But if they did, it would be more interesting—and certainly more useful—than the way foreign policy is now debated in presidential campaigns.



The first Labor Day parade, New York City, September 5, 1882

Jobs in America

Fifty years after the onset of the Great Depression, the average American changes jobs six times during his working life. With a civilian labor force of 103 million people, that means the job market is in a constant state of flux. So are attitudes toward work. So is "unemployment." Anomalies like the postwar Baby Boom ripple through the economy with unpredictable consequences. The biggest recent shift: an enormous increase in the number and proportion of women in the workforce, especially married women, that shows no sign of letting up. This development alone, claims Columbia's Eli Ginzburg, will change modern American society "more than the rise of communism or the harnessing of nuclear power." Perhaps. Economists' views vary. Here, Richard Freeman looks at the evolving "shape" of the U.S. labor force; James O'Toole surveys some fresh approaches to "work reform"; and Katherine Swartz describes the difficulties of defining and alleviating joblessness.

THE NEWCOMERS

by Richard B. Freeman

George Bernard Shaw may have amused London audiences when he wrote in *Man and Superman* (1903) that "home is the girl's prison and the women's workhouse," but the remark was slightly anachronistic even then. Millions of women in Britain and the United States were already working outside the home in shops and factories and as servants in the homes of people who flocked to Shaw's plays.

In the face of today's realities, the acerbic British playwright would probably have kept his mouth shut.

Since World War II, "work" has increasingly been women's world as well as men's. Reflecting the pattern in Western Europe

and Japan, the female share of the U.S. workforce grew from 28 percent in 1947 to 42 percent three decades later. Half of all women older than 16 held jobs in 1978 (versus 31 percent in 1948). The biggest gains were registered not among single women (who have traditionally worked for wages) but among married women, particularly mothers. More mothers are now working than not, and two-thirds of *all* American women with children will probably be holding down jobs 10 years from now.

"Like the Industrial Revolution," say the authors of a new Urban Institute study, "the movement of women out of the home and into the workplace [constitutes] a fundamental and lasting shift in the way in which the nation conducts its business, its family life, and its governmental policies."*

Defying the Predictions

As yet, the full implications of this movement are only dimly perceived.

Some side-effects are already obvious. Fast-food restaurants have become a fixture in every community—in large part because they are such a convenience to families in which both parents work. Day-care centers are common, and household cleaning services are doing a brisk business. Perhaps as a cause, or perhaps as a result of the expansion of the female workforce, U.S. fertility has fallen to 1.8 births per woman, down 40 percent in the last 20 years. By all accounts, women's employment has contributed to a new sense of "economic independence"; it may be partly responsible for the high frequency of divorce. And because 40 million women are now working for pay, the pool of volunteers for hospitals, Girl Scouts, and other community services is shrinking.

There is no single explanation for the long-term influx of women into the work force. That the jobs exist in the first place is due to the aggregate expansion of the U.S. economy since 1945.

The changing "shape" of the economy has also helped. Among the fastest growing sectors have been health care and education—fields in which women have always been well repre-

**The Subtle Revolution: Women at Work,* edited by Ralph E. Smith, with Nancy S. Barrett, Nancy M. Gordon, Sandra L. Hofferth, Kristin A. Moore, and Clair Vickery, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1979.

Richard B. Freeman, 34, is professor of economics at Harvard University and director of labor studies at the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass. Born in Newburgh, N.Y., he was graduated from Dartmouth College in 1964 and received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1969. He has written The Overeducated American *(1976) and* Black Elite *(1977).*

WARS, WOMEN, AND WORK

In 1890, some 3.7 million American women were working for pay. Two-thirds of them were single, and most of the rest were widowed or divorced. One-third worked as servants.

Such patterns did not survive World War II. "To win this war," wrote Susan B. Anthony, II in 1943, "American women *must come out of their homes.*" And they did, replacing absent husbands, brothers, and sons in factories and offices around the country. Between 1940 and 1944, Norman Rockwell's "Rosie the Riveter" (below) and 5 million other new women workers swelled the employment rolls. For the first time in U.S. history, wives edged out single women as job-holders; that trend continues.

Often overlooked is the role played by World War I in breaking down barriers to women. With 4 million American men under arms, American women became an emergency labor supply—and proved (to the surprise of skeptical managers) that they could do a "man's work." Between 1914 and 1918, the number of women working in the steel industry trebled. The official U.S. government list of occupations in which women replaced men filled some six pages in tiny print. And most working women stayed in the labor force after the war. This fact, the author of a 1920 Labor Department study rightly predicted, "bids fair to encourage a larger share of woman labor in the future."

From The Saturday Evening Post. © *1943 The Curtis Publishing Company.*

sented as nurses and teachers. And, throughout this period, women's wages have increased substantially, making employment ever more attractive.* More employers have begun making part-time jobs available to women able to work only a few hours a day. (Today, 20 percent of *all* jobs are part-time.) Finally, most American women and men have come to accept the idea that women may work, may contribute to family finances, may even

*As yet, however, average female earnings do not begin to approach those of men, despite passage by Congress of the Equal Pay Act (1963). In 1977, women earned 58.5¢ for every dollar earned by a man. One reason is "occupational segregation." Most working women have tended (or have been forced) to take jobs where wages historically have been low. For example, 97.9 percent of all secretaries are women. Another reason is that women have usually gone into and out of the labor force more frequently than have men; thus, they have accrued less job seniority and fewer chances for advancement.

have their own careers; they have rejected the old notion that "a woman's (only) place is in the home."

What is fascinating is that the massive influx of women into the work force—the biggest single change in the labor market since World War II—was consistently underestimated in nearly every forecast, even those made during the mid-1960s when an upward trend was already apparent.

The chronic problem for planners is that the U.S. labor market is a dynamic arena, rapidly affected by everything from war, recession, and inflation to manners and morals. Supply and demand are always changing. So is the "mix" of jobs across the nation. And economists are not very good at predicting what lies ahead. In 1969, for example, the National Science Foundation foresaw a bumper crop of new Ph.D.s entering the academic workforce in 1976. They were wrong. What the forecasters didn't know was that the bottom was about to fall out of the academic job market.

The Youth Problem

Another prediction gone awry can be found in the 1966 *Manpower Report to the President.* The report predicted that the number of workers of both sexes under age 35 would grow by 51 percent between 1960 and 1975; actual growth was 66 percent. The influx of younger married women into the job market was one big surprise factor. Despite this unexpectedly large increase, the economy has adjusted reasonably well. In 1960, about 11.5 million young persons (aged 16 to 24) had jobs; that figure more than doubled—to 23.7 million—by 1977.

The great youth influx has had some harsh effects. It has brought a marked drop in the average earnings of young workers relative to the earnings of older persons—a matter of supply and demand. While this change is most pronounced, as we shall see, among college graduates, for whom the economic return on an "investment" in education is no longer so great, the slippage occurs across the board. In 1967, men aged 45 to 49 earned, *on average,* only 6 percent more than males aged 25 to 29. In 1977, the differential was 21 percent. There is reason to believe that members of the huge baby-boom generation will suffer economically for the rest of their lives.*

*See "The Effect of Demographic Factors on Age-Earnings Profiles" by Richard B. Freeman, in *The Journal of Human Resources,* Summer 1979. Among the reasons: (*a*) Owing to the seniority systems and graduated pay scales built into much of the economy, an "age cohort" that starts behind in the earnings race may never catch up; and (*b*) many young people in the 1970s have been pushed, for lack of alternatives, into poor jobs from which they may never emerge.

JOB GROWTH, BY SECTOR (in millions)*

Sources of employment expand and contract over time, even as the total number of jobs increases. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there will be 50 percent fewer telegraph operators by the mid-1980s, 54 percent fewer bootblacks. But demand will jump for dental hygienists (by 118 percent), legal secretaries (50 percent), and practical nurses (54 percent).



*excluding farmers and farm laborers

Source: *Employment and Training Report of the President*, 1979, U.S. Dept. of Labor.

MEN'S SALARIES

	1958	1963	1967	1972	1977
Salaried engineers	$7,738	$9,185	$11,352	$15,130	$20,959
College professors	—	—	—	—	20,337
Salaried managers	6,247	7,799	9,474	12,696	17,803
School teachers	5,393	6,097	7,498	10,452	14,148
Craftsmen	4,638	5,652	6,957	9,200	12,313
Sales workers	4,133	5,129	6,028	8,138	11,685
Clerical workers	4,356	5,260	5,995	8,135	10,822
Service workers	3,018	3,292	3,645	4,242	5,077
Farmers	1,555	1,852	2,673	4,026	4,317
Median male earnings	—	5,032	6,030	7,991	11,037
Constant '67 dollars	—	5,487	6,030	6,337	6,080

Source: Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Report*, 1958-77.

OCCUPATIONAL PATTERNS, BY SEX, 1978



Source: *Employment and Training Report of the President*, 1978.

THE TEN LEADING OCCUPATIONS FOR WOMEN, 1870-1970



Source: *The Women's Book of World Records and Achievements*, edited by Lois Decker O'Neill Anchor Books, Garden City, N.Y.: 1979.

The "controlling" characteristic of this postwar generation, now aged 20 to 35, is its large size. Because the population bulge appeared so suddenly and passed so rapidly into the economy, both lower wages and somewhat higher than normal unemployment among the young were only natural. This unhappy situation will be turned on its head in the 1980s, when the relative proportion of young workers will decline, earnings for the young will be higher, and job opportunities better.

The postwar generation exemplifies the central *qualitative* change in the U.S. labor force: the increase in educational attainment. During the 1960s, with help from Washington, colleges and universities enjoyed unprecedented growth in enrollments, expenditures, salaries—and graduates' job prospects. Between 1966 and 1974, the number of B.A.s granted by American colleges doubled; the number of M.A.s and Ph.D.s grew almost as quickly. By 1978, more than 17 percent of the workforce had a college degree (versus 8 percent in 1952); the average U.S. worker had 12.6 years of schooling. And the economy benefited, for as a general rule the better educated a country's workforce, the higher its productivity, the larger its Gross National Product. Up to a point, anyway.

Overeducated, Underemployed?

With more and more young Americans attending college and entering the job market, the relative economic advantage of a college degree began to decline. (As economist Paul Samuelson has described the phenomenon, standing on tiptoe is a solution for one person at a parade, even for several people; it is not a solution for the whole crowd.) An increasing number of college graduates ended up in jobs that did not "require" college training. In 1968, 83 percent of male graduates were employed as professionals and managers; in 1978, only 77 percent were so employed. Among women, the proportion fell from 81 percent to 65 percent. At the same time, the ratio of male college graduates' earnings to those of male high school graduates declined. Commentators began to talk grimly about the "over-educated American": literate, underemployed, dissatisfied.

Not surprisingly, the proportion of young men starting college, which climbed rapidly in the 1960s to 44 percent, fell to 34 percent in 1974. The proportion of young women entering college leveled off at one-third.

Meanwhile, students began to shift from "depressed" fields, such as education or the humanities, into such promising specialties as engineering. ("Many engineering graduates can write

THE INVISIBLES

The much-publicized influx of migrant workers into the United States is nothing new. How the phenomenon is viewed by Washington, however, changes with the circumstances. During the high-unemployment Depression years, the Roosevelt administration repatriated 400,000 illegal aliens to Mexico. Later, under the *bracero* program (1942–64), begun during wartime, as many as 450,000 Mexicans each year were granted seasonal permits to help U.S. farmers harvest crops. Then, in 1953–54, the Eisenhower administration cracked down on illegal migrants. Under "Operation Wetback," some 2 million Mexican "illegals" were returned to Mexico.

Today, the nation is host to an invisible labor force, vaguely estimated at several million illegal aliens. Employing illegals is not itself illegal (thanks to the "Texas proviso" of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952), nor is being in the United States without a visa a crime. But because they are subject to deportation, few undocumented aliens go out of the way to identify themselves to researchers or census-takers.

Unemployment and a looming recession currently make the presence of illegal workers a political issue. The basic questions are two: Are the illegals a drain on state and municipal budgets? Do they take away jobs from U.S. citizens?

The answer to Question No. 1 is "no." The typical illegal alien is a 27-year-old bachelor who makes few demands on schools, clinics, or welfare officials. A 1975 Labor Department study suggested that

their own ticket," a university placement director told the *Chronicle of Higher Education* last autumn.) Today, at the graduate level, law and business programs are swollen; Ph.D. programs, by contrast, are anemic. To a greater extent than analysts realized in the past, young people tend to react quickly to the changing labor market by altering their choices of career and education.

Economists don't puzzle much over the current buyers' market in college graduates; the problem is straightforward. One of the real riddles, however, is the continuing, steady decline in the participation of older working men aged 55 to 64, only 74 percent of whom are currently in the labor force, a decrease of 13 percent since 1960. Some, but not all, of the erosion can be explained by higher social security and disability benefits and the availability of pension plans.

It may be that this decline will eventually level off. Inflation places a heavy burden on pensioners with fixed incomes. And the 1978 Age Discrimination in Employment Act raised the manda-

three out of four illegals pay federal income and Social Security taxes. Fewer than 3 percent have children in school. Fewer than 2 percent receive food stamps. In San Diego, illegals used an estimated $2 million worth of public services in 1975 but paid some $49 million in taxes on locally earned wages.

Question No. 2 is harder to answer. The view of some union officials and many black leaders was summed up recently in *Ebony* magazine: "The siphoning off of jobs [by illegals] is a major reason for the unemployment crisis among blacks." Economist Michael Piore believes otherwise. Illegals benefit, he contends, from a "labor vacuum"; they are taking jobs—dishwashing, apple-picking—that Americans, black or white, young or old, don't want, even at the minimum wage. The average "experienced" illegal lands a job within two days; a newcomer, within two weeks.

The U.S. population in the year 2000 is projected at 253 million. If illegals continue to enter the country at current rates, the figure will be closer to 278 million.



tory retirement age from 65 to 70 for most private employees.

There are other signs. While the Department of Labor has estimated that fewer than 200,000 of today's working Americans will actually stay on the job after age 65, a Harris poll in February 1979 found that more than 50 percent of those workers surveyed wanted to keep on working. "The basic undeniable fact," commented pollster Louis Harris, "is that most Americans want to work for the rest of their lives." Harris's findings came after Sears, Roebuck and Co., in late 1978, discovered that more than three-quarters of its salaried people scheduled to retire (along with 60 percent of wage workers) had decided not to do so.

Another riddle: the drop in the proportion of black men of all ages who either hold or seek jobs. In 1954, 85 percent of all black men were in the workforce; that figure fell to 71 percent in 1977.

Some economists argue that, because blacks are, on average, poorer than whites, they have responded more strongly to the increased availability of social security, disability insurance, and

other forms of "welfare"; as a result, they have dropped out of the labor force. Others point to the sharp decline of the two-parent, male-headed household among blacks. Men who are not "heads of households," they note, have historically had higher dropout rates. Although each explanation is plausible, again we still do not know the whole story.

Overall, the U.S. labor force is mobile and adaptable. Perhaps at some cost to social stability, Americans shift readily from job to job, place to place, or in and out of the job market. "Employment" is not the clear-cut concept many middle-class Americans think it is; barely half of all working Americans work full-time all year long. In addition, U.S. workers have adapted nicely to an environment where the *types* of available work can shift as quickly and momentously as the *composition* of the work force.

Look at recent history. Some industries that expanded in the 1960s, such as education and aerospace, contracted sharply during the 1970s. Between 1967 and 1977, New York City lost 30,000 printing jobs. Yet other industries, such as coal mining, the sick sector of earlier decades, started down the road to recovery during the 1970s.

A White-Collar Revolution

More than one-third of all American workers changed their *occupations* between 1965 and 1970. In 1960, there were so few computer experts that the specialty was not listed as a separate occupation by the Census Bureau. In 1977, there were more than 370,000 computer specialists in the country (many of them doing computerized typesetting); a recent 96-page *New York Times* supplement on "Careers in the '80s" carried enticing ads for computer programmers on nearly every page. In this field as in others, large numbers of older adults have gone back to school to adapt or maintain their work skills in a period of rapid change. (In 1976, 1.6 million persons 35 or older were enrolled in some sort of school.)

The most publicized shift during the past three decades has been from blue-collar and semi-skilled craft jobs to white-collar jobs—as secretaries, paralegals, bureaucrats, bank tellers; as managers and technicians in the small, new "high-technology" companies whose aggregate payroll doubled every 30 months during the 1970s. That is not to say that all of these new jobs are psychically rewarding and "challenging"; indeed, many people in clerical positions are essentially "white-collar factory" workers, whose tasks, though they may involve computers and

paper-pushing, are nevertheless highly routinized. And new labor-saving technology has not eliminated the need for skilled hands and strong backs—in steel mills and coal mines, on farms, construction sites, and elsewhere. Still, the basic trends are clear.

Congested Decade

One of the great catalysts in the growth of the white-collar workforce has been government: federal and, most notably, state and local. From the 1950s through the '70s, government's share of all workers nearly doubled; by 1976, one American worker in six was on the public payroll. And that does not include the consultants, the medical researchers, the employees of defense contractors, local hospitals, and highway builders—whose salaries may ultimately be paid by the taxpayers, though none is technically on the public payroll. As the *National Journal* has noted, the federal government *alone* "is responsible, directly or indirectly, for employing nearly 13 million people." The expansion of the public sector accounts for one-third of all the growth in employment in the postwar era.

Paralleling the growth of public sector employment has been the rise of public sector unionism; in this respect, the United States is catching up with the rest of the West. Jerry Wurf's 1.1 million–member American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, for example, is now one of the largest unions in the country. Almost all public-school teachers are organized, as are many policemen, firemen, and garbagemen.

By contrast, private sector unionism is lagging in the United States, for a variety of reasons. In 1956, more than one-third of all private, nonagricultural wage-and-salary employees were unionized; the proportion today is just over one-quarter. That is not to say the AFL-CIO's days are numbered. Historically, unionism has grown in sudden spurts that have defied the predictions of the experts. Its moments of stagnation, too, have eluded the specialists. In 1947, political scientist Charles Lindblom predicted that a new wave of syndicalist fervor was about to sweep the land. Union membership promptly leveled off.

It is inherently difficult to foresee such structural changes. Who in 1950, for example, could have predicted the massive federal intervention in the labor market to help minorities, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964? But Washington did intervene. Demand for minority workers increased dramatically, especially in the high-skill occupations; corporations set into place "affirmative action" searches and "fast tracks" especially

TROUBLED UNIONS

"The labor movement is losing members, falling on its face on the legislative front, and running aground on real wages." So concluded a recent essay in *The Nation.*

Trade unions have faced periodic crises ever since the founding of the American Federation of Labor in 1886. The biggest challenge today: a sharp drop in the proportion of the total U.S. workforce represented by unions, from about one-third to one-quarter since the mid-1950s. In actual numbers, too, union membership (now at 19.3 million) has fallen off. The causes vary. Factories have moved from the industrial Frostbelt states to the largely nonunion Sunbelt states. Ohio alone has had a net loss of 150,000 manufacturing jobs during the past decade. The increase in working women and white-collar employees has also hurt; historically, neither group has been receptive to union organizers. (Only one out of eight women working today is a union member.) And congressional support appears to be ebbing. Despite an intensive lobbying effort on Capitol Hill, AFL-CIO leaders watched the Labor Law Reform Act of 1978, which would have eased unions' organizing tasks, go down to defeat.

