

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

“Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy.”

The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. 438 pp. \$22.95

Authors: Joseph A. Yager et al.

After 35 years, the nuclear weapons club now has six members — the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, and India. (Israel and South Africa may make it eight.) During the 1980s, this number could double.

Too many different factors seem to be driving nations into the nuclear club for the United States to carry out a single, consistent anti-nuclear proliferation policy. So concludes a team of Brookings researchers in this survey of America's “antiproliferation” options.

South Asia provides a case in point.

The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) froze the world into nuclear weapons “haves” (then, the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, and Britain) and “have-nots.” Most advanced Third World nations, including India, view the NPT purely as a device to preserve the superpowers' military dominance.

India, South Asia's dominant power, scorned the treaty and exploded its own “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974. Short-lived American and Canadian cutoffs of nuclear fuel simply induced New Delhi to stockpile and enrich its own uranium.

In fact, the Carter administration insisted in 1980 that only continued shipments of U.S. nuclear fuel — despite India's refusal to forswear reprocessing—could preserve Washington's influence with New Delhi. (The Soviet invasion of nearby Afghanistan was also instrumental in turning U.S. pol-

icy around.) The case of India shows that a tough antiproliferation stance can be not only futile but possibly undesirable.

Yet U.S. resumption of nuclear exports to India has infuriated Pakistan. Despite Pakistan's signing of the NPT, American officials are convinced of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's hunger for nuclear arms. Pakistan has now acquired enough expertise that a test detonation is expected by 1985. Meanwhile, U.S. offers of economic and military aid to Pakistan have been skimpy. That fact and Washington's need for allies near the Persian Gulf have limited U.S. opposition to Zia's nuclear plans.

What kind of antiproliferation policy is practical? Urging nations to forgo nuclear technology already within their grasp will not work, the authors argue. But U.S.-assisted settlements of Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian border disputes, for example, could make a nuclear build-up seem unnecessary to both India and Pakistan.

Globally, U.S. policy must combine diplomacy, military aid, and defense guarantees, which reduce the need for nuclear arms, with limited nonproliferation measures. Two suggestions: encouraging the establishment of regional fuel reprocessing centers; and publicizing the economic inefficiency, not the military potential, of the small uranium reprocessing and enrichment plants currently popular with Third World countries.

**“Public Opinion on Environmental Quality:
Results of a National Opinion Survey.”**

U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, 722 Jackson Pl. N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006. 49 pp.

Americans' concern over pollution has abated somewhat since the nationwide celebration of “Earth Day” in 1970. But the environment has become an “enduring” interest like health care or education, according to this study of public opinion trends.

Eleven years ago, only crime outranked air and water pollution in a Gallup poll measuring public concern over 10 domestic issues (inflation was not included). By 1980, respondents faced with the same choices on a survey conducted by Resources for the Future (RFF), a Washington-based research organization, ranked pollution sixth, behind crime, unemployment, “killer” diseases, education, and poverty, in that order.

But, despite massive federal programs to control pollution and widespread support for curbing Big Government, 48 percent of Americans in 1980 still felt that Washington was spending “too little” on the environment. Even survey questions asking respondents to make “tradeoffs” between environmental quality and


other goals revealed a significant — though declining — preference for pollution control. According to RFF polls, people who support continuing environmental improvement “regardless of cost” dropped from 55 percent in 1977 to 42 percent in 1980.

Americans oppose pollution controls that jeopardize energy supplies. In early 1980, University of Michigan pollsters asked whether “you think the government should . . . keep environmental protection regulations unchanged even though this may delay the production of more energy.” Twenty-nine percent favored unchanged regulations, 34 percent supported easing standards, and 15 percent opted for lower standards with qualifications.

However, most Americans are confident that the federal government can both protect the environment and satisfy future energy needs, according to the 1980 RFF survey.

Some critics have seen the environmental movement as an “elitist” cause championed by affluent Americans.

VIEWS ABOUT POLLUTION CONTROL



Source: Opinion Research Corporation, 1977; Resources for the Future, 1978, 1980.

But the 1980 RFF poll found that 62 percent of the public considered themselves active environmentalists or sympathetic to the cause — the same percentage recorded in 1978 when the question was first posed. The proportion characterizing themselves as un-

sympathetic dipped from 6 to 4 percent.

Only among blacks, persons lacking a high school diploma, and residents of the East South Central states (Mississippi to Kentucky) did "sympathy" drop below 50 percent.

"Palestinian Nationalism: The West Bank Dimension."

