

## RESEARCH REPORTS

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*Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions*

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### **“Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics.”**

Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.  
612 pp. \$32.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.  
Editor: Richard K. Betts

The small, slow, 1500-mile range cruise missile has emerged as the major current U.S. military innovation—a descendant of the crude German V-1 buzz bombs used against England during World War II. It was first pushed by Pentagon civilians as a strategic weapon, relatively cheap and hence available in quantity. Yet the full implications for future arms control talks, NATO doctrine, and U.S. nuclear strategy have yet to be widely debated.

So say the authors of this detailed Brookings study. Twenty specialist-contributors cover just about everything: cruise missile history and technology; potential military uses and weapons “trade-offs”; the complex diplomatic and domestic political context; the reactions of the Soviets.

Of the six U.S. cruise missile systems under development, only Boeing’s air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) is intended for strategic missions against the Soviet Union. By year’s end, the first B-52 long-range bombers will be armed with a dozen ALCMs apiece; by 1985, most of the aging B-52 force will be equipped to fire ALCMs with nuclear warheads against Soviet targets from outside the ring of Soviet air defenses. Not surprisingly, the cruise missile figured in the 1979 Soviet-American SALT II arms control agreement (unratified by the U.S. Senate).

Most recently, the planned U.S. NATO deployment in 1983 of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), initially sought by Washington’s allies as a counter to new Soviet SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, has helped stir up an anti-nuke furor in West Germany, protests in Moscow, and misgivings elsewhere. In Congress, controversy surrounds the Navy’s decision to reactivate two battleships, partly to serve as big platforms for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM).

Other Pentagon discussions center on arming attack submarines with cruise missiles, rather than torpedoes, and on using ground-launched cruise missiles with conventional nonnuclear warheads as a substitute for manned fighter-bombers in attacks against heavily defended fixed targets on the NATO front.

This first generation of small cruise missiles, especially the proposed non-nuclear versions, should make everybody think twice, suggests Betts, the study’s editor.

Guidance systems are far from perfect. The conventional (nonnuclear) version of the cruise missile cannot now deliver enough explosive “punch” to knock out a big bridge or an airfield. Yet how much can such weapons be improved without making them too costly to produce in large quantities? And how can the Soviets be sure that a

**U.S. CRUISE MISSILES UNDER DEVELOPMENT**

Missile	Mission	Warhead	Carrier	Range (nautical miles)
ALCM	Strategic	Nuclear	B-52	1,500
GLCM	Tactical	Nuclear	Truck	1,300-1,500
TLAM-N	Tactical	Nuclear	Submarine or surface ship	1,300-1,500
TLAM-C	Tactical	Conventional	Submarine or surface ship	700
TASM	Tactical	Conventional	Submarine or surface ship	300
MRASM	Tactical	Conventional	Tactical fighter	300

Note: The strategic missile (ALCM) is in production; the tactical nuclear missiles are in the engineering phase; the tactical conventional missiles are in an accelerated engineering phase. All will be capable of subsonic speed. All but the ALCM are variants of General Dynamics' Tomahawk, whether ground-launched (GLCM), Tomahawk land-attack (TLAM), Tomahawk anti-ship (TASM), or medium-range air-to-surface (MRASM). Nuclear warheads weigh a few hundred pounds; conventional warheads weigh about 1,000 pounds.

Source: *Cruise Missiles*, Brookings, 1981.

U.S. conventional cruise missile is really nonnuclear?

It would be ironic, Betts concludes, if someday ground-launched nonnuclear cruise missiles, deployed only to

bolster NATO defenses against ever-superior Soviet conventional ground forces, ended up wrecking all prospects of Soviet-American agreement on nuclear arms control.

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**“Teenage Childbearing and Welfare: Policy Perspectives on Sexual Activity, Pregnancy, and Public Dependency.”**

Urban Institute, 2100 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. 182 pp. \$6.  
Authors: Kristin A. Moore and Martha R. Burt

Teenagers give birth to nearly half of the nation's out-of-wedlock babies. And these young mothers end up accounting for the majority of welfare benefits: Over half of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1975 went to women who as teens bore their first children. The AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamp expenditures to their households totaled \$8.6 billion that year.

The rise in births to teenage mothers

has had an important impact on the federal budget as well as on the persistence of poverty in America. Moore and Burt, senior research associates at the Urban Institute, examine recent increases in early childbearing and offer possible “economic” solutions.

Sexual activity among youths has become widespread. Among unmarried 19-year-olds in 1979, 65 percent of white females (about one and one-half times the 1971 rate), 89 percent of

black females, 77 percent of white males, and 80 percent of black males had had sexual intercourse. Pregnancy, surprisingly, has not reached "epidemic" proportions as yet. According to one estimate, some nine percent of women aged 15 to 19 were pregnant in 1979—only a two percent increase over the 1971 rate.