Perhaps the most serious problem faced by trade unions is stiffer opposition from employers. Today, as never before, company managers seek to win National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) referendums among employees on whether to unionize, often hiring specialized labor-management consultants to run their campaigns. In such NLRB-sponsored shop elections, the unions lost out 54 percent of the time in 1977. By contrast, in 1950, the unions won three out of four such votes. A few companies have refused to negotiate even after union victories in NLRB elections.



Courtesy AFL-CIO

for well-trained blacks and Hispanics.

Such efforts have radically altered the relative economic status of minorities. The earnings of all blacks relative to those of all whites have risen considerably. Black men, on average, now earn about 70 percent as much as white men, up from 50 percent just after World War II. Blacks are attending colleges and universities in almost the same proportion as whites, and young black men with college degrees earn about as much as their white counterparts. Overall, black and white women have virtually

identical earnings. Moreover, since the early 1960s, blacks have secured managerial and professional jobs in major corporations that were previously closed to them.

What can be said (albeit tentatively) about the labor force of the future?

First, the age structure is likely to change through the rest of the century. We know that the relative number of young workers will probably decrease, while the number of middle-aged workers will increase as the baby-boom generation grows older. What happens two decades and more down the road, however, will depend on the birth rate, which is unpredictable.

The other imponderables are sobering. In the past, technological developments—the railroad, the automobile, the computer—have destroyed whole industries while creating new ones. Over the next 20 years, occupations we now take for granted may disappear. Regional economic differences around the country may wax or wane. And who can say what effect even peaceful developments abroad—in science, manufacturing, import policies—will have on U.S. jobs?

Perhaps the biggest wild card is the federal government. Few expect Washington to retreat from its stand against racial or sexual discrimination on the job. But even the most confident forecasters are reluctant to predict how the government will deal with unemployment over the next 10 years—how the President and Congress will tackle inflation, or tinker with taxes, or secure the nation's energy supplies, or safeguard the environment, or shape our defenses.

Whatever the unknowns, the next decade should be an era of intense competition for jobs and promotions. By the late 1980s, more than half of the labor force will be in the "prime age" bracket—25 to 44. Where in 1975 there were 10 workers competing for every middle-management job, economist Arnold Weber has written, "there will now be 13—and to this total you can probably add three women and three members of minority groups." One need not predict a desperate Hobbesian war of "all against all" to conclude that interesting times lie ahead.

THANK GOD, IT'S MONDAY

by James O'Toole

"If a man will begin in certainties," said Francis Bacon, "he will end in doubts." That could be the motto of academic researchers who have been studying American workers' values and attitudes, and how both affect the workplace.

Despite years of valiant effort, scholars have been unable to link cause and effect in explanations of workers' attitudes and behavior. For example, it is impossible to say with "scientific" certainty that workers with interesting jobs are better motivated than those with dull jobs. It is impossible to demonstrate a growing discontent with work, a changing attitude among the young toward employment, or a blue-collar revolt against the assembly line. Many of us who are professional observers of the work force *believe* these things, but we cannot *prove* them.

We had more confidence during the early 1970s. Then, teams of researchers at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center claimed they had data showing that American workers were bored and alienated—that the "inhumane" way in which tasks were organized by management inhibited workers' "self-actualization"— jargon for living up to one's potential.* Underlying this idea was the purported existence of a "hierarchy of human needs," an idea pioneered by psychologist Abraham Maslow in the 1940s.

As Maslow saw it, all people have the same "order" of needs, beginning with food and shelter, and rising, rung by rung, through security, friendship, and esteem. At the top: the crowning human achievement, "self-actualization." According to Maslow, as each level of need is met, the next slides into view, like rolls of candy in a dime-store dispenser. Since American workers, in the main, are tolerably safe, secure, affluent, and befriended, they must now, social scientists assumed, be yearning for self-actualization.

Once Maslow's assumptions were accepted (by more academics and journalists than labor leaders or businessmen), a

*See the 1969 *Survey of Working Conditions* and the 1972–73 *Quality of Employment Survey*, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.



Textile Mills *by Ben Shahn, 1938. The Bronx Central Annex Post Office.*

whole array of conclusions about work flowed as easily as marbles off a tilted table:

¶ Because work is organized in a stultifying, assembly-line manner, job satisfaction is thwarted.

¶ There is widespread discontent with working conditions, particularly among blue-collar employees.

¶ America's affluent workers are now more likely to be motivated by interesting jobs than by money or other material rewards.

¶ Jobs can readily be redesigned or "enriched" to reduce worker alienation and increase productivity.

The University of Michigan findings seemed to back up these conclusions. But a skeptical 1978 analysis, *Managers and Work Reform* by University of Pennsylvania sociologist Ivar Berg and his colleagues, revealed that it just wasn't so. The studies didn't prove much of anything at all.

At about the same time that Berg was putting the scalpel to the Michigan surveys, another team of academic surgeons was slicing up pollster Daniel Yankelovich's decade-long studies showing that a "New Breed" of young Americans held nontraditional attitudes about work. (He contended, for example, that this New Breed wanted "something more" out of work, hoped to "keep on growing," and recognized a special "duty to themselves.") Yankelovich, president of Yankelovich, Skelly, and

White, Inc., and one of the most imaginative and reputable of U.S. opinion surveyers, glumly saw his work nit-picked to shreds on methodological grounds at a 1978 conference on work sponsored by the Work in America Institute.*

Interestingly, however, while the specialists were busy castigating each other's survey techniques, a small number of progressive companies leapfrogged this sterile debate and actually transformed working conditions on the unverified assumption that workers' attitudes and values had indeed changed. The Ford Foundation's Robert Schrank, one of the few specialists on working who has actually "worked" for a living (he has been a plumber, auto mechanic, and machinist), and I recently invited 20 authorities on work to sit down together and talk about what was actually happening in the workplace. These specialists had, among them, first-hand observations of several hundred U.S. factories and offices, and while nothing approaching a consensus emerged, there was some agreement that a handful of companies are changing job conditions in a variety of creative ways and that workers are responding positively and productively.

A good place to start is with a glimpse inside one of the nation's newest factories.

> *Case #1:* ICI Americas, Inc., recently opened a factory in Bayport, near Houston, Texas, to produce agricultural chemicals. Although it employs only about 90 (nonunion) workers, the plant cost $85 million to build; it is one of the world's most fully-automated production facilities. Machines do nearly all the basic work, and when things are going right, there is so little for workers to do that they spend their time sitting around chatting or reading.
>
> Yet, surprisingly, the performance of each worker is more important to the productivity of the plant than it would be in a more labor-intensive facility. Since computers, robots, and other devices handle all the routine tasks, the workers—who typically have high school di-

*My own record is not unblemished. In 1973, I was responsible for the *Work in America* report to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Cambridge: MIT Press), which, among other things, advocated the "reform" of the American workplace based on social science research that has since been ignominiously discredited. *Mea culpa.*

James O'Toole, 34, is associate professor of management at the graduate school of business, the University of Southern California. Born in San Francisco, he received his B.A. from the University of Southern California (1966), and a D.Phil. from Oxford (1970). He is the principal author of Work In America *(1973).*

MOVING TALENT AROUND

When Harold Geneen left Raytheon Co. for ITT in 1959, Boyden Associates was the broker. Korn/Ferry International was ready in 1970 when the Nixon administration had some top managerial slots to fill. Russell Reynolds Associates, Egon Zehnder International, and Heidrick and Struggles all take on similar assignments.

These American companies—and 500 others like them—are executive recruiters, better known as "headhunters." They do what top managers often do not have time to do: find and hire needed talent away from other corporations. In the process, they often spot promising juniors and rescue senior men from dead-end jobs. When headhunters call, executives listen. The quest for more responsibility—and a bigger piece of the pie—does not, after all, preoccupy only rank-and-file workers.

Executive recruiting is growing fast. (Total 1979 billings: $180 million.) Last year, headhunters placed 12,000 men and women in executive jobs in the United States alone; 800 of these positions came with salaries of at least $100,000. "The headhunter is not in the business of helping individuals," one Washington-based talent scout wrote recently. The corporation is always the client. The fee: usually about 30 percent of the salary for the position a company is seeking to fill, paid whether the job is filled or not.

plomas plus a year of college (about the national average)—must take the initiative in dealing with unanticipated problems. Says a company executive: "Workers here make bigger decisions, so they run the risk of making bigger mistakes."

The management has abandoned old-style industrial discipline (e.g., sending rule-breakers home, docking them a day's pay). The company executive explains: "If somebody has broken a safety rule, we want him to think about the responsibility for the safety of others, not about how he got 'cheated' out of a day's pay." All workers are paid on the same pay scale.

There are two reasons for a stopover at ICI on a Cook's tour of "front-line" workplaces. First, the plant helps to undermine the old assembly-line stereotype that Americans typically associate with factory work. In fact, when you count in the millions of workers in "service" industries, government employees, and all the repairmen, technicians, clerical workers, skilled workers,

supervisors, and executives, it turns out that less than 1 percent of all U.S. workers are on assembly lines.

Second, ICI managers are attempting to deal with what might be called the Three Mile Island Syndrome that occurs whenever workers must perform sophisticated tasks without constant supervision. While the consequences of a mistake in a chemical plant are seldom as potentially dangerous as they are in a nuclear power plant, they are still serious and *will* have adverse effects on productivity. This is one of the ironic side effects of automation. Eventually, most simple, repetitive, manufacturing tasks will be done by machines or by workers in such places as Asia, Africa, and South America, where labor is cheap. The United States will be left with industrial jobs that require problem-solving and initiative from workers who will have to care about their jobs—and about their coworkers.

The challenge to managers during the next decade will be to figure out how best to tap into the natural abilities and acquired skills of 100 million relatively well-educated American workers. Unfortunately, few plant managers are ready to let workers take the initiative. Time and again, in almost every instance where workers have assumed (or tried to assume) significant responsibility for their work, managers have tried to kill off such efforts:

> *Case #2:* When the Gaines Pet Food Plant in Topeka, Kansas, was opened 10 years ago, productivity ran about 40 percent higher than at a traditionally designed and managed Gaines plant; absenteeism and grievances were negligible. It seemed that the source of the productivity and morale at Topeka was that the plant's 70 nonunion workers had shouldered some managerial responsibility: for allocating tasks among the workforce; recruiting new workers; electing leaders of work teams; and setting their own work schedules.
>
> Indeed, the need for supervisors and middle-managers in the plant was eliminated entirely. But within five years after the plant had opened, the top brass at General Foods headquarters had succeeded in bringing Topeka into line with the company's standard operating procedures; possibly their most satisfying act was to introduce several layers of supervisors and managers into the Topeka operation. The responsibility and, ultimately, the productivity of the self-managing teams were thus gradually whittled away.

It is a sad fact that almost all of the well-publicized efforts of the 1970s to restructure the work environment have failed to

survive intact. The general pattern—in more than 100 plants, ranging from a radio factory to a telephone company—is one of a brief leap forward followed by prolonged backsliding.

The fault has not rested only with reluctant managers.

The experimental designs were monolithic. The redesigners often fell back into the industrial engineer's trap of trying to find the "one best way" to do a job. In effect, then, they simply substituted one inflexible design for another. Indeed, in their approach to the workplace, some "reformers" have been about as delicate and adaptable as Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915), Father of "Scientific Management." Taylor and his efficiency experts, backed by time-and-motion studies, made a standard of the stopwatch and generally alienated every factory worker with whom they came in contact.

The experimental designs were static. The only thing that has ever been proved "scientifically" about workers' behavior is that their productivity will improve when they are made subjects of an experiment. Always.

What turns the workers on? Apparently they are responding to a tangible sign that their bosses *care* enough to try something new. This so-called Hawthorne Effect (named after experiments conducted in the late 1920s at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant in Cicero, Illinois) is manifested by spurts in productivity only for about as long as the managers sustain their interest. The trick, then, is to design an experiment that never stops. Sadly, most of the job enrichment experiments of the 1970s have been one-shot quick fixes and, hence, no fixes at all.

The redesigners succumbed to Maslow's "self-actualization" ideal. In other words, the reformers expected workers to be more productive but not to share in the gravy. The assumptions were that intrinsic, psychic rewards are everything and that workers are not interested in such vulgar considerations as money.

Not all experimenting company managements have been deluded on this point. "Enrichment," after all, has many meanings:

> *Case #3:* Since 1934, the Lincoln Electric Company of Cleveland, Ohio, the world's largest manufacturer of arc welding machines and electrodes, has rewarded workers in cold cash for their efforts. Creativity and entrepreneurial initiative are especially prized. Already highly paid to start with, workers at the nonunion company receive an annual bonus based on four criteria (output, quality of work, cooperation, and ideas to improve productivity). This bonus effectively *doubles* the annual income of the average employee to about $39,000 a year, according

At what rate do *you* run *your* brain?

There's more to life than just hard work, noted this 1926 ad for Dr. Eliot's Five-Foot Shelf of Books: "Horses do hard work and get nothing but their board. . . . Send for the free book that gives the secret of earning *more by* learning *more."*

to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer.* Workers at Lincoln are encouraged to find ways to eliminate their own jobs—and get promoted if they do. The firm has a job security agreement with its 2,550 employees and has not laid off one person since it promised not to in 1951. Worker productivity at Lincoln is about 100 percent higher than in U.S. industry in general, and the sales price of its products has not increased in several decades.

In every company where work reform has been more than a flash in the pan, the guiding principles have been teamwork, cooperation, trust, responsibility—and collective participation in decisions and profits. Significantly, such reforms have not started as small-scale experiments, which were then diffused throughout the company. Rather, the reforms that have taken hold were *systematic and total.* That is one reason why reform has succeeded in small firms and industries but only rarely has taken hold in large corporations.

Ironically, then, work reform, though democratic in its consequences, tends to work best when despotic in its inception—when top management orders it done, and stands firm against the rearguard actions of threatened middle-managers or the grumblings of local union officials.

While one might assume that the "guiding principles" of

work reform enumerated above would be consistent with the goals of the labor movement, most union leaders, in fact, are hostile to such reforms. Part of the unions' skepticism is understandable—they've seen too many changes proposed by management that turned out to be sheer exploitation disguised as Good Samaritanism. ("If you want to enrich the job, enrich the paycheck," says William Winpisinger, president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.) But there is another reason for labor leaders' lack of enthusiasm: Work reform does nothing to enhance union power.

Nevertheless, some unions, such as the United Auto Workers, are making an honest effort to cope with work reform. (The UAW has undertaken several demonstration projects with General Motors.) The preface to a 1978 contract between Shell Canada and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International shows that some union leaders have been reading Maslow, too:

> Employees should be permitted to contribute and grow to their fullest potential and capability without constraints or artificial barriers, with compensation based on their demonstrated knowledge and skills rather than on tasks being performed at any specific time.

Admittedly, researchers have not found much demand among workers for such conditions. Indeed, when asked, workers generally want to change only such trivial things as lighting and the placement of water coolers. But experiments, unlike survey research, show that once workers get involved in decision-making, they quickly move from trivia to the tough underlying issues. It seems that workers *initially* do not demand more because experience has taught them that they do not have the power to change anything that is important.

Another reason why there is not more apparent demand for basic change is that there is a presumption, among both managers and workers, in favor of the status quo. For example, few workplaces are more medieval than the corporate law office, but the existing model is accepted without question because that is the way things have always been. Yet there are alternatives:

> *Case #4:* Typically, large law firms hire young lawyers (associates) and condemn them to dog work for seven years. Associates willingly submit in the hope of one day becoming partners; they forego vacations, weekends, and a good many lunches in order to impress the partners with their dedication.

PART-TIME WORKERS



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Fifteen million Americans work exclusively on part-time (less than 35 hours per week) schedules, and 4 million more "moonlight" in part-time jobs. The proportion of part-time employees has grown rapidly since 1958, from 1 in 12 workers to 1 in 7. Most part-timers are happy with their lot, but about 20 percent of them are "involuntary" part-time workers who are looking for, but have been unable to find, full-time jobs. Students, pensioners, and mothers dominate the part-time market, working, on average, 18 hours per week.

A key reason for the growth in part-time employment is the expansion of the "service" sector of the economy, particularly restaurants, shops, and recreational facilities that must remain open to fit the leisure hours of people who work a standard 40-hour week.

There have been some notable experiments in industry. Since 1970, for example, Control Data Corporation's bindery in St. Paul, Minnesota—the plant packages computer manuals—has been staffed entirely by part-time workers. Some 75 women, most of whom have children in school, work the "mothers' shift," 7:00 A.M. to noon. They are replaced by 56 high school students from 12:30 to 4:30.

PART-TIME JOBS



In contrast, Munger, Tolles, and Rickerhauser in Los Angeles was founded by a group of young lawyers who decided to trade off the possibility of hitting the financial jackpot in favor of work satisfaction. Some of their policies seem purely hedonistic: First year lawyers get a month of vacation, for example. Other policies affect the work itself. New associates deal with real clients, not just footnotes; from the start, they are given full responsibility for entire cases. Promotions to partnership are made at the end of three years.

This means that the firm is top-heavy with partners (two for every one associate, the exact opposite of most firms). It also means that the difference in compensation between partners and associates is smaller than usual. In lieu of Beverly Hills mansions, attorneys at Munger Tolles have the opportunity to take sabbaticals and do extensive *pro bono* work on firm time. The bottom line: The firm is reputed to have some of the finest lawyers in Southern California.

The work policies at this firm are remarkably consistent with the latest survey research about what is important to workers on the eve of the 1980s. The most recent and best designed Michigan study (the 1977 *Quality of Employment Survey*) has found that one-half of employed Americans have problems with the inflexibility of their working schedules; one-third of these workers say long working hours interfere with their family life. In another study, *Exchanging Earnings for Leisure*, Fred Best of the Department of Labor has found that 70 percent of American workers would be willing to give up 2 percent *or more* of their income for less time at work.

Such findings, for what they are worth, are at least in keeping with the only workplace revolution predicted in the early 1970s that is actually happening: flexitime.* Flexitime was pioneered in 1967 by Christel Kaemmerer, a management consultant at Messerschmitt-Bolkow's industrial complex in West Germany. The idea caught on in the Federal Republic, where it has been adopted by some 6,000 companies and their (mostly white-collar) employees. It is slowly catching on in the United States: Between 1974 and 1978, the proportion of Americans with flexible working schedules doubled, from 4 to 8 percent of the work force, or about 7 million people.

*"Flexitime" generally means that the working day is composed of a "core" period (10:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., for example) during which all employees must be present, plus flexible time. Thus, Metropolitan Life in New York lets employees come in at any time between 7:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., but all must put in a full eight-hour day.

