

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"Living With Nuclear Weapons."

Harvard Press, 79 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138. 268 pp. \$12.95 cloth. Bantam Books, 666 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10103. 269 pp. \$3.95 paper. Authors: Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffman, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Scott D. Sagan

"Living with nuclear weapons is our only hope. It requires that we persevere in reducing the likelihood of war even though we cannot remove the possibility altogether."

So argue the six foreign affairs specialists of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group.

They see advocacy of achieving either strategic superiority over the Soviets or nuclear disarmament as "atomic escapism." Banishing nuclear weapons is impossible without complete trust among nations; each would be tempted to rearm in secret. But neither does a massive build-up of America's nuclear arsenal offer any realistic hope of eliminating the Soviet threat to American society.

Arms control, the authors argue, can keep a lid on the arms race while ensuring that each side maintains a sufficient deterrent. Over the long term, it offers the hope of guiding both superpowers to nuclear weapons that are less destabilizing.

Unlike disarmament, arms control can succeed in an atmosphere of minimal political trust. In 1959, well before the Cold War had thawed, the superpowers signed their first major treaty, an agreement barring military activities in Antarctica. Other accords followed: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which brought an end to above-ground nuclear tests and slowed the development of new weapons; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), banning weapons of mass destruction from earth-orbit; and the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968).

These agreements were possible because they focused on issues and weapons in which neither side dominated. And verification techniques, particularly after the development of surveillance satellites—first used by the United States in 1960 and by the Soviets in 1962—enabled each superpower to see for itself whether the other was cheating.

The landmark 1972 SALT I Treaty, the most comprehensive yet, set ceilings for the first time on the numbers of Soviet and American intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. The 1972 ABM pact, negotiated in tandem with SALT I, sharply limited deployments of newly developed defensive antiballistic missiles. Talks were eased by the fact that the Soviets were nearing strategic parity with the United States; neither side had enormous advantages to preserve.

But during the mid-1970s, thanks in part to Soviet adventurism in the Third World, three treaties—the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and SALT II—failed to win the approval of the U.S. Senate.

Yet, despite today's chill in Soviet-American relations, the authors remain hopeful. Communication between the two sides is far more open than it was during the Cold War: Trade, tourism, and scholarly exchanges are firmly established. Regular talks on the implementation of existing treaties continue, and each

“Public Works Infrastructure: Policy Considerations for the 1980s.”

Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. 20402. 137 pp.

The collapse of an 100-foot bridge span on Interstate 95 in Greenwich, Connecticut, on June 28 merely highlighted what engineers have been saying for a decade: America's public works “infrastructure”—highways, mass transit, airports, air traffic control, dams and canals, sewage treatment plants, and municipal water supplies—is falling apart.

Yet the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that by shifting some federal subsidies, cutting others, and increasing user fees, Washington could not only repair the crumbling system, but reduce overall federal public works outlays as well.

Federal infrastructure spending now totals some \$24 billion a year, or four percent of all nondefense outlays.

But many of today's continuing public works programs “were designed [to reach] important goals that have now been met,” such as building irrigation systems to promote agriculture in the West. The CBO believes that by channeling more money to what might be called the “three R's” of infrastructure—repair, rehabilitation, and replacement—Washington could reduce its spending for the next seven years to an average of \$20 billion a year.

An example is the Interstate Highway system. Federal funding formulas (\$9 from Washington for every state and local dollar) still encourage states to build new roads, although only 1,700 miles of the 42,900 miles planned in 1956 remain to be built. The price tag for the new roads: \$36.3 billion. Meanwhile, 41 percent of the existing system needs major overhauls. By reducing its contribution to new Interstate construction and shifting the funds saved to the “three R's,” Washington could save \$1.3 billion an-

nually *and* get the repair job done.

The CBO's other remedies are more painful. One is ending all federal aid for airport construction, a saving of \$800 million annually.

Today, airlines pay their fair share of airport costs, but private and corporate aircraft do not. Higher fees for noncommercial fliers at congested airports would divert them to nearby underused fields, reducing new construction while also raising revenue for the remaining building needs.

According to the CBO, a similar strategy could cure the ills of the nation's major municipal water supply systems. Cities will need to raise roughly \$7 billion by 1990 to expand or repair their water systems. In Boston's antiquated system, for example, 43 percent of the city water escapes through leaks in the pipes.

The CBO's chief solution is simple: Double the cost to consumers. Water rates average \$1 per 1,000 gallons in the United States, less than half the Western European norm; per capita water consumption, 100 gallons per day, is about double the European rate. Raising fees would increase local revenues for repairs and encourage water conservation, thus reducing the need to enlarge existing systems.

Although the United States no longer needs to make massive investments in *new* public works, the CBO says, stressing the “three R's” will require more money. Investment in infrastructure by all levels of government dropped from 2.2 percent of the gross national product in 1960 to 1.3 percent in 1980. Given the yawning budget deficits in Washington's future—an estimated \$201 billion in 1984 alone—state and local governments and those using the facilities will have to pay more of the bill.

**"The Americas at a Crossroads:
Report of the Inter-American Dialogue."**

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20560. 63 pp. in English, Spanish, and Portuguese.

Even as democracy slowly returns to a few nations in Latin America, financial woes, war and chronic civil strife, and persistent poverty imperil further progress.

The Inter-American Dialogue's 47 participants, ranging from David Rockefeller to Xabier Gorostiaga of Nicaragua's Institute of Social and Economic Research, call the 1980s a time of "unusual danger and . . . special opportunity."

Topping the list of dangers is Latin America's debt crisis, notably in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica. Governments and businesses in the region now owe some \$300 billion to overseas creditors, up from just \$27 billion in 1970.

The group worries that the debt crisis may lead to neglect of Latin America's persistent social distress—up to two-thirds of its people still live in poverty. Forcing the indebted nations to defer critical domestic spending to meet their bills, it warns, "would only reinforce inequities and require repression."

The panel supports the Reagan administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative (\$350 million in economic aid, along with trade and investment incentives) but criticizes the White House for its emphasis on military aid. Washington should recognize that domestic problems, not simply communist intervention, have fostered civil strife in El Salvador and elsewhere.

Given Latin Americans' bitter memories of past U.S. intervention, the

panel argues, the Reagan administration should neither oppose "profound change" nor try directly to promote democratic institutions.

In Central America, Washington should back the effort begun by Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela with the 1982 Contadora Declaration to mediate among the contending parties, including Cuba as well as the governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Salvadoran elections, with the participation and safety of the insurgents guaranteed, should be a key goal.

A revitalized Organization of American States (OAS) could provide a forum for resolving future conflicts. To this end, the group favors empowering the OAS Secretary-General to intervene on his own initiative. In economic affairs, the OAS needs to coordinate the multitude of existing private and governmental aid programs for Latin America rather than simply to sponsor its own.

The military regimes that took power in many Latin American nations during the 1960s and '70s have proved unable to cope with today's economic difficulties, leaving the region at a political crossroads.

In recent years, democracy has been, more or less, restored in Bolivia (1982), Ecuador (1979), Honduras (1982), and Peru (1980). Brazil and Argentina have taken the first steps in that direction. But Latin America will have to get back on its feet financially to ensure further progress.