Contraceptives have kept the numbers down; inconsistent use allows the problem to persist. In 1979, 63 percent of "never-using" teen girls became pregnant, compared to 14 percent of "always-users" and 30 percent of "irregular users." Awareness of contraceptives is nearly universal. Even so, a quarter of sexually experienced teenagers have never used any method of birth control. The reasons: ignorance, embarrassment, cost, and medical, moral, and social objections.

How unmarried teenage mothers resolve pregnancy varies strikingly according to race. Abortion and out-of-wedlock births are more common among black teens; marriage and adoption are chosen more frequently by whites. Eighty-three percent of black and 29 percent of white teenage mothers in 1978 were unmarried. (The white rate, nevertheless, was an all-time high.)

Once on welfare, teen mothers find it hard to escape: They complete less schooling (only half of the women aged 18 or younger at first birth graduate from high school by age 29); they tend to have larger families over time;

and their job prospects are slim.

Blame for teenage pregnancy has been directed at the media and advertising for glamorizing easy morals, at the declining role of religion in the lives of the young, and even at efforts to mitigate the problem—sex education, family planning clinics. No evidence to date supports or disproves the hypothesis that these services—and the existence of AFDC—encourage early sexual activity or early pregnancy, say the authors.

Their availability, however, may affect the resolution of a pregnancy. Out-of-wedlock motherhood and legalized abortion have replaced "shotgun" marriage as primary choices. And welfare policies may encourage an unwed mother not only to keep her child but also to avoid marrying the father. In about half the 50 states, only single mothers can receive AFDC and Medicaid.

"There are no easy or 'good' solutions once a teenager becomes pregnant," conclude the authors. Clearly, the Reagan administration does not intend to increase the availability of abortion. Other options—better medical care and nutrition, adoption information and support, financial, educational, and occupational assistance for mothers who keep their children—require added federal spending. The best measures—more sex education and contraceptives—are those that prevent unwanted pregnancies in the first place.

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### **"On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context."**

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013. 137 pp.

Author: Harry G. Summers, Jr.

As they prepared reluctantly to intervene in South Vietnam in 1965, both President Lyndon Johnson and his civilian and senior military associates

shared this view: "They [erroneously] equated mobilizing national will with total war, and they believed total war unthinkable in a nuclear age."

Such fears and misconceptions about the nature of war, fostered in part by academic "limited war" theorists and the perceived "lessons" of Korea, helped lead to U.S. failure in Vietnam. No less to blame was the willingness of the U.S. military to leave the development of strategic ideas to civilians who had no experience of the brutality, uncertainty, and moral requirements of warfare.

Such is the thesis of this wide-ranging analysis by Colonel Summers, a combat veteran and a senior strategist at the Army War College. In essence, he asks both civilians and military men to rethink the "lessons" of Vietnam for future U.S. conflicts in terms of the enduring maxims of *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz.

Washington's reluctance to arouse the "national will" and tie the Ameri-

can people to the war effort led step-by-step to fatal disarray. LBJ dispatched troops to Southeast Asia without a declaration of war. The failure to ask Congress for a declaration of war led to White House decisions not to mobilize the reserves. The refusal to mobilize the reserves discouraged U.S. military leaders from pushing for decisive strategies aimed at halting Hanoi's aggression and led instead to protracted campaigns against its "symptoms"—the communist insurgency in the South.

One reason, says Summers, for Johnson's refusal to ask for a declaration of war in 1965 may have been his belief that Congress would not approve it. Such a rebuff would have put an immediate halt to U.S. efforts in South Vietnam—"a preferable result, given the final outcome."

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### **"Across the Border: Rural Development in Mexico and Recent Migration to the United States."**

Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720. 198 pp. \$12.

Authors: Harry E. Cross and James A. Sandos

Over seven million persons of Mexican descent, by one estimate, lived in the United States in 1978. Many were legal residents. But between 2.6 and 5.2 million Mexicans during the mid-1970s were here illegally.

By law, only 20,000 Mexicans a year have been allowed to enter since 1977. But the net total of arrivals (subtracting those aliens who return home) has been about 135,000 a year.

Mexicans have been migrating north throughout most of this century, and, for economic reasons, are expected to continue to do so for years. So report Cross, of the Battelle Human Affairs Research Center in Washington, D.C., and Sandos, a University of Redlands historian.

Between 1900 and 1930, one and one-half million people—one-tenth of Mexico's population—came to the United States. Most of this movement occurred after 1913, as rural peasants fled Mexico's Revolution (1913–20) and the Cristero rebellion (1926–29). The Depression reduced the attraction of the United States during the 1930s, although world economic troubles and President Lázaro Cárdenas's ill-fated agrarian reforms caused severe unemployment in rural Mexico.