UP AND DOWN AND SIDEWAYS

Historically, there has been considerable inequality in the incomes of individual American workers, even as all incomes have grown. In 1975, for example, the most prosperous fifth of all American families earned at least $22,000; the bottom fifth earned no more than $6,914.

Of late, critics like Richard de Lone (*Small Futures*, 1979) have contended that this American class system is fixed, not dynamic and fluid; that an individual's income, job, and status depend on race and class, not ability, education, and luck. The remedy, de Lone suggests, is federal action to equalize incomes through taxes and subsidies.

Yet, recent major statistical studies show that social mobility and "opportunity" have, in fact, increased: Education has helped blacks as well as whites. Little publicized, these analyses include *Opportunity and Change* by David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser (1978), Stephan Thernstrom's historical *The Other Bostonians* (1973), and Richard Freeman's *Black Elite* (1976).

Rags-to-respectability if not rags-to-riches is common enough. According to Featherman and Hauser's 1973 data, of every 100 sons of unskilled workers, 23 make it to the professional ranks, 12 to the clerical level, and 24 to the level of skilled craftsmen, while 40 remain laborers like their dads and 1 drops to farm-worker status. Of 100 sons of top professionals or managers, only 59 do as well as their fathers; indeed, 16 become unskilled laborers or service workers. Citing these findings, *Washington Post* columnist William Greider wrote: "America is not simply onward-and-upward; it is up-and-down and often sideways."

If the watchword of the 1980s is likely to be flexibility, then today's airline stewardess may be the prototypical service worker of the next decade:

> *Case #5:* The stewardess on TWA Flight 19 from Washington to Los Angeles is filling out her request for next month's flight assignment. As long as she works the equivalent of 16 days a month, she is free to schedule her flights in almost any pattern she chooses. Stewardesses who have children can schedule many short day flights; those who like to travel can schedule flights with long layovers in distant cities. Students can cluster their hours around their class schedules. The stewardess says: "The best part about this job is that it allows you to plan to enjoy the non-work part of your life."

Admittedly, stewardesses (and stewards, too—this *is* 1980) have more flexibility than the average worker. But the general trend in the workforce is toward more flexibility. Indeed, one of the least noticed facts about the workforce is that now nearly one-fifth of all employed Americans—including 90 percent of the 250,000 people on the payroll of McDonald's fast-food restaurants—are part-time workers.

Social science techniques may still be too primitive to measure the changes, but my own guess is that young (under 35) workers today really do want some different things from work than did the Depression era adolescents who became their parents. That is not to say they don't want some of the same things, too—like a decent income.

Many who were at an impressionable age during the Depression—including corporation executives now in their late 50s and 60s—had fathers who had trouble getting or keeping a job, any job. As youths, they may have had to forego not just luxuries but even basic necessities. It is not surprising that people who so suffered would make security the Sirius in their firmament of values. This desire for security is complemented by other qualities: loyalty to organization, stability, materialism. Work is seen as a necessity, *not* as an option, and while the conditions Depression-era alumni have on the job may not be perfect, they are a lot better than what existed during the 1930s.

In contrast, the postwar boom babies (now between 20 and 35 years old) were at impressionable ages during an era of incredible affluence and high expectations. Moreover, this "Woodstock generation" is better educated than the preceding one; its members have lived through a time when women and minorities have sought to transform centuries-old social patterns. Many in this group learned from the Vietnam protests that even the most inertial of institutions—the U.S. government—could in fact be moved. Given such experiences, it is not surprising that for these young people the brightest stars in the heavens seem to be change, flexibility, diversity, choice.

Alas, I have no *proof* that these are indeed the work values cherished by the largest "age cohort" in American history. But I suspect that employers who design work in order to conform to these qualities—in effect, tapping the self-interest of young workers—will find their employees as productive in the 1980s and '90s as another generation was in the '50s and '60s.

HELPING THE JOBLESS: THEORIES AND PRACTICE

by Katherine Swartz

The first "official" study of poverty and joblessness in the United States was commissioned by the Massachusetts legislature in 1821. (The report's authors suggested that the "sturdy beggar" and "profligate vagrant" be consigned to the workhouse.) Interest in the subject waned during the five decades thereafter, when, as economist John Garraty has noted, rootless, out-of-work persons generally answered to the name of "pioneers." Then, in the 1870s and '80s, faced with rapid industrialization and a wave of immigration, U.S. scholars discovered "unemployment" (the word was coined in 1887). Today, it is the focus of much research and the concern of several federal agencies, including the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

At the end of the first week of every month, the Bureau issues its *Monthly Labor Review*, a status report on work in America based on a U.S. Census Bureau survey of 56,000 households. The *Review*'s single most publicized statistic: the monthly aggregate unemployment rate, whose fluctuations can spark



Drawing by Reginald Marsh; © 1930, 1958 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

banner headlines and big political trouble. Last November, the unemployment rate stood at 5.8 percent, which meant that out of 103 million Americans in the labor force, 6 million were actively seeking work and unable to find it.

The aggregate unemployment rate is simple enough to make sense to most newspaper readers; but its simplicity may be seriously, if inadvertently, misleading.

A vast variety of individual circumstances is rolled into that 5.8 percent figure. For example, both a Los Angeles high-school student unable to find a part-time job and a disabled Detroit autoworker who is also the family breadwinner are lumped together in computing the overall unemployment rate.

Washington first stepped in to "do something" about unemployment with a patchwork of emergency programs during the Depression. With congressional passage of the Employment Act of 1946, promoting employment became "the continuing policy and responsibility of the federal government." Unfortunately, government programs designed to cure or ameliorate social ills tend to work best when the target is small, static, and clearly defined. Unemployment has proved so hard to cure partly because its definition can vary. And, too, people who are "disadvantaged" (by whatever definition) at one moment may not be sometime later. In short, they are moving targets.

Despite the accusatory laments of some academics and politicians, Washington's chronic failure to produce "full" employment is not due to lack of effort. In 1965, only 510,000 Americans were enrolled in new Great Society manpower-training



programs aimed at unemployed young people, blacks, Hispanics, and sundry "hard-to-employ" adults; these and other bootstrap measures used up just $414 million in federal funds. This year, the federal government is spending nearly $12 *billion* on the problem. At any given moment, about 400,000 hard-to-employ Americans are in government-sponsored training programs; another 560,000 are actually working in "public service" jobs. Over a year's time, some 3 million individuals participate in these programs.

The real issue in 1980 is not so much increasing the *size* of the federal effort as finding the right *direction* for it. Since World War II, manpower programs have been one step behind evolving academic theories of unemployment; the theories themselves have never quite meshed with labor force statistics. It is hard to say just what group needs help, or why.

For example, slicing the data one way, a group of people appears to be disadvantaged if, as a group, it has a disproportionately high unemployment rate. Under this definition, women, teenagers (especially minorities), and minority adults (both men and women) are all disadvantaged.

Yet this isn't very helpful, because unemployment is unevenly distributed among individuals in *any* group. Last year, about 75 percent of the total man-weeks of unemployment occurred among the 7.1 million Americans who were unemployed for 15 weeks or more. (A total of 17.6 million workers were unemployed for at least one week.) If such long-term unemployment is a fair definition of a person's labor force status as "disadvantaged," then about two-fifths of those Americans without jobs are disadvantaged. *This proportion holds for all major groups.* In other words, only 40 percent of all unemployed blacks (or teenagers, or women) are actually "disadvantaged."

The picture changes again if one examines gross numbers. Given the fact that the U.S. labor force is made up largely of men, whites, young people (16–24 years old), and high-school graduates, it should not be surprising that two-thirds of the unemployed are men, 40 percent are young, and more than half have a high-school diploma.* Contrary to the general impres-

*See "Concepts and Measures of Structural Unemployment" by Robert Lerman, Burt Barnow, and Philip Moss, in *Technical Analysis Paper #64*, U.S. Department of Labor, 1979.

Katherine Swartz, 29, is assistant professor of economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. Born in Rochester, N.Y., she holds a B.S. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison (1976). She is a member of the editorial board of Policy Analysis.

sion given by the media, only one out of four "disadvantaged" persons is from a racial minority.

Diagnosing the *causes* of unemployment is just as difficult as isolating its victims. (Many people on the West Coast, for example, work in canneries and are employed only a few months a year. Is it because they lack the skills for any other kind of job, because cannery work is seasonal, because no other jobs exist in the area, or all three?) In this vast arena of federal endeavor, as in others, the views of academics are important; they shape policy. Currently, three competing (if overlapping) theories of unemployment vie for the attention of economists and policymakers: the demand deficient, structural, and dual labor market explanations.

Demand deficient unemployment exists because the total demand for goods and services is not as high as the "productive capacity" of the economy—in other words, because the economy is in a natural "downswing." The result: Factories lie idle; firms go out of business; workers lose their jobs. In theory, people are unemployed because there are not enough jobs nationwide, not because they are unskilled or live in a "depressed" area.

Automobile workers, waiters and waitresses, and clothiers are typical of the people who are hurt first by drops in consumer demand. The standard antidote is government intervention in the form of tax cuts or increased spending. Each tends to spur consumer and business spending, which in turn creates jobs.

"Human Capital"

The late 1950s and early '60s provided a textbook opportunity to put the "demand deficient" theory into practice. The sluggish economic growth of the Eisenhower years, coupled with rising unemployment (which climbed from 2.5 to 5 percent between 1953 and 1960) and the 1958 and 1960 recessions had virtually banished inflation, and even the anticipation of inflation, from the Republic. Vowing to "get the country moving again," President John F. Kennedy boosted spending on public works; he planned a major tax cut (which came in 1964). Unemployment dropped to the 4 percent range in 1964–65, where it stayed for six years.

According to his aide, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy "paid no heed to those [arguing] that runaway inflation was just around the corner." Neither did Lyndon Johnson. But it was. By the late 1960s, though the U.S. economy was vastly overheated by the combination of Great Society spending and outlays for the Vietnam War, both Congress and LBJ proved reluctant to

THE RISE AND FALL OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 1930-1980



apply the brakes with a tax hike. (A 10 percent tax surcharge was enacted—too late—in 1968.) When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, inflation replaced unemployment as the top economic concern.

At about this time, economists trying to look beyond the "aggregate" jobless rate to its component parts noticed that demand deficient unemployment first hit employees with no seniority ("last hired, first fired") or those in whom a company had invested little in training costs. Most of these so-called secondary workers turned out to be unskilled. Soon, economists began focusing new attention on structural unemployment.

Structural unemployment may occur because a person, otherwise fit for work, lacks the skills desired by nearby employers, or is hampered from finding work by accidents of geography, or for any number of other "structural" reasons. The structural model first came into vogue in the mid-1950s when economists feared that automation and high technology would



Source: *Employment and Unemployment During 1978*, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

throw thousands of workers out of jobs, with snowballing consequences. (For example, technological unemployment could eventually spur demand deficient unemployment; as Walter Reuther once noted, "machines don't buy cars.")

The popularity of this narrow structural model, focused on technological unemployment, subsided during the Kennedy-Johnson years, when automation turned out to be no bar to "full" employment. But when joblessness picked up again in the early 1970s, economists began to pick a whole menagerie of new (and still hotly debated) structural barriers out of their hats: the high minimum wage (now $3.10 per hour) discouraging the hiring of the young and/or unskilled; the jerrybuilt structure commonly termed "welfare," which, some argue, can make employment unnecessary or unattractive; and geographic shifts (e.g., "runaway" textile plants that have left the unionized Frostbelt states for the largely nonunion Sunbelt).

But the greatest structural barrier of all—and the one to

which economists have devoted most attention—appeared to be a lack of schooling or appropriate training, be it manifested in a black youth with an inferior ninth-grade education or in a jobless Massachusetts shoemaker who knows no other trade. This aspect attracted economists and politicians, in part, because it fit in nicely with "human capital" theory.

Pioneered by Nobel laureate T. W. Schultz, human capital theory was actually best defined by Benjamin Franklin in *Poor Richard's Almanack*: "An investment in knowledge pays the best interest." The appeal of the theory to politicians is that a solution is inherent in the definition of the problem. Hence the billions of federal dollars spent on training programs.

The structural and demand deficient theories share one assumption: On balance, people are either "employed" or they aren't. Unfortunately, in real life, people cannot always be categorized so handily.

Coming Full Circle

During the early 1970s, economists began to observe that many individuals were unemployed frequently but only for short periods of time.* This phenomenon was referred to as "turnover unemployment." Since it did not involve the long-term unemployed, some economists contended that it did not require massive government intervention. Turnover unemployment was largely voluntary and would drop if people's notions of fair wages and working conditions were based more on common sense than on fairy tale images conveyed by television and the movies. Moreover, many of these "marginal workers" did not mind drifting from one unskilled job to the next. They had their own notions about getting satisfaction out of life. Yet, as economist Robert Hall has observed, "liberals fighting for low unemployment at the cost of high inflation are reluctant to accept the suggestion that part of the unemployment they hope to reduce results from the choice of the unemployed."

The *dual labor market* theory was not long in coming. Proponents of this notion hold that unskilled workers cannot get "jobs with a future" in the so-called primary market and must instead compete for low-paying and sometimes disagreeable jobs (e.g., dishwashing, picking tomatoes) in the "secondary" market. Such persons typically work for a while, quit, live by their wits, and then take on another job. Like the structuralists,

*See, for example, "Unemployment Flows in the U.S. Labor Market" by George L. Perry, in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (1972:2); "Turnover in the Labor Force" by Robert E. Hall, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (1972:3).

THE DOUGHNUT OR THE HOLE?

The monthly unemployment rate is one of the U.S. economy's "vital signs." How accurate is it?

Some liberal economists believe unemployment is *understated* in the monthly figures, in part because officials fail to include "discouraged workers"—people who don't seek work because they believe none is available—as part of the labor force. Many such persons, it is said, would work if the jobs were there.

Other economists contend that unemployment is considerably *overstated.* Why? About one quarter of the "unemployed" seek only part-time work; the Labor Department counts them as *full-time* unemployed. Many of the jobless are in fact working "off the books" as carpenters, repairmen, domestics, day laborers. Others *say* they are looking for work merely to qualify for food stamps and welfare.

No one knows exactly how much of all this goes on. But Brookings' Philip Cagan and other like-minded economists argue that it means Washington policymakers should no longer equate "full employment" with a low 4 percent official unemployment rate; rather, 6 or 6.5 percent is a more valid figure to aim for.

Moreover, they note, worried politicians often forget that much unemployment has stemmed not from job *losses* but simply from the influx of more people into the labor force, particularly women. During the deep 1974–75 recession, for example, joblessness swelled from 5 to 9 percent. Yet, the number of Americans at work dropped by only 1.6 percent. The number of women working actually increased.

Faced with such seeming paradoxes, some economists and politicians, chiefly conservatives, have proposed a new barometer of national economic health: The *E-P ratio* (below). This is the ratio of total employment to the total population of working age. The E-P ratio has climbed steadily since the 1974–75 recession, despite ups and downs in monthly unemployment rates. In any case, Washington policymakers may find that looking at the "doughnut" (employment) as well as the "hole" (unemployment) is a better way to gauge how depressed the labor market really is.



Source: U.S. Department of Labor

JOB GROWTH BY STATE SINCE 1949



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

WHO WAS UNEMPLOYED IN 1978



Source: *Employment and Unemployment During 1978: An Analysis*, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

dual labor market theorists advocate training and "work experience" programs to help secondary workers break into the primary labor market. They also press for tax incentives to encourage companies to move into high poverty areas.

As I have noted, academic theories are important. They shape the assumptions of federal policymakers who propose the programs and the Congressmen who enact them into law. The give-and-take over theories among economists and the Washington "political establishment" during the past two decades is mirrored in the history of Washington's attempts to deal with unemployment. Indeed, the federal government seems to have come full circle since the days of the New Deal.

The basic response of the Roosevelt administration to the 25 percent unemployment of the Great Depression was establishment of the Works Progress Administration, which, at its peak in the late 1930s, provided public service jobs (often derided as "leaf-raking") to some 3 million persons. That ended in 1942. After World War II, U.S. manpower policy essentially meant aid to education. Uncle Sam helped provide employers with an educated workforce—particularly after the Soviets launched Sputnik I in 1957; but except for special programs aimed at the handicapped, veterans, and health-care professionals, Washington avoided any direct involvement with workers or their jobs. The federal bureaucracy provided some financial relief to the jobless but did not seek to create jobs for them.*

Warring Against Poverty

That all began to change in 1962. Congress passed a Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) aimed at curbing joblessness due to automation by providing displaced workers with new skills. However, as noted above, the assumption that "structural" unemployment was in fact caused by automation proved ill-founded. The MDTA programs were quietly (to avoid irking Southern Congressmen) redesigned to focus on the problems of "disadvantaged" workers, particularly blacks, whose employment rates worsened during lean economic years but were not greatly improved during times of plenty.

Next came passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the first salvo in Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty." Economists had noticed that most unemployed people who

*Last year, 7.9 million Americans received a total of $10.1 billion in unemployment compensation; about 97 percent of wage-and-salary workers are covered by unemployment insurance. Maximum benefits range from $80 weekly in Mississippi to $192 in Connecticut. In most states, the maximum duration of benefits is 26 weeks.

eventually landed jobs were equipped with previous work experience. So, inside R. Sargent Shriver's busy new Office of Economic Opportunity, Congress lodged the Community Action Program, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Adult Basic Education, and the Work Experience Program—all of them designed to give jobless people of every stripe remedial education, job training, and some kind of work experience. Most of these programs, like the ones that followed, were set up to serve individuals who met certain criteria (e.g., unemployed young people from low-income families); some were targeted on whole communities deemed to be impoverished.

The OEO manpower programs had little effect; the welfare rolls continued to grow. Congress responded in 1967 with a "work-incentive" program (WIN), which allowed welfare recipients who found jobs to retain the first $80 of their monthly earnings. Even so, the welfare caseload kept climbing.

Next, in 1968, came JOBS (Job Opportunities in the Business Sector), a $106 million program created by diverting money from other federal manpower efforts. Co-sponsored by the National Alliance of Businessmen, its purpose was to encourage private companies (with cash incentives) to hire and train disadvantaged workers.

Up to this point, despite its stepped-up forays into the labor market, the federal government had eschewed a return to direct job creation. But when unemployment crept up to 6 percent in 1970–71, President Nixon signed the Emergency Employment Act, which created 150,000 public service jobs.

More of the Same

Political support for public service employment picked up. When President Nixon sought to consolidate all federal manpower programs through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) in 1973, the Democratic-controlled Congress made additional public service jobs the price of passage. Today, CETA money is distributed to 450 "prime sponsors" (i.e., state and local governments), which then hire unemployed people as file clerks, counselors, guards, community workers, and whatnot. CETA funds have even kept alive artists' colonies and acting troupes; some mayors have used the money to avoid layoffs of career civil servants. Training, counseling, and other such services are offered only when placement in public service jobs is not possible. Today, direct job creation accounts for 53 percent of CETA spending, up from less than 30 per cent in 1975. In 1978, the average cost to the federal government for each

public service job was $8,600.