Prepared for the International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560. 41 pp.
Author: Moshe Ma'oz

The hilly, densely populated West Bank of the Jordan River has been the cradle of Palestinian Arab nationalism since the turn of the century. But only since Israeli occupation of the region, in 1967, has historically spotty support for a West Bank homeland turned into a Palestinian Arab cause célèbre. So writes Ma'oz, a political scientist at Jerusalem's Hebrew University.

When the newborn state of Israel won control of all Palestine in the 1948 war of independence, most Palestinian Arabs and their leaders fled to the Egyptian-ruled Gaza Strip and the Jordanian-governed West Bank. Palestinian Arab nationalism became lost in the broader pan-Arab struggle against Israel.

Distinctively Palestinian opposition to the Jewish state reappeared during the 1960s, with the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). But the Lebanon-based PLO made few inroads among Palestinians on the West Bank. From 1948 to 1967, Ma'oz writes, many had grown resigned to Jordanian control.

Post-1967 Israeli occupation policies oddly abetted the rebirth of Palestinian nationalism. In order to prevent the development of a unified West Bank Arab leadership, Israel increased the powers of the area's local town councils and mayors. In 1976, the strategy backfired. West Bank voters

elected a group of nationalist mayors loyal in varying degrees to the PLO. These politicians cooperated with the military government on local issues but became spokesmen for the Palestinian cause, leading strikes and demonstrations, and protesting alleged Israeli repression.

The economic progress fostered by Israeli authorities has increased the mayors' independence. The Israeli government has spent generously on the West Bank, modernizing agricultural production and creating jobs. As a result, radical mayors are able to collect higher taxes and more voluntary contributions from the populace. Aid from wealthy Arab countries has further reduced Israeli budgetary support, from 40 percent of total municipal outlays in 1969 to 7 percent today.

The election of conservative Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1977 and his controversial support for permanent Jewish settlement of the West Bank have intensified Palestinian Arab radicalism. Support for establishing a fully sovereign Palestinian nation is now nearly universal among Arabs in the region. Yet, Ma'oz contends, few of the mayors insist on eliminating Israel and making an Arab state of all Palestine. They fear the destructive effects of a new war and appreciate the economic gains generated

by Israel.

Despite PLO intimidation, many West Bank mayors are willing to consider interim steps toward full sovereignty—such as a temporary federation between an autonomous West

Bank Palestinian “entity” and Israel or Jordan. Ma’oz suggests that these leaders’ ability to negotiate with Israel without PLO approval will determine how soon lasting peace comes to the Middle East.

“Have Black Men Gained in Employment?”

Urban Institute research paper, unpublished, presented on October 2, 1980, at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution. 25 pp.

Author: Frank Levy

Although individual black male earnings as a percentage of white male earnings have been steadily growing (to 71 percent in 1978), the U.S. Census earnings data do not include people who earn nothing at all. Hence, the impact of the growing black male “underclass” on overall black economic progress is masked.

Levy, a senior economist at the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., used a revised census sample of black and white males, aged 20 to 55, to include those with “zero earnings.” Such men accounted for 10.7 percent of the blacks and 3.8 percent of the whites in 1978; full-time, full-year black male workers accounted for 55 percent of all black men in 1978 (versus 65 percent in 1967). All this pushed down the “real” overall black-white earning ratio in 1978—from 71 percent to 59 percent.

Then Levy examined the same statistics to see what the odds were that a male of given race, age, and characteristics would be employed. How many blacks had a *less* than 50 percent likelihood of being employed? In 1964, only about 2 percent of all black men fitted this description. In 1978, about 17 percent were in this category. At the same time, the job prospects for the “top” 15 percent of blacks got better; they matched those of the top 51 percent of whites in 1978 versus 61 percent of whites in 1964.

Do black men with low prospects for employment starve? No. In 1978, they lived in households where other income averaged \$7,300, and 18 percent of the households were on welfare. Whether welfare (and food stamps) induced these men not to seek work remains unclear.

What is clear is a growing split in the black community: Some men are doing better; others worse. After the civil rights revolution, the male underclass grew to over 375,000 individuals (the “bottom” 12 percent) in 1978, most of whom did not work at all in 1977.

The differences between the top 36 percent of the sample of black males and the “bottom” 12 percent were smaller than one might expect. On the average, persons in the lowest segment were younger (27 years old versus 31), slightly less educated (11.5 years versus 13), less likely to live in the South (47 percent versus 61 percent), and more apt to be single (67 percent versus 30 percent).