The rural uplift efforts begun by President Avila Camacho in 1940 modernized much of Mexican agriculture, increasing maize production by over 500 percent by 1970 and quadrupling wheat harvests.

But this disproportionately benefited wealthy landowners. The poor *ejidatorios* (communal farmers), already largely limited to subsistence farming, were soon in dire straits. In real terms, the rural minimum wage declined by six percent between 1940 and 1960. In 1950, 54 percent of all Mexican farms earned less than \$80 annually—well below the subsistence level.

Mexico City's response to rural unrest was the *bracero* program, which sent at least two million Mexicans to the United States on temporary visas between 1942 and 1964 under an agreement with Washington. Almost 55 percent of the government's *permisos* were given to residents of the north central states, which accounted for only 25 percent of Mexico's rural population, but were once the stronghold of the most powerful dissident movement, the Sinarquistas.

Washington terminated the *bracero* program at the end of 1964, after Americans complained of substandard working conditions for Mexicans and a

loss of jobs for U.S. citizens. But more than 500,000 Mexicans still crossed the border *legally* during the next 10 years alone. With economic disparities between the United States and Mexico constantly growing, massive illegal immigration began during the late 1960s. Fewer than 15 percent of the legal immigrants since 1960 have become naturalized citizens. Meanwhile, it is estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of jobs held by Mexican aliens might otherwise have gone to U.S. citizens.

Mexico's birth rate has declined dramatically in the last decade, but most of the potential migrants during the next 20 years have already been born. The authors urge oil-rich Mexico to distribute income more equitably and to increase jobs for low-income people. The United States should establish a five-year program to admit Mexicans, without quotas, under renewable, one-year work visas. And the U.S. Border Patrol should be strengthened sufficiently to discourage further illegal migration.

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### **“Women, Work, and Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value.”**

The National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418. 136 pp. \$8.75.

Editors: Donald J. Treiman and Heidi I. Hartmann

“Equal pay for work of equal value” is a new feminist battle cry, superseding the oft-heard “equal pay for equal work.”

The earlier slogan—whose words were made fact by the Equal Pay Act of 1963—had the advantage of precision, and cases of discrimination were relatively easy to detect. The second slogan was designed to end current differentials in pay between those occupations dominated by women (e.g., nursing) and those dominated by men

(e.g., carpentry). But the National Research Council's Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis reports that an “equal value” approach makes the detection of cases of “discrimination” far more difficult.

By what yardstick are the respective values of dissimilar jobs to be gauged? Neoclassical economic theory insists that the only valid measure of a job's relative worth is the wage it is assigned in an unfettered, competitive labor market. The committee, how-

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**Mean Earnings of Year-Round Full-Time Civilian  
Workers 18 Years Old and Over, 1978**


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	Men	Women	Percentage of Earnings of White Men	
			Men	Women
All races	\$17,547	\$9,939	97.7	55.3
White	17,959	9,992	100.0	55.6
Black	12,898	9,388	71.8	52.3
Spanish origin <sup>a</sup>	13,002	8,654	72.4	48.2

<sup>a</sup> Persons of Spanish origin may be of any race.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980:Table 57.

ever, is more impressed by the actual market's imperfections, by its "rigid and balkanized" character, by the limited nature of the competition for wages and for workers, and by the concentration of women in low-paying jobs. In 1978, women of all races and ages who worked full time all year earned only 55 percent as much as all white men did. The income gap between white women and white men grew during the late 1950s and early '60s; since then, it has remained essentially unchanged—although nonwhite women caught up with white women during the mid-'70s.

Men and women tend to hold different types of jobs. Ninety-two percent of mail carriers and 98 percent of construction workers are men, according to a 1973 Census Bureau report; 93 percent of stenographers, and most bookbinders, decorators, and window-dressers are women. In many firms, the committee notes, it is typical for white men to dominate managerial jobs and, to a lesser extent, professional jobs, while women dominate clerical and, along with nonwhite men, service jobs.

Why jobs in the American economy are so segregated by sex is not entirely clear, the committee acknowledges. The choices women themselves make play a part, but so, too, the committee assumes, does discrimination, in the form of denial to women of access to better-paying jobs and of underpayment for work done by women. A 1974 study of Washington State government jobs showed that pay rates for jobs held mainly by women averaged about 80 percent of the pay rates for jobs of "comparable value" held mainly by men.

Although no absolute standard of job worth exists, many companies do, to varying degrees, explicitly estimate the relative worths of jobs within the firm. Such "job evaluation plans" are not necessarily untainted themselves, but "under certain circumstances," they could be used to unearth and reduce wage discrimination against females. The committee, however, does not urge that every firm adopt a job evaluation plan. Why? The committee's answer: "At present, we know of no method that would guarantee a 'fair' pay system."