Ironically, some studies suggest that programs focused on training have more impact on participants' future earnings and employment than do work experience programs or public service employment (although, as we shall see, it is hard to determine the validity of many such studies). Moreover, although CETA jobs are supposed to be "transitional," leading to unsubsidized employment after one year, in times and places of high unemployment there may be no other jobs to go to.

Which brings up the harsh question: How effective over the long-term has the federal job effort been? The answer is elusive.

First, most studies of disadvantaged workers in manpower programs do not use "control" groups (i.e., groups of individuals similar to those people enrolled in programs though not themselves enrolled). Without control groups for comparison purposes, it is impossible to say what long-term benefits participants received that they would not have gotten on their own.

There are other imponderables. If discriminatory barriers persist in the workplace, then the employment and earnings records of blacks and Hispanics after they graduate from federal job programs may be weak for *that* reason, not because of the way programs were set up. Another issue is eligibility. If the eligibility criteria for various manpower programs are broad, then it is tempting for administrators to enroll only those applicants who are most likely to do well, and so increase the perceived cost-effectiveness of the program. This is known as "skimming" or "creaming," and it is not uncommon.

Despite uncertainty over which kinds of federal programs work and which don't, and over who has been helped and who hasn't, it seems likely that the future holds more of the same: more (and more expensive) training programs, more public service jobs, and (when and if the rate of inflation is ever pulled down) more stimulation of "aggregate demand," possibly through a tax cut.

Such *ad hoc* strategies at least have the advantage of a certain flexibility. But the sad truth is that some obstacles to more (or better) jobs for the disadvantaged just aren't susceptible to government action. I am thinking of factors such as racism, ailing public schools, or community attitudes that seem immune to quick legislative remedies. Samuel Johnson put it well: "How small, of all that human hearts endure/The part that laws and kings can cause or cure."

BACKGROUND BOOKS

JOBS IN AMERICA

"When men are employed," wrote Benjamin Franklin, "they are best contented." America was one of the West's first nations where, for lack of a leisured aristocracy, everybody worked for a living.

After independence from Britain, the U.S. urban work force consisted of the gentry (merchants, lawyers, ministers), "mechanics" (carpenters, masons, shoemakers, tailors, bakers, butchers), and unskilled workers (day laborers, free blacks, and, in the South, slaves).

Because of their uncommon expertise, the mechanics were, in effect, their own bosses, even when, as journeymen, they worked for a salary. These artisans often took Mondays off, as well as Saturdays and Sundays, for leisure pursuits—mostly drinking and gambling.

Their relatively jolly life is recorded in **Artisans of the New Republic: The Tradesmen of New York City in the Age of Jefferson** (New York Univ., 1979). Historian Howard B. Rock goes on to note that, in New York's shipyards, workers routinely interrupted their toil four times a day for candy and cakes, and as many as 10 times for grog (beer). Only when industrialization loomed in the early 1800s did craftsmen adopt a more disciplined, 60-hour work week.

According to historian Daniel T. Rodgers, the famed New England textile mills of the 1820s were ahead of their time. In **The Work Ethic in Industrial America, 1850–1920** (Univ. of Chicago, 1978), he writes that "as late as 1850, the centers of manufacturing remained the home and the workshop." The transition to the factory system came quickly, however. During the 1840s, for example, small shoe shops were the norm; by the 1870s, shoemakers had become machine operators in shoe plants.

Tracing the work ethic back to its Puritan roots, Rodgers argues that 19th-century industrialization "upset the [old] certainty that hard work would bring economic success."

For their part, labor leaders of the 1860s were quick to recognize the impact of the new division of labor, the increasing size of the workshop, and the tendency to concentrate production in factories. In a thorough history, **Industrialization and the American Labor Movement, 1850–1900** (Univ. of Chicago, 1978), CUNY historian Irwin Yellowitz describes the response of the nascent unions, such as the iron-molders and the machinists. Union organizers attempted to control the supply of skilled labor—a successful tactic in preindustrial days, but one that proved inadequate as factory owners brought in machines and the need for craftsmen diminished.

However, the unions seldom opposed technology as such; they sought to protect their members' wages and working conditions. During the 1870s, trade union officials called for an eight-hour work day and immigration quotas. Employers and employees began to battle for control of the workplace.

Economist Richard Edwards contends that the employers won. In his

well-argued **Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century** (Basic Books, 1979), he maintains that the growth of job categories, work rules, and promotion procedures ultimately led workers to identify not with a boss or foreman but with their company. During the 1940s, for example, IBM pioneered the "cradle-to-grave" corporation welfare state to insure employee allegiance.

Labor leaders also competed for workers' loyalties. Along with the steelworkers' Philip Murray and the autoworkers' Walter Reuther, the coalminers' John L. Lewis stands out among the union chieftains of the 1930s and '40s.

In their detailed **John L. Lewis: A Biography** (Times Books, 1978), Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine follow this son of Welsh immigrants from his first job in an Ohio coal mine to his powerful role as the autocratic president of the United Mine Workers of America (1920–60) and founder and first president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Lewis successfully, sometimes violently, organized workers in the coal, steel, auto, and tire and rubber industries.

But unions provided no guarantees against layoffs, especially during the Great Depression.

In **Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy** (Harper, 1978, cloth; 1979, paper), Columbia University historian John A. Garraty first discusses Western explanations of the persistence of poverty and joblessness. He finds none, including those of David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes, totally satisfactory. Nor does history, he adds, offer many examples of successful make-work programs.

"Policy intellectuals" tend to disagree with Garraty, as evidenced by **Creating Jobs: Public Employment Programs and Wage Subsidies** (Brookings, 1978, cloth & paper). The book is a collection of seven highly technical analyses of public and private job schemes. Summing up, editor John L. Palmer, a Brookings economist, and Wisconsin sociologist Irwin Garfinkel suggest that a broad approach, applying federal wage subsidies to private as well as public jobs, would help end the plight of the chronically unemployed low-income worker.

The two large groups most affected by the changing shape of the U.S. labor market have been women and farmers.

In the 19th century, New England's burgeoning textile mills destroyed the chief cash income—from home spinning and weaving—of local farmers' daughters, suggests historian Thomas Dublin in **Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826–1860** (Columbia, 1979). By 1860, more than 60,000 women had flocked to the mill towns, to work for as little as 44¢ a day (in 1836), less than half the pay of male workers.

Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker (Greenwood, 1977), edited by Milton Cantor and Bruce Laurie, is a bright cluster of 10 essays on topics ranging from the mills of Lowell to Italian-American women garment workers in 20th-century New York City. Historian Caroline F. Ware points out that although 9 out of 10 women are in the labor force at some time in their lives, fewer than half of them are fully employed at any given moment. Even the paternalists who ran the New England textile mills did not expect factory women to remain

at their jobs forever. Most ended their mill careers and got married by the age of 26.

Keeping men and women down on the farm has proved difficult. So notes University of Pennsylvania historian John L. Shover in **First Majority—Last Minority: The Transformation of Rural Life in America** (Northern Ill. Univ., 1976, cloth & paper). Between 1929 and 1965 alone, more than 30 million Americans moved off the land to better opportunities elsewhere.

By 1973, less than 5 percent of America's work force was engaged in agriculture (versus 27 percent in 1920). Shover shows that, thanks to farm mechanization and higher productivity, America no longer *needs* many farmers to produce bumper crops. In 1820, one farm worker supplied subsistence for four people; in 1945, the ratio was 1 to 14.6, in 1969, 1 to 45.3.

Labor in the Twentieth Century (Academic Press, 1978), edited by Harvard's John T. Dunlop (former Secretary of Labor) and Cornell's Walter Galenson, is a statistics-packed mini-encyclopedia analyzing the changing scene in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Japan.

A new movement that seeks to put workers on corporate boards has caught on in Scandinavia and West Germany, but not in America, as editor Svetozar Pejovich makes clear in an eight-essay review of **The Codetermination Movement in the West: Labor Participation in the Management of Business Firms** (Lexington, 1978).

The Soviet worker's bleak lot and his low productivity are examined in **Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.** (Pergamon, 1979, cloth & paper), edited by Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, and sponsored by the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute. Essays by 16 scholars cover unions, workers' daily lives (complicated by rampant alcoholism), strikes, and political activism. During the mid-1970s, a Russian worker enjoyed a standard of living roughly similar to that of his U.S. counterpart 50 years earlier.

In **Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition** (Univ. of Calif., 1971, cloth & paper), University of Michigan sociologist Robert E. Coles notes that Japanese workers often remain with the same employer throughout their careers. The lack of movement from company to company carries over into social life as well; employees associate with co-workers rather than with people holding similar jobs in other factories.

Britain's declining worker productivity has often been attributed by scholars to worker alienation. In **What Went Wrong? Why Hasn't Having More Made People Happier?** (Pantheon, 1979, cloth & paper), social worker Jeremy Seabrook records the discontent of England's factory hands. He finds that class-conscious Britons lament the loss of the sense of purpose that brought them together during World War II. They blame technology for depriving them of pride of workmanship, and they are quick to fault the growing minority of Asian and Caribbean immigrants for current economic ills.

What do U.S. workers think? One set of answers is in Studs Terkel's **Working: People Talk About What They Do All Day and How They Feel About What They Do** (Pantheon, 1974, cloth; Avon, 1975, paper). A best-selling collection of interviews with more than 130 individuals—from a movie critic to a washroom attendant—*Working* has often been

cited as evidence that Americans do not like their jobs. What emerges more clearly is the love/hate relationship most people have with their work. Terkel records many complaints, but there is much satisfaction as well. One 32-year-old Brooklyn man joined the fire department. Of firemen, he says proudly: "You actually see them produce. You see them put out a fire . . . come out with babies in their hands . . . give mouth-to-mouth when a guy's dying . . . That's real."

Robert Schrank's **Ten Thousand Working Days** (MIT, 1978, cloth; 1979, paper) is an informal, sometimes rambling, examination of Americans at their jobs. Many academic specialists, argues Schrank, a Ford Foundation sociologist, neglect the importance of human relationships. The social rituals—coffee and smoke breaks, lunch time, in-jokes—are especially important to people whose daily tasks do not provide creative outlets.

Yet those who do have good jobs are often dissatisfied too. U.S. novelists have taken up where scholars lag in penetrating the anxieties of America's class of middle managers.

J. P. Marquand's satires—notably **Point of No Return** (Little, Brown, 1949)—depict the mid-career predicaments of New England Brahmins and Manhattan executives. A popular novel that chronicles a bright young man's effort to make it big on Madison Avenue is Sloan Wilson's **The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit** (Simon & Schuster, 1955). And an updated portrait of the troubled corporate male appears in Joseph Heller's **Something Happened** (Knopf, 1974, cloth; Ballantine, 1975, paper).

A fair number of Americans, it seems, earn good incomes by analyzing the current employment scene and predicting its future.

Two informative studies are Columbia economist Eli Ginsberg's latest examination of manpower policy—**Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, No Jobs** (Harvard, 1979)—and a gathering of cogent essays on **Work in America: The Decade Ahead** (Van Nostrand, 1979), edited by Clark Kerr and Jerome M. Rosow.

Many commentators on the future state of work in America have been influenced by Daniel Bell's much-debated **The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting** (Basic Books, 1973, cloth; 1976, paper). Bell sees U.S. society in the future as characterized by an increasing shift from a goods-producing to a service economy. New science-based industries will come to the fore; a professional class of elite workers will process and codify highly complex information for industry and government. These specialists will become more powerful as technical advice becomes essential to politicians' decisions (e.g., on such issues as construction of nuclear power plants).

But people will be all important. "In the salient experience of work," Bell writes, "men live more and more outside nature, and less and less with machinery and things; they live with and encounter one another."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Suggestions for this essay came from James O'Toole and former Wilson Center Fellow Edwin M. Epstein, professor of business administration at the University of California, Berkeley.*

CURRENT BOOKS

FELLOWS' CHOICE

Recent titles selected and reviewed by Fellows of the Wilson Center

BLOOD OF SPAIN: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War
by Ronald Fraser
Pantheon, 1979
628 pp. $15.95
L of C 78-20416
ISBN 0-394-48982-9

For nearly three years, until Francisco Franco's victorious Nationalists captured Madrid in March 1939, the Spanish Civil War polarized world opinion. The Popular Front—a quarrelsome coalition of leftist Republicans, socialists, communists, and anarchists—fielded a militia supplied with Soviet arms and a few volunteers from Britain, France, and the United States. The insurgent Nationalists deployed Spain's regular army, bolstered by aircraft, artillery, and manpower from Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. The alignments presaged World War II. For his impartial oral history, Ronald Fraser interviewed some 300 survivors. Idealistic Nationalists here air suspicions that Franco wanted a long war in order to wipe out all opposition. "The right," says an ex-leader of the Basque Nationalists, "was even worse than the left. Assassinations committed by so-called religious believers . . . were even more unpardonable than those committed by the . . . poor on the left." On the Left, the fear grew that collectivization was leading to "nothing other than the creation of two classes; the new rich and the eternal poor." Fraser's compelling account is one of disappointment and grief—on both sides.

—Geoffrey Best ('79)

THE POLITICS OF CANCER
by Samuel S. Epstein, M.D.
Sierra Club, 1978
583 pp. $12.50
L of C 78-985
ISBN 0-87156-193-X

Scientists disagree on the amount of evidence needed to prove that a substance causes cancer; they argue, too, over when—and how—federal agencies should shield the public from carcinogens. Between 70 and 90 percent of all human cancers, writes Epstein, a University of Illinois professor of occupational and environmental medicine, are environmentally induced and can be prevented. He

contends that the fight against cancer is slowed not by lack of scientific knowledge or of adequate laws but rather by the public uncertainty nurtured by continuing scientific debate. Chemical and food industry lobbies, such as the powerful American Industrial Health Council (of chemical manufacturers), marshal their own scientists to question the findings of government researchers. The industry studies "neutralize" those of such agencies as the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration; regulators become hesitant to act, wary of corporate resistance and legal snarls. Many of the examples Epstein cites are familiar: the prolonged debates over asbestos and vinyl chloride in the workplace, red dyes and saccharin in food, DDT in the environment. In each, Epstein details the *political* struggle that has taken place between industry's scientists, who argue that the costs of regulation are too high and that the benefits of cancer-causing substances often outweigh their risks to health, and government and environmental scientists, who stress the need for extreme caution where the public's health is concerned.

—Samuel P. Hays ('79)

THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES
edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan
Johns Hopkins, 1979, 733 pp.
$35 cloth; available in 4 pbk. vols.: $2.95, vol. 1; $3.95 each, vols. 2–4
L of C 78-584
ISBN 0-8018-2008-1
0-8018-2009-X pbk (vol. 1)
0-8018-2002-7 pbk (vol. 2)
0-8018-2023-5 pbk (vol. 3)
0-8018-2010-3 pbk (vol. 4)

Why do democracies fail? Many historians stress the crowd appeal of democracy's chief foes (fascism and communism). Others point to democracy's vulnerabilities (the "inevitable" concentration of economic power and resulting class inequities). Some contend that various peoples (e.g., the Russians, the Chinese) simply lack the taste for political give and take. In his long, analytic introduction to essays on a dozen 20th-century democratic breakdowns, Yale political scientist Juan J. Linz argues that democracy fails when its *friends* stop supporting it. Democracies come apart when their leaders begin to define conflicts in either/or terms, leaving no room for compromise, as happened in Spain in the 1930s and Venezuela in 1945–48; when, to shore up their power,

democratic party strategists collaborate with radical or violent groups, as happened in Weimar Germany and in Colombia during the 1940s and '50s; or when institutions (e.g., the courts, the legislatures) cease to be significant forums for decision-making. In the book's most detailed case study, Arturo Valenzuela, a scholar at Duke, traces the polarization of Chilean politics during Salvador Allende's Presidency (1970–73). Radical demands within its own leftist minority coalition forced the Allende government to accelerate its Marxist economic programs (income redistribution, nationalization of key industries, land reform). Conflict between Left and Right escalated; the military felt compelled to restore order. Both sides, Valenzuela maintains, set aside chances for compromise "in favor of the short-term requirement of preserving immediate political strength."

—Gianfranco Pasquino ('79)

BEAST AND MAN: The Roots of Human Nature
by Mary Midgley
Cornell, 1978
377 pp. $12.50
L of C 78-58021
ISBN 0-8014-1032-0

"We are not just rather like animals; we *are* animals," writes Mary Midgley, lecturer in philosophy at England's University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Regarding animals as beasts, Western society has attributed its own savage propensities to "the beast within" and has seen reason as the leash that holds the beast in check. But the much-maligned wolf, for instance, is a faithful spouse, a loving parent, a loyal pack member, and a killer only from necessity. Midgley is among the first scholar-philosophers to take full advantage of the recent explosive growth in knowledge of the behavior of animals in nature. Her book has received scant attention compared to that accorded works by Edward O. Wilson, Desmond Morris, and Robert Ardrey. She criticizes Wilson's sociobiology for its "bias toward noticing inherited tendencies and ignoring causes that operate after birth." She faults the opposing "blank paper" environmental theory of human nature for its denial of all human instincts. Recent experiments

have shown that chimpanzees can acquire language, notes Midgley. And many animals display a hierarchy of motives (e.g., a wolf will feed its cubs before itself); reasoning may well enter into their choices between aggression and affection. Can it be that humans have inherited the best, not the worst, aspects of their natures from their animal ancestors?

—Peter Singer ('79)

THE FINE ARTS IN AMERICA
by Joshua C. Taylor
Univ. of Chicago, 1979
264 pp. $17.50
L of C 78-23643
ISBN 0-226-79150-5

The White Girl
James McNeill Whistler
National Gallery of Art, Washington
Harris Whittemore Collection

A nation's art is the product not only of its creators' skill and imagination but also of their training and education, of viewers' expectations, and of institutions' support. In his account of American art history, Joshua C. Taylor, director of the Smithsonian's National Collection of Fine Arts, stresses the roles of institutions and patronage. In 1794, portraitist Charles Peale founded the first American art academy in Philadelphia; it lasted only a year. In the early 1800s, well-to-do American intellectuals, who felt that art was too important to leave only to artists, opened academies in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. They were concerned with safeguarding art's "moral stature" (casts of classical sculptures were imported from Paris) and, in the spirit of the new democracy, with making art available to the public. Artists were often frustrated because they had so little impact on early academies, and they were forced to form their own teaching and exhibiting societies. Today, American artists are more respected. After the Civil War, writes Taylor, the artist grew in status "from one who had artistic talent to one who had proper schooling under the guidance of internationally accepted masters." With the inclusion of their works in international exhibitions and, after World War II, with the advent of Jackson Pollock and the abstract expressionists, American artists established themselves as professionals. And Taylor adds, New York City has emerged as the world's art center. "America has acquired confidence in

art, and . . . the artist has gained confidence in America." Small black-and-white illustrations in the margin accompany Taylor's highly readable prose.

