She argues that prevention of family breakup is "the most effective way" to end welfare dependency.

But further cuts in federal social spending and continued intransigence by social-welfare interest groups, she adds, only make meaningful welfare reform more difficult.

WILSON CENTER PAPERS

Summaries of key reports given at recent Wilson Center meetings

"The State and America's Higher Civil Service."

Paper by Hugh Heclo, presented at a Wilson Center conference sponsored by the Wilson Center's American Society and Politics Program, October 23–24, 1982. Michael J. Lacey, moderator

In Western Europe and Japan, powerful senior civil servants are a permanent feature of government. The United States, however, has no comparable "higher civil service."

Washington does have its French-style elite technocrats—in the U.S. Forest Service, the Justice Department's antitrust division. Parallels to the British administrative class can be found in the Foreign Service and the Office of Management and Budget.

Overseas, the higher civil service is rooted in a tradition of service dating back to the founding of the state, observes Heclo, a Harvard political scientist. The U.S. Constitution, by contrast, established no clear role for the nation's bureaucracy. The U.S. higher civil service is a conglomerate molded by external forces—personalities, politics, Congress.

President Carter's 1978 civil service reforms authorized creation of an 8,000-man Senior Executive Service. Unlike their European counterparts, relatively few of these Americans come from families devoted to public service (only nine percent had fathers in government service) or out of top-drawer families. And, unlike the Europeans, the U.S. *career* bureaucrats usually stay in one agency and one program and serve as administrators, not as policy or political advisers.

But the United States is developing a distinct class of politically appointed "public careerists" who shuttle from high posts as aides and assistant secretaries in the federal government to universities, "public policy" think tanks, law firms, and back to Washington again. Half of President Reagan's top political appointees in 1981 had more than five years of previous Washington experience.

Public careerists perform the dual political-administrative functions that elite bureaucrats do in other lands, but without enjoying an institutional identity. The system as a whole, Heclo says, lacks central control: While this makes it more representative of the population, it also opens the door to opportunism and outside political influence.

Neither Congress nor the Presidents want to rely on a European-style, nonpartisan, merit-based senior bureaucracy. What we have instead in Washington are the "strengths and dangers of a democratic technocracy."

"Germany's Role in Europe: Historical and Psychological Dimensions."

Paper by Renata Fritsch-Bournazel, presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Wilson Center's International Security Studies Program, August 31, 1982.

Along with German antinuclear demonstrations, Bonn's insistence on détente and on completion of the Siberian natural gas pipeline has roused fears in Washington that West Germany is moving away from the West. But Fritsch-Bournazel, Research Fellow at the Fondation Nationale des Sciènces Politiques in Paris, argues that Bonn's independence is a direct result of its strong Western ties.

Because of its vulnerable position in the middle of Europe, Germany traditionally looked both east and west. After the unification of Germany in 1871, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck arranged a series of alliances to keep Germany's neighbors from uniting against her. In 1922, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Moscow to preclude a West-Soviet pact.

Germany allied herself closely with the West only after World War II, when the Cold War posed a stark choice, Fritsch-Bournazel says. Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Bonn put aside hopes of reunifying East and West Germany and relied on Western military might as a counterweight to Moscow.

But the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 showed that the West was powerless to prevent the Soviets from working their will in Eastern Europe. And moves by John F. Kennedy and French President Charles de Gaulle to relax tensions with Moscow encouraged Bonn to reconsider its assumptions.

Ultimately, Washington led the way to détente beginning in the late 1960s, but without taking into account West Germany's interests—eventual reunification of the two Germanys and greater permeability of the borders between Eastern and Western Europe. In response, Bonn edged towards the traditional German *mitteleuropa* foreign policy stance.

But that change was possible only because West Germany's firm military and political ties to the Western alliance provided a hedge against Soviet power, Fritsch-Bournazel contends. Public opinion surveys show that more West Germans (74 percent) than French or Italians agree that it would be better to fight than accept Soviet domination. Eighty percent support continued NATO membership.

Bonn is not abandoning the Western alliance, she concludes, but building upon it to solve its unique problem.

"The Soldiers' Plebiscite: Soviet Power and the Committee Revolution at the Front, October–November, 1917."

Paper by Allan K. Wildman, presented at a colloquium sponsored by the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, October 1, 1982.

During the autumn of 1917, the reins of the Russian Revolution passed from Menshevik to more radical Bolshevik hands, leading ultimately to the Soviet state.

While Bolshevik intellectuals led by Lenin and Trotsky are usually credited with orchestrating the shift, Wildman, an Ohio State University historian, argues that the common foot soldiers of Russia's seven-million-man army swung the balance within the military

to the Bolshevik side.

After the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in March 1917, several revolutionary factions established a coalition government in Petrograd under Aleksandr Kerenski, dominated by the Mensheviks and their allies. It was that government's decision to launch a July 1 offensive against Germany and Austro-Hungary that proved to be the Mensheviks' undoing, Wildman says.

The troops grew mutinous at the prospect of a fourth bloody World War I campaign short of supplies and food. The concerns of the average peasant-soldier, Wildman notes, were limited to his *mir*, or world—his village, family, and farm. The revolution meant liberation from the tsar and his oppressive system; it did not mean continuing to fight a losing war involving privations too great to justify any gain the soldier could imagine.

The army committees, established after the overthrow of the tsar as organs of revolutionary democracy, were dominated by Mensheviks. Better-educated and more nationalistic than the peasants, they tended to represent the central leadership in Petrograd to the troops, rather than vice versa. Committee members and army officers generally supported the war effort and solidarity with England and France; they sought to impose discipline on the restive troops.

The Mensheviks blamed the soldiers' discontent on Bolshevik activists, whom they tried to purge. But the infantrymen, caring little about the ideological struggle between the two factions, concluded that the Mensheviks "had fallen into the role of enforcers of old regime discipline," Wildman notes. To them, he observes, the only sensible interpretation of the continuation of the war was that it "was being fought in the interests of the bourgeoisie and the *pomeshchiki* (landowners)," as the Bolsheviks claimed.

The Mensheviks realized too late that the source of the soldiers' discontent was the war, not Bolshevik agitators. A few of the army committees issued antiwar proclamations. But beginning in mid-October, the soldiers elected increasing numbers of Bolsheviks to the army committees.

By the time the Bolsheviks staged their successful coup against the Petrograd government on November 6, 1917, one Russian field army was firmly in their hands; the others offered little resistance.

The peasant-soldiers, Wildman concludes, did not see the change in Petrograd as a victory for the Bolsheviks but merely as a fulfillment of the revolutionary slogan, "Land and Peace." The radicals triumphed less as a result of their own careful planning than as a consequence of the Mensheviks' blindness.