Thus, contrasts between the underclass group and other black men with better prospects were fairly modest—although these variations “may of course obscure large differences in unobserved characteristics such as literacy and criminal records.” Or the modest differences may reflect a limited job market in which luck plays a disproportionate role.

“Litigation on Behalf of Women.”

The Ford Foundation, P.O. Box 559, Naugatuck, Conn. 06770. 72 pp. \$4.50
Author: Margaret A. Berger

Judicial decisions that struck down racial bias during the 1960s prompted feminists to press the courts—especially the Supreme Court—to ban all forms of sex discrimination. But already by 1979, many prominent women’s rights attorneys believed that their effort had hit a dead end, after a string of modest legal victories.

Berger, a professor at Brooklyn Law School, attributes the Supreme Court’s apparent insensitivity to sexism to judicial uneasiness over the possible effects of granting women full equality under the law—radical changes in U.S. family life, employment trends, and welfare programs.

Feminist lawyers have generally won only those cases where victory conferred benefits on both men and women. They have fared poorly in cases where the problems are peculiar to women or where discriminatory patterns would be costly to eliminate.

In *Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld* (1975) and *Califano v. Goldberg* (1977), the Burger Court made Social Security benefits automatically available to widowers and widows alike. (Previously, the former had to prove dependence on their spouses.) And in the 1979 case *Orr v. Orr*, the Court invali-

dated an Alabama law prohibiting wives from paying alimony.

In contrast, *Gilbert v. General Electric* (1976) was regarded as a major defeat by women’s rights activists. The Court ruled that an employee income protection plan covering temporary disabilities except pregnancies did not discriminate against women—even though men who voluntarily underwent vasectomies and hair transplants qualified.

Another case jarred feminists. In 1979, a Massachusetts court upheld the state’s practice of giving veterans preference in handing out civil service jobs. The judges ruled that the policy was not sexist in *intent*.

The outlook for further legal progress is bleak, according to Berger. The Supreme Court seems to believe that sex discrimination exists only when government officials or employers fail to prove that their current discriminatory policies meet vital objectives. Employers are resisting further concessions to women, realizing that the subtler forms of bias now under feminist attack are difficult to prove statistically, as the Supreme Court now explicitly requires in more and more cases.

“Technology Transfer Between East and West.”

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Publications and Information Center, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. 435 pp. \$50
Authors: Eugene Zaleski and Helgard Wienert

The flow of advanced industrial equipment and technology from the Western democracies to Soviet bloc countries rose sharply as U.S.–Soviet

relations warmed during the 1960s and early ’70s. Now it is slowing, report Zaleski, of the French National Center for Scientific Research, and

Weinert, a researcher for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

This is not the first such change. Russian trade with the West ground to a halt following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Soon, however, the Kremlin began to perceive foreign assistance as the key to its numerous industrialization plans. By 1929, German, British and American-designed metallurgical facilities, electric power stations, chemical plants, and steel mills had been built throughout the country.

During World War II, the Lend-Lease program injected some \$1.25 billion of the latest American industrial equipment into the Soviet economy. Yet subsequent Cold War tensions prompted U.S. legislation banning the sale of militarily useful American equipment to the East by domestic industries or foreign trade partners.

Trade between the two blocs blossomed again during the mid-1960s, when two trends converged. As U.S.-Soviet relations gradually improved, America joined the competition for Communist markets cautiously begun by West Germany, Britain, and Italy in the 1950s. And their slumping economies spurred the Communists to make massive purchases of Western technology, to be financed by borrow-

ing billions of dollars from Western banks.

Between 1965 and 1977, total Western and Japanese high technology sales to the Soviet bloc—mainly of heavy machinery and transportation equipment—grew from \$1 billion to \$10 billion. (Of this, more than half went to the USSR.) Then came a downturn. After a nearly \$3.4 billion jump in 1975 alone, the increases shrank to \$100 million in 1976 and rose to only \$832 million in 1977.

The trade slowdown stems primarily from the Communist countries' staggering \$100 billion collective debt and Western reluctance to extend further credit. But, the authors maintain, politics will continue to dog East-West high technology trade—even if the Communist countries raise more hard cash by boosting their exports. Some specialists in the U.S. Congress charge that sales of "civilian goods" such as computers and automotive technology have strengthened Soviet military capabilities.

Indeed, since 1977, there has been growing support in Congress for severe curbs on the export of semiconductor devices, precision machines, integrated circuits, and computers that could help the Soviets close the remaining gaps in military technology. The boom in East-West technology transfer may be over.