—*Wanda M. Corn*

THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE: Communications and Cultural Transformation in Early-Modern Europe
by Elizabeth L. Eisenstein
Cambridge, 1979, 794 pp.
$49.50, 2-vol. set; $29.50, vol. 1; $24.50, vol. 2
L of C 77-91083
ISBN 0-521-22044-0 (set)
0-521-21967-1 (vol. 1)
0-521-21969-8 (vol. 2)

More than just a technical breakthrough, the development of the printing press in the 16th century profoundly affected the course of Western institutions, human knowledge, and people's everyday lives. Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, a University of Michigan historian, reminds us that when Europe's 15th-century adventurers began their major voyages of exploration they had no uniform world maps on which to plot their courses. Scribes were prone to error; readers, lacking standard reference works, were in no position to question them. The ability to cheaply produce identical texts in large numbers resulted for the first time in technical books—for architects, mathematicians, astronomers, and biologists—bearing uniform pictures, charts, and tables. Scholars could now build upon the work of others. Printers themselves became influential. In England during the late 1540s, for example, they harnessed their presses to the Protestant cause. Ever on the lookout for new markets, printers recruited authors (Paul of Middleburg got Copernicus to write on calendar reform in 1515), invented advertising, and flooded the market with self-help books. So great was the avalanche of information that codification acquired a new sophistication (indexing, cross-referencing), and teaching the alphabet became a central function of the schools.

—*Rosemary O'Day ('79)*

NEW TITLES

History

GIVING UP THE GUN: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543–1879
by Noel Perrin
Godine, 1979
122 pp. $8.95
L of C 78-74252
ISBN 0-87923-278-1

Reprinted by permission of David R. Godine, Publisher.

In 1846, a shipwrecked American seaman swam ashore at the tiny Japanese island of Etorufu. There he saw "'what appeared to be a fort, but [in fact] was a piece of cloth extended about three-quarters of a mile, and painted so as to represent a fort with guns.'" The astonished sailor could not have known that the isolationist Japanese had not produced a single firearm in 150 years. Perrin, a Dartmouth professor of English, tells a lively tale of the social and political maneuvering that led to Japan's decision to give up the gun. The Japanese saw their first matchlock musket in 1530, in the hands of Portuguese explorers. Soon the islanders were making their own. An unsuccessful invasion of Korea in 1592 started the firearm's fall from favor. Among those urging swords over guns were upper-class samurai swordsmen who saw that firearms, deadly even in the hands of peasants, threatened their eminence. The firearm, notes Perrin, went the way of other Western influences (foreigners had been expelled in 1636). But the islands' isolation—which permitted the Japanese to eschew guns for so long—lasted only until Matthew Perry's visit in 1853. So well-crafted were the 16th- and 17th-century rifles that, with adjustments, they were later used with great effect in the 1904 Russo–Japanese War.

YOUNG MUSSOLINI AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF FASCISM
by A. James Gregor
Univ. of Calif., 1979
270 pp. $16.50
L of C 78-64470
ISBN 0-520-03799-5

Many scholars think of fascism as lacking any intellectual foundations. Berkeley political scientist A. James Gregor is not among them. Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) worked as a laborer before becoming, in his 20s, a leftist political journalist and propagandist for a construction workers' union. In his early writings, he espoused the orthodoxies of Marx and Engels. But he soon came under the influence of Europe's socialist innovators led by

French syndicalist George S. Sorel. Mussolini came to believe, with the syndicalists, that the proletariat was incapable of achieving anything other than "bourgeois" consciousness without guidance from an elite vanguard. The future dictator finally broke with the orthodox Italian socialists when he called for intervention in World War I. Recognizing newly unified Italy's need for nationalist feeling to help its people overcome poverty, illiteracy, and overpopulation, Mussolini saw the war as an opportunity to strengthen a nascent patriotism. This pro-war stance served as a springboard for *il Duce's* 1922 seizure of power and for the creation of a Fascist state. His chauvinistic appeals rallied popular support for his totalitarian program of modernization (a strong state, control of inflation, revitalized public services). Many 20th-century revolutionaries (Russian, Chinese, Cuban), Gregor argues, have taken a similar ideological journey without, however, losing their "socialist" credentials in the eyes of Western intellectuals.

LEST INNOCENT BLOOD BE SHED: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There
by Philip P. Hallie
Harper, 1979
312 pp. $12.95
L of C 77-11825
ISBN 0-06-011701-X

Even after the fall of France in 1940, the 3,000 inhabitants of Le Chambon kept their mountain town a "city of refuge" for fascism's fugitives. Already in 1936, they had opened their homes to Spanish Republicans and anti-Nazi Germans. They later sheltered Frenchmen avoiding the *Service du travail obligatoire* and Eastern European and French Jews. The Chambonnais forged food-distribution papers and identity cards for the refugees; secret lines of communication within the town warned escapees of Nazi raids. In all, an estimated 2,500 Jews passed through en route to Switzerland, despite Nazi harassment. Other French towns had their underground activists, but none displayed Le Chambon's singleness of purpose and thorough organization. Philip P. Hallie, a Wesleyan University philosophy professor, searched the town's records and interviewed its war survivors. Again and again, he is

drawn to Le Chambon's late Protestant minister, André Trocmé, "a violent man conquered by God." As Protestants in a Catholic country, the Chambonnais empathized with persecuted outsiders. But, Hallie notes, it was Trocmé's tenacity in uniting the townspeople behind a belief in the preciousness of human life that spurred them to heroism, year in and year out.

TRUTH IN HISTORY
by Oscar Handlin
Harvard, 1979
437 pp. $17.50
L of C 78-24157
ISBN 0-674-91025-7

In 1862, Abraham Lincoln told Horace Greeley that if freeing blacks would end the Civil War, he was for it; if tolerating slavery would do so, he was for that. The Great Emancipator's "ambivalence" has tantalized many a scholar. In this collection of essays on the historian's craft and on U.S. history, Harvard's Oscar Handlin issues heartfelt admonitions to his colleagues (sample chapters: "How to Count a Number," "How to Read a Word"). His targets: academic infighters, "quantitative" historians who selectively scrutinize data, scholars with over-riding ideological biases, and authors aspiring to the bestseller list. Books published after 1965 on blacks and slavery come in for special criticism. Consider Lincoln's alleged ambivalence, says Handlin; he points out that Lincoln had the Emancipation Proclamation on his desk when he wrote to the New York newspaper editor. The President's words were aimed only at persuading loyal slaveholders to fight for the Union. The historian's task, suggests Handlin, is deceptively simple: "Put the evidence in order . . . . [Bring] it as close as possible to correspondence with the occurrence in the past."

BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: The Aftermath of Slavery
by Leon F. Litwack
Knopf, 1979
651 pp. $20
L of C 78-24311
ISBN 0-394-50099-7

Been in the Storm So Long is history that Oscar Handlin would approve. Berkeley historian Leon F. Litwack provides a sweeping view of Southern society, 1863–67. Interviews with ex-slaves conducted during the New Deal Federal Writer's Project, contemporary newspaper accounts, diaries, and letters make the reader a witness to a complex social and cultural breakdown. Most of the 4 million ex-slaves, writes Litwack, "were neither 're-

bellious' nor 'faithful'" toward their former masters. Rather they were "ambivalent and observant"—"Folks dat ain' never been free," one of Jefferson Davis' slaves is quoted, "don' right know de *feel* of bein' free." Nonetheless, most whites felt betrayed as their former slaves either left or ceased to listen to them. The whites, Litwack observes, had mistaken "the slave's outward demeanor for his inner feelings, his docility for contentment and acquiescence."

Contemporary Affairs

FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954–1978
by J. Harvie Wilkinson III
Oxford, 1979
368 pp. $17.95
L of C 78-20860
ISBN 0-19-502567-9

The Supreme Court's 1954 decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, outlawing "separate but equal" education for blacks and whites, was unanimous. Southern newspaper editor J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a former law clerk (1972–73) to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., examines the disputes—in the courts, on local school boards, among scholars—that have raged over race and education ever since. Between 1954 and the mid-1960s, writes Wilkinson, "the Court's prolonged patience with tokenism was its greatest mistake"; local officials integrated at their own "deliberate speed"—i.e., slowly, if at all. As the Court in the late 1960s and '70s intervened to insist on immediate integration of urban schools, white flight to the suburbs accelerated, black disillusionment deepened. In this thoughtful revisionist account, Wilkinson expresses the fear "that no solution fair to both races, supported by both races, and advantageous to both races can be humanly devised." He sees hope in the Court's 1978 5-to-4 decision in the "reverse discrimination" suit filed by a white man, Alan Bakke. By denying racial "quotas" but upholding "affirmative action" in school admissions, contends Wilkinson, the Court (deciding for Bakke in an opinion written by Justice Powell) pointed the way to balancing legitimate claims of discrimination against those of merit.

MERCHANTS OF GRAIN
by Dan Morgan
Viking, 1979
387 pp. $14.95
L of C 79-11543
ISBN 0-670-47150-X

The great grain traders volunteer remarkably little information about their operations, even by corporate standards. Cargill and Continental (both U.S.-based), Louis Dreyfus (France), Bunge (Argentina and the United States), and André (Switzerland) are family-owned businesses that publish no financial statements. *Washington Post* correspondent Dan Morgan chronicles the history of big grain operators (in milling, storage, and transport) since 1870, when Leopold Louis-Dreyfus began importing wheat from Tsarist Russia to feed increasingly urbanized Europe. Swiftly matching worldwide supply with volatile demand for grain is the multinationals' task, usually at a profit. Their importance was underscored during the 1972 "great grain robbery," when Russia quietly purchased 20 million tons of U.S. wheat and soybeans. "If the Russians had gone to the USDA [Department of Agriculture]," writes Morgan, "and proposed buying such an enormous amount of American grain, there immediately would have been political problems"—among them, White House pressure for Soviet concessions in other areas. The grain dealers offered what the Russians wanted: secrecy, access to grain, and a buffer between governments.

Arts & Letters

THE YEAR OF THE FRENCH
by Thomas Flanagan
Holt, 1979
516 pp. $12.95
L of C 78-23539
ISBN 0-03-044591-4

Most historical novels these days are rife with formula plots, stock characters, and facts distorted to accommodate romance or ideology. This long, flowing first novel by a professor of English at the State University of New York is historically accurate, even-handed, and not a bit sentimental. In 1798, 1,000 of Napoleon's troops, dispatched to harass the English, invaded County Mayo on Ireland's northwest coast. There they joined up with the rebellious Society of United Irishmen, a rabble of Catholic and Protestant peasants vexed by English tithes. To the astonishment of all, the

allied force won its first skirmish with the redcoats at Castelbar. But the rest of British-ruled Ireland did not join the struggle; most farmers were too busy with the harvest. The British commander, Lord Cornwallis, was determined not to repeat the embarrassment he had suffered at the hands of other rebels—the Americans—at Yorktown. The few Irish insurrectionists (many armed only with pikes) who escaped slaughter on the battlefield were later hanged; the French were captured and repatriated. Flanagan renders this woeful story through several voices: a Protestant minister, an aristocratic Irish historian, Cornwallis' clerk, a rebel informer, and an Irish poet/schoolteacher. Each provides perspective on a "small Protestant world of property and [the] multitudinous Papist world of want."

ART AND POLITICS IN THE WEIMAR PERIOD: The New Sobriety, 1917–1933
by John Willett
Pantheon, 1979
272 pp. $17.95
L of C 78-51805
ISBN 0-394-49628-0

Berlin's decadent cabaret life, the earthiness of Kurt Weill's *Three Penny Opera,* the rival fanaticisms of Right and Left—all marked republican Germany from the collapse of Kaiser William II's empire to the rise of Hitler. But British journalist John Willett's focus is on the simultaneous search for a new culture by a class of young Germans committed to boldness in art and to egalitarianism in society. The Bauhaus, center of functionalist architecture; the hortatory theater of Bertolt Brecht; and the then shocking atonal music of Arnold Schönberg developed during the days of the Weimar Republic. Art was not enough to change history's course. The movement, notes Willett, "depended on [an] awareness of political factors . . . at once too varied and too uneven." Hitler's nationalism attracted working-class Germans, and the Nazi folk cults encouraged stifling chauvinism in the arts. Yet the cultural experiments of Germany's young intellectuals proved immensely fertile. In this richly illustrated book, Willett demonstrates that Weimar Germany, more than any other place at the time, set the course of 20th-century Western art and ideas.

THE PUSHCART PRIZE, IV: The Best of the Small Presses
edited by Bill Henderson
Pushcart Press (Box 845, Yonkers, N.Y. 10701), 1979
591 pp. $16.50
L of C 76-58675
ISBN 0-916366-06-5

There are more than 1,000 small presses and magazines publishing poetry, fiction, and nonfiction in the United States and Canada today; within the last five years another 1,400 have come and gone. With so many outlets for amateur authors, much second-rate literature gets into print. For the last four years, Henderson and more than 100 leading editors have endeavored to separate the good from the bad. In the process, the annual *Pushcart Prize* has presented excellent new writing—traditional as well as experimental. This year's collection offers 32 poems, 18 short stories, and 11 essays. (Only one of the authors—John Updike—already has a wide readership.) The publishers range from New York City's *Antaeus* magazine to the Cedar Rock press of New Braufels, Texas. Highlights include Jayne Anne Phillips' sensitive story, "Home," about the distances between a mother and daughter. In an engaging essay, Charles Molesworth examines the motivation behind much contemporary verse and offers a strong caveat: "Making only poems about poetry . . . is a temptation that needs stout resistance." Happily, many of *Pushcart*'s poets need not heed the warning.

THE POEMS OF STANLEY KUNITZ: 1928–1978
by Stanley Kunitz
Atlantic–Little, Brown, 1979
249 pp. $12.50 cloth, $6.95 paper
L of C 79-463
ISBN 0-316-50711-3
0-316-50710-5 pbk

Stanley Kunitz's latest collection brings together almost all of the 1959 Pulitzer Prize winner's past work, plus a section of recent compositions entitled "The Layers." Over the years, Kunitz has turned and returned to the same subjects, gradually paring down his style. Yet, he is not repetitive. Each new, clear-sighted poem is a transformation of an experience, carrying within it the weight of previous observation. Two poems about dragonflies illustrate: An early one, from *This Garland, Danger* (1958), fills two and a half pages and describes the insect in baroque detail—*A triumph of chinoiseris./He seemed, in green and gold/Enameling, pin-brained./ with swizzle-stick for tail./The breastplate gemmed between.* A recent poem, "The Catch," recounts the capture of a dragon-fly. Here the

creature has become *gossamer dragon/less image than thought/and the thought come alive.* Something else, too, has changed in the poet's consciousness since the earlier poem, in which he paid a "tithe of awe" with his attention. In "The Catch," a child asks, "May I look?" *You may look, child,/all you want./ This prize belongs to no one./But you will pay all/Your life for the privilege,/all your life.*

Science & Technology

THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS
edited by William L. Kahrl
Kaufmann (1 First St., Los Altos, Calif. 94022), 1979
118 pp. $37.50
L of C 78-620062
ISBN 0-913232-68-8

When Americans turn on their faucets, water flows. (The average U.S. city-dweller uses 150 gallons of water daily—mostly for washing, cooking, and cleaning.) Few give much thought to where it comes from and how it gets into their homes. Filled with color maps, charts, tables, and photos, this book explains water supply, delivery, and use in the nation's most populous state. Two-thirds of water-scarce California's rainfall occurs in the northern one-third of the state; the mean annual rainfall in extensive areas east of Los Angeles is less than 10 inches. Crop irrigation accounts for 91 percent of the state's water use; 5 percent goes for domestic purposes; and manufacturing consumes 1 percent. The history of water management in California mirrors the story of the state's growth. During the 1860s, a growing population regarded marshes, tidelands, and swamps as obstacles to settlement; reclamation was begun. The 1887 Wright Act set up local irrigation districts as agriculture assumed a central role in the economy. With the increasing concentration of people in cities after 1911, a new grid of municipal and county water lines was imposed. Today, 3,700 agencies direct the flow of California's precious water by means of a vast computerized system controlling dams on the state's lakes, rivers, and reservoirs. Novelist Joan Didion said it best: "The apparent ease of California life is an illusion."

GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: An Eternal Golden Braid
by Douglas R. Hofstadter
Basic Books, 1979
777 pp. $18.50
L of C 78-19943
ISBN 0-465-02685-0

Metamorphosis. *Woodcut by M. C. Escher. ©The Escher Foundation, 1979. Rights arranged courtesy of Vorpal Galleries.*

In any mathematical system, propositions exist that cannot be proved or disproved. Czech mathematician Kurt Gödel shocked his peers with this "incompleteness" theorem in 1931. Now Douglas R. Hofstadter, an Indiana University computer scientist, sets out to probe the human thought process by examining the logic of Gödel's proof, the 18th-century music of Johann Sebastian Bach, and the 20th-century art of M. C. Escher. In Gödel's mathematical deduction, Hofstadter finds the concepts of self-reference—"Strange Loopiness"—and circular argument. (For a parallel, consider the irony in the simple declaration, "This statement is false.") Gödel used mathematical reasoning to explore mathematical reasoning itself; Escher and Bach developed self-mirroring and irony in their works. Thus, Escher drew staircases that seemingly ascend and descend simultaneously. Bach invented musical themes, then reversed and inverted them in different keys. Like a Lewis Carroll story, this often funny book—connecting art, literature, and science—has its own offbeat circularity.

DISTURBING THE UNIVERSE
by Freeman Dyson
Harper, 1979
283 pp. $12.95
L of C 78-20665
ISBN 0-06-011108-9

"I have always remained a problem solver rather than a creator of ideas," writes Freeman Dyson, a physicist at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. In these essays, Dyson supplies a philosophic insider's view of America's leading nuclear physics laboratories. Dyson never helped devise nuclear bombs, but his friends did. He recalls that the famed Robert Oppenheimer, a Jew, "was driven to build atomic bombs by fear that if he did not seize this power, Hitler would." Physicist Edward Teller, a Hungarian, was driven to build hydrogen bombs by the Stalinist threat of world domination. In 1958, Dyson took part in the planning of the now-defunct Project Orion (a spacecraft to be powered by nuclear explosions). Discussing such topics as nuclear energy and recombinant DNA, Dyson describes the scientist's dilemma of reconciling a "technically sweet" project with its potential ill effects.

PAPERBOUNDS

FOOD AND DRINK IN HISTORY. Edited by Robert Forster and Orest Ranum. Johns Hopkins, 1979. 173 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $14)

The old saw, "you are what you eat," is taken seriously by a group of recent French historians. These 11 essays first appeared in *Annales,* the journal of history noted for its close examinations of everyday life. The authors delve into such matters as the role of the potato in 18th-century Belgium and France, the family pig under the *ancien régime,* and Jewish dietary laws. Jean Leclant narrates the history of coffee in Paris. Coffee was first brought into Marseilles from Turkey in 1644. Seizing on Parisians' infatuation with the brew, émigré Armenians, who by 1666 were France's leading coffee importers, opened shops that sold nothing else—the first cafés. Then, in 1689, the *Comedie Francaise* coincidently opened near a new café. Actors, writers, and nobles soon became habitués. "Scarcely was it born," writes Leclant, ere "the café became a literary café."

MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION. By Christopher Hill. Penguin reprint, 1979. 541 pp. $5.95

To generations of college students, John Milton (1608–74) is the dour Puritan whose masterpiece, *Paradise Lost,* rivals only Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queene* in unreadability. British historian Christopher Hill brings to life a very different Milton. Known in his time as a high-spirited iconoclast and libertine, Milton committed "heresy" by attributing sexuality to Adam and Eve *before* the Fall in *Paradise Lost.* In his first of many political pamphlets, "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates," Milton defended the 1649 execution of King Charles I; he was briefly imprisoned when the monarchy was restored in 1660. Milton, notes Hill, was influenced by (but, always the snob, refused to join) semi-religious radical groups such as the Ranters, the Levellers, and the Diggers. He championed their right to be heard and shared many of their beliefs—opposition to tithes and support of the popular election of magistrates, religious toleration, even polygamy.

THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE. By Gordon W. Allport. Addison-Wesley, 1979. 537 pp. $4.95 (cloth, $19.95)

"Imaginary fears can cause real suffering." So writes Harvard's late Gordon W. Allport in this influential analysis, first published 26 years ago. Allport synthesizes data from dozens of psychological studies (of, for example, white soldiers' attitudes towards black GIs) to examine the roots of racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual bias. He defines bigotry as a learned hostility. There is a "propensity to prejudice," he observes, that lies in a "whole habit of thinking about the world." A prejudiced person is likely to view people and even the elements of nature, as well as morals, in rigid terms of good and bad, right and wrong. He cannot tolerate ambiguity. He often seeks solace in hierarchical institutions (e.g., churches, clubs). There is a strong connection, Allport theorizes, between prejudice and authoritarianism.

TO LOSE A BATTLE: France 1940. By Alistair Horne. Penguin reprint, 1979. 704 pp. $5.95

After Hitler's six-week blitzkrieg in the spring of 1940, the French Third Republic lay prostrate. British historian Alistair Horne recounts in detail the *Wehrmacht* campaign that took the lives of 27,000 Germans and 90,000 Frenchmen. But he

cites domestic political disarray as the chief cause of France's unexpected defeat. The chronic feuds between Left and Right in the interwar years polarized French society. Thus, after declaring war against Germany in 1939, Frenchmen were readier to fight a civil war than to form a strong coalition government to battle the Nazis. When the German attack began, the leaders in Paris could not agree on strategy. The cabinet failed to respond to Winston Churchill's June 1940 offer of support, and Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned in frustration. Marshal Philippe Pétain, who thought it was "easy and stupid to talk of fighting to the last man . . . criminal in view of [World War I] losses," proposed France's surrender.

BROOKLYN BRIDGE: Fact and Symbol. By Alan Trachtenberg. Univ. of Chicago, 2nd ed., 1979. 206 pp. $6.95

One night, shortly before the Brooklyn Bridge opened in 1883, a young New York reporter climbed boldly up the cables to the very top of its Manhattan-side tower. The next day, he declared to his astonished rescuers that he had been "unaccountably drawn to the bridge, almost as to a woman warm and pulsing." Trachtenberg, a Yale professor of English, recounts the history of Americans' emotional responses to John Augustus Roebling's greatest engineering feat. Taken as a symbol of everything from democracy to industry to Christianity (human cooperation in the pursuit of perfection), the bridge has been "explained" anew by succeeding generations. Novelist Henry James, for example, found it to be "a mechanical spider in a 'steel-souled machine room.'" Trachtenberg does not neglect the actual history of the bridge's construction. He describes the cutthroat practicality of its Berlin-educated designer and its backers. He notes the corruption: Tammany Hall's William M. "Boss" Tweed was paid $65,000 for his help in securing the necessary building permits. A portfolio of Walker Evans's stark 1929 photos of the bridge is included.



Collection of the Newark Museum.

THE POET'S WORK: 29 Masters of 20th Century Poetry on the Origins and Practice of their Art. Edited by Reginald Gibbons. Houghton Mifflin, 1979. 305 pp. $6.95 (cloth, $12.50)

These essays, journal entries, and interviews offer musings on the poet's craft—what editor Gibbons calls a "welter of decisions, dogmas, beliefs, and methods." The authors are well-known and diverse: Wallace Stevens, Dylan Thomas, William Carlos Williams, W. H. Auden, to name a few. Not surprisingly, they emphasize the highly personal nature of their endeavors. "One writes," posits Marianne Moore, "because one has a burning desire to objectify what it is indispensable to one's happiness to express." Poetry can be taken, reflects Seamus Heaney, "as divination . . . as revelation of the self to the self, as restoration of the culture to itself . . . with the aura and authenticity of archaeological finds." For Boris Pasternak, poetry transcends recorded history; it is "the ominous turning of a dozen windmills at the edge of a bare field in a black year of famine."



The layout of the Plan: (a) basilica; (b) scriptorium; (c) dormitory; (d) privies; (e) bathhouse and laundry; (f) refectory; (g) cellar; (h) cloister; (i) kitchen; (j) guests' lodging; (k) school; (l) abbot's house; (m) house for bloodletting; (n) novitiate and infirmary; (o) cemetery and orchard; (p) gardens; (q) fowl houses; (r) mill; (s) mortar; (t) brewery and bakery; (u) houses for livestock and their keepers; (v) house for vassals and knights.

Heaven on Earth: The Plan of St. Gall

The Plan of St. Gall—a sophisticated architectural blueprint for a utopian monastic community—is a unique product of the Carolingian Age. After centuries of tumult and decay in the wake of Rome's collapse, order had at last been restored to Western Europe by the strong hand and visionary policies of Charlemagne (742–814). Uniformity, rationality, planning—these were the watchwords of the day, reflected in the concept of St. Gall. Dating from the early 9th century, the Plan itself (a 30-by-44-inch piece of calfskin now preserved in the library of a Swiss monastery) is a masterpiece of design, one of the great original documents of Western civilization. For hundreds of years, it held religious and secular architecture under its spell. More important to modern scholars, it provides a rare glimpse into both technology and daily life in the Age of Charlemagne. In its clear vermillion lines, there lurks, too, a complex theory of state and society. On Christmas Day 1979, the University of California Press published *The Plan of St. Gall* in three lavishly illustrated folio volumes, the culmination of 20 years of painstaking reconstruction by art historian Walter Horn and architect Ernest Born. The essay here is drawn from their monumental work.

The story of the wrinkled piece of vellum known as the Plan of St. Gall begins in the island-abbey of Reichenau, in what is now West Germany. The year is around A.D. 820, early in the reign of Louis the Pious, who succeeded his father, Charlemagne, as King of the Franks in 814.

It is probably still daylight, the preferred working time of monastic scribes, as two monks in the *scriptorium* at Reichenau apply the finishing touches to a compact architectural master plan for a self-sustaining community of some 300 souls in a plot only 480 by 640 feet.

There is a not an inch of wasted space. The chicken houses abut the vegetable gardens, so that the birds' diet may be augmented with garden clippings even as the garden is enriched with the birds' manure. The

cemetery doubles as an orchard and contains 14 different kinds of trees.

It is a settlement of urban complexity, its 40 buildings clustered around the imposing bulk of a basilica that, had it ever been built as drawn, would have been the most outstanding church of the Age of Charlemagne.

An Abbot's Ambition

Using a fine Carolingian minuscule—forerunner of the typeface you are now reading—the two monks are busily penning the last of the explanatory legends. "Here is the house for brood mares and foals and their keepers," writes the younger of the scribes in a small, crisp hand. From time to time, the older monk helps out, dipping his quill into a different inkpot.

Finally, the younger man writes out the letter of transmittal:

> For thee, my sweetest son Gozbertus, have I drawn this briefly annotated copy of the layout of the monastic buildings, with which you may exercise your ingenuity. . . .

We know enough about this Gozbertus to fit him into the picture.

He was named abbot of the old monastery of St. Gall, near Reichenau, in 816; we may surmise that he was taken aback when he arrived. At a time when most monasteries were great estates, much of St. Gall's property had been seized by unscrupulous neighbors.* Some of its dilapidated buildings dated back to the founding of the establishment by St. Gall in A.D. 612.

Gozbertus threw himself into the task of restoring the monastery's fortunes. He quickly won new rights from the crown, then sued successfully for return of the abbey's lands. Prosperity assured, Gozbertus now launched his most ambitious project yet: the total architectural reconstruction of the monastery.

It was his need for a master plan—the Plan of St. Gall—that brought our two scribes together in the *scriptorium* at Reichenau, where they made him a copy of a (now lost) master plan already in their library.

Order out of Chaos

The most curious aspect of the incident is this: that a prototype plan for an "ideal" monastic community should have existed in the first place. To understand this, one must grasp the inner dynamics of the whole Carolingian era.

The first two decades of the 9th century—the peak of the Carolingian renaissance—were a time of relative peace and extraordinary progress in

*The bulk of the labor for a monastery's agricultural and industrial domain was done by laymen. A total of 40,000 persons lived on the lands of the Abbey of St. Germain-des-Prés at the time of Abbot Irminon (c. 800–826), for example. Yet, there were only 120 monks in the monastery.

This essay has been drawn, with permission, from The Plan of St. Gall, A Study of the Architecture & Economy of, & Life in, a Paradigmatic Carolingian Monastery *by Walter Horn and Ernest Born, with a foreword by Wolfgang Braunfels; a translation into English by Charles W. Jones of the Directives of Adelhard (A.D. 753–826), the ninth abbot of Corbie; and a note by A. Hunter Dupree on the significance of the Plan of St. Gall to the history of measurement. Illustrations based on the Plan of St. Gall are reproduced by permission of the University of California Press.*



Monks' cloister and adjacent buildings (authors' interpretation). At the center of the cloister is a savin plant, well known for its medicinal properties, chiefly of a diuretic nature. It is banned today from most public parks.

the West. Population was on the increase again. For the first time since the fall of Rome 350 years earlier, most of Western Europe was under the administrative control of a single state, ruled by Charlemagne and his successors.

Charlemagne's most outstanding trait was an overriding insistence on order and consistency at all costs.

He re-established a uniform system of weights and measures, and from his book of instructions to the managers of all royal estates, the famous *Capitulare de villis,* we learn that the standard molds for such measures of capacity were kept in the royal palace.

Charlemagne regulated coinage and mints, and began pulling together local laws and "folkrights" into a universal system of justice. He established the *missi dominici,* the king's messengers, who rode out from Aachen to the farthest corners of the empire to ensure that his will was done.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Charlemagne wanted the hundreds of monasteries under imperial jurisdiction also to yield to his passion for uniformity.

Monasticism had emerged in the 4th century A.D. at the eastern fringes of the Roman Empire. It was the creation of religious fanatics, who, by

severing all ties with the secular world and immersing themselves in self-mortification, sought to achieve a mystical union with God.

When this Eastern phenomenon took root in Western Europe, it retained its Eastern flavor, hermetic and austere. But by its very nature, it varied from place to place.

Then came St. Benedict.

Benedict of Nursia (c. 480–547) began his monastic career by practicing the extreme, ascetic form of monasticism. From St. Gregory's *Dialogue,* we learn that he sometimes rolled himself in a thicket of briars to overcome temptation.

In the maturity of his later years, however, Benedict drew up a new rule for monastic life, the *regula sancti Benedicti.* Rejecting reckless asceticism and isolation, he promoted, instead, the complete submersion of the individual in a close-knit, well-run monastic community.

Benedict counseled moderation in self-denial. He acknowledged for the record that "wine is no drink for monks" but added with characteristic sense that "since nowadays monks cannot be persuaded of this, let us at least agree . . . to drink temperately, and not to satiety."

He ordered abbots to see to it that "the monks' clothes fit them," even decreed that monks be issued a blanket, coverlet, mattress, and pillow.

All of this, of course, assumed an otherwise severe monastic regimen that included vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, and prescribed, down to the minute, the hours for prayer, for manual labor, for meals.



The henhouse.

Changing the Rule

By the time Charlemagne was crowned Emperor on Christmas Day 800, Benedict's word was law—theoretically—in most of Europe's monasteries.

Yet, in practice, local variations thrived. Strong-willed abbots ran their abbeys like private fiefs. For Charlemagne and his like-minded son, the learned Louis (the Pious), this diversity was intolerable.

It was Louis who brought the ensuing monastic reform movement to its climax. His chief ally in this effort was Benedict of Aniane (known as the "second Benedict") to whom Louis gave religious authority over all of France.

Benedict convened two synods of church leaders at Louis' royal palace at Aachen in 816 and 817. There he drew up 79 chapters of laws, many of them unimaginably specific, to supplement, even supersede, the *regula sancti Benedicti.**

*The Aachen synods defined the standard issue of clothing to each monk as follows: two shirts, two tunics, two cowls, two copes, four shoes, two pairs of socks, one frock, one "fur garment down to the heels," two head coverings, one pair of summer gloves, one pair of winter gloves made of sheepskin, two pairs of day shoes, two night slippers for the summer, two night slippers for the winter, and a "sufficient amount" of soap.



The Plan was traced in the abbey of Reichenau at the heart of Charlemagne's empire (red on inset). The copy sent to Gozbertus survived the Magyar invasion (A.D. 926) and a millennium of wear and tear in the library of St. Gall.

It was at these two synods, we believe, that someone, or some group, was charged with the responsibility of working out a blueprint to show just how the welter of resolutions taken by the assembled abbots and bishops could be embodied in the layout of an "exemplary" monastery.

The scheme was a statement of policy drawn up at the highest levels, intended to standardize monastic planning throughout Europe, just as the molds in the Aachen palace had standardized weights and measures.

This is the master plan requested by Gozbertus, the builder, the plan traced off by two monks at Reichenau and sent to St. Gall, where it has been ever since. And while neither Gozbertus nor anyone else ever built a monastic complex exactly like the one depicted on the Plan (Le Corbusier never built his Radiant City, either), the design alone is of enormous significance.

The Plan of St. Gall gathers, as in a lens, the whole of Carolingian life, as vividly as the ruins of Pompeii capture daily life in imperial Rome, flash frozen in a brief, eternal moment of time.

The nucleus of the planned community is a great monastery church. Annexed to the southern flank of the church is the monks' cloister, an arcaded open court with the monks' dormitory, refectory, and cellar arranged around it.

Except for the times when he worked in the fields or outbuildings, or those rare occasions when he was away on journeys, the entire life of the monk was spent in this core complex, sealed off from laymen.

Beyond the church and cloister, to the east, are the quarters for the novices, the infirmary, houses for physicians, and a medicinal herb garden; to the south of the novitiate lie the cemetery and orchard, monks' vegetable garden, and chicken and goose houses.

Forming a perimeter to the south and west are the monastery's indus-

A medieval wooden bathtub.

trial facilities: mill, mortar, drying kiln, workshops, and no fewer than three bake and brew houses. West of the church are six large buildings sheltering livestock.

The architects clearly knew what they were doing. The Plan is drawn, we believe, at a consistent scale of one Carolingian inch (the thumb breadth of a grown man) to 192 Carolingian feet (1 C.F. = 1'⅝"), which corresponds roughly to a metric scale of 1:200—ideal for architectural plans of similar scope even today.

If our calculations are correct, the cloister would be 100 feet square, which tallies with the opinion of Hildemar of Corbie, writing around A.D. 845, that "a cloister should be 100 feet square, and not less, because that would make it too small."

The architects also worked from a clearly formulated population plan—possibly handed down by the Aachen synods—and stuck to it with punctilious care.

A count of the beds of the monks and various monastic officials discloses that the monastery shown on the Plan of St. Gall was designed to accommodate between 100 and 110 *religiosi*. The church seats 112. The 100-foot-long refectory ("This hall, where the food is laid out, has a place for everybody," the legend reads) accommodates the same number, with a few seats left over for the inevitable holiday overflow.

In the house for distinguished guests, the number of toilet seats for servants is identical with the number of beds that could fit into the servants' sleeping quarters.

The Plan's creators clearly took pains to scale every room and building to a specific use. More striking still is their ingenuity in the siting of each structure.

They knew, for example, that the baking of bread and the brewing of beer both require an active yeast culture, or "sponge," which in turn requires a temperature held above 75°F at all times. Cleverly, they put bakery and brewery under one roof in the Plan, figuring that the bakery oven would keep the building at that temperature year round.

Bread and Wine

While the oven's temperature rose and declined with the rhythm of the baking cycle, it was never cold in a community whose planned population needed not only a one-pound loaf per monk each day—the daily ration fixed by St. Benedict—but also enough bread for the 170 or so lay workers provided for in the Plan. These included fowl-keepers, shoemakers, goldsmiths, coopers, grooms, millers, and shepherds.

Even the 14 lovingly drawn barrels—which seem at first to be merely a draftsman's whimsical symbol for "Here lies the cellar"—are rendered to scale, based on an accurate statistical estimate of the alcoholic beverage needs of a community of these 300 monks and

laymen drinking the regulation one *hemina* (probably about a half-liter at the time of Louis the Pious) of wine per day.

Moreover, each of the large (30,000-liter) barrels exactly fills six of the smaller (5,000-liter) barrels—a telling feature, since good cellar practice requires draining the properly aged contents of a large barrel into smaller containers. As the creators of the Plan must have known, small daily withdrawals from one large barrel would shortly cause "acetification" of the remaining liquid.*

For good reason, the architects of the Plan gave as much attention to the library and *scriptorium*—the intellectual nerve centers of the monastery—as they did to the cellar.

The copying of texts was held in high esteem, but it was also arduous. "Writing is excessive drudgery" reads one marginal comment in an eighth century Visigothic manuscript. "It crooks your back, dims your sight, twists your stomach, and your sides. Three fingers write, but the whole body labors."

Light was important in the *scriptorium*. Along the north and east walls of the room, the architects placed seven desks and seven windows. This is one of only two places where windows are explicitly marked on the Plan. (The other is the monks' privy, where ventilation was necessary.)

The planners also put the *scriptorium* in the best conceivable location: at the northeast corner of the church, in the shadow cast by transept and choir. This protected scribes

*The practice of storing alcoholic beverages in wooden casks made its appearance in Europe in the 1st century B.C. among the Celtic peoples (who also gave us *cervasia*, or beer). It was the monks who began the classification of beer by strength into *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia*, which, simplified into the categories "x," "xx," and "xxx," survives even today.



Reconstruction of access road to church and monastery grounds, framed by circular towers. House for servants traveling with the emperor's court is on the right, house for vassals and knights in the emperor's entourage on the left.



The Plan's water-powered trip-hammer, activated by a cam block. The device had been used in China for centuries and may have been brought to Europe by the Huns, who came from central Asia.

from the glare of the sun as it traveled through the southern and western portions of its trajectory, and allowed them to work in the more diffused light made available by their east and north exposure.

The internal logic of the Plan of St. Gall obviously stems in large part from common sense. But its creators had more on their minds than that. As form follows function, so the design of the monastery hews hard to the Rule of St. Benedict and the modifications of the Aachen synods.

Take the matter of bathing. With its connotations of Greco-Roman decadence, bathing had always been controversial in monasteries, though St. Benedict, with the tolerance that characterized his judgment, permitted the use of baths "to the sick, as often as may be expedient."

At the Aachen synods, however, it was decided that the use of baths "shall be left to the judgement of the prior." Reflecting the new ruling, separate bathhouses are depicted in the Plan for the novices, the abbot, and the monks, as well as the sick.*

The strictures of Benedict's Rule also help to explain why the architects put so many privies in the Plan (83 in all).

Because of the rigid time schedule of the many monks, and the long hours they had to spend collectively in church celebrating divine services, the use of the privy was subject to timing.

The *regula sancti Benedicti* specified, for example, that from Easter to the first of November, "the

*The monk Hildemar, cited above, categorically ruled out "bathtubs made of stone in which three or two or even four might bathe simultaneously," since this might encourage "that most detestable crime" to which a monk must never succumb. "It would be of little help," he wrote, "to fortify an entire town, and yet leave a passage open through which the enemy may enter."

hour of rising be so arranged that there be a short interval after Matins, in which the brothers may go out for the necessities of nature, to be followed at once by Lauds, which should be said at dawn."

This was a compelling reason to have as many privies available as possible.

The sanitary facilities as designed in the Plan are of superior design. The toilet seats *(sedilia)* are suspended above a water-flushed channel made of stone or hardened clay.

The technology of the Plan of St. Gall is advanced in every respect. The Plan has two sophisticated heating systems. One is a hooded corner fireplace that emits smoke through a chimney stack. In the second system—used in rooms where the entire community of monks and novices were meant to sleep or work together—heat is generated by a furnace built against one of the outer walls of the building, conducted into trenches beneath the floor, and from there released through openings into the room above.

To judge by the two water mills in the Plan, water power was also commonplace in monasteries by the 9th century. Owing to the abundance of slave labor, the Romans had made little use of hydraulic power.

But their inventive successors, with their manor-based economy, were quick to harness technology that offered new vistas of exploitation to landlords who, by right and custom, held a monopoly on the milling of their tenants' grain.

The amount of crushed grain used daily in a medieval monastery must have been considerable. A mixture of barley and oats, made into a kind of porridge, or "pap," by the crushing action of a mortar, was a chief item in the diet of Western Europe prior to the introduction of the potato in the 16th century.

The crushing devices devised for the Plan are enormous. Their design—a hammer attached at right angles to a pestle beam connecting at the opposite end with a body of cylindrical shape—leaves no doubt that they were recumbent hammers activated by the cams of a revolving drum. The dimensions (overall length: 17½ feet) as well as the location next to the water-driven mill, suggest strongly that they were water-powered.

In a sense, the Plan of St. Gall is a catalogue of the debt modern society owes to the Age of Charlemagne, and of the debt the secular Carolingian world owed to its monastic enclaves.

The men who conceived the Plan were of the intellectual elite of their time: They would have stood out among sagacious men of any age. They were expert in every facet of that microcosm of life compacted by history within the walls of a monastic enclosure. Associated with them were the greatest scholars, artists, and metalworkers of the time.

It is to such men, anonymous as they are and separated from us by a span exceeding a millennium, that we express our deepest thanks. With their work, they have held us spellbound and in the course of time have become a part of us.

Surviving the '80s: Decalogy Comes of Age

Some predictions for 1980 have already foundered on reality. Ten years ago, for example, the Institute for the Future suggested that by this year contraceptive chemicals could be distributed to the public through the water supply. Five years ago, a Center for Futures Research report saw OPEC in disarray by 1980. Not surprisingly, many scholars now suggest that this popular "if-present-trends-continue" school of forecasting is intellectually bankrupt. Fortunately, writes historian Sybil Schwartz, there is an alternative: the "rigorous" new science of "Decalogy." If, as she argues (with what appears to be the utmost solemnity), the Decalogists are right, the coming decade will be the least eventful era America has seen since the age of Chester Arthur.

by Sybil Schwartz

No subject has so captured the imagination of Americans as the decade of the 1980s. With George Orwell's fateful 1984 just around the corner, everyone anxiously wants to know precisely what lies ahead. Coaxed by prominent foundations and think tanks, scholars have rushed in where prophets fear to tread.

And like the bookshelf needed to store them, the scope of the resulting studies stretches from here to eternity: *Thinking About the '70s and '80s*; *Who's Afraid of 1984?*; *The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985*; *Toward the Year 2018*; *The Next 10,000 Years*.

Yet even the best of such studies, with their Bauhaus graphics and their long lists of blue-ribbon contributors, are not good enough.

To be sure, they are full of sage predictions and "words of learned length," like Goldsmith's parson. But when one probes for the scientific underpinnings, one finds a common assumption running through all the predictions—namely, that one can project from the very recent past and present to determine what will happen in the future.

Nothing could be sillier.

If the human body continued to grow at the rate achieved during the first 15 years of life, we would all be about 22 feet tall when we received our first social security checks. If someone in 1959 had used the previous five years' experience to project the height of Chrysler tailfins by 1980, he would have warned of appendages six feet high. Instead, we



ALINARI/Editorial Photocolor Archives

The eruption of Vesuvius, A.D. 79: the storm before the calm? Great events, Decalogists believe, are crammed disproportionately into "79" years in order to occur before the arrival of the historically placid '80s. Predictably, Vesuvius erupted again in 1779, Mount Etna in 1979.



Reprinted by permission of Politikens Forlag.

ALINARI/Editorial Photocolor Archives

From Histoire de Ferdinand-Alvarez de Tolede *by Jean Guignard.*

Britain's William the Conqueror (left), France's Catherine de Medici (center), Spain's Duke of Alva (right). All died in the '80s. Decalogists also note with quiet satisfaction that the Parthenon was partially destroyed in 1687.

have no tailfins and may not have any Chryslers.

Yet there *is* a rigorous science capable of penetrating the future. This science, which has emerged on the academic scene with startling rapidity, is confounding its critics and fast rendering obsolete entire university departments with each fresh disclosure.

I refer, of course, to the discipline of Decalogy.*

Decalogy seeks out the "inner rhythms" of history, as manifested in each decade. Just as "bio-rhythms" reveal hidden phases in the behavior of our bodies, so Decalogy lays bare the little noticed regularities of history. And Decalogy tells us that the 1980s will be a dull period, very dull.

The entire range of human history forces Decalogists ineluctably to this conclusion. We know that the 1580s marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's dreary decline and that the politics of the 1680s in Japan produced little more than some legislation protecting dogs; in the 1780s, France's economy hit the skids and its bureaucracy grew, and the 1880s merely saw Lesotho made a protectorate of Britain.

This tedious pattern extends back through all of recorded history. With the intensified use of carbon-14 dating techniques, we shall no doubt be able to trace it back even further.

The '80s have always been decades in which interesting people die and dull ones are born. Among those who have given up the ghost during previous '80s are William the Conqueror (1087), the Duke of Alva (1582), Catherine de Medici (1589), and Samuel Johnson (1784). What a contrast to the bland crew who entered the world in past '80s. Are we to cel-

*In the 1977–78 academic year, the latest period for which data are available, 213 college departments were closed or consolidated nationwide in order to make room for new departments of Decalogy. Hardest hit: political science, sociology, and, inexplicably, agronomy. According to the American Society of University Professors, more than half of the 1,587 tenured faculty with Dec.D. degrees are teaching in California.

Sybil Schwartz is the occasional pen name of a young American historian. Her essay, "In Defense of Chester Arthur," appeared in the Autumn 1978 issue of The Wilson Quarterly.

ebrate in 1984 the bicentennial of the birth of Zachary Taylor? Or the centennial in 1985 of the birth of poet Humbert Wolfe? All of us like to think that our own friends are a lively bunch. But ask yourself: How many of them were born in the '80s?

Decalogy gives scientific depth to what common sense has already told us. We all know, for instance, that the 1960s were a tumultuous decade, but thanks to Decalogy, we can now appreciate that the '60s were always thus. Our own Civil War, the great emancipation of the serfs in Russia in 1861, and Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" speech of 1862 all conform to this pattern. By the late '70s of each century, though, life begins to slow down. Characteristic events include, for example, the birth of the justly forgotten Czech composer Rudolf Friml in 1879. By the '80s, human affairs have invariably sunk from *adagio* through *adagio sustenuto* to *largo*, à la Friml.

Exceptions immediately spring to mind. What about the eruption of Mount Vesuvius and the destruction of Pompeii in the year A.D. 79, or the birth of dictator Joseph Stalin in 1879?

Decalogists have long pondered such apparent anomalies. Yet, far from contradicting the general truths enunciated above, such events actually confirm them. All are examples of the phenomenon of *anticipation*. All manner of dramatic events have occurred on the eve of past '80s, as if rushing to slip in before the dawn of tedium. Hence Vesuvius and Stalin. With eery prescience, the most philosophical of Roman emperors, Marcus Aurelius, departed this life just in time to enable his well-named son, Commodus, to assume office in the year 180.

Anticipation is even more common at the end of the '80s, as if human affairs become infected by a zeal to move into the more vital (or "gay") '90s. The energetic King Richard Coeur de Lion ascended the British throne in 1189 and the French Revolution broke out in 1789. In both cases, of course, the real action came only later, when Richard set out on the Third Crusade, and Robespierre, a typical '90s man, drove the French Revolution to its bloody climax.

A true understanding of the dynamics of Decalogy helps one to strip away false perceptions and see

Used by permission of G. Schirmer, Publishers.

From a marble bust found at Ostia.

Used by permission of Ann Wolfe.

Composer Rudolf Friml, the Emperor Commodus, poet Humbert Wolfe were quintessential '80s people. Wrote Wolfe: "Other men have written worse/Than the author of this verse/But at least they had the wit/Not to go and publish it."

Reprinted by permission of Babe Ruth Baseball.

From Makers of Electricity. *Fordham University Press, 1909.*

From History of the Crusades *by Major Proctor.*

Slugger Babe Ruth (left), physiologist Luigi Galvani (center), the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders (right). In the '90s, Decalogists contend, history always tries to make up for time lost during the previous decade.

many events in their true light. The English may have dubbed their change of rulers in 1688 a "Glorious Revolution," but Decalogy assures us that nothing very revolutionary really occurred—which is just what the British wanted and why they considered it "glorious." When genuinely revolutionary events do take place in an '80s decade, they are almost never appreciated until the decade has passed. Leibnitz issued his differential calculus in 1684 and Isaac Newton published his *Principia Mathematica* in 1687, but it took several years before the cheering began.

If the '80s are bound to be flat and dreary, watch out for the '90s. The tempo invariably picks up. Luigi Galvani's discovery of "animal electricity" in 1791 is an utterly characteristic event of the final decade in any century. Others: Columbus's voyage to America (1492), the discovery of the electron (1895), the arrival of the Crusaders at the gates of Jerusalem (1099), and the birth of Babe Ruth (1894). Such epochal moments could never have occurred during the '80s, a decade epitomized 300 years ago by the last sighting of the Dodo bird (1681) and, fast upon its heels, the annexation of what is now Iowa by France (1682).

It should be obvious that centennial years are fated to produce events on a millenial scale. The coronation of the emperor Charlemagne in 800 could only have taken place at the dawn of a new century. So too with the discovery of Brazil in 1500, and the conquest of the Punjab by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1000. We can reasonably expect this pattern to continue in the year 2000.

As any scientist knows, years after Joseph Priestley discovered oxygen in 1774 (N.B.), there were still those who sang the praises of phlogiston. Similarly, there are still pockets of retrograde historians holding out against Decalogy.* They insist that it is merely a "pseudoscience," like phrenology or sociology, and that its purported "truths" are nothing more than computational accidents arising from the Christian calendar. Take another calendrical system (they imply) and the entire edifice of Decalogy—including its wisdom

*See, for example, *Dekalogiia i burzhuazniia falsifikatsiia budushchego*, by G. A. Guboshliapkin (Ibansk, 1977) and *Les Carnets Secrets de la Decalogie*, by Thérèse Stopowska (Gdynia, 1979).

about the '80s—will go up in smoke.

Will it?

The Islamic peoples date events from Muhammad's *hegira* in the year A.D. 622. By this reckoning, the presidency of Warren Gamaliel Harding would have to be counted as a centennial event, as would the conversion of Riga to Protestantism (1522) and the founding of St. David's College, Lampeter, Cardiganshire, for the training of Episcopal priests in Wales (1822). So much for the Muslim calendar.

What about the Hebrew calendar, which counts from the year 3761 B.C.? Regrettably, this has practically nothing to recommend it to the serious Decalogist, unless Scotland's "Drunken Parliament" (1661) or the union of Moldavia and Wallachia as Rumania (1861) strikes one as noteworthy.

Moreover, the Hebrew calendar assigns such lively periods as the fifth decade of each century (the '40s, our style) to the soggy penultimate spot and transforms the monotonous '80s into the dynamic ("roaring") '20s. It would have us believe, in other words, that World War II, the Revolutions of 1848, and the breakup of the Danish empire (1042) were minor incidents in history, and that events like the Rebellion of the Yellow Turbans in 184 and the founding of the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors (1885) should be everywhere memorialized.

A second argument raised against Decalogy is that it is invalid for B.C. dates. It is true, of course, that a serious controversy has raged among Decalogists over this matter. It has only recently been resolved.

On the one side were a few misguided scholars who insisted on counting the years 20 to 10 of each century before Christ as the "eighth" decade. On the other side were the clearsighted majority, who preferred to count backwards from the birth of Christ and hence recognize the pathetic decline of the Parthian Empire in 88–70 B.C. as the typical event of the '80s it is. The decisive victory of this second school of thought has resolved the matter of B.C. dates once and for all. We can now recognize such events as the Battle of Marathon in the year 490 B.C. as the turning points they were. Even 2,500 years later, one can sense the Athenians' eagerness to rout the Persians before the onslaught of the flabbier decade of the '80s.

So, faithful to history's internal rhythms, we will be in the doldrums for the next 10 years despite all current predictions to the contrary. But monotony is not without its virtues—especially in light of what we can expect from the decade after that. During the hectic 1990s, we should brace for renewed campus turmoil as the children of the Baby-Boom children crowd into public universities and the remaining private colleges. Defense analysts will note with horror that our B-52 bombers are twice as old as their pilots, even as Kremlinologists speculate about who will succeed Brezhnev's ailing successor. King Charles will occupy the British throne and Caroline Kennedy will be of presidential age.

We'll need all the rest we can get.



COMMENTARY

We welcome timely letters from readers, especially those who wish to amplify or correct information published in the Quarterly *and/or react to the views expressed in our essays. The writer's telephone number and address should be included. For reasons of space, letters are usually edited for publication. Some of those printed below were received in response to the editor's requests for comment.*

Salvaging the Atomic Age?

Alvin Weinberg's nuclear safety conclusions ["Salvaging the Atomic Age," *WQ*, Summer 1979] reflect his Utopian faith that institutional arrangements can achieve human near-perfectability and social stability despite human fallibility and malice.

I cannot share this faith.

His arguments about nuclear wastes rest on well-known technical and logical fallacies.

If nuclear power is unnecessary or uneconomic, then we need not debate or accept its risks. Weinberg assumes it is necessary. His three main fallacies, treated more fully in my review of his Institute's nuclear-moratorium study (see *The Sciences*, October 1979), are, briefly, his failure to note that:

—If energy is used with a technical efficiency justified by the cost of new power stations, then maintaining and improving our standard of living, without significant lifestyle changes, will need not more energy but less: at least three times less electricity and six times less total energy.

In the long run, the United States would therefore need no thermal power stations of any kind. Efficiency improvements during 1973–78 actually contributed over two-and-one-half times as much to new U.S. energy supplies as did *all* supply expansions combined, including nuclear power and increased oil imports.

—If we did need more *energy*, more *electricity* would be a grossly uneconomic form in which to supply it, since present electrical supply more than meets all the premium end-use needs—8 percent of all delivered U.S. energy needs—that can use electricity to economic advantage. For our unsaturated needs for heat and portable liquid fuels—the other 92 percent—new power stations are by far the slowest and costliest solution.

Nuclear power does not have to compete with coal-fired power stations; rather, *neither* can compete with weather-stripping, insulation, heat exchangers, greenhouses, biomass-waste liquid fuels, and the other relatively cheap ways to meet our particular needs.

—As shown by the recent Harvard Business School study, *Energy Future* [see "Research Reports: Energy Future," *WQ*, Autumn 1979] and by other recent analyses, the cheapest long-run replacements for dwindling oil and gas (after efficiency improvements) are renewable sources (e.g., solar energy). These supply energy at the scale and quality needed to do each task more effectively, rather than only centrally and electrically as Weinberg largely assumes.

The best renewable energy sources already in or entering commercial service suffice to meet essentially all long-term energy needs in the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Japan, etc.

Contrary to Weinberg's assertions, solar intermittency is not an important problem; an essentially "all-solar" world must indeed be "low-energy," but that means high energy productivity and unprecedented affluence, not privation. And

while some solar technologies do mean "costlier energy than now" and none is an instant cure, they are also several times *cheaper* and substantially faster than nuclear power, coal-fired electricity, or synthetic fuels that do the same tasks.

In short, Weinberg's analysis is fatally flawed by failing to consider the full economic response of demand to the supply prices he assumes; by supposing that the long-run supply system must be largely electrical, although this is the highest-cost approach; and by ascribing to renewable systems faults that, if intelligently designed, they do not possess.

Amory B. Lovins
British Representative
Friends of the Earth, Inc.

No Need for Nukes

Alvin Weinberg correctly identified the key task facing nuclear power. "For nuclear energy to grow in usefulness, the accident probability *per reactor* will simply have to diminish."

Otherwise, Weinberg acknowledged, the rising rate of accidents *per year* will destroy public confidence in nuclear power, shutting off construction of new reactors and limiting it to use as a marginal energy source. (Nuclear power today accounts for less than 4 percent of energy supply here and in the other industrial nations.)

Unfortunately for Weinberg, nuclear power has already been gored by both horns of its safety-versus-costs dilemma.

Not only has public trust in the nuclear enterprise been severely shaken by the Three Mile Island accident, but the attempt to make new reactors safer has already made them almost prohibitively expensive.

At the end of 1971, when total installed U.S. nuclear capacity stood at only 10 million kilowatts, the construction cost of a typical new reactor was a modest $350 per kilowatt of capacity (all costs expressed in January 1979 price levels). By the end of 1978, prior to the Three Mile Island accident but with 50 million kilowatts of nuclear capacity, the marginal nuclear capital cost was $930/KW.

A five-fold expansion of the nuclear sector had produced almost a tripling of costs in constant dollars, as more stringent design requirements and equipment standards were adopted in an effort to reduce the likelihood of accidents. If nuclear capacity triples, as will occur if all plants with construction permits are completed, costs will almost double again as new equipment is added to achieve the commensurate reduction in accident rates required by Weinberg.

Although coal-fired plants are subject to similar pressure to reduce their per-plant societal impact (chiefly air pollution, in their case) as more plants are built, the coal sector is far larger and is expanding at a much lower rate of cost increase.

Whereas coal and nuclear plants completed at the start of the decade had roughly *equal* capital costs, under present trends nuclear capital costs will be twice those of coal for plants undertaken today, far offsetting nuclear's lower fuel costs. In the shrinking market for new generating plants, nuclear power now runs a poor second to coal.

The certainty of continuing cost increases for nuclear power and the availability of abundant yields through improved energy efficiency argue against the need to "salvage" nuclear power. Efficiency steps appear sufficiently productive, at costs less than those of nuclear power, to extend the usefulness of the world's fossil resources to provide time for an orderly, unhurried transition to a renewable-energy economy.

Charles Komanoff
Komanoff Energy Associates
New York City

The Public Schools

Today's teacher works in an environment that is, much of the time, physically dangerous, emotionally enervating, and intellectually absurd [see "The Public Schools," *WQ*, Autumn 1979].

We cope with too many uncaring par-

ents, too many timid administrators who believe that their success hinges on their ability to muffle problems rather than resolve them, too many school board members who use their positions as means to attain higher political office at the expense of students and teachers.

Every faint breeze of social change leaves its smudge on curricula, from the deschooling chic of some years ago to today's anti-intellectual "back-to-basics" rantings.

The relentless jangle of the school day—overcrowded classes; batteries of standardized tests designed only to shove round, complex kids into square, unyielding holes; bushels of papers to shuffle; countless interruptions; drug problems —inevitably takes its toll.

The nation is witnessing "teacher burnout"—overstressed teachers bailing out of the profession. Sadly, many of those choosing to leave are experienced and highly competent educators.

It should not be surprising that those of us who have decided to stay have become politically sophisticated activists.

We've learned that timid silence solves nothing, and because teachers are inherently hopeful people who believe that what one generation puts into the heads and hearts of the next can improve the quality of society, we will continue to shape our activism to what we perceive to be the constructive improvement of our nation's schools.

Willard H. McGuire, President
National Educational Association

No Place for the Millennium

The articles on "The Public Schools" presented a lively discussion of public education.

If there was a theme that unified the historical article by Fred M. and Grace Hechinger ["A Long Tug-of-War"] with the current assessment by Diane Divoky ["A Loss of Nerve"], it was the recurring confusion about the role of the school.

Both articles showed that the schools have repeatedly been asked to fulfill great expectations, then assailed by those who became greatly disillusioned by the schools' failure to solve problems that were beyond their capacity.

Schools have done many useful things in our history, but they have always disappointed those evangelical reformers who expected them to usher in the millennium. It should be noted that it was radical critics in the 1930s and again in the '60s, and not society in general, who demanded that schools create a new social order.

The key problem is suggested by both the Hechingers and Divoky. There continues to be confusion between the *purpose* of the schools and their latent *functions*. I would suggest that the central purpose of schools is to educate children.

By that, I mean that the school is the one institution that we expect to develop cognitive skills, to impart knowledge and understanding in an organized fashion, and to teach the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a free society. We also want schools to offer good programs in physical fitness, nutrition, and driver training, as well as to introduce children to vocational and avocational interests.

But no matter how well the school carries out any of these secondary functions, it is not a good school unless it provides a good liberal education to all of its students.

We know that this is not the case today.

We know that many high-school students have only a smattering of history, literature, mathematics, science, or foreign languages. And, we suspect, given the figures on functional illiteracy from the National Assessment of Educational Progress, that a significant minority can't even read or write intelligibly.

Schools do reflect the values of the society that sustains them. When they do not, they lose public confidence. Those that embody the values of intelligence, reason, and civility deserve and receive public support. Those that to not are in need of reform, not more public funds.

Diane Ravitch
Teachers College
Columbia University

Don't Give Up on the Schools

I found your articles on "The Public Schools" to be extremely valuable. If there are any answers to the problems we face in the public schools today, it is in finding an appropriate balance.

We must continue to discuss, sometimes disagree, but make every effort to constructively contribute to the improvement of the public schools. To give up is unacceptable to the needs of our children and, indeed, the future of this nation.

Wilson Riles
Superintendent
of Public Instruction
State of California

Learning to the Learners

A democracy depends upon an educated electorate. Therefore, wise governments provide for the education of young citizens. Twentieth-century American governments have tried to accomplish this by delivering education through schools and compelling young citizens to attend.

The results are mixed.

Perhaps the metaphor is wrong.

Is education a "service" to be "provided" by older folk for younger?

Or is it rather something to be taken by whomever the learner is?

Do people "learn" better when compelled or when they see an incentive in their own lives to learn?

American schools have succeeded when the purposes of the "providers" of "educational services" and those of their "clients" have been roughly congruent. They fail when there is disjunction. There is growing disjunction—almost "mindlessness," as Charles Silberman has reminded us—today.

As the *Quarterly*'s articles make clear, schooling in America is Big Business, adult fun and games. The purposes of schooling include a big and educationally irrelevant older folks' agenda: jobs, money, keeping kids off the labor market, purveying a raft of social nostrums from driver to sex education. The nonvoting, unorganized youths have little say (though some self-righteous and self-appointed adults assert that they "represent" them). Many older kids are responding: They'll be damned if they'll learn. And so test scores go down, and youth, by truancy, in effect goes on strike.

And so, let us change the metaphor, painful though it may be. Open up the system to include the same responsible diversity among institutions ("service providers") as exists among students and parents. Start by searching (again) for congruence between what students and parents *really* want and what schools provide. Focus on incentives for learning, and lessen the use of schools for social engineering only tangentially connected with education. In a word, give learning back to the learner.

Impossible? The Hechingers remind us that we've achieved the apparently unachievable in education in the past. Today's dream seems Herculean: taking on the system, its very governing metaphor. Let's try. Democracy itself is at stake.

Theodore R. Sizer
Headmaster, Phillips Academy
Andover, Mass.

A Teacher Speaks: Dignify Our Role

As a high-school teacher and a citizen broadly committed to improving the quality and extent of education in the United States, I am pleased that you found the courage to include three articles on "The Public Schools."

I suggest that you go beyond the "primer" to explore subjects not commonly considered by journals such as yours. Perhaps some perceptions of mine about the teacher as educator (rather than pedagogue) will illustrate some dimensions of such a study:

—Hierarchical structure, unionization of teachers, and the scapegoating of teachers have all tended to alienate the

teacher from his community's educational aspirations.
—The classroom teacher is at once without power in the hierarchy and dictatorial in his own fiefdom (the classroom).
—The teacher is subject to arbitrary, intermittent "observation" by authorities who scarcely know his values and norms but is isolated from enriching exchange with peers who have mutual concerns and goals. (Imagine a lawyer, doctor, scientist, druggist, or baker isolated from public scrutiny.)
—Teachers are expected to be sensitive to the individual needs of students and competent in group control, yet neither basic teacher education nor "in-service training" develops in the teacher the special skills needed to observe and understand individual behavior or the dynamics of group interaction. Further, the teacher's day is so jam-packed that no time or energy is left to share these observations and concerns with fellow teachers.
—As mere mastery of data becomes increasingly suspect in our complex and befuddled world, and as pop solutions wax and wane, the teacher has no clear standard against which to measure himself. No wonder the demand for accountability may end where it began—with rhetoric.

Even after 25 years of teaching or, I think I would rather say, *because of* 25 years of teaching, I am hopeful that we can find ways to dignify the role of public-school classroom teacher. Perhaps you will help.

Charles R. S. Shepard
New Haven, Conn.

A Secure Taiwan

On the question of Taiwan's security [Ralph Clough, "Taiwan's Future," *WQ*, Autumn 1979], the Carter administration's public position has been that any Chinese Communist attack against Taiwan is extremely unlikely, primarily because the People's Republic of China has limited amphibious capacities and because such an attack would reverse Peking's political gains in the West and jeopardize continued U.S. help for the PRC's modernization.

This view is unfortunately shortsighted. Such assertions may be *partially* true today, but the PRC is currently in the midst of an intensive military modernization program including, of course, its amphibious forces.

The further argument that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to take military action against Taiwan for fear of jeopardizing their developing relations with the United States and other Western countries may be true today.

However, circumstances may change. As the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Report on the Taiwan Enabling Act (later known as Taiwan Relations Act) stated: "Vice-Premier Teng is 74 years old and has twice been purged from office. Chinese foreign policy could again dramatically change. A Sino-Soviet detente would free large numbers of Chinese troops currently near the Soviet border. The Chinese may miscalculate U.S. resolve to continue providing security to Taiwan."

Furthermore, there is the PRC's record of changing course with bewildering speed. Only a few years ago, Peking was accusing Japan of "militarism" and the United States of "imperialism."

Hungdah Chiu
School of Law
University of Maryland

Cooling the Debate over Sociobiology

In the debate over the biology of sex differences [Edward O. Wilson, "Sex and Human Nature," *WQ*, Autumn 1979], it is essential to distinguish theories about what is or is not the case from views about what ought to be done.

I support equality for women, but I do not rest my support on a factual belief in the biological identity of male and female temperaments and abilities. If I did, conceivably I might one day have to cease to support sexual equality, for the biological

data is not yet all in. No one can be sure of the ultimate answer to what is still an open scientific question.

My support for equality rests on the moral principle of equal consideration of interests. No scientific finding can ever refute this principle, for it makes no factual claims.

Scientific findings are germane to the application of the principle of equality, not to the foundations of the principle itself.

Equality for women ought to mean the full equality of all individuals to do what they wish to do without either official sexual discrimination or the more subtle barriers of sexist attitudes and stereotypes. Wider acceptance of this principle, *whatever* the outcome of investigations into the biological basis of differences between the sexes, would take a lot of the heat out of the current debate over sociobiology.

Peter Singer,
Wilson Center Fellow

A Philosopher's View: Careless Science?

Edward O. Wilson's speculations are neither sociology nor biology but a kind of pseudo-theology/philosophy. He extrapolates from genetic information to conclusions about purpose (final cause sneaks in again) on the basis of a concept of evolution as a kind of surrogate Divine Providence.

On page 92, Wilson writes, "Evolution has devised much more efficient ways for creatures to multiply. . . ." On page 104, he writes, "The erasure of estrus in early human beings. . . ." This is careless talk for a scientist. The Wilson Center really ought to assign a couple of Fellows to the investigation of the reification (indeed, the deification) of scientific theories. Is evolution some kind of being that can "devise" presumably with some purpose in mind? And who or what "erased" estrus. That estrus is *absent* in the human female is obvious to any perceptive sixth-grader, but where is the archeological evidence that some agency "erased" it?

In the box, "Reorienting Social Theory", Wilson writes, "Our deepest feeling—the source of our ethical codes—are innate creations whose ultimate function is genetic survival. They may appear (or even be) sublime, but they are based ultimately on physical laws, not some mysterious, supernatural set of instructions. We are on our own, the product of very special genetic and cultural history."

I submit that absolutely none of this is science (at least in the modern, empirical sense). No scientific evidence can be advanced for the assertion that the ultimate purpose of human activity (even genetic activity) is merely survival.

Actually, almost all of Wilson's theses can hold up without recourse to dubious evolutionary assertions. Evolution, in any case, is history, and as such, rather than being a principle of explanation, it requires one. That our human nature is rooted in a biological base is also obvious; anything else would be either "angelism" or the kind of social determinism Wilson rightly abjures. As for other forms of life, Wilson can make good use of arguments from analogy without having to assume causal or emergent connections (the hierarchy is there in any case) or having to take a reductionist stand on human nature.

Let me add that I am not a religious fundamentalist (criticisms of the misuse of evolutionary theory are usually dismissed as coming from such a source). Rather, I have been trained in philosophy and the encroachment of Wilson into my field under the name of science is the basis for my reaction.

Lawrence B. De Saulniers
Department of Philosophy
University of Albuquerque

Myopia at Harvard

The Wilson Quarterly certainly can't be faulted for bias in its reviews of other publications.

In a Winter 1977 review of a *Fortune*

article ["Periodicals: Quantities of Quads Beneath the Gulf"], you told us how the Gulf of Mexico contains enough methane to supply most of the U.S. energy needs for several centuries. Now in the Autumn 1979 issue ["Research Reports: Energy Future"], you pass on the conclusion from the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School that none of the four conventional alternatives (including natural gas) "can supply much more energy than they do now."

It's too bad I didn't read the second item first, because then I might not have wasted my time reading related articles about the huge amounts of natural gas awaiting recovery in our country in such obscure journals as *Fortune* (William M. Brown, "A Huge New Reserve of Natural Gas Comes Within Reach," October 1976); *Barron's* (Roscoe C. Born, "Energy to Burn," February 13, 1978; "Eyes of Texas," October 9, 1978; and "New Source of Energy?," July 30, 1979); *National Geographic* (Bryan Hodgson, "Natural Gas: The Search Goes On," November 1978); the *Wall Street Journal* (James R. Adams, "Popping the Cork on Natural Gas," May 30, 1979; and "Mobil Unit Proposes Venture for Conversion of Natural Gas Into Gasoline," July 3, 1979); and *Time* (Marshall Loeb, "Executive View," June 4, 1979)—all of which seem to support what appeared in the Winter 1977 issue.

I don't suppose the Harvard Business School people have access to these obscure journals, but you would think that they would be reading *The Wilson Quarterly*.

John N. Warfield
Department of Electrical Engineering
School of Engineering and Applied Science
University of Virginia

Corrections

I would like to bring to your attention a possible error on page 147 in the Summer 1979 issue of *The Wilson Quarterly*. The artist of the cartoon "Upon My Honor!", I believe, is Hugh Hutton, not Hullow (as printed). He was a cartoonist for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, and I recognize the signature since Mr. Hutton was my uncle. Thank you.

Judith A. Covell
Kansas City, Mo.

In "The Top Ten Schools" [*WQ*, Autumn 1979], an admissions dean at Phillips Andover Academy was quoted as saying that, in the determination of National Merit semifinalists, rival Phillips Exeter Academy competes only against New Hampshire schools. In fact, Exeter is part of the National Merit Scholarship Program's "boarding school region I" and competes against Andover and 52 other "independent" schools. There are five boarding school regions, each encompassing highly competitive independent schools that draw many of their students from out of state.

Statement of ownership, management and circulation (required by 39 U.S.C. 3685) of The Wilson Quarterly published quarterly at the Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560 for October 1, 1979. General business offices of the publisher are located at the Smithsonian Institution Building, 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20560. Name and address of publisher is Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, James H. Billington, Director, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Name and address of editor is Peter Braestrup, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Name and address of managing editor is Anna Marie Torres, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Owner is the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities: None. The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months (Section 132.122,PSM). The average number of copies of each issue during the preceding 12 months is: (A) Total number of copies printed: 102,821; (B) Paid circulation: (1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: 632; (2) Mail subscriptions: 97,418; (C) Total paid circulation: 98,050; (D) Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means: 2,708; (E) Total distribution: 100,758; (F) Copies not distributed: (1) Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: 1,878; (2) Returns from news agents: 185; (G) Total: 102,821. The actual number of copies of single issue published nearest to filing date is: (A) Total number of copies printed: 100,248; (B) Paid circulation: (1) Sales through dealers and carriers, street vendors and counter sales: 595; (2) Mail subscriptions: 96,732; (C) Total paid circulation: 97,327; (D) Free distribution by mail, carrier or other means: 2,528; (E) Total distribution: 99,855; (F) Copies not distributed: (1) Office use, left over, unaccounted, spoiled after printing: 23; (2) Returns from news agents: 370; (G) Total: 100,248. I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.

(signed) Peter Braestrup, *Editor*

CURRENT FELLOWS

RICHARD BARTLETT, Professor of History, Florida State University

MICHAEL L. BENEDICT, Associate Professor of History, Ohio State University

WANDA CORN, Associate Professor of Art History, Mills College

WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, Professor of Political Science and Director of U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego

ANN L. CRAIG, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

RALPH DELLA CAVA, Professor of History, Queens College, City University of New York

LEON EPSTEIN, Bascom Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison

JUN ETO, Professor of Comparative Literature and Culture, Tokyo Institute of Technology

MURRAY FESHBACH, Chief, USSR Population, Employment, and Research and Development Branch, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, U.S. Department of Commerce

J. WILLIAM FUTRELL, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law

MANUEL ANTONIO GARRETÓN, Professor and Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Santiago, Chile

VLAD GEORGESCU, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of South East European Studies, Bucharest

KONRAD JARAUSCH, Professor of History, University of Missouri, Columbia

PETER KENEZ, Professor of History, University of California, Santa Cruz

MANSOUR KHALID, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

TODD LA PORTE, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

MELVYN P. LEFFLER, Associate Professor of History, Vanderbilt University

CHARLES A. MOSHER, Executive Director, Science and Technology Committee, U.S. House of Representatives

LAURA NADER, Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley

EMMANUEL N. OBIECHINA, Chairman, Department of English, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

DAVID OTTAWAY, Correspondent, the *Washington Post*

MARINA OTTAWAY, former lecturer in sociology, University of Zambia

MARK POPOVSKY, Journalist

ANGEL A. RAMA, Professor of Latin American Literature, Universidad Central de Venezuela

EDWARD L. ROWNY, Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.), former representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at SALT II

CHRISTOPHER D. SCOTT, Lecturer, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia, England

NEIL SHEEHAN, former correspondent, the *New York Times*

RAYMOND TANTER, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

MIGUEL URRUTIA MONTOYA, Director, Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo, Bogotá, Colombia

MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, Novelist, Peru

DWIGHT WALDO, Albert Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities, Syracuse University

KENNETH N. WALTZ, Professor of International Politics, University of California, Berkeley

ALLEN WEINSTEIN, Professor of History, Smith College

In 1968 the Congress established the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars as an international institute for advanced study and the nation's official "living memorial" to the 28th President, "symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

The Center opened in October 1970, and was placed in the Smithsonian Institution under its own presidentially appointed board of trustees. Its chairmen of the board have been Hubert H. Humphrey and, since 1972, William J. Baroody.

Open annual competitions have brought more than 250 Fellows to the Center since 1970. All Fellows carry out advanced research, write books, and join in seminars and dialogues with other scholars, public officials, members of Congress, newsmen, business and labor leaders. The Center is housed in the original Smithsonian "castle" on the Mall in the nation's capital. Financing comes from both private sources and an annual congressional appropriation. The Center—and *The Wilson Quarterly*—seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and of